First Published: Frontline, Vol. 6, No. 3, July 18, 1988.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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On the surface, the logic seems attractive: Jesse Jackson has mobilized a powerful Rainbow people’s movement behind his presidential candidacy. That movement must continue beyond the Democratic Convention, and must retain its independence from the untrustworthy leaders of the Democratic Party. But the Democratic power-brokers will prevent Jackson from winning the nomination and give the nod to Michael Dukakis instead. So a second presidential candidacy is needed – on an independent ticket – to put the Rainbow program before the voters in November and continue the momentum toward popular empowerment.
Under the slogan of “Two Roads Are Better Than One,” the New Alliance Party (NAP) has advanced the above approach as the winning strategy for progressives in 1988. And NAP offers one of its leaders, Lenora Fulani, as the standard-bearer of the “second road.” In Atlanta, NAP is calling for a “Four-Day Demonstration and People’s Rally” outside the Democratic Convention, billed as a “Tribute to Reverend Jesse Jackson” and a mass rally to say “Carry It On” to Lenora Fulani.
“Two Roads” is a neat formula – but like all quick-fix solutions to complex problems, the catchy slogan is far better than the political content.
First of all, there’s the problem that “Two Roads” comes wrapped in a misleading package and is offered for sale by a dishonest promoter. The supposedly decisive “Second Road” is totally bound up with the candidacy of Lenora Fulani, but the NAP is not prepared to conduct her campaign based mainly on Fulani’s own record and base of support. Rather, their principal tactic is to imply a direct connection between Fulani and Jesse Jackson. NAP sets up groups called the “Rainbow Alliance” and the “Rainbow Lobby” to give the impression of an association with Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition. Doctored photographs appear in NAP’s newspaper which purport to show Fulani and Jackson sharing a speaking platform –when in fact Jackson has never appeared on a podium with the New Alliance Party leader. Phrases such as the “Fulani/Jackson” approach fill NAP’s literature, implying that somehow Fulani’s campaign continues and has the approval of the Reverend’s effort. The truth is that Jackson and other leaders in both his campaign and the Rainbow Coalition have publicly disclaimed any relationship with NAP or its affiliates, and Rainbow leaders have criticized the NAP for what they see as deliberate attempts to exploit Jackson’s prestige for NAP’s own narrow concerns.
To find NAP engaged in such false advertising is no surprise: the organization has a long history of dealing fast and loose with both truth and political principle. NAP leaders have consistently covered up the nature and extent of their association with Lyndon LaRouche during the period when LaRouche’s organization – evolving in the direction of the neo-fascist cult itis today – launched a campaign of physical assaults against progressive and left groups. [NAP’s approach to organizing relies heavily on “Therapy Institutes” which promise “psychological counselling” but which actually provide the “advice” that involvement in NAP is the solution !to personal difficulties. Fulani’s predecessor as NAP’s presidential candidate – 1984 standard-bearer Dennis Serrette – has since broken all ties with NAP and denounced it as a “dangerous organization” which “lies outright” and uses its resources to “prey on Black communities, to attack Black leaders and institutions, and to assault progressive organizations at whim.”
Because of such damaging and dishonest practices, NAP’s political perspective is met with more suspicion than serious interest by the bulk of the people’s movement. But even if the “Two Roads” strategy were put forward without trickery and deceit, it would still deserve to be rejected by progressive activists.
“Two Roads” claims to offer a recipe for creating a powerful popular force in both the electoral and non-electoral arenas independent of the capitalist-controlled Democratic Party. This is a goal shared by broad layers of progressive activists, precisely because of the limitations imposed on the popular movement in the absence of its own vehicle for doing battle in the national political arena.
The Jesse Jackson campaign has provided a glimpse of the way a “Peace, Jobs and Justice” presidential candidacy can impact U.S. politics. At the same time, it illuminates just how determined those who control the Democratic Party are to suppress or buy off the movement Jackson leads. This combination produces wide-spread enthusiasm to keep the Rainbow momentum going, but also widespread frustration at the constraints of operating on Democratic Party terrain. NAP’s “Two Roads” strategy taps into that frustration and promises a route to make it go away.
If politics were as simple as making the right promises, NAP’s reasoning would be fine. The problem is that a strategy for building an independent people’s party must be based on more than agitation for this goal, articulation of a program and selection of a candidate. It must be based on a concrete assessment of the actual political level of the key social forces that must be drawn into such a party and a more-than-rhetorical proposal to bring unity between these forces about.
On this level, “Two Roads” comes up wanting. Jesse Jackson’s candidacy is not conducted within the Democratic Party because Jackson has arbitrarily decided to “choose” this course, and he could not establish a powerful independent party merely by “changing his mind.” The political reality which frames Jackson’s strategy is that the main sectors of his social base – the bulk of the Black community, the more progressive wing of organized labor, growing sectors in the Latino and other minority communities, the lesbian/gay community, the peace movement, etc. – are not yet ready to abandon the Democratic Party. They are critical of many of its policies and angry at its leaders’ rightward drift-but they have not yet come to the conclusion that leaving the party will advance their most vital and immediate interests. On the contrary, these broad forces believe that far more can be gained by fighting for influence within the Democratic Party.
Without a doubt, this level of consciousness reflects a number of illusions about the potential for transforming the Democratic Party into an expression of popular, working class interests. However, those illusions will not be shattered by slogans and agitation, no matter how creative, from the left. Rather, they will erode as a series of concrete political experiences demonstrate in practice that all options for progress inside the Democratic Party have been exhausted and that the only alternative is a new, independent party. The fight to maximize the influence of Jackson’s progressive program within the Democratic Party is a crucial one of those concrete experiences; it is a stage that cannot be skipped or circumvented, and it is a stage whose potential will not be exhausted even if Jackson does not achieve his maximum goals at the Atlanta convention. This is precisely the reason why Jackson, closely in touch with his base, is positioning himself to continue the fight within the Democratic Party after Atlanta rather than to lead a breakaway movement to form a third party.
Under these circumstances, the road to an independent people’s party lies through building the momentum behind Jackson, while simultaneously winning more and more activists to seeing the underlying clash of interests that at a moment of more intense class conflict and mass upheaval will make a break with the Democratic Party leadership necessary, This is the way to accumulate forces and train broad layers of the masses in the complex twists and turns of U.S. politics. It’s not an easy course, and there’s no question that it involves making numerous tactical compromises and putting up with a lot of frustration. But there are no short cuts in politics, and it’s the only course capable of bringing a serious independent party into being.