## THE IS IN THE SAULC WSK! CAMPAIGN

Cur political line of critical support for Sadiowski is already established. The purpose of this paper is to develop a perspective for the implementation of that political line in practice.
According to the best information we have at this time, there has been a cantroversy within the sadiowski brass on how the campaign should be run, between Rauh's people and Clem Balinoff - and Balinoff has won. It means the campaign will be run under the banner of 'Steel Workers Fightback" at least in District 31 and in the Pittsburgh area. How it will or can be run applied in other areas is not yet at all clear.

The decision to run the campaign through fightback seems to mean a looser campaign structure, less under Sadlowski's cirect control. It also seems to be a decision legitimating organizing on more than a narrow electoral basis leaving open the possibility of campaign organizations raising or their own issues and participating in their own activities.

In District 31, fightback will be under the control of Clem Balinoff. In the Pirtsburgh area, it will be run by Coyne and Tenco. Sudlowski's main man in Youngstown will be Weinstock (unclear whether he will be organizing as fightback or not). There is also an operation in Buffalo.

The final shape and direction of the campaign, and particularly of the campaign organizations seem to be not at all determined yet. Major campaign decisions will be made by Sadlowski personallynot by any steering committee or national campaign director. In the various districts and/or geographic regions, manchises are being given out to individuals or small groups to run the campaign there. The franchise holders will probably be given broad lattitude on how to run the campaign in their areas. How light they will be able to hold the reigns is not yet at all clear.

Regional franchise holders will be under pressure to run their campaigns in a way that is consistant with the "overal@hational.campaign. They will be forced to work in the framework of the national campaign decisions made by Sudlowski. But, for example, if Palinoff allows a wide open movement type campaign in 31. this will make it harder for Coyne to keep tight reigns in Pittsburgh, etc. Any initiative from below that succeeds in one area can help open things up in other areas as well.

Inside the Districts or geographic regions, there will be two pressures. One will be from the staff men and local bureaucrats supporting Sadlowski who will insist the campaign be run with the maximum of bureaucratism and the minimum ob politics. So long as it seems to the franchise holders that these people have the most calistic potential of delivering votes; their pressure will tend to predominate.

The other pressure will come from rank and file campaign activists and from office holders who feel the need to build up membership enthusiasm for the campaign and mobilize rank and file support. These forces will press for a losser, more open, more movement type campaign. They will have influence to the degree that they can demonstrate that if things are opened up, they will be able to build, in a practical sense, increased support and involvement in the campaign.

3. Inside the Sodlowski campaign, we orient toward the maximizing the importance of mill or Local Union fight back groups - and maximizing their autonomous character and their involvement in issues and activities beyond mere electoral campaigning. Given our small and weak forces in

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steel, our influence in shaping the overall direction of the campaign will be only marginal. But the extent to which we can, in fact, influence the campaign and win respect and recognition for ourselves will be the extent that we can show that our methods yield practical results, and that we are people who do, in fact make a real contribution to the overall campaign. Where we have members, and where no mill of local fightback organization yet exists, we should be prepared to take initiatives in helping set the fightback up - and we should move quickly. Where the local initiative is already in the hands of others, we should join the local campaign organization.

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e ei na Inside the campaign, our first priority is to establish work in our own mills and locals. This is where we can derive the most benefits from our work, and this is the only way we could establish the credibility to have wider influence. In terms of influenceing the campaign with our good ideas, Sadlowski and his leutenants are already surrounded by all kinds of people who claim to have good ideas. Establishing good local work makes it possible to influence people in other locals to follow our lead and to come onder our influence.

It is our perspective to work for local fightback groups that are more than merely electoral campaign organizations. We want them to become involved in the day to day issues of their mill and of their locals, and to deal with the broader issues facing the union in a political way. We would like to have mill or local fightback committees publish regular mill newsletters that both campaign for the Sddlowski ticket and give a lead on immediate mill problems. In each mill, it should be our perspective to fold our existing work into the fightback movement. But this must be done with care – both so that we can carry people with us, and so that we can be sure that it won't lead merely to the liquidation of what we already have. Where Sadlowski people succe already to ntrol the local, it may not be possible to carry this approach out.

4. In both Gary and Pittsburgh, our comrades have been able to step into a vacuum created by a large influx of women into the mills. Women face property numerous problems. Neither management not the union are experienced in passifying and controling the women. In this wreas, it has been easiest for revolutionaries to give a lead.

Our comrades should put special attention on organizing for fightback to stand up for women workers and for women workers to see building fightback as a way of increasing their power in dealing with their special problems. In this way we can bring women into fightback and be their leaders within fightback. Our women comrades who succeed in their own mills, will then be able to develop recognition as women leaders in fightback on a district or regional level. This can be used as an opening to other mills and locals, and particularly to women in these other mills.

5. We want our comrades to put very high premium on being openly associated with WP and the IS. We should publish a WP pamphlet directed to steelworkers. This pamphlet should spell out why we support Sadlowski and fightback, and the potential significance of the campaign. It should honestly analyse and criticise Sadlowski and his program in the framework of critical support. But mainly, it should be a program for fightback, It should lay out how we think fightback should be organized and built, and how we think fightback should take up the issues facing steelworkers. Its program is to make fightback a rank and file based, fighting movement,

It should discuss the ENA and the need not only to oppose it, but to smash it. It should deal with ENA not as an isolated issue, but as the highest expression of management/union collaboration on every level – and should project the fight against ENA as part of the fight against this collaboration on every level. 12 GI Mark and 2. 1 B C - - - -

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The general line of the pamphlet should be that Sadlowski will be no better than the movement that is built. It is our job, not only to get him elected, but to keep him honest. In fact, the main significance of a Sadlowski campaign and a Sadlowski victory is the opportunity to build a powerful movement of the rank and file in steel.

de sint Central to our involvement in the campaign is to sell the pamphlet and to sell WP. It will require ongoing coverage in WP of the campaign and our line on it. We should also develop and IS steel committee mailing list of steelworkers who like the pamphlet and who read  $W^p$ , and we should send them regular reports on the campaign that go beyond the WP coverage. To the extent we are able to develop influence in the campaign, we want to make ourselves a trend in fightback, directly in the mame of the IS and WP.

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7. Our main intervention is not to organize in fightback polemics and disputes over the politics and direction of the overall campaign - or to be the people mainly known for asking the embarassing questions. We want to fight for our direction mainly through action and example. To do this will often require tactical flexibility and maneuvering. Our influence among fightback activists will be predicated on our establishing a reputation as practical, hard working compaign workers, This in turn will open people to our fuller views, second to still interviews.

We want local fightback newsletters to take a better line than Sadlowski. But we should not do it in a way that will force a confrontation that we will lose. 

We should use the pamphlet, WP and the mailings to organize the widest possible dialog with other steelworkers on our full views toward the campaign. In our IS literature, we should be totally honest about Sc dlowski and the campaign. But we should to it in a way that is still positive and enthusiastic about building the movement.

Cur whole organization is inexperienced in this sort of an operation. There is a natural, but mistaken tendency to translate critical support into "embarassed support", "unenthusiastic support", "hesitant and vaccilating support" etc. We will get nowhere if we project these kinds of attitudes. No one will follow us if we appear embarassed about what we are doing, or hesitant or vacilating. We would be better off opposing Sadlowski, than projecting a program of "on the one hand, but then again, on the other".

We make no secret about our criticisms. We agressively seek opporutnities to sell the pamphlet and WP, and to discuss these criticisms with anyone interested. But we need not automatically attach disclaimers and qualifications to everything we say and do as fightback activists. Though we have criticisms, we want to be active, enthusiastic, proud members of fightback-and its best builders. ne ei

8. It is our eveluation that an active campaign, and particularly a winning camapign will Build the agressiveness, self confidence, and militancy of the USW membership; can open up the union to further progressive developments; and can contribute to building an active movement of the rank and file that will go beyond the political limitations of the present leadership. We want our members in steel to establish reputations as important militants in the Sadlowski campaign and we want the IS and WP to be identified as a left current in that campaign. We believe that in the years to come, the most important militants in steel will be veterans of this campaign. We want our members and our organization to share a common experience with those militants. We want Now sollton work

to use this campaign to learn our way around in the union and to establish ourselves as a tendency in it- however small to begin with,

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Cur perspective is to jump into this effort fully and without reservations. In practice, we may find that the opportunities are more limited than what is here laid out, that things may be tighter more controlled, more burecucratic, more impossible than we thought. If so, we will be force d to modify our perspectives based on experience. But without jumping in, we will have no way of evaluating the possibilities or developing a next step based on conarete experience. If we wait until everything is clear, and the direction of the campaign is firmly established, we will have waited too long to accomplish anything.

9. Our emphasis at this time, is to overcome the reservations comrades feel about becoming involved in the Sadlowski camapign. We do this only because we believe that there is some possibility (no guarantee) that there will be a movement around the campaign that will develop its own self confidence, tendencies toward individual initiatives etc. Our support for Sadlowski is based precisely on the evaluation that his candidacy – and his electoral victory – has the potentiality of opening things up in the USW and raising the level of rank and file self activity.

If the involvement in the Schlowski campaign goes poorly, or if the situation fails to open up, there is little danger that false illusions about Sadlowski will develop within our wwn membership and immediate periphery. But, if things go well, this will become a danger that we will have to be on guard against.

If things open up in the USWandsta shift left, Sadlowski may try to run left to stay ahead of the membership. He knows how to use left-sound ing rhetoric. He may even be willing, if the pressure exists, to take a more militant lead on some issues than is common among trade union bureaucrats today. Al this will be to the good. But, it is under these circumstances that comrades will have to clearly ground themselves inan understanding of the limits of trade union reformism. Sadlowski will only ap ture control of the USW (if he does) in an al liance with a substantial section of the current bureaucracy. In the immediate future, there is no possibility of a mass rank and file movement - independent of the current bureaucracy - sweeping him or . anyone to national power in the union. Whatever private opinions Sadlowski may hold (and . there is no reason to believe that he at all rejects class collaboration) Sadlowski's behavior as union president will be severely limited by the collaborationist limits and the bureaucratic methods that will be imposed upon him. And in the period to come, these limits and methods cannot cope with the fundamental needs of the union's membership, 17.1

This means, that whatever his private view, in the final analysis, we expect Sadlowski to end up being a cop for the boss. A strong rank and file movement can pressure a bureaucrat to respond especially a left bureaucrat. But as the goals of the movement come into increasingly shar p conflict with the limits of what the boss can afford under capitalism - even the most left bureaucrat draws the line and uses his prestige and influence in the membership to derail the movement.

To most workers today, our long term assessment of Sadlowski's limits will be just an abstraction. As we become an established part of the movement, however, we will have the increasing task of finding concrete ways to raise our criticisms and to differentiate ourselves from Sadlowski and his strategy without alienating ourselves from the best militants.