THE
CHINESE
REVOLUTION
Part I
by Peng Shu-tse and Peng Pi-lan

June 1972
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

I.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This is the first of a series of three educational bulletins dealing with the evolution of the Chinese revolution from the conquest of power in 1949 through the events of the "Cultural Revolution" in the latter part of the 1960's.

The material in this series consists of a selection of articles written by Comrades Peng Shu-tse and Peng Pi-lan covering a span of some 20 years.

The collection falls roughly into three distinct parts, each dealing with a critical turning point in the development of the Chinese revolution: (1) Analysis of the conquest of power and its immediate aftermath; (2) the People's Communes; and (3) the so-called "Cultural Revolution."

Bulletin # 1 contains biographical material on the background of the authors which establish their qualifications as authorities on the subject under discussion. Included in the collection are polemical articles presenting the special viewpoint of the authors on the disputed question of relationships within the regime.

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Chinese Revolutionists in Exile

by Ross Dowson

WHERE is the Sino-Soviet dispute leading? Upon what forces at work in China, impinging on the most vital issues of our time, does this conflict reflect? And what are its repercussions on the thinking of the Chinese masses — on the working class youth, on the students and intellectuals who fervently grasped the promises of Mao's Hundred Flowers speech only to be driven back into silence, who see in the pages of Renmin Ribao and Hongqi the charge of Trotskyism being bandied about, comments about “the emergence of new bourgeois elements after the victory of a proletarian revolution” in reference to Yugoslavia, and “the revisionist and new social-democratic trends which have now appeared in the international communist movement”?

Khrushchev’s revelations at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were a belated recognition of the new Soviet realities — that it was no longer possible to rule an advanced and powerful working class in a period of continued expansion of the forces of world revolution, with police state methods. At the same time that the Soviet bureaucracy promised a new deal, it spurred deep-rooted desires that the historic record be straightened, that those who fought the Stalinist degeneration be rehabilitated and honoured, that the cause of the disasters be understood so that there would be no return to that awful time.

Trotsky Excluded

The unrolling of the record has rehabilitated two old Bolsheviks, Radek and Bukharin. Its posing of the rehabilitation of Lenin’s martyred collaborator, Leon Trotsky, has resulted in a fierce repetition of lies, only proving that the process is not to be halted.

In the Soviet Union there can be little physical meting-out of justice. The blood of the chief oppositionists has long since drained into the soil — their bones have been scattered. Only their thoughts and their heroic example could be recalled.

But with China this is not so. Some of those who opposed Stalin’s cynical intervention in China, which led to the tragic defeat of the 1927 revolution, still survive in Mao’s prisons. Two of the leaders live in exile. I met them in Europe last fall where they had been since 1948 when they fled from Mao’s police.

Two Exiles

Peng Shu-tse and Chen Pi-lan live in quite different circumstances than their former co-workers, party chairman, Mao Tse-tung, and chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Liu Shao Chi. They live in two small, damp rooms, sustained by friends, in a foreign country surrounded by a foreign culture, far from the Chinese to whose socialist development they devoted their lives. Probably Peng, as he ponders over the Chinese press, likens this period of his life to when he was in Chiang Kai-shek’s jail — considering it a plateau from which release will soon come, so that once again the upward climb can be resumed. That is the life that they lead — one of anticipation. The hours of the day are carefully allocated. Both Peng and Chen are writing their memoirs.

Now 67 years of age, Peng Shu-tse comes from a well-to-do peasant family. In the fall of 1920 he, along with Mao Tse-tung and several others, set up the first communist group in Changsha, capital of Hunan province. Like other communist groups in Peking, Wuhan and Canton, it was established right after the founding of the first Chinese communist group in Shanghai. At that time there were many persons across the country who had been stimulated by the magazine New Youth, by the May 4th movement a little later, and particularly by the October Revolution in Russia.

It was Chen Tu-hsiu who launched New Youth in 1915. Chen had participated in the first 1911 revolution. With its failure and the rise of reaction represented by war-lord Yuan Shih-kai, Chen had decided to publish New Youth as an organ of revolutionary democracy. It waged a vigorous struggle on two fronts — democracy and science — against Confucianism, which represented traditional feudal ideas and superstitions. Intellectuals, students, and advanced workers gathered to its side to form the nucleus of the May 4th movement, which took its name from the stormy May 4, 1919 demonstrations against Japanese imperialism.

The Chinese Communist Party was organized on the initiative of Li Ta-chao and Chen Tu-hsiu with the aid of a representative of the Third International founded by Lenin and Trotsky. One of the first tasks confronting the small and inexperienced forces was the development of a cadre. Elsewhere, in Europe and America, the Communist Party resulted from a fusion of forces coming from the social democracy and other workers’ organizations. But China had no Marxist tradition or experience with working class struggles.

In order to expedite the development of a cadre, the Comintern representative urged that young revolutionists be sent to Moscow to study Marxism and gain experience. Peng was one of the first group of 20 who went to Moscow to later become the
basic cadre of the Chinese CP. The present chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, Liu Shao-chi, was also one of the 20.

Visits Moscow

Arriving in Moscow in the spring of 1921, Peng was soon elected secretary of the Moscow Chinese student branch of the Communist Party of China. On the advice of Chen Tu-hsiu, who attended the Fourth Congress of the Communist International in Moscow in 1922, it was decided to organize the Chinese student groups in France, Germany and Moscow into one group, with the Moscow group in charge of liaison. Chen also advised the leading cadre in France and Germany to go to Moscow to study. This brought Chu Teh, now chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress; Li Fu-chun, now Minister of State Planning; and Tsai Tsan, now chairman of the All China Women’s Union, with others, to Moscow.

PENG, from a pupil soon became an instructor. At the same time he joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and became acquainted with the epochal dispute raging through the CPSU, with Trotsky and Stalin heading up the respective sides. Peng told me that while the Chinese students had a tremendous respect for Trotsky and were not at all impressed by Stalin, they did not express an opinion at the time.

Together with Li Ta-chao, who was co-founder with Chen Tu-hsiu of the CPC, Peng was an official Chinese delegate to the 1924 Fifth World Congress of the Communist International. Following the Congress, Peng returned to Shanghai to work on The Guide, weekly organ of the Central Committee, and shortly became editor-in-chief of New Youth when it became the theoretical organ of the CPC. As a delegate of the Moscow branch, he participated in the 1925 National Convention of the CPC and was elected to its central committee. As a member of the political bureau he was placed in charge of the party organ and propaganda work. This political bureau, chaired by Chen Tu-hsiu, was the leading body of the Second Chinese Revolution of 1925-27.

Chen’s Background

It was in the fall of 1925 that Peng’s path crossed Chen Pi-lans, then 23 years old, who was to become his wife. Chen, who came from the intelligentsia (her father was a professor), became a leader in the student struggles under the influence of the May 4th movement while she was at school in Hupeh. She joined the CP in 1922 and the following year went to Peking to participate in party activities under the guidance of Li Ta-chao. In the autumn of 1923 she entered the University of Shanghai, which had been established by the CP and the left wing of the Kuomintang, and the following year went to Moscow to study. Under party direction, she returned to the center in Shanghai when the revolution broke out. While on the Shanghai CP city committee, she became secretary of the women’s section and editor-in-chief of the magazine China Woman. She concentrated her activities among student and working women.

The policy that led to the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution has been described and analyzed by Harold Isaacs in his book The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. The central committee under Chen Tu-hsiu’s leadership was profoundly disturbed by the party’s subservience to the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek and was convinced that it was necessary to oppose him and defeat him. When Chiang staged his anti-Communist coup in March 1926, the central committee sent Peng to Canton to discuss with Comintern representative Borodin how to deal with Chiang’s policy. In the name of the central committee, Peng suggested that all CP members withdraw from the Kuomintang and lead the workers’ and peasants’ revolutionary movement independently.

Comintern Veto

But Borodin stuck to Moscow’s orders, resolutely opposing the anti-Chiang policy of the central committee and Peng’s suggestions of withdrawal from the Kuomintang. Instead, he reaffirmed the policy of complete subordination to Chiang which resulted in the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution. To the enlarged meeting of the central committee held in July 1927, Chen and Peng again proposed that CP members withdraw from the Kuomintang. The resolution was passed but was vetoed by the Comintern.

From May to July 1927, Chen and Peng clearly sensed the falseness of the Comintern policy, and as the situation deteriorated, they could see no way out. Had Trotsky’s views reached the Chinese party at that time, the situation would have been different; the impasse would have been broken. However, all of Trotsky’s documents were blocked by Stalin.

After the Wuhan Kuomintang government carried out its anti-communist policy in July 1927, spelling the defeat of the Second Revolution, the Comintern changed its policy from extreme right opportunism to extreme left adventurism. Chen and Peng both resolutely opposed this adventurous policy. In August, Chen Tu-hsiu wrote two letters to the central committee demanding an end to this policy.

Peng Dismissed

The same month, Peng was assigned to the party secretary of the northern region which encompassed several provinces north of the Yellow River. His instructions from the central committee were to stage uprisings in the Peking and Tientsin area. In order to avoid futile sacrifices, Peng postponed the uprisings with the excuse that time was not right. Consequently he was dismissed by
the political bureau headed by Chu Chiu-pai. Tsai Ho-sen, who was then assigned the task by the political bureau, carried out the uprising in Peking which ended in failure and the sacrifice of all 60 of the leading cadre there.

Following the collapse in Peking, Peng went to Shanghai to join Chen Tu-hsiu. While both remained members of the central committee, neither was given any tasks. It was then that Chen wrote his famous two letters scoring the false policies of the party and placing the responsibility for the disaster on the Comintern headed by Stalin and Bukharin.

The Chinese CP, although composed of brave and devoted cadres, was young and had no experienced leaders other than Chen Tu-hsiu. Only in its seventh year of existence, it had been faced with titanic problems. Chen was convinced of the in-correctness of the Comintern’s policy although it was backed up with all the prestige of the October revolution. But he proved unable to delineate an alternative one.

MOSCOW learned that Chen and Peng were opposed to the policies imposed by the Comintern. In the summer of 1928 Stalin and Bukharin sent a joint wire inviting them to attend the Sixth World Congress of the CI in Moscow. At first Chen could not decide whether to accept or decline the invitation. Peng told Chen that if they went, there would only be two courses open to them. One was to admit that the Comintern’s policies had been correct all along, but in implementing them the Chinese leadership committed serious errors which led to the defeat of the revolution. By making such a statement they might both be returned to the leading bodies of the party. But this would be contrary to the facts and in violation of their conscience. The other course would be to insist that the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution was chiefly due to the false policies of the Comintern. Even if they were not arrested for such a declaration, they would at the least be held in Moscow and prevented from returning. Chen agreed with Peng’s opinion and so declined Stalin’s invitation.

Although they decided not to go to Moscow, nonetheless the clarification they sought came the following spring when some returning students brought back from Moscow two documents of the Left Opposition, written by Leon Trotsky.

Left Opposition Forms

Peng studied these two documents, *Summary and Perspective of the Chinese Revolution and The Chinese Question after the Sixth World Congress*. The meaning of his experiences were clarified by the theoretical arguments of Trotsky, and he decided to support Trotsky’s struggle in the CI and make known his views to his Chinese comrades. He gave the two documents to Chen Tu-hsiu who returned them shortly, declaring that he agreed with Trotsky’s position and proposing that together they should organize a Left Opposition in the Chinese party.

Chen Tu-hsiu and Peng Shu-tse each wrote to the central committee demanding that the party review the lessons of the defeat of the revolution, change its adventurous policy, and make all of Trotsky’s documents on the Chinese revolution available to the party. Then they gathered 80 members together to formulate a manifesto which systematically analyzed the Comintern’s opportunist and adventurous policies during and after the defeat of the Second Revolution. The manifesto further stated that Stalin had substituted bureaucratic dictatorship for Lenin’s democratic centralism, and employed opportunist and adventurous policies in the Soviet Union. With the publication of the manifesto in December 1929, Chen Tu-hsiu, Peng Shu-tse and the other 80 signers were expelled. Among the 80 was Chen Pi-lan.

THE fledgling forces of the Left Opposition were immediately caught between two fires — vicious attacks from the Stalinists, such as were experienced by Left Oppositionists across the globe, and Chiang Kai-shek’s white terror. Despite difficulties they managed to publish a clandestine periodical *The Proletariat* and Trotsky’s writings on China. Largely due to the reputation of Chen Tu-Hsiu, the Left Opposition exerted considerable influence inside and outside the CP. Many of the old party cadre, called reconciliationists by the center, were shaken. Valuable opportunities were lost due to the fact that there were three other Left Opposition groupings in Shanghai, formed by students returned from Moscow, that were attacking one another. With Trotsky’s aid, in May 1931 the forces of the opposition were united in The Communist League of China.

Left Harassed

The constant harassment by Kuomintang police made work extremely difficult. One team after another, despite all security precautions, was arrested. Chen Tu-hsiu was forced into hiding. Peng, after missing arrest by a hair’s breadth, was forced to move some 20 times in a period of four years. He eked out a meagre living by translating.

In October 1932 Chen, Peng and eight others were arrested. Following pleas for their life by such prominent persons as Sun Yat-sen’s widow, Soong Ching-ling, at present vice-chairman of the Peoples’ Republic of China, they were granted a trial. The trial lasted two years. Chen and Peng conducted their own defense and received tremendous coverage in the press. They were sentenced to 13 years in prison which, following an appeal, was reduced to eight years. The other eight oppositionists were sentenced to five years.

WITH the imprisonment of Peng, Chen Pi-lan attempted to support herself and their two children by teaching. In order to supplement her income she wrote a number of articles on the woman question from the Marxist viewpoint. They appeared in the well known *Eastern Magazine* and other left periodicals under the pen name of Chen Pi-yum. These articles, which established her as an authority on the woman question in China, were later gathered and published in two volumes.

With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in August 1937, Chen, Peng and their comrades were released and took refuge in the international settlement. The infamy of
the Moscow Trials caused Chen Tu-
siu to challenge Trotsky's position
of defense of the Soviet Union as a
workers' state. He also had dif-
ferences on the war and left the
movement. His defection was a heavy
blow to the Chinese Trotskyist move-
ment. He died in Szechuan province in
1942.

Peng commenced to gather to-
gether the forces of the movement.
Besides publishing a clandestine
organ called Struggle, the Chinese
Trotskyists published a legal periodi-
cal called Moving Forward. In a
short time scattered isolated groups
were regrouped, and the movement
commenced to make considerable
progress.

Two of Trotsky's most important
works, The History of the Russian
Revolution and The Revolution Bet-
rayed, were published and exerted a
deep influence among revolutionary
youth.

Like their co-thinkers elsewhere,
the Chinese Trotskyists were
slandered and vilified by the Stalin-
ists. The Chinese CP press repeatedly
slandered them as recipients of
money from Japanese imperialism, as
Japano-Trotskyite fascist agents.

In the summer of 1938, four newspa-
pers under the influence of the
Chinese CP calumniated Pen Shu-
tse as an intimate friend of the in-
famous traitor Li Kuo-che, who had
just been assassinated by a Kuomintang
agent and suggested that he
should meet a similar fate. Under
the threat of legal action the pub-
lishers of these papers were com-
pelled to make a public retraction.

**The War Period**

The development of the Chinese
revolutionary socialist movement was
again dealt a grievous blow with the
outbreak of the Japanese-American
war in December 1941. Many leaders
were arrested by the Japanese when
they occupied the international set-
tlement. All connections between
Shanghai and other points were
shattered. Peng narrowly escaped on
several occasions. Under an assumed
name, from 1941-45 he worked as a
professor at Shanghai University lec-
turing on Chinese history, western
literature and philosophy. In this
way he was able to win many rev-
olutionary youth to the Trotskyist
viewpoint.

With the end of the war, the Com-
munist League, with Peng as editor,
published a magazine called Search-
ing for Truth. This became one of
the better known magazines in post-
war China, having a monthly cir-
culation of 3,000 to 5,000 copies. Chen
Pi-lan edited a monthly periodical
called Youth and Women, later
changed to New Voice, which had a
circulation of from 2,000 to 3,000
copies. With the publication of these
magazines Trotskyism became widely
known and highly respected among
intellectuals, students and young
workers. Connections across the coun-
try were again established.

**Plans Derailed**

As soon as the CP occupied
Shanghai they arrested the entire
Trotskyist leadership. Subsequently
rank and file activists were arrested —
three of them were shot. From
September 1952 to January 1953 all
Trotskyists, even sympathizers and
wives, in all the major cities of China,
were arrested and, without any trials,
sent to concentration camps. To this
day, aside from a report that the
wives of a few members have been
released, there has been no word of
them.

Towards the close of 1948, Peng
Shu-tse, Chen Pi-lan and Liu Chia-Lien
arrived in Hongkong to
work with about 100 of their com-
rades there. They published a clan-
destine organ, the Chinese edition of
the Fourth International. In 1949
there were several arrests. The big-
gest came when the Hongkong au-
thorities, in collusion with the post
office, traced several addresses to
which copies of the Militant and the
Fourth International, published by
the U.S. Socialist Workers Party,
were coming. This resulted in the
arrest of ten members and their de-
portation to Macao.

With the police searching for them,
Peng, Chen and Liu Chia-lien fled
to Vietnam. Two months after their
arrival in Vietnam, Liu Chia-lien
was arrested along with two leaders
of the Vietnamese Trotskyists. He
died shortly after in Ho Chi-min’s
prison.

Already in difficulty in Vietnam
and warned that the Chinese police
knew of their presence there, Peng,
Chen, and their family left for
Europe, arriving there in the summer
of 1951. Cast up on the shore, they
continue to devote their lives to ad-
vancing the internationalist revolu-
tionary struggle for the socialist
emancipation of mankind.
Looking Back Over My Years with Peng Shu-tse

By Peng Pi-lan

[On November 24 the world Trotskyist movement will celebrate the seventy-fifth birthday of Peng Shu-tse, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist party and of the International Left Opposition that eventually developed into the Fourth International of today.

[As part of the celebration, we are publishing an account of his life and political contributions written by his companion Peng Pi-lan five years ago, in November 1965. The first installment appears below.

[We will be glad to forward any greetings our readers may wish to send to the birthday celebration.]


I

It is not my intention in this brief account to write a biography of Peng Shu-tse, but I shall attempt to sketch his thinking, his political positions, and his activities in the Chinese Communist party from the time I first met him forty years ago. I shall also try to indicate his arduous struggle over the past thirty-six years for the Trotskyist movement.

I first met Peng Shu-tse in the autumn of 1925, but I had already become familiar with his outlook by the end of 1924. At that time I was attending the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow. I read articles by him that appeared in Hsiang Tao [The Guide], the official organ of the CCP, and in the theoretical magazine Hsin Ch'ing Nien [New Youth].

In his first article, "Imperialism and the Boxer Movement" (published in Hsiang Tao, September 3, 1924), he analyzed the decline of China to semicolonial status, a process that began with the Opium War (1840-41), citing facts on the military, political, economic, and cultural penetration of China by the imperialist powers. He characterized the Boxer Movement of 1900 as an "antimperialistic movement of national revolution, undertaken by the peasant masses under the excessive pressure of the imperialists." He thus took exception to the invidious terms used by many historians in referring to the "Boxer Rebellion," which they generally characterized as "barbarous" and "antiforeign." Peng correctly defined the Boxer Movement, not only for the CCP but also for the Chinese intellectuals who were arguing the question. The bourgeois historians, of whom Professor Hu Shih of Peking University was typical, maintained that this view flew in the face of the traditional interpretation of Chinese history.

Peng's next article, which impressed me deeply, was entitled "Who Is the Leader of the National Revolution?" (published in Hsin Ch'ing Nien, December 1925).

Early in 1923 the Communist International, claiming that the Chinese revolution was a national democratic revolution involving all the classes, had ordered members of the CCP to join the Kuomintang and to follow a policy of collaborating with it. The question arose—what class is the leader of the revolution? The order of the Comintern implied that the CCP, representing the proletariat, could not carry full responsibility for leading the national revolution alone, since it had to join the Kuomintang and collaborate with it.

Having accepted the order, the leaders of the party changed their previous views and shifted toward the right. Mao Tse-tung, for instance, in an article "Peking Coup d'Etat and the Merchants" (published in Hsiang Tao, July 11, 1923), openly urged that the merchants, i.e., the bourgeoisie of Tientsin and Peking, "rise and collaborate with those of Shanghai to advance the revolution. The greater the unity of the merchants, the more powerful their leadership of the masses throughout the country, and the shorter the time necessary to bring the revolution to success." (Emphasis in original.) Obviously the author here recognized the bourgeoisie as the leader of the national revolution.

Later on Ch'en Tu-hsiu wrote an article entitled "The National Revolution and All Classes" (published in the monthly Ch'en Feng [The Vanguard], Vol. 2, December 1923). In this article, after analyzing all the social classes in China and their relationship of forces, he came to the conclusion: Only the bourgeoisie can lead the national revolution, since on the one hand the character of the revolution is inherently bourgeois, and on the other the proletariat is insufficient in numbers and lacks the knowledge needed to lead a revolution. Such concepts caused considerable confusion and bewilderment among the rank and file of the party. Although Peng did not mention Ch'en by name, his article was in fact a criticism of Ch'en's view.1

In his 1925 article, after analyzing in detail the economic basis and interests of all the social classes, from the bourgeoisie (i.e., the bank capitalists, merchants, and industrial capitalists) through the petty bourgeoisie, the artisans, the peasantry, and the proletariat, Peng pointed out that the Chinese bourgeoisie, including the industrial capitalists, depended either directly or indirectly on the imperialists and Chinese warlords and therefore could not mount the determined struggle against them necessary for success in the national revolution. Furthermore, owing to its fear of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie would inevitably prove reactionary. Peng drew the following conclusion:

"After analyzing all the classes ... we may now affirm

1. Shu-tse told me later that he gave the draft of his article to Ch'en Tu-hsiu with the hope of winning him over to his view. Ch'en published an article entitled "Lessons of the National Movement Over the Past 27 Years" in the same issue of Hsin Ch'ing Nien in which Peng's article appeared. Ch'en, in his article, dropped his former point of view and advanced that of the proletarian leadership of the national revolution.
that from the standpoint of their material basis, revolution ary consciousness, and the conditions of the international revolution . . . only the working class can become the leader of the national revolution."

* * * *

Peng joined the CCP in the autumn of 1920. The following year he attended the Communist University of the Toilers of the East in Moscow. He was elected to serve as secretary of the Moscow branch of the CCP, holding this post until 1924 when he returned to China after attending the Fifth Congress of the Communist International.

In the Moscow branch, I was told, he gave many reports on Marxism and discussed all kinds of problems with the comrades. Small wonder that they regarded him highly.

When I was there, his successor as secretary of the branch was Lo I-neng. (He returned to China in the spring of 1925, soon being assigned to serve as secretary of the Shanghai Regional Committee. After the failure of the revolution in 1927, he was executed by Chiang Kai-shek.) At that time there were about 100 comrades in Moscow. Some of them had come from France and Germany, but most of them were sent from China. In addition to our regular classes, we often held discussions in the evening. When we took up Peng's long articles ("Imperialism and the Boxer Movement" and "Who Is the Leader of the National Revolution?"), everyone agreed with the viewpoint expressed.

Among the students was Li Tao-chao, one of the founders of the CCP. After attending the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, he stayed in Moscow to do research work. After he returned to China, he was hanged in April 1927 by Chang Tso-lin, the warlord in Northern China.

Another student was Liu Pai-ch'en, who later became the head of the Political Commission of Peng Yu-hsiang. He was shot by Chiang Kai-shek.

I recall that at the farewell party for Li Ta-chao when he returned to China, the chairman was Liu Pai-ch'en. In his remarks, the smiling Liu said proudly: "One pen has already gone home. That pen is our comrade Peng Shu-tse. Now Comrade Li Ta-chao is going home, too. We believe that he will certainly make a great contribution to our party."

The word "pen" struck a chord because that was where my interests lay. That is why I began by saying that I already knew Peng's outlook before I came to know him personally.

* * * *

After returning home in the summer of 1924, Peng, besides writing articles for Hsiang Tao and Hsin Ch'ing Nien, participated in the daily work of the Shanghai Regional Committee. In January 1925, when the Fourth Congress of the CCP was held, he was elected to the Central Committee and to the Central Standing Committee (Political Bureau), and was assigned to be chief editor of both Hsiang Tao and Hsin Ch'ing Nien.

In the autumn of 1925 I came back to Shanghai to participate in a meeting for all women comrades in Shanghai. The man who gave the political report at the meet ing, I learned from the brief introduction by Hsiang Ching-yu, who was in charge of the Central Board for Women, was none other than the author of the many articles I had read in Moscow. My first impression of him was his quiet and dignified manner and the warmth he displayed toward comrades.

* * * *

The Central Standing Committee was composed of five members: Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Peng Shu-tse, Chu Ch'iu-pai, Ts'ai He-sheng, and Chang Kuo-tao. But in fact there were only three, because Ts'ai went to Moscow and Chang was often absent from Shanghai.

Ch'en always stayed in the central office to meet comrades coming in from all over the country. Peng also often assisted Ch'en in this. Chu, owing to his better facility with the Russian language, was in charge of contacts with representatives from the Comintern. He did not like to participate in the Shanghai Regional Committee, which included three provinces (Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei), nor did he like to meet comrades. Consequently, Peng was the only member of the Central Standing Committee to attend the Shanghai Regional Committee meetings. He also regularly attended the meetings of the Central Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps.

Since Peng often participated in the meetings of the Shanghai Regional Committee (of which I was a member) as well as in other meetings of cadres, I had occasion to see him frequently. When literary work was involved, I used to go where he was staying, as he was the director of the Central Department of Propaganda and I was the editor-in-chief of the monthly magazine Chung Kuo Fu Nu [Chinese Women]. Some of the important articles involving politics and theory had to be taken up with him for approval or correction. Thus I saw him often, and after a certain time, understanding each other perfectly, we decided to live together.

* * * *

In 1925 the May 30 Movement stirred up resistance against imperialism and the warlords. Throughout the whole country in 1925 and 1926, workers, peasants, students, women, and various elements of the petty bourgeoisie all took part in the revolutionary upsurge. For instance, whenever they were aroused by events, such as the struggle against the warlord Feng, the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese, the March 18, 1926, slaughter in Peking, hundreds of thousands of persons demonstrated in the streets of Shanghai.

Immediately after the emotionally charged demonstration protesting the March 18 slaughter, the news reached Shanghai of the March 20 coup d'etat in Canton. Chiang Kai-shek, the representative of the bourgeoisie with whom the CCP had collaborated in the Kuomintang, had signaled his intentions. The event, which came like a bolt from the blue, paralyzed the whole party. Caught by surprise, every member of the CCP in the Shanghai region was anguished and bewildered.

On the following day, after the Shanghai Regional Committee had weighed the meaning of the coup, the activists
were called together in a meeting. More than 100, sitting on the floor, listened to Peng's report on the Canton coup and the opinion of the Central Committee of the CCP. By the end of the meeting they were seething with indignation over the coup. They were in complete agreement that it was a clear indication of the reactionary nature of the bourgeoisie, and that we Communists, standing firmly with the proletariat, had to reconsider the question of the CCP's collaborating with the Kuomintang, and take up the problem of what policy the party should adopt toward that formation. Everyone wanted the Central Committee to speedily work out ways and means of coping with Chiang Kai-shek.

After critical consideration, the Central Committee decided on a counterattack. This included an alliance with the armed forces of the Left Wing Kuomintang, expansion of the army under the command of the Communist Yeh T'ing, and the arming of detachments of the proletariat and the peasantry.

At the end of April 1926, the Central Committee sent Peng to Canton delegated to set up a special committee to discuss with Borodin, the representative of the Comintern, on what should be done concretely with relation to Chiang and to express the views of the Central Committee.

The Third Congress of the National Trade Unions was being held at the same time in Canton. The Shanghai Regional Committee designated me to help the delegation of the Shanghai Federated Trade Union in its participation, and so I went with Peng on this trip.

* * *

Peng, as the representative of the Central Committee, proposed taking a stand against Chiang. He also proposed, on his own, that the CCP withdraw its members from the Kuomintang, end the tactic of working from within, and conduct subsequent collaboration party to party.

Borodin, as the representative of the Comintern, continued to support Chiang and collaboration between the CCP and the Kuomintang. He was therefore opposed to these proposals.

Thus Peng and Borodin were in sharp conflict. The outcome of this was that Peng became isolated.

Borodin was a sophisticated bureaucrat, skilled at maneuvering. He was armed with the prestige of the Soviet Union and the Comintern, and had abundant material resources at his command (arms and money), which added to his authority and power.

The members of the provincial committee in Kwantung (Chou En-lai was one of them), and the other members of the Central Committee such as T'an P'ing-shan, Chang Kuo-t'ao, etc., thus adjusted their views to fit those of Borodin.

Borodin turned the Central Committee's anti-Chiang policy around into a policy of supporting Chiang. Peng's proposal to withdraw from the Kuomintang was converted into acceptance of Chiang's "party-adjusted program." As a result, the CCP became an appendage of the Kuomintang.

The "party-adjusted program" specified that criticism by Communists of Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I [The Three Principles of the People] be prohibited; that no member of the CCP could hold the post of chief of the Central Headquarters of the Kuomintang; that not more than one-third of those sitting on the regional committees of the Kuomintang could be members of the CCP; and that the CCP must turn over to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang a complete list of CCP members in the Kuomintang.

Borodin agreed to this "party-adjusted program." Of course, Borodin's policy of surrendering to Chiang was put into effect under orders from the Comintern.

In order to successfully carry out the Comintern's, or, better put, Stalin's policy, Borodin told Ch'en Yen-nien, the secretary of the provincial committee in Kwantung: "Unless Peng Shu-tse leaves Canton, I can't start doing anything."

It was on Borodin's suggestion that Ch'en Yen-nien immediately wrote to his father, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, asking him to transfer Peng Shu-tse back to Shanghai. This was the first harsh experience suffered by Peng at the hands of the representative of the Comintern.

* * *

After Peng left Canton and returned to Shanghai in early June 1926, the Central Committee of the CCP was forced to accept the Comintern's policy of surrendering to Chiang Kai-shek. With the support of Borodin, Chiang consolidated his military dictatorship without hindrance, manipulating the apparatus of the Kuomintang, the administration, and the army to his own ends, and assigning himself the post of commander-in-chief to undertake the Northern Expedition.

In face of the mounting threat, the Central Committee of the CCP felt it necessary to correct the policy of surrender.

In July 1926 a plenary meeting of the Central Committee took place. Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Peng Shu-tse submitted a proposal to end collaboration with the Kuomintang from within, substituting collaboration party to party, and thus freeing the CCP from the yoke of the Kuomintang. They also proposed putting into practice the CCP's stated policy of leading the workers and peasants in the revolution. Although the suggested course was not adopted, most of the members agreed to submit it to the Comintern for consideration.

The Comintern criticized it severely and turned it down. The CCP had no alternative but to obey the orders of the Comintern and continue the opportunist policy. This meant that the CCP had to mobilize the workers and peasants as a whole in support of the Northern Expedition headed by Chiang Kai-shek. From then on, the workers had to restrain themselves from violating bourgeois property rights; the peasants were denied early possession of land held by the landlords; the CCP could not carry on propaganda work among the Kuomintang troops or organize anything within their ranks. In particular, the CCP was not to set up its own regime based on soviets of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, since this would be likely to injure collaboration between the Kuomintang and the CCP, and would constitute a "rash adventure" overstepping "the stage of the national revolution." The Chinese revolution was thus taken, step
by step, down a blind alley ending in destruction.

Nevertheless, Peng Shu-te felt, as he still does, that limiting the Chinese revolution to "the stage of the national revolution" and confining it within "the bondage of Kuomintang-CCP collaboration," did not conform to the historical experience of the October revolution in Russia.

Early in 1927 he wrote an article entitled "Is Leninism Applicable to the National Peculiarities of China?" (published in Hsiang Tao, January 21, 1927). In this article he criticized the fallacious reasoning according to which the national peculiarities of China differ so much from those of Russia as to make Leninism inapplicable to China. After analyzing in detail the social and economic conditions in China, the relationships of forces among the classes, and the international position of China, he pointed out that these, in general, resembled those of Russia before the October revolution. Consequently, he concluded, the Chinese revolution could be expected to follow the Russian pattern, and Leninism was entirely applicable to the situation in China.

He acknowledged that "the Chinese revolution is a national democratic revolution at present, but this revolution is absolutely not limited to the ideas of nationality and democracy; it will certainly turn gradually in the direction of socialist revolution." (My emphasis.)

Accordingly, he suggested the label "permanent revolution" and the following:

"It should be finally understood that the national revolution is not the last stage of the revolution; it is only a road leading to the socialist revolution. The final and genuine emancipation of humanity depends solely on the socialist revolution being carried out by the proletariat as a foundation for the building of communist society. The ultimate objective of Leninism is to lead mankind as a whole from the oppression of various societies to the freedom of communism. Thus 'permanent revolution' should be understood to mean the process leading directly from the national revolution into the proletarian revolution." (Emphasis in the original.)

In the early part of 1927, when the revolution had reached a very critical stage, Peng Shu-te wrote another article entitled "The Present Revolutionary Crisis of the Rightward Tendency" (published in Hsiang Tao, March 6, 1927).

"The whole situation of the Chinese revolution is already clearly apparent," Peng pointed out. "On the one hand, the power of the revolution, especially the power of the national revolutionary army, the workers, and the peasants, is developing with exceptional rapidity. The tide of revolution is still swelling and deepening. . . . On the other hand . . . A compromising and reactionary tendency among the leaders of the national revolutionary army has become apparent. . . . They have attempted, publicly, or secretly, to make a compromise with the enemy against the masses they confront. This is the most dangerous phenomenon in the revolution at present, and it may well destroy the whole revolution." (Emphasis in the original.)

This compromising and reactionary tendency to which Peng drew attention was the bourgeois counterrevolutionary tendency represented by Chiang Kai-shek. Peng continued:

"The so-called moderate group in the Kuomintang has fully disclosed its bourgeois tendency; they . . . have seen the workers and peasants rising to fight not only for general revolutionary interests but in the interest of the workers and peasants themselves. They have also noted the concessions granted by the imperialists and the warlords. Hence this group aims at stopping the revolutionary process . . . in order to unify all the compradors, bureaucrats and landlords, the rotten gentry and those enemies of the revolution, the imperialists and the warlords, for the purpose of striking back at the worker and peasant masses." (Emphasis in original.)

In view of all this, Peng drew the emphatic conclusion:

"The Chinese revolution should create a regime of revolutionary democracy, and, above all, should not create a personal military dictatorship (Chiang Kai-shek) . . . .

The present revolution is urgently in need of a revolutionary regime of democratic dictatorship. That means a regime for the masses in their majority, composed of workers, peasants, and petty-bourgeois, in which they participate directly, thus controlling the government in order to carry out their interest in striking down all the elements of the counterrevolution and in enforcing a revolutionary dictatorship over them." (Emphasis in original.)

Peng's conclusions were advanced two weeks before the workers in Shanghai were victorious in their armed insurrection of March 21, 1927. His views were thus put forward five weeks before Chiang Kai-shek's next coup on April 12 when he butchered the revolutionary masses in the same city.

Although Peng's formula of a "revolutionary regime of democratic dictatorship" cannot be equated with a dictatorship of the proletariat in alliance with the poor peasants, it obviously excludes the bourgeoisie from the revolutionary regime, and can therefore be considered to be a formula calling for a workers' and peasants' government.

It is completely different from the policy of a "bloc of four classes"—the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie—insisted upon by the Comintern in preparing for the establishment of a coalition government composed of representatives of the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and bourgeoisie.

Furthermore, in an article entitled "After Reading Chiang Kai-shek's Speech of February 21" (published in Hsiang Tao, March 18, 1927), Peng with the greatest precision exposed Chiang's calculations and his anticommunist, anti-peasant, anti-Communist, and anti-Soviet course. Peng uttered a grave warning: "The coming struggle in China is a life and death struggle between the forces of the revolution and the antirevolutionary forces represented by Chiang Kai-shek." (Emphasis in original.)

But the Comintern took a different attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek, since it still urged the CCP to continue its policy of collaborating with him.

Special attention should be paid to an article written by Peng two years earlier entitled "The Banning of the Confederation of Trade Unions in Shanghai and the Ensuing Responsibilities of the Workers in the City" (published in Hsiang Tao, October 5, 1925). In this article, Peng observed:

"The success of the Chinese national revolution is possible only on condition that the Chinese workers arise and fight. Shanghai . . . is the equivalent of Russia's Petrograd—the February revolution and the October rev-
olution in Russia were under the leadership of the workers in Petrograd."

He ended his article by forecasting:
"The hundreds of thousands of workers in Shanghai have gained much experience in the May 30 Movement under the leadership of the General Trade Union, and have become familiar with a number of the elementary methods of carrying out a revolution. In the future they will advance further along the road of armed insurrection... following the examples set by the workers of Petrograd from the February revolution to the October revolution." (Emphasis in the original.)

Peng’s prediction had proved to be accurate. The workers in Shanghai organized an armed insurrection on March 21, 1927, in response to the advance of the Northern Expedition. The following day, they occupied the entire city except for the foreign concessions. More than 2,000 armed pickets were organized to maintain peace and order. Workers flooded into the trade unions and the CCP, opening up the possibility of establishing a proletarian regime.

If, at that time, the CCP had not been controlled by the Comintern; if it had been permitted to follow its own assessments (such as those expressed by Peng) based on the lessons drawn from the October revolution in Russia and its own experiences; if it had led the Shanghai workers in a determined way and drawn in those soldiers in sympathy with the workers; if it had organized councils...

2. The great majority of the Shanghai contingent of soldiers in the Northern Expedition were, at that juncture, sympathetically disposed towards the workers.

Unfortunately the CCP had to obey the Comintern and, in accordance with its opportunistic policy, collaborate with Chiang Kai-shek. After having led the workers to victory in an armed insurrection in Shanghai, the CCP was soon disarmed politically. The CCP had to do what the Comintern wanted it to do—organize a "provisional government" in Shanghai in collaboration with the bourgeoisie.

The bourgeois elements participating in the provisional government did everything possible to paralyze it through sabotage and boycotts while waiting for Chiang’s next move. The Comintern’s policy tied the hands of the Communists and workers. Under these circumstances, the CCP was useless to the workers.

Early in the morning of April 12, 1927, Chiang, having been granted the time needed to work out another plot, gave the signal to start the slaughter of his second coup. Many Communists and workers in Shanghai fell at the hands of the executioners, and Chiang took over the gains made by the revolution. This was the inevitable outcome of Stalin’s insistence on the CCP following a policy of collaborating with the Kuomintang and helping Chiang’s Northern Expedition.

[To be continued.]

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Founding of the Left Opposition in China

Intercontinental Press

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Looking Back Over My Years with Peng Shu-tse

By Peng Pi-lan

II

[Continued from last week.]

Stalin did not have the least inkling of the meaning of the Canton coup carried out by Chiang Kai-shek on March 20, 1926. That was why he continued the policy of having the CCP collaborate with the Kuomintang and of giving assistance to Chiang. This paved the way for the butchery committed in the Shanghai coup of April 12. Even this massacre did not open Stalin’s eyes to the facts; the tragedy taught him nothing.

Now he shifted to Wang Ching-wei, placing confidence in him instead of Chiang Kai-shek. "Collaboration with the Left Wing Kuomintang" replaced "Kuomintang-CCP collaboration."

The Fifth Congress of the CCP was held when this shift occurred, from the end of April to the beginning of May, 1927. The basic policies adopted by the congress remained as before inasmuch as Stalin’s basic policy remained unchanged. The peasants were still restrained from demanding the land; the need to seek improvements in the workers’ standard of living was ignored; above all, out of fear of damaging collaboration with the Left Wing Kuomintang, arming of the workers and peasants was rejected.

Stalin held that "Wuhan is the revolutionary center," and that naturally Wang’s regime would solve the agrarian problem and improve the standard of living of the workers. Stalin’s policy, however, paved the way for Wang Ching-wei, as the representative of the Left Wing Kuomintang, to purge the CCP.

At the time of the Fifth Congress, Trotsky proposed that the CCP, in order to establish its independence, leave the Kuomintang, and that soviets of the workers, peasants, and soldiers be organized in preparation to displace Wang’s regime. Trotsky’s proposals, which would have led to a showdown, were blocked by Stalin.
Ch'en, as general secretary, had no choice but to carry out the policy decided on in Moscow. At the same time he was well aware that Wang's "Left Wing Kuomintang" was giving more and more support to the counterrevolutionary army generals against the CCP, and turning toward an attack against the mass movement of workers and peasants.

Once more, Ch'en proposed to withdraw from Wang's Kuomintang so that the CCP could lead the movement independently. Again the Comintern rejected the proposal. In his disappointment over the leadership of the Comintern, Ch'en resigned shortly thereafter. (Chu Ch'i-pei was put in as acting general secretary.) Almost immediately, Wang Ching-wei cracked down July 14, 1927, with his "Communist purge."

From now on, the second Chinese revolution met with failure and tragedy.

* * *

On the eve of the "Communist purge," Peng was sent to the North to serve as secretary of the "Northern Regional Committee." To renew contact with the workers and peasants, he set about working out a defensive policy and reorganizing the party in Peking, Tientsin, and other areas. This was the moment chosen by the Central Political Bureau, headed by Chu Ch'i-pei, to order an armed insurrection in Peking and Tientsin.

What had happened? Following Wang's coup, the Comintern switched its policy on the Chinese revolution from extreme right opportunism to extreme left adventurism. The Central Committee of the CCP met August 7, 1927 (hence the so-called "August 7 Conference") for the principal purpose of absolving the Comintern of its responsibility for the defeat of the Chinese revolution and laying the blame on Ch'en Tu-hsui as the scapegoat. Chu Ch'i-pei, who tended to follow blindly the adventurist policy of the Comintern, was chosen formally as the general secretary.

Disregarding the objective situation, Chu had already ordered the troops under Ho Lung and Yeh T'ing to engage in an armed rebellion. This started August 1, 1927, in Nan-ch'ang. Then came the so-called Autumn Harvest Rebellions in Hunan and Hupeh . . .

Peng held that the Comintern's policy of jumping from the extreme right to the extreme left, was not only out of keeping with Marxism, but also lacked common sense. Although he could do nothing to change things, he discussed the situation with members of the Northern Regional Committee and a "delaying policy" was agreed on.

They clearly saw that Peking and Tientsin were completely under control of the reaction ary warlords. Since neither a mass movement nor a mass organization existed, if they ordered party members and workers to engage in an artificial armed insurrection, the sole outcome would be the useless sacrifice of the lives of the cadres and militants. As a pretext for delaying, they argued that an armed insurrection takes time to prepare. However, Chu Ch'i-pei and the Political Bureau believed that Peng was purposefully refusing to carry out the decision and dismissed him as secretary.

Ts'ai He-sheng was sent to replace him and to organize the Northern Bureau. He moved toward an armed insurrection in the most energetic way, but this had not even
begun when more than sixty cadres were arrested in Peking and shot. This was the outcome of only attempting to carry out the Comintern’s policy of armed insurrection in North China.

After being dismissed, Peng went back to Shanghai. This was in the days immediately following the failure of the Canton insurrection (staged December 11, 1927), when Stalin’s adventurist policy was clearly an utter failure. In Shanghai and throughout the rest of the country, terror reigned. Virtually not a day passed without comrades being arrested and shot.

The CCP became increasingly dependent on the Comintern as the sole source of funds, and there was no alternative to this owing to the defeat of the revolution. Under Stalin’s control, the Comintern was increasingly being used as a device to housebreak the CCP by backing the more pliable leaders and cadres.

Thus the bureaucrats, especially Chu Ch’iu-pai, utilized material means to advance their control. Those who demonstrated their tractability were assured of material help, which, to a certain extent, gained protection for them against danger. Those who dared to express doubts as to the effectiveness of the adventurist course, or to evidence dissatisfaction with Chu Ch’iu-pai’s bureaucratic measures, faced great difficulties. They would inevitably find themselves out of a job and denied living expenses.

This was a deadly threat to cadres who had become professional revolutionists. Working wholeheartedly for the party, making this their way of life, they had severed ordinary social relations, often even with friends and relatives. They could expect help from nowhere. Under the white terror those known as Communists could in no circumstances so much as apply for a job. Even in journalistic or translating work they were compelled to use pseudonyms. The bureaucrats exploited this situation to tighten their control over the cadres.

Peng Shu-tse, our six-month-old daughter, and I underwent great dangers and suffered many hardships. Under the control of Chu Ch’iu-pai, the Central Committee would give Peng no work, although he was still a member of that body, even refusing to admit him to meetings. Out of fear that his opposition to adventurism and bureaucraticism would affect other cadres, they wanted to isolate him.

They soon stopped his frugal living allowance, and Shu-tse was left with no other alternative but to make a living by translating books.

When we returned to Shanghai from Tientsin, Peng Shu-tse could once again meet with Ch’en Tu-hsü. Ch’en was Peng’s source of information on what had been going on in the CCP since Wang Ching-wei had launched his purge against the Communists. In August and September of 1927, Ch’en had written two letters to the Central Committee criticizing the adventurist course. Consequently, Peng and Ch’en found themselves in common agreement on their political positions.

Their criticisms of the Central Committee of the CCP and of the Comintern were, of course, reported back to Moscow by Chu Ch’iu-pai. As a result, just before the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, which was held in Moscow in 1928, Stalin and Bukharin sent a telegram to Ch’en Tu-hsü and Peng Shu-tse (the telegram was delivered personally by Chou En-lai to Ch’en’s home), inviting them to attend the congress.

Ch’en Tu-hsü and Peng Shu-tse had already lost hope and confidence in the Comintern, and, clearly understanding that the real aim was to “persuade” or “detain” them and thus eliminate their influence in the CCP, they politely but firmly declined the invitation.

* * *

In the spring of 1929, Peng Shu-tse had a long talk with several students who had just returned from Moscow. From them he learned of the struggle of the Left Opposition, led by Trotsky, against the Stalinists. They told him about Trotsky’s view on the problems of the Chinese revolution. These students also gave him two important documents written by Trotsky on the Chinese question: "Summary and Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution" and "The Chinese Question After the Sixth Congress."

After studying these documents, Peng Shu-tse decided what political line he would take inside the Chinese Communist party; he would fight in support of the line adopted by the Trotskyist Left Opposition. That Peng so swiftly accepted Trotsky’s program was by no means accidental. On the one hand he was grounded in Marxism and Leninism, and had a thought-out concept of the Chinese revolution. On the other hand he knew from personal experience why the revolution had failed and had seen with his own eyes the tragic results of Stalin’s adventurist policy.

He was powerfully impressed upon reading how acutely Trotsky had criticized first the opportunistic policies of Stalin and Bukharin during the rise of the Chinese revolution and then their adventurist course during its decline, and how Trotsky had advocated a defensive policy, calling for a National Assembly as a general slogan, to replace the hopeless adventurism. The accuracy of Trotsky’s forecasts had been registered in blood.

Peng gave the two documents to Ch’en Tu-hsü to read and study. The next day Ch’en came to our home to tell us that in his opinion Trotsky’s criticisms of the policies of Stalin and Bukharin were completely justified. It was most urgent, he thought, in view of the current objective situation, to adopt a defensive policy centered around the slogan of calling for a National Assembly, replacing Stalin’s adventurist policy.

The outcome of this common understanding and agreement was that Ch’en Tu-hsü and Peng Shu-tse worked out a plan to bring together all the cadres in disagreement with the party’s adventurist policy in order to discuss Trotsky’s two documents and to organize a Left Opposition within the Chinese Communist party.

Ch’en Tu-hsü and Peng Shu-tse each wrote a letter to the party’s Central Committee, requesting that a discussion be opened to draw the necessary lessons from the defeat of the revolution and the results of the current policy. They asked that the party publish Trotsky’s documents on the Chinese revolution so that they could be referred to in the discussion.

Our left oppositional work inside the party was very successful. Within two months we had assembled about

3. Published in an English translation in The Third International After Lenin by Leon Trotsky. — IP
4. Published in an English translation in Problems of the Chinese Revolution by Leon Trotsky. — IP

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fifty cadres and held a meeting that adopted the stand taken by Trotsky. A provisional central committee composed of three members (Ch'en, Peng, and Yin K'uan) was elected. The cadres, divided into many cells, met constantly to discuss problems and activities inside the party. We also published a periodical The Proletariat and a book consisting of Trotsky's main documents on the Chinese revolution.

In consequence of our activities both inside and outside the party, and the dissemination of the ideas expressed in the letters addressed by Ch'en and Peng to the center, the party was greatly shaken. The leadership of the party, under directives from the International, was compelled to expel us, one by one. The first to be singled out for expulsion were Ch'en Tu-hsiiu and Peng Shu-tse. It was then the turn of Yin K'uan, Cheng Ch'ao-ling, myself, and other cadres. News of the expulsions was published in the party organ Red Flag.

However, the expulsions, because of their nature, did not resolve the crisis in the party, but instead aggravated the shaky situation, causing a number of cadres to join us. On December 15, 1929, eighty-one outstanding cadres signed their names to the "Declaration of the Left Opposition." In the history of the Chinese Communist party, this marked the most intense struggle and division between Stalinism and Trotskyism. Not only did it shake the Chinese Communist party; it drew the attention of Chinese society as a whole and had repercussions in the Communist parties throughout the world.

A number of seasoned cadres, who had experienced the consequences of the defeat of the revolution and the bankruptcy of the policy of adventurism and who had suffered from the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy, yet had remained in the party, now indicated their sympathy for the Left Opposition as they observed their cofighters in the revolution waging a brave and resolute struggle against the party leadership under the guidance of Ch'en and Peng on the basis of the program of Trotsky.

These comrades were called "conciliators" in the party since they sought to bring about a conciliation between those following the party line and the group led by Ch'en Tu-hsiiu. (Liu Shao-chi, now the chairman of the People's Republic of China, also belonged to the "conciliators," and was sent to Moscow because of this.) According to Chen Shao-yu, who was one hundred percent for the line of the International (he later changed his name to Wang Ming), "the conciliators suggested that the Party welcome back Ch'en Tu-hsiiu and Peng Shu-tse, who had been expelled because of their opposition to the line adopted at the Sixth Congress of the Party." These few words indicate the impact of the Left Opposition on the party.

* * *

While Ch'en and Peng were forming the Left Opposition

5. Five years ago, when Peng Pi-lan wrote this account, Liu Shao-chi was still the chairman, having been reelected January 3, 1965. Mao ousted him during the purge of the "cultural revolution" on charges reminiscent of those used by Stalin during the great purges of the thirties in the Soviet Union against his political opponents. — IP


in China, some students who had recently returned from Moscow were also organizing Trotskyist groups and publishing their own periodicals. In these publications they not only quarreled among themselves, they also attacked Ch'en and Peng, whom they considered to be responsible for the past opportunistic policy. In their eyes, only the younger comrades, who had not participated in the revolution, and who, therefore, had not caused it to fail, were worthy of being called Trotskyists.

This sectarian attitude was exploited by the Stalinist leadership of the party in attacks against Ch'en Tu-hsiiu and Peng Shu-tse. The "conciliators," noting the confusion and divergent views in the Left Opposition, gradually lost their sympathy for Trotskyism.

This was a heavy blow to the newly born Trotskyist movement in China. Later, when Trotsky heard about the confusion, he suggested that the various Trotskyist groupings unite. The unification took place at a conference held in May 1931. The united Trotskyist movement was called the Communist League of China.

Right after the unification, a number of leading comrades were arrested—a traitor had passed information to the military authorities in Shanghai. Shu-tse, I, and our daughter, then four years old, escaped only several hours before the police raided our home and confiscated all our belongings—books, documents, and clothes. This loss intensified our sufferings and difficulties in the years ahead.

Ch'en Tu-hsiiu was not arrested on this occasion, since his address was not known to the turncoat.

It was a terrible situation, since the traitors to the party worked hand in hand with Chiang Kai-shek's agents. The agents waited at entrances to parks, theaters, department stores, major street crossings. If a comrade met one of the traitors, he would be followed and arrested by the plainclothesmen. His fate was then sealed.

* * *

Although our Left Opposition suffered heavy losses—demoralized comrades even left the movement—the objective situation changed as a result of the Japanese imperialist invasion of Manchuria on September 18, 1931, and of Shanghai on January 28, 1932, giving us new impetus. The invasions gave rise to a big anti-Japanese imperialist movement which, in turn, scored the nonresistance of the Kuomintang government. During the mass anti-Japanese and anti-Kuomintang movement, the Communist League of China published, for the first time since its formation, an open weekly periodical, Warm Tide. It called for arming the masses against Japanese imperialism.

Our agitation and propaganda work had great influence among the students and working masses, and we met with an especially broad response among the lower levels of the party cadres.

Wang Ming, with Moscow's support, now ousted Li Li-san and Chu Ch'i-kuo from leadership of the Chinese Communist party, assuming leadership himself. During his tenure, he went to a bizarre extreme in his sectarian attitude toward the anti-Japanese movement and later towards the 19th Route Army, then under the leadership of the left wing of the Kuomintang. In Red Flag, the official party organ, he advocated supporting the Red Army in its fight against the Japanese in the country-
side, but he opposed arming the masses and backing the 19th Route Army in its struggle against the Japanese. That was on the political side. Organizationally he was just as bad. He expelled a great number of activists—the "conciliators" led by Ho Meng Hsing—causing them to lose their lives. In one instance, cut off from financial support from the party and unable to rent a safer place to meet, some twenty cadres gathered in a small room in a poor hotel. They were arrested and shot. Many cadres left the party, and the disintegrating organization became a big field of recruitment for the Trotskyist movement.

Many rank-and-file cadres who read the documents of Trotsky and the anti-Japanese articles and criticisms of Stalin's policies published in Warm Tide got in touch with us. After discussing with Peng Shu-tse, they joined the Trotskyist movement. Several dozen important industrial party cells came over to us, including the postal, power-plant, and textile workers. These cells totaled half the membership of the Chinese Communist party in Shanghai. The Left Opposition was thus able to lead the workers movement in Shanghai in several important strikes that met with relative success. The Trotskyist movement simultaneously made fresh headway in Peking, Wuhan, Nanking, Kwantung, and Hong Kong.

The Trotskyist movement likewise registered progress in expanding the publication of socialist literature. First of all, we put out a magazine called The Moving Force. This was printed by a left-wing publishing house. Peng edited it and contributed articles on the nature of Chinese society and on philosophical and political problems which he dealt with from the Trotskyist standpoint.

The magazine had considerable influence among intellectuals and students. Later it was taken over by another editor and renamed Reader's Magazine. However, Peng Shu-tse encouraged continued contributions by Trotskyists to the magazine and they went on taking up the question of the nature of Chinese society.

The Stalinists maintained that China was predominant-

ly feudal. This touched off a big controversy between the Trotskyists and Stalinists on the subject and related theoretical questions having to do with the nature of the Chinese revolution.

The Trotskyist viewpoint, which was based on the theory of permanent revolution, gained the upper hand in this controversy. As a result our influence increased in the left. In addition we translated into Chinese various works by Marx and Lenin dealing with social science and philosophy and the first part of Trotsky's autobiography. These books were brought out by some left-wing publishers who were generally accessible to us.

As for us personally, Peng devoted all his time and energy to the movement, neglecting our sole means of gaining a livelihood—translating books—and since I could not find a job owing to the witch-hunt kept up by the Chiang Kai-shek government, our resources touched bottom. I frequently visited the pawnbroker, and sometimes Peng had nothing but a bun for sustenance throughout a whole day of meetings or discussions with comrades. He was often obliged to walk long distances because he had no money with which to buy a tram ticket. Several years passed, working in the movement in this fashion.

It was then that misfortune befell the harvest. Our movement was beginning to reap. On October 15, 1932, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Peng Shu-tse, and eight other comrades were arrested.

The blow to our movement was extremely heavy, and this disaster was shortly to be followed by another. All the important cadres who had joined us from the Chinese Communist party were arrested. As a result, nearly all of the workers' groups were broken up. Our contacts with the workers thus came to an end.

Those intellectuals that escaped arrest became very demoralized, many resigning and leaving the movement. Our forces were reduced to a few cadres faced with stagnation and isolation, a situation that was to endure for several years.

Five Years in Nanking Model Prison

Looking Back Over My Years with Peng Shu-tse

By Peng Pi-ian

III

[Continued from last week.]

The big press reported the arrest of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Peng Shu-tse, especially the fact that they had been transferred from Shanghai to Nanking where they were to be tried by a military court. Fearing that the two revolutionary leaders would be condemned to death, many eminent figures sent telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek and his government, calling for their case to be transferred to a civil court. These included Tsai Yuen-pai, the former chancellor of Peking National University, Soong Chingling, the widow of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who is a vice-president of the People's Republic of China today, and a number of well-known professors. Because of these appeals, the two were finally transferred to a civil court in Nanking. The proceedings, which were made public, lasted two years, and were closely followed by the press throughout the country.

The Kuomintang government charged Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Peng Shu-tse with violating the "Emergency Law Governing Treason." Both of them wrote statements defending themselves and chose several lawyers to represent them in court. Peng, in addition to answering the charges
in his statement, denounced as treason the Kuomintang’s policy of offering no resistance to Japanese imperialism, abolishing civil liberties and democratic rights, and stated that in his opinion only communism could save China from disaster.

On the day of their open trial (the one and only time in the history of the Kuomintang government that communists were granted an open trial), the courtroom was crowded. Chen Li-fu and his entourage, the bosses of the Kuomintang, even followed the trial, although hidden from view behind screens.

In his speech of defense, Peng boldly attacked the foreign and domestic policies of the Kuomintang, and affirmed his belief in the goals of communism. Chen Li-fu and his companions were particularly outraged at this.

Ch’en and Peng were each sentenced to thirteen years and the other comrades to five years. The thirteen-year sentences, upon being appealed to a higher court, were later reduced to eight years.

Actually, Peng spent five years in the Nanking Model Prison, not being released until the prison was destroyed by Japanese bombers at the opening of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937.

During the years in prison, Peng converted his cell into a “study.” His reading ranged from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky to the history of China and the Western world, philosophy, the natural sciences, and literature. He read every good book he could lay his hands on, broadening his knowledge as much as possible, including even the origins and social content of the Christian and Buddhist religions.

Unfortunately, during their second year in prison, differences arose between Peng Shu-tse and Ch’en Tu-hsiu over problems involving the Soviet Union, proletaarian dictatorship, and democracy. These were the outcome of a few articles Peng wrote on these subjects. They found it impossible to reconcile their differing points of view and their friendship finally came to an end. During the same year, Peng’s younger brother, Peng Tao-tse, one of the best cadres, who was also being held in the same prison, died of an illness left untreated for want of money. These two misfortunes greatly affected Peng, as I could tell from his letters. Yet his fortitude, his patience, and his inner balance enabled him to take these blows and recover.

Over the long five years Shu-tse was in prison, I suffered greatly, personally, from the disruption of our family life, meeting with much hardship. I had to support our two children, yet be wary of the offers of help that came from many sides. Most painful of all, I had to face political isolation.

Whenever I participated in meetings of left groups or engaged in political discussions, almost inevitably I encountered Stalinists and their sympathizers, very seldom Trotskyists. At first the Stalinists displayed sympathy and friendliness. They even went so far as to find work for me, thus hoping to win me to their ranks. However, once I had openly rejected their advances, making clear my political views, they cut me off from all their various activities.

On August 13, 1937, a few days after the Nanking Model Prison was bombed, Peng, Ch’en, and the other comrades were released. Peng was the last to be freed. Had it not been for the strong objections of the chief jailer, the Kuomintang hierarchy might still have kept Peng locked up because of his strong attack against their regime at the time of his trial.

When Peng Shu-tse returned to Shanghai, the nationwide anti-Japanese campaign was at its height. However, there were only a dozen or so Trotskyists left in Shanghai. On top of this, although a nominal central organization existed, contacts with other local groups had not been reestablished.

To begin swimming in the current of the anti-imperialist struggle, Peng called a provisional conference of all the remaining comrades, including those newly released from prison. A resolution was passed at the conference supporting the armed struggle being waged by the Kuomintang government against Japanese imperialism. Accompanying this was a criticism from the political point of view of the government’s reactionary policies.

A provisional central committee was elected and authorization given to publish a clandestine party journal, The Struggle. Shortly after this meeting, a number of small regional groups were again established. Owing to the favorable objective situation, the Trotskyist organization was soon expanding in areas such as Shanghai, Peking, Canton, Hong Kong, and the provinces of Kwangsi and Chekiang.

No sooner had our movement found its feet than two important events occurred.

The first was a rumor cooked up by the Stalinists and published in their press alleging that Ch’en Tu-hsiu and Peng Shu-tse had accepted funds from the Japanese imperialists and had pledged to enter into their service. The tag they used for this was “Trotskyite Traitors.” The Stalinist newspapers in Shanghai followed this up with the slander that Li Kuo-chieh, a traitor who had just been assassinated by Kuomintang agents, and Peng Shu-tse were good friends. The purpose of this was to provoke an agent of the Kuomintang into assassinating Peng, or to provide a cover for one of their own agents to kill Peng. They retracted the slander only after Peng filed a lawsuit.

The second event involved Ch’en Tu-hsiu. He proposed to offer all-out support to the War of Resistance as led by Chiang Kai-shek. He objected to the political criticism of the Kuomintang published in our journal. His attitude gave rise to a severe dispute within our organization. Peng Shu-tse, trying to overcome the confusion that had been created, had no choice but to criticize Chen Tu-hsiu’s viewpoint. This ruined their relationship conclusively.

For the Chinese Trotskyist movement, the loss was a great one.

Yet, as Peng Shu-tse, Liu Chia-liang, Wang Fan-si, and other cadres released from prison collaborated with the few comrades who had remained firm in Shanghai, the movement progressed steadily despite the rumors circulated by the Stalinists and despite the difficulties caused by Chen Tu-hsiu’s erroneous position. In fact, after the publication in August 1939 of an open periodical, Moving Forward, its influence was quite considerable. The periodical carried criticisms of the Kuomintang’s passivity in the War of Resistance and of Stalin’s signing the infamous German-Soviet pact.

In this same period, various sympathizers gave Peng substantial financial aid, enabling us to publish two books.
and a pamphlet by Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, The Revolution Betrayed, and The Moscow Trials. We also published three pamphlets by Peng, The War Against the Japanese Imperialists, The Lesson of the Defeat of the Spanish Revolution, and The Defeat of the Austrian Revolution. These received a quite a wide response from workers and intellectuals. Once again our movement was moving forward.

At the outbreak of World War II, just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, a very serious internal struggle took place within the Chinese Trotskyist movement.

One tendency, headed by Ch'en Tu-hsü, viewed the war as a struggle between democratic countries and the fascist Axis. He therefore argued for abandoning the policy of "defeatism" in democratic countries like England and France. In addition, in view of the tragedy of the Moscow trials and the Hitler-Stalin pact, he reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union was no longer a workers state and consequently should not be supported.

Another tendency, headed by Wang Fan-si, held that if war broke out between Japan and the USA, China would become involved in an imperialist war. A consequence of this would be the conversion of the national war of resistance into an imperialist war. Thus he held that we should adopt a policy of "defeatism" towards the War of Resistance led by the Kuomintang.

These two tendencies, especially the ultra-left one, caused great confusion among the rank and file.

To combat this, Peng Shu-tse wrote a long article, "On the Struggle Against Two Deviationist Lines," explaining the dangers inherent in Ch'en's opportunism and Wang's ultra-left sectarianism. Peng defended Trotsky's fundamental position on the second world war and the Sino-Japanese war, including the possibility of war breaking out between Japan and the USA.

The discussion in the membership ended at the National Convention of the Communist League of China in August 1941. Peng's resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority. No one supported Ch'en's position, and Wang's position was backed by only a few members.

After the convention, Ch'en Tu-hsü broke with Trotskyism. He died in June, 1942, in Szechwan province.

The minority group led by Wang continued to maintain its position but then violated the principles of democratic centralism by publishing an open periodical of its own. Not long after the outbreak of the war between the United States and Japan, Wang and his small group of followers left the Communist League of China.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, Japanese troops occupied the foreign settlement in Shanghai. This dealt a heavy blow to our movement. Communications between our central headquarters and the local organizations were disrupted. More importantly, a number of cadres were arrested. Peng Shu-tse barely escaped.

The repression caused a number of activists to leave Shanghai. Once again our link with the masses was severed. A period of extreme terror opened under the Japanese imperialist occupation.

Despite the precarious situation, Peng managed to bring together a group of young comrades. Using a pseudonym, he gained an appointment as a professor of Chinese history, Western history, and philosophy in two universities. In his classes, of course, he could not use Marxist terminology. Nevertheless, he oriented his lectures along Marxist lines and influenced a number of leftist students. Some of them wanted to meet him after his lectures and thus we welcomed a group of young people to our home, regardless of their political backgrounds.

We discussed various problems with these students, later converting even those who had come under Stalinist influence to our positions. These youths were to become the foundation of our movement in the postwar period.

We also became acquainted with several businessmen of leftist inclinations. They later became good friends of ours. After the war they helped the movement financially in an energetic way, especially in the publication of periodicals.

With the surrender of Japan, Chiang Kai-shek's government came under mounting pressure from the people to grant democratic concessions. This eased the political situation somewhat. Taking advantage of the opening, our organization once more moved actively forward. Our first task was to publish an open journal to stir up the masses.

On May 1, 1946, two open monthly magazines came off the press. Seeking the Truth was a theoretical and political magazine edited by Peng Shu-tse. It was the most attractive magazine of the postwar period, openly propagating Trotskyist ideas. The second magazine, Youth and Women, which I edited, was later renamed New Voice. It became the organ of the Trotskyist movement.

The two periodicals had a nationwide circulation, reaching all the important cities until they ceased publication in 1948 upon our leaving Shanghai. Their influence was considerable among the intellectuals, students, and young workers. In addition they made it possible for branches of our movement, disrupted by the war, to renew contacts and to reach out to individuals who had become isolated.

The Communist League of China not only recovered its lost forces, it began to grow at a rapid rate. It constituted a number of cells among industrial workers and university students in Shanghai, Canton, Hong Kong, and other cities.

We devoted our most intensive efforts to educating young cadres. In addition to regular cadre schools, we held a seminar each week that was regularly attended by more than one hundred comrades and sympathizers. This weekly gathering continued for two and a half years, becoming a pole of attraction that recruited many youths and intellectuals into our movement.

Peng Shu-tse was one of the principal speakers and organizers of these meetings as well as of the cadre schools. Despite sleepless nights, which he spent in writing articles for our publications, he participated in all these meetings with rare and unflagging energy.

In August 1948, when the Third National Convention of the Communist League of China opened, our membership stood at 350. This was a good gauge of our fast rate of growth. A new political platform was adopted at the convention, and it was decided to change the name of the organization to the Chinese Revolutionary Communist Party.

As our movement made these strides forward, a decisive change took place in the objective situation. The military counteroffensive opened by the Chinese Communist party against Chiang Kai-shek gained victory after victory. The People's Liberation Army stood at the north bank of the Yangtze and was poised to take Nanking and Shanghai.
Under these circumstances, the Chinese Revolutionary Communist Party held an emergency conference at which measures were adopted in the light of the experiences and lessons learned from the treatment of Trotskyists by the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union.

All the members of the Executive Committee were present. They voted for a resolution recommending that the Political Bureau be transferred to Hong Kong and that a Provisional Committee be set up in Shanghai, charged with the responsibility of keeping in touch with the regional groups and giving directives as necessary.

It was also decided that all our party members and the members of the youth movement should do everything possible to integrate themselves into the Chinese Communist party, the Communist Youth League, and the mass organizations of workers and peasants of various kinds in order to better support all progressive measures undertaken by the CCP.

The cadres who were too well known to the Stalinists were instructed to leave Shanghai for other provinces. Exchanges of cadres between different areas were also decided upon. Of the five comrades on the Political Bureau, Kin was already in Hong Kong; Yun Kuan, who was not willing to leave Shanghai, was soon arrested by the CCP regime along with many other comrades none of whom have been heard from since; Peng Shu-tse, Liu Chia-liang, and I set out for Hong Kong, where we arrived at the end of 1948.

In Hong Kong, Vietnam, and Western Europe

Looking Back Over My Years with Peng Shu-tse

By Peng Pi-lan

IV

[Continued from last week.]

As soon as we had become settled in Hong Kong, we set up a printshop again and resumed publishing our party's journal. We also helped the Hong Kong branch in its activities and in improving its educational work. We projected the publication in Chinese of Trotsky's Stalin and Harold R. Isaac's The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, succeeding in getting out the latter book.

The British authorities in Hong Kong, however, had already put Trotskyist activities on the island under close surveillance because of the strikes they had led, much to the distaste of the rulers of the Crown Colony. Our comrades had suffered frequent arrests and deportations. Since the leading journal of the Chinese Revolutionary Communist Party had now opened up offices on the island, the authorities tightened their surveillance of all our movements.

The Hong Kong police discovered our printshop, arrested two of the comrades in charge, and deported them at once. Two persons who received correspondence from the international movement and Western Trotskyist publications were jailed. They were not members but only sympathizers. However, by tailing them and following all the leads, the police also managed to arrest more than ten of our comrades. Most of them were soon sentenced and deported. Then the police discovered where we lived and raided our flat. Fortunately, we had left the night before. Two days after this narrow escape, the police found our temporary refuge at a friend's flat and we had to move again. No sooner had we moved into another friend's home than the police appeared once more.

It was evident that under these circumstances we could no longer continue to live in Hong Kong. Since Shu-tse had become the main quarry in the hunt pursued by the Hong Kong authorities, the comrades were of the opinion that the Political Bureau should move elsewhere. Thus it was that Liu Chia-liang, Shu-tse, I and our children left Hong Kong for Vietnam. The move was made possible thanks to considerable help from our friends and comrades.

We reached Vietnam at the end of January 1950. Save for Liu, we found jobs to keep us going. Hardly a few months had passed, however, before misfortune struck again.

Two leading Vietnamese Trotskyists (René and Liu) were invited to participate in a conference in the zone controlled by the Vietminh. We had been assured that the conference was being organized by Trotskyist elements inside the Vietminh, among them being the chief of staff of the army in control of this zone. The conference was scheduled to discuss the military situation and organizational problems of the Vietnamese Trotskyist movement. Unfortunately, the Stalinists had prepared a trap.

When the conference came to an end, all the Vietnamese Trotskyists, and our Comrade Liu Chia-liang, who had been invited to attend, were arrested. Shortly afterwards, Liu Chia-liang died in prison. As for the Vietnamese comrades, the report was that they were still alive at the time we left Vietnam, but we have never heard what their final fate was.

The Trotskyist movement in Vietnam had suffered a serious blow. Comrade Liu Chia-liang was now gone. Even Shu-tse's life was in immediate danger because the Stalinists knew where he was and could eliminate him whenever they pleased.

Upon learning of Liu's death, all our comrades and
friends in Hong Kong and elsewhere urged us to leave Vietnam without further delay. They collected sufficient funds to assure our getting to Europe. Thus we started out on our long exile to the West.

* * *

Despite hardships, poverty, and illness, the years of exile in Western Europe have been instructive. Upon arriving in Europe, Shu-tse was able to participate more directly in the international activities of the world Trotskyist movement. This enabled him to gain a better appreciation of world developments and, above all, to gain a better grasp of where our movement as a whole stands in seeking to achieve its tasks.

His contributions in the past fifteen years to the Trotskyist movement have been primarily literary. First of all, he made a detailed analysis of the victory of the third Chinese revolution, its causes, its impact on the international situation, and its consequences in China in the initial subsequent stages.

In his opinion the third Chinese revolution ought properly to be characterized as a "deformed" revolution. The overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek's bourgeois regime, the realization of such revolutionary measures as national independence, land reform, etc., showed incontestably that a deep-going revolution had occurred. But the regime established in China following the revolution had to be characterized as a type of dictatorial bureaucratic rule. Therefore the prospects in China were much like those in the East European countries, that is, the formation of a "deformed workers state" (see "Report on the Chinese Situation," November 1951).

When the fanatical campaign to establish "People's Communes" was launched by the Chinese Communist party, this led to considerable confusion and the creation of illusions among radical and progressive elements all over the world. Peng followed the events very closely and wrote about them in the light of the fundamental principles laid down by Marx, Lenin, and Trotsky on collectivization of the land, the experiences of the Soviet Union and the East European countries in this field, and in particular the existing conditions in China. To force the peasants to enter the people's communes by ukase, he held, could only lead to resentment on their part and as a result an inevitable decline in agricultural production (see "Criticism of the Various Views Supporting the Chinese Rural People's Communes," published in January 1969).

When a few Trotskyists began to idealize the CCP and its regime, seeking to establish that Mao's party and regime are analogous to the Bolshevik party and the revolutionary regime that existed in the Soviet Union during Lenin's lifetime, Peng Shu-tse sought to refute their assertions by facts and theoretical arguments. The CCP, he maintained, still continued to be a Stalinist party and its regime a bureaucratic dictatorship. For this reason, he held, a political revolution would inevitably occur in China as had been forecast for the Soviet Union and the East European countries (see "On the Nature of the Chinese Communist Party and Its Regime," written in April 1960).

Within the Fourth International, he opposed the tendency represented by Pablo that inclined to take a conciliatory attitude toward the Soviet bureaucracy, and he also opposed the ultra-left sectarian tendency represented by Healy that appeared later (see "Pabloism Criticized" and "Where Is Healy Taking the Socialist Labour League?").

In the years following the split in the world Trotskyist movement that occurred in 1953-54, as soon as it became clear that a new basis for a principled unification existed, he became an advocate of reunification. In the International Committee he conducted a solitary battle for several years against Healy's stubborn hostility to reunification. At the Reunification Congress in June 1963, when he saw the actual reunification of the world Trotskyist movement with his own eyes, he said, "For me, during my stay in Europe this is the happiest event of the past ten years."

* * *

Peng Shu-tse is now seventy years old. He feels extremely lucky to be alive. Most of the militants of his generation, with whom he fought side by side during the days of the second Chinese revolution and following its defeat, are dead. The majority lost their lives under the knife of the butcher Chiang Kai-shek.

For the past thirty-eight years, the years following that defeated revolution, Peng Shu-tse has passed most of the time in privation, danger, terror, and exile. He has lived through the witch-hunt conducted by Chiang Kai-shek; arrest and imprisonment under the rule of the Kuomintang; the lies and slanders splashed on his name by the Stalinists, their attempts on his life; through the persecution inflicted by Japanese imperialism. To survive all this sounds like the role cast for the hero in popular fiction. Yet that is the way it turned out, and Shu-tse is a most fortunate man.

As early as 1920 when he joined the newly founded Communist party as a youth of twenty-five, he made up his mind to dedicate his life and energies to the revolution. That is why, after so many years of hardships and setbacks, endured during his youth and manhood, he has never regretted his decision or felt disheartened. He knows to the bottom the contradiction that can occur between truth and reality, that all those who fight for a noble ideal have to suffer a hard fate as long as the truth is not definitively triumphant. So it has been that each time he has suffered a blow or setback, he has adopted a sort of "fatalistic" attitude, confronting life with the utmost patience and an iron will. "For gnarling sorrow hath less power to bite the man that mocks it and sets it light," Shakespeare said. A real revolutionary has no choice but to forge his morality and his will through suffering. Out of this comes an even state of mind that makes it possible to avoid being overwhelmed by suffering; suffering can instead be reduced.

Of course, even revolutionists of excellent morality and

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7. This was written five years ago. Peng, of course, is now seventy-five and is celebrating fifty years as an active participant in the revolutionary Marxist movement. — IP

firm resolution cannot defy the test of events and resist
the incessant pressure of suffering and setbacks without
being armed with Marxism. To mention only China, many
revolutionists who were staunch and resolute to begin
with, gradually lost heart and faith under the constant
terror and persecution, under the rain of blows and un-
ending hardship. They lacked a deep Marxist apprecia-
tion of the world. Shu-tse often tells comrades, "We must
raise our own level by studying Marxism. This is not
only an absolute necessity in leading the revolution, but
is the most effective weapon in resisting the setbacks that
come in a period of counterrevolution."

Through consistent study of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and
Trotzky's works, and their way of thinking; through the
experiences and lessons to be learned from the world
revolutionary movement; by seeking to make these in-
tellectual gains his own, Peng Shu-tse has remained a
revolutionary optimist. He firmly believes that Trotzky-
ism, in which is to be found the heritage of Marxism
and Leninism, is certain to carry out the tasks of the
world revolution and lead mankind to freedom from capi-
talist exploitation and oppression, to deliverance from
the threat of extermination in a nuclear war.

In the struggle against Stalinism, which still functions
as a brake on the world revolution, Peng Shu-tse is con-
vinced that Trotzkyism will emerge triumphant.

Stalin's successor, Khruschev, in his report to the Twen-
tieth Congress of the CPSU, revealed a portion of the
offenses committed by Stalin, a portion of the offenses that
were repeatedly exposed and denounced by Trotzky and
his followers. At the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU,
further revelations were made. Since then the most revolt-
ing expressions of Stalin's self-adulation, such as statues
and monuments have been toppled; and Stalin's corpse
has been removed from Lenin's tomb. Sufficient has been
done to show that even Stalin's own heirs have been com-
pelled to confirm at least partially the truth of the de-
nunciations leveled by Trotzky and his followers.

After the exposure at the Twentieth Congress of the
cult of Stalin and some of his crimes, the working class
in Poland and Hungary rose up against the Stalinist
bureaucracy. Then came the breakup of the Stalinist mono-
lith on a world scale as a result of the rupture between
Peking and Moscow. This was followed by splits among
the Stalinist parties throughout the world.

All of this confirmed the correctness of the Trotzkyist
analyses and forecasts concerning the inevitable crisis
and decline faced by Stalinism, thus reinforcing the con-
victions held by Peng Shu-tse and all the Trotzkyists in-
ternationally.

When Stalin's heirs, under the pressure of the Soviet
masses, felt compelled to repudiate Stalin's crimes, this,
I firmly believe, represented the opening of a new era
for humanity in which the truths espoused by Trotzky-
ism will gain ascendency. These truths have been sown
all over the globe and will be harvested in revolutions
everywhere.

For forty years I have shared Peng Shu-tse's fate. I
believe that I understand better than anyone else his way
of thinking, his enthusiasm in seeking the truth, his con-
viction in the truth of Marxism-Leninism and Trotzkyism,
his role in the Chinese Communist party, and the ex-
remely difficult conditions he had to face in struggling
for the Trotzkyist movement in the past thirty-six years.
I have written this article as my present to him at his
seventieth birthday celebration and to express my con-
gratulations.

November 1965.
REPORT ON THE CHINESE SITUATION

by S.T. Peng

(reprinted from International Information Bulletin, February, 1952)

(Note: This article is reprinted from the January 1952 Bulletin of the International Secretariat of the Fourth International for the information of our readers.)

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This is the first of a series of bulletins to be devoted to the discussion of the Chinese Question which was decided upon by the Third World Congress of the Fourth International, and which the enlarged international secretariat, meeting on November 11-12, 1951, decided to place on the agenda of its forthcoming meeting.

This bulletin contains a report given by Comrade T. S. Peng at the Third World Congress, which is published in this bulletin.

This first bulletin will shortly be followed by two others containing a series of discussion documents on the Chinese Question, all written by comrades of our Chinese section and which are referred to in several places in Comrade Peng's report.

The IS reminds members of the International of the resolutions of the 7th and 8th plenums of the IEC pertaining to the Chinese revolution, especially those which characterize the position taken up to this time by the international leadership on the Chinese question.

The views expressed on this same question by the Third World Congress will be found both in the "Theses on Orientation and Perspectives" as well as in the political resolution approved by the Congress. The purpose of the present discussion is to define a more comprehensive position for the International on the Chinese revolution, on those points which have not yet been sufficiently clarified (the class character of the government, of the State, and of the Chinese CP; perspectives of the Chinese revolution), and to settle the existing differences on these points both in the Chinese section and in the International.

December, 1951
International Secretariat
REPORT ON THE CHINESE SITUATION
by S. T. Peng

The victory of the Chinese Communist Party over the reactionary power of Chiang Kai-shek, its occupation of the entire Chinese mainland, and the establishment of the "People's Republic" (or the "People's Democratic Dictatorship") has marked a great and even a monumental change in modern Chinese history, and has also caused profound changes in the Far East and in international relations. This event and this change were unexpected both among bourgeois ruling circles and the petty-bourgeois politicians, the former being stunned and panic-stricken; the latter, perplexed or dazzled. But this event was likewise far from being anticipated by us Trotskyists (including Trotsky himself) owing to the fact that the CCP arrived at this current victory by its extremely reactionary Menshevik program of "revolution by stages," coupled with the fact that the peasant armed forces were completely isolated from the urban working class.

As a result, a considerable amount of confusion has been raised in our ranks regarding Mao's victory, and serious deviations of opinions have occurred on the causes of the victory, its significance, the nature of the power and its perspectives. A few comrades have even begun to doubt the correctness of the theory of the Permanent Revolution. If these differences should not be clarified and resolved in time, the most serious consequences would ensue in our ranks, especially in our Chinese section. A part of the comrades would proceed from doubting the Permanent Revolution to capitulating to Stalinism (some comrades in Shanghai have already evinced this tendency); others would arrive at ultra-sectarianism and complete demoralization in their revulsion against the opportunistic victory of Mao Tse-tung which is the result of a complete violation of the Permanent Revolution (the Chinese Minority has already clearly demonstrated this tendency). We must therefore examine very prudently and seriously Mao's victory and the extraordinary situation emerging from it.

First of all, we should not overlook the reactionary role of Stalinism independently of the victory of the CCP, and reconcile ourselves or even surrender to it. We must still insist on the basic position of the Permanent Revolution, which is the only compass to guide China and all backward countries to genuine liberation; we must judge any further events from this position.

But, in proceeding with the discussion, it is necessary not only to discard all subjective prejudices, desires or mechanical analogies, but to free ourselves from traditional formulae (not, of course, principles). We must face the concrete living facts, whether desirable or undesirable, particularly the decisive influence of the situation created after the Second World War on the Chinese events. We must also take note of the specific function Stalinism played in these events, the distortion or deformation imposed by their rule over the events and their consequences. In a word, we should seriously and flexibly apply the dialectic method of Marxism to observation of the facts, analyze the facts, and by analysis of the causes and effects of the realities, obtain a correct understanding, and thus form a correct appraisal of possible developments.

In other words, we must adopt on the Chinese problem the same spirit and method as our International has done in the study of the Yugoslav events and the question of Eastern Europe. Only in this way can we extricate ourselves from perplexity and extremely dangerous deviations to reach a decision on what the fundamental attitude and orientation of our party should be in respect to the leadership of the CCP. Thus this report is not aimed at supplying a great deal of data; it intends to provide necessary and essential facts in the course of the logical development of the events and to explain certain opinions which have already caused serious disputes, as references for the International so that it can achieve a correct solution of the Chinese question.

THE DIVERSE CAUSES OF THE VICTORY OF THE CCP OVER THE KUOMINTANG

One of the traditional conceptions which was repeatedly pointed out by Trotsky and has been maintained by the Chinese Trotskyists over the past twenty years, and which is also a conception to counter-balance the Stalinist conception of conquering the cities by the peasant armed forces alone, is that the overthrow of the bourgeois regime of the Kuomintang is possible only if the urban working class stands up and leads all the oppressed and exploited in the country, especially the peasant masses, carries forward a persistent struggle and eventually brings about an armed insurrection. It is not possible to overthrow the bourgeois regime by relying exclusively on the peasant armed forces, because,
under the present conditions of society, the countryside is subordinated to the cities and the peasants can play a decisive role only under the leadership of the working class. But the fact now confronting us is exactly the contrary: it was a Stalinist party relying exclusively on the peasant armed forces that destroyed the old regime and seized the power.

This extreme contradiction between the "facts" and the "traditional conception" first of all evoked confusion and disputes among the Chinese comrades. Meanwhile, some comrades in the International, because of their inadequate understanding of Trotsky's traditional conception of the Chinese question and the specific causes of Mao's victory, underline the "pressure of the masses" and account for his victory by this factor. So I think that an accurate and detailed explanation of the causes of this victory is necessary not only for eliminating the differences of opinions among the Chinese comrades but also for correcting the deviation of some comrades in the International. Moreover, the most important thing is this. Only from a correct answer to this question shall we be able to go one step further and comprehend the objective significance of Mao's victory, as well as the twists and turns of all the measures taken by his regime and its possible perspectives. In order to best answer this question, I shall start from several aspects of the facts.

A. The Complete Rottenness and Automatic Collapse of Chiang's Regime

It is known to everyone that the regime of Chiang Kai-shek was born amid the bloodshed of the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution. Naturally it was extremely afraid of and hostile to the people. It oppressed the people and sustained itself on the exploitation of the masses (especially the peasant masses) by the most barbaric Asiatic methods. At the same time, since by its very nature this regime represented the bourgeoisie of the Orient (characterized in the saying that "the farther East the bourgeoisie goes, the more cowardly and the more incompetent it becomes"), Chiang's regime could only support itself on imperialism (one of them, at least) and united all reactionary influences, including the feudal survivals, to resist the masses and to suppress them. It was consequently unable to fulfill any of the bourgeois-democratic tasks, and not even such a slight reform as a 25% reduction in rent. It was mainly characterized by consummate Asiatic despotism, corruption and inefficiency. These characteristics were completely disclosed during the Resistance War. On one hand, after the failure of its long period of concessions to the Japanese imperialists through its "non-defensive" policy and then when Chiang's government was forced to defend, it showed its complete incapacity by losing cities one after the other. On the other hand, it clamped an iron grip over any spontaneous activity by the masses, while its bureaucrats and warlords, profiting by this rare opportunity, exploited and plundered the blood and flesh of the people by storing and smuggling goods and other extortions, and thus enriched themselves through the national disaster. These deeds stirred up great dissatisfaction and bitterness among the common people -- which was reflected in the student demonstrations and the peasant unrest in certain regions during the closing period of the war.

After the surrender of Japanese imperialism, the tyranny, corruption and inefficiency of Chiang Kai-shek came to a climax. First, in the name of taking over the "properties of the enemy and the traitors," the militarists and bureaucrats stole almost all the public property to fill their own purses, and indulged themselves in extravagant luxury and dissipation. Meanwhile, under pretense of proceeding with the civil war, they extracted food from the peasants and imposed conscription upon them, did their best to squeeze and to oppress (as some enlisted peasants could be exempt from duty by subscribing a sum of money, this became another one of the sources of extortion on the part of the bureaucrats). This further inflamed the fury of the masses, and provoked the eruption of several large-scale protest demonstrations (organized with the students as their center). But the only answer from Chiang Kai-shek to these bitter feelings, protests and demonstrations was suppression, massacres, and even assassinations and kidnappings by gendarmes, police and secret agents.

The financial basis of Chiang's government had already been exhausted in the course of the war. Besides compulsory extortions, it could only resort to issuing paper-notes to maintain itself. Consequently the speed of inflation climbed in geometric progressions. After peace was announced, the pace of inflation advanced from geometric progression to lightening speed, terminating in the general collapse of the "Golden Yuan" and an unprecedented economic chaos at the end of 1948.

All commerce and industry were halted and disintegrated, and the living conditions of the various layers among the middle and lower classes (including all the middle and lower functionaries in the government institutions) cast them into the pit of despair. Driven by starvation,
the workers rose up in a universal surge of strikes (there were two hundred thousand workers on strike in Shanghai alone). Everywhere plundering of rice took place. At that time, the United Press gave a brief description of the situation as follows: "The people below the middle class are not able to go on living; discontent and resentment against the status quo prevail. Everyone craves for a change." The regime of Chiang Kai-shek was tottering. If the CCP had called upon the workers and all the masses in the big cities to rise in rebellion and overthrow the regime, it would have been as easy as knocking down rotten wood. But Mao's party merely gave orders to the people to quietly wait for their "liberation" by the "People's Liberation Army."

Chiang's sole reliance was in his military force and so he continued the fight to the end and would never compromise with Mao Tse-tung. He hoped to exterminate the peasant armed forces of the CCP by his "superior military equipment" and rescue his doomed power from death. In fact, the army of Chiang Kai-shek far surpassed that of the CCP not only in numbers but also in equipment, because a considerable part of his army (about six to seven hundred thousand soldiers) was armed with the most modern American weapons. But this army had two fatal defects: first, most of the soldiers were recruited from the countryside by compulsory conscription, some of them even by kidnapping, so they naturally reflected more or less the dissatisfaction and hatred of the peasants; secondly, all the generals and officers of top and high rank were rotten to the core; they ill-treated the soldiers, and steadily reduced rations. These oppressions inflicted much suffering upon the soldiers and deepened their discontent and hatred. Once this "hatred" found a suitable outlet, it would be transformed into a deluge of flight and surrender. The "general counteroffensive" of Mao Tse-tung furnished this outlet.

All the above-stated facts demonstrate that Chiang's government was not only isolated from the people who were hostile towards it, but was also deserted by the greatest part of the bourgeoisie. Even those who formerly supported it turned bitter against it, and were ready to sacrifice it in exchange for their own life. This situation resulted in the appearance of various kinds of factions and cliques against Chiang Kai-shek within the Kuomintang itself, which was thus involved in complete decomposition. One of these factions crystallized into the so-called "Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee" (Lee Chi-sun being its leader), and in view of the irrevocable fall of Chiang Kai-shek, it anxiously sought for understanding and reconciliation" with Mao Tse-tung. Another group prepared to "rise to arms in response to the counteroffensive" of the CCP (such as Cheng Chuan the governor of Hunan Province, and Lu Han the governor of Yun-nan, or others were ready to capitulate, as in the case of Fu Cho-i in Peiping and Liu Hsiang in Szechuan). The third group — the Kwei-clique, represented by Lee Chun-jen and Pei Tsung-san, attempted to replace Chiang Kai-shek. The bourgeois elements outside the Kuomintang gathered more and more around the "Democratic League," trying to find their way out through this organization. In a word, the basis and upper structure of the Kuomintang regime were entirely corroded and it could no longer hold itself erect. The only remaining hope for Chiang Kai-shek was imperative aid from Washington.*

B. Chiang Finally Deserted by American Imperialism.

Prior to the Second World War, the most powerful and most decisive influences in Chinese economy and politics were the Japanese, British and American imperialists. With the end of the war, the influence of Japanese imperialism vanished. British imperialism, due to its extreme decline, although still maintaining its rule in Hong Kong, has since stepped completely from the political stage in China. This last one which attempted to control the country was American imperialism. It intended at the beginning to uphold Chiang's government with all its might in order to monopolize the Chinese market and use this country as a rampart in defense or aggression toward the Soviet Union. Starting from this motive, it had dispatched a tremendous amount of material and military equipment to Chiang's government at the close of the war. But it soon opened its eyes to the excessive corruption of the administrative and military apparatus of this government and the crisis issuing from this corruption. (For instance, most of the material given by the U.S. was swallowed by the bureaucrats, and American-made arms often came into the hands of the CCP as a result of the lack of combativeness of the Kuomintang officers.) On the other hand, it still endeavored to "prevail upon" Chiang Kai-shek to take some measures of "reform," such as excluding a few of the most corrupt and incapable top-rank officials and generals, inviting into office some more competent "democratic individuals," and restraining certain excessively despotic oppressions and exploitation, etc. On the other hand, it maneuvered between Chiang and Mao for a temporary compromise, in order to gain time to destroy the latter — that was

*He had sent Soong Ching-ling on this special mission to bet for a last favor.
the special mission of Marshall in China.

But Chiang not only refused to practice any "reforms"; he likewise obstinately abstained from concluding any compromise with Mao's party. Eventually, the Marshall mission turned into a complete failure. The only road left for American imperialism was to engage in a direct military offensive against the CCP in Chiang's place (as demanded by one group of Republicans at that time), and to extend its direct control over the administrative and military power of the government. However, it was very clear that the situation emerging from the Second World War would never permit this headstrong action. Had American imperialism done so, the whole of its resources and energy not only would have been drawn into the vast quagmire of China, but this would even have led immediately to a new world war. Under the condition of utter unpreparedness, American imperialism was not bold enough to run the risk, as her allies would have vehemently opposed it.

Hence the U.S. was finally compelled to give up its aid to Chiang's government, and put on an attitude of "wait and see" towards the CCP, and bid a more favorable opportunity. To the regime of Chiang Kai-shek, this final decision on the part of American imperialism came as a death knell, which was fully expressed in the atmosphere of dejection and despair hovering around Chiang's group when the news of Truman's victory in the 1948 election and his refusal of aid to Chiang arrived in China.

C. The Subjective Force of the CCP

The basic strength of the CCP lies in its peasant armed forces. These armed forces originated from the successive peasant revolts which exploded in the southern provinces of China after the defeat of the Second Revolution. Although there were no real prospects in these peasant revolts, yet, through the full effort of the CCP in organizing and training the peasants, and also owing to the economic backwardness of the country and other specific geographic conditions (the vastness of the territory and the extreme lack of means of communication), and the utter despair of the peasants and the incompetence of the bourgeois government, the armed forces assembled during the revolts could maintain their existence, continue to develop, and carry on a durable peasant war. Only later when Chiang Kai-shek obtained enormous quantities of military aid from imperialism was the peasant army of the CCP forced for a time to flee from South to North China, and even capitulated to Chiang's government by cancelling its agrarian policy and dissolving the "Red Army" and the Soviets.

However, thanks to the outbreak of war against Japanese imperialism, this armed force secured the opportunity for an unusual development. Especially at the end of and after the war, this army made great progress in numbers as well as in quality which far surpassed those in the Kiang-si Period. This army thus grew into a weighty military force.

Politically, the CCP always oscillated between adventurism and opportunism: it cancelled its agrarian revolution and dissolved the "Red Army" and the Soviets on the eve of the Resistance War; it "collaborated" servilely with the Kuomintang and supported the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek during the war. But despite all these things, it also carried on a long period of resistance against Chiang's government, it made certain criticisms of the political, economic, and military measures of the latter during the war, and had put forward a number of demands for democratic reform. It carried out agrarian reform notably in some regions of North China. Furthermore it was backed by the prestige of the tradition of the October Revolution in the USSR and the amazing effect the Soviet Union produced in the recent world war, and the powerful position it held since the end of the war.

On the other hand, under the intolerable oppression and exploitation of Chiang's utterly despotic, rotten, and inefficient regime, the common people, desperate and deeply resentful and especially the petty-bourgeois intellectuals and peasant masses, lodged all their hopes in the CCP since there was not a powerful and really revolutionary party to lead them. Therein was the source of the political capital of the CCP. This "political capital," plus the "peasant armed forces," constituted the subjective strength of the party. But without aid from the Soviet Union, this victory would still have been unassured.

D. The Aid from the Soviet Union

Notwithstanding the Soviet bureaucracy's fear of a genuinely victorious revolution in China of the working class leading the peasant masses and its foreign policy seeking for compromise with American imperialism, for the sake of its own privileges and to resist the threat of American imperialism, it would not refrain from giving certain help to the CCP within the range of its possible control over the latter. Hence, besides its support in political agitation, it actually gave the CCP decisive aid. Its occupation of Manchuria * (footnote on next page )
objectively gave a mortal blow to Chiang's government. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union had recognized Chiang's as the official government, and had handed over to it the greater part of the cities and mines in Manchuria, the Soviet bureaucracy had destroyed almost all the most important factories and mining machinery (it also took away a part of them), and thus brought industry almost to a complete stoppage. Meantime, through its control over the two ports -- Dairen and Port Arthur -- it blocked the main lines of sea communication of Chiang's government with Manchuria and barred its trade and commerce, especially its transportation of supplies to the army stationed in Manchuria.

On the other hand, it armed the troops of the CCP with huge amounts of light and heavy weapons taken from the Japanese soldiers** and enabled it to occupy the villages, smaller cities and towns and to besiege the great cities and mining districts where Chiang's army was stationed. Thus the cities and mines restored to Chiang Kai-shek did not benefit him, but on the contrary, became a most insupportable burden, and finally turned into a trap. To begin with, Chiang had to send a huge army (around a half-million soldiers) with the best equipment, that is to say, equipped with American weapons to remain on guard. At the same time, it had to provide for the enormous expenditures in the big cities and in the mines. Consequently, this greatly limited and scattered the military force of Chiang Kai-shek and accelerated the financial bankruptcy of his regime.

The weapons taken from the Japanese captives by the Soviet Union served to build up the army of the CCP*** and produced a decisive effect upon the military apparatus and strategy of Mao-Tse-tung. We must understand that the original peasant army of the CCP, despite its preponderant quantity, was not only very backward but also had extremely scanty equipment, especially in heavy weapons. Having obtained this gigantic quantity of light and heavy weapons through the medium of the Soviet Union, (in addition to numerous Soviet and Japanese military technicians), a part of the originally very backward peasant troops was modernized overnight.

The bravery of the peasants and the military adroitness of the Communist generals, together with these modern weapons, then enabled the Communist army to transform guerrilla warfare into positional warfare. This was fully manifested in the battles where the Communist troops gained complete victory in conquering the great cities and mines in Manchuria during the changing season between autumn and winter of 1948 (such as Chan-chun, Mukden, Chin-chao, and the big mining districts, Tshih-lin, Fu-shun, Ben-chi and An-san). This victory won for the Communist army an ample economic basis. Moreover, in the military field, since the best equipped of Chiang's troops (about 80% of those with American equipment) was destroyed, that meant that the greatest part of this American equipment was no longer effective. On the other hand, since the Communist army had taken possession of modern weapons and technicians, together with the Japanese arms handed over by the Soviet Union, that made it possible for the CCP to transform the former unfavorable situation in respect to Chiang's troops in the sphere of military equipment and technique into an overwhelming superiority. Henceforth the strategic attitude of the Communist army fundamentally changed (that is, shifted over from guerrilla warfare to positional warfare and an offensive towards the big cities). This change was undoubtedly a decisive factor in the victory of the CCP inasmuch as it depended on the peasant army alone to conquer the cities.

From the facts illustrated above, we are able to make out a clear picture as follows: the bourgeois-landlord regime of Chiang Kai-shek collapsed automatically in toto, both on the economic and political planes and in its military organization. Its only supporter, American imperialism, forsook it at last. The peasant army of the CCP, having won the support of the peasants and the petty-bourgeoisie in general and especially having obtained military aid from the Soviet Union, had become a colossal and more or less modernized army. The combination of all these objective and subjective factors paved the way for this extraordinary victory.

If we give a brief description of the process of this military victory, the truth of these factors as stated above can be made more explicit. Beginning with the "all-out counter-offensive" launched by the Communist army in the autumn of 1948, in the successive battles occurring
in the North East of China (except for a violent fight in Ch'ing-chao) the other big cities, such as Ch'angan, Mukden, etc., were occupied without battle as a result of the capitulation or disintegration of Chiang's army in their defensive positions. As for the great cities and important military bases north of the Yangtze River, except for an encounter in Ch'ung-chao and P'ang-po, the others, such as T'ai-nan, Tientsin, Peiping, Kai-feng, Ch'eng-chao, Si-an, etc., were handed over either because of the rebellion of the army stationed there (T'ai-nan), or surrender (Peiping), or automatic desertion as in Tientsin, Kai-feng, Ch'eng-chao and Si-an. In the Northwest, in the provinces of Kansu and Kinki-chang, there was only surrender. In the city of Taiyuan, there was a comparatively longer struggle, yet this had no weight at all in the whole situation. As for the great cities south of the Yangtze River, except for token resistance in Shang-hai, the others were either given up in advance (Nanking, Hangchow, Hangkow, Nanchang, Fu-chow, Kwei-lin, and Canton), or surrendered upon the arrival of the Communist army (as in the provinces of Hunan, Szechuan, and Yunnan). Thereupon, after crossing the Yangtze River, the army of Mao Tse-tung marched headlong down to Canton as though through "no man's land," while the remnants of Chiang's troops either surrendered or withdrew and fled away. Hence the peculiar situation whereby the "Liberation Army" did not "conquer" but rather "took over" the cities. From this concrete military process, one can get a clearer view of the amazing extent of the regime of Chiang Kai-shek and the exceptional conditions under which the victory of the peasant army of the CCP unfolded.

Now we can comprehend that it was under the specific conditions of a definite historical stage -- the combination of various intricate and exceptional conditions emerging from the Second World War that the CCP which relied on the peasant army isolated from the urban working class could win power from the bourgeois-landlord rule of Chiang Kai-shek. The essential features of these exceptional conditions are as follows: the whole capitalist world wherein China is the weakest link, tended to an unparalleled decline and decay; the automatic disintegration of the bourgeois Chiang Kai-shek regime was only the most consummate manifestation of the deterioration of the whole capitalist system. While on the other hand, resting on the socialized property relations of the October Revolution and exploiting the contradictions among the imperialist powers, the Soviet bureaucracy was able to achieve an unprecedented expansion of its influence during the Second World War, and this expansion greatly attracted the masses were deprived of hope under the extreme decline and decomposition of the capitalist system, especially the masses of the backward oriental countries. This facilitated the hypertrophy of the Stalinist parties in these countries. The CCP is precisely a perfected model of these Stalinist parties.

Meanwhile, placed in an unfavorable position in the international situation -- the situation brought forth by the Second World War -- American imperialism was obliged to abandon its aid to Chiang and its interference with Mao. Whilst the Soviet Union, which had secured a superior position in Manchuria at the end of the war, inflicted serious damage upon Chiang's government and provided direct aid to the CCP on this basis, enabling the latter to modernize its backward peasant army. Without the combination of these two conditions, the victory of a party like the CCP which relied purely on peasant forces would be inconceivable. For example, if Manchuria had not been occupied by the Soviet Union but had fallen entirely under Chiang's control, Chiang Kai-shek would have utilized the economic resources and the Japanese arms in Manchuria to cut off direct connection between the CCP and the Soviet Union, and block the armed support by the latter to the former. Similarly: in the situation at that time had permitted direct intervention by American imperialism in relation to the military activities of the CCP -- under either of these two conditions -- the victory of Mao Tse-tung would have been very doubtful. Or on the other hand, if we recall the defeat which the peasant army of the CCP suffered during the Kiangsi Period of 1930-1935 when the power of the bourgeois Kuomintang was considerably stabilized, owing to the incessant aid from imperialism and the isolation of the CCP from the Soviet Union, we can also derive sufficient reason to justify the conclusion that today's victory of the CCP is entirely the result of the specific conditions created by the Second World War.

Trotsky and the Chinese Trotskyists insisted that the overturn of the Kuomintang regime could not be achieved by relying solely on the peasant armed forces, but could only be accomplished by the urban working class leading the peasant masses in a series of revolts. Even today, this conception is still entirely valid. It is derived from the fundamental Marxist theory that under the modern capitalist system (including that in the backward capitalist system), it is the urban class which leads the rural masses, and this is also the conclusion drawn from numerous experiences, especially that of the October Revolution. This is
precisely one of the fundamental conceptions of the permanent revolution, which we must hold on to firmly, despite the present victory of the CCP. Let us take India for example where we should insist that the Indian working class lead the peasant masses in the overthrow of the bourgeois power which is headed by the Congress Party. Only this process can guarantee that this backward country take the direction of genuine emancipation and development, i.e., the permanent transformation from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution.

That we could not foresee the current victory of the CCP is the same thing as Trotsky and we Trotskyists having been unable to envisage the unusual expansion of Stalinism after the Second World War. Our mistake is not one of principle. It is rather because we insisted too much on principle that we more or less neglected the specific conditions involved in the development of events, and were not able to modify our tactics in time. Of course, this is a lesson which we should accept and apply to the evaluation of development in other countries like those in China, where the Stalinist parties maintain great influence (such as Vietnam, Burma, etc.), and help formulate a correct strategy in advance.

At the same time, we must understand that the victory gained by a party like the CCP which detached itself from the working class and leaned entirely on the peasant armed forces is not only abnormal in itself, but has also laid down many obstacles in the path of the future development of the Chinese revolutionary movement. To understand this is, in my view, of great importance in our judgement and estimation of the whole movement led by the CCP as well as in determining our strategy and tactics.

**IS THE SEIZURE OF POWER BY THE CCP THE RESULT OF "MASS PRESSURE" AND THE VIOLATION OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE KREMLIN?**

Some comrades of the International, not being quite familiar with the concrete process and specific conditions of the events happening in China, have particularly stressed the factor of "mass pressure," or interpreted the victory of the CCP by an analogous comparison of it with the Yugoslav events. For instance, Comrade Germain says:

"Our movement has traditionally conceived the outstripping of Stalinism by the masses as involving profound splits inside the Communist parties. The Yugoslav and Chinese examples have demonstrated that placed in certain exceptional conditions, entire Communist parties can modify their political line and lead the struggle of the masses up to the conquest of power, while passing beyond the objectives of the Kremlin. Under such conditions, these parties cease being Stalinist parties in the classical sense of the word." ("What Should be Modified and What Should Be Maintained in the Theses of the Second World Congress of the Fourth International on the Question of Stalinism?" - published in the International Information Bulletin, April 1951.)

The ideas contained in this passage are obviously as follows: the CCP succeeded in conquering power, like the YCP, under pressure from the masses, and in violation of the objectives of the Kremlin. But, unfortunately, this "traditionally conceived" analogy can hardly be justified by the facts of the Chinese events. Now let us first of all begin with these facts.

Regarding the relation between the CCP and the masses (including its relation to "mass pressure"), I am not going to trace the facts prior to and during the war against Japan, which however fully demonstrate how often the CCP violated the aspirations of the masses and ignored "mass pressure." I shall start with the period at the end of the war. The first period immediately after the war, from September 1945 to the end of 1946, marked a considerable revival and growth of the mass movement in China. In this period, the working mass in the great cities, Shanghai being the center, first brought forward their demands for a sliding scale increase in wages, for the right to organize trade unions, opposed freezing of wages, etc. They universally and continuously engaged in strikes and demonstrations. Although this struggle in its main features did not pass beyond the economic framework, or reach a nationwide level, it at least proved that after the war the workers had lifted up their heads and were waging a resolute fight against the bourgeoisie and its reactionary government for the improvement of their living conditions and general position. It actually won considerable success. Doubtless, this was the expression of a new awakening of the Chinese workers' movement.

Meantime, among the peasant masses, under the unbearable weight of compulsory contributions, taxes in kind, conscription, and the threat of starvation, the ferment of resentment was boiling, and some disturbances had already occurred in the regions controlled by Chiang's government. Notably the students, representing in general the petty-bourgeoisie, engaged in large-scale
protests, strikes, and manifestations in the big cities, such as Chungking, Kunning, Nanking, Shanghai, Canton, Peiping, etc., under banners and slogans demanding democracy and peace, against the Kuomintang dictatorship, against mobilization for the civil war, and against the persecutions conducted by the Kuomintang agents.

On the other hand, returning to the "recovered areas," Chiang's government not only revealed extreme corruption and inefficiency in administration, and stirred up strong resentment among the people. It already appeared to be tottering. Its power did not extend into North China for a certain period of time, especially Manchuria. (It was not until the beginning of March, 1946, that the Soviet Union began gradually to transfer such great cities as Mukden and Chanchuan and the important mines to Chiang's government.) During this same period the military strength of the CCP and its political influence among the masses were growing rapidly. These struggles of the workers, the ferment of resentment and rebellion among the peasants, and widespread demonstrations of the students, accompanied by the corruption and insecurity of Chiang's regime, and the strengthening of the CCP, obviously created a pre-revolutionary situation. If the CCP would then have been able to stay in step with the situation, that is, accept the "pressure of the masses," raise slogans for the overthrow of the Chiang Kai-shek government (i.e., the slogan for the seizure of power), and join this slogan with other demands for democratic reforms, especially with the demand for agrarian revolution, it would have been able to swiftly transform this "pre-revolutionary" situation into a directly revolutionary situation, to carry through the insurrection and thereby arrive at the conquest of power in the most propitious way.

But, unfortunately, the fundamental political line adopted by the CCP in this period was quite different. Contrary to what it should have done -- mobilize the masses in the struggle for power under the slogans of overthrowing Chiang's government and agrarian reform -- it bowed to Chiang Kai-shek and pleaded for the establishment of a "coalition government" (for this purpose Mao flew to Chungking to negotiate directly with Chiang, and even openly expressed his support to the latter in mass meetings), and tried its best to pull together the politicians of the upper layers of the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie in order to proceed with peace parleys under the initiative of American imperialism.

As for the economic struggles of the working class, not only did the CCP not offer any positive lead to transform these struggles into political struggles, which was quite possible at that time, but on the contrary, in order to effect a "united front" with the "national bourgeoisie," it persuaded the working masses not to go to mass meetings in their conflicts. Moreover, it dealt obsequiously with the leaders of the "yellow trade unions" in order to check the "excessive" demands of the workers. Its activities in the countryside were limited solely to organizing the guerrillas, while it avoided by all means broad mass movements which would have encouraged and unified the peasant masses. The great student movement in the cities was handled as a simple instrument for exerting pressure on the Kuomintang government to accept peace parleys, and were never linked with the strikes of the workers in a common struggle against the rule of Chiang Kai-shek.

However, in May, 1946, as the result of the incessant military offensive of the Kuomintang, the CCP announced that in certain areas under its domination it had begun agrarian reform, which served only to reinforce its military influence. Yet, this kind of land reform was by no means thoroughgoing since it consisted largely in compromise with the landlords and rich peasants by preserving all their "industrial and commercial properties" and allowing them to get the best and most of the land, and it was also quite limited in its scope. (For instance, no land reform was allowed in the areas of the provinces of Shantung, Kiangsu, Hopei, Honan.) Moreover, in its anxious desire to accomplish its reconciliation with Chiang Kai-shek, the CCP dissolved the peasant army in Kwangtung and Chekiang, and removed only a part of it to North China, causing great dissatisfaction among the rank and file members within the party itself. These facts sufficiently prove that the policy of the CCP not only did not accede to the "pressure of the masses," but proceeded arbitrarily in precise opposition to the will and demands of the masses.

Chiang Kai-shek, on his part, made full use of the time during the peace conference to transport his army with the aid of American planes and warships from the interior to the great cities and the strategic bases in the "recovered areas," to solidify his position and to prepare for armed attack upon the CCP. Meantime, he suppressed all the newly arising mass movements, especially the student movement. At the end of 1946, when all preparations were completed, Chiang's government openly barred all the doors to compromise and peace parleys by holding its own "national assembly" and
organizing its own "Constituent Government," which showed its determination to eradicate the establishment of any "coalition government" with the CCP. Following these steps, it mobilized a great military offensive (such as the seizure of Chang-Chia-Kow and some small cities and towns in North Kiangsu). Yet up to this moment the CCP had not given up its efforts at conciliation. Its delegates to the peace conference still lingered in Shanghai and Nanking, trying to reopen peace parleys with the Kuomintang through the mediation of the so-called "Third Force" — the "Democratic League." Not until later when Chiang Kai-shek drove away the peace delegation of the CCP (March 1947) and succeeded in occupying its capital and stronghold, Yen-an (April 1947), did it begin to realize the hopelessness of this attempt and only then did it muster its forces to engage in a military defense. But even at that time, it still did not dare to raise the slogan of the overthrow of the Kuomintang government, nor did it offer a program of agrarian reform to mobilize the masses.

Finally, at the moment that Chiang's government made public the "warrant" for arresting Mao Tse-tung (June 25, 1947) and proclaimed the "decree of mobilization for suppressing revolts" (July 4), after several months of hesitation (during which it seemed to be waiting for instructions from Moscow), the CCP published its manifesto on October 10 in the name of the "People's Liberation Army" which openly urged the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek and the building of a "New China." Meantime, it once again brought forward its "agrarian law," declaring the expropriation of the land of the landlords and rich peasants (while maintaining the "industrial and commercial enterprises"), and redistribution of this land to peasants without any or too little land.

However, this was a remarkable change in the policies of the CCP since the time that it vowed support to Chiang's regime and abandoned land reform in 1937. In view of its relations with Chiang's government, this change in policy can be considered fundamental.

Was this "charge," then, the result of "mass pressure"? No, obviously not. At this moment the mass movement had already been brutally trampled down by Chiang's regime and was actually at a very low ebb; while the Kuomintang agents raged everywhere, thousands of young students were arrested, tortured, and even assassinated, and the active elements among the workers were constantly being arrested or hunted. The undisputable facts indicate that the CCP was compelled to make this change solely because Chiang had pulled down all bridges towards compromise and because it was confronted with the mortal threat of a violent attack designed to annihilate its influence once and for all. So we might rather say that this change was the result of "Chiang's pressure" than the "pressure of the masses."

In order to forearm itself for a counter-offensive, the CCP began to make a "left turn" on the political plane. Only then did it begin to make concessions to the demands of the masses (or to incline before "mass pressure"), especially the demands of the peasant masses under its control, with the intention of regaining and reinforcing its military power. Hence, from November 1947 to the next spring, it initiated a universal struggle to "correct the right deviation" in areas where land reform was set into motion. In the course of this struggle, the CCP liquidated all the privileges previously granted to the landlords and kulaks, re-expropriated and distributed the land among the poor peasants. It deprived the landlords and kulaks of the posts they held in the local administration, the party and the army.* "The Poor Peasants' Committees" were created and accorded a few democratic rights to permit them to fight the landlords and kulaks head on, and they were even allowed to criticize the cadres of the lower layers of the party, some of whom were removed from their posts and punished. All these actions indeed succeeded in gaining considerable support from the huge peasant masses and greatly reinforced its anti-Chiang military forces. But we should not forget that all these "leftward" policies and actions were nothing but the fruits of "Chiang's pressure."

In regard to the question of the relationships between the CCP and the Kremlin, I can only offer as illustrations some important historical "turns." After the disastrous defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution, when the Kremlin switched its policy from ultra-right opportunism to ultra-left adventurism (the so-called "Third Period" in its general international line), the leadership of the CCP followed on the heels of the former without hesitation. Closing their eyes to the most grave injuries it suffered because of this "turn," and deaf to the unremitting severe criticisms from Trotsky and the Chinese "Left Opposition," the leading organs executed... [the rest of the text is not fully visible or is not the focus of the question]
these adventurist policies and carried on a desperate struggle to "build up Soviets and the Red Army" in the desolate and sealed villages, with complete isolation from the urban workers' movement, and in the general counter-revolutionary climate of the victory and relative stability of the bourgeoisie.

As the "Red Army" in China was driven out of the South and fled to Yen-an in the North, the Kremlin, threatened by the triumph of Hitler, turned back from the "Third Period" to ultra-right opportunism, and opened the period of building up the so-called "Democratic Front" and the "Peace Front." Just as before, adjusting itself to this turn of the Kremlin, the CCP likewise advocated unreservedly the "People's Front" or the "Front of National Defense," and renewed its demand for "collaboration" to the Kuomintang. Even when Chang Hsueng-liang, Commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang expedition at the time, detained Chiang K'ai-shek in Sian under "pressure of the masses," particularly under pressure from his own soldiers and lower officers,* and when this incident aroused delight and hope in the whole country, especially among the members of the CCP,** to everyone's astonishment, the CCP complied without any resistance with the directives of the Kremlin, and urged and compelled Chang Hsueng-liang to release Chiang K'ai-shek, the chief butcher of the Second Revolution and Mao's mortal enemy during eight years of civil war,*** as a price to buy Chiang's consent for a "new collaboration" (on condition of cancelling agrarian reform, dissolving the "Soviets" and the "Red Army") in order to "fight together against Japan!" This amazing servile obedience of the Communist leadership towards the Kremlin not only stirred up discontent among the people in general, but also caused great disappointment and disturbances among its own members and masses.

* These were all Manchurians, who nourished a bitter hatred against Chiang K'ai-shek because his "non-defensism" during the Japanese attack on Manchuria had rendered them homeless.

** As the news spread the whole nation was at the peak of excitement and rapture, thinking that this counter-revolutionary butcher was doomed at last, and a new era was dawning.

*** Chou En-lai was the fully authorized representative sent then by the CCP to Sian to confer with Chang Hsueng-liang about freeing Chiang K'ai-shek, and to negotiate directly with Chiang on the terms of "collaboration between the Kuomintang and the CCP."

After the end of the war, the desperate effort of the CCP in submissively following the policy of compromise and peace with Chiang K'ai-shek in complete disregard of the aspirations of the masses was the freshest fact to show that it was entirely under the direction of the Kremlin and that its policy was completely subordinated to the foreign policy of the latter, which was one of seeking compromise with American imperialism.

Thereafter, the "big turn" in the policy of the CCP from a compromise attitude to overthrowing Chiang's regime was also in line with the "turn" in foreign policy of the Kremlin which, having failed in its attempt to achieve compromise with American imperialism, turned to a defensive policy as a result of the "cold war." The timing of the "big turn" of the CCP in October 1947 with the formation of the "Cominform" under directives from the Kremlin in September of the same year was not merely a coincidence and should suffice to prove that this "turn" of the CCP, far from violating the "objectives" of the Kremlin, was completed precisely under the direction of the latter.*

In view of the above-mentioned facts, it is perfectly clear that to place the

* Some comrades of the International have cited certain facts regarding the isolation of the CCP from Moscow during the Resistance War, in order to "justify" the theory that the latest turn in the policy of the CCP was the consequence of violating the "objectives" of the Kremlin. But these "facts" are just the inverse of the real facts. Before the war, the agents of the Kremlin stayed constantly at Yen-an (not openly), and there were regular communications by wireless between Yen-an and Moscow. After the war, the Soviet Union sent its ambassador to Chungking, accompanied by its secret agents, so that it could openly and legally obtain constant contacts with the Chinese Communist delegation and its special agents in Chungking, to dispatch news and instructions. Therefore we have sufficient reason to say: during the war, the relations between the CCP and the Kremlin not only were not cut off, but on the contrary became closer than ever. This fact has been clearly revealed in all newspapers and documents of that period which mirrored with full speed all the propaganda and strategic positions of Moscow. As for the post-war period, since the Soviets' occupation of Manchuria, and with so many of the Soviet delegates working in the CCP and the army, the intimacy between Moscow and the CCP has been too evident to need further clarification.
CCP and the YCP on the same plane and consider the former's conquest of power as the result of similar "pressure of the masses" and "passing beyond the objectives of the Kremlin" is mechanical and misunderstanding, as will. If we make a comparison of the policies and measures adopted by the YCP and those of the CCP in the process of the events, the distance between them would be even more apparent.

In the course of the anti-imperialist national liberation movement during 1941-45, the YCP already destroyed step by step the bourgeois-landlord regime and consummated its proletarian dictatorship in the first period after the war (October 1945), despite its somewhat abnormal character. Simultaneous with or a little later than the consummation of the proletarian dictatorship (1945-46), it succeeded in carrying out agrarian reform and the statization of industry and banking, and expropriated private property by enactment of law. Meanwhile, on many important problems, the YCP had already formulated its own views which were different from and independent of the Kremlin, and pursued its course according to its own "experiences," that is, submitted empirically to the "mass pressure" against the "objectives of the Kremlin."*

But the CCP not only closely followed the foreign policy of the Kremlin during the national liberation movement against Japanese imperialism, and devoted itself to seeking a compromise with the bourgeois-landlord regime regardless of pressure from the masses, but even after it conquered full power, it persisted in forming a "coalition government" with the national bourgeoisie and guaranteed them protection of their properties. It even tried to postpone carrying out the land reform to the latest possible date. Here we must note: the differences in attitude expressed by the YCP and the CCP in the course of the events are not quantitative, but qualitative. To assume therefore that the CCP has completed the same process of development as the YCP and ceased to be a Stalinist party in the classical sense of the word is to go entirely beyond the facts.

But what explanation should be given for these differences? First, since the CCP withdrew its military forces to the countryside in 1928, it established a considerably solid power and army (the peasant army). For these twenty years, it used this army and power constantly to rule over the peasant masses (as we know, the backward and scattered peasants are the easiest to control), and hence a stubborn and self-willed bureaucracy took shape (especially in its manner of treating the masses). Even toward the workers and students in the Kuomintang areas, it employed either ultimatum or deceitful methods instead of persuasion.

Secondly, in ideology, the CCP has further fortified and deepened the theory of Stalinism through its treatment of a series of important events -- the defeat of the Second Revolution, the peasant wars and the Resistance War against Japan, etc. -- especially through its resistance to the criticism of Trotsky and the Chinese Trotskyists in regard to its concepts and policies. The "systematic" and dogmatic "New Democracy" of Mao Tse-tung is nothing else but an ideologically and politically deepened and crystallized expression of Stalinism, that is to say, it is the expression of obstinately holding onto the "revolution by stages" with a direct challenge to the Permanent Revolution.

Thirdly, over these two decades, the CCP has been an organization receiving special attention from the Kremlin, and it follows that its relations with the latter are particularly intimate. After the Soviet Union occupied Manchuria and rearmed the CCP with weapons taken from the Japanese captives, the Kremlin's control over the CCP became more rigorous than ever.** On account of these three

* Here I should call attention of the comrades to the fact that on the Chinese question the criticisms made by Trotsky himself and the Chinese Trotskyists against Stalinism far surpassed those made on any other country except the Soviet Union.

** In fact, this "control" was effected through internal strife. When the Soviet Union started to arm the troops of Lin Piao and other generals, it expressed skepticism regarding Mao Tse-tung and backed Lee Li-san, Mao's old adversary, to be the political leader of the Communist army in Manchuria and the spokesman of the party, thus calculating to take Mao Tse-tung in tow and to tame him. However, this at once aroused resistance on Mao's part. On one hand, he ordered Liu Shao-chi to make a public statement, declaring that Lee Li-san was not authorized to speak on behalf of the Central Committee of the CCP (about the end of 1945); at the same time, he mobilized a big "ideological campaign" within the party against "Lee Li-sanism" (or "secretarianism"). In view of this situation,

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*Read "The Resolution on the Yugoslav Revolution" adopted by the Ninth Plenum of the IEC, and "On the Class Nature of Yugoslavia" by Comrade Pablo.
characteristics, the CCP has neither been able to yield to "the pressure of the masses" and modify its own political line, nor has it been easy for this party to "pass beyond the objectives of the Kremlin" and go its own way. The YCP on the other hand has traversed an entirely different course. This party was almost completely lifted up from the national anti-imperialist movement of the masses, and within a comparatively short span of time, it was not able to form a bureaucracy and Stalinist ideology as tenacious as that of the CCP. Since it was actually quite isolated from the Kremlin during its Resistance warfare, it was more disposed to empirically incline before the pressure of the masses, and in accord with the development of events to gradually modify its own political line until it finally arrived at violating the objectives of the Kremlin. Therefore, we must say that the conquest of power in these two cases has only an apparent resemblance. In respect to the motivating causes (in terms of "pressure"), the manner adopted in taking power, and in the content of the power, the differences are quite great.

From this judgement and explanation, should we deduce a further interference that the CCP will resist pressure from the masses at all times and under any conditions and never come into conflict with the Kremlin? No. What we have demonstrated above is that the most important turns the CCP experienced in the past were entirely the result of pressure from the Kremlin, and in violation of the will of the masses. Even the present "turn" toward the seizure of power was not a product of its yielding to mass pressure and its violation of the objectives of the Kremlin, but on the contrary resulted from the moral pressure of Chiang Kai-shek, in complete agreement with the Kremlin. However, in ordinary circumstances, in order to maintain its own existence and continue its development, the CCP is obliged to seek support from certain layers of the masses and to establish a base among them. Accordingly, it would more or less concede to demands of the masses within certain limits and within the possibilities permitted by its own control, that is, in other words, to incline before pressure from the masses. In the past, its policy passed through not a few "leftward" oscillations, such as the limited agrarian reform policy offered in May 1947, the "liquidation of the right deviation in the land reform" in the period from the end of 1947 to the spring of 1948, and some comparatively leftward measures taken after its conquest of power. These are the solid facts of its condescension to the pressure of the masses. It is possible that this kind of leftward turn will appear more often and to a greater extent in the future. Also because of the same reasons, we can believe that in the past certain differences or conflicts must have occurred between the CCP and the Kremlin, but these conflicts have not yet burst up to the surface. For instance, the dispute between Mao and Lee illustrated above may serve as a conspicuous reflection of this existing conflict, which is not only unavoidable in the coming days but will also be further intensified. So I must say that the error made by Comrade Germain (as already indicated above) is not one of principle, but of fact.

Yet I must also point out that the mistake committed on such an important question may not only give rise to a series of other mistakes (such as underestimation of the bureaucratism of the CCP, its Stalinist ideology and methods; and over-optimism on perspectives concerning the CCP, etc.), but may also lead to errors in principle. For example, some comrades in our "Proletarian" have already asserted that the regime of the CCP is a "proletarian dictatorship," because they consider that events in China are in the same category as the Yugoslav events, and since the YCP regime has already become a proletarian dictatorship. Proceeding by abstract deduction according to formal logic, the regime of the CCP is doubtlessly also a "proletarian dictatorship." (There will be further explanations on this question later in this report.)

Just because this way of transposing facts to suit certain formulas may bring about the danger of committing mistakes in principle, we should be very cautious in applying "principles," especially "formulas" deduced from principles. We cannot bring events which are quite similar in appearance under the same principle or the same formula, or force events into accommodation with a given
principle or formula. First of all, we must examine and analyze the concrete facts of the events themselves, particularly taking account of whatever exceptional circumstances have played a decisive role in the events and judge whether this event conforms to a certain principle or formula, whether it actually is the unerring expression of this principle or formula. As Lenin said: the facts are forever alive, while formulas often tend to become rigid.

Our movement has assumed and insisted that it is possible for the masses to pass beyond the boundaries of Stalinism, and that there exists hidden profound contradictions between various Communist parties and the Kremlin, so that under certain specific conditions, the entire Communist Party may modify its political line, outstrip the objectives of the Kremlin, lead the masses to the seizure of power. This principle and this formula is correct in its basic theoretical premise, and has already been justified by the Yugoslav events (or to be more exact, it is rather derived from the latter). But here we must particularly note one thing, and that is precisely the "certain specific conditions." Although under "certain specific conditions" the Communist Party could be pushed by the pressure of the masses to seize power in violation of the aims of the Kremlin (as in the case of the CCP), yet under certain other "specific conditions," a Communist party could come to power not necessarily through the pressure of the masses, meanwhile receiving instructions from the Kremlin (or at least not violating its objectives). This is exactly what has happened in China.

We believe that similar events may possibly be repeated in other Oriental countries (Vietnam, Burma, etc.). What the Kremlin fears is the victory of a genuine revolutionary movement of the workers, especially in the advanced countries, simply because it will not be able to control this victorious revolution which will in turn threaten its very existence. So long as there is no "threat" of this kind, and no terrible interference will be directly incurred from imperialism, whereas it can still extend its sphere of influence, the Kremlin would not let such an opportunity slip from its hand, and would naturally allow a Communist Party under its control to take power. This is the lesson which can be drawn from the Chinese events and which we must accept. Even though it may not be considered as a different pattern of the conquest of power performed by a Communist Party, at least it must be taken as a supplement to the lesson of the Yugoslav events. Only in this manner can we avoid falling into the mis-

take of transforming a principle into a rigid formula, of imposing this formula on every apparently similar event, and thereby producing a series of erroneous conclusions.

We Marxists react toward events by analyzing the concrete facts in the course of events with our methods and principles, testing our principles through this analysis and thus enriching our principles, or if necessary, modifying our principles and formulas, for the truth is always concrete.

IS THE VICTORY OF THE CCP THE BEGINNING OF THE THIRD CHINESE REVOLUTION?

The resolution on the Chinese question of the Seventh Plenum of the IEO stated that: "the victory of Mao Tse-tung over Chiang Kai-shek is the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution." When this resolution first arrived in China (autumn 1949), the leading organ of our party -- the Political Bureau -- agreed with it in general, but because of its urgent need to move it was not able to discuss it in detail and express its opinions in written form. Then doubts arose among some comrades regarding the resolution of the International (the first appearing in writing was "The Significance and the Nature of the Victory of the Chinese Stalinist Movement," an article written by both Comrades Chao and Ma, published in the Chinese edition of "Fourth International," No. 2, Vol. 1, April 1950), and the most acute controversy of this recent year commenced. Part of the responsible comrades are in complete agreement with the views of the International (Comrades Chao and Ma who formerly expressed their disagreement are now becoming the major supporters of the views of the International), while another part of the responsible comrades are in strong opposition. We have selected four of the most representative articles in this controversy of ideas and translated them into English for reference. So in this report, it is not necessary to recount in detail the points of divergence in their discussion. I am simply going to give my personal criticism and explanation of the essential arguments, particularly those of the comrades with oppositional views.

ON THE QUESTION OF "THE REVOLUTIONARY" SITUATION

The major argument of the comrades in opposition is that the ascent to power of the CCP is not based upon the revolutionary actions of the masses, especially the working masses (i.e., from general strikes to armed insurrection), but has relied entirely on the peasant armed forces and purely military actions. On
the basis of our traditional conception of "revolution" and the experiences of revolutions in modern times (notably that of the Russian October Revolution), they conceive of the revolution only in the sense when the huge masses, especially the working class, are mobilized from bottom to top, go beyond the domain of the general democratic struggle to armed rebellion, directly destroy the state apparatus of the ruling class, and proceed to build up a new regime. That we can call the beginning of the victory of a real revolution. Now, this movement, under leadership of the CCP, not only did not at all mobilize the working masses, but even refrained from appealing to the peasant masses to organize, to rise for action and engage in a revolutionary struggle (ousting the landlords, distributing the land, etc.). As the facts stand, the CCP relied solely on the military action of the peasant army instead of the revolutionary action of the worker and peasant masses, and therefore these comrades asserted that this victory is only the victory of a peasant war, and not the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution.

We must admit that the traditional conception of revolution held by these comrades is completely correct, and the facts enumerated by them are irrefutable. But they have forgotten a "small matter." That is that the epoch wherein we live is not that of the victory of the October Revolution, the time of Lenin and Trotsky; it is the epoch in which the heritage of the October Revolution -- the Soviet Socialist Workers' State -- has been usurped by the bureaucracy of Stalin and has reached the point of extreme degeneration. These are the main features of this epoch: on one hand, the capitalist world, having experienced two world wars, is in utter decay, while the objective revolutionary conditions have become transformed from a ripe to an over-ripe stage; on the other hand, the Stalin bureaucracy, by dint of the prestige inherited from the October Revolution and the material basis of the Soviet Union, has made utmost efforts to hold the Communist parties of all the countries in its bridle, and through these Communist Parties, it attempts to place the revolutionary movement of different countries in subordination to its own diplomatic interests. Under these exceptional circumstances and as a result of them, the revolutionary movements of several countries have not only suffered frustrations and defeats, but in some other countries, the revolutionary movements have been deformed. The victory of the movement led by the CCP is a prominent example of this deformation of its revolution.

As we have said, viewed from the aspect of the CCP's attempt to avoid the mobilization of the masses, particularly the worker masses, and its conquering of power on the basis of peasant armed forces, this event is indeed far from conforming with a classic or normal revolution. But considered from the standpoint of its overthrow of the bourgeoisie-landlord regime of Chiang Kai-shek, its widespread practice of land reform, and its political resistance against imperialism and its struggle for national independence, it is undeniably not only "progressive," but revolutionary. Further, it marks a great dividing line in modern Chinese history. The destruction of the bloody twenty-year rule of Chiang Kai-shek and the blow dealt to the imperialist powers who have trod on the Chinese people for centuries are quite sufficient to prove that this event can stack up with the First Chinese Revolution (1911). In as much as a sizable general land reform has been carried out (no matter how incomplete it is), the feudal remnants left behind through thousands of years are being for the first time shoveled away on a wide scale, and since this work is still being carried out -- we ought still insist that it is not an epoch-making revolutionary movement? Well, the comrades in opposition contend that they have completely acknowledged the progressive aspects of this movement, but, nevertheless, they are by no means identical with the initial triumph of a real revolution, or the beginning of the Third Revolution, since they have been achieved by military and bureaucratic methods. Though we admit this fact, our conclusion cannot simply be a condemnation of the process and its outcome as "not revolutionary." The only correct view is to say that this is not a typical or normal revolution, but a distorted, damaged, and hence a deformed revolutionary movement. In order to obtain a more precise understanding of this question of deformed revolution, let us recall the discussions on the nature of the states in the buffer countries of East Europe.

In these buffer countries the dispossession of the bourgeoisie from power, the land reform procedures, and the nationalizations of industry, banks, means of transportation and exchange were either not at all or only a small degree affected through the revolutionary action of the worker and peasant masses. The stalinized properties and enterprises of the new regime have never been placed under the supervision and control of the masses, but are, under occupation by the Soviet Army, operated and monopolized by the Communist bureaucrats of the Kremlin order. Concentrating on this fact, various "minorities" among the sections of the International (which are in fact elements already outside of or on the way to quitting our movement if they insist on their own views) dogmatize about the nature of
these states as "state-capitalist" or "bureaucratic centralist." However, the IS of our International, with the traditional method employed by Trotsky in studying and characterizing the nature of the Soviet state under the rule of the Stalin bureaucracy as a degenerated workers' state, has affirmed that these buffer states have already become "deformed workers' states" assimilated into the Soviet Union. As the property relations in these countries have been fundamentally changed, i.e., statized, and since this statization is an indispensable material premise for the transformation from capitalism to socialism, on the basis of this fundamental change in property relations we can then affirm the change in the nature of the state.

But while maintaining this assertion, the International has not overlooked the detestable facts of the way in which the bureaucrats of the Soviet Union and the Communist parties of these countries are monopolizing all economic and administrative power and the police and the GPU are strangling the freedom and initiative of the masses. It is precisely in view of these facts that our International calls these states deformed or abnormal workers' states. This is the only correct way to dialectically comprehend the events, the only way to "call things by their right names."

If our Chinese comrades in opposition could adopt the method used by the International in deciding the nature of the state in the buffer countries -- the traditional method of Trotskyism -- to evaluate the victory of the CCP, it would be very plain that no matter in what manner the CCP succeeded in seizing the power, whether by purely military means, the conquest it has attained (the overthrow of Chiang's regime, the land reform, the relative political independence) are nevertheless the realizations of what must be realized in the permanent process from the democratic revolution to the socialist revolution, and they are therefore revolutionary. But inasmuch as the CCP has not mobilized the worker masses and has not thoroughly advanced the revolution with the help of the working class leading the peasant masses, in other words, just because it substituted the military bureaucratic methods of Stalinism for the Bolshevik revolutionary methods of mobilizing the masses, this revolution has been gravely distorted and injured, and its features are misshaped to such an extent that they are hardly to be recognized. Yet, we Marxists judge all things and events not from their appearance, but by the essence concealed under the appearance. So, no matter how ugly and abhorrent the appearance of the Soviet Union is under the rule of Stalin's bureaucracy, since it preserves the nationalized property created by the October Revolution, we still recognize it as a "workers' state" -- a degenerated workers' state. And although from their very birth, the buffer states in Eastern Europe have already been seriously disfigured by Stalin's bureaucracy, and have revealed such monstrous deformity, we must nevertheless call them "workers' states," although deformed workers' states. In the same way, no matter how the movement led by the CCP is distorted and damaged by its bureaucratic methods, since it has overthrown Chiang's regime, has secured considerable independence and carried out a certain degree of land reform, we must recognize it as a revolution, although an abnormal revolution.

We must understand that our epoch is a transitional epoch lying between capitalism and socialism, a most comprehensive and intricate epoch in the history of mankind. Hence, many of the events and movements under the complex influences of diverse factors, often happen to develop out of accord with the normal procedures of our logical thinking which have been derived from historical experience or principles. Moreover, the extraordinary expansion and interference of Stalinism following the degeneration of the first workers' state (which is in the last analysis also one of the products of this intricate and convulsive epoch) have further pulled these events and movements out of the normal orbit and served to distort them. In this epoch, anyone who demands that all events and movements conform to one's own ideal or norm, and would only recognize and participate in those which are considered normal and capitalist in the narrow and narrow-minded, so-called perfect Utopian, who either hurls meaningless curses (or "criticisms") so they claim on events and movements, or wages a desperate fight against history. These people have nothing in common with Marxists.

We Trotskyists, being wholly responsible for the coming revolution, should not only maintain "our own ideal" and understand the "normal development of the movement," but should particularly understand the abnormal events and imperfect movements produced under exceptional and combined conditions over a given period or under certain circumstances. In other words, we must recognize the reality already coming into existence, accept this reality, even though it may be inconsistent with our "norm" or disgusting; and we must carry on an indefatigable struggle in face of this reality in order to alter it in the course of the struggle and turn it toward the direction of our goal.

Now the entire Chinese mainland has fallen into the hands of the CCP; the whole
movement has been placed under its control or leadership. This is an absolute "reality," although distorted and contrary to our ideals. But unless we accept the reality of this movement, penetrate into this movement, actively join in all mass struggles, influence the masses with our Trotskyist revolutionary program, try patiently to convince and to win the confidence of the masses in the course of the struggle, help them to disentangle themselves step by step through their own experiences from the illusions and control of Mao Tse-tung's opportunism and bureaucracy, and eventually divert the orientation of this movement, all our "criticisms" will be futile as well as harmful. This task is, of course, extremely difficult and it will not necessarily proceed in tune with our efforts. But at least by participating in this movement, we can lay down a basis for future work, and then when we are faced with a more favorable situation shall be able to intervene and even to lead the movement. If we refuse to recognize the victory of the CCP as the beginning of a deformed revolution, if we do not participate in the movement positively in order to deliver it from deformation, or if we only express some passive criticisms on the CCP, we shall surely fall into the bog of sectarianism (as our Chinese minority has done), quit the movement and the masses, and finally inevitably withdraw from all practical political struggles and be swept away by the historical current.

Besides, I must also point out that our oppositional comrades in underlining the movement led by the CCP as a purely peasant war and therefore denying the significance of its mass character, have committed an act of political criminality. Because the peasant army led by the CCP is not only a tremendous peasant mass in itself (the peasant mass in uniform), the most active among the peasant masses, but it is supported by a greater peasant bulk at its back. The experiences of history have shown us that once the peasant movement heaves up, it is often involved in armed struggle. In the Second Chinese Revolution, when the peasant masses in Kwangtung and Hunan were organized into "Peasants' Associations," their armed forces appeared almost simultaneously since it was quite impossible for them to fight the landlords and the country gentry without any substantial force. This has almost become a natural law in the peasant movement. And we must also note that the present army differs greatly from any former peasant army in the sense that it has been systematically organized and trained by the Stalinist method, more or less equipped with modern knowledge and techniques and has been endowed with a nation-wide and up-to-date program of democratic reform as the general direction of struggle, no matter how opportunistic this program has been. It is just for this reason that we cannot call this movement simply a peasant war, but an abnormal revolutionary movement, and this designation alone is true to the facts and to dialectic logic.

The Chinese comrades who support the resolution of the International, on the other hand, in their attempt to demonstrate that the victory of the CCP is the beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution, the movement led by the CCP is a mass movement, and the change of its policy is the result of pressure from the masses, have gone to another extreme of exaggeration or even misinterpretation of the facts. This is equally harmful. For instance, Comrade Chao and Comrade Ma interpret the turn in the CCP's policy as the result of mass pressure and representing a mass movement by misdating the "beginning of the Third Chinese Revolution" from October 1947 when the CCP formally declared the overthrow of Chiang's regime. This is not only mechanical, but is entirely contradictory to the actual fact as I have already indicated above. Moreover, Comrade Ma says, "From the point of view of the number of masses mobilized, the present revolution is even more normal than the Second Revolution, because the masses organized in the latter numbered only about ten millions, while even before the 'Liberation Army' crossed the Yangtze River, there were already more than one hundred million farmers rising to distribute the land." This kind of exposition is over-exaggerated and also fundamentally wrong in its conception of the mass movement.

Comrade Chao has refuted and criticized it fully in his article entitled "On the Question of the So-Called 'Revolutionary Situation.'" I think that his refutation is correct and consistent with the historical facts. Here I would like to mark only one point. In the Second Chinese Revolution, the greatest part of the working class was not only organized as in the Kwantung-Hongkong Committee" and the "General Federation of Trade Unions of Kwangsi" (which were then practically functioning as soviets), mobilized and occupying the leading positions in the nation-wide movement, and launched a number of general strikes and grand demonstrations; but, furthermore, they had engaged in several victorious armed revolts, as in the case of the worker masses in Hangkow and Chukiang who seized the British settlements, and in Shanghai where they occupied all parts of the city except the foreign concessions.

Now in this movement of the CCP, from its beginning to the conquest of power, there has neither been the rising of the working masses in any city to the point of general strikes or insurrections, nor
even a small-scale strike or demonstration. Most of the workers were passive and inert, or at most showed a certain hopeful attitude towards this movement in their dispositions. This is an indisputable fact. How can we compare this present movement with the revolutionary movement of the Second Chinese Revolution? The resolution of the International has clearly asserted, "The victory of Mao Tse-tung over Chiang Kai-shek is the military victory of a peasant revolt over a thoroughly collapsed regime." That is to say, this victory of the CCP is not the political victory of a real revolutionary movement of the worker and peasant masses over the bourgeois power. So this only helps to prove that Comrade Ma who ardently supports the resolution of the International has gone too far, has overidealized the Communist-led movement. This idealization of events will not only foster illusions, but objectively lead to wrong judgments. Both will be dangerous, because illusions are always the original of disappointment or disencouragement, while wrong judgments will inevitably become the root of erroneous policies.

We should never overlook all the extremely serious dangers hidden in the "deformation" of the "Third Chinese Revolution" created by the CCP: the tenacious opportunism, the imperious bureaucracy, the severe control over the masses, the hostility towards revolutionary ideas, and the brutal persecution of the revolutionary elements, especially the Trotskyists. (Our organization has been ransacked in many places in the mainland, many comrades have been arrested, imprisoned, forced to "repent," and a few of our most responsible comrades have already been executed.) All these dangerous factors combined to not allow any optimism in regard to the development and perspective of this already commenced "Third Chinese Revolution," and will make it immeasurably difficult for us Trotskyists to work in this movement. Yet, despite all of these circumstances, we should never adopt a sectarian or pessimistic attitude, give up our efforts and our revolutionary responsibility for pushing forward or transforming this movement. At the same time we must also reject all naive ultra-optimism, which always tends to disregard the difficulties in the movement and the hardships in our work. At the beginning, they might throw themselves into the movement with great zeal but when they encounter the severe difficulties in the course of their work, they will become disheartened and shrink back. Though, with the entire perspective of our movement in sight, we Trotskyists always hold firm to our unswerving faith and revolutionary optimism, in other words, we profoundly believe that the victory of the proletarian revolution in the whole world and the reconstruction of the human society can be accomplished only under the banner and the program of Trotskyism, the most enriched and deepened Marxist-Leninism of modern times; yet we should not overlook the formidable obstructions on the way from the present period to the eventual victory, particularly the obstacles laid down by Stalinism. We must first of all bring to light these obstacles, then overcome them with the most precise program, correct methods, and supreme patience and perseverance.

The sectarians find their excuses in the fact that the movement does not conform to their preconceived norms and attempt to flee away from it in advance. The naive optimists idealize the movement, but, as soon as they discover later on that the movement does not follow the track of their idealization, they leave it. Revolutionary optimists have nothing in common with these two sorts of people. Since they have the strongest faith in the victory of the revolution, since they apprehend the enormous difficulties lying on the road to this victory, they will cut their path through the thorniest thickets only with revolutionary methods and unparalleled persistence to reach the ultimate end.

Confronted with Mao's victory, serious controversies have been raised in the Chinese organization through the discussion of the party's policy in the past which have produced certain unhealthy effects on the party itself. Though it is not possible for me to dwell in detail on a description and criticism regarding these controversial opinions, yet I should express my fundamental attitude toward this discussion (especially since many comrades have asked me to do so). It is absolutely reasonable that a political organization, on the morrow of a great event, in order to readjust its political line, should examine and discuss carefully its past policy. Therefore, I do not agree with some comrades who object to this discussion. But I should also insist that we must proceed with the discussion on a basis which is fully responsible both for the revolutionary tasks and for our party, and in a very circumstantial, exact, and precise manner. It is absolutely unbecoming to criticize at will the party's past policy with giddy and bombastic gestures which create confusion and centrifugal tendencies in the party. The experience of history has already taught us that under pressure of a great event, especially in face of growing difficulties in conditions of work, a political party is most susceptible to centrifugal tendencies. If, at this moment, criticism of the party's
policy in the past assumes an indiscreet, exaggerated or unjust attitude, it will be most apt to affect the rank and file of the party to falter in their faith, encourage the development of centrifugal tendencies and finally lead to a terrible rupture.

But unfortunately, some of our comrades are not prudent enough in their criticisms on the policy we adopted in the past period. The article written by Comrade Chao, "Thesis on the Ideological Re-armament," is a notable example. Though this article is aimed at correcting the "sectarian tendency," its criticism of the past policy of the party is not only over-exaggerated but misleading. In his view, or at least according to his way of talking, it seems that the whole political line of the party in the past was fundamentally wrong and therefore, following the example of Lenin in posing the "April Theses," the party must be ideologically rearmed." However, as a result, this attitude only stimulated strong protests and criticisms from another group of comrades, which found their first expression in "Rearmament or Revisionism?" written by Comrade Ning.

In reality, our party has maintained and struggled over long years in the past for the traditional line of Trotskyism, the line of the Permanent Revolution. The great events -- the Sino-Japanese War, China's involvement in the Second World War, and in the struggles against the right opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu and the ultraleft sectarianism of the Minority group led by Cheng Chao-lin during the critical periods of these two events, have justified the political line we persisted in over the past. During the Civil War between the Kuomintang and the CCP, our basic line and our position towards the CCP have also been correct and coincide with the fundamental attitude of the resolution of the International on the Chinese Civil War. After the CCP started upon the seizure of power, the program offered by our party (contained in "An Open Letter to the Members of the CCP" adopted by the Plenum of the Central Executive Committee of our party) almost completely corresponded to the program adopted by the Seventh Plenum of the International. Comrade Chao's appeal for an "ideological re-armament of our party" is tantamount to saying that our party in the past, or at least in the course of the CP's conquest of power, "deserted Trotskyist ideology" and needs to be "rearmed" once more by

*Read "Revolution on the Chinese Civil War" adopted by our party in January 1947, and "Resolution on Colonial Questions" of the International adopted by the Second World Congress.

the same Trotskyist ideology. This presentation is not only exaggerated and distorts the historical facts, but is actually an insult to the party. Hence it naturally has stirred up vehement indignation, rage and protestations, and even to a certain extent, confusions and vacillations among the comrades. It is with the presentiment of just such consequences that I forewarned our comrades to be not too hasty in making a diametrically opposite turn.

Nevertheless, I do not mean that our party has never committed any mistakes in the past, especially in the recent events of the CP's conquest of power. I have already pointed out that our party did not envisage the victorious conquest of power by the CCP. From this major error in estimating the whole event derives a series of mistakes on the evaluation of events in the course of their development, and certain tactical errors in our propaganda to the outside world, and these errors in estimation have affected our attitude to the entire event which more or less tended to passive criticism and an underestimation of its objective revolutionary significance. This is what we seriously admit and must correct. But, as I have said above, these are rather mistakes in estimating the events than in principle, and therefore can be easily redressed.

As we know, the best Marxists (Marx, Lenin, Engels, Trotsky, etc.) could maintain correctness in principle and in method, but could not guarantee accuracy in every estimate of the development of events. Marxism is the most effective scientific method of predicting social phenomena. But it has not yet reached such exactness as meteorology in foretelling the weather or astronomy in astral phenomena, since social phenomena are far more complicated than those of nature. So Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky have also made mistakes in their estimation of events. For instance, the optimistic estimation of Marx and Engels on the development of the situation after the failure of the 1848 Revolution; the optimistic anticipation of Lenin and Trotsky on the revolutionary evolution in Europe after the October Revolution; and Trotsky's appraisal of the perspectives of Stalinism during the Second World War. What distinguished them was not infallibility in estimating any and all events, but their constant, cautious and exact observation of the objective process of events, and once they realized that the development of events did not conform to their original estimates or that their estimates were wrong, in immediately re-adjusting or re-estimating them. This is the attitude of a real
Marxist, and is the example we should strive to follow.

THE CLASS NATURE OF THE CCP AND THE NEW REGIME

Though there has not been much discussion among the Chinese comrades on this question, some opinions which tend to deviate from the Marxist line exist among the comrades of the International. I therefore consider it necessary to raise this question for serious discussion and to make a definite appraisal which can serve as the premise in determining our position in relation to the CCP and its new regime.

About the nature of the CCP, almost all the Chinese comrades have unanimously declared it to be a petty-bourgeois party based on the peasantry. This has been a traditional conception of the Chinese Trotskyists for the past twenty years, and is one defined by Trotsky himself.

Beginning with 1930, Trotsky continuously pointed out: the CCP had gradually degenerated from a workers' party into a peasant party. Once he even said in a letter to the Chinese comrades that the CCP was following the same path as the Social Revolutionary Party in Russia. The main reason for this judgment was as follows: After the defeat of the Second Revolution, the CCP gave up the urban workers' movement, left the urban proletariat, and turned entirely toward the countryside. It plunged its whole strength into village guerrilla fighting and therefore absorbed a great quantity of peasant masses into the party. As a result, the basis of the party's composition became purely peasant. Despite the participation of some worker elements which retreated from the cities, the tiny number of these workers was not enough to determine the composition of the party. Furthermore, during the prolonged period of living in the countryside, they also assimilated little by little the peasant outlook in their ideology.*

As we know, this judgment formed by Trotsky on the nature of the CCP was never revised up to his death. The composition of the CCP and its nature described in the last part of Isaac's 'The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution' clearly reflected this conception, because his book was read and corrected by Trotsky himself before publication.

Has there been any alteration in the composition of the CCP in the direction of the working class since Trotsky's death? Not only has there been no fundamental change, but the petty-bourgeois composition of peasants and intellectuals has on the contrary been strengthened, while the unprecedented swelling of the CCP during and after the Resistance War was almost completely the contribution of the peasants and the petty-bourgeois intellectuals. Before its conquest of power, the party declared it had about three and a half million members. Of this total number, the worker element was very weak and at most did not surpass 5% (including the manual laborers). We can therefore confirm that up to the time the CCP came to power, the nature of the party still remained petty-bourgeois.

Despite all this, some of our International comrades consider that the CCP has already become a workers' party. Comrade Germain, for example, is of this opinion. When we referred to the judgment maintained by Trotsky that the CCP was a petty-bourgeois peasant party, he replied: "I know, I admit that was true before. But since the CCP seized the power and came into the cities, it has become transformed into a workers' party." This assertion is based on the argument that the nature of a party is not determined simply by the criterion of composition, but also by the role it plays. From the fact that the CCP has overthrown the Kuomintang bourgeois regime and set up its own power, it is quite evident that the nature of the party has changed. Unfortunately, this kind of reasoning is only a simulacrum of the truth, because the CCP overthrew the regime of Chiang Kai-shek not through the revolutionary action of the working class leading the peasant masses, but by relying exclusively on the peasant armed forces; and therefore the newly established regime still remains in the bourgeois category. (The category of this regime will be treated in subsequent passages.) So how can this fact be used as a criterion to judge the change in the nature of the party? We could say on the contrary: the very fact that the CCP did not mobilize the working masses and depended solely on the peasant armed forces to conquer the power reveals the petty-bourgeois nature of this party.

Then has the nature of the party been changed after it came into the cities? The answer must again be in the negative. The change in the composition of a political party can never be accomplished in twenty-four hours, especially in the case of the CCP which has an unusually heavy base of peasants. We can be assured that up to now, the CCP is still a party in which peasant members are

*All these ideas can be found in several articles written by Trotsky on the Chinese question and in his letters to the Chinese comrades.
predominant, and so to speak, is still largely petty-bourgeois in nature. But this does not mean that the peasant character of the party is now fixed and invariable. In fact, since this party has seized the power and occupied the great cities, in its eagerness to seek support among the working class, it has empirically stressed recruiting its members from the workers, while, on the other side, it has temporarily ceased to recruit farmers into the party. Following this bent, it is possible in the future for the CCP to gradually change its composition from petty-bourgeois peasant into a more of less workers' party. However, this is what might happen in the future, and it cannot be substituted for the reality of today.

The resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the IS has pointed out: "From the social point of view, the CCP is a bipartite party, up to now this party has had a very weak foundation in the urban proletariat." This is really a very cautious judgment on the nature of the party. If this appraisal is considered as a summery formula for this transitional period in which the CCP is attempting to transform itself from a peasant party into a workers' party (purely from the viewpoint of social composition), it is quite acceptable. But we must not forget the serious lesson disclosed in Trotsky's criticism of the "worker-peasant party" that: any attempt to organize a worker-peasant party under the conditions of present-day society (including the backward countries) is reactionary, petty-bourgeois, and extremely dangerous to the proletarian revolution. Because in a "worker-peasant party" it is not the proletarian elements who assimilate the peasant but quite the reverse, it is the peasant members who overwhelm the former. Therefore, from the revolutionary point of view, it is never possible for two classes to establish an equal weight in a common party. Accordingly, a so-called two-class "worker-peasant party" is always a reactionary tool of petty-bourgeois politicians to deceive the working class.*

The International has not yet given specific clarification in the documents on China on the class nature of the new regime (the so-called "People's Democratic Dictatorship"). Despite some differences in interpretation among the

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* I have no documents on hand on Trotsky's thesis about the "worker-peasant party" so what I have said above is completely taken from memory. If any mistakes have been made, the comrades may correct them according to the texts.

Chinese comrades (the "Chinese Minority" is an exception, since they have already asserted that the regime of the CCP represents "state capitalism" or "bureaucratic centralism"), the general opinion is that this regime rests on the social basis of the petty-bourgeois peasantry. It depends on the peasantry as its trunk, and is a Bonapartist military dictatorship. In the last analysis, therefore, in view of its fundamental role towards property relationships it is a bourgeois regime. Yet some of our comrades here entertain a completely opposite view. I was told by a comrade once that the regime of the CCP is a proletarian dictatorship. Though he did not present any reasons, I surmise he very likely deduced this conclusion from the formula given for the YCP regime in Yugoslavia. We can find another view in the formal document which regards the regime of the CCP as having the character of "dual power."* Since such diverse ideas prevail among our International comrades, especially among responsible comrades, it is necessary, in my opinion, to undertake a thorough clarification. First of all, let us start with the notion of "proletarian dictatorship."

To determine the nature of any regime, we Marxists must check on two essential conditions: the class relations and the property relations, and the latter is an even more decisive factor. We call the regime established by the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution in Russia a proletarian dictatorship, because the power was completely in the hands of the proletariat supported by the peasant masses even though there was not yet a fundamental change in the property relations at that time. The change in the class relations sufficed for us to call it a proletarian dictatorship. We can also call the regime of the YCP after 1947 a proletarian dictatorship, mainly because the property relationships have been basically altered, that is, from private ownership to statization of the properties. Despite the fact that the power of the YCP is not entirely controlled by the proletariat, and is still marked by certain bureaucratic deformations, the fundamental change in property ownership suffices to qualify this regime as a deformed proletarian dictatorship.

But what is the real situation with the regime established by the CCP? In class relations, this regime claims to be a "coalition government" of "four

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classes" (workers, peasants, the petty-bourgeoisie, and the native bourgeoisie). It is therefore very clear that this regime is not controlled or "dictated" by the proletariat. In fact, the social basis of this regime is constituted by the petty-bourgeoisie of which the peasants form the major part. Though the bourgeoisie does not have a decisive role in the government, yet in comparison with the proletariat, it still holds prominence (at least in appearance). In property relations, this regime not only has not abolished the private property system, but on the contrary, it deliberately enacting laws and constitutions to protect private ownership, to develop the economy of so-called "New Democracy," i.e., a non-socialist economy. I must, therefore, ask: on what ground can we assert this regime to be a "proletarian dictatorship"?

The argument brought forth by Comrade Germain on the "dual character" of this new regime is in the following passage: "Whether it wished to or not, the government found itself compelled to institute a genuine dual power in Southern China. On the provincial and district level, the majority of the old cadres remain in place; on the local level, their class enemies, the poor peasants of the Peasants' Associations bid fair to seize all of the actual power in carrying out the agrarian reform."*

Despite the obscurity in this passage, it seems to mean that the power in the provinces and counties is of bourgeois character, whereas in the countryside, the power is in the hands of the poor peasants. Let us take for granted that this is the fact. Yet we can not thereby conclude that the CCP regime in the South is of a dual character, for the power of the poor peasants is not identical with the proletarian power; at most, it can only be considered as the most thorough-going petty-bourgeois peasant power. The change in the petty-bourgeois character of a poor peasant power is possible only when it is under the leadership of the urban proletariat. Now this is the condition which is precisely lacking in the present regime, so this idea of a dual character is too inadequate to stand criticism.

To enable our comrades to recognize more concretely and more precisely the nature of this new regime, I will point out several of its important characteristics:

A. The major support of this regime is the enormous peasant army, which is entirely under the control of the already

Stalinized (or bureaucratisation) CCP. Hence the CCP has absolute power of determination and control over the regime.

B. Representatives of the bourgeoisie and the top layers of the petty-bourgeoisie occupy eminent positions in this regime, but they have no direct decisive function. They can only indirectly affect the regime through their economic and social influence.

C. Though a handful of individuals among the workers have been appointed to participate in the government (very few are in important posts), the working class as a whole still remains in a subordinate position. The working masses are deprived of the fundamental rights of freely electing their own representatives (such as Soviets or other similar workers' representative committees, etc.) to participate in and to supervise this regime; general political rights (freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association, publication, beliefs, etc.) are considerably limited, and even completely forbidden (such as strikes). Consequently, though the workers are hailed as the "master" by this regime, in reality they only have the right to "petition" within the "bounds of law" for the improvement of their living conditions.

D. On the social and economic plane, the regime has practiced land reform on a considerable scale, and is prepared to complete it and wipe out the feudal remains "step by step" -- in line with the bureaucratic methods of the CCP. This is indeed an unprecedented and great reform. But it is confined within the framework of preserving the "industrial and commercial properties" of the landlords and kulaks, and "free purchase of land," i.e., the non-violation of capitalist property relations.

E. In its relation with the capitalist properties, except that the regime has taken over the originally nationalized properties (the so-called "bureaucratic capital") and transformed them into nationalized properties of the new regime, all other kinds of private property are being left untouched, and are further offered protection by new laws. Despite this, it imposes by regulations comparatively strict limitations on the interests of private capital. As a result, the workers under this regime, though, still remaining in the position of hired laborers, can at the same time avoid too severe exploitation.

From these characteristics, we can clearly see that the nature of this regime
is by no means very simple and normal. Since this regime is a product of the combination of exceptional historical conditions, its nature and the forms it takes are equally complex and abnormal. It is scarcely possible to find another regime in modern history analogous to it. If we make a comparison of this regime with that of the Jacobins during the French Revolution, perhaps its features may be made more distinct.

The social basis of the Jacobin Party was the then urban toiling masses in general -- the "Sens-culottes." It thoroughly completed land reform, eliminated feudal influences. The regime of the CCP is founded on the petty-bourgeois social basis of the rural people, and it is also carrying out the land reform and eliminating the feudal remnants. Both of them are consummate dictatorships. From these essential aspects, these two regimes bear great resemblances to one another. But the time of the Jacobins was a period when capitalism was still in its embryonic stage. Its thorough completion of land reform and elimination of feudal influences fulfilled a great historical task for the bourgeoisie, and opened the broad highway for later capitalist development. This regime was thus absolutely revolutionary, and only the regime established by the Russian Bolsheviks has been able to match it in significance. The epoch in which the CCP exists is entirely different: it is the period of the utter decline and approaching fall of capitalism. In this epoch a genuine revolutionary power must be founded on the social basis of the proletariat (the modern "Sens-culottes"), even in backward countries. The realization of land reform should not and cannot clear the way for capitalist development, but must immediately open the prospects for socialism. Hence it must proceed in line with the expropriation of the landlords and the private properties of the bourgeoisie. This is just what was realized in the regime of the Russian Bolshevik Party under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky. Since the regime of the CCP is proceeding in the opposite way in history, it will eventually be a stumbling block in the course of historical development, and is in essence reactionary.

In conclusion. In class relations, this new regime bases itself on the petty-bourgeois peasantry and attempts to "arbitrate" between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; in property relations, it has abolished feudal land ownership, built up the capitalist land system, and nationalized the greater part of the enterprises. On the other hand, it is conferring protection on capitalist private property, and seeks to "co-ordinate" the relationship between nationalized property and private property in order to construct a "New Democratic" economy in the long run. Therefore, the regime is in itself fully charged with incompatible contradictions and high explosives. From the historical point of view, it can only be very short-lived and transitional. In the development of future events, it will be obliged to choose its social basis between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, to decide its destiny between socialism and capitalism. Otherwise, it will either be overthrown by one of these two classes, or be crushed by both, and become only an episode in history.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE NEW REGIME

To give an adequate account and criticism of the measures taken by the new regime on all economic, social and political planes over the past two years (beginning with October, 1949 when this government was formally announced) would necessitate the writing of a special document for this purpose. This report, being limited in space, and with lack of sufficient data on hand, can only offer a brief description of some essential features of these measures and the most important changes which have taken place in the orientation of the regime. In this respect, we are prepared to supply materials continuously for supplementary reference.

In respect to the evolution of the measures adopted by this regime, seen in the light of the traits exhibited by its policies and the subsequent modifications, we can take the outbreak of the Korean War as the line of demarcation, and divide the whole into two periods. During the initial months of the first period (October, 1949 to June, 1950), under the slogan of "Military Matters First!" (i.e., clearing away the remaining military influences of the Kuomintang on the mainland), the CCP threw its whole effort on the economic plane into expropriating money and food from the people to support the front and to cover the expenses of the administration. The noteworthy aspects of these measures are as follows: they levied severe taxes on all of industry and commerce, forced the buying of bonds, such as "Victory Bonds," "Front-support Bonds," "Patriotic Bonds," etc., and appropriated foodstuffs from the countryside (the so-called "voluntary contributions"); while the deficit in the budget was made up by issuing enormous quantities of paper-notes; the open suspension of land reform, and the lowering of wages, etc. On the political plane, it assiduously conciliated the
bourgeoisie, landlords and kulaks, pulled
toward itself all kinds of bourgeois and
petty-bourgeois politicians and military
men, including some of Kuomintang bureau-
crats and agents, in an attempt to dis-
integrate the enemy and strengthen its
own power. But it does its best to sup-
press the activities of the workers and
peasants. Cases of workers being arrested
or even killed on account of protests
and strikes were often heard.

All these measures resulted in in-
flation, lowering of the level of living,
pauzerization of the whole society, and
precipitated the collapse of industry
and commerce. Most factories and shops
were utterly unable to sustain themselves
and asked for official permission to close
down, or shut down automatically, and
even those which were not closed could
not pay salaries and wages to their em-
ployees. Consequently, great anxiety and
resentment were aroused among the
bourgeoisie. With the lowering of wages
(compared with the level during Kuomintang
rule) and the compulsory reduction of
wages through buying bonds, the living
conditions of the worker masses became
more and more miserable. Yet they had no
way to express their own opinions or
to demand improvements, and were univer-
sally discontented with the new regime,
and even complained openly against it.
However, the most serious consequences
occurred in the countryside. Due to the
interruption of land reform, the broad
peasant masses were not in the least
benefited but on the contrary were forced
to contribute endless taxes and food.
Meanwhile, the landlords and kulaks trans-
ferred the greater part of their own
burdens onto the shoulders of the peasant
masses and even "contributed" the last
handfuls of grain used for sowing seeds,
required for their livelihood. Robbed
of their means of living, filled with
fury, and further provoked by the land-
lords, kulaks, and Kuomintang agents,
a part of the peasants came to acts of
open rebellion, such as refusing "to
contribute," gathering in groups to
plunder "public foodstuffs," and even
rallied to the anti-communist guerrilla
bands. This reaction objectively revived
the influence of the Kuomintang anti-
communist guerrillas.

In the spring of 1950 this situation
attained the breaking point of a crisis.
At that time the leading organ of the CCP
was compelled to admit, "At present the
feudal system of the vast countryside
has still not been eliminated, the wounds
of wars are not yet healed, and in ad-
tion to the unbalanced and unfair
appropriation of state foodstuffs last
year, the lawless landlords exploit this
opportunity to transfer their own bur-
dens, and as a result the peasants in
many regions are destitute of food and
seeds, and can hardly proceed with the
spring season of farming. In the regions
ravaged by droughts and floods, con-
ditions are much more grave. Meantime
there are a few special agents of the
enemy, the bandits, who use threats to
make people organize revolts, plunder
the state food, attack revolutionary
groups and individuals, create social
confusion, and sabotage the orders of
production... to throw productive relations
and the social order into a chaotic and
dangerous situation." The Chiankiang
Daily, the official paper published in
Hangkow, summarized this critical situ-
ation in the following conclusion, "The
essence of the immediate crisis lies in
this: whether the peasants follow the
Communist Party and the People's Gover-
ment, or the country autocrats and the
Kuomintang agents?"

Under this serious crisis and the
"pressure" from all sides, especially
from the peasant masses, the industrial-
ists and the merchants, the regime was
obliged to make a "turn" in its policy.
This turn first appeared with the an-
nouncement of the carrying out of
land reform (at the beginning of March,
1950), the so-called "execution of land
reform by steps," that is, it was pro-
posed to start with the redistribution
of land north of Yangtze, while in the
South (not including North-west and
South-west) to proceed first or all with
the struggle "against the vicious auto-
crats" and with "the reduction of rents
and interest." The regime also revised
the "Act of Food Appropriation." These
measures served as antidotes to appease
the resistance of the peasants. Almost
at the same time, it proclaimed the "Act
of Financial Coordination," which has
more or less alleviated the weight of
taxes, unified and standardized taxation
in the whole country. This has to a
certain extent pacified the resentment of
the tax-contributors and comparatively
stabilized finances, while inflation has
also slackened. The imperative measure
taken to maintain industry and commerce
was the universal organizing of "Labor
and Capital Consultative Conferences."
Under the supervision and arbitration of
the government, the outcome of these
"consultations" was always unfavorable
to the workers. In order to maintain the
factories and shops, the workers and
employees were obliged to lower their
wages or even to forfeit their wages,
or else to resign "voluntarily" in order
to join "the farming work in their native

*See the announcement of the "Military and
Political Committee of the Central-South
Area, published in the "Wan-wei Pao,"
March 6, 1950.
countries," or to prolong their work-time "voluntarily" with the aim of reducing costs of production. Of course, the industrialists and merchants were quite pleased with these results, while the workers became more and more resentful.

All these imperative measures were then discussed, amended at the meeting of the "Political Consultative Conference" in May, 1950, and concretized into various laws and acts (such as "Land Reform Act," "Trade Union Act," etc.) which were ratified by the government and became decrees. Besides, there was a "Report on Financial and Economic Coordination" also adopted by the Conference, ratified by the government, and put into execution. The points which merit our notice in these new acts are the following: First, the new "Land Reform Act" is generally in the same vein as the former "Land Law," except that it emphasizes the "necessity of preserving the industrial and commercial properties" (according to the report of Liou Sao-chin), and "strictly forbids all violence: beatings, killings, arrests, and the pardoning of criminals in high hats" (contained in the Directives of the Ministry of Public Affairs). This is obviously designed to prohibit severely the spontaneous organization of the masses, to punish the landlords, the country gentry and autocrats with their own revolutionary methods and submit all kinds of struggle to the procedure of law and appeal to law, this being termed by the regime "rational struggles."

Secondly, in the economic field, it supported the industrialists by means of low-interest loans, or by allotting what is called "extra-works" whereby the administrators of the state enterprises offer raw materials, consign extra labor and allocate a certain amount of profits to the private enterprises, or by buying the commodities of the private enterprises, or by giving extra facilities in buying raw materials, fuel, and transportation. With this aim it also reduced state commerce to oblige private business. In the "Trade Union Act," it recognizes the right of the workers to demand improvement of their living conditions within the limits of law. So the workers remain helpless if the "law does not consent." In addition, the compulsory buying of "bonds" was stopped.

We can say in brief that this "turn" in the policy of the CCP originated from the fact that it deeply felt the danger to itself from the "pressure of the peasant masses and the bourgeoisie, who have thereby become the main beneficiaries of this "turn" and gained certain "concessions" from the regime. The working class, especially the workers in the private enterprises, have not only scarcely benefited but in many respects have been its victims.

In the second period, beginning with the outbreak of the Korean War up to the present, the measures of the regime have generally proceeded according to the orientation fixed in May by the "Political Consultative Conference." However, under the call of "Aid to Korea against American imperialism," particularly under compulsion to undertake a broad mobilization of the masses for participation in the war, the CCP has once again been compelled to modify its policy, or make another "turn."

On the economic plane, following the blockade by American imperialism, the supply of certain industrial raw materials and machines has diminished day by day. And since its own finances are more and more plunged into difficulty, aid to the private enterprises has also been decreased and limited. Consequently, the comparatively revived private enterprises have again relapsed into stagnation and decline. The government attempts to concentrate its energy on the development of the state sector of industry and stresses the building up of a "self-sufficient heavy industry," but owing to the extreme lack of capital and equipment, has made very little progress. In the field of commerce, particularly in foreign trade, it has more or less resumed control over private business, and hence causes a stagnation of commerce.

Since the regime has won support from the huge peasant masses for its campaign of "aid to the Korean War," it has indeed accelerated the pace of agrarian reform, and enlarged its scope. To a certain extent, it has even relaxed its control over the peasant masses, and strengthened its foundation among the poor peasants. The obvious examples in recent months have been its emphasis on the role of the peasants, especially the importance of the movement of the poor peasants; its attempt to correct right opportunist deviations in the land reform movement, and the penalties inflicted on some cadres who are directly responsible for the execution of land reform, when they violate the "will of the masses," employ "bureaucratic methods," or are corrupt. But this does not signify that the CCP has full confidence in the peasant masses, and will allow unhampered away to their revolutionary initiative, to organize spontaneously the distribution of the land and conduct the revolutionary struggle against the landlords and rich peasants. In fact, the fundamental line
of "protecting the industrial and commercial properties of the landlords and rich peasants," of "the gradual execution of land reform," and of "rational struggle" still holds sway. It is only in practical execution of these policies that the control is less strict than before.

In its relation with the working class, owing to its need of support for the Korean War, the regime has made certain improvements in the living conditions of the workers. Recently it has gradually raised the wages of the workers in the state enterprises, and is more inclined than before to listen to the opinions of workers concerning the technical aspects of production. But the executive power of production is still in the hands of the manager or the committee appointed by the upper structure. While under the slogan of competing for "increase of production," on the one hand, the already over-burdened labor of the average worker is further intensified; and on the other hand, a group of labor aristocrats (the Stakhanovists) is brought into being and weighs upon the general working masses, and thus creates differentiation in the ranks of the workers. In its attitude towards the struggles of the workers in the private enterprises, it is much more tolerant than before, that is to say, it permits the trade unions, "on condition of not fundamentally hampering production," to engage in a "legal struggle" with capital for improving living conditions. Henceforth, the lowering of wages and the free dismissal of workers as in former times is more strictly guarded. Though the recently adopted "Labor Assurance Law" is still a half-measure, yet, generally speaking, it has indeed affected a considerable improvement in the position and life of the working masses. But the essential rights of the working class in politics and in production (namely, the rights of participation and control in government administration and production) are still denied.

Since the outbreak of the Korean War, the activities of all the reactionary elements have revived, and this has obliged the CCP to more or less modify its former political line of conciliation. This new turn is manifested in the tempestuous drive of "suppressing the counter-revolutionaries." In this campaign, not only thousands of reactionary landlords and kulaks ("the vicious local autocrats" according to their popular designation), labor traitors, and Kuomintang bureaucrats and agents have been imprisoned, exiled, and executed, but likewise a great number of "affiliated" elements and followers of Li Chi-sun and the "Democratic League" have suffered the same fate. This, however, marks a considerable progress within certain limits. Yet this drive has not even touched a single hair of the real spokesmen of the bourgeoisie, such as the "Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee" represented by Li Chi-sun and the leaders of the "Democratic League." While on the other hand, under the pretext of suppressing "counter-revolutionaries," the more advanced and discontented elements among the workers and peasants, especially the Trotskyists, are repressed, imprisoned and killed. This only demonstrates that, even while executing certain limited progressive measures, this regime still drags behind it the reactionary specter of Stalinism.

In its international relations, the regime has really made important progress. After its establishment, it won considerable political independence from imperialism (such as taking back the custom houses and cancelling the stationing of foreign armies in China). We must say that this has opened a new phase in modern Chinese diplomatic history. But in the economic sphere, it still assures "protection to the properties of all foreigners in China," and attempts to engage in conciliation with imperialism by its implicit consent to the preservation of the concessions of Hongkong, Kowloon, and Macao. With the outbreak of the Korean War the foreign policy of the CCP has evinced certain further developments. In order to take revenge for the economic blockade and freezing of Chinese property in the United States, the CCP regime has taken "control" over American banks and enterprises, seized all the schools, hospitals and similar institutions formerly operated by foreigners. Moreover, as a counter-measure against the appropriation of a "rebellious" oil ship by the Hongkong government, the Peoples' Government declared its "appropriation" of all the capital of the Asia Oil Company in China. Although these progressive measures have not altered the fundamental line of "protecting all foreign properties in China," they have at least driven the regime to entrench more or less on the inviolable foreign properties. Also due to its direct intervention in the Korean War and the subsequent measures taken, the possibility of compromising with American imperialism -- the chieftain of the capitalist world -- is not only greatly diminished but Mao's regime has even become the most hated by the American imperialists in the Orient.

In its relations with the Soviet Union, because of the historical origins of its birth and its geographical and economic ties, this regime has tended to dependence and submission from the very beginning. This attitude was clearly reflected in
the "Sino-Soviet Mutual Aid Agreement" signed in February, 1950. This agreement was first of all aimed at pacifying the indignation of the Chinese people towards the Soviet Union (here we must note that ever since the Soviet Union seized Port Arthur and Dairen in accord with the "Yalta Agreement," and acquired many other privileges such as the joint control of the Chum-tung and Chon-chuan Railways, especially after it destroyed and moved away the greater part of the industrial and mining installations in Manchuria, very strong reactions have inflamed broad layers of the Chinese people, especially among the working masses in Manchuria). Also, made wiser by the bitter lessons of the Yugoslav events, the Soviet bureaucracy has learned to pay its "respects to the sovereignty and independence of the Chinese People's Government," and has promised to restore the two ports and control over the railways in Manchuria no later than 1952. (But whether his promise will be kept and realized in time is still an open question.)

On the economic plane the agreements on trade and the so-called "Sino-Soviet Partnership" mostly favor the Soviet Union and are in nature quite similar to the treaties signed with the East European countries. Especially after the outbreak of the Korean War, the dependence of the new regime on the Soviet Union has become more and more close and inextricable. That is to say, the actual control of the Soviet Union over the Chinese government has become more solid and irremovable. Viewed simply from this angle, the Korean War is really like a set of chains, fastening the regime of the CCP to the horn and wheels of the Soviet Union's war chariot, and dragging it along, despite its will.

It is true that the intervention of the regime in the Korean War has greatly increased its weight on the international arena, raised its esteem, and heightened its prestige among the people in the country. But the grievous damage (in both men and material resources) incurred in this war has imposed more difficulties in the way of social and economic construction in China (even according to the norms of the CCP), which has already been overwhelmed by difficulties. Meanwhile, these sacrifices have also stirred up discontent and complaints among the masses. If the war should continue, future evils can scarcely be measured. Simply viewed from this aspect, the war would probably have to cease or be slackened. But if the Kremlin should persist in the strong intention to hold back the CCP through this war, there might be a further prolongation of the war.

In the past two years, under pressure and restraint from all the powerful and complex influences at home and abroad, both the internal and exterior measures taken by this new regime have been constantly and empirically changing. In its general trends, the whole rotates in a "leftward" direction. But inasmuch as its fundamental opportunistic orientation and bureaucratic administrative methods -- the line of "revolution by stages," of "New Democracy" and "class collaboration"-- and the systematic and well-planned control over all mass activities from above, are still completely preserved, the basic contradictions and explosiveness contained in the regime (indicated in the previous section) are far from attenuated or diminished by the measures taken, but have even become still more acute with the logical development of events.

THE PERSPECTIVES OF CHINA

With the victory of the CCP, a brand-new situation has unfolded in China -- the beginning of a deformed Third Chinese Revolution. But having absorbed into itself all the profound and sharp contradictions in social and economic relations, class relations and international relations, this situation is destined to be no more than transitory. It will be channeled into one or the other of the following perspectives:

A. Relapse into the Reactionary Rule of the Bourgeoisie

With the combination of all the objective factors and conditions: the protection of all the capitalist property relations within the cities and countryside, the bourgeoisie still maintaining a certain political power and influence, the proletariat being frustrated and repressed in political and economic life, and the despotic state apparatus built on a petty-bourgeois social basis, inclining to corruption -- we cannot exclude the possibility of retrogression to the reactionary rule of the bourgeoisie. But only through a most brutal counter-revolutionary blood-bath could this possibility be realized. But, under another basic present condition, that is, so long as the CCP has full authority over a potent peasant armed force, this perspective is out of the question.

Yet in the event of a most unfavorable conjuncture in the development of both internal and international events, the possible disintegration of the organism of the CCP regime would favor restoration of bourgeois rule. Especially in the case of future world war, if the proletarian revolution in other countries would not be able to rise in time, to intervene
energetically in Chinese events, American imperialism, after striking a military death-blow to the Soviet Union, could turn back and lead the armies of Japan and Formosa to attack the Chinese mainland, and bring about inevitable ruin or rupture in the regime of the CCP (a part of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements would surrender to American imperialism). Then a reactionary bourgeois reign would reappear on the political stage of China.

Of course, this is the worst perspective and it is merely a possibility. But it is not wise to absolutely exclude this worst variant. Only by recognizing and comprehending this worst of perspectives, by our precaution and alertness, and through our subjective revolutionary efforts can we prevent its appearance and development.

B. To the Road of Revolutionary Proletarian Dictatorship

Taking account of the gradual execution of land reform, the widespread purge of feudal remnants, the nationalization of a great part of the enterprises and properties (such as the main industries and means of transportation, big banks, etc.), the liquidation of the reactionary forces represented by Chiang's groups, the considerable rise of broad peasant masses, re-grouping of the urban working class (in the all-national trade union organization), and a gradual lifting of the general cultural level and political consciousness of the worker and peasant masses (indicated by the universal literacy campaign and legalization of reading the works of Marx, Lenin and Engels), all these progressive measures have objectively laid down a favorable basis for revolutionary development. The chief obstacle on the revolutionary path is the tenacious opportunism and tyrannical bureaucratism of the CCP. But in the favorable unfolding of future events at home and abroad, the worker and peasant masses would be able by their own strength to push the CCP onward, to deliver blows to the reactionary influences of the bourgeoisie, and by securing certain prerequisites for revolutionary development (such as certain democratic rights) to proceed step by step on the road of revolution.

Even in the event of the Third World War, if there should be an upsurge of world revolutionary movements, the Chinese worker and peasant masses, stimulated by the strong impetus of revolutions abroad, could possibly assail the opportunism and bureaucratism of the CCP, bring about a split and create a revolutionary left wing in this party, thus freeing them-selves from the yoke of Stalinism, and then joining the current of the Trotskyist movement. This would lead the revolution straight on to proletarian dictatorship which would complete the Third Chinese Revolution and open a future of socialist construction.

Yet I must point out that this perspective will not be a reproduction of the Yugoslav events, but a more advanced and heightened revolutionary development. There is very little possibility for such a repetition simply because China is a country greatly different from Yugoslavia both in its internal and external conditions, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War. (On this point, I could offer further explanations, if need be.)

C. Assimilation into the Soviet Union

The two perspectives set forth above deal with only the most fundamental outcomes of the possible eventual developments in the Chinese situation. But, in view of the opportunist bureaucratic deformations of the CCP leadership and its present intimate relations with the Kremlin, these two perspectives will meet frantic resistance since either one of them would be fatal for this leadership. Consequently, it will consciously or unconsciously choose a third road—the road of gradual assimilation into the Soviet Union. That is to say, under the ever-increasing menace from bourgeois reactionary forces allied with imperialism and the ever-growing dissatisfaction and pressure of the masses, on the one hand, the CCP would empirically exclude by gradual steps the bourgeois parties and cliques from the political field. Through operations of "purge" and "fusion," it would annihilate these factions and the "Coalition Government," and form a "one-party dictatorship" in name and in content, which would conform to the so-called "transformation from peoples' democratic dictatorship to proletarian dictatorship."

On the economic plane, it would carry out a gradual process of expropriation of bourgeois private properties, the expansion of nationalized properties, in keeping with the so-called "ascension from the economy of New Democracy towards the socialist economy." On the other hand, while executing these political and economic measures, the CCP would make certain concessions to the pressure of the masses in order to utilize that as a weapon to suppress reactionary influences. But it would never basically loosen its rigorous bureaucratic grip upon the revolutionary activities of the masses, especially of workers and poor peasants, lest they pass over the permitted bound-
aries or interfere with its basic line.

This line may be called "the line of East-Europeanization." But there exists an essential difference between the two processes: the "assimilation" of the buffer states was accomplished entirely under military control of the Kremlin, and through its directly designated Stalinist bureaucrats in these countries. In China, due to the vastness of territory, the numerosness of the population, and the powerful influence of the Soviet Army, and especially taking into account the experience of the Yugoslav events, the Kremlin can rely only on its general superiority in economic and military force and its control over Manchuria and Sinkiang to threaten and exert pressure upon the CCP. However, in appearance, it would still pay certain respects to the "independence and sovereignty" of the regime of the CCP and allow it to proceed on its own "initiative."

Although in the main, this "assimilation" depends solely on the subjective inclination of the CCP itself, we should not overlook what an important role this subjective tendency of a party already in power, which holds in its hands immense material forces (including a powerful peasant army) can play under certain circumstances and during a certain period of time. (The role played by Stalin and his group in the Soviet Union is a most conspicuous example.) Before the intervention of a new world war, and in the absence of other revolutionary upheavals in the world, this line of the CCP's assimilation into the Soviet Union is most probable and realistic. To repudiate it would be unwise as well as harmful in the field of practical politics. But as soon as the Third World War breaks out or a new revolutionary movement arises in other countries, this process of assimilation of the CCP will immediately be interrupted, and the whole situation in China will be forced to head in either one of the two directions indicated above.

We should also point out that this process of assimilation will by no means have a smooth and even course. Parallel with the development of the situation, the profound and acute contradictions inherent in the new regime and the conflicts between the interests of Chinese revolution and the diplomatic interests of the Kremlin would inevitably erupt and gather into fierce billowing disturbances or tragedies.

In general, the development of the Chinese situation will be slow-paced and drawn out, and will hardly undergo decisive change before the explosion of the coming Great War. Therefore we may say that the destiny of China will only be ultimately solved in the event of the Third World War and a gigantic surge of world revolution. There is therefore still time enough for us to prepare before the advent of such a solution.

OUR FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDE AND ORIENTATION

Following the above analyses and appraisals, we must openly admit that a new revolutionary situation has not only begun, but has already attained certain achievements, and will possibly go forward. Hence we reject all sectarian and passive criticisms. We must integrate our organization in the main current of this movement, join in the mass struggles, and make the utmost effort to push this movement on to a really victorious road. At the same time, we must realize that, as the bureaucratic and opportunist leadership of the CCP is distorting this revolution, continuously imposing injuries and obstacles on its course, and leading it to the edge of a precipice, we must reject all naive and over-optimistic illusions. Our fundamental attitude is that, confronted with this living reality, with all the perils and hardships, we must point out to the masses the tremendous contradictions and crises imposed on this movement by the bureaucratic and opportunist line of the CCP. With patience and persistence, we shall convince the masses, encourage them and help them to overcome these contradictions and crises by their own efforts and to arrive at a victorious outcome.

Our fundamental orientation in pushing this abnormal revolution on to a genuine victory are as follows:

A. Carry out thoroughly the land reform, exterminate all the feudal remains, and realize nationalization of the land. Meanwhile, expropriate all the private properties of the bourgeoisie, complete the statization of their properties as a basis for socialist construction.

B. Do away with the "Coalition Government" of class collaboration, end the bonapartist military dictatorship, establish a dictatorship of the proletariat leading the poor peasants, and thus achieve genuine national unity under democratic centralization.

C. Declare the abolition of all unequal treaties, take back all settlements and concessions (such as Hongkong, Kowloon, Macao, etc.), confiscate all imperialist properties in China, and cancel all privileges held in China by the Soviet bureaucracy — in order to attain complete and genuine national independence.
To struggle for carrying out these fundamental points of orientation, our party should formulate a concrete and inclusive program of action, in which we must emphasize that we support every progressive measure of the CCP, but criticize any reactionary measure. At any time and in any place, we must fight as much as possible to give workers and peasants the realization of basic democratic rights (such as freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, belief, strikes, etc.), fight for the workers' right of participation, supervision and control in administration and production, and establish representative committees (Soviets) of workers, peasants and soldiers.

As our organization is at present still very weak and suffering the most brutal persecutions from the new regime, it is far from able to intervene directly in this movement and sway events. But since we know that our Trotskyist line of the Permanent Revolution is the line most suited to the objective logic of revolutionary development in China, if we stand resolutely and courageously within this movement, within the struggles of the masses, cautiously and patiently explaining to them in order to convince them, the evolution of events will help us win step by step the confidence of the masses. With a new conjuncture, in a new rising of the revolutionary tide, we will be lifted to the leading position and direct the masses on the road of victory.

* * *

Finally, I should add that, not only because of the vastness of territory and the enormous population, the events in China have wrought important effects in the Far East and even in the whole international situation which deserve our special attention. But we should further understand that of all the backward countries, China is the most typical in its manifestation of the law of uneven and combined development. In the past half century a series of great events have broken out in this country -- two revolutions, several prolonged civil wars, and foreign wars, and the third revolution still at its beginning, and during these twenty-five years, Trotsky and the Chinese Trotskyists under his leadership, have directly participated in the greater part of these events, and have therefore accumulated rich experience. Therefore, a correct solution of the Chinese question will not only have decisive significance for the future of the Chinese Trotskyist movement, but will be a precious guide for our International in orienting and directing the movements in the Orient and in all other backward countries, and even in advanced countries. That is why I repeat once more: I hope that our International comrades in discussing the Chinese question, will not be constrained by any formalistic analogies and abstract concepts, but will seriously employ the Marxist method in analyzing the objective reality in order to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.

November 8, 1951
Having analyzed the most recent facts relating to the development of the Chinese situation and after a study of the evolution of Yugoslavia and the Eastern European countries, I deem it necessary to make some supplementary remarks and corrections to the analysis and the appreciations of the character of the CP and of the regime in my previous "Report on the Chinese Situation" so that the next IEC has more concrete material on this question and can arrive at the most correct conclusion.

* * *

On the Problems of the Nature of the Chinese CP

On this question, in view of the fact that after the defeat of the second Chinese Revolution, the CP completely abandoned the workers' movement in the cities, turned toward the countryside, absorbed a great number of peasants in the party and concentrated on the peasant guerrillas, Trotsky and the Chinese Trotskyists had once declared that this party had gradually degenerated and had become a petty-bourgeoisie party based on the peasantry. But some comrades in the International have their doubts on this point and say that even if Trotsky had expressed this opinion he was wrong.

That is why I think that it is necessary first to give some explanations in the context of certain facts.

In judging the nature of a party, we Marxists base ourselves on two fundamental factors: the composition of the party and its political tendency. If workers comprise the majority of the party, and the party truthfully represents the fundamental interests of the working class, this party can be called a really healthy or revolutionary workers' party. If the workers comprise the majority of the party and its political leadership is of a petty-bourgeoisie or opportunist, reformist type, we still call it a workers' party, but it is a deformed or degenerated workers' party. If the petty-bourgeoisie predominates in its social composition and if the leadership is also opportunist, even if it pretends to be a workers' party, we can only designate it a petty-bourgeoisie party.

Regarding the evolution and the composition of the Chinese CP, the number of members in the last period of the Chinese revolution was approximately 60,000 according to the report to the Fifth Congress of the party held in April, 1927 (not including members of the Communist Youth whose membership exceeded that of the party), and the workers of the big industries accounted for some 50% of these. But after the disastrous defeats of this revolution and several adventurous insurrections, particularly after the great defeat of the Canton uprising, most of the workers were sacrificed or automatically left the party so that the percentage of workers decreased to 10% in 1928 and to 3% in 1929 ("On the Organisational Question" by Chou En Lai). It fell to 2.5% in March, 1930 (Red Flag, March 26, 1930) and to 1.6% in September of the same year (Report to the Third Plenum of the CC of the Party by Chou En Lai). The Bolsheviks of October 10, 1931 openly admitted that "The percentage of workers had already fallen to less than 1%. After most of the workers' branches of Shanghai were won over to the Left Opposition "Trotskyist Group," Red Flag complained on October 23, 1933 that in Shanghai, the largest industrial city of the country, "there is not a single real workers branch." But in the same period they said that the number of members had risen to over 300,000. This was adequate proof that the CP had an almost exclusively peasant composition. Precisely because of that, Trotsky drew the conclusion: "The Chinese Stalinists...in the years of the counter-revolution have gone over from the proletariat to the peasantry. They had assumed the tasks of the revolutionary party at the time when they were still a revolutionary party...." "The party has been divorced in fact from its class...." "The causes of conflict between the army which is of peasant composition and under the leadership of the petty bourgeoisie, and the workers have not been eliminated but have been made extremely possible and even inevitable by all the conditions.... Consequently the content of major tasks only can not to permit the petty-bourgeoisie democrats resting on the armed peasants to politically and militarily command the proletariat, but should prepare us to assure the leadership of the proletariat over the peasant movement and especially its 'Red Army'." (Trotsky, in a Letter to the Chinese Left Opposition, and postscript to this letter, September 22 and 26, 1933.)

When the Chinese CP was obliged to flee from the south to the north, to Yenan because of the fact that conditions were still more primitive there, the number of its worker members dropped still further because the only possible recruitment of worker elements came from village artisans. Consequently the petty-bourgeoisie peasant atmosphere dominated the entire party and was formally crystallized in 'the theory of the revolu-

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tionary peasantry." Mao Tse-tung in the theses on "The New Democracy" openly declared: "Comrade Stalin said that the problem of the colonial and semi-colonial countries was virtually a peasant problem," i.e., that "the Chinese revolution is in fact a peasant revolution.... The policy of the New Democracy is in fact the transfer of power to the peasantry. The new three principles, the real three principles (Mao pretends that his new democracy contains the "real three principles" inherited from Sun Yat Sen as to distinguish them from the "false principles" espoused by Chiang Kai-shek) are nothing else than peasant revolutionism." These words of Mao Tse-tung completely established that the Chinese CP was not only a petty-bourgeois party based on the peasantry in its composition, but that it also manifested itself as a petty-bourgeois peasant party in its ideology.

Consequently during the entire anti-Japanese war, the Chinese CP by supporting the leadership of the Kuomintang not only insisted on the need for class collaboration in its propaganda but declared openly in practice that "the workers should increase production to aid the government in the common resistance against Japan," and rejected the "exorbitant demands" presented by the workers to the national bourgeoisie, charging that "the policy of class struggle" of the Trotskyists was a "policy of betrayal to aid the enemy" thus slandering the Trotskyists as "traitors." Naturally in the real struggles of the workers the Chinese CP was always on the side of the national bourgeoisie against the reasonable demands of the workers, even sabotaging them. At the same time it did everything possible to have the most positive elements of the working class leave the struggle in the cities and join the workers in the countryside. It was precisely because of this that this party, although considerably augmenting its armed peasant forces during the war of resistance had an extremely weak influence among the worker masses of the cities.

Finally when the Chinese CP was obliged to carry on a general counter-offensive against the Chiang government and to occupy the big cities, not only did it not make any appeal to the worker masses to carry on some form of struggle, but it did its best to curb their activities. Its only appeal was to call upon them "to protect production and to watch Chiang Kai-shek's bandits who are sabotaging it." When it occupied the cities, it imposed severe restrictions on all activity or spontaneous organization of the worker masses. When the workers went out on strike to demand increases in wages or to resist oppressive conditions it was brutal in its repressions, going to the point of massacres. For example, the strikers in several factories in Tientsin were arrested and executed. The workers of Sun Sin factory #9 (where 6,000 workers were employed) were attacked with machine guns because they refused to leave the city with the factory and there were more than 300 casualties. In the coal mines of Chin Sin, when the workers revolted against the cruelty and arrogance of the Soviet advisors and specialists the Chinese CP sent numerous troops to repress the revolt and there were more than 200 dead or wounded workers and more than a thousand expelled and exiled to the northeast and to Siberia. (This happened in May 1950.) All this demonstrates the attitude of this petty-bourgeois party towards the working class, one of distrust, hostility and even massacres. That partially confirmed the prediction and the warning made by Trotsky 18 years ago. If the worker masses of the cities had been more united under the leadership of another revolutionary force (the Trotskyists) it is very probable that the CP would have had recourse to civil war to beat down the workers. As Trotsky said, "They would have utilized the armed peasantry to attack the advanced workers." (See postscript of the letter mentioned above.) From these historic facts the question of whether Trotsky and the Chinese Trotskyists were right in their estimation of the nature of the CP can be left to the re-examination of those comrades who have doubts on the matter. If the comrades have adequate facts and correct theoretical reasons to demonstrate that the estimation of the CP made by Trotsky and the Chinese Trotskyists was "incorrect" we are ready to abandon our estimation and to adopt the new one.

* * *

On the other hand I should emphasize that after the defeat of the second revolution, and although the CP on the basis of its composition, gradually degenerated into a petty-bourgeois party based on the peasantry and had postulated in its ideology Mao Tse-tung's theory that "the Chinese revolution is practically a peasant revolution....power should

*Since this mine produces a better quality coal which can be utilized in the making of steel the Soviet Union had sent advisors and specialists to control the mine so as to appropriate all the production for the U.S.S.R. This arrangement has probably been regulated in the Sino-Soviet agreement and mutual aid and assistance.
be transferred to the peasants," because of its historic origin (as a section of the C.I.) because of some working class traditions remaining from the second revolution and because of its close relations with the international Stalinist party (which and it is still remains a workers' party) and because of its general support of Marxism- Leninism, of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the perspective of Communism, etc., we have to admit that even when it had degenerated into a peasant party there remained a certain inclination in the party towards the workers. But this tendency was curbed and repressed during the long years of peasant guerrilla war. When this party entered the cities and came into contact with broad worker masses, and especially when it had an urgent need of the support of the working class to resist the threats of the bourgeoisie and imperialism, the worker tendency, long hidden and repressed had the opportunity to emerge and to exercise its pressure on the leadership of the party, to demand the transfer of the base of the party from the peasantry to the working class and to demand that certain concessions be made to the demands of the worker masses. The events of the last two years and particularly of the last six months have clearly reflected this tendency.

The CP decided to stop the recruitment of peasants in the party and emphasized the need of a rapid recruitment of workers. The editorial in the Peoples' Journal, July 1, 1950 on the 29th Anniversary of the CP especially insisted on a reform of the composition of the party, i.e., on the absorption of workers into the party. It also said that in the recent period among the 6,648 new members in Tientsin 73% were workers, and out of 3,350 in Peking more than 50%.

To sum up, according to these concrete facts, there have been quite a considerable number of workers recruited by the CP in the last two years in the large industrial cities and in the mines in the Northeast, in Shanghai and in Wuhan. Of course if consideration is given to the composition of the entire party (according to the same editorial of the Peoples' Journal, there are some 5 million members in the party) the number of workers is still very small. (Kao Kang, secretary for the northeastern district admitted in a speech made on January 10 to the heads of the party that "working class elements are still not very numerous in our party," as the principal reason to explain the serious crisis of the right-wing tendency and the corruption in the party. But this turn of the CP in insisting upon working class recruitment for the purpose of changing the composition of the party, has indubitably had an important effect on the class nature of the party.

This "turn" is more or less reflected in the process of carrying out the agrarian reform. According to the plan for agrarian reform adopted by the Political Consultative Conference or the CP and other organizations and parties in May 1950, special emphasis is placed on "the protection of the commercial and industrial property of the landed proprietors and the rich peasants." The decree of the Minister of the Interior severely prohibits "excessive actions" of the poor peasants toward the landed proprietors and the rich peasants. Consequently, at the start of the execution of this project, not only were the industrial and commercial properties of the landed proprietors and the rich peasants generally protected, but in numerous areas they obtained the best and the largest share of the land, and even preserved local power (such as head of the Peasants Association or of the village, etc.). But then, when the masses of the poor peasantry gradually awakened in the course of the movement, the lower cadres, under the demands and the pressure of the poor peasants, considerably altered the agrarian reform project and even upset it. That is to say, a great number of industrial and commercial properties of the landed proprietors and the rich peasants themselves were subjected to severe penalties from the poor peasantry (recent reports on the agrarian reform in Chinese newspapers often reveal these facts). In face of the "left" tendency of the lower cadres to upset the guiding line of the party and to automatically place themselves at the disposal of the interests of the masses, the leadership of the CP not only has not expressed any reproach to taken reprisals, but on the contrary it has acquiesced in general. Although the CP has not fundamentally changed its policy of "protection" of the industrial and commercial properties of the landed proprietors and the rich peasants, there is nevertheless a tendency to defend the interests of the poor peasants, which manifests itself strongly in the lower cadres and in the ranks of the party. This is particularly worthy of our attention.

In the campaign of recent months carried on against corruption, waste and bureaucratism, an anti-bourgeois working-class tendency is clearly being revealed in the ranks of the CP. The principal reason for this campaign is that an extremely serious phenomena of corruption, waste and bureaucracy is manifesting itself among the responsible cadres of the
CP in the state institutions, the army, the mass organizations, and particularly in the industrial and commercial sections and cooperatives dealing with finances and the economy. These cadres not only fatten themselves by pilfering state funds which are in their control or wasting public funds to assure a comfortable life, but in addition they associate with the bourgeois elements "to sell commercial information, state resources, and raw materials, to cut the working force and to raise costs (of production — tr.) in order to assure supplementary profits to the capitalists. The capitalists do not hesitate in providing necessary sums to corrupt these corrupted elements." (See Kao Kang's report cited above.) On the one hand, this situation has caused enormous financial and economic losses to the various state institutions, and on the other hand it has aroused the discontent of the masses, especially of the workers in the ranks of the party. (See Comrade Ping Shan's report on this campaign.) In order to maintain itself, the leadership of the CP is obliged to organize this campaign to exclude certain rotten cadres and to attack certain bourgeois elements as a means of appeasing the discontent in the ranks of the party and especially of the worker masses.

The corruption and degeneration of the cadres of the CP on various echelons is due principally to the opportunist policy of class collaboration and to bureaucratic practices in violation of workers' democracy. This campaign against corruption, waste and bureaucracy does not fundamentally alter the opportunism and bureaucracy of the CP; it is carried out by bureaucratic methods. Naturally, the tendency toward corruption in the party will not be eliminated in this way. Nevertheless, the anti-bourgeois working-class tendency within the CP is strongly fortified in this campaign. Because of this movement they insist, only verbally, on "the necessity of recognizing the corrosive influence of bourgeois ideology on the party and the harm caused by the right-wing tendency in the party" and on the fact that "to base oneself on the bourgeoisie signifies only to abandon the working class, the popular masses and the role of the party and the country." (See Kao Kang's report cited above.) In fact, they have more or less accepted the appeal and the demands of the working masses. For example, they now publish in all newspapers the conditions of the oppressed and exploited workers in the state enterprises through the medium of the cadres of the CP within recent years, as well as various methods of exploitation and oppression employed by private capitalists under the pretext of "violation of decrees." Such things were rarely mentioned previously and it was prohibited to denounced them openly. Public opinion of the CP recognizes that and considers it necessary to make certain improvements.

From the facts cited above, we can say on the social composition of the CP that, although the peasants and other petty-bourgeois elements still predominate in their majority (more than 90% of the 5 million members), the worker elements have increased in number in the last two years and the working-class tendency has been strengthened during the agrarian reform and the campaign against corruption, etc. That is why up until now the CP had a dual character. From the point of view of the tendency in its composition, keeping in mind the systematic acceleration in recruitment of workers and the halting of peasant recruitment, the party is in a transitional stage toward a workers' party.

From the point of view of ideology, we can see three different tendencies in the CP: the right tendency representing the upper strata of the petty-bourgeoisie of the city and the rich peasants; the left tendency representing the workers and the poor peasants; the centrist tendency between these two tendencies represented by the top leadership. Naturally these three tendencies, notably those of the right and of the left are still obscure and are far from having been crystallized. But in the subsequent developments of the class struggle, these tendencies toward the right and the left will gradually crystallize and will lead to an organizational differentiation. Finally, when the international and national situation reaches a serious, decisive stage, this party will tend toward a split which will be inevitable.

On the Character of the New Regime

If we re-evaluate the character of the party as being of a dual nature, this duality naturally affects the nature of the new regime which is controlled by this party. In view of the important factor of the nationalization of the enterprises, the dual character of this regime is even more manifest.

Of course, the new regime under the control of the CP is quite different from the dual power referred to by Lenin after the February Revolution and the classic form of dual power. It is a special kind of dual power created by exceptional conditions. This duality is analogous to that of the transition period in Yugoslavia and in the countries of Eastern Europe. Consequently, the new regime established by the CP can only be of a transitory form which will either move in the direction of the dictatorship of the proletariat
(normal or not) or will move backward to the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. But in view of the present tendency, it is moving in the direction of a deformed dictatorship of the proletariat. Therefore, so far as its perspectives are concerned, I retain my previous position.

May 10, 1952