THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

Part III

by Peng Shu-tse and Peng Pi-lan

June 1972
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

III.

Table of Contents

"Background to the Purge in China," page 3
by Antonio Farien

"Mao's Cultural Revolution," (interview with Peng Shu-tse) by Antonio Farien 10

"Open Letter to the Members of the Chinese Communist Party," by Peng Shu-tse 20

"An Interview with Chen Pi-lan on the 'Cultural Revolution'" 27

"What Our Position Should Be on the Fractional Struggle Inside the CCP," by Peng Shu-chi 36

"The Relationship and Differences Between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi," by Peng Shu-tse 45

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

This bulletin is the third and concluding section of a three-part selection of articles by Peng Shu-tse and Peng Pi-lan on the evolution of the Chinese revolution from the taking of power in 1949 through the "Cultural Revolution" in the 1960's.

The selection of articles in this section deal with the so-called "Cultural Revolution" and the internal relationships within the Chinese regime.

The selection published in this series of three educational bulletins is but a small part of the total output written by the authors in a lifetime of activity as leaders and participants in the world Marxist revolutionary movement.

CONTENTS OF BULLETINS # 1 & 2

Bulletin # 1

"Chinese Revolutionists in Exile," by Ross Dowson

"Looking Back Over My Years with Peng Shu-tse," by Peng Pi-lan Part I

"Looking Back Over My Years with Peng Shu-tse," by Peng Pi-lan Part II

"Looking Back Over My Years with Peng Shu-tse," by Peng Pi-lan Part III

"Looking Back Over My Years with Peng Shu-tse," by Peng Pi-lan Part IV


"Some Supplementary Remarks and Corrections to 'The Report on the Chinese Question,'" by Peng Shu-tse 1952

Bulletin # 2


"On the Nature of the Chinese Communist Party and Its Regime -- Political Revolution or Democratic Reform?," by Peng Shu-tse
BACKGROUND TO THE PURGE IN CHINA

By Antonio Farien
(reprinted from World Outlook, Vol. 4, No. 25, August 12, 1966)

In a letter accompanying the manuscript, the author explains that during a trip to Europe he had the good fortune to meet Peng Shu-tse. "I found his observations on the current purge in China so interesting that I took extensive notes from which I later wrote this article. I then asked him to read it and make any necessary corrections. The footnotes, however, are entirely my own responsibility."

Peng Shu-tse was one of the founding members of the Chinese Communist party and played a leading role in it until he was expelled in 1929 on charges of "Trotkyism." Subsequently he became a leader of the Chinese Trotskyist movement. For more about Peng Shu-tse and his companion Chen Pi-lan see: International Socialist Review, Summer 1969, "Chinese Revolutionists In Exile" by Ross Dowson.

* * *

The recent events in China, such as the dismissal of Peng Chen from his key party post, are the result of a struggle inside the Chinese Communist party that began almost a decade ago. In order to understand what is happening now we must take into account the whole evolution of the struggle and the opposition led by Teng To.

We should start from around 1957 when Mao Tse-tung initiated the "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom" and "Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend" movement inviting the intellectuals and the people as a whole to speak their mind, to criticize the "three harms" within the CCP -- "bureaucratism, commandanism, and subjectivism" -- and to help in "rectifying" and reforming the party. Within a very short time this movement became very large with many deep-going criticisms of the leadership being brought into the open.

Much of the important criticism was published in such papers as the People's Daily (Jemmin Jih Pao), the official organ of the party. Teng To, editor-in-chief at the time, encouraged criticism from the people and even wrote some articles of sharp criticism himself.

At the high tide of the "blossom and contend" movement (April to June 1957), facts about the arbitrariness and special privileges enjoyed by the CCP bureaucracy poured in from all corners, especially from young students and revolutionary intellectuals. Members of the CCP itself and its youth organization also responded. By June the movement had developed to such an extent that it seemed that the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 might be transplanted to Chinese soil. (There was a rebellion, for example, by more than 3,000 students in a high middle school -- the equivalent of high school in the US -- in Han Yang near Hankow.)

The leadership became frightened at such a possibility and immediately discontinued the movement -- in the middle of June -- and vigorously counter-attacked all its critics. The left revolutionary elements were ruthlessly suppressed under the blanket charge of being "rightists." Thousands upon thousands were forced to recant, were suspended from their posts, placed under surveillance and even arrested and sent to labor camps. Many party and youth organization members, besides suffering expulsion, were fired from their jobs, dismissed from school, placed under surveillance or arrested, etc. Teng To was removed from editorship of the People's Daily.

The opposition was accused of being headed by rightist elements, representatives of the bourgeoisie and large landlords, etc., the charges being similar to those leveled by the CCP at the present time against victims of the purge. However, close examination of some of the facts that have slowly sifted out since shows that this accusation does not seem to have been justified in many cases. For example, in Red Flag (Hung Chi or Hungqi), the ideological journal of the CCP's Central Committee, it was reported: Teng To "vigorously supported the rightists attacking the party. The extreme rightist Lin Hsi Ling was his most intimate friend." But if anything, Lin Hsi Ling, a student movement leader and member of the CCP youth organization, reflected in her writings, the revolutionary tendency of this movement. Lin Hsi Ling, who was purged in 1957, had written that "the present upper strata of China does not correspond with the property system of common ownership" because "the party and state apparatus has become a set of bureaucratic organs ruling people without democracy." Therefore, she proclaimed "not reform but a thoroughgoing change."

The statement in Red Flag about Lin Hsi Ling also sheds light upon the political thinking of Teng To. Since
she was identified as being so close to Teng To, one can probably surmise that their political positions were not much different. Also in speaking of Teng To, she said that he was not an orthodox Marxist. In other words, Teng To did not agree with everything the infallible Mao Tse-tung said, or rather, Teng To was not a Maoist Marxist.  

In 1958, after the crushing of the "blossom and contend" movement, the CCP adopted an adventuristic policy in order to rationalize its forceful suppression of the so-called rightist opposition. Around May the Central Committee of the CCP adopted the slogan, "A Big Leap Forward." Under this slogan a program was initiated to make steel in small backyard furnaces. Around 100 million people were mobilized to carry out this program. Almost all students as well as professors, workers, peasants and even housewives had to make steel. This program lasted about one year — June 1958 to July 1959.

A little later, in August 1958, Mao gave the order that every peasant must enter the People’s Communes as fast as possible. Three months later 99 percent of the peasants were in the People’s Communes. The CCP ordered the privately owned land, stored grain, animals, etc., to be turned over to the communes; all peasants were to eat in the commune's kitchens; the children must attend the commune's nurseries, etc. This policy was designed to communalize all the peasants within a five-year period.

The peasants were given no choice in the matter. They were forced to join and to give up all their holdings to the commune. This resulted in wide dissatisfaction among the peasants. At least one-half of the peasants — there were approximately 500 million at the time — were against such measures and opposed the communes actively by committing acts of sabotage, such as killing their animals, cutting down fruit trees or destroying crops. This precipitated a tremendous scarcity of nonstaple foods, and the situation became very serious in the summer of 1959. At the same time the failure of the backyard steel-making program became clear — three million tons of steel had been made, but little of it met minimum standards in quality.

The bankruptcy of these two policies which had been bureaucratically imposed by Mao and the top leadership of the CCP became quite evident to everyone, and mounting dissatisfaction was very apparent among the masses. They referred to Mao and his policies as "petty bourgeois fanaticism." This dissatisfaction made inroads into the cadres of the CCP.

Many top leaders in the Central Committee, the army and government administration were also in sympathy with the masses. Among the leaders voicing dissatisfaction was Peng Teh Huai, minister of defense.

As early as the spring of 1959 he criticized the policies of the party, i.e., he criticized Mao Tse-tung. This precipitated a crisis inside the party. The Central Committee along with Mao called a plenum in August 1959 to deal with it. This meeting became known as the Lushan conference.

At the plenum a serious dispute took place among the top leaders. Although the actual proceedings have never been released, two important measures were adopted: (1) Peng Teh Huai was relieved of his position along with Wuang Keh Cheng, chief of staff of the army, and many other members of the Central Committee also disappeared. (2) A resolution was passed which made certain concessions to the peasants; i.e., the people's communes would be reorganized.

A short while after the plenum, Teng To formed a small group. His closest collaborator in the group was Wu Han, a leading historian and vice mayor of the municipal government. In June 1959, before the plenum, he had written an article called "Hai Jui Solds the Emperor." Hai Jui was governor of Nanking under the Ming dynasty. (Peking was the capital.) The emperor was a bad one, unjust to the people, so Hai Jui sent him a letter criticizing him. Wu Han used this historical analogy to describe the present situation; i.e., "Peng Teh Huai Solds Mao Tse-tung."

After the plenum Wu Han wrote a drama called "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office." When Hai Jui was governor he carried out a few token reforms. One of these was a small land reform in which he took some unjustly acquired land from the big landowners and returned it to the small peasants from whom it had been taken. The big landowners became furious and complained bitterly to the emperor who promptly dismissed Hai Jui from his governorship. The people were very angered at this turn of events. Hai Jui was very popular, becoming known as the honest official. Here too, Wu Han utilized the historical analogy to describe and criticize the present situation; i.e., "Peng Teh Huai Dismissed from Office."

The drama was openly published in January 1961 in the Peking daily papers, and afterwards it was performed on the stage in Peking. It received an exceptionally enthusiastic reception from the people and many critics gave it high praise.
"Speak Big Words" was the title of another article in which he says that big words are not always useful and can even be damaging. In the essay, "The Theory of Treasuring Labor Power," he accuses the leadership of wasting the people's time and labor power -- "we should...take care to do more in every way to treasure our labor power." Both of these were indirect references to the "Big Leap Forward," i.e., the program has been a failure and even harmful and wasteful.

Teng To wrote another article entitled "Cheng Pang-chao and His Style" in which he quoted this famous artist, who said that one must become a master and not a servant. In other words, the people must control the leaders of the revolution and not just become the servants or slaves of the Maoist bureaucracy.10

There were around 150 such articles written by Teng To and the group around him, all of which were indirect criticisms of the policies handed down by Mao and the top leadership. These articles also reflected criticisms coming from the masses. In 1961-1962 the economic situation in China had become serious: food was scarce and during the summer of 1962 alone more than 100,000 persons fled to Hong Kong.

At the end of 1962 the economic situation started to improve to a certain degree, so the leadership -- feeling more secure -- adopted stronger measures to better control the peasants. Measures were also taken in order to control the intellectuals and students -- many were sent to the countryside to work and be "reeducated."

In face of the more and more aggressive policy of the CCP leadership, which included blocking publication of their articles, Teng To and his group started to retreat.

In November 1965, in an article published in the Wen Hui Daily and then in the People's Daily and many other papers, the CCP for the first time openly criticized Wu Han's drama "Hai Jui Dismissed from Office."

After that the campaign against Wu Han's "Hai Jui Dismissed" spread throughout the country. Every day the People's Daily, and especially the Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Pao) plus many other papers all over China carried articles criticizing Wu Han.

Between November 1965 and April 1966, however, there were a few writers mainly in Peking and Shanghai who wrote articles
defending him. Wu Han also wrote an article -- while admitting he had made some mistakes in the drama -- defending himself and his work.

However, since April the situation has changed radically in many ways: (1) Up to then Wu Han was said to have only made some mistakes and to be revisionist in his thinking. Now he is accused of being antisocialist, antiparty and even counterrevolutionary -- supporting the bourgeois and trying to restore capitalism. (2) The papers stopped publishing articles by Wu Han and his supporters. (3) More and more people came under attack and Teng To was made the central target. As a result, parts of "Notes from Three-Family Village" and "Evening Talks at Yenshan" were published in the People's Daily with commentary as proof of his counterrevolutionary objectives. (4) The newspapers and the journals edited and controlled by Teng To and his group came under attack from such publications as the Peking Daily, Peking Daily Evening (or Peking Evening News), Frontline and, beginning in May, Peking Literature and Art (Beijing Wenyi), Kweichow Daily and the Yunnan Daily. (5) High party officials like Peng Chen, the mayor of Peking, became targets.

Since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute, around 1960, the CCP has not only criticized the revisionism of Khrushchev, but also his repudiation of Stalinism at the twentieth congress of the CPSU. Since then they have carried on a systematic campaign to establish a worldwide cult of Mao Tse-tung similar to that of Stalin's. Since last November this campaign has been greatly stepped up. For example, the People's Daily, a six-page paper, now devotes an average of four pages daily to this task. Each day a slogan such as: "One must study the thinking of Mao Tse-tung and raise higher the red banner of Mao's thought," "The people must study Mao's books, hear his words and work according to his instructions" or "Mao's thought is the beacon of revolution for the world's people" appears on the front page. In other words, Mao's thought has become a panacea and his writings a bible. A typical example of the articles is one in the May 16, 1966 issue. A musical concert that took place in Shanghai is reported. In conjunction an article describes how Mao's thought influenced the concert.

A similar article was sent in by a cook. After a satisfied customer asked him how he cooked so well, he sat down and wrote an article explaining the secret of his success -- he used Mao's method.

In the University of Peking an English teacher told his class that in order to learn English, they must use Mao's method. (Mao knows no foreign language except a few words of English.) Such stories are not the exception but the rule.

The attempt to establish the cult of Mao is connected with the present purge. Because of Mao's many mistakes, his standing is low among the intellectuals. It is understandable why they are opposed to deifying him. They favor an intelligent and fruitful discussion of the problems which continue to haunt China and her development.

The increasing difficulties and failures of Mao's foreign policy have also undoubtedly played a great role in the present purge if nothing more than in its timing and fierceness.

The disastrous role of Moscow's opportunism is undeniable. However, the extremely sectarian position taken by Peking in rejecting a united front against US imperialism -- especially in regard to the Vietnam war -- has not only weakened the struggle against imperialism, but has heightened the danger of an attack on China herself and increased the possibilities of a nuclear war.

This sectarian position has also led to the increasing isolation of China in the socialist world. Many of the workers states that leaned towards China at the beginning of the dispute, such as Korea and Vietnam, are now leaning more toward Moscow. Also the defeats suffered by the colonial revolution and the failure of Chinese diplomacy in the "third world" have led to increased isolation for China and to the demoralization of Peking's followers all over the world.

The crushing of the Communist party of Indonesia [PKI] with hardly a fight, stands out as one of the greatest defeats and tragedies for China. D.N. Aidit, whose policies were almost identical to those followed by the Khrushchevists, spoke many times in China; his books were translated into Chinese and he was highly praised by the leadership of the CCP who held up the PKI as a model Communist party, and one to be emulated by the other Communist parties in the world. In other words, the responsibility for the tragedy of the PKI and the Aidit leadership falls directly on the CCP, and especially on Mao.

Because of such events, the people and especially the intellectuals placed an even bigger question mark over Mao's leadership. The intellectuals, such as
Teng To and his group, who were already voicing doubts, base their opposition around three main points: (1) They are against the bureaucracy and its arbitrariness and want more freedom of thought, criticism, etc. In other words, they want a program such as the "blossom and contend" movement to be the norm. (2) They are against the adventurism of the CCP with its programs like the "Big Leap Forward" and its wasting of the people's labor in such things as the backyard steel-making, forced collectivization of the peasants into the People's Communes which they claim has not been successful but has even been damaging. (3) They oppose the idea that Mao is omniscient and infallible, and they are against making a cult of his personality.

From Mao's point of view the opposition of the intellectuals to his regime is intolerable and must be ended. The present situation reminds Mao and the leadership too much of the Hungarian Revolution (1956) as can be seen from their references to the "literary men of the Petofi Club who acted as the shock brigade in the Hungarian events. The turbulent wind precedes the mountain storm." But Mao does not even want the wind to blow let alone allow it to get turbulent. He has not only attacked those intellectuals and party leaders who looked upon the gentle breeze as a breath of fresh air but even those who only tolerated it.

At the beginning of May, the leadership of the CCP raised the general slogans: "Big Leap Forward in the Ideological Field" and "The Great Revolution of Socialist Culture" in order to eliminate the "poisonous weeds" of the "bourgeoisie" and "feudalists," i.e., to eliminate all differing tendencies and elements. However, in order to carry out the purge, Mao has mainly utilized the army, because even the party cannot be trusted to any great extent as the Peking municipal party so well demonstrates.

In March 1966 Lin Pao, minister of defense, gave instructions to the army that it must take a strong position against the "antiparty and antisocialist" tendency. The army cadres were mobilized for the campaign, and since then, the most vicious articles attacking the opposition have come from the Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Pao) which has already gone so far as to suggest the physical elimination of the opposition.

The campaign has been carried on to create an atmosphere of terror in order to stifle criticism from the intellectuals and to assure maintenance of control over the masses who feel likewise. They publish continual reminders of what happened to those who dared criticize the party during the "blossom and content" movement. "Your fate cannot be better than that of your forerunners and brothers-in-crimel "Your days are numbered."

Nor is this intimidation directed only against the intellectuals in Peking or the upper echelons. It involves intellectuals in every field along with officials and cadres in the party and government at all levels and all over China. (It is also safe to assume that each of the prominent figures who have been attacked represents a larger group. From all appearances, however, they seem to be very loosely and poorly organized). While at first, there may only be slandering attacks in the press plus removal from posts, it is most likely that arrests with long prison terms will follow or possibly worse in some cases.

The fierce action taken by the party against those who dared to question Mao's infallibility and criticize the policies of the party leadership, set the stage in which Kuo Mo-jo, China's most noted scholar, made his speech of self-criticism in order to protect himself from the onslaught.

The purge of the opposition, represented by Teng To and Wu Han, reflects a serious contradiction inside the CCP -- a contradiction which developed from the suppression of the "blossom and contend" movement. By suppressing progressive intellectuals and others, Mao may be able for the time being to silence the oppositional mood but he cannot suppress the objective conditions which gave rise to it in the first place. And in the future it will undoubtedly again challenge the bureaucracy. As Teng To put it, "People who think of themselves as being omniscient, despise the masses and attempt to win victory by devious means. Such people...will be defeated in the end."

The victory, however, will not be scored by reaction or by the procapitalists who are undoubtedly to be found in the administration, and in very high posts at that. The victory will be won by those seeking proletarian democracy based on the conquests of the revolution. That victory will reinforce those conquests and assure China a genuine big leap forward, not only at home but internationally.

**FOOTNOTES**

(1) It was disclosed June 3 that Peng Chen,
who had been missing from public activ-

ities since March 29, 1966, had been removed

as first secretary of the Peking munici-

pal Communist party, a post which he had

held since 1955. Peng had also been mayor

of Peking since 1951. He was a long stand-

ing member of the Politburo, a secretary

of the CCP's Central Committee and was

generally regarded as the fifth most

powerful figure in China and a possible

successor to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

(2) Teng To, branded the "leader of the

anti-party, antiscientific gang of con-

spirators" in the current purge, was one

of China's leading journalists and a key

political figure. He was director and

former editor-in-chief of the People's

Daily, the principal party newspaper,

and editor of Frontline (Qianxian), the

bimonthly theoretical organ of the

Peking municipal Communist party until

it recently suspended publication. He

was a secretary of the Peking municipal

Communist party -- the immediate subor-
dinate to Peng Chen -- and only last year

became an alternate member of the party's

North China Bureau (North China section

of the party's national Central Committee).

He was also president of the Chinese-

Soviet Friendship Association.

(3) During the rise of the "blossom and

content" movement, Liu Shao Chi, chief

of state, the second leader of the CCP,

openly admitted: "There is serious

bureaucracy...mass criticism is spread-
ing to every corner of China, including

factories, farms, schools and other

organizations. The target of criticism

is the leadership." (Speech at the

reception party given to representatives

of the LSPF of Ceylon visiting China.

People's Daily, May 19, 1957.)

(4) Red Flag, seventh issue of 1966,

"A Criticism of the Bourgeois Position

Taken by the Frontline and the Peking

Daily."

(5) Tai Haung, another example, was a

reporter for Hsinhua and a member of the

CCP. He proposed to build a new party

and "to realize democracy, freedom and

the eradication of a privileged class."

(6) An example of what is meant by

orthodox Marxism in China is to be

found in the June 10, 1966, issue of the

Peking Review (p. 4) which quotes an

editorial carried by the People's Daily,

June 4, 1966. "No one who dares to op-

pose Chairman Mao, to oppose Mao Tse-
tung's thought, to oppose the Central

Committee of the Party, the dictator-

ship of the proletariat and the social-

ist system can escape denunciation by

the whole Party and the whole nation,

whoever he may be, whatever high posi-

tion he may hold and however much of a

veteran he may be. The only possible

result is the total loss of his stand-

ing and reputation."

(7) Peng Teh Huai was a sergeant-major

in the army of the Kuomintang. At the

end of 1927 he led his troops over to

join Mao Tse-tung. He was commander in

chief of the Chinese forces in the

Korean war after which he became minis-
ter of defense until 1959.

(8) Peng Teh Huai disappeared from pub-

lic view and has not been seen since.

His name, however, still appears on the

list of the Politburo, but this is only a

formality, since only a party congress

has the power to remove someone from

the Politburo and the CCP hasn't held

a congress since 1958.

(9) For information on the reorgani-

zation of the communes see Peking Re-

view, September 1, 1959.

(10) See the Daily Light (Kwangming Jih

Pao) November 21, 1965. For more on

the writings of Teng To and his criticisms

(in English) see: Peking Review, May 27

(1966) (No. 22) "On 'Three-Family Village'

by Yao Wen-Yuan. This article was one

of the main attacks directed against

the opposition, published May 10, 1966,

in Shanghai's Liberation Daily. An ar-

ticle written by the same author, Yao

Wen-Yuan, an editor of Liberation Army

Daily (see footnote No. 18), published in

November 1965, which attacked Wu Han

and his drama, was criticized by Teng

To -- "Yao Wen-Yuan's article is not

completely right and Wu Han is not com-

pletely wrong." (People's Daily, May 12,

1966.)

(11) Red Flag "asked why they [the Peking

papers] had never mentioned that Pro-

fessor Wu 'is willing to be a slave of

the US and is guilty of scheming and

planning for the reactionary Kuomintang

(Chinese Nationalist) clique?'" Red Flag

as quoted by the New York Times, May 17,

1966.

"A revolution was under way which was

'sweeping away the representatives of

the bourgeoisie who have wormed their

way into the party, monsters of all kinds

and all various forms of decadent bourge-

oisie and feudal ideology.'" Red Flag

quoted in the International Edition of the


"The representatives of the bourge-

oisie, infiltrated into the party, seem

to be a colossus, but in fact, like all

reactionaries, they are nothing more than

paper tigers." Red Flag quoted in Le

Monde, June 14, 1966.

(12) See People's Daily, May 9 and May

11, 1966.
(13) For the English version of this article see: Peking Review, May 27, 1966 (No. 22) p. 13.

(14) For information on how Mao Tse-tung's teaching "On Contradiction" can lead to higher sales of watermelons, see Hsinhua, May 19, 1966.

(15) This was the largest Communist party in the capitalist world. It had a membership of three million and more than ten million sympathizers. To date between 250,000 and 500,000 have been slaughtered.

(16) Quoted from the People's Daily in the Peking Review, June 10, 1966 (No. 24), p. 9, "A Great Revolution that Touches the People to Their Very Souls."

For a short explanation of the Petofi Club (Circle) see: World Outlook, Vol. 4, No. 18 (June 3, 1966), p. 4-12, "The Internal Struggle in Peking" by George Novack.

(17) Lin Pao, minister of defense, and Teng Sha-peng, general secretary of the party, seem to be much closer to Mao now because of their positions and their importance in carrying out the purge. They are probably the two most likely figures right now in the line of succession to Mao as party chairman.

(18) Liberation Army Daily (Jiefangjun Pao or Chiehfang Chun Pao), the official army newspaper, is the chief organ used in attacking the opposition. The Daily Light (Kwamming Jih Pao), a newspaper for intellectuals, the People's Daily (Jemmin Jih Pao), the principal party newspaper, and The Red Flag (Hungh Chi or Hongqi), the ideological journal of the party's Central Committee, are among others that have followed close behind.

(19) Peng mentioned two other well-known figures who have been denounced whom I failed to include in the above text. One is the very famous playwright Tien Han, chairman of the National Association of Drama. He also wrote a drama like Wu Han's which came under fire last February.

The second is the famous historian Chien Po-tsen who has been a professor in many of the universities in Shanghai and head of the history department at Peking University.

Others not mentioned in the above article who have been denounced or purged include: Chou Hsing-fang, a famous actor and head of the Shanghai Opera Company; Lu Ping, Secretary of the Peking University party committee, and his deputy secretary, Peng Fei-Yung (or Peng Fei-yun); Sung Shi, a member of the Peking University party committee; Li Chi, a director in the party's Peking municipal branch; Hsia Yen, noted playwright who was vice-minister of culture from 1954 to last year; Wang Hsiachuan, the Kweichow provincial party committee's propaganda chief and editor of the Kweichow Daily; Li Meng-wei, editor of the Yunnan Daily in the Yunnan province; Fan Chin, a woman who is director of the Peking Daily and vice-chairman of the All-China Journalists' Association.

(20) The speech was made April 14, 1966, to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of which he is a vice-chairman. (See Hsinhua, May 7, 1966).

Kuo Mo-jo was born in 1892 in the province of Szechwan. He joined the CCP in 1927. After the defeat of the revolution of 1925-27, he left the party and fled to Japan, where he spent the next ten years in exile writing several histories. During the war against Japan (1937-45) he played a role in organizing the Chinese people to struggle against the occupation forces. It was during this time that he wrote By the Moonlight and The Wave (1941 and 1942). He has also translated many works into Chinese, notably War and Peace by Tolstoy and Faust by Goethe. In 1939 he was given the Stalin Peace Prize. He rejoined the CCP only about three or four years ago. However, he holds many important positions in China. He is president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, chairman of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers, chairman of the China Peace Committee and holds more than twenty other official positions.
(reprinted from World Outlook, February 10, 1967)

MAO'S "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

[The following is the text of an interview which Antonio Farien obtained with Peng Shu-tse January 20 on the latest developments in the "cultural revolution" in China. Peng Shu-tse was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist party and a leader in the 1925-27 revolution which ended in a tragic defeat at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek due to the disastrous policies which Stalin compelled the young party to follow. Upon drawing the lessons of the defeat, Peng Shu-tse and Chen Tu-hsiu, the father of Chinese communism, were astounded to discover that Leon Trotsky had anticipated what had happened. For spreading this information and their approval of Trotsky's analysis, they were expelled on charges of 'Trotskyism.' A little later the two leaders joined in founding the Chinese Trotskyist movement. During the thirties, they were arrested by Chiang Kai-shek's political police and imprisoned for many years. Many other Trotskyists were butchered by Chiang during this difficult period.

[Upon the victory of the revolution in 1949 the Chinese Trotskyist movement sought to work with the Mao regime; but Mao's policy was to arrest and imprison anyone even suspected of "Trotskyism." Some of the Trotskyists arbitrarily arrested in 1952 are still in prison in China. Despite this they remain firm partisans of the Chinese Revolution to which they dedicated their lives as revolutionary-minded youths. They are for the unconditional defense of China against imperialism. At the same time -- and this is their real crime in the eyes of the regime -- they are protagonists of proletarian democracy in accordance with the program outlined in Lenin's work State and Revolution. Because of the antidemocratic practices of the regime, they have advocated that the Chinese masses undertake a revolutionary struggle to install proletarian forms of democratic rule such as soviets or councils.]

* * *

Question: Because of all the news accounts of the events in Peking and Shanghai, and especially in Nanking, during the last two weeks, there has been much speculation that China might be on the brink of a civil war. What do you think about this possibility?

Answer: The struggle between the two main factions -- pro-Mao and anti-Mao -- has developed to a very critical stage in the last few weeks. Such things as the recent strikes by the workers in the cities of Peking, Shanghai, Kwangtung and many other places, especially the fierce clashes in Nanking, where it has been reported that more than fifty people were killed and several hundred were injured, demonstrate quite clearly the seriousness of the conflict between the two factions.

If this news is true, then it is certain that the struggle inside the party has become much more critical and is finding expression in the toiling masses outside the party. If such a situation continues, it is of course possible that it will lead to a civil war. However, in order to speak about the possibilities of a civil war, it is necessary to look at the evolution of Mao's so-called cultural revolution over the past several months.

Q: Could you outline some of the most important aspects of that evolution?

A: In order to explain the recent developments it is necessary to recall the previous interview I had with you last June. [See World Outlook August 12, 1966.] In that interview I explained the development of the present divisions in the party which began at the time of the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" program when many intellectuals, and even a few top party leaders openly expressed discontent and were critical of many domestic and foreign policies arbitrarily instituted by Mao; and they even went so far as to call into question Mao's leadership capacities. This, then, was the origin of the
factions as they are more or less presently constituted.

What seems to have precipitated the present crisis and heightened it, however, was the question of foreign policy -- the continuing isolation of China in general, and the defeat in Indonesia in particular.

Just after the Indonesian coup d'état there was a meeting of high officials of the party. At this meeting it was reported that Peng Chen said "everyone is equal before the truth" and that if Chairman Mao has made some mistakes, he should also be criticized. It seems that Mao suffered a setback at this meeting.

It was shortly after this that he left Peking for Shanghai -- the end of October or the beginning of November 1965 -- where he immediately began to secretly organize the "cultural revolution."

During the period when Mao was in Shanghai -- about six months -- he was out of public view, and it was at this time that the press began to speculate about his health. It seems that Mao chose Shanghai as his base of operations because he thought the party officials there were loyal to him.

Mao began by attacking many cultural leaders, especially writers, such as Wu Han and Teng To, who had written many unfavorable things about him and his programs in the past. The campaign increased in intensity until finally Peng Chen and the whole Party Municipal Committee of Peking were purged and the committee was reorganized. This was shortly followed by the purge of Lu Ting-yi and Chou Yang -- who were respectively heads of the Center of Propaganda Department of the party and Minister of Culture -- along with other high officials of the state and party in the cultural field.

Mao ordered all the universities and middle schools (high schools) closed, and many famous educators such as the presidents of Peking University, Wu Han University, Nanking University and others were purged.

Such large-scale actions and purges aroused many of the top leaders such as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, along with many regional leaderships, and caused new antagonisms among the different tendencies.

Mao carried out his actions and purges by relying on the army, led by Lin Piao. For example, Lin Piao sent troops at the end of April 1966 to occupy the offices of the Peking Municipal Committee in order to remove Peng Chen and the other leaders. Under such conditions Liu Shao-chi and other leaders felt the situation to be very serious, and they began to unite against Mao's so-called cultural revolution.

Q: Are there any concrete facts which prove that some of the top leaders began to organize at this time against Mao and the "cultural revolution."

A: Yes, there are. However, in order to be able to see it clearly, I must explain a little about the structure of the leadership in the party. The decision-making body of the CPC [Chinese Communist party] is the Central Political Bureau. In addition to this bureau there are six regional bureaus -- the North Bureau, the Central South Bureau, the East Bureau, the Northeast Bureau, the Northwest Bureau, and the Southwest Bureau. Each of these bureaus directs several provinces or administrative areas. Each is very powerful. They are in charge of the direction of the party, the local governments and the army in their region.

The leaders of two of these six bureaus, that is the first secretaries, such as Li Hsueh-feng of the North Bureau and Liu Lan-tao of the Northwest Bureau, have in the past collaborated very closely with Liu Shao-chi.

Li Ching-chuan, first secretary of the Southwest Bureau, and Sung Jen-chung, first secretary of the Northeast Bureau, are close to Teng Hsiao-ping.

The removal of Peng Chen from office by Mao, with the help of the army, caused these bureau leaders, along with Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, to be worried that they might suffer a similar fate, and they began to unite their forces against Mao. The leaders of especially the Northwest and Southwest Bureaus took a passive attitude toward Mao's "cultural revolution," and at times even actively resisted it. For example, when Peng Chen was dismissed the beginning of last June, Mao organized a central "cultural revolutionary" group. Mao made his former private secretary, Chen Po-ta, the chairman of the group, and his wife, Chiang Ching, first vice-chairwoman.

This group sent representatives to the provinces in order to organize the "cul-
tural revolution." However, many groups were resisted by the provincial leaderships, especially in the four bureaus I mentioned earlier. This resistance was attacked in an editorial of the People's Daily (Jennin Jih Pao), July 1, 1966.

The most important event, however, occurred in June-July 1966. During this time Mao left Peking for south China. In his absence, Liu Shao-chi, as first vice-chairman of the party, prepared to call an emergency meeting of the Central Committee in order to decide anew the policies of the "cultural revolution," to put pressure on Mao and possibly to remove him from the leadership of the party. At about the same time Peng Chen was sent to the Northwest and Southwest bureaus to talk with the leaders there about the current situation, and about the emergency meeting of the Central Committee.

Around the tenth of July Peng returned to Peking with the members of the Central Committee from these bureaus for the emergency meeting, the date of which had been set by the Central Political Bureau for July 21. Mao, who was still in south China, sent a message to the Central Political Bureau asking them to delay the emergency meeting in order that he might be able to attend. At the same time, Lin Piao surrounded Peking with many troops, and it was under this threat that Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping retreated by rescheduling the Central Committee meeting for the first of August.

Lin Piao's army remained just outside the city during the plenum meeting of the Central Committee, and it was at this time that the decisions "Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" were adopted. The plenum also took decisions to organize the "Red Guards" and to reorganize the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. It was through this reorganization that Mao was able to gain firm control of the Standing Committee by selecting and placing on it three of his closest supporters. They were Tao Chu, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng.*

Mao, along with Lin Piao, also opened up a fierce attack on Liu Shao-chi, and they removed him from his post of vice-chairman. Lin Piao took over as first vice-chairman.

This plenum gave the "cultural revolution" a furious boost, and outlined as its objective "to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road."**

Q: Why didn't Mao organize the purge through the party and its youth group instead of organizing the Red Guards?

A: This is a very important question, and it should be given special attention and clearly explained. The CPC is very large. The membership of the party and its youth group, for example, is almost equal to the whole population of France. There are approximately 50 million altogether -- 20 million in the party, and 30 million in the youth group. If there really existed a procapitalist tendency in the party, as Mao claims, and if he had any confidence at all in the masses of the party, he would organize a democratic discussion inside the party which would, it seems, resolve the question very easily.

However, the reality is the opposite, that is, no procapitalist tendency exists. It is even unimaginable that the same leaders of the party who struggled so many years against capitalism are, after conquering power, now struggling for capitalism.

The fact is that those people whom Mao accuses of taking the procapitalist road are against Mao because they believe that many of his policies, arbitrarily taken on many foreign and domestic issues, have endangered the prospects of socialism.

Many cadres of the party, such as Teng To and Wu Han, whom I talked about in the last interview, are good examples and reflect the opinions of most of the rank and file in the party and youth. They feel that Mao has made some mistakes and that it is absolutely necessary to correct them in order that China might continue her development toward socialism.

If Mao organized any discussions in the party, he would place himself in great danger; and therefore he has tried to suppress all criticism. This is the reason Mao has utilized the army since the beginning of the "cultural revolution."

The decisions taken by the August plenum were only formalities. Mao was able to

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* The Standing Committee carries on the day-to-day work of the party. Five members in all are reported to have been added at this time. The other two were Chen Yi and Li Fu-chun.

** Quoted from Peking Review No. 33, August 12, 1966, "Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," p. 6.
obtain them because of his bureaucratic control of the top bodies. But in reality he has completely avoided the party, and has employed the Red Guards in order to carry out his purge, or as he calls it, the "cultural revolution."

Q: What has been the result of the actions of the Red Guards?

A: We must first understand who the Red Guards are. They are primarily youth. About 60% of them are lower middle-school students, that is, between the ages of 13 and 15. About 30% are high middle-school students between the ages of 16 and 20. Only about 10% of them are university students. Because the overwhelming majority of the Red Guards, especially the lower middle-school students, are so young, they have had no previous political experience, and do not possess any great understanding of politics.

For this reason it is very easy to understand why such elements can be organized behind the campaign to build the cult of Mao, leading to many outlandish and absurd actions, even to attacks upon local party headquarters and officials.

Most of the university students went along at first with the "cultural revolution," but as it developed, these students, because of their greater political understanding, began to become divided among themselves.

The first actions of the Red Guards were to destroy the "Four Olds" -- old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits -- and to establish the "Four News." This became a slogan: "Destroy the Four Olds and Establish the Four News."

They later continued with such actions as destroying Buddhist sculpture, making people remove western clothing and jewelry, and even invading people's homes and destroying any modern furniture, among other things, which they found.

They changed the names of almost everything in their path, such as streets, stores, buildings and even cemeteries. This and more was all done in the name of carrying the revolution forward against the feudalists, the bourgeoisie, the revisionists, and the imperialists. The People's Daily even commented in an editorial August 28, 1966, that the spiritual face of the country had been changed as a result of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

There were, nevertheless, some progressive slogans and demands raised by some elements of the Red Guards. One of them was the demand to eliminate the interest payments to the remaining capitalists and to confiscate all their properties. These progressive slogans, however, have not been carried out.

Since the beginning of September the actions of the Red Guards have changed their complexion. At a large meeting of the Red Guards in Peking on August 31, 1966, Lin Piao gave a speech, substituting for Mao, in which he emphatically told the Red Guards that the main aim of the "cultural revolution" was to isolate and purge those party officials who are taking the capitalist road. It was after this speech that the Red Guards began to attack many provincial leaders by name in wall posters.

It was in retaliation against these attacks that some of the provincial leaders began to organize the party functionaries and cadres and even some of the workers and peasants, and they proceeded to set up their own Red Guards. These were the organizations that Mao's Red Guards soon began to clash with.

The People's Daily has referred many times to these clashes. On September 12 it said, "Some responsible leaders in some locals have suppressed the mass movement under many and different pretexts, and they have agitated many of the workers and peasants against the revolutionary students." That is to say, they organized the masses against the Red Guards and the "cultural revolution."
Many of these conflicts ended with hundreds of casualties. For example, in Ching Tao there were more than 140 killed and injured. In Canton there were over 50, and in Lin Wu more than 300.

On September 15, at the third large meeting of the Red Guards in Peking to be reviewed by Mao, Lin Piao made a speech in place of Mao. What he told the Red Guards, in effect, was that they must attack all those officials who are resisting Mao's thought, and that they must have no fear since the army was supporting them.

It was after this speech that the Red Guards began to be much bolder and even unrestrained. In the wall posters in Peking, leading party members were named and accused of taking the capitalist road. The first secretaries of the Southwest, Northwest and North bureaus, Li Ching-chuan, Liu Lan-tao, and Li Hau-hung-feng -- who had also become first secretaries of the Peking party in place of Peng Chen -- are only three examples.

Simultaneously, officials of the state began to come under attack. Chen Yi, foreign minister, Li Hsien-nien, minister of finance, and especially Po i-po, minister of industry and communications, are only a few examples. Finally Liu Shao-chi, president of China, and Teng Hsiao-ping, secretary of the party, also came under attack.

In the latter part of October a special, very important meeting was held. This meeting lasted for 17 days. It was during this meeting that Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were forced to make their self-criticisms after being severely attacked by many of the participants. It was just after this meeting that

It seemed that Mao thought he had beaten the opposition. On December 26 a large victory celebration of the Red Guards was held in Peking, and newspapers like Red Flag (Hung Chi), proclaimed the victory of the "cultural revolution." At this celebration the self-criticisms of Liu and Teng were revealed for the first time. Nevertheless, we can see by the events from the first two weeks in January that the opposition was far from being broken.

Q: Since the beginning of the year the newspapers have reported very confusing accounts as to what has been happening in such places as Nanking and Shanghai. Can you clarify at all what has actually been taking place?

A: First of all, it must be noted, that the events in these cities mark a new stage in the development of the struggle. Before, everyone considered these cities to be under the strict control of Mao and Lin's forces. However, the events there have shown the existence of a very powerful resistance.

Shanghai and the surrounding area make up the most industrialized section of China, and Nanking is also an industrial city. It was the party in these cities that organized the opposition, and it has, of course, a very large base in the working class. By granting the workers more pay and more welfare benefits, it has organized the workers against many of the slogans of the "cultural revolution" like "Make the cultural revolution and maintain production."

This presents a big problem for Mao. The only means he has to suppress such a force is the army. However, it would be very dangerous for him at this time to actively use it. From this angle, then, Mao is very weak. His strategy in Shanghai has been to try and gain control of the workers' organizations by occupying offices of the trade unions and other workers' institutions. After the occupation of these offices, the leaderships of the organizations were reorganized and Mao placed his own followers in charge. Mao, as far as I know now, seems to have been successful in doing this in the dockers, railway,
and bus workers trade unions, and it is this that his faction refers to when speaking about the victories it has made in the working class in Shanghai.

In Nanking the situation was a little different. The party in this city was able to control the police and army as well as to organize the workers. It appears that Mao has been unable to make any headway whatsoever there, and the whole city, therefore, remains under the control of the opposition.

Q: Then it seems very important, if one is to consider the possibilities of a civil war, to examine the strength of both factions in the party and in the army.

A: Yes, especially the army. At this point we can very briefly draw a balance sheet as far as the party is concerned. As I stated earlier, the leaders in the Northwest, Southwest and East bureaus can be considered to stand pretty firmly in the camp of the opposition. The leaders of the North Bureau in general seem to be in support of the opposition. However, there are some leaders who support Mao.

The Central South Bureau has been considered a stronghold of Mao and Lin, although now we have to consider the situation in light of the recent attacks against Tao Chu, the new chief of the party's central propaganda department, because before assuming his new post he had been the first secretary of the Central South Bureau for many years, and he is still very influential there. The new first secretary of the bureau, Wang Jim Chung, has also been attacked, which demonstrates that Mao and Lin are not completely in control.

As far as the East Bureau is concerned, the events in Nanking and Shanghai demonstrate that Mao and Lin have even less control than in the Central South Bureau. It is possible to say, then, that a large majority of the party either supports or sympathizes with the opposition.

It is more difficult to judge the relationship of both factions to the army. Nevertheless, if we take into consideration some historical aspects of the army, it makes the situation much easier to judge.

The original Liberation Army was divided into several parts. After victory, and Chiang Kai-shek's flight to Taiwan, the different sections of the army were led into a number of different regions by their commanders. The army led by Lin Piao went from the Northeast to the region now controlled by the Central South Bureau. The army led by Peng Teh-huai went to the region now under the Northwest Bureau. Liu Po-ching led his army to the area under the Southwest Bureau.

When Lin Piao left the Northeast, he left behind the native guerrilla army. It is now under the control of the Northeast Bureau. Chen Yi's army occupied the whole area under the control of the East Bureau. In the Northern Bureau the army was constructed by combining many regional armies under the direct leadership of the North Bureau. As I said earlier, the leadership in each bureau controls that particular army, and therefore, we can say generally that the influence in the army of both factions is similar to their relationship in the party. Of course, it is possible that certain local army leaders are in disagreement with the bureau leaderships.

There are, however, some other factors we have to take into consideration concerning the army. There are figures such as Peng Teh-huai, minister of defense from December 1954 to September 1959, Lo Jui-ching, the chief of staff from 1959, and especially Chu Teh, the historical leader of the whole army, and Ho Lung, who is also a historical leader of the army, all of whom wield tremendous influence in the army. All of these figures have been attacked -- Chu Teh and Lo Lung only recently -- by the Mao-Lin Piao faction which indicates that these leaders have differences with it.

From this we can judge that the position of Mao in the army as a whole is not too favorable. It is precisely because of his weakness that he has attempted to reorganize the army by introducing into it the "Cultural Revolution Committee." This committee sent representatives to the different armies for two main reasons. One was to find out what strength the opposition had in the army and on what parts of the army Mao himself could depend. The other was to try and win certain elements in the army to its side, by such methods as bribing certain leaders with promises of promoting them to high posts.

In my opinion, this cannot change the situation very much in Mao's favor. Of course, the delegates are met and dealt with very diplomatically, and they show their enthusiastic agreement with the 16-point program adopted by the Central Committee on August 8, 1966. Yet in reality it seems most of them are waiting, if not preparing, for a showdown with Mao in the future.

There is one other force which is also of importance, and this is the security
forces, both public and secret. This organization was formed right after the CPC took power through Lo Jui-ching with the assistance of many specialists from the GPU of the USSR. When he resigned from that post in 1959 in order to become chief of staff, Haieh Fu-chih -- who had worked under the leadership of Teng Hsiao-ping for almost 20 years -- took over his post as head of the ministry of public and secret security. Both of these men have been attacked by the Red Guards, and Lo Jui-ching has even been arrested by the Mao-Lin faction because, as it seems, the police force as a whole, or at least the greater part, are under the influence of the opposition. Recently it seems that Haieh Fu-chih, under tremendous pressure, especially that of Lin Piao's army surrounding Peking, made a compromise with the Mao-Lin faction, and this explains the statement of Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, that the Red Guards should no longer attack him.

I must also say a few words about Chou En-lai, who represents somewhat of a third major tendency between the two opposing factions. This tendency is very weak as it has no mass base and is not itself actually struggling for power. The strength it does have comes from its control of the government ministries. To understand the position of this group, it is necessary to describe its leader, Chou En-lai. Politically, he is very weak and has continually, throughout his career, leaned towards the stronger groups when there has been a struggle in the party. Yet, organizationally, he is very capable, and he is valued by the whole party for his abilities in this field. At the present time with Liu Piao's army surrounding Peking and his ministries, he has made a compromise with Mao and is trying to play more or less the role of a compromiser. If the opposition should begin to show its power, however, there is no doubt that he would change his position accordingly.

What the future holds, then, still depends on many factors, domestic and foreign. However, we can make an overall judgment now that Mao's forces are in a minority and that Mao and Lin Piao will not -- unless they take an adventurist course, or are forced to -- launch a civil war at this time.

Q: If Mao is in a minority, as you explain, how has it been possible for him to seemingly control the party and carry on with the "cultural revolution"? For example, how was he able to get the party to adopt the 16-point program of August 8, 1966?

A: First of all we must not underestimate Mao's influence in the party and in all of China. The CPC conquered power under his leadership as chairman of the party. Therefore, in the eyes of the masses he is the great symbol of the victory of the revolution. There is no doubt that even now he still commands respect among a portion of the masses.

However, with the failure of the "Great Leap Forward," his influence was weakened, and the many obvious mistakes in his policies since then, such as his positions on literature and art, education, on the Vietnamese war, and especially on the Indonesian CP, have further tarnished his reputation in the party and among the masses.

Most of Mao's so-called victories have taken place in Peking, such as the adoption of the 16-point program you mentioned by the Central Committee. These "victories" have been almost completely dependent upon one factor -- the army of Lin Piao. It is with the army and the threat of the army that Mao removed Peng Chen, secured the adoption of the 16-point program, forced self-criticisms from leaders such as Liu Shao-chi, forced Haieh Fu-chih to compromise, etc.

Q: Mao accuses his opponents of being capitalist restorationists, revisionist, etc. Yet no one seems to know for sure what the program of Mao's opposition is and who this opposition represents. Can you clarify the nature of the opposition?

A: The CPC is something like its sister party in the USSR. There is no democratic discussion inside the party; all decisions are handed down from above and must be carried out and obeyed by the cadres and the rank and file. Even in the top bodies such as the Central Committee and the Political Bureau there is generally little discussion. Only on very critical questions such as the "Great Leap Forward," the People's Communes, and the defeat in Indonesia, has any real discussion taken place inside the top bodies. The oppositions which have developed and attempted to criticize Mao and his programs have in the past been expelled. I have already spoken about Peng Chen, for example, and in the first interview, about Peng Teh-huai.

Under these conditions it is very difficult to learn what the specific program of the opposition in the party is. However, we can get an idea of the opposition's general attitudes from the documents published by the CPC itself criticizing the opposition, as well as from the writings for which many intellectuals in the party have been attacked. I will point out what seem to be the main points of disagreement with Mao's faction.

(1) They considered Mao's economic programs like the "Great Leap Forward" -- espe-
cially the formation of the People's Communes -- to be adventuristic.

(2) In literature and art they have felt that Mao's ideas are too strict, and that they put a straitjacket on any creative writing, etc.

(3) Almost all educators, professors, teachers, and university students opposed Mao's policies in the educational field because of their interference with freedom of study, and they felt it was a waste of time for them to be sent into the countryside or into the factories. They felt that Mao's policies on the whole had disrupted the educational system.

(4) The position of the opposition on international questions is much more difficult to determine because there is much less material. It is probably safe to assume that there is general agreement with Lo Ju-i-ching on the question of how to defend China in case of a possible attack from the U.S. Lo Ju-i-ching does not seem to have been in disagreement about politics being in command in the army. Rather, it was his position that one must recognize the importance of today's type of warfare, especially the role of nuclear weapons. Therefore, he felt that the break with the Soviet Union on the state level had endangered China's capacity to defend herself militarily against a probable imperialist attack.

(5) Finally on one point they make themselves very clear. There is general disgust with Mao's omniscience and they demand more discussion in the party on important questions.

These five points give us a general picture of the ideas and opinions of the opposition. It is impossible, of course, for us to give a comprehensive explanation of their program, and I doubt that they have one that is systematic and formal. But we can say that these make up the most important disagreements with Mao to be found among the various members of the opposition.

To understand fully the differences between the two groups, I should say something about some particular points in Mao's own program. Since the stated objectives of Mao's formal program do not correspond to the development of the "cultural revolution" itself, it is more enlightening to examine the way in which Mao has actually implemented the "cultural revolution." I have already described at some length what Mao is doing when I discussed the struggle and its evolution. Briefly, Mao is trying to carry out a purge in the most undemocratic way, and in fact a coup d'état. He has tried to make himself a living god and to make his very word law.

It seems that in the recent events another very important disagreement has arisen between the two factions. The opposition, in order to win over and organize the workers, has granted many concessions in some localities, and has taken measures to raise their standard of living. Mao, with the "cultural revolution," has continually and strongly opposed such measures.

Q: Does the opposition, then, represent a democratic force, and what do you think about the idea which seems to be the most widely accepted, that is, that the main opposition to Mao is Khrushchevist?

A: The opposition is not homogeneous but is composed of many tendencies. We are able to distinguish three main currents. The first is found among the top leaders like
Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and many leaders of the bureaus. This tendency in general represents a bureaucratic group inside the party which is in control of a considerable sector of the party's apparatus. The political traditions of this group organizationally and politically are those of Stalinism.

The second current can be referred to as a "liberalizing" tendency, and is made up of second rank or middle cadres in the party, of which Teng To and Wu Han are good examples.

The third current is much more difficult to define because there doesn't seem to be any single leader, or any well-known cadres for that matter who represent it. But we can say almost with certainty that this group represents, if not a revolutionary, then a quasi-revolutionary tendency, and is made up primarily of rank-and-file party members.

The third current would, of course, represent a sector of the masses and express most vividly the feelings of the population as a whole. The middle layers of the party have much more contact in their work with the rank and file, and would therefore be more likely to reflect the attitudes of the masses.

It is with sectors of the middle layers that the top leaders have the most contact in their day-to-day party work. For example, Teng To was directly under Peng Chen, who was one of the top leaders. It would have been impossible for Teng To to carry on the work that he did without at least the tolerance, if not the approval, of Peng Chen. It was Liu Shao-chi's close personal relationship with Peng Chen that probably thrust him into the leadership of the present opposition faction.

In the very top leadership, Mao tolerated no disagreement, and every opposition was expelled. However, because of the past experience of the top leaders in working with the masses, and their connection with the middle layers, some of them reflect in some measure the movement of the masses. While the middle layers represent the tendency in the party for reform, it is probably safe to assume that the need for reform is also recognized by top leaders who are, nonetheless, more conservative, and who still wish to maintain a tight control over the party.

The question of Khrushchevism is very important. We must first understand what is meant by Khrushchevism, and especially what Mao means by Khrushchevism.

There are two different aspects of Khrushchevism: one is political revisionism, which is reactionary; and the other is de-Stalinization, which is progressive.

Mao does not distinguish between these two aspects. He lumps them together under the label of revisionism. Both are reactionary from his point of view, and he has said that Khrushchev's policies have restored capitalism in the USSR.

We must understand, then, that anyone agreeing with any aspect of Khrushchevism is, according to Mao, a revisionist, and wants, or is attempting, to restore capitalism. From what I have said earlier, you can see that the opposition desires in its own way similar reforms as those carried out under Khrushchevism during de-Stalinization, and of course these reforms are directed at Mao.

In Mao's opinion, then -- if he actually believes his own propaganda -- such reform measures will lead to a capitalist restoration.

As far as the politically revisionist side of Khrushchevism is concerned, we must recognize that in practice Mao's own policies have not proved to be substantially different, as the events in Indonesia so well demonstrate. It seems that Mao's main objection to the revisionism of Khrushchev has been de-Stalinization. There is no evidence that I know of that the opposition is in any way in disagreement with the official policy of exposing the political revisionism of Khrushchev. Therefore, at least on the question of de-Stalinization, the stand of the opposition, is the more progressive. In general, the opposition shades from currents that are really Maoist to tendencies that are quite revolutionary.

Q: What, in your opinion, will be the final outcome of the struggle?

A: Taking into consideration the relationship of forces on each side as I have already outlined, it is clear that the odds are against Mao, especially if the organization and mobilization of the peasants and workers, which we have seen in the recent events, continues.

If Mao should nevertheless be victorious, I think a sweeping purge comparable to the one in the Soviet Union during the 1930's, if not larger, could occur, and the de-
fenses of the Chinese Revolution would be placed in grave danger. However, if the opposition should win, the most likely result would be a few concessions of a liberalizing nature as well as a shift away from the ultraleft sectarian positions taken by Mao. For example, it is possible they would set up some kind of united front with the other worker states against U.S. imperialism.

There is another important prospect if the opposition should win. If the masses have entered into motion, it will not be so easy for the bureaucracy to stop them or to contain them within the prescribed limits. In that case, a real massive struggle for workers democracy could open up.
OPEN LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

[The author of the following document, Peng Shu-tse, was one of the founding members of the Chinese Communist party. He later became one of the founders of the Chinese Trotskyist movement. A victim of the repression following the unsuccessful 1925-27 Revolution, he spent many years in Chiang Kai-shek's prisons. As a Trotskyist, he together with many other courageous revolutionists suffered at the hands of the Maoist faction. Despite this, he remains a firm defender of the Chinese Revolution and the Chinese workers state.]

[In the current situation in China, readers of World Outlook will undoubtedly find the programmatic proposals advanced by Peng Shu-tse at the end of his open letter of special interest. They reflect the views of the Chinese section of the Fourth International.]

Dear Comrades,

In May 1966, in the Liberation Army Daily, the chairman of your party, Mao Tse-tung, launched the so-called cultural revolution. Since then, and especially since the organization of the Red Guards in August 1966, a storm has arisen over China, and a series of extraordinary events have taken place which have greatly shocked some of the most devoted friends and supporters of the Chinese Revolution. In particular, these events have included such things as the dismissal, the arrest, and imprisonment of top leaders in your party and government like Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi and Lo Jui-ching, without any recourse to the laws or regulations of the party. These same people have also been so insulted and abused, and even humiliatingly by being paraded through the streets by the Red Guards, that some of them have attempted suicide. Hundreds of other well-known leaders and cadres in the cultural and educational fields, such as Chou Yang, Wu Han, Teng To, Tien Han, Sha Yen, Yang Han-sing, Li Ta, Lu Ping, Kung Ta-ming, Peng Kang, etc., have been purged. Even Liu Shao-chi, the vice-chairman of the party and president of the People's Republic of China, and Teng Hsiao-ping, the general secretary of the party, have been openly attacked by the Red Guards and obliged to make self-criticisms. Moreover, in recent weeks, Mao Tse-tung has used the army to take over the government and party apparatuses in certain provincial capitals such as T'uyuan in Shansi, Nanchung in Kiangsi, and Anhwei.

All these events taken together demonstrate that your party not only finds itself in the grave crisis of an open split, but that the country itself could be on the brink of a civil war. If this situation is not corrected in time, the outcome will be catastrophic and socialist China will be led into an impasse. For the sake of the perspectives of socialism in China, the fundamental interests of the workers and peasants, and the fate of thousands of militants inside and outside the party, I can no longer remain silent. Therefore, I am addressing this letter to you in order to express my views on the crisis in the party, and to offer my ideas on how that crisis can be resolved.

First of all I would like to ask you to notice that all the top leaders of the party, as well as the leading cadres in the cultural and educational fields have been purged or attacked for the "crime" of being "antiparty," "antisocialist," and opposed to "Mao Tse-tung's thought," and they have been accused of being "capitalist restorationists" and of "taking the capitalist road." But, one must demand, what evidence is there to support such extreme charges as being "antisocialist" and "taking the capitalist road"? We must say that absolutely no such evidence has been offered, and that these charges are very clearly nothing more than a frame-up. They are similar to the ones Stalin employed thirty years ago when he eliminated his political opponents by accusing them of being "enemies of the people."

As far as I am concerned, I am not in agreement with the fundamental political positions and organizational methods of those leaders of your party who have been purged. Nevertheless, I feel that these leaders cannot be accused of being antisocialist, nor are they taking the bourgeois road and trying to restore capitalism.

I am personally acquainted with Liu Shao-chi. I know him very well since I was a co-worker with him in the party from 1920 to 1927. Since he joined the Communist movement in the autumn of 1920, he has actively and wholeheartedly participated in revolutionary activities. After the defeat of the second Chinese Revolution, our ways parted politically (Liu supported the position of Stalin, while I turned in the direction of Trotsky). However, at that time I still considered him to be a revolutionary. As far as your party is concerned, Liu has made a very great contribution. During the "White Terror" of Chiang Kai-shek, he worked in the underground under very difficult and dangerous circumstances in order to overthrow Chiang Kai-shek's bourgeois regime and to put China
on the road to socialism. It is absurd and absolutely impossible to believe that such a person as Liu Shao-chi, who enjoys the high post of head of state, would, seventeen years after the victory of the revolution, now turn against socialism and work for the restoration of capitalism.

Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Lo Jui-ching, and others in the cultural and educational fields -- who all have a history similar to that of Liu Shao-chi -- have also been labeled "antisocialist" and accused of "taking the capitalist road." Such absurd slander can only be described as absurd. Are these not the same accusations as those used by Stalin when he accused Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and their supporters of being "capitalist restorationists" and "enemies of the people"? Could such base and absurd slanders find their way into your party? This is the central question that now confronts you, and which you must try to understand and resolve.

Your party refers to itself as "Marxist-Leninist," and has stated in its statutes that it bases itself on democratic centralism. But as you know only too well, in reality there is no democracy in your party, but only a bureaucratic centralism in which the power is centered in the hands of the party's chairman, Mao Tse-tung. All the important decisions taken by the party are arbitrarily decided by Mao Tse-tung himself, and the party must accept them as being infallible. If anyone did not agree with or criticized Mao's opinions, he would be accused of being "antiparty," "antisocialist," and "anti-Mao Tse-tung's thought," and would almost certainly be purged. These procedures, which violate democratic centralism, are the source of the grave crisis in which your party presently finds itself.

If your party actually operated on the basis of democratic centralism, such slanders would be impossible. The method of democratic centralism practiced by the Bolshevists, placed all important questions before the entire membership, and allowed them to freely present their own ideas and to criticize anyone's position, including that of the top leaders. The final decisions were taken at the party congresses, and it was after these decisions that the party became united. The minority had to obey the majority decision, although it had a right to maintain its ideas, and to ask the party, at any time it felt necessary, to reconsider them. The minority was at no time punished for its ideas. This, then, was the democratic centralism instituted by the Bolshevists under the leadership of Lenin.

During the period of Lenin's leadership of the Soviet party and government, the congresses of the party were held each year, and emergency congresses were even called when urgent and important issues arose. It is only by such practices that the opinions of the rank and file can find expression. This is the embodiment of democratic centralism.

In the Soviet party, then, all important issues, such as the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the New Economic Policy, were decided upon only after a full and free discussion. After the decisions were taken, the minorities were able to maintain their political position. It was only mandatory that they unite with the rest of the party to help carry out the majority decisions. The leaders of the minorities, such as Bukharin and Radek, who continued to maintain their minority position concerning the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, were not only not punished, but they retained their official posts in the party and in the government. This is a concrete example of democratic centralism in practice.

After the death of Lenin, Stalin usurped the leadership of the party and turned the democratic centralism practiced by the Bolshevists into bureaucratic centralism without democracy. He took all the power into his own hands and made himself into a dictator. Under these conditions, all the important issues concerning the party and state were arbitrarily decided by Stalin himself, and as a result, neither free discussion within the party nor regular scheduled party congresses were any longer necessary. (After the Sixteenth Congress, when Stalin established his rule, there were only three congresses of the party until his death in 1953 -- a period of twenty-three years). Those who did not agree with Stalin and criticized him were purged as being "rightist," "antiparty," and "enemies of the people." It was for this reason that the entire generation of the old Bolshevists, as well as numerous newer, young revolutionaries, were liquidated under Stalin's dictatorship.

Since your party took power in 1949, none of the important questions has been decided upon at a party congress following a democratic discussion. For example, the "Great Leap Forward" policy -- especially the people's communes, involving the lives of 500 million peasants -- and the current "Proletarian Cultural Revolution" policy, were never democratically discussed by the party or decided upon by a party congress, nor were they even discussed and decided upon by your Central Committee. These and all other important questions have been decided by your party's chairman, Mao Tse-tung, and he has merely given the party orders to carry them out. The Central Committee of your party

-21-
only meets to ratify Mao's decisions, often after they are already being carried out. For example, Mao Tse-tung arbitrarily instituted the people's communes in the beginning of August 1958, and then, an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau at the end of August 1958, had to ratify his decision. And again in May 1966, Mao organized the "Cultural Revolution," and it was not until August 1966 that the Plenum of the Central Committee, which adopted the resolution on the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," took place.

During the seventeen years that your party has been in power, there has only been one party congress -- the Eighth Congress in 1956. Therefore, the conditions of your party resemble those of the Soviet party under Stalin, if in fact they do not duplicate them. Hence, if your party continues in the same way, it will engage in a purge comparable to the one carried out by Stalin in the 1930's. The present purge of Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Lo Jui-ching and the others is only a prelude to a much greater tragedy.

The most serious and dangerous condition which has so far presented itself is your Chairman Mao's ordering the army to intervene in the struggle taking place inside the party. He has used the army, as well as the Red Guards, in order to take over, step by step, the offices and administrative powers of the party and state throughout the country, and in order to establish his bonapartist military dictatorship. By doing this he has ignored and violated all laws. (These are laws which were initiated and passed by your party and government.) Mao has gone even beyond the actions of Stalin. This situation will inevitably lead to a large-scale civil war if it is not countered in time.

As you already know, the Mao-Lin Piao faction is a very small minority among the rank and file of the party. Except for Peking and the capitals of Kwangtung, Shansi, Kiangsi, Anhwei, and Hsiliungkiang provinces, where the Maoist forces claim they have control -- even in these places the Maoist forces have had to depend upon the army and the Red Guards for their power -- the rest of the country remains under the control of the opposition or neutralist elements. If Mac Tse-tung continues to insist upon occupying the rest of the country, he will undoubtedly meet strong resistance from the opposition and neutralist elements, who will be forced to unite to protect themselves in many areas, and especially in the Southwest, Northwest, and in Inner Mongolia; in such an event, a great civil war will be unavoidable. Who can say what amount of economic destruction would take place in the event of a civil war, or how much suffering it would bring to the people, and how many would meet their death? It is impossible to say. Yet, there is one thing which can be predicted: a civil war would set China back many years, her energy would be exhausted, and the cause of socialism would receive a very, very damaging blow. There is even a strong possibility that American imperialism would be influenced to take this opportunity to strike. In the event of such developments it is impossible to predict what the fate of China would be.

My dear comrades, the present situation is so serious that not only is your party endangered, but the fate of socialist China itself is at stake. The time has come for you to rise up and begin to struggle.

It is claimed that your party has around twenty million members, and the youth organization around thirty million. The party is unique because of its huge mass membership, and because of the real and potential power it possesses compared to all other forces in China. With such masses and power, any and almost all obstacles should be easily overcome. Except for a minority of corrupt bureaucrats, case-hardened Stalinists and Maoists, I believe that the majority of the party is made up of militants who are loyal to socialism and concerned that China remain on the socialist road, and who are willing to sacrifice themselves in the interest of the worker and peasant masses. Therefore, I would like to put forward the following proposals as a means to overcome the present critical situation.

I.

You must immediately make an appeal to the whole party and its youth, calling on them to intervene with practical action. First you must demand that your chairman, Mao Tse-tung, comply with the following measures:

(1) Immediately stop using the army to remove the party and government officials throughout the country. The leadership of the party must be elected by the members of the party through democratic procedures. As regards the government, it should be democratically elected by soviets (councils) of the workers, peasants, and soldiers.

(2) Immediately dissolve the Red Guards, because the majority of them are completely controlled by Chen Po-ta (Mao's ex-secretary) and Chiang Ching (Mrs. Mao Tse-tung) through the Cultural Revolutionary Group, and because they have been used as an instrument to slander and physically attack the opposition. Their activities have been
contrary to democratic procedures, and are hence reactionary.

(3) Immediately release all the party opposition leaders and cadres who have recently been arrested and imprisoned, and restore them to their original positions. At the same time, release all those political prisoners who have been arrested in the past and who believe in socialism, and let them freely express their opinions and participate in political activities.

(4) All the organs of the party, as well as other journals and radio broadcasts, must immediately stop their slanders against the opposition -- the use of such epithets as "antiparty," "antisocialist," and "capitalist restorationist" -- and stop the absurd propaganda relating to Mao's personal cult. Substitute in their place the actual political positions of the different tendencies, and launch a public discussion on all important questions.

(5) Immediately establish a consulting committee made up of representatives of all the different tendencies in the party. Its task should be to prepare a party congress and to launch a democratic discussion inside the party on all the essential questions on which differences have arisen, such as the failure of the people's communes and the "Great Leap Forward"; the different ideas on literature, art and education; the personal cult of Mao Tse-tung; democratic centralism in a Bolshevik party; the reasons for the tragic defeat of the CP in Indonesia; and especially the question of a united front with the other socialist countries to oppose U.S. imperialism in Vietnam. The many different tendencies should be allowed to express their opinions and submit their resolutions on the issues stated above, and then a final decision should be adopted at the party congress.

These proposed measures, if carried out, would make it possible to avoid a civil war, and would restore peace.

II.

If Chairman Mao should fail to comply with the measures outlined above, it would demonstrate that he has absolutely no respect for your opinions, and that by using the Red Guards and the army he is bent on taking the power and destroying any and all opposition in the party and government in order to establish his own bonapartist military dictatorship. This, then, will inevitably lead to a civil war which could lead socialist China into a blind alley.

In such circumstances, you not only have the full right but a duty to split with him and openly appeal to the worker, soldier, and peasant masses, calling on them to struggle in defense of the socialist conquests and for the reunification of the country, that is, to transform the present factional struggle into a revolutionary struggle against bureaucratic dictatorship.

As a program in this struggle, I urge you to consider the following proposals:

(1) It is absolutely necessary to defend the conquests of the revolution and the socialist property relations, and to resolutely attack all attempts at capitalist restoration led by the remaining bourgeois elements, rich farmers, and corrupt bureaucrats who might try to take advantage of the present situation. The payment of interest to the remaining capitalists must be stopped, and they must be removed from their high positions in the factories, etc.

(2) It is necessary to form a united front with all socialist-minded groupings in order to do away with the dictatorship by one faction or by one party. At the present time your party is divided into two uncompromising factions -- pro-Mao and anti-Mao -- but in reality it is already split into two parties. In addition to this, there are several tendencies in the opposition. There are also many revolutionaries who are outside the party, such as those people who were expelled after the crackdown on the "100 Flowers Blossom and Contend" movement. All these revolutionary tendencies must be allowed to form their own independent party or grouping, and every group or party claiming to be fighting for socialism must be allowed to present its political position and program in an attempt to win the support of the masses. These different socialist groupings and parties must then unite in one common front to oppose the Mao-Lin Piao faction and prevent it from establishing a bonapartist military dictatorship -- thereby preventing a tragedy similar to that of Stalin's purges in the 1930's -- and in order to establish a truly democratic socialist regime.

(3) To establish a democratic socialist regime, it is necessary to work among the worker and peasant masses, to call on them to struggle, to encourage them to form soviets and elect their soviet representatives by secret ballot, and to form a government
based on soviets, in place of the present government which obtained power by fraudulent elections. The organization of soviets is not only one of the best ways to mobilize the masses for struggle, but it is the only type of structure that can lead to a democratic socialist government.

(4) The present militias must be expanded and reorganized, and their commanders elected through secret ballot by those who belong to the militias. This organization must take the place of the public and secret police in maintaining social order, and if necessary, it should be used to defend the democratic socialist government against its enemies.

(5) Worker's committees must be democratically formed by secret ballot in every factory and mine in order to direct production in cooperation with the technicians, and in every commune administrative committees must be formed, through the same democratic methods, in order to manage production and distribution. As for the communes themselves being reorganized, this question should be resolved only after a complete and thorough discussion among the whole peasantry.

(6) It is necessary to improve the living standards of the masses by such means as increasing wages and cutting working hours for the workers, and increasing the incomes of the peasants while doing away with their excessive work loads. Improving the material benefits of the working masses, and developing their initiative through democratic procedures is the only way to increase production and to mobilize the masses for struggle. At the present time, Mao's faction considers any material improvement for the masses to be "economism." This only reflects the psychology of those in the top bureaucratic layer who themselves enjoy privileges, including luxurious material benefits.

(7) In the history of China, the antagonisms between national minorities have led to many civil wars. Resolving the question of the national minorities, therefore, has become a very important factor in unifying the nation and stabilizing society as a whole. In 1922 the Chinese Communist party decided to acknowledge the right of self-determination of the national minorities, which meant they had the right to establish their own independent government in such places as Tibet, Inner Mongolia and the Moslem community in Sinkiang. This decision was in order to win the sincere collaboration of the national minorities and to unify the nation on the basis of equality.

Since your party took power in 1949, it has yet to solve the problem of the national minorities on the principles practiced by Lenin. Formally the party has established the autonomous regions of Tibet and Inner Mongolia, yet, in practice the national minorities are still ruled in the tradition of the great Han race, and they have never enjoyed the right of self-determination, let alone the right to establish their own independent government. It is for this reason that old antagonisms still lie just beneath the surface and could possibly foment a crisis of still another civil war. Already in the present crisis of the party, the problem of the national minorities has again erupted.

To unify the nation, then, it is absolutely necessary to acknowledge, both in word and deed, the right of the national minorities to form their own independent parties and governments in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and the Moslems in Sinkiang. Only in this way will it be possible to win the sincere collaboration of the national minorities, and to form a Soviet Union of China, that is, to accomplish the socialist unification of the nation. It is imperative, then, that the recognition of self-determination for the national minorities be an important point in any socialist program.

(8) It is necessary to adopt a revolutionary foreign policy, and in order to do this, it is necessary to draw the lessons of the tragic defeat in Indonesia. As you have all personally witnessed, the leader of the Indonesian Communist party (PKI), D.N.Aidit, visited China several times, and each time he talked with Chairman Mao. Aidit also made several speeches in which he supported the NASAKOM of President Sukarno. These speeches were reprinted in the People's Daily, the organ of your party, not only without criticism, but even with much praise; the Indonesian CP was held up as a great Marxist-Leninist party, and D.N.Aidit as its great revolutionary leader. Mao encouraged the PKI to lend its support to Sukarno in order that Mao himself might win Sukarno for his own diplomatic interests. He also encouraged Aidit to practice the same revisionist policies of Khrushchev in order to win Aidit to his side in the dispute with Khrushchev. The result of these policies was the great October tragedy in which the blood of hundreds of thousands of Indonesian Communist militants, workers, and peasants was spilled. This gigantic defeat has dealt a serious blow to your party and to the cause of socialism in China and all of Asia.

The tragedy of the PKI is a repetition of the disastrous setback dealt to the Chinese revolution in the years 1925-27. Mao's encouragement of the PKI's support of
NASAKOM -- which support was the very reason for the defeat of the PKI -- echoes the way Stalin forced the Chinese CP in the 1920's to support Chiang Kai-shek and his continuation of the "three principles of the people," the program of Sun Yat-sen. The only difference is that the defeat in Indonesia was a still greater calamity. From this we have to learn an important lesson: the policy of class collaboration, embodied in the theory of a bloc of four classes -- working class, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie -- being required to carry out a national democratic revolution before coming to the stage of a socialist revolution, is a policy which dooms the revolution to a catastrophic defeat. This lesson must be clearly presented in any program seeking to promote the world revolution, especially in the backward countries of the world.

(9) At present, Chairman Mao Tse-tung accuses all his opponents of being Khrushchevists, that is, modern revisionists, and this has caused considerable confusion in the party. Mao has even said that there can be no unity with the Khrushchevists, and has in practice tried to break off all relations with the USSR. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the question of Khrushchevism.

First of all one must define Khrushchevism. In general, there are two different aspects of Khrushchevism. One is the political revisionism, i.e., the policy of peaceful coexistence between socialist countries and capitalist countries, and the perspective of a peaceful transition to socialism. This is, of course, complete opportunism, and must be rejected and exposed. The other is de-Stalinization, i.e., the partial repudiation of Stalin's personal cult, and the partial exposing of his personal dictatorship and horrendous crimes. However limited the de-Stalinization has been, it is nonetheless progressive, and must be supported with the necessary criticisms of its inadequacies.

Mao lumps both of these two quite different aspects together, attacking them both as "revisionist." It is even being said in official party publications that under the leadership of Khrushchev the Soviet Union is becoming a capitalist state. This is absolutely absurd, because the socialist property relations remain intact. One must differentiate between the socialist property relations and the bureaucratic political dictatorship. Every Marxist must defend the former against the latter.

Mao's own political policies have not differed much from those of Khrushchev, as the Indonesian affair demonstrates; consequently, Mao has in mind, for the most part, de-Stalinization when he speaks against revisionism, and he attacks de-Stalinization in order to maintain his own personal dictatorship and cult.

As far as the relationship between the socialist countries is concerned, it must be pointed out that the ideological struggle must not interfere at the state level nor interrupt the advancement of the country by hindering such things as commerce, military aid etc. despite the fact that the ideological struggle must still be carried on against the revisionists.

(10) Since U.S. imperialism began its systematic escalation of the war in Vietnam and its savage bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, it has inflicted immense suffering upon the people; not only has the Vietnamese war of resistance been endangered, but China herself is being threatened, and there is even a possibility of a nuclear war. The only way these perils can be overcome is for the socialist countries to unite in a common front to oppose the aggressive might of U.S. imperialism. However, Chairman Mao has refused to join in any united front under the pretext of opposing revisionism. Objectively, such a sectarian position only helps U.S. imperialism in the end. It is absolutely clear that the Soviet bureaucracy, with its line of peaceful coexistence, is not resolved to help the Vietnamese people win their struggle against imperialism. On the other hand, because of the pressures from the people of the USSR and the other socialist countries, the Soviet bureaucracy has been forced to take certain steps to aid the Vietnamese people, and even to adopt the position of agreeing to a united front with the other socialist countries. China has no alternative but to accept the united front proposals, and to join in common action with the other workers states to oppose U.S. imperialism in Vietnam.

Should the Soviet bureaucracy then reject the united front, they would expose themselves before the whole world as insincere. If they accepted the united front but then sabotaged it in practice, it would be much easier to expose them and their treacherous policies. The possibility of such an exposure might be enough to prevent them from even attempting such sabotage. The result would be to enormously strengthen the Vietnamese people. For these reasons, it is necessary to counter Mao's sectarian policy with the policy of joining in a united front so that the Vietnamese people can carry their struggle forward to victory.

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The program outlined above can be condensed into the following slogans:
Struggle against the restoration of capitalism, and defend socialist property relations.

Down with the personal cult and dictatorship of Mao, and establish a democratic socialist regime.

Advance the world revolution by replacing all class-collaborationist policies with revolutionary Marxism.

A united front with the socialist countries and all revolutionary and democratic-minded forces to defend the Vietnamese revolution.

February 15, 1967
AN INTERVIEW WITH CHEN PI-LAN ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

[Chen Pi-lan is well known in the history of the Communist movement of China as a woman's leader in the twenties and thirties. She took an active part in the 1925-27 revolution and was a founding member of the Trotskyist movement.]

[Born in 1902, she joined the socialist youth movement in April 1922. She became a member of the Chinese Communist party in October 1922. She was active in the Peking branch under Li Ta-chao. Later she moved to Shanghai.]

[In the spring of 1924, the party sent her to Moscow to study. She remained there until the outbreak of the Chinese revolution the following year and then returned to Shanghai where she served as a member of the regional committee and as secretary of the Women's Section and as editor of the magazine China Woman.]

[In the fall of 1925, she met Peng Shu-tse, a founding member of the Chinese Communist party, and they became lifelong companions.]

[Shortly after Peng and Chen Tu-hsiu, the founders of the Chinese Communist party, were expelled in 1929 because of their assessment of the errors committed by the party leadership during the preceding revolutionary period, she, too, was expelled. The charge was "Trotskyism."]

[There was substance to the accusation since the errors committed by the young Communist party were due primarily to the beneficent influence of Stalin; and full insight into the nature of the errors came from studying writings by Leon Trotsky which had been kept from the knowledge of the ranks and most leaders of the international Communist movement but which finally reached China in a roundabout way and came to the attention of Peng Shu-tse and Chen Tu-hsiu.]

[In 1932, when her husband and Chen Tu-hsiu were imprisoned by Chiang Kai-shek, she continued to work at building the Trotskyist movement, supporting herself and two children by teaching and writing under the most difficult underground conditions. She wrote a number of articles under the pen name of Chen Pi-yun which were published in various periodicals and later compiled in two volumes. The publication of this work established her reputation in China as an authority on the woman question.]

[After Peng's release from prison in 1937, she became editor of a monthly magazine New Voice and a member of the Political Bureau of the Revolutionary Communist party of China, the Trotskyist organization.]

[Throughout World War II, the Chinese Trotskyists fought against Japanese imperialism and at the same time struggled for a socialist revolution in China. With the victory in 1949, however, some of the best-known Trotskyist leaders had to leave their homeland due to Mao's extremely factional attitude toward them. Those who remained suffered extreme persecution. Some disappeared, others were killed, a number were imprisoned. The ultimate fate of many of those who were imprisoned is not known to this day. Some are still behind bars. Chen Pi-lan is among those who, much against their will, have been forced to live in exile.]

[The interview below was granted to Antonio Farien. In the opening he refers to two interviews with Peng Shu-tse. For these see World Outlook, August 12, 1966, and February 10, 1967.]

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Question: In my interviews with Peng Shu-tse, who analyzed the situation in China in some detail, I have gotten a fairly clear idea of the origins and subsequent evolution of the "great proletarian cultural revolution," the different and contrasting positions of the Maoists and anti-Maoists, and the possible future perspectives of the struggle.

In the first stage of the "cultural revolution," the people who were attacked were artists, writers, scholars and educators. Therefore, I would like to ask you some questions about the differences of opinion on questions of literature, art, education, etc.

First of all, may I ask you to describe and analyze the differences between the two factions on these questions, as it seems these differences can be most important and give us a much clearer and better understanding of the general lines and positions of the two contending factions.

Answer: Yes, this is true. If one understands the differences on these questions, one can get a very good idea as to what the general struggle between the two factions is about.

In reality, when Mao launched the "cultural revolution" movement, he began by attacking the drama of Wu Han, Hai Jui Dismissed from Office, Tien Han's drama, Shi Yao Whan (a woman's name) and the writings of Teng To, Midnight Discussions on Yen Shan and Notes from a Three-Family Village. In other words, Mao began by attacking the leading cadres in the cul-
tural fields which, of course, gave rise to the name, "cultural revolution."

We all know that under Stalinist dictatorial regimes, there is no political freedom, and, under these conditions, there is much dissatisfaction among the people. Dissatisfaction of this kind is usually reflected in literature and art since most artists and writers are very sensitive to the world around them. They observe the daily life of the people and see their plight as well as their hopes and aspirations. Through the means of literature and art, then, they mirror what they have observed -- the bad as well as the good.

It is for just this reason that the Stalinist policies have always severely restricted the cultural fields in order to keep the bad side from being exposed, including the bureaucratic regime. Literature and art were no longer allowed to reflect the actual reality but became mere propaganda to praise the policies of the bureaucrats as well as them as individuals.

It is very clear that such a situation existed under Stalin's regime; and the policies elaborated by Zhidanov on literature and art are typical examples.

The policies elaborated by Mao in this respect have been in no way different, except that perhaps they have been more restrictive and harsher. The result in China has been an almost constant resistance in the field of literature and art to Mao's policies. The present purge of people in this field is by no means the first, although it is the largest and most serious.

Q: Could you briefly tell us when Mao began to purge these people in the cultural fields and why?

A: Mao's policy of restricting literature and art began in May 1942 during the Yenan period. It was during this time that Mao made his well-known "Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art" which were given in preparation for the purge of a well-known writer.

In these long discourses, except for a few quotations from Lenin, whom he cited as his authority, Mao demanded that literature and art serve only the workers, peasants and soldiers in line with the political policies of the party; and he was against any exposures or satires of his Yenan regime. The writers were supposed to praise the Communist New Democracy, revolutionary heroes, etc.; and he pointed out that there were many defects in the field of literature and art and that it was necessary to launch a movement in order to purge them.

During this time, there were several writers who had written some articles exposing the real life in Yenan, such as the famous woman writer, Ping Ling, who wrote an article entitled, Impressions of the March Eighth Holiday; the famous poet, Ai Ching, who wrote an article entitled, One Should Understand and Respect the Writers; and Wong Shi-wei, who wrote a series of articles entitled, Crotonaria Sessiliflora. The latter were the sharpest exposure of certain aspects of Yenan. He criticized the lack of democracy and contrasted the privileged life of the bureaucracy to that of the rank and file. These articles attracted much attention among the people and especially among the young Communists.

Mao could not tolerate such criticism and for this reason called a meeting to discuss the questions of literature and art where he gave his talks. These meetings and talks not only prepared for the purge which followed; they also laid the foundations for the basic line of Communist party policy in questions concerning literature and art.

Not long after these discussions and meetings, a special meeting was called to purge Wong Shi-wei. Many of the party's officials, such as the heads of the Central Propaganda Department and the Organizational Department and the president of the Center of Academia, as well as cadres working in the field of literature and art, and other writers, took part in this meeting.

One might wonder why it was of such a serious nature. The reason is simple. Wong joined the party in 1926. This made him an old party member and one of the most important members of the Center of Academia. Wong had translated into Chinese more than two million words of works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. He was, as well, a very capable writer and was respected by almost everyone, especially the youth. Thus the purge of Wong Shi-wei was a most important event in the Yenan period.

The meeting lasted sixteen days during which Wong expressed and defended his opinions in the face of vigorous attacks by the leading cadres and officials of the party. There were a number of cultural workers who agreed with Wong's opinions and sympathized with him. Yet, due to his being condemned as antiparty, anti-Marxist and Trotskyist by some of the party leaders, and especially by Chen Po-ta -- who is now the leader of the present cultural revolutionary group but who at that time was Mao's private secretary -- who criticized Wong most maliciously, they became fearful and repressed. Nevertheless, Wong, from beginning to end, remained strong in defending
his ideas as correct.

The meeting finally ended by condemning him as being antiparty, anti-Marxist and Trotskyist; he was expelled from the party, thrown into prison and tortured. Finally, he acknowledged that he was a Trotskyist; and hence he was killed.

We should take special note of the fact that Wong Shi-wei's book, Crotalaria Sessiliflora has exercised great attraction and has interested many youth, including members and sympathizers of the CCP as well as its youth organization. The book has circulated throughout China by means of handwritten copies passed on and on, time after time. The original copy that I read was borrowed from a sympathizer of the CCP and was of this type.

Because of the bravery and boldness of Wong's resistance against the vicious attacks and his insistence on the correctness of his own position, he became very famous. His name is to be found in most histories of this period.

Q: Were there any other purges after Wong?

A: After the CCP took power in 1949, Mao's cultural policies were put into effect for the nation as a whole.

The first to resist and criticize them was Hu Feng, who was a very famous left theoretician on literature and art. He considered Mao's "Talks at Yanan" to be mechanistic and therefore he said that "mechanism has controlled literature and art circles for the last ten years...this ideology of literature and art has been sterilized...when one speaks they must employ Mao's thought which causes people more than enough trouble."*

He held that truth is the highest principle of art. He was against what he regarded as the oversimplified policy of having literature and art serve only political ends and was against the limitation of themes as proposed by Mao. Thus he insisted that all writers should have the right to choose their own subjects.

The ideas and opinions of Hu Feng, as I have indicated, are, of course, based on principles which everyone should be able to accept. However, from Mao's point of view, such ideas were out of bounds and in 1955 he began a campaign against Hu Feng and his followers. This campaign lasted several months and was carried out on a national scale.

Not only were Hu Feng's followers attacked and criticized, but many people in the universities, middle schools and cultural organizations who only sympathized with him were also attacked and purged. According to reports published at the time, more than 150 Hu-Fengists were imprisoned or put in labor camps. Since that time there has been no news of him or his followers.

Almost immediately after the Hu Feng purge came the "Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom and a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend" movement, April to June 1957. It was during this period that a number of left writers criticized Mao's policies on literature and art, such as Ting Ling, Ai Ching and Feng Hsueh-feng, the most famous contemporary theoretician of literature and art. These three were all leaders of the party in the cultural fields, especially Ting Ling and Feng Hsueh-feng, who were respectively chairwoman and vice-chairman of the National Association of Literature and Art Workers.

In June, when Mao began to suppress the "Blossom and Contend" movement, they came under attack.

For example, in September, a special meeting was held in Peking to purge Ting Ling. There were around one hundred participants in this meeting, including many high officials of the party in the cultural fields, such as the minister and vice-minister of culture, Shien Yen-ping and Chou Yang.

This meeting, like the one held in Yanan to purge Wong Shi-wei, lasted sixteen days and was very exhausting for Ting Ling as she was subjected to one attack after another, accusing her of being a rightist and a reactionary. Attacks against her which appeared in the People's Daily made a connection between her and Wong Shi-wei and accused her of being like him.

Shortly after the meeting, Ting Ling, Feng Hsueh-feng, Ai Ching and many others were imprisoned or sent to "reeducation camps." As with Hu Feng and his followers, nothing further has been heard about their fate.

Concerning Ting Ling, I should say a few more words. In 1923-24 she was a classmate of mine in Shanghai University where we lived in the same home. We became very close friends, so I know her very well. She had a very strong character and was very democratic minded.

Also during the "Blossom and Contend" movement, we should take notice of the position taken by Shien Yen-ping. In a meeting called by the Central United Front Department on May 16, 1957, Shien Yen-ping expressed his own views on liter-

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*The quotation is from "On the Counterrevolutionary Double-dealer Chou Yang," by Yao Wen-yuan, published in Hengqi, No. 1, 1967. - A.F.
ature and art. He said, "In regard to literature and art, it must be considered a special field. By only depending on some of the party's basic texts and without any special knowledge in this field, it is impossible to resolve concrete problems concerning literature and art...What then should be done? There is the short road which is dogmatism and comman-
derism." It is very clear that Shien was criticizing the whole apparatus of the cultural department.

Shien considered that in litera-
ture and art, there existed a "general phenomenon" of "monotony" and "repeti-
tiousness." He explained that the "sick-
ness" of repetition was due to reducing everything to formulas and to the lack of variety in themes. In short, these sicknesses were due to not carrying out the policy of the "Blossom and Contend" move-
ment.

All the criticisms of Shien Yen-ping no doubt implied that Mao's policies on literature and art restricted the creative initiative and freedom of the writers; hence the monotonous and repeti-
tious works which were devoid of any liveliness or creativity.

Q: Since Shien Yen-ping was the minister of culture, that is, the highest leader in the cultural field, why is it that he spoke out against Mao's policies and why was he not purged with the others?

A: In order to answer this ques-
tion, it is necessary to give a short ré-
sumé of Shien's personal history. He
joined the CCP in 1921 and at that time he was already the author of several ar-
ticles and the editor of the large maga-
zine, Novel. After the defeat of the
revolution of 1927, he left the CCP. How-
ever, he continued to write and published several books under the pen name of Mao Toing, some of which became very cele-
brated and he himself became very well known. It was for this reason that he be-
came minister of culture after the CCP took power in 1949. He held this post
until January 1965 when he requested that he be allowed to retire.

As to the reasons why he criti-
cized Mao's policies and why he was not
purged, we must note that first of all, his speech was made during the peak of
the "Blossom and Contend" movement;
secondly, Shien was not a member of the
party; and, thirdly, the Ministry of
Culture was really controlled by Chou
Yang.

According to some recent reports, however, Shien has been arrested in the
current purge. It is most probable that he was arrested because of the position he expressed in his speech of 1957.

During the 1925-27 revolution, I
had quite a bit of personal contact with
Shien, and so I also knew him very well.
He was an extremely cautious man and most likely, in my opinion, he has probably not made any criticism of Mao's policies since 1957.

Q: Since you said that it was
really Chou Yang who controlled the Minis-
try of Culture and since Chou Yang him-
self has recently been attacked, what
were his ideas and did they conform with
those of Shien Yen-ping?

A: Chou Yang's opinions on litera-
ture and art are not only similar to
those of Shien Yen-ping, they are much
more profound. If we turn only to the
article by Yao Wen-yuan, recently pub-
lished in Hongqi, No. 1, 1967, "On the
Counterrevolutionary Double-dealer Chou
Yang," attacking Chou Yang, we can see
what his position is.

For example, Yao Wen-yuan very
clearly states, "Chou Yang, like Hu Feng,
repeatedly advocated the propaganda that
'the highest principle of art is truth,' and
he was against the 'oversimplification and
vulgarization,' the conditions placed on
writers and the role of literature as propa-
ganda. Chou Yang considered that 'dogmatism' and 'sectarianism' and
the harsh attitude towards artists and
writers has seriously restricted their
freedom." "As to the 'question of making
literature and art serve politics,' there was
narrow, one-sided and incorrect under-
standing." Therefore, Chou advocated that
"there should be no limits on subjects
and that we should help people see the
diversity of the world, the laws of his-
tory and the complex nature of life." "Re-
gardless of the subject, it can reflect the
spirit of the present period."

In another article, Chou Yang said,
"It is better to describe the intellectuals,
technicians, and others from the point of
view of the proletariat. However, the
working class should not be sectarian;
that is, it should not only write about the
workers and peasants. The idea that
proletarian literature is only about
workers and peasants is not correct."

Chou Yang was especially against
literature and art serving only politics. He
also said, "The writers should not only
write about current affairs and should
not follow the policy put forward today
and then follow a different policy that
might be put forward tomorrow."

"In a word, Chou Yang considered

*Quotations taken from an article criti-
cizing Chou Yang by Li Chi-kai and others, published in Wenhui Bao, July 31, 1966. -- A.F.
that writers should write what they themselves see and according to what they feel, even if what they see and feel does not correspond to the ideas and policies of the party. The writer must be loyal to the facts, to the truth and to the objective conditions, and write freely what he believes." Therefore, Chou Yang advocated assured freedom in the sphere of writing.*

Q: If Chou Yang disagreed with Mao's policies, why was he allowed to remain as vice-minister of culture, being in fact the real head of the ministry, to carry out Mao's policies?

A: This is an important question and it is very necessary that it be answered. Under the personal dictatorship of Mao, many leaders and cadres of the party disagreed with his policies, but nevertheless they were forced to carry out Mao's decisions. Chou Yang was only one of many such cadres and leaders. He often found himself in a contradictory situation, that is, not believing in Mao's policies and even speaking and writing about his differences, but nevertheless forced to carry out Mao's line in practice.

For example, before the purge of Hu Feng in 1955, during a discussion meeting on Hu Feng's case, Chou Yang said, "Hu Feng's general political position is in agreement with the party."** In other words, Chou Yang did not want the case of Hu Feng to become too serious. When Mao ordered Hu Feng to be purged as a reactionary, Chou was obliged to carry out his orders.

In 1957, when Ting Ling, Feng Hsueh-feng, Ai Ching and the others were attacked, Chou Yang was forced into the same contradictory position as in the case of Hu Feng. It was for this reason that Yao Wen-yuan accused him of being a "double-dealer" or "two-faced counter-revolutionary." In reality, then, under the pressure of Mao, many cadres were obliged to carry out policies with which they did not agree. This reflects the contradiction between Mao and the cadres of the party of which the present crisis is only a culmination, reaching to the point of explosion.

Q: Can Chou Yang's opinions be considered as exemplary for most of the cadres in the cultural fields?

A: Yes, it seems as though Chou Yang's opinions reflect most of those of the rank and file. For example, the two other vice-ministers of culture, Sha Yeh and Lin Mo-han, as well as the secretary of the party group heading the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles, Yang Han-sheng, all shared the same opinions as Chou Yang.

Yang Han-sheng's opinions were even more radical than Chou's, however, and it was for this reason that he has been subjected to harsher criticism than many of the others.

Q: Could you give us some idea of Yang Han-sheng's opinions?

A: Yes, I can, but first I should give you a few details about his personal history. Yang Han-sheng was also a classmate of mine at Shanghai University in 1923-24. He was at that time a member of the party and was a very active participant in the revolutionary movement. After the defeat of the revolution in 1927, he remained in Shanghai and was active in the underground, and it was during this time that I had much contact with him and his wife. Beginning in 1928, he wrote several novels and afterwards became a very important party cadre in the cultural work of the party.

Because he remained loyal to certain traditions of the party during the second Chinese revolution, he disagreed with the many restrictions which Mao placed upon writers and artists and criticized them very harshly.

For example, in 1962, at a meeting of playwrights and actors in Canton, he said, "The party's policy on literature and art [that is, Mao's policy] is equal to ten ropes binding the hands and feet of writers. These ten ropes prove to be five obligations: (1) one must write about important subjects (2) one must write about heroes and outstanding figures (3) one must participate in collective writing (4) one must finish his work in a certain amount of time (5) one must always have the OK from the party leadership. From these five obligations arise five ventures: (1) to write about the contradictions among the people, especially between the masses and the leaders (2) to write any satirical dramas (3) to write any tragedies (4) to write about the defects and failures of a hero (5) to write about the weaknesses of any of the party's leaders. All of this leaves a writer in despair and makes it difficult for him to write, and even when he does write, his work is only repetitious."

In conclusion, he advocated that "it is necessary to do away with all restrictions and to break out of all limitations. We must respect the rule of cre-
activity, that is, freedom for the writers."*

Yang Han-sheng was severely attacked by the Maoists for the above opinions as well as for many other things. In 1957, Yang and Tien Han went to the USSR for the anniversary of the October Revolution. While they were there, they saw many plays such as "The Infinite Perspective" and the "Bluebird." These two dramas were exposures of the personal cult of Stalin and the purges of his opponents. They portrayed Stalin's rule to be "like that under the Tsars," and pointed out that "the USSR no longer needs the period of terror."

When Yang Han-sheng and Tien Han returned to China, Yang said that the actors of the USSR were very "bold": "we are very timid. We should make the utmost effort to reform, to be bold and creative."**

For these things, the Maoists accused Yang of being a "counterrevolutionary revisionist"; yet, in reality, he was only expressing agreement with the de-Stalinization taking place in the Soviet theater. It was this which Mao could not tolerate.

Q: Wu Han, Teng To and Tien Han are some of China's most famous writers who not only have been among the first to be attacked but also among those who have been the most severely attacked by the Maoists. Have they ever expressed their opinions on literature and art?

A: Wu Han, Teng To and Tien Han have, of course, differences with Mao's policies, but these have never been expressed openly as far as I know. They have, however, written plays and articles in which they have indirectly criticized Mao's policies and his personal cult and dictatorship. The two plays, Hai Jui Dismissed by Wu Han and Shi Yao Whan by Tien Han, which uses historical plots in order to criticize Mao and his policies are good examples.

Teng To also wrote many articles in which he indirectly attacked the policy of the people's communes as well as Mao's infallibility. But this was explained in your interview with Peng Shu-te, and so it is not necessary for me to repeat it. Here, I would only like to point out that even those who attacked Mao indirectly could not be tolerated by Mao.

Q: Were any of the leaders in the cultural fields, such as Chou Yang, against any of Mao's other policies?

A: Almost all of those who disagreed on questions of literature and art were also in disagreement with Mao's overall policy. Since the leaders and cadres working in the cultural fields have frequent contact with writers and artists working directly with the masses, they learn from them the feelings and aspirations of the masses.

For example, in a meeting held in Darien, August 1962, of writers from all over the country, the overwhelming majority of them expressed their dissatisfaction with and criticized the "great leap forward" policy and especially the people's communes, as well as Mao's policies on literature and art. They felt that "the life of the peasants is getting worse and worse," and "the general line is the psychology of an upstart." Similarly, "the Great Leap Forward is like a stimulus," and "the people's communes are adventurism." Chou Yang himself said, "The Great Leap Forward represents subjective idealism." Again, "the people's communes have been established too early." He even said, "It is good to let the peasants have their own plots," and he advocated "opening the free market" in the countryside.*

The criticisms of the "great leap forward" and the people's communes by Chou Yang and the other writers are echoes of the criticisms advanced by Peng Teh-huai in 1959. Therefore, in a meeting of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles in June 1964, Mao made an address in which he said that "in the past 15 years, these associations and most of their publications [a few said to be good] had for the most part failed... to carry out the policies of the party... and failed to reflect the socialist revolution and construction. In recent years, they had even verged on revisionism. If they did not take serious steps to re-mould themselves, sooner or later, they were bound to become organizations of the Hungarian Petöfi club type."**

From what Mao said, it is clear that he feared the intellectuals in the cultural fields and it is easy to understand why he began the cultural revolu-


**See the article entitled "Yang Han-sheng as a Propagandist of the Revisionist Literature and Art," published in the Worker's Daily, February 27, 1967. -- A.F.

*See above, Li Chi-kai in Wenxiu Mao.

-- A.F.

**Yao Wen-yuan, "On the Counterrevolutionary Double-dealer Chou Yang." -- A.F.
tion and a purge of all those who opposed
him. Mao feared an actual development
such as the Hungarian revolution of 1956
in China itself, started by similar
groups as the Petofi Club and it is for
this reason that he began his purge by
singling out these cadres in the fields
of literature and art.

Q: Why is it that many of the fa-
mous educators such as Lu Ping, presi-
dent of Peking University, Li Ta, presi-
dent of Wu Han University, Huang Ya-ming, presi-
dent of Nanking University, etc., have
been purged? Did they have differences,
and possibly refused to carry out Mao's
policies in education?

A: These educators were against
Mao's policies on education. But this is
a complicated and difficult question. It
would make it much clearer if I would
first outline Mao's attitude toward edu-
cation.

Since the CCP took power in 1949,
Mao has based his educational policies on
the principle that "education must serve
politics." Mao often stressed the idea
that "students and professors should re-
mould their thought." Ma compelled the
students to attend political lectures and
to participate in political discussions
and physical work. In other words, his
policy was to make Communists out of all
the students and to get them to accept
and support the party's policies. The
learning of other subjects, Mao does not
regard as being important; or, at best,
it is only a secondary consideration. Be-
cause of such policies, the standards of
education have greatly diminished.

In the "great leap forward" pro-
gram of 1958, Mao put forward the idea
of an "educational revolution." He
stressed the idea that "education must be
accompanied by productive work." Under
this slogan, the professors as well as
the students were sent to the countryside
to participate in the work of the peo-
ple's communes, while others were sent
to work in the factories, still carrying on
their political studies and activities.
These conditions led to almost a stand-
still in the students' regular studies.
This was the situation in 1958-59.

Mao's policies and their results
aroused much dissatisfaction among the
professors, teachers and students. For
example, Li Ta said, "The Educational
Revolution has destroyed the educational
process. The fundamental courses have
been torn asunder. The quality of edu-
cation has been lowered, the methods of
teaching and studying have been disor-
ganized. All the schools controlled by
the party have become anarchic. The relations
between teachers and students, between
the young and old and between the masses
and the party have worsened to the great-
est degree."

He also said, "The Educational
Revolution in 1958 caused a very bad situ-
ation. It destroyed the activities of the
intellectuals and hampered their self-
respect."*

The crisis described by Li Ta rep-
resents the common opinion of the over-
whelming majority of educators, profes-
sors, teachers and students.

Li Ta was one of the founding mem-
ers of the CCP and was one of the twelve
who attended the founding congress in
1921. He was elected to the Central Com-
mittee of the party and became the head
of the Central Committee's Propaganda De-
partment. Sometime afterward, he left the
party because he disagreed with the deci-
sion that the members of the CCP should
join the Kuomintang, although he remained
a Marxist.

He translated many Marxist books
and propagated the ideas of Marxism in
many of his own articles. It is evident
that he helped the Marxist movement when
he was outside the party.

Since he was a professor and had
studied education from a Marxist point of
view, including the educational system in
the USSR, he became very well known as a
Marxist educator. This was why the CCP,
after taking power, appointed him as the
president of Wu Han University.

It was because of his profound
knowledge as an educator that he realized
the dangers of Mao's educational policies
and criticized them very severely.

Mao's policy of "educational revo-
lation" met with bankruptcy following the
failure of the "great leap forward." At
the beginning of 1960, Mao was no longer
able to maintain his policies and so he
temporarily sat back while Liu Shao-chi
and Teng Hsiao-ping took on the responsi-
bility of dealing with the situation.

Educational policies, then, were
somewhat changed and corrected. First of
all, the Central Educational Department
published the "Sixty Points of Higher Edu-
cational Reforms." The chief reforms were
aimed at encouraging the students to
study in their special fields and to make
sure that they had the necessary time to
do so. The students were supposed to par-
ticipate in physical work and political
activities; however, these things were
not supposed to interfere with or be done
during the time set aside for study and
class. A regular system of teaching and
studying was to be reestablished as well

*See Ming Pao magazine, No. 12, 1966,
p. 37. -- A.F.
as a disciplined relationship between the students and professors. In order to raise the quality of education, examinations were also to be reinstituted. Many of the students were to be encouraged to take up studies in the scientific fields as well as foreign languages. The schools were no longer supposed to interfere in the love life of the students, nor were they supposed to apply any other inappropriate pressures. Attention was also to be brought to the health of the students and to their welfare in general.

The Peking municipal government, headed by Feng Chen, carried out these new reforms very enthusiastically and elaborated a series of concrete measures to implement them. For example, it was stated that "students and teachers should not be demanded to learn politics too quickly, nor should any time be taken away from their regular studies for political activities. The teachers must know and teach their subjects as well as possible and the students must learn their lessons as well as they can. The use of abstract political ideas and terms, the empty preaching and the long political reports must be avoided."

The president of Peking University, Lu Ping, from 1961 completely abandoned the "educational revolution" policy and turned the university into an experiment for the new education reforms. He lowered the amount of time required for physical labor and political activity and made sure the students had adequate time to study their particular subjects. Hence the students of Peking University were much better off from 1961 to 1962.

Lu Ping also advanced the slogan, "Learn from the USSR," that is, China should also try to copy some of the educational policies in some of the Western countries; and he advocated inviting the old professors who had been expelled in the past years to return to their teaching posts.

Li Ta, Kuang Ya-ming and many of the other educators carried out similar reforms. Thus the universities and colleges succeeded in returning to normal and constructive educational practices.

This educational reform, in the eyes of Mao Tse-tung was an absolute negation of his own policies of "education serving politics" and "education combined with productive labor," and he considered it to be a "revisionist educational line" or the "restoration of bourgeois educational policies." With this he deliberately prepared to purge those who were responsible for these reforms.

On June 13, 1966, Mao published a notice in the name of the Central Com-
mittee of the CCF and the State Council. This document is a concrete manifestation of the purge in the educational field and contains two major points:

(1) All universities and middle schools were ordered closed for six months in order to "carry out thoroughly the cultural revolution." In reality, this meant to "carry out thoroughly" a purge in all the universities and middle schools. Following publication of the notice, there was a furious struggle and all Mao's opponents in the universities and middle schools came under attack and were purged.

(2) Almost all opponents were attacked by the students as they carried out Mao's orders, resulting in the purge of such people as Lu Ping, Li Ta, Kuang Ya-ming, Peng Kang, president of the University of Communications in Sian, Ho Lu-ting, president of the Museum College in Shang-hai, and Chiang Lan-tsin, president of Tsing-hua University in Peking. As for the professors, the purge is difficult to estimate; however, from all reports, it seems as though the number would run into many thousands.

The People's Daily held that the most important question was to see "whether we shall pass on Mao Tse-tung's thought from generation to generation." This is comparable to the religious attitude towards the Bible, and Mao's "cultural revolutionary educational" reforms come close to paralleling the educational methods of the Catholic Church during the Middle Ages.

Q: What, in your opinion, will be the outcome of the "cultural revolution"? That is, what do you think will be the overall influence and effect of Mao's "cultural revolution" on Chinese culture?

A: Mao's purge has included almost all those cadres working in the Central Propaganda Department, the Central Cultural Ministry in the All-China Foundation of Literature and Art Circles, the All-China Union of Stage Artists, National Federation of Film Workers and the National Federation of News Workers as well as writers, musicians, painters, educators, professors, etc., who are the embodiment of Chinese culture. To purge them means to destroy China's culture. I will only point out here two indisputable examples of what Mao's "cultural revolution" means concretely to Chinese culture.

(1) Since Mao launched the "cultural revolution" in May 1966, most writers have not dared to write anything. The publication of most cultural magazines has stopped, film-making has almost come to a standstill; the publication and republication of many books of foreign origin and even many by Chinese authors has been
terminated; many cinemas and theaters have ceased to operate. In other words, almost all cultural activities no longer exist.

(2) Since all the middle schools and universities were closed in June 1966, not one university has reopened and it was only last March that a part of the middle schools began to reopen in such places as Peking and Tiensing. Even before the "cultural revolution" and Mao's purge, there was a great lack of teachers and professors; now, of course, there are even fewer.

The worst part is that from the elementary schools to the universities there is a chronic shortage of textbooks, since almost the whole printing establishment has been given over to printing the works of Mao Tse-tung. For example, in the last half year, fifteen million Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung have been produced, each containing four large volumes, as well as eighty million Quotations from Mao Tse-tung. In addition to this, another eighty million copies of the Selected Works have been scheduled for publication this year. Nearly all other books, therefore, such as textbooks, literature and even the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin have ceased to be printed.

Generally, then, I can say that not only have cultural activities stagnated since Mao launched his "cultural revolution," China's culture is being destroyed to the point of disaster.

Finally, I would like to say that the "proletarian cultural revolution" is theoretically absurd. When the proletariat takes power in a country, its greatest task is to overthrow the remaining capitalists in the world and complete the socialist revolution. Before the world capitalist class has been destroyed, it is impossible to construct a real proletarian culture. However, after the world socialist revolution has been completed, the proletariat itself will begin to disappear; that is, classes and, of course, class antagonisms will begin to disappear. It is at this point, then, that socialist culture will begin naturally to establish itself. Therefore, it is in no way necessary to establish a proletarian culture.

Mao's launching of the "cultural revolution" is not only theoretically absurd, it is also foolish from a practical point of view. The socio-economic base in China is so backward that there are many areas which remain in a state of primitive production. As for culture, the majority of the peasantry remain illiterate along with almost half the working class. If under these conditions, to launch a "proletarian cultural revolution" in order to establish "four new" -- new culture, new ideas, new habits and new customs -- does not display ignorance, then it reveals illusionary and foolish idealism.

If Mao really intended to raise the cultural level of the workers and peasants, he should have started by eliminating the illiteracy of the masses. In order to achieve this, it would, first of all, be necessary to increase the standard of living of the masses, that is, increase their pay and decrease their hours of work. It would be necessary to let them have time and energy to study and to participate in cultural activities.

Mao's policy is, however, just the contrary, demanding that the workers and peasants work longer hours with no improvement in their living standards. Mao's recent campaign against "economism" and his refusal to grant any concessions to the working class show his attitude quite clearly; that is, the working class should serve only as instruments of production in the interests of the bureaucracy.

In reality it can be said that Mao utilized the label of "proletarian," only in order to rationalize his attack and to purge his opposition under the accusation of "taking the capitalist road." However, we can see that Mao has not attacked the real capitalist and bourgeois elements still existing in China. This in itself is enough to prove that Mao's "proletarian cultural revolution" is nothing more than a purge which he is carrying out in order to maintain his own bureaucratic rule and personal cult.
WHAT OUR POSITION SHOULD BE ON THE FRACTIONAL STRUGGLE INSIDE THE CCP

By Peng Shu-chi

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In November 1965, when Mao Tse-tung launched the so-called Great Cultural Revolution, a tremendous struggle broke out between two major factions represented by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. During the subsequent two years, this struggle has intensified and made itself felt in every fiber of Chinese society. Not only the party and its youth, but also the trade unions and the government at all levels have been thrown into the greatest confusion. Deep going divisions have even developed in the People's Liberation Army. Bloody clashes have taken place throughout China, and the country as a whole still remains today under the threatening clouds of this great political storm.

In the last two years the International has not only found itself without any common position with which to intervene in the Chinese events, but also in a state of confusion and with serious conflicting political positions. To clarify this confusion in order to arrive at a correct and common position, let me first enumerate the three major political differences which have developed.

1. Comrade George Novack in his article, "The Political Crisis in China," (International Socialist Review, Fall 1966) after analyzing the Chinese events, stated in the name of the SWP:

   At the same time we have a responsibility to the revolutionary Communists, intellectuals, students and youth in China who are being unjustly victimized and slandered for demanding more freedom of thought and expression and the rectification of errors committed by the present leadership. We are on their side in the struggle for greater democracy and a more correct course. (p. 144)

2. The statement on the Chinese events adopted by the IEC plenum, March 1967, stated:

   But the information is not sufficiently clear to permit the International to identify itself with any of the tendencies or factions in the Chinese CP now contending with each other. (World Outlook, May 19, 1967, p. 523.)

3. The Argentinian comrades in their statement on the March 1967 IEC discussion resolution stated:

   The Maoist bonapartism has played, by launching the cultural revolution, a progressive role, leaving aside all its grotesque, bureaucratic aspects, because it initiated a mass mobilization against bureaucracy, which has its own dynamic, despite the bonapartist plans of Mao-Lin Piao.

   That this mobilization has to be supported, conditionally to make its anti-bureaucratic motive more precise and to criticize its terrible Maoist limitations, leadership and ideology;

   That this critical support must not limit our active intervention in the mobilization which provoked the cultural revolution, because only this intervention, united to that of the masses, will prove to be able to overcome in the facts the Maoist leadership; (Internal Bulletin of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, Vol. 1967 No. 7, Oct. 1967. International Discussion Bulletin on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, No. 4)

   These three positions are quite clearly in contradiction with each other, especially numbers 1 and 3. The task we are faced with now is to decide which of these interpretations conforms closest to the actual development of the Chinese events, in order that we might adopt it as a common basis for the International's work. To make this decision, we must begin by examining and analyzing each of the above interpretations.

   Siding with those who are unjustly victimized

   Comrade Novack's article, quoted above, was originally given as a speech on July 1, 1966; that is, over one year ago. At that time there was much less information available on the Chinese events than now. Nevertheless, even then Comrade Novack was able to say:

   From the accusations against the dissident intellectuals and other sources, it is possible to discern the vague contours of their criticism and the trend of their thinking.

   1. They doubt the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung.

   2. They claim to be better Communists than the present leaders.
3. They display 'sympathy' for the Khrushchev revisionists; that is, they want to unite the 'socialist countries' in face of a possible attack by the United States, heal the breach, and renew the Russian alliance.

4. They have criticized the excesses of the 'Great Leap Forward' and such wasteful efforts as attempting to produce steel in backyard furnaces.

5. They seek changes in economic, policy and agrarian reforms.

6. They demand more intellectual liberty, freedom of expression and the right to dissent from the official line.

7. They may even have dared to suggest that Mao step down on grounds of health or age.

Taken together, these positions would constitute a serious oppositional program.... (p. 142)

The tumultuous events of the last year have proven, in general, the correctness of these points as well as Comrade Novack's view of their seriousness. These events have also proven correct Comrade Novack's insight that "The publicly assailed writers, experts and scholars may be surrogates for the real targets in the commanding heights of the party and the army, embracing those dissidents who are discontented with the results of the foreign and domestic policy in recent years...." The events have certainly shown that Wu Han, Teng To, Liao Mo-sha, Tien Han and others were the surrogates for the real targets in the commanding heights of the party and army, such as, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Lu Ting-yi and others.

How is it that Comrade Novack was so accurate in his analysis? In my opinion, such accuracy was not accidental. Nor was it an accident that Comrade Novack's conclusion was similar to that of the Chinese section's, even though there was no collaboration between them. Comrade Novack as well as the Chinese section merely considered the objective facts and applied to them the method of Marxism.

Neutralism

The body of the March 1967 IEC discussion resolution was taken from the draft prepared by Comrade Livio Maitan, and was published with corrections by the United Secretariat nine months after Comrade Novack's article. During that nine months, the struggle between Mao's and Liu's factions escalated to new heights, and the basis of the conflict became increasingly clear, especially from the information in the wall posters and articles published by the Maoists attacking their opponents. Nevertheless, the IEC document still maintained that the information was "not sufficiently clear." This would tend to show that either the author of the document was prejudiced or he had not grasped the essence of what was taking place.

Immediately following the above quote, the IEC document tries to justify its position of neutrality in the following way:

The lack of information is largely due to the Stalinist methods employed by the Mao faction against its opponents, which we energetically condemn. As for Mao's opponents, such as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, who held and who still hold considerable means of making known their political line had they so desired, their silence on this subject compels us to be relatively cautious concerning the contents of their policies.

This justification is misleading in two ways:

1. In October 1966 during a working meeting of the central committee of the CCP, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were subjected to serious attacks by the Maoists and were forced to make self-criticism. Since then, not only have they lost all "means of making known their political line," but also, they have been held in the custody of their residences under close supervision. Under these conditions, one can easily understand that they have no possibility, whatsoever, to put forward their political line nor to answer the many attacks and slanders leveled at them by the Maoists. If the IEC document's condemnation of Liu's and Teng's silence is not iron, then it can only reflect an absurd ignorance of the Chinese events.

2. We should of course, "energetically condemn" "the Stalinist methods employed by the Mao faction against its opponents." But this does not mean there is insufficient information. We should also examine and analyze the attacks of the Maoists in order to determine the contents of their "(Liu's and Teng's) policies." This has been a traditional procedure in the Trotskyist movement when examining a struggle inside a Stalinist party since the days when Trotsky himself used it in making his analysis of the events inside the Soviet Union. But nowhere in the IEC document does one find even an attempt at such an analysis.

It seems the idea of the IEC document
is to put off taking a position before Liu and Teng have formally put forth their position. If this is the case, then it will be necessary to wait until Liu and Teng have captured power and the struggle is ended. But as Marxists, it is our obligation to intervene in the present struggle in order to help determine its actual outcome. Therefore, examine the Maoist attacks and accusations. For example, let us consider the following points:

1. The fundamental difference between Mao and Liu developed in 1958, when Mao arbitrarily instituted and carried out the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policies. Comrade Novack noted in his article cited above, the difference on these policies. I myself, noted it more concretely in my interviews with Comrade Antonio Farien, especially the last one, "The Relationship and Differences Between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi"—submitted to World Outlook last August—in which I gave an accounting in some detail of this as well as the other major differences. (See W.O., August 12, 1966, and Feb. 10, 1967) The development of the events over the past six months has more than confirmed this judgment.

Mao's attack against Wu Han's drama, Hai Jui Dismissed which began the Cultural Revolution, was not by accident. Wu Han's drama of Hai Jui was really about Peng Teh-huai who Mao had purged in August 1959 at the Lushan Meeting for opposing the Great Leap Forward and especially the People's Communes. Because of his opposition, Peng Teh-huai became a symbol for all those who were opposed to Mao's policies.

Here we must note the position taken by Liu Shao-chi during and after the Lushan Meeting. The Red Guard newspaper, Red Guards in the Capital had this to say about Liu Shao-chi:

At a meeting called by the central committee, which was attended by 78 cadres in January 1962, he made a revisionist report. He violently attacked the Three Red Banners (The Three Red Banners are: 1. General Line, 2. Great Leap Forward, and 3. Peoples Communes), and exaggerated to the utmost errors and mistakes in our work. He felt that the temporary economic difficulties were due to these errors and mistakes—"70% due to artificial disasters". He attacked the 1959 struggle against the Rightist (Peng Teh-huai) as being excessive, and even said, in an attempt to rehabilitate the Rightists, that the struggle itself was a mistake. He maliciously said that the party lacks democracy and that party life is a 'brutal struggle' and a 'pitiless fight', attacking Chairman Mao's correct leadership of the central committee. (Feb. 22, 1967—"The Crimes of Liu Shao-chi")

This shows that Liu was not only against Mao's policies, but he was also for the rehabilitation of Peng Teh-huai and his followers and for more democratic measures in the party.

The People's Daily and Red Flag in August 1967 (see Peking Review, No. 54, 1967), published excerpts from a resolution on Peng Teh-huai's case adopted at the Lushan Meeting in 1959. This resolution condemned Peng Teh-huai for branding the Great Leap Forward and Peoples Communes policies as adventurism and "petty bourgeois fanaticism". These words clearly reveal Peng Teh-huai's position.

More important is the People's Daily editorial of August 16, 1967, which stated:

It was this person (Liu Shao-chi) who at the Lushan Meeting put his utmost efforts into a counterrevolutionary double dealing tactic, and actively backed Peng Teh-huai's anti-party activities.... After the Lushan Meeting he came out into the open, slandering the general line as having been put forward blindly, the Great Leap Forward as being 'brought about in a rush' causing 'disproportions in the economy', alleging that the 'people's communes were set up too early', and 'there is danger of disintegration.' He even made the absurd assertion that 'the Lushan Meeting made a mistake' and that 'it was wrong to oppose Right opportunism.' (Peking Review, No. 55, 1967, p. 7)

If the above ideas expressed by Liu Shao-chi are not completely correct, they are, nonetheless, progressive and reflect the moods of the worker and peasant masses in China as well as the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the CCP's cadres.

2. De-Stalinization and opposition to Mao's own cult and personal dictatorship are the most uncompromising questions dividing the Mao-Lin and Liu-Peng factions.

During the discussion at the 8th Congress of the CCP in September 1956 on Khrushchev's 20th Congress speech in which he denounced Stalin's personal cult and some of his crimes, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and many other
leaders voiced their agreement with Khrushchev's actions. It was for this reason that the 8th Congress acting on the initiative of Liu Shao-chi (see the Red Guard newspaper, Chinkengshan, "See the Ugly Face of Liu Shao-chi," reprinted in Ming Bao, Jan. 18, 19, 1967) changed the CCP's statutes by omitting all references to Mao Tse-tung's thought. Teng Hsiao-ping gave the report motivating the change of the statutes in which he stated:

The significance of opposing the personal cult was explained energetically at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This will make a great impression on every communist party throughout the world. "The important contribution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU is to inform us that regarding a person as a god has led to very criminal results." "The personal cult is an old, historical, and social phenomenon, and it is to a certain degree reflected in the life of our party and society. Our task is to carry out successfully, consistently, and with determination the directives of the central committee against individual prominence and personal glorification. (See Red Guard newspaper, The Red Flag Battle, "Teng Hsiao-ping is One of People in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road", reprinted in Ming Bao, Jan. 21, 1967)

The above is a reflection of the atmosphere inside the CCP on the question of de-Stalinization. Under the pressure of this atmosphere, Mao was forced to tolerate the de-Stalinization measures even though they meant severe personal blows. Nevertheless, it is clear from the history since the 8th Congress that Mao never accepted the de-Stalinization measures. He held Liu and Teng responsible for his personal loss and took every opportunity to retaliate against them and regain his old prestige. It is for this major reason that Mao's Cultural Revolution has singled out Liu and Teng as the major enemies, and exulted Mao's cult to unbelievable heights.

3. Mao's policies in the literature, art and educational fields are comparable to, if not stricter than, those put into practice in the Soviet Union by Zhdanov. Hence criticism continually arose among the cultural and educational workers. Often there were sharp antagonisms between Mao and leaders in the cultural and educational fields, and these antagonisms are the origin of Mao's accusation that these people were the Chinese version of the Hungarian "Petoji circles."

Basing herself on many reliable and varied sources, Chen Pi-lan in an inter-

view has described in some detail a few of the most important struggles that have taken place on the questions related to literature, art, and education. (See W.O., July 14, 1967) I will not repeat here the rich and pertinent information contained in this interview, but will draw to the comrades' attention one important fact. In his political report to the 8th Congress of the CCP, Liu Shao-chi emphasized the point that the party should not interfere arbitrarily in the work of the scientists or artists. On the basis of Liu's report, the Congress adopted a resolution which stated:

In order to assure the prosperity of the sciences and arts, we must firmly insist on the perspectives of "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom and a Hundred Schools Contend" policy. It would be a mistake to use administrative methods to interfere arbitrarily in the sciences and arts.

The above shows that the ideas of Liu on the questions of literature, art and education are much different than those of Mao. Because of Liu's more tolerant position on these questions, most of the cadres in the cultural, educational, and scientific fields have sided with him against Mao. It was for this reason that Mao singled out the leading cadres in the cultural and educational fields as the first targets of attack in his Cultural Revolution.

4. Although there is much less information concerning the differences of foreign policy, one can generally agree with Comrade Novack's observation that "they (the opposition) want to unite the 'socialist countries' in face of possible attack by the United States, heal the breach and renew the Russian alliance." This has been confirmed by the exposure of the ideas of Lo Jui-ching, the ex-chief of staff of the army. From the military point of view, Lo opposed the break with the Soviet Union.

After launching the Cultural Revolution, Mao pushed China's relations with the Soviet Union to the point just short of a complete break. At the same time he made clear his point of refusing to unite with other "socialist countries," especially the Soviet Union, for the defense of Vietnam against US imperialism. This shows, if only in the negative, that differences exist between Mao and Liu on foreign policy, especially in regards to the Soviet Union.

5. It seemed that the Shanghai events raised even new differences between Mao's and Liu's factions, mainly the question of the people's living standards. Yet
this difference has existed for a long time.

Soon after the CCP took power, Mao put forward a program to build socialism by appealing to the revolutionary spirit of the masses in the name of his thought. Hence, he created the atmosphere of sacrifice, severely limiting the improvement of the masses' standard of living. Liu, on the other hand, felt it was impossible to build socialism by not improving the living standards of the masses, that is, to ask the masses to sacrifice without compensation. Therefore, Liu emphasized, as well, in his political report to the 8th Congress, the necessity of improving the living standards of the people. And in the same resolution based on Liu's report cited above, we find the following:

If the state takes for itself too large a proportion of the national income and does not pay proper attention to improving the people's living standards not to their interests and personal needs, then harm will be done to raising the productivity of labor and to the activity of the masses in building socialism, i.e., harm to the interests of socialism.

From Mao's point of view, to improve the living standards of the people, is to promote material incentives, which is for him the revisionist road. Mao arbitrarily instituted the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes policies in order to exploit to the utmost the labor of the masses; they were forced to work longer hours than before for less pay. The dissatisfaction and resentment this produced among the masses is still a major factor in Chinese life, and it was around these very feelings that the opposition to Mao was able to organize the masses to defend themselves from the attacks of Mao's Red Guards. By giving concessions to the workers and peasants such as increasing wages and other benefits, the opposition induced the workers and peasants to resist and even strike against Mao's policies. This culminated with the massive strikes last January (1967) in Shanghai, Nanking, Nanchang, Canton and many other places. After Mao took the power in Shanghai with the army and put down the strikes, he withdrew all the concessions and accused the opposition of corrupting the masses, i.e., "economism" and "revisionism". Since these events the question of the people's living standards has become a major difference between the two contending factions.

The above five points are thoroughly documented in the many Maoist articles attacking Liu, Teng, and other important figures in the Opposition. If these five points together with Comrade Novack's seven points noted above and others outlined in my interviews are not enough to "constitute a serious oppositional program," they do show that the opposition represented by Liu and Teng is a reformist tendency within the CCP which reflects more or less the aspirations of the masses and is, therefore, progressive.

The IEC document did not examine or analyze the difference between the two factions. We must ask why? The main reason is the failure of the author to employ the Marxist method. On this point the Argentinian comrades have correctly criticized the IEC document in their "Statement on the March 1967 IEC Resolution." They stated:

That this resolution contains omissions and dangerous methodological errors,...it does not say that all interbureaucratic differences, when they receive such a dramatic and grievous character, reflect in themselves deep class pressures and not the other way around; that merely political or tactical inner bureaucratic differences receive afterwards a class character;

In the IEC document the method of Marxism was abandoned for that of impressionism. The struggle was only superficially analyzed, hence, the assertion that it was only an "interbureaucratic conflict." (see Comrade Maitan's article, "Stormy Internal Conflicts in China -- 1," W.O., Oct. 7, 1966) With this abstract formula -- "interbureaucratic conflict" -- one is not obliged to analyze the differences separating the contending factions nor the social origins of those differences. This abstract formula presupposes that the two factions are essentially the same and therefore demands a position of neutralism, i.e., no support for either side. This was the theme of the United Secretariat's statement of November 1966.

Although the IEC document (March 1967) dropped all mention of the "interbureaucratic conflict" formula, it proceeded along the very same lines as those of the U.S. statement of November. Describing different phases of the development of the Chinese events the IEC document never mentions what the struggle is about nor the different political positions involved.

The IEC's analysis is not only superficial, but in several places it distorts the facts. For example, it gives credit to the Maoists for having initiated the Shanghai strikes. It then states that the
Maoists split in face of the strikes over the question of giving concessions to the masses. This idea was developed by both Comrades Livio Maitan and Pierre Frank in several articles. (See W.O., March 10, 1967 and August 29, 1967) Comrade Maitan states in one of his articles:

...the Shanghai leadership has been Mao's main support when the crisis was touched off and...the city committee of the party decided unanimously to publish the famous article against Wu Han.

The fact is that the Shanghai leadership were not "Mao's main support." Their position can be described as neutrality. When Mao ordered Yao Wen-yuan's article attacking Wu Han's drama to be published in Wenhu Bao and Jiefang Ribao, the Shanghai leadership did not consider the matter that important, since it only involved the criticism of one individual. Therefore, they did not oppose Mao's order. However, the serious development of the events following Wu Han's disgrace, especially the dismissal of the entire Peking Municipal leadership and the Red Guards attacks on many high ranking officials of the party as well as on local party committees throughout the country, forced the Shanghai committee to adopt certain measures in order to protect themselves. Hence they began to organize the masses and to give them concessions. This resistance on the part of the Shanghai leadership forced Mao to utilize the loyalty of the army to suppress the strikes of the workers. Almost the entire leadership of the Shanghai Municipal party committee as well as the leading cadres of the party in the unions, factories, and other economic institutions, along with the editors and staffs of Wenhu Bao and Jiefang Ribao, were subsequently purged. The concessions which had been given to the workers were then rescinded by the Maoists. All of this resulted in an economic paralysis, which prompted Chou En-lai to criticize the exclusion of all the original cadres from the new leading committees. An alliance between the army, the Red Guards, and certain original cadres -- the "triple alliance" -- was then put forward as the correct means of constituting the new leading bodies and carrying out the Cultural Revolution.

When the Cultural Revolution was launched, many regional, provincial, and local leaderships took a neutral or wait and see attitude. It was not until the struggle had developed to the stage where their own positions were threatened, that they began to take a definite position of resisting Mao. The Shanghai leadership is a good example as well as the provincial leaderships in Kwangtung and Hubei.

Many of the army leaders also took a neutralist position at the beginning. For example, Chen Tsai-tao, the commander in Wuhan, after witnessing the severe and slanderous attacks against people like Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Tao Chu etc., and after seeing the Red Guard attacks in Wuhan, changed his original position of neutrality to that of resisting the attacks by the Red Guards and Maoists.

It is unfortunate that the authors of the IEC document did not take such important information into consideration.

Critical Support to the Cultural Revolution

The demand by the Argentinian comrades to give critical support to Mao's Cultural Revolution, is in reality, a demand that we support Mao's purge of the Liu-Teng faction. The "16 Points" resolution adopted by the 11th plenum of the C.C.'s central committee on August 8, 1966, pointed out that the main object of the Cultural Revolution was to "struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road." The subsequent events have clearly shown that this meant the purge of the leaders in Liu's faction, such as Liu himself, Teng Hsia-ping, Tao Chu, Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Lo Jui-ching, as well as many regional and provincial leaders, such as the first secretary of the North bureau Li Hsueh-feng, the first secretary of the North bureau Liu Lan-tao, the first secretary of the Shanghai Municipal committee Chen Pai-chia, the Mayor of Shanghai Tsao Ti-chiu, and almost all the leaders in the provincial committees of Kiangsi, Shansi, Heilungkiang, Shantung, Chingsai, and Kweichow.

The only reason the Argentinian comrades give to justify their demand for critical support to Mao's Cultural Revolution is the following:

--The Maoist bonapartism has played, by launching the cultural revolution, a progressive role, leaving aside all its grotesque, bureaucratical aspects, because it initiated a mass mobilization against bureaucracy..." (emphasis added)
The argument was advanced much earlier by Comrade Frank in his article on the Shanghai events in which he said:

...we cannot at all condemn an appeal to the masses against a bureaucratized party and apparatus...along the lines of equalitarian demands, even if this appeal originates from a wing of the bureaucracy.... We already noted the possibility that certain appeals of the Maoists along the lines of equalitarian demands, even if they were demagogic, would not fail to have consequences. (W.O. March 10, 1967)

If the Maoists actually appealed "to the masses against a bureaucratized party and apparatus...along the lines of equalitarian demands," then one must admit that such appeals are progressive, and therefore, we should give critical support to those who voice them, i.e. the Maoists.

The opinion clearly stated by Comrade Frank above was also one of the themes of the statement issued by the United Secretariat in November 1966. I already made a short criticism of that statement in a letter to the March 1966 IEC plenum in which I stated:

Moreover, if the ideas expressed in the statement that the struggle is only an 'interbureaucratic struggle' and that Mao faction has appealed to the masses against bureaucracy using equalitarian slogans, are really considered to be true, then it is necessary to ask why the statement did not give critical support to Mao's faction rather than take a neutralist position? Why did the statement hold back from adopting clearly the logical conclusion of the ideas it put forward?

The Secretariat's statement did not say that we should give critical support to Mao's Cultural Revolution, nevertheless, the ideas it expressed definitely imply that we should or, at least, lead to that position, and now the Argentinians are only logically demanding that we adopt it.

The fundamental analysis advanced by the Argentinian comrades is essentially the same as Healy's group and not much different from Swabeck's or Huberman's and Sweezy's of Monthly Review. They too, started from the assumption that Mao organized the student masses to fight bureaucracy. This assumption, however, raises two very important questions: How were the Red Guards organized and what means were employed in the fight against bureaucracy? These two aspects were dealt with by Comrades Novack and Hansen in their answer to Monthly Review:

Schools were shut down and millions of youth were turned loose. They were then offered a special privilege that would be attractive even in a wealthy capitalist country; namely, taking a trip at government expense to Peking. Transportation, free lodging and free meals were provided to a large proportion of these prospective candidates for the new organization.

The policy was to line up these youth on the side of one of the contending factions by such means and inveigle them into adopting its factional platform without being informed of what was intended, without giving the opposition currents an opportunity to present their views in a fair debate, and, in fact, with the opposition smeared and branded from the beginning without a hearing as disloyal and even counterrevolutionary, a 'miserable handful' of monsters, demons, and ghosts.

The real 'crime' of the accused leaders is not that they have been plotting to bring back capitalism but that they have serious differences with the Mao-Lin faction. Their views are falsified to discredit them in the eyes of the masses and to destroy them politically, if not physically.

These polemical methods which Mao and his men learned in the school of Stalinism, first applied against the Trotskyists... There are no innovations in the pattern beyond peculiarities of style in applying it and even these are not very novel. (See the pamphlet Behind China's "Great Cultural Revolution," Merit Publishers, pp. 47-48 and 52.)

This explains very well how "Maoist Bonapartism...initiated mass mobilization against bureaucracy" and the methods that were used. If the Argentinian comrades have come to the conclusion that Mao's actions have been progressive, then, they are on the same path which has already been blazed by Monthly Review, Healy, and Swabeck.

The Argentinian comrades made a valuable contribution to the discussion when they criticized the IEO's "dangerous methodological errors." However, they themselves have failed to utilize the methodological procedures which they advocated. They failed to mention let alone describe and prove what "class pressures" are reflected by either the Mao-Lin faction or the Liu-Teng faction. It is only implied that the Liu-Teng faction represents the hardened bureaucratic elements who have been purged by the Maoists, the more progressive elements among the bureaucracy, and therefore, we are asked to give critical support to Mao. If the
Argentinian comrades continue to insist on their position, using such methods and taking such a light minded attitude, then, one cannot seriously discuss with them, and can only express regret.

Political Revolution and Neutralism

The second paragraph in the IEC document of March 1967 reads:

In the course of the violent struggle which resulted from this crisis of leadership, and in particular due to the forms taken by the "Great Cultural Revolution" the party, state, trade union, youth apparatuses, etc., were upset from top to bottom. For the same reasons, the relationships among the leaders, the apparatuses, and the masses also underwent fundamental changes. For the first time since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the masses, and in particular the proletarian masses of the large cities, were mobilized in a process the logical culmination of which is an antibureaucratic political revolution.

This description and perspective of the Chinese events should be emphasized, especially the perspective of the "antibureaucratic political revolution." This is the first time since reunification that the International has formally taken a position in favor of political revolution in China. However, the IEC document in no way showed why political revolution was necessary. It did not characterize the CCP as a Stalinist party nor its regime as a bureaucratic dictatorship. If one does not illustrate these two points, then he has no theoretical basis for a demand of political revolution.

In the International there are several differing opinions as to the nature of the CCP and its regime. As far as I know, however, only the SWP and the Chinese section have extensively discussed the Chinese question and adopted a definite position — for political revolution. (see the SWP resolution, The Third Chinese Revolution and Its Aftermath, Discussion Bulletin A-31, Oct. 1955; and On the Nature of the Chinese Communist Party and its Regime — Political Revolution or Democratic Reform? by S.T. Peng, SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 4, March 1961.) It seems as though the overwhelming majority of the other sections in the International have yet to seriously discuss and adopt a definite position.

The majority of the leading comrades in the International following the 1949 Chinese revolution, took the position that with the capture of power by the CCP it was no longer a Stalinist party, and the subsequent government established by it was not a bureaucratic dictatorship. This analysis, of course, ruled out any need for a political revolution. Now the IEC document puts forth the perspective of an "antibureaucratic political revolution." Therefore, if the nature of the CCP and its regime are not clarified in the present discussion, it is inevitable that only confusion and new contradictions will develop.

In addition and even more important, the IEC document put forth the perspective of political revolution without mentioning the social basis of the two contending factions. The lack of such an analysis cannot direct the masses onto the road of political revolution, but on the contrary, only confuse them and objectively help the more reactionary elements — the Maoists.

What does the neutralism actually mean? In essence, it means that it is not necessary to intervene in the present struggle. In other words, it is not necessary to give critical support to one side against the other. In the light of such tumultuous and historical events which are taking place in China today, neutralism that is, standing by and regarding the events as a spectator — can only be described as the most irresponsible position for revolutionaries. And any objection to the effect that we are not interested in the struggle between Mao's and Liu's factions, but rather interested in directing the masses onto the road of political revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy as a whole, can only reflect either an ignorance of Marxism or a manifestation of sectarianism. It is not the nature of any mass movement to realize at the outset the nature of a bureaucratic regime and the necessity of a political revolution. Such a realization comes only through direct experiences. At the present the masses in China are only coming to realize which of the two contending factions is more in tune with their own interests.

The masses, at first, always support the reformist tendencies, and it is only after they have gone through certain experiences with them, will they realize that even the reformists are unable to solve the urgent problems at hand. In other words, the masses in China will come to realize the necessity of political revolution mainly through their own experiences and not from someone standing on the side lines propagating for political revolution.
The present differences between Mao and Liu are becoming very clear. On the one hand, Mao still maintains that the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policies were correct; demands the utmost servility in the scientific, educational and cultural fields; absolutely refuses any concessions to improve the living standards of the masses; refuses to allow the masses any freedom of expression, but demands that they abide completely in accordance with his thought; and categorically rejects any united front with the other workers states, especially the Soviet Union with whom he had strained relations just short of a complete break. The opposition led by Liu, on the other hand, opposes the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policies; energetically opposes Mao's policies in the fields of science, education, and culture; supports de-Stalinization and opposes Mao's personal cult and dictatorship, and thereby is in favor of freedom of expression; proposes to improve the living standards of the masses; and wants to improve relations with the Soviet Union in order to help the Vietnamese. These differences rule out any position of neutrality, i.e., being only bystanders. We, as Trotskyists, are forced to intervene by taking a definite position based on a transitional program, that is, we must give critical support to Liu's faction against Mao and his followers. Only by doing so, will it be possible to win the masses and those attacked by Mao to a revolutionary program. Only by supporting Liu's faction can we show the masses that Liu and his collaborators are incapable of solving China's fundamental problems. This is the only road to convincing the masses that it is necessary to overthrow the bureaucracy as a whole in order to build a democratic socialist China.

Conclusion

The October revolution and Stalin's seizure of power have proved to be the acid test of many groups and individuals claiming to be revolutionaries. Historically as well as today the Chinese question is only second to that of the Soviet Union. Especially since the Chinese revolution in 1949, many groups and individuals have been tested by the Chinese events. In our movement we have seen the outstanding examples of Pablo and Swabeck. Therefore, I hope the International takes a serious attitude in adopting its position on China. I sincerely hope the comrades in each section will actively participate in the discussion in order to help the International arrive at a correct position to intervene in the Chinese events and put the Chinese political revolution on History's coming agenda.

November 19, 1967
Q. Since my last interview with you (January 20, 1967; see World Outlook, vol. 5, no. 6) the development of events has become more and more serious. The struggle between the two factions -- anti-Mao and pro-Mao -- has become more and more violent.

On the one hand, since Mao openly called on the army to intervene in the struggle to help the Red Guards to seize power, the Maosites have occupied the government and party offices in Shanghai and in the capitals of Anhui, Heilungkiang, Kwangtung, Kweichow, Fukien, Kiangsi and Kwangtung. This struggle for power has now extended into the provinces of Honan and Szechwan, as well as many other cities and districts, such as Chichi, Heilungkiang, Suchow, Kiangsu, Pinhsiang, Kiangsi, etc. The situation in Honan and Szechwan is of special significance, since according to Le Monde of June 14, 1967, during the night of June 7-8, a large scale, bloody clash took place in Szechwan in which over 300 were killed and several thousand wounded. In Honan similar clashes were supposed to have taken place, and the opposition captured the key positions of power. It was reported over the Honan radio that the oppositionists openly supported the position of Liu Shao-chi. These events demonstrate that the possibility of the struggle between the two factions breaking out into a national civil war is becoming increasingly greater. In fact, the present clashes already constitute civil war on a local scale.

On the other hand, immediately following the publication of an article in Red Flag by Tse Peng-yu (April 1, 1967), huge demonstrations of Red Guards took place in Peking, Shanghai and other cities against Liu Shao-chi, openly accusing him of being "the top party person in authority taking the capitalist road," and shouting the slogans "Down with Liu Shao-chi!" "Down with the Chinese Khruushchev!" "Down with Liu Shao-chi, Teng Haiao-ping and Tao Chu!" and "Bury the Black Dynasty of Liu's Family!" These and other such slogans were spread about as widely as possible by the Maosites. The Peking radio even broadcast newspaper articles attacking Liu Shao-chi by name, and reported all the news about the demonstrations and meetings which were held in order to denounce him. Judging from these events, it seems that Mao had decided to prepare public opinion for the removal of Liu, Teng, and other opposition leaders from their posts. This development is, of course, not surprising, since it stems logically from the earlier developments. However, many people who are interested in China, and concerned with her fate, find it difficult to understand why and how these two factions have reached such irreconcilable positions. In other words, it is very difficult to understand just what the basic political differences are which separate the two factions, making all compromise between Mao and Liu impossible. Can you explain these differences and how they developed?

A. Because of the Stalinist traditions of the Chinese Communist party, the nature of all essential differences is kept secret, and it is very difficult for anyone outside of the party to understand these differences. However, owing to the wall posters and the many newspapers of the Red Guards which in recent months have openly attacked Liu Shao-chi, we can see much more clearly what the essential differences between Liu and Mao are. For example, an article, "See the Ugly Face of Liu Shao-chi," published in the Red Guard newspaper, Ching-kung-shan (reprinted in Ming Pao Monthly, January 18 and 19, 1967), and another article, "The Crimes of Liu Shao-chi," published in Red Guards in the Capital (February 22, 1967), which, despite the most malicious attacks on Liu and his past activities, reveal some important facts which may be used to judge the underlying historical differences between Mao and Liu.*

However, before one can understand the present differences between Liu and Mao, one should first know a little about their past, that is, their different posts and activities, both inside and outside the party, as well as the two men's past relationships.

Q. Generally speaking, Mao Tse-tung's past positions and activities are fairly well known. The history of Liu Shao-chi is still relatively unknown and very unclear. The past relationships between Liu and Mao are even more obscure. Therefore, it would be of great interest

* It should be pointed out here that some of the facts revealed in the Red Guard newspapers have never before been known outside of the ruling echelons of the party. Therefore, it is quite evident that these articles were written, if not by, then under the direction of some very high officials close to Mao, directing the "Cultural Revolution," such as Chen Po-ta, Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, etc.
if you could describe and explain some of the past history of Mao, and especially of Liu, as well as the relationships between them.

A. After attending the founding congress of the CCP in 1921, Mao was sent to Hunan as the secretary of the provincial committee, where he was active for about two years. In 1923 he was elected to the central committee, at the 3rd congress of the party, and was assigned to the post of organizational secretary. It was during this period that the Comintern decided members of the CCP to join the Kuomintang and to collaborate with it, and Mao was appointed a member of the Kuomintang's Shanghai Municipal Committee, where he did all of his work, neglecting his work in the CCP.

In the autumn of 1924 Mao returned to Hunan and participated in the peasant movement, after which he went to Canton and began to work in the headquarters of the central committee of the Kuomintang as a secretary of the propaganda department and as editor of the Kuomintang's weekly magazine Political Weekly. Towards the end of 1926 he again returned to Hunan, and it was during this time that he gathered the information for his famous article on the peasant movement.

In the spring of 1927 Mao became the president of the Provisional National Federation of Peasant Associations. He held this post until the defeat of the revolution in July 1927, when the members of the CCP in Wuhan were purged from the Kuomintang.

Liu Shao-chie's work during this same period is quite different. After returning to China from Moscow in the summer of 1922, all of his work was done in the workers' movement. His first activities were among the coal miners in Anyuan, where he and Li Li-san led huge strikes and organized several trade unions, and Liu became one of the most important leaders.

In the summer of 1925 Liu went to Shanghai, where he participated in the May 30 Movement and helped in the organization of trade unions. In the latter part of the year he was sent by the party to Tsintien to help in the organization of the workers' movement there.

In the spring of 1926 Liu went to Canton, where he organized, together with Li Li-san and Teng Chung-heia, the 3rd Congress of the National Federation of Trade Unions (NFTU), and he was elected secretary of the Congress and a member of the NFTU Executive Committee. After this Liu became well known, and one of the most important leaders in the trade union movement.

At the end of 1926 Liu went to Wuhan as a delegate from the NFTU in order to lead the workers' movement; he remained there until July 1927, when the Kuomintang purge took place.

From the above brief descriptions of the two men one may say that, generally speaking, up to mid-1927 Mao's main area of work was in the Kuomintang and with the peasant movement, while Liu's work was entirely in the working class movement. Therefore, we can say that during this period there was no direct working relationship between Mao and Liu.

After the defeat of the 1925-1927 revolution, the policies of the Comintern changed from opportunism to adventurism. It was during this turn that Mao began to play an important role in carrying out the party's line by organizing the peasants into guerrilla units and carrying out the "Autumn Harvest Uprising." After the failure of the "Uprising" he became one of the most important leaders of the guerrilla and Soviet movement in Kiangsi until 1934. Nevertheless, during this period Mao was still under the leadership of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san and Wang Ming — ideological leaders of the Central Committee of the CCP — who criticized him very severely, especially the Wang Ming group which dealt him a very severe blow after the Central Committee moved to the Soviet base in Kiangsi in 1933. All of Mao's powers were, in reality, taken away from him, and he was left with only the name of "Chairman of the Soviet Government," while the vice chairman Hsiang Ying took over almost all the responsibilities.

The situation only changed for Mao at the meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP held in Tsuanyi during the Long March, where Mao took over the leadership of the party. Yet, he did not control the whole party and the army, because the followers of Wang Ming captured many leading posts, and because a part of the army remained behind in Kiangsi, Anhwei and Chekiang led by Hsiang Ying, who was a follower of Wang Ming and refused to accept the leadership of Mao. It was not until the 7th Congress of the CCP in 1945 that Mao was able to gain complete supremacy over the party.

This same period (1928-1945) found Liu Shao-chie in much different circumstances. After 1928 Liu's work was mainly inside the party. Until about 1931 he worked in Peking and Manchuria, and then in 1932 he was sent to the Soviet area in Kiangsi, where he was assigned to the workers' movement.* He arrived just about

* In reality, he had no work there, since there was no workers' movement in the Soviet areas.
the time when Mao lost all of his powers.

In the autumn of 1934 Liu was sent north where he again began to work for the party in Peking, and became the secretary of the party's Northern Bureau. It was during his work at this time that he helped to launch the anti-Japanese movement of September 9, 1935. It was from this movement that Liu, along with Peng Chen and others, was able to win many new, young and talented recruits to the party, such as Liu Lan-tao, Chiang Nan-chiang, Lu Ping, Teng To, etc.

At the beginning of 1938 Liu was recalled to Yanan to participate in the work of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP, where for the first time he collaborated closely with Mao Tse-tung.

In 1938 Liu, as secretary of the newly created Central Area Bureau, was sent as a special representative from the Central Committee to the region occupied by the New Fourth Army (NFA).** This army had been organized out of the many small guerrilla units in the south which had not made the Long March. The commander of this army was Yeh Ting, and the vice commander and political commissar was Hsiang Ying.

At this time there was a dispute taking place between Mao and Wang Ming over the question of collaboration with the Kuomintang, and since Hsiang Ying was in agreement with Wang Ming, it was Liu's mission to try and reduce the influence of the Wang Mingists in the New Fourth Army.

In January 1941 the New Fourth Army was attacked by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, and Yeh Ting was captured and imprisoned by Chiang; Hsiang Ying was killed in action. Afterwards, Chen Yi took over as commander while Liu Shao-chi took Hsiang Ying's place as political commissar. Liu also dissolved the South-Eastern Bureau, of which Hsiang Ying had been the secretary, and incorporated its jurisdiction under the Central Area Bureau, of which he himself was secretary. Liu then became the party's most important leader in those areas under the influence of the Kuomintang and those areas occupied by Japanese imperialism. During this time he greatly expanded the influence of the party throughout these areas, and at the same time increased the numbers of the New Fourth Army, destroying in the process all the influence of Wang Ming's group. In other words, he brought the entire NFA under Mao's direction, since before, while under the influence of the followers of Wang Ming, the NFA had not always obeyed Mao's directives. This was a great contribution to Mao and his position, and there followed a very close collaboration between Liu and Mao.

In the autumn of 1942 Liu returned to Yanan to work in the Political Bureau, and he became recognized at the party's number two leader after Mao.

During the next few years Liu helped Mao to discredit Wang Ming and his supporters in the Central Committee. He also helped Mao prepare several documents, such as the "Resolution on Several Historical Problems" (adopted by the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1945) and "The New Statutes of the CCP" (adopted at the 7th Congress of the CCP, April-June 1945).

In the first document, all the defeats which the CCP had suffered were blamed on Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san, and especially Wang Ming and his group.* This document justified Mao's work as always having been correct, and praised Liu for his position from 1928-1932. The second document, which was probably written by Liu Shao-chi and which was reported on by him at the 7th Congress, stated in the preamble that "...the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the combined principles derived from the practical experiences of the Chinese Revolution, united with Marxism-Leninism, are the guiding principles of all the party's work." Liu's whole report was along this very line, praising Mao's thought as the supreme guide of the Chinese Revolution.

The Congress ended by electing Mao as the supreme leader of the party, and Liu as one of its top leaders, while almost all of Wang Ming's followers were either removed from the Central Committee or set back to candidate status.**

Following the Congress, Mao and Liu

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* Peng Chen, the Mayor of Peking who was purged by Mao in June 1966, was at this time a member of the Northern Bureau and in charge of the student movement for the party in Peking.

** The army in the North was the New Eighth Route Army.

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* Ch'en Tu-hsiu was blamed for the defeat of the 1925-1927 revolution; Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Li Li-san were blamed for the defeats during the adventurerist period; and Wang Ming was held responsible for the defeat of the Red Army in Kiangsi, which was followed by the Long March. The Comintern was never singled out for any rebuke whatsoever.

** There were 44 members and 19 candidates in the new Central Committee. Wang Ming and a close collaborator of his were elected members in the next-to-last and last position.
collaborated closely in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. With the victory of the CCP in 1949 Mao became the chairman of the People's Republic of China, and Liu its vice chairman; the ensuing close collaboration between Mao and Liu is well known.

Q. When did the differences between Mao and Liu develop, and over what questions?

A. During the period which I have just described, there were, of course, no major political differences. According to some of the recent news, major differences became apparent over the question of the agricultural cooperative movement. From 1955-1956, for example, the newspaper The Red Guards in the Capital reported, "Liu Shao-chi openly and frankly dared to sabotage the movement of cooperativization. In 1955 he helped Teng Tsu-hui* to cut off the formation of 200,000 cooperatives." This accusation is, of course, far from concrete. Yet it is difficult to demonstrate that a major difference between Mao and Liu developed in 1955.

Mao proposed his plan of agricultural cooperativization in 1955, and insisted that it be completed in a very short time. His plan called for the completion of 850,000 cooperatives before the end of the year. Liu Shao-chi, Teng Tsu-hui and others, probably basing themselves on some of the past experiences of the Soviet Union, as well as on some of Lenin's ideas concerning collectivization, advocated a more prudent policy of long term collectivization. They were able to secure the majority of the Political Bureau for a program that called for the completion of cooperativization only in 1957.

Mao was against this decision, and over the head of the Political Bureau he called a conference of municipal, provincial and regional secretaries which decided that the agricultural collectivization should be completed in 1957.

This was the first major difference between Liu and Mao, and it is clearly and closely connected with the later differences over the "People's Communes."

Q. In the last interview you explained that the most important difference

*Head of the party's Agricultural Department.

**Liu was reported by a Red Guard newspaper to have said, in a speech given at the Conference of National Propaganda Workers in 1951, that "Some comrades think that socialism in the countryside can be realized through the peasant mutual aid groups and cooperatives. This is, however, impossible. It is the utopian idea of 'agricultural socialism.' The realization of socialism in the countryside, i.e., collectivization, without industrialization, is absolutely impossible." This statement tends to indicate that Liu has studied some of Lenin's works on collectivization and industrialization.

was over de-Stalinization. You explained that while Mao was opposed to de-Stalinization, Liu seems to have been in agreement with it. Are there any facts to substantiate this?

A. Yes, it is true that this is the most serious difference between Mao and Liu. The Maoists have openly called Liu the "Chinese Khrouchev." The origin of this label is precisely over the question of de-Stalinization. The article recently published in the Red Guard newspaper Ching-kan-shan entitled "See the Ugly Face of Liu Shao-chi," stated that at the 8th Congress of the CCP in September 1956 Liu revised the statutes of the party, changing the sentence from the preamble which I quoted earlier: "...the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the combined principles derived from practical experiences of the Chinese Revolution," to read simply, "The CCP takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism as its guide to all actions." Thus, any reference to Mao and his thought was deleted. The author of this article considered this to be proof that Liu was in most malicious opposition to the great leader, Chairman Mao.

The 8th Congress of the CCP not only revised the statutes of the party, removing the reference to Mao, but also emphasized that any personality cult must be prohibited. This can be seen very clearly in the report on changing the party statutes, which was given by Teng Hsiao-p'ing: "The significance of opposing the personality cult was explained energetically at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This will make a great impression on every communist party throughout the world." And, "The important contribution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU is to inform us that regarding a person as a god has led to very criminal results." And, "The personality cult is an old, historical and social phenomenon, and it is to a certain degree reflected in the life of our party and society. Our task is to carry out successfully, consistently and with determination the directives of the Central Committee against individual prominence and personal glorification."

It is very clear that under the impact of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and de-Stalinization, the majority of the Central Committee accepted the ideas of opposition to the personality cult; hence the removal of the reference to Mao and his thought from the party statutes and the prohibition of his personal cult.

* Teng Hsiiao-p'ing became the General Secretary of the party at this congress and has, along with Liu, been attacked as one of the "top leaders in the party who are taking the capitalist road."

-48-
It is necessary to point out that the words of Teng about the personality cult reflecting itself in the society and the party are very important, as this was in direct reference to Mao Tse-tung himself. Since the 7th Congress in 1945, and especially since the CCP took power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung has deliberately established his personal cult, and has considered himself as "The Sun in the East," and "The Chinese Stalin." For example, there is a song, "The East is Red," which has the following verse: "The East is becoming Red, The sun is rising and Mao Tse-tung appears in China, He works for the well being of the people, He is the Great Saviour of the people."

After Mao's talks with Stalin in Moscow in 1950, a new song was composed, "Mao Tse-tung and Stalin are like the Sun shining in the Sky." These two songs have been scored for orchestration, and at the beginning of important meetings, and especially when Mao was in attendance, one or both of these songs were played, while everybody stood and afterwards shouted, "Iong Live Chairman Mao Tse-tung!" This became almost a religious ceremony. After the beginning of de-Stalinization in the USSR, however, this ceremony was discontinued in China.

The effects of de-Stalinization in China constituted, without a doubt, a severe personal blow to Mao, and under the pressure of existing conditions Mao was obliged to make certain concessions, tolerate the changes -- if only for the time being -- and wait for more favorable circumstances in order to reassert his own cult.

If one compares the 7th and 8th congresses of the CCP one can see clearly the decline of Mao's prestige. At the 7th Congress Mao made the political report, and with Liu's help Mao's "thought" was incorporated into the party statutes, thus establishing his personal cult. At the 8th Congress however, the political reporter was Liu, and Mao's "thought" was removed from the statutes, and measures were taken to prohibit his personal cult. This shows what a tremendous effect

Khrushchev's de-Stalinization has had, and it is clear why Mao became so hostile towards Khrushchev, as well as towards Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.

Q. Earlier, you stated that the differences between Mao and Liu on the cooperative movement were closely connected to the differences concerning the "People's Communes." Could you explain the differences on the question of the "People's Communes"?

A. Until recently, Liu was thought to have been a supporter of the "People's Communes" idea launched by Mao. However, the recent facts have revealed that this is not true. In the article, "The Crimes of Liu Shao-chi" it was stated, "At a meeting called by the Central Committee, which was attended by 78 cadres in January 1962, he (Liu Shao-chi) made a revisionist report. He violently attacked the "Three Red Banners" and exaggerated to the utmost errors and mistakes in our work. He felt that the temporary economic difficulties were due to these errors and mistakes -- 30% due to natural disasters, 70% due to artificial disasters. He attacked the 1959 struggle against the Rightists as being excessive and even said, in an attempt to rehabilitate the Rightists, that the struggle itself was a mistake. He maliciously said that the party lacks democracy, and that party life is a 'brutal struggle' and a 'pitiless fight,' attacking Chairman Mao's correct leadership of the Central Committee."

From the many attacks against Liu, one can conclude the following:

1) Liu opposed the "Three Red Banners" policy, that is, he opposed the "People's Communes" launched by Mao. This stems logically from his opposition to Mao's cooperativism movement.

2) Liu considered the economic difficulties as mainly the result of artificial disasters; that is, he felt that the economic troubles of 1960-1962 were a result of the "People's Communes" and "Great Leap Forward" policies.

3) Liu's opinion that the party was mistaken in the struggle against the Rightists of 1959, and in the purging of Peng Teh-huai**, Wang Keh-ching and others, means that he felt their criticism of the "People's Communes" was correct, and therefore he felt they should be rehabilitated.

* At the 8th Congress Mao made a speech in which he declared, "The Soviet Party not too long ago held its 20th Congress, and it worked out a number of correct directives criticizing a number of existing shortcomings. One can say that their work will have a great effect on the future.... Our experiences are lacking; hence we must study as much as possible the experiences of our forerunners, i.e., the CPSU." This demonstrates that Mao at this time could not oppose the anti-cult atmosphere, and that it was only against his will that he tolerated the anti-cult actions of the party.

* The "Three Red Banners" are (1) General Line, (2) Great Leap Forward, (3) People's Communes.

** Minister of Defense until 1959, when he was purged as the leader of an opposition to the "Great Leap Forward" program, and especially to the "People's Communes."
4) Liu's charges that the CCP lacked democracy, that the party life was "a brutal struggle" and a "pitiless fight" meant that Liu felt that Mao's purge of Peng Teh-huai and the others was a very dangerous symptom.

These four points show that very serious differences existed at that time between Liu and Mao.

Following the failure of the "People's Communes" and the economic disaster, Mao let Liu take over the reins of the party to deal with the serious difficulties. Liu, along with Peng Hsiao-ping, put into effect a rectification campaign which included many reforms, such as re-establishing private plots, a free market, personal ownership of livestock, and doing away with most of the public kitchens, public nurseries, etc. All the reforms met with a very favorable response from the great majority of the people, and therefore Liu won their respect and support, as well as that of most of the party cadres.

Q. Are there, or have there been, any differences between Mao and Liu over questions of literature, art and education?

A. Differences between Mao and Liu do exist over these questions. Your interview with Ch'en Pi-lan (see World Outlook, volume 5, number 26, July 14, 1967) explained some of the differences which exist between Mao and the opposition as a whole. The fact that Chou Yang was one of the main leaders of the opposition in the cultural field shows that it was under the influence of Liu Shao-chi. One can find proof of this in an article in the People's Daily, April 25, 1967, entitled "Crush the Counter-Revolutionary Program of Peaceful Transition — Expose the Words of the Chinese Khrushchev Concerning the Problems of Writers." In this article it was stated that in March 1955 Liu Shao-chi asked Chou Yang and others to discuss with him questions concerning the writers. During these discussions Liu was supposed to have advocated the necessity of writers having more time to study, allowing them to write freely, and not interfering with their creative freedom.

These same ideas were expressed by Liu in his political report to the 8th Congress of the CCP, September 1956, and the Congress adopted a resolution based on Liu's report. This resolution stated that "In order to assure the prosperity of the sciences and the arts, we must firmly insist on the perspectives of the 'Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom and a Hundred Schools Contend' policy. It would be a mistake to use administrative methods to interfere arbitrarily in the sciences and arts." This shows that Liu's ideas on these questions are much different from those of Mao.

When Liu took over the reins of the party (in 1960) he carried out a much more moderate policy in the fields of literature, art and education, allowing much more freedom to the artists and writers. As a result, the work in the cultural fields improved to a certain degree under Liu's direction of the party. This, combined with the improvement in the economy, rallied to Liu's side most of the cultural workers, as well as the party cadres.

The Peking Municipal Party Committee, led by P'eng Chen, is a good example. This turn of events led to the increasing isolation of Mao, and he even felt that his leadership position had been brought into question.

Q. What was Mao's reaction to this situation?

A. Mao saw the hopelessness of waging a struggle inside the party; he therefore turned towards the army. After 1960 Mao, through Lin Piao, Lo Yen-huan and Hsiao Hua, launched a broad movement in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to study Mao Tse-tung's thought, under the preface of "correcting the mistaken line of P'eng Teh-huai and Wang Ke-ching."

Lin Piao proposed to the Central Military Committee a resolution entitled "The Correct Handling of Four Questions in the Political Fields of the Army." In this resolution Lin placed his emphasis on the importance of the role of man, politics and thought. Some time later, the Military Committee adopted a "Resolution Concerning Political Work in the Army." This resolution set forth 14 provisions. The first one stated that "It is necessary that Mao Tse-tung's thought be in command in all spheres of the Army." Before this, the slogan had been "Politics in Command," but now openly, and probably for the first time, this was spelled out clearly to mean Mao Tse-tung's thought in command.

It was following the adoption of this resolution that Lin Piao demanded "Everyone must read Chairman Mao's books, listen to Chairman Mao's words, work according to Chairman Mao's instructions, to become a good fighter of Chairman Mao."

An editorial published on January 1, 1966 in the Liberation Army Daily even stated that "every word of Chairman Mao is truth... We must firmly support and carry out everything conforming to Mao Tse-tung's thought and we must firmly resist and oppose anything which does not conform to Mao's thought." The reasoning behind such statements is very clear. No longer were the directives of the Central Committee, headed by Liu Shao-chi, to be followed, if they did not correspond to Mao's own personal thinking.

Mao also attempted to purge Liu's
supporters in the party. In September 1963 Mao proposed a resolution entitled "Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas" (the 23-article document). This resolution was not adopted by the Political Bureau; nevertheless, it was circulated throughout the party. This document then formed the basis of the "Four Clean-ups Movement," i.e., "The Socialist Education Movement to clean up politics, ideology, organization and economy." The main purpose of this movement was to purge those cadre who supported Liu, but the movement met with strong resistance, and in many places was sabotaged. The movement had no great effect except for the purging of some lower ranking cadres in the "People's Communes" and the district party committees. Therefore, Mao became even more dependent upon the army, and put forward a theory to carry on the struggle outside the party. The foundation of this theory was the idea that the class struggle continues after the victory of the proletariat and is reflected inside the party.

In a plenum of the Central Committee in September 1968 Mao put forward the slogan "We must not forget the class struggle!" This same plenum issued a communique, on Mao's insistence, which said, "During the transitional period from capitalism to socialism... the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie still exists. The struggle between the two lines of socialism and capitalism still exists." "This struggle is inevitably reflected inside the party... We must take heed in time, and we must firmly struggle against the different types of opportunist tendencies. The significance of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee, in August 1959 at Lushun, is the clashing victory over the Rightist tendency, that is the crushing of the attack by the revisionists." Here we can see that Mao is directly attacking Liu's defense of Peng Teh-huai and Liu's suggestion that those who had been purged should be rehabilitated.

During 1963 and 1964 the Central Committee of the CCP published 9 articles criticizing the CPSU. The ninth article was entitled "On Khrushchev's Pseudo-Communism and the Historical Lessons for the World" (July 14, 1964). This article maintained that under the leadership of the revisionist Khrushchev the USSR had been transformed from a socialist to a capitalist state. The implication was, of course, that it was necessary to unleash a struggle inside the party against all revisionists, otherwise China herself would "change color."

At a meeting of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles in June 1964 Mao made an address in which he gravely warned that "In the past 15 years, these associations and most of their publications have for the most part failed... to carry out the policies of the party.... In the recent years, they have even verged on revisionism. If they do not make serious efforts to remold themselves, sooner or later they are bound to become groups of the Hungarian Petozi-Club type." These words were a frank warning to those cadres working in the cultural fields under the influence of Liu's leadership.

All the arguments elaborated by Mao, such as those mentioned above, were a preparation for the purge of "those people in power who are taking the capitalist road" which was to follow.

Recently, Red Flag and the People's Daily published an article entitled "A Great Historical Document" (Hung-ch' i, no. 7, 1967), in which they stated "Lenin saw that after the proletariat had taken power, the defeated bourgeoisie still remained stronger than the proletariat, and often attempted a restoration.... Therefore, in order to deal with this counterrevolutionary threat, and to overcome it, it was necessary to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship over a long period. There was no other road. Unfortunately, Lenin died too soon. He could not have solved this question in practice. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist who actually eliminated a great number of the counterrevolutionary bourgeois representatives who wormed their way into the party, including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rakosi, Bukharin, Rykov, and their like."

These words not only demonstrate that Mao tries to justify his purge of the opposition led by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping on the basis of Lenin's theory, but also justifies his purge on Stalin's famous frame-up trials in the 1930's. From this one can see clearly what Mao has in mind for Liu, Teng, and the rest of the opposition.

Q. Are there any differences between Mao and Liu on foreign policy?

A. In the last interview I pointed out that the position of the opposition on foreign policy questions is much more difficult to determine, since there is less material from which to judge, and up to now I have been unable to find any new facts. Nevertheless, the position of Liu on foreign policy is different from Mao's extremely sectarian foreign policy. Foreign policy is almost always an extension of domestic policy. Therefore, in my opinion, Mao is responsible for China's extremely sectarian foreign policy, which would be in agreement with his extremely sectarian domestic policies. Liu, on the other hand, probably advocates a more moderate foreign policy, in line with his domestic policy. Since I Ju-ch'ing has been attacked as one of Liu's strongest supporters, we can almost certainly say
that Liu's attitude towards the USSR and the united front with the various socialist countries over the Vietnam war is identical with that of Lo.

Q. You have explained how reference to Mao's thought was included in the party statutes at the 7th Congress, and how it was removed at the 8th Congress, as well as the campaign carried out in the army on how everything was to be done under the guidance of Mao's thought. Now, in the "Cultural Revolution," Mao's thought stands out as one of its most prominent characteristics. Other than the personality cult aspect, can you briefly describe what Mao's thought actually is?

A. Broadly speaking, Mao's thought boils down to nothing more than the practical application in China of Stalin's theories. The essence of Stalinism consists of opportunism and adventurism, the revolution by stages, socialism in one country, and bureaucratic centralism which finds its most pronounced form in personal dictatorship. All these things can not only be found in Mao's theoretical works, but also in his actions. Here I will only give a few examples.

You will recall some of the things I have already said about the "Resolution on Several Historical Problems" adopted by the Central Committee in April 1945, in which Mao laid all the blame for all past defeats on Chen Tzu-hsiu, Chu Ch'ü-p'ai, and Li Li-san. Mao never analyzed or even pointed out the opportunistic or adventurist policies of the CCP during and after the 1925-1927 revolution, which had been forced on the CCP by Stalin. That is, Mao accepted Stalin's role and policies of opportunism and adventurism as being correct.

Mao's most important theoretical work is "On the New Democracy." When the party adopted the new statutes at the 7th Congress in 1945, which stated that Mao's thought should be the guide to all the party's actions, the party congress was basing itself on this work, written by Mao in January 1940. At this congress, Lin Po-ch'u, an important member of the Political Bureau at that time, said, "The theory of 'New Democracy' is the most brilliant manifestation of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism combined with the concrete revolutionary practice in China. This theory is the sharpest weapon the party and the Chinese people have in the struggle for victory." Chou En-lai said, "We are dependent on the brilliant leadership of our party's leader and comrade Mao Tse-tung. He has shown us the direction to follow in 'New Democracy.'" With such praise, we should examine the contents of Mao's 'New Democracy.'

According to Mao, after the October Revolution in Russia the national-democrat-

ic revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries was a "new bourgeois-democratic revolution." In this revolution, the national bourgeoisie remained a revolutionary class, and hence it was necessary to carry out the "united front" of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie -- the bloc of four classes -- in order to destroy the imperialists and feudal forces, and to establish a "new democratic republic." That is, Mao advocated the establishment of a coalition government of four classes, as well as a "new democratic economy."

The "new democratic economy" meant the nationalization of only "the big banks, large industry and large commercial enterprises" by the state. "One must not nationalize the private property of other capitalists, and one should not prohibit the development of capitalist production which cannot control the national economy and the people's life... The rich peasant's economy in the countryside should also be permitted."

All this is, of course, self-explanatory, and demonstrates clearly Mao's opportunism. Mao's theory of revolution by stages is clearly manifested in the following sentences: "The present tasks of the Chinese Revolution are the tasks of struggling against imperialism and feudalism. Before these tasks have been accomplished, it is not possible to speak about socialism. The Chinese Revolution must be divided into two stages. The first step is that of new democracy, and the second is socialism. The period of the first stage is relatively long."

Nor is any comment needed here, and in Indonesia, where Mao applied the theory of revolution by stages, the revolution has suffered a greater disaster than did the second Chinese revolution which Stalin led to defeat with the same theory.

Here it should be pointed out that Mao's "On the New Democracy" is still considered as the center of Mao Tse-tung's thought. The "16-Point Decision" adopted by the Central Committee last August 1966 put "On the New Democracy" as the first work to be studied in studying Mao's thought. The Liberation Army Daily published some articles explaining the contents of "On the New Democracy," encouraging all the cadres in the army and the party to study it.

In Yenan, at a party school in May 1941, Mao made a speech entitled "The Reorganization of Our Study," in which he said, "The Brief History of the OGPU is the highest synthesis and summary of the world communist movement in the last 100

* Selected Works, Volume 3, p. 120, International Publishers, 1965
years. This is a model of theory combined with practice." It is very well known that the Brief History of the CPSU is a "model of theory combined with practice" of Stalinism, because it contains the theoretical justification of Stalin's theories of revolution by stages and socialism in one country, as well as the justification for Stalin's adventurous policies of collectivization, industrialization and the foreign policy of the third period, the famous purges in the 30's of the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Bukharinists and other oppositions, the cult of the personality and Stalin's own personal dictatorship.

As far as Mao's methods are concerned, one can really find no difference between him and Stalin. Mao has always imposed his own opinions upon the party, and the present "Cultural Revolution" is the best example of Mao's bureaucratic methods against the great majority of the party in order to maintain his own personal dictatorship.

Q. What has been your personal relationship with Mao and Liu, and what is your personal appraisal of the two men?

A. Because my work and posts in the party were different from Mao's, I did not have much of a working relationship with him. I did have some personal contacts with him, however, only two of which I will describe.

In May 1926, after Chiang Kai-shek's coup d'état of March 20, I went to Canton as the Central Committee's representative to discuss with Borodin, the Comintern representative. During my stay Mao visited me twice. One time he asked me to address his peasant school. The other time he brought an article he had written on the different strata among the peasantry, on which he asked my opinion. In his article he had divided the peasantry into many different strata according to the amount of land they owned. I then told him that in Lenin's opinion the peasants were divided mainly into three categories -- rich, middle, and poor -- depending upon the amount of land they were able to farm and what they needed in order to maintain their families. Mao did not reject my criticism and seemed to have accepted it.

In June 1927 I saw Mao for the last time in Wuhan. At that time he was very disappointed with the revolution, although he never discussed with me how the revolution could be rescued from the dangerous situation which existed. He was only concerned with finding a safe place for his family, and he asked my wife, Ch'en Pi-lan, if she could help him.

My contact with Liu Shao-chi is somewhat different. In Shanghai in 1920 I studied Marxism and Russian together with Liu, and our relationship was quite close. From 1921-1922 we studied together in Moscow, during which time I was able to recruit him to the party.

After returning to Shanghai from Moscow in August 1924 all my work was in the party itself, and especially in the Political Bureau, and head of the Propaganda Department. I therefore had no real working relationship with Liu, although I saw him several times during my stay in Canton, and again in Wuhan during the summer of 1927. The last time I saw Liu was in the summer of 1929. At this time Ch'en Tu-hsiu and I had started to organize the Left Opposition. Liu, of course, understood my position in relation to the party, yet nevertheless he visited me at my home. During this visit we discussed the party's policy, and I criticized the party's present policy of adventurism as well as the bureaucratic organizational methods of the leadership. I also pointed out that during the workers' and peasants' uprising in the spring of 1927 the party should have then organized soviets in preparation for the taking of power. With all these criticisms Liu expressed his agreement, but could not bring himself to join the Left Opposition and struggle against the leadership. Liu was considered in the party at this time as a "reconciliator."

As far as my personal appraisal of the two men goes, I would say from a political point of view that both of them are Stalinists. After the defeat of the second Chinese revolution, neither of them accepted the lessons of the defeat, and they remained in the Stalinized CCP following Stalin's line on all fundamental questions. Nevertheless, from the point of view of character and personal experience, the two men are quite different. While both men are very strong willed, Mao is very arbitrary while Liu is much more considerate.

Due to Mao's experiences of working in the Kuomintang, and especially his work in organizing the peasants and guerrilla warfare, his arbitrary character has been reinforced. Hence, upon coming to power in 1949, regardless of the opinions or well being of the majority, Mao deliberately established his personal cult and practiced his personal dictatorship. The cooperativization, the "Great Leap Forward," the "People's Communes" and the present "Cultural Revolution," as well as China's sectarian foreign policy, are all the result of Mao's arbitrariness.

Liu's life's work, however, has mainly been among the working masses, and

at times under very difficult circum-
stances, such as after the defeat of the
1925-27 revolution when he worked for the
party in the underground during the reac-
tionary rule of Chiang Kai-shek. These
environmental conditions reinforced his
basic thoughtfulness, since he was
obliged to listen to the opinions of other
cadres in the party and workers' movement
who reflected the opinions and aspirations
of the masses. Hence, in his dealings
with people, he is more capable of reach-
ing a balanced solution, and this is the
origin of his personal differences with
Mao on cooperativization, "People's Com-
munes," etc., as I have already explained.

Q. What, in your opinion, will be
the future of China under the leadership
of the two men respectively?

A. The above analysis of Liu and
Mao shows clearly that Mao represents a
more hardened and extreme form of Stalin-
ism. Regardless of the circumstances or
the will of the masses he has carried out
his adventuristic and sectarian domestic
policies. While on the other hand, Liu
represents a much more moderate and reform-

ist tendency in the party. He attempted
to a certain degree to correct Mao's ex-
tremist policies, in order to avoid the
catastrophic consequences.

In my opinion this same analysis is
valid in the present struggle between the
two men. If Mao should win, it would be
at the expense of all the left and revo-
lutionary elements, and he will embark
China upon a most reckless and cataclysmic
course, in which the Chinese Revolution
would be placed in grave danger. If Liu
should win, China's domestic course will
most likely be similar to that carried out
when the party was under Liu's leadership,
with China's foreign policy becoming less
sectarian and possibly resulting in a
united front with other socialist coun-
tries, including the USSR, to aid the
Vietnamese and their struggle.

In a China under Liu's leadership
there would definitely be more freedom in
the party and society, although the over-
all question of the Stalinist bureaucracy
would not be solved. Nevertheless, Liu's
victory could be a first phase in the
development of a real revolutionary strug-
gle for socialist democracy.