John Green

In general I found the situation in Japan far more factional than when I was there two years ago. Some indications: Sakai was not at all interested in talking and expounding his latest world view. I had only the most cursory conversations with him. The other CC members were not interested in talking even those who have a little English. It seems to me they have all been hardened up considerably. There was a lot of giggling even heckling while I was reporting on Portugal etc. This was a new feature thogh it might have been generated by there being 30 in one room all at once. Add to this Sakai's characterization of our positions as Kautskyite and Menshevik and you can get an idea of the situation. Also my impression of there approach to politics in Japan was more unreal and ultra left.

I talked briefly to Sakai and Rousset about what they had in Asia and their "Second Asian Youth Conference". About 35-40 attended this event, 2 Malaysians, some Koreans, 1 Chinese and not much more. The Malaysians, 1 from London, the other from Kuala Lumpur, were willing "to make a united front with us, that's all" according to Sakai. The Koreans I think were Japanese Koreans. Rousset had spent a month in Thailand but said we only had contacts there nothing much else and not much of that. Says he was also taking a holiday. But of course even this much was as a result of pumping.

The plenum was held in a ryokan near the seaside about 60 miles from Tokyo. About 30 attended, 2 of them women.

Firstly Sakai reported on the world movement. A document was available in the bulletin. The differences today were between those who supported peaceful revolution and those who supported violent revolution. An extreme conclusion but Hino will report. Our characterization of the stage of the international itself (a seperate report on Asia later) is in the context of the new political situation after the victory of the Vietnamese revolution. The world revolution has recovered after a long defeat; struggles for power in Asia and Europe are on h the order of the day. We have a chance for power because of the changed relationship of forces. Vietnam has defeated US imperialism and this is stimulating mass movements. The international revolutionary problem is to analyse each region, eg new rise of revolutionary struggles in Asia, new perspectives for political revolution in the workers states. Vietnam has led to a qualitative change. Therefore building the FI as a communist international taking over from the third international is becoming a practical task.

Chapter 2 of the document analyses the new development in the FI after 1968. 3 points to a balance sheet.

Those struggles that developed in the international based on the youth radicalization were in general spontaneous - no international leadership, an empirical approach from '68 to '74. We observed the uneveness between regions and sections. Asia to Europe, and France to Italy. In face of explosive struggles we could not build a centralized leadership. At the time of the radicalization Trotskyism was attractive but there was no systematic leadership.
Development of the situation in Latin America. A miserable situation. In Argentina the chance of a big explosion today. There still exists the possibility of building organs of dual power based on the working class. A big possibility in Latin America but our organisation is paralysed and so its a bad situation for the FI in LA. 'E need a clearer resolution on LA.

3) Divisions in the international itself between two factions became clear. For the $\frac{1}{2}$ years before the tenth world congress sections concentrated on interval divisions so groups found it hard to deal with their own country. The divisions are based on how we see the perspectives for revolutionary struggle internationally and what line we take to intervene. Present stage of the international: when we look around now we believe that its clear that in most of the imperialist countries and semi-colonial countries we observe the possibilities of the struggle for power. The exception is the United States.

In the Arab east the next stage will be determined by the coming out of **Arab**x Egyptian workers - Egypt is the center of all the Arab countries - a big proletariat. In the Indian sub-continent there is a big problem of leadership. Crisis is shown by Gandhi's declaration. The power of the proletariat was shown by the railway strike in '74. In SE asia after the fall of Saigon the situation is ripe for the struggle for power. The next stage in the Us is the **prol**etariat coming onto the stage so we should organise this sort of work in the US.

So it is clear that the struggle for power is rx the basic task our international is faced with in every area.

We work in SE asia because we are faced with the possibility of the struggle for power.

So the problem is how to unite the possibility of this struggle for power and how the FI leadership can oversee our work in each country. So must overcome the neglect apparent in the recent history of the FI since 1968. So we see the divisions between the IMT=/LTF reflected in the way the IMT is taking up the struggle for power in a practical sense, reflected by their organisational proposals on **kanu** how to build an international leadership. Therefore the JRCL has basically the same position as the IMT.

But the LTF political position is Federalist on the organisational question. They take the position of building propaganda groups in each country but already the task in each country is the taking of power. What will come of this is a neutral attitude towards struggles. A Monshevik position in Argentina or in Portugal.

On Portugal the IMT takes the position that the traditional military structure in Portugal is broken up and this has started the proletarian struggle. Revolution is on the agenda and the problem is how to build dual **pass** power in Portugal. ... The SP represents the democratic tendency in Portugal and is the hope of the international bourgeoisie. The LTF supports the SP and has a stages theory: 1- Democracy, 2) Revolution. Lenin argued against this in his April theses. Its a Menshevik attitude which refuses to struggle for power. How to overcome this and rebuik Bolshevik Leninism is the basic problem for the FI.

Conclusion: Division should be overcome on the political level. I make the following proposals. Obtain political homogeneity not administrative unity. ... 2 tasks; Japan is a little belated compared to the west European situations which are all advancing in the struggle for power. An international program is needed for the FI. By preparing documents for each region we could prepare

political unity again.

On the organisational question of the international. We have to strengthen the Fi leadership. Its a pity that leadership is based only on European sections. We should support their activities more. Inprecor is a step forward. We should send our comrades to gatherings. We should organise a regional leadership in each area, coordinate regional activities. Need a west European bureau. Have to overcome uneveness in the development of the international. is nothing in Thailand and Malaysia. India: a big lack - a big blank in the Asian area for Trotskyism. The majority of the population in the area but no Trotskyists there. Of course there is a big base in Ceylon but this is isolated.

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Rousset reported next:

Must set the framework of the stage of development of the international and our tasks. I wont concentrate on any one aspect but give an overall appreciation.

The new period is due to the end of the economic boom and the opening of a new wave of class struggles. Its not a regional upsurge but has worldwide repercussions. Its a new actuality to overall world dialectic of revolution - it means that tangentially it ends the period where revolutions were isolated. Its a tendency not a fact i insist. In this framework a new political generation appeared internationally. Its a big opportunity for us as we are the only organisation that can pose in the international class struggle with a central point of view.

Its not easy to fill this potential and we are convinced that this needs a big transformation of the Fi and its sections. So we have to understand the stage of development in this framework.

We can say that while we have ruptured with the previous propaganda period we are only at the very beginning of the transformation of the international.

The first stage was the 7th & 8th world congresses. We saw the regroupment of the healthy Trotskyist currents from the lessons of the colonial revolution. 9th & 10th congresses saw the beginning of the transformation but only the karginng beginning and with big waknesses.

Firstly we saw a big extension of the FI to new countries.

Secondly a number of sections began their own transformation with a fusion between old and new Trotskyist generations. We can see now that the big majority of sections are in this sense new sections. ...

That Bakai said about the nature of our political development in this period is very important: it was spontaneous, pushed by new layers. But the limits of this spontaneism are evident.

Exx & 4 Problems at the time of the 10th world congress. 1) Essentially the stage of the natural extension of the FI was finished. For new countries we needed a policy is for SE Asia where there is no tradition of -Trate

Trotskyism. Also in Eastern Europe it wont be spontaneous. 2) Also needed more centralization in order to have a policy of extension finance for cadres etc. Had to have a campaign not in the framework of the '60s student movement but to appear as an international to the world and against all the varieties of centrism. 3) We needed a political and programmatic centralization much more than before to obtain homogeneity. We had to break the too unilateral empiricist way of elaborating the line (there are good aspects to empiricism too ha ha). 4) Had to overcome uneven development regionally and because most of us were young leaders.

The key task after the tenth world congress was to pass from spontaneous organic growth to lead a conscious growth of the FI. This implied two central things which were given as a mandate to the new US by the FI congress: 1) A new type of centralization

2) Turn towards external work mainly and thereby overcome previous stage of propaganda.

How far have we come:

We built a center, previous centers had **Xix** Ernest in Brussells, Livio in home, Pierre in Paris, Hansen in New York and two days every six weeks there were meetings in Brussells. Such a center can hardly answer the needs of a propaganda international but in our stage it is now finished. So first we built a center of 5-7 leading cadres in one town and 3-4 other comrades. Thats progress but limited.

On the level of organisational centralisation we have got better in Europe. For the first time in a few years we took some regional initiatives on Chile, army work, workers control. Its been a 50-50 success and failure.

On Portugal we did more than we over did before . We sent a lot of money and there have been 15-20 trips by USFI members and many others. We gave political help to a young section. We built a European network to help them but due to the importance of Portugal today it was still insufficient. But we couldnt do more.

On an international scale we have made progress in strengthening the links between the center and the non-European groups but only a little progress.

But the key point id the political centralization, ie Inprecor is the first bi-monthly officialorgan of the FI published in 4 languages.

But a big failure has been the internal bulletin.

Today the emphasis is on the cadre school: a few members of the PBs of many sections, to develop programmatic abilities ofmembers of the PBs - very few play this role now. This summer we had the first trial run but next year will be the first school proper.

But behind all this progress there is one qualitative change on which Sakai insisted: that now we are engaged in experiences like the Portuguese one that allow us a full discussion on the question of power in the program. So its the

first experience of the new leaders of the sections of this type. This makes a cadre school so important because we have something to say that maintain is qualitatively different from ever before.

But the uneven development is still a big factor and there are three regions where our regional development policy is very concrete: 1) Europe, we must combine regional development and developing the center. 2) East Asia because of the possibility of the Japanese section doing regional work. 3) In the Arab East because of the nature of the problem and the capacities

of the Lebanese group.

But for a number of reasons our work is very weak. So extension of our work is slower. There has been some progress in our East European work with publications in 5-6 languages and stability in the work. But the period of quick development is ended and we have to have a policy over years to penetrate countries where there is no tradition.

But behind this change **inxthe** its a question of understanding the real stage of the development of the Fourth International and its sections. Building the FI is and was a big task. The transformation of the FI depends largely on the transformation of each of its sections, ie in East Asia it depends on the Japanese section so will depend on the stage of the Jap. s ection itself. Take the semi=falure of the workers conference in Europe - a similar problem- not only bad preparations but also because our gegree of implantation in factories is too weak. We wanted to gather cadres of key struggles i.e Plaget not just FI cadre. Among these types of vanguard workers there is a lot of interest in regional limks but in fact we were not ready yet to gather Plaget from Lip, dockers from Scotland etc So we took to other initiatives. We organized one or two workers meetings in a section of industry such as auto and after this we can organise a wider conference. 2) Through an agreement with Lotta Continua we are preparing to have a European wide discussion with far left organisations with us appearing as a unified

central current. We want to impose a full discussion with all the centrist currents that exist in Europe.

The weakness of the centre is now largely the weakness of the European sections. More people are needed in the centre to link up with the sections which also carry out some tasks. In principle, we should divide the centre and the European bureau but that is impossible, even today. It is difficult to supply the leaders because all the leaderships are in a difficult equilibrium. Even if you take the French, we are in a difficult phase because now we passafrom a groupuscule to a nationwide political current but now we have to make an implantation in the factories. But it's a big, big difficult stage which shakes us a lot. So today we cannot hope for qualitatively better involvement in **xxx** building the centre like this. So a key battle is still strengthening the centre. Also one function of the cadre school will be to widen the leadership base at the centre and section level.

International discussion

In the same framework we have to try to understand the nature of the intl dis zero cussion. The reunification was based on new developments in the codonial revolution.

Today the intl discussion is based on two different understandings of the two the nature of the period and the tasks we face. The Tenth World Congress document of the LTF is very clear: the refusal of the analysis of the period as the opening of short-term confrontations; the definition of the stage of the international as propagandistic as a whole; the refusal to understans that the FI passes through a transformation, for instance the YSA convention of 1972 had the slogan "More of the same".

But now we have reached the gravest stage. From here on it is largely a personal report. I have been out of Europe for two months and have had no report on the SWP convention and its implications. Three points will show the gravity. L. The degree of crystallisation between the IMT and the SWP leadership. (Jim can report but apparently the political homogeneity of the LTF is broken.) This crystallisation is new. There are three examples. 1) The reunification itself implied there was no crystallised difference. 2) Between the 9th and 10th WC I think we can say the majority has made a consistent shift on Latin American questions. The LTF thinks there has been no real change. But we say there was a change between the subjectivist approach and the programmatic approach in LA. 3) What has developed now on the side of the leadership of the SWP is new, at least in its own history-I don't say there's no links - but still there's important new aspects. Now it seems that concrete historical experience can hardly change positions and that's bad. In the discussion on Europe we were accused of adventurism but Portugal shows a revolution in progress and the SWP position does not change.

The PST has changed its analyses they call it "a major pre-revolutionary situation" At the United Sec. the PST representative voted against both resolutions. The SWP resolution was presented in the name of Gus and not in the name of the LTF.

2) The PST representative has made a little self criticism on the Argentine case. They admit they were wrong at the time of the IEC to think that the fascist threats were coming from outside the government. In fact the threats were coming from inside the govt itself. But in spite of this there has not been any reassessment of t the document presented at the last IEC. Another example, Vietnam. Two divergent global analyses on Vietnam; them- the prognosis first setback will lead to further setbacks. Us- an advance, will lead to a better situation. Now its full vicory all the previous analyses are still maintained unless changed by the SWP convention. The Portugal example. There is a big divergence in analysing the flature of the SP leadership offensive. Now it is clear that this leadership offensive was backed by reactionary forces in Portugal. But if I can read IP there is no change from all the previous analysis. So here is the first and gravest divergence within the International. For us the main task is the self-organisation of the masses around which we organise the rest of the policy. Forthe leadership of the SWP (the PST was on a different course two months ago) the line is the main danger is the military dictatorship so the main task is the defence of democratic rights. This led to the participant characterisation of the policy of strengthening grass roots organisations as anarchist, ultraleftist, populist etc

So the nature and the implication and the divergences in a concrete situation such as Portugal are very grave. To speak crudely, in the early sixties each new revolutionary process threw us together. Today each new process divides us. This is obviously a grave situation.

3) Organisational implications. At the time of the IEC there was a dual phenomena. On the one hand the divergences deepened, around the second document of the PST. But organisational agreements on the better functioning of the International were reached. We applied our clause in the agreement that more integration of the SWP in the ldadership, PST present at USFM meetings. Well - on the side of the LTF I think that the agreement was not applied. With the exception of the NZ group no dues have been paid by the LTF. The reintegration of the IT was not carried out. We can argue about words buythe substanceof the IEC was clear, the IT was to be feintegrated.

There have been two bad developments since. The invitation of Lambert to the SWP convention-we learned of the invitation by letters sent to the USFI and not to the French leadership. We were very upset. The game of the OCI is to play a role in the split in the FI- they say so openly. So we sent a letter to the SWP leadership to ask them to withdraw and to say that if Lambert goes we cannot go. $\not L$

Last point. The policy of **inexi** IP towards Portugal. There were resolutions adopted by USFI and a line of the OCI and in spite of this **YP** put a different line. This obliged Ernest, Livio and Pierre as three of the editors to send a long letter on the practice of the **D**CI. So that the degree of crisis is very great. So we have to insist on two aspects. We have to find organisational agreement but those past have been broken by LTF policy. But the problem is essentially political- on this I agree with Sakai- and here a solution in the middle-term can be found.

A solution is not a further discussion but the maintenance of external work. Today we have real opportunities, at least in certain regions of the world. In Europe we have big potential if we are able to appear as a European current and answer the big political questions arising.

We have seen the question of the common agreement of the LCI whose effect was bad. The Attempt of the LCI was to answer with a united front initiative to the rightwing offensive in Portugal but for this they signed & document closer to the line of the CP. Not because they were convinced of the content but because they thought they had to make a compromise. It was a compromising compromise. But this is very symptomatic of the situation in which we find ourselves. It's the first time we have the possibilities of a situation like Portugal for our generation at least. It's the first situation but there will be more later and ultra-left errors will exist. Here the International will be decisive to avoid that. Also today the level of activities required becomes very important, i.e., those condemned to death in Spain.Urgent tasks will increase. Here we will be judged not by what we write but by what we do.

The relationship of forces is not so good- in France we are the biggest, in Spain among the biggest, in Switzerland and Luxemburg we're the biggest. GB, Italy etc etc Country by country the Maoists and the centrists are bigger than us. We have two advantages 1)programmatic and 2) we exist as the only homogeneous current on a European scale. If we use those strengths practically our perspectives are good. But if we don't make a policy of maintaining a centralisation of our external work we will be set back. Regions like the three mentioned above we have good possibilities in the middle-term. But it requires a policy carried out over years otherwise no possibilities. If we want

to reorganise in LA, if it looks like the working class is on the rise- all this will need continuous, solid external work. We can characterise the crisis as a crisis of growth. If we want to solve it it can't be a crisis of decline.

There are bis opportunities for regional development and this might provoke expansion of explosion. Links between Europe and SE Asia are very good in this framework. But if we look at the exchange of documents it is very weak. It's mainly an oral tradition. It would be very important to have a written article for Inprecor. We must strengthen there links or else we build on sand and not rock.

Conclusion

Three main tasks 1) to continue to put a big emphasis on centralisation of the International and to put an emphasis on this intervention towards external work. 2) The policy of building cadres and regular exchange 3) to create the conditions for a full clarification of the nature of the differences in the FI today. This is one one element of building the FI today and in this framework we can have it out and allow the development of the International.

At this point I gave my report on Portugal concentrating on the points raised in Barry's report to the convention and attacking the MMF IP document and taking up initially some of the points Sakai had made about Portugal and his position of the stage of the FI being the struggle for power. I think I made some telling points that worried them in the context of the LCI error in the signing of the joint datatement. At least Hino who was to report the next morning seemed a little worried and went up to Rousset afterwards to get some points to strengthen his own report. The next morning Hino reported. I have less thorough noted on this but it was a rather short talk and not a very good one, even from their point of view. Sakai had to make a long intervention after it before they felt happy.

Hino:

There are three characteristics of the Portuguese revolution. 1) The collapse of the colonial wars led to the collapse of the Caetano dictatorship which led to a big working class upsurge. 2) Portugal is directly linked to European-scale perspectives and the European bourgeoisie is trying hard to organise a reactionary offensive and this especially linked to Spain. 3) A new discussion on the nature of the revolution has begun i.e., a new discussion on the nature of the dictatoship of the proletariat... Stalinists are divided on the nature of the revolutionary crisis... so international Communist movement is faced with all the problems in Portugal.

My view of the MFA

Spinola's coup d'etat was prepared by American imperialism trying to introduce a neo=colonial solution so Spinola emerged. Politicisation first began in the MFA because of the colonial wars. The army is elitist and the Portuguese military wanted to transform the Potuguese army into a mass army. The MFA was a substitution

for a mass polarisation. The polarisation was brought back from the colonies by the MFA.

There is a pre-revolutionary situation in Portugal. In the initiative against the Sept 14 coup led by the working class the bourgeoisie was forced onto the defensive, and agains in March this year. The bourgeoisie had found that concessions had failed. The MFE managed to solve the problem by form of the Constituent Assembly... Copcon document calls for people-MFA alliance but there's no talk of rank-and-file soldiers' committees. The

The Antunes document: the agrement between Antunes wing and European reactionaries was shown by victory of Antunes cabinet.

MFA is an officers' mevement. Now there's a new phenomenon - a rank-and-file mevement beginning among soldiers especially in the colonies. The MFA is faced with the difficulty of getting the rank-and-file to obey the officers and this leads to the MFA's line of trying to reconstruct Portugal as part of the European bourgeois states... ... Discussion of the peasantry. In essence thePort. situation is a prerevolutionary situation and the struggle for power is already on the agenda. Dual power is being organised and the possibility is **buing** open for victory.

Peoples committees are influenced by the MFA but are not instruments of the MFA.

Internal differences

Republica affair. To say that this is a question of defending workers democracy against the MFA is false.

The problem of the SP. The SP and submits to the framework of the MFA. The SP says the MFA should take this line or t at line etc therefore it is in the framework.

We need to clarify the question of workers control. Whether we worry about the question of workers control or whether we worry about which worker is in which party.

The MFA has mobilised the Constituent Assembly. The elections were organised by the MFA so we should ignore them. The MFA has taken the initiative to organise soviets. In Russia the Mensheviks were a majority but we said all power to the soviets. The problem is clear. The international bourgeoisie and U^S imperialism is trying to organise the MFA power in that framework. The problem is whether we gather round the SP and the international bourgeoisie or some other framework on the other side of the barricades.

The IMT has always been clear on the character of the MFA. It's clear that they are saying that the working class should organise a struggle independent of the MFA so Jim's criticism is nor correct. i.e., Mandel's document is not talking about organising the MFA over to our side but by organising the rank-and-file there is some chance of getting a split.

Sakai spoke next on Portugal:

It's a very simple principle relating to Constituent Assemblies and soviets. Are they contradictory or not? We're not really talking about the CA but bourgeois democracy and soviets ... When we think of Leninist principles we think of the April Theses. The emphasis in the Theses was on proletarian dictatirship not bourgeois democracy. We must arm the proletariat openly. We are antagonistic to all the bourgeois democratic ideas. The proletariat must take all the power... so transitional slogans seem to be democratic slogans but these slogans can only be solved by proletarian dictatorship so the problem of power is posed. Jim criticised this point but the LTF still said there was a prerevolutionary situation in Portugal so clarify this. Since we say a prerevolutionary situation exists the EPD was correct.

One thing on the question of workers control.. Soviets cannot automatically become the power of the proletariat. They can be dominated by reformists. In Germany the soviets were ofganised by social democrats but what is important is what solutions we shouls draw. Democracy was not the conclusion but to take power. (Discussion of the Bolsheviks in 1917 ...)

We should mechanically oppose the C^A to soviets. The We agree and so does the IMT. It's true that Lenin organised the a CA but only in order to dissolve it. Lenin dissolved it - it was Kautsky who was opposed to dissolving it.

The SP refleceted a reactionary point of view in the interests of the Em bourgeoisie. So Jim has proposed in principle a mechanistic view. So the problem is violent revolution or not.

The problem of democracy is posed in a concrete way and Jim is taking up the problem abstractly i.e., the quote he read by Trotsky on China. Jim does not explain the concircte situation where he proposed this solution i.e., in China in 1927 the problem was how to defend from defeat but before 1927 Trotsky proposed soviets. Jim's position was the position of Stalin. Again on the Spanish situation, he didn't explain the political context. At that time the Spanish Revolution was about to begin and we have to consider the concrete political context. In that sense Cde Jim's view is in principle a two-stage theory of revolution. As Hino said, the initiative for the breakthrough was taken by the MFA. The Portuguese working class has big illusions in the MFA and as Jim says big problems exist here. How to break these illusions is the essence of the problem. In Russia after the February revolution the initiative was with the SRs and the Mensheviks. The problem of winning the masses was a big problem for the Bolshevike - how to break their illusions. Lenin did not make this breakthrough by way of democracy. Lenin's position was how to organise the independent activity of the working class and this cannot be done by the slogan of the CP/ SP government. In the present situation the slogan of the CA cannot break the masses from illusions in the MFA. If there is a prerevolutionary situation the working class should organise the working class to arm themselves to take power. The problem is that the masses are already organising themselves in their own initiatives and so on. We should organise our own organs etc

The Kautskyist position should be remembered in regard to the LTF position. On the problem of Republica it is very clear. The SP reflects the international

bourgeoisie's **maximum Agents and** interest in repressing the independent activity of the masses. So which side we have to take is very clear. Which side of the barricades? The LTF position is clearly a Menshevik position.

A question from the floor was directed to me regarding the PST's position on Portugal. I then had the chance to speak in discussion and made another intervention on Portugal where I took up Sakai's and Hino's points.

Rousset then made a contribution on Portugal: In discussions with the PST in June there was deep divergence between the PST and the SWP. The PST said there was a prerevolutionary situation in Portugal and the SWP said there wasn't and that the main threat was the military dictatorship. If anything, on theMFA the PST was too open in its attitude whereas the SWP said the key question was an analysis of the MFA.

It's not good to take things out of context from Rouge etc. We need to argue on the central documents.i.e., the Couthino interview in Rouge doesn't mean anything. It's clear that we've made our attitude to Couthino clear to the readers of Rouge.

Because we agree on the prerevolutionary situation, the logic is clear of the differing positions. For the LTF socialism is built by the extension of democracy. The key question of power is avoided. No distinction is made between the state and the government. Jim's approach is summarised in the following way. We must defend democratic rights and defend the Constituent Assembly. We must defend the right of the CA to form a government and not the MFA and committees around this **demax** demand can become the basis of soviets.

Our approach is completely different. We don't raise the slogan of the dissolution of the CA but stress that the CA is a bourgeois institution. Workers parties in it doesn't change the situation. We have to explain that it's a bourgeois institution and that no workers power can come from it. It's very grave to see the GA elections as the sole democratic expression of the masses in Portugal. Many committees are growing not controlled by the MFA. Centralisation of all these forms of working class power is the necessary next step. In the south we now see the first examples of these committees in the peasantry. These committees are both in opposition to the MFA and the CA. We put forward the slogan of a workers government and a national assembly of all worgers committees. But theSP and the CP don't want that. Now not even the CP is putting this line. Soldiers are beginning to mobilise against the MFA and there are now **barranexs** examples of barracks training the workers in their districts. In Jim's talk the question of workers self-defence was not mentioned.

The question of the united front to overcome the division of the working class is the main problem. The SP leadership has launched a criminal offensive....

If you recognise the right of the CA you have to recognise the right of the CA to suppress workers organisations.

In Angola we call for withdrawal and urge the soldiers to give their arms to the

MPLA. The FLNA is the main weapon of imperialism in Angola today.

The discussion is clear now. We organise all our policy around one major goal the extension of soviets. For the minority, by definition the extension of democracy is an advance of the socialist process. This position evades one key question- that of power itself in the context of a heated class struggle.

Sakai then spoke again on what was called the summary on Portugal: I think the characterisation of the differences was confirmed from our point of view. It confirms that the problem in Portugal is how to organise the struggle for power. One position is a Menshevik-type position... it's argued that there's no authoritative revolutionary party in Portugal today. There was no revolutionary party in Vietnam therefore from that position no revolution took place there... Jim's view is a one-stage revolution theory but its a theory that only carries out the democratic stage... Finally on the question of Angola and the problem of anti-imperialism. When Japan invaded China the chairman of the JCP organised a struggle against the Japanese imperialist armies. If Japanese soldiers joined the Chinese Red Army, should we have discouraged them? We propose two things to this central committee meeting on Portugal. In World Revolution there is a resolution of the USFI on the unity agreement. We propose a motion of support for the USFI statement on the August 25 accord. Secondly, we instruct the Political Bureau to draft up the positions of the JRCL and submit it to the international discussion.

Since the debate had concentrated entirely on Portugal, they felt they hadn't had enough time to discuss the latest scandals and put me through the hoops on these. So they extended the session and **Reveret spoke** I spoke on the issues and then Rousset spoke again.

Rousset:

There are three main organisational issues: Lambert, dues and IT. Firstly on the IT. The SWP leadership has taken two major steps which have a political meaning. The tenth WC resolution stated there would be no expulsions. But it expelled the IT and broke boths the SWP statutes and the International statutes. There was no chance for a defence by those expelled and the IEC meeting condemned the expulsions. The SWP recognised that the members of the IT were still members of the FI but the since that time the SWP has played a very bad role. They've been manoeuvring and playing with these comrades.

With Lambert it is an entirely different story from the one Jim told. **The** It was an SWP idea in the first place. We don't trust these Lambertists any more. All we agreed to was to exchange bulletins. It's a political question with political implications. I don't know what right now (Rousset was very upset and implied that Eddie had misled the French leadership at the US meeting and put on a very naive act saying that he didn't realise that the French leadership would be upset so that the SWP in these circumstances would have to consider thematter again.)

On the question of dues. We've had hours of discussion on this question and it is true that the SWP pays no dues because of the Voorhis Act. They send no bank notes to Brussells. But when we were banned in France we couldn't either but French bank noted arrived in Brussells anyway.

We agree that the SWP takes some financial moves on its own and we agree to **manni** consider this as the moral equivalent of dues if it be agreed by the US collectively what to spend it on. The statutes are clear on this question. We must have 16 per cent on income as dues as a minimum and of course these dues are under the authority of the leading body. On the form we can come to an agreement but on the substance we insist - that we spend the money on projects decided by the USFI. We thought this question was to be solved...

Two things flow from all these political decisions. 1) conception of the International. It's not a matter of Pablo's practice but **axests** the right of the USFI to exist as a leadership body with a majority line as elected by the congress. 2) It has obvious significance for the International faction fight.

Rousset made some other points. He was upset that I characterised the MMF dat document as a laundered document and that the real **im** line could be seen in the press of the sections in Europe. He also took up Vietnam again and thirdly he ta took up again the question of power: when we say that power is not posed bere because we are small we come back to the tenth WC discussion. Even a revolutionary situation can occur when a revolutionary party is small or does not exist. The emergence of a new situation like this implies in a big difference in the type of tasks. The LCI must say that the question of power is posed. It's the only solution if you want to win. All we say is that the problem that the working class is facing today is the problem of the revolution. That's the heart of the tenth WC resolution. On the question of defence of democrady. You are defending not just democratic rights but state institutions. We give no defence to democratic state institutions. We say no we don't fight for the same things. We wanted a soviet republic in Spain, it's very clear. This brings up exactly back to the Argentine discussion. There is no military dictatorship in Portugal today. We are very clear on that. I would prefer to live in Portugal than in France.

Portugal opened a new stage in the discussion. We must link it up to an overall discussion of democracy.

Sakai then summarised the discussion:

We agree with comfade Roman on Lambert. On the IT that an article in the statutes says that each member has a right to appeal to the highest body of the Interm national. So comrade Jim's argument violates our International statutes. So at the last IEC meeting it was agreed that the IT comrades were a part of the International and it was unanimously agreed. So we think that the agreement was not carried out. On fincance we think that Jim's argument on dues is less than the federalist concept of the International. Such arguments are acts to destroy the International In the case of the Japanese section, we now pay for Japanese IEC members' trips to Europe plus our dues. Who is fighting for an International has been confirmed by comrade Jim so now we are losing the common base as the FI, namely our statutes. We must be ready to draw any necessary conclusions because we must be prepred to build the FI.

Finally I would make thank comrades Roman and Jim for helping us to clarify the problems facing the FI.

The next session of the plenum by Kihara on the coming congress of the section. I have some notes on Kihara's report but they were not very clear so I will go over them quickly:

We postponed the conference because we did not produce documents quick enough and one regional committee proposed a postponement and then the Tokyo committee agreed so the Political Samuitian Bureau agreed too. Samantapaints

Aim of the coming congress:R

After the victory of the Viet. Revolution there is a new intl balance of frcess and the intl situation is moving beyond simply the youth radicalisation. So now the question of power is being posed. The Asian-wide class struggle is entering a stage where we must prepare for the final victory. So the coming congress should grasp this aspect of the situation in East Asia. And this situation poses the problem of building the FI in our region.

Kihara then discussed the different turns they had made at different times, the problem of penetrating the mass movement and the sorts of documents they needed for **the** their congress. They needed four documents on the intl situation; on the political situation and our tasks; theses on tactics in the immediate future and lastly a organisational document including a change in their statutes. There wasa lot of talk about different balance sheets that were good, bad or had to be rewritten He set three fundamental tasks. L) work to build a strong anti-imperialist struggle of the South Korean and Japanese masses against the US, Japanese and South Korean regimes 2) Economic and social struggles in the current stagnant situation so big struggles will loom here.3) The struggles of workers on economic issues must be unified in a single struggle against bourgeois government.

There was discussion then from the floor with a representative of each district or prefecture giving their impression. Unfortunately, at thes point translation became almost non-existant. Muraki had to go back to Tokyo and Sakai was exhausted. However, it seemed clear that virtually every district had some criticism of the documents presented or of the past performance of the section. I could in no way determine what the thrust of the criticisms were and are and are or whether there were any unifying threads in them but it seemed as if the documents were offering no real guidelines for what to do in Japan.

I stuck this for a couple of hours and then went to bed. Rousset told me later that the translation for the final two hours got even worse. Sakai told me the next morning that no better translation could be expected that day so I decided to go back to Tokyo and leave that afternoon for Hong Kong and save a day. Some other random facts. Sakai says they have 330 members in the JRCL and about 1000 in their youth organisation with a total tendency membership of 1100-1200. Furthermore, apparently Nishi has written a letter to the or about the Kakamaru agreeing with them on some question or other. I didn't find out any more.