FOR NATIONAL COMMITTEE INFORMATION ONLY

Dear Comrades,

Enclosed is a translation of a Rouge supplement entitled "For Bolivia!" which was published in October.

A copy of the original French version is being sent to one National Committee member in each area to be shared with the other NCers in the area.

This material is for the information of National Committee members only.

Comradely,

Jack Barnes  
Organization Secretary
[The following is a translation of a Rouge supplement published in October, 1969.]

FOR BOLIVIA!

The Corruption

On the brink of economic bankruptcy, since 1964 Bolivia has been under a military regime which instituted a pitiless dictatorship. Imperialism and the bourgeoisie have made the masses suffer from their policy of looting the country and their incapacity to regulate seriously the smallest economic problem. The only way the system can survive is through savage repression. All the political organizations are illegal, except the puppet groups which, at home or abroad, support the regime. The trade-union organizations are also banned. All efforts towards rebuilding of the unions have been violently suppressed. In the factories, the military occupation continues in a climate of terror. The miners' districts resemble concentration camps.

The clique which came to power in the last coup d'état is attempting to give itself a liberal image by nationalizing the holdings of the Gulf Oil Company: this palace revolution reflects the concern of American imperialism over the revolutionary upsurge on the continent -- and the necessity it feels of maintaining military juntas that play demagogically on the nationalist aspects of the anti-imperialism of the masses so that they serve their purposes better.

The Revolutionary War

The insoluble governmental crisis (of a General Ovando or the others), Bolivia's geographical position in the heart of the continent, make this country both the weakest link in the imperialist domination of Latin America and also a strategic site for the development of the revolution on a continental scale -- in view of its common frontiers with Peru, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina and Chile.

That is why Ernesto Che Guevara installed the general staff of his army in Bolivia. His assassination could not keep down a new burst of the armed struggle for long. The E.L.N. (Army of National Liberation), under the command of Inti Peredo and the P.O.R. (Workers Revolutionary Party, Bolivian section of the Fourth International) directed by Hugo Gonzales Moscoso, holding faithfully to the road laid out by Che's first guerrillas, together raised the torch again.

In order to allow the development of the mass workers and peasants movement, muzzled at present by the white terror, there is no other way out for the Bolivian revolutionists except to take up arms, except revolutionary war against the system.
The Repression

After the publication of the manifesto "We shall return to the mountains," the execution of the traitor Honoratio Rojas (responsible for the ambush at Vado del Yeso, where ten of Che's comrades fell in 1967) marked the resumption of the guerrilla offensive.

The repression intervened at this decisive moment. Following a stool pigeon's tip-off, it struck at the militants of the E.L.N. and the P.O.R. Inti Peredo died in battle in a house in La Paz: The police are searching for Hugo Gonzales Moscoso; his home was plundered. A threat was made to execute him without trial if captured. Underground supply depots of the E.L.N. and the P.O.R., containing arms, radio equipment, surgical and medical supplies, were seized.

The Necessary Support

This blow is not fatal. It severely cuts into the reserves of men and supplies patiently accumulated and prepared during two years of underground activities following the death of Che. Nevertheless, none of the guerrilla organizations has been dismantled; the massive support from the cities and countryside should allow the merciless struggle to be taken up again. During the underground period, the Bolivian revolutionists reorganized their network, reestablished contacts. For this they need our support, our active support and not just our verbal support; not just the solidarity of press releases.

At the threshold of a new stage, from now on they must have the weapons required by their politics. In an underdeveloped country where an underground revolutionary cadre can live on 75 francs [$15] a month, the thousands of dollars collected should aid in building the revolutionary army, with all the means they need to bring down the pro-imperialist bourgeoisie.

The Communist League appeals for financial and political support to the Bolivian Revolution.

The Communist League is setting up a solidarity fund for its sister organization, the P.O.R. of Bolivia.

The P.O.R. and Armed Struggle

The P.O.R. which has taken part in all the great revolutionary struggles of the Bolivian people since the end of the Second World War, has sunk deep roots in the mines in the course of its history. It was outlawed in January 1967 at the start of Che's guerrilla campaign. The Trotskyists of the P.O.R. publicly supported Che's guerrilla struggle and played their role of revolutionary militants
in the mines and universities by arousing support for the guerrillas. Theirs was the only party to explain to the masses that the armed struggle was the continuation of their struggle and that they should support it vigorously (in the P.O.R. manifesto, "All the people are on the side of the guerrillas"). The P.O.R. likewise carried on work among the soldiers, explaining the objectives of the guerrilla struggle and the political and economic causes for its appearance. Since being banned, the P.O.R. has lived in the strictest clandestinity, devoting all its efforts to again launching revolutionary war.

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Against the internationalization of the forces of repression under the leadership of U.S. imperialism we must organize the international solidarity of militant revolutionists and their organizations.

Let us help the Bolivian Revolution by supporting the Bolivian fighters materially, let us give financial aid to the P.O.R. in order to strengthen the armed struggle.