$n$ the flections held in the current political situatioj the IME will adopt the following tactics:
i. It will call for the return of a Labour Govt against the Tories while oxposing the reformist and anti-working class charater of such a government. It will expose the fact that the Labour Govt, and all those who support its poldcies, are responsible for its own downfall.
ii. In order to reach the maximum nember of forces with the most important conclusions on how to fight against the economic, socaal and political crisis and the policies which will be pursued by a Tory or Labour Govt, the IMG sesks to promote the maximum number of candidates running on a programme of opposition to the anti-working class policies of the Labour Govt o although for tactical reasons, to maks clear that the responsibility for a Labour defeat lies with the policies of its leadership, these candidates should stand in constituencies where the losss of the seat would not be attributed to this electoral intervention. Such opposition is manifested in a committment to the most decisive parts of the IMG's action programme and an orisntation to reliance of mass struggle and not on Parliament for the defeat of the policies of the governemnt.
1ii. Flowing from the above situation, the attitude of the IMG to forces stending in the election will be
(e) Candidates of the IS, SLP (SF), WSL, or supporters of the Militant current are forces which, despite major inadequacies, are clearly carrying on a struggle against the policies of the governemnt. We call for a vote for the IS, SLP (SF), or WSL against the Labour Party, and in any situation where a supporter of the Militant current was the Labour candidate, we are not in favour of running againat Labour in that con-tituancy. The WRP's policies do not conform to the above criteria and we favour a vote for the Labour Party against the WRP.
(b) We try to promote wherever possible independent class struggle candidates. Our attitude to any candidates standing in opposition to Labour claiming to represent a left alternative will be defermined by the considerations outlined above in point il.
(c) Certain individual Labour candidates (Maynard, Knoght, Livingstone) and the SLP (Sillars) represent bordar-line cases who have vacillated between support and activity of mass struggle and reliance on Parliamentary and bureaucratic maneouvres. At present however, the correct tectic to expose the vacillating character of these alements, and to take the class struggle forward, is by making demands on them. We do not favour therefore at present running candidates against these forces. This situation must however be reviewed in the light of developments towards any election.
(d) Both the Tribune group and the Communist Party have clearly subordinated action against the Labour Government's policies to Parliamentray and bureaveratic menoauvres. Neither general programmatic considerations nor its current role in the class steuggle lead to a call for a vote for the Cummunist Party. There is no reason not to stand candidates in areas where the Labour candidata is a Tribunita.
(e) In all arees whare there is no candidate representing a clase struggle alternative standing, we call for a vote for Labour against the parties of the bourgaaisia.
iv. The general slogan issued by the IMG for the election will be "For a Labour Governemnt but fight for a socialist alternative".
$v$. In order to maximise the impact of the presentation of candidates representing e class struggle alternative to Labour, the IMG will fight for the maximum co-ordination, organisationally and programmatically, amongst such forces. This will inciude an approach to IS for the greatest possible measure of agreement in the election in ragard to avoiding ciashes of candidates, calling for a joint vote, etc. In tha event a serios agreament of this characeer were reached, the IMG would discuss how to put up the maximum number of candidates. If only a minimal, or no agreement, is reachad, the IMG will attempt, as part of an integrated paln of work involving propaganda, united front initiatives, and the fight for revolutionary regroupment, to present around six candidates in our str申ngest arsas. These will be prepared through a local campaign for cidass strugele candidates, where possible participation in the locel elections, and nationally through a campaign for an electoral intervention for a socialist alternative to Labour in the elactions, for the raising of funds, production of maturial, etc.


The following resolution is based on the document 'Notes on the electians' discussad at the? C on Nov 20th. It has been amended and extended in the light of discussion at the? C; and should be read together with that document. The proposal is that the $P C$ should vote on the resolution at the end of the text and submit this as a $\mathcal{C}$ document for the next National Committee.

## General consic 3rations on elections

1. In deterniring the framework of imterventin in elections, revoluzionaries have to develup at least two simultaneous tasks. Firstly, they have, in the interests of the long term and present struggle of the working class, to organise the naximum number of forces around the basic historic programme of proletariar revolution. Secondly, in the interests of the proletarian movement immediately and as the sole way in which the forces for the revilutiobary taske of the working class can be won over, they have to organise in the most effective way the fight around the most urgent and burning tasks questions which confront the working class and its aliies today. A correct tactic inust effacectively combine these two tasks in the general dynamic of the class struggla. The suppression of the second furely in favour of the first results in a policy of laft sectarianism, and the suppression of the finst in favour of the second results in a capitulation before the reformist bumatucacies and a failure to prepare the working class for the struggle against the dynamic unleashed by these bureaucracies.
2. Within their strategic conceptions and class criteria, the position of revolutionaries in elections is a question of tactics they reject any idea that revolutionaries should always participate in elections, that they should always boycott elections, that they should always vote for the party of the masses, or any similar panacea. The form of intervention in elections is determined by how best to succed in winning the maximum number of forces to the most correct and. important politicla positions. Whether this is best achjaved by standing candidates in the lection, by calling for boycott, by calling for a vote for another party than our own organisation, or by some other tactic can only be decided by a concrete analysis of all the elements in the sitsuation - what are the decisibe issues in the class struggle refratced in the election, whether there is any significant force independent of the reformist bureaucracy, what is the likely dynamic of the ciess strugele following the elections, etc.
3. The poiitical sivuation in regard to our determining of folicy in elections in general is relatively clear. In Europe, in the present period, as notad in tee EPD, and our owm perspectives, the emergence of a vanguard of soma tens of thousands which has brøken with illusions in any section of the reformist bureaucracy and which, while small in terms of the masses, is relatively large in rejataon to the vanguard organisations, poses new tactics compared to the 1950 s and early 1960 s. To wim over this vanguard is the chief task today in organising the forces prepared to fight for the historic progremre of tha working class. Furthermor-- as by definition as a vanguard, this layer yakos up the struggle for the most crucdal questions of the day confronting the working class, the organising of these forces is one of the ways of fighting around the chief issues of the class struggle today. The meeds of the class struggle and the necessity to organise this vanguard fully doveteii. As intervention in elections is one of the methods of organising this vanguard, the emergence of such a force is charateristic which leads in the direction of revolutionaries in this period in Europe undertaking an indepemdent electoral intervention.
The coming election and our line.
4. In order to determine our position in this specific election an Britain, hovever, it is necessary to go beyond the general characteristics of the perios to the concrete sitijation in this present phase of tae class struggle. The central issue at this election, and in conteast to for example Italy and Spain, will not te deminated by a revolutionary situation or the likely short-term development of one. The central dividing line of action in the calss struggle today is not between those who stand for revolution and those who oppose it. To make our intervention in the election on the basis of draw-
ing the lire between revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries would be an exampla of iefr sectarien propagandism. The central issue of this election is the efononic, sovial and political crisis of capitalism; anf the fact taht policies ta attempt to overcome this crisis in the interests of the bayrgeisisis, and at the expense of the working ckass, are being pursued by a Letour Gow. The central dividing line in the class struggle today is between those who are prepared to oppose this attempt to solve the crisis at the expense uf the working class and those who oppose this policy. Specifically revalutiobary propaganda on saviet power, the necessity of the violent overthroul af capitalism, etc, is, as always, a task of our propaganda in the electicn but"it cannot be its central axis.
5. The elements which the IMG analyses as the most dacisive and defining ones of the aresent sitaution, and the answers it gives to these issues, are encapsulated in our action programme. Within this framework, however, atfentiom must be drawn to two points. Firstly, a programme consists not of demands on paper but a project of struggle - and the only stuggle which is effective for any demand, is that based on the mobilisation of the masses in action: ThoEe who really stand for elements of our action programme are not those who give verbal adherence to it but those who are preapared to engage in a struggle for it. This is a decisive criteria at a time when forofs in the LP give verbal adherence tio opposition to the govt's policies but are not prepared to taka one step in action to fight it. Secondly, of course while only the implementation of our full action programme can provede a rea real outcome to the crisis, we of course recognise some elements are the most decisive - thus for example it is possible to take at least certain steps in the interests - ${ }^{\text {dif }}$ the working class without as yet endorsing the demand for eliding scale of wages but it is not possible to take one serious step forward while supporting wage conyrols, various forces who do not yet andorse the demand for sliding scale of putilic expenditure can and do nevertbeless wage an important and correct struggle, which takes the working class forward against all cuts in public expenditure.
6. It is this cantral dividing line in the lection which defines our relatic tc all candidetes in tris electiom. In relation to the polarisation of the social masses, we stand for a Labour Govt as against a Tory one. However, we also try to organise the maximum forces for the struggle against any suct governemmt.
the Tory governma. and for the most offactive fight against gornman whixh will almost certainly be returned at the next election. The forces" which stand for such a struggle, for the reasons outlined above, are those who stand for at least the decisive elements of our action programme and who, while they do not necessarily reject a parliamentary road to socialism (to demand this would correspond to a view that the decisive issue in this elaction is socialist revolution), nevertheless do not réy on parliament or imtra-bureaucratic manoesures but on actions of the working cless.
7. It is among other things the relation of the forces inside and outside the Labous Party to this decisive task of the day which determines our attitude to whether to run independent candidates. If there were today a broad opposition within the LP, committing itself to action against the government's policies, then tha way forward would be participation in this opposition, and a central axis of waging the struggle within the LP to overturn the present policies of this governemnt. The central orientation would be to fight for socialist alternative policies in Labour with, at the most and as a subsidiary task, running a few candidates against the most extreme and nptorious rightists and supporters of the govarnemnt. The realit hovever is that today no such serious force exists. Those forces who have fursued a consistent and active role in fighting the governemnt's policies have done so primarily either independently of, or completely outside; the organisational framework of the LP, and any serious opposition current within the I. P. Under such circumstances, the chief task is not the fight within the lP, but the task to project and organise as clearly as possible those forces who are prepared to fight consistently - forces which today are organisationally not acting through the LP. This situation determines
a lane whereby the way to reach and win the maximir iumb of forces to the oorrect and vital positions in the class strusi , bet achiveva by running candidates índependent of Labour and not mirmby offering critical support to Labour.
8. Such independent candidates have must have a limited and sericus goal. The realistic task of the period is not that of defeating babour but of imposing a serious set-back on the CP as the main force competing for united action with leftward moving groups of workers breaking from the line of the Labour bureaucracy: Within this framework, the running uf independent candidates will have a positive role both in building a revolutionary organidation and in the central task of the present nericd - -re task of creating a serious class struggle opposition at the base of the mass

## organisations.

9. The general slogen issued by the IMG for the election must encapsulate this general analysis and it's organisational conclusion. The slogan which would correspond to the view that the most urgent task was to ight within the LP for an answer to the crisis would be "Vote Labour but fight for socialist policies" - a position which would also correspond to runngng no or only a handful of candidates. The slogan which would correspond to the view -that the central issue in this election was reform versus revolution, and the task of revolutionaries was therefore to polarise the election arrund this question, would be For a Labour Govt but vote for a revolutioriary alternative" - a position entailinga vote, apart from Labour, for solely the organisations of the revolutionary left (i.e. not the SLP and inrolving funning against all Labour candidates). Of the slogans advanced to encapsulate the analysis outlined above "For a Labour Givt but fight for a socialist alternative" is the möst satisfactory. Such a slogan clearly involves voting for revolutionary candidates running against Labour but, unlike the slogan
for a 'revolutiónary alternative', also can ibclude voting for candidates or not running against candidates who are not revolutionaries but who have pursued a policy of fighting the policies of the governemnt.
Dur position on the forces in the election
10. The attitude of the IMG to all other forces is determined by the considerations outlined above:

- (i) Suppoeters of the line of the Labour Govts Support for the Govt will
- of course be the line of the LP in the elction. Despite all the attacks rf the Labour Govt, the defeat of the LF in the elections would undoubtedly be a.setback, letting im a viciously abti-working class Tory governemnt, temoralising importamt sections of the working class in the face of this kitzemoment, and preventing layers of the working class drawing the experience of the role of the Labour bureaucrats in office. For these reasons, w= are for the return of a Labour Govt. We will call far a Labour vote against the Tories while, at the same time, in as many places as possible, attempting to get put forward cancidates against the line of the Labour Govt wh ve supporters of the policy of that governemnt are standing.
(ii) The organised Labour left and the Communist Party, Even apart trom their general programmatic backwardness, no organised section of the Latour left has pursued a serious campaign of resistance to the policies of the governemnt. With the exception of individuals, the Tribunites have at most, and not even in all cases, put up purely verbal opposition. Their objective role has been the left coter of the governemnt. There is no reason whotever why we should not stand or support candidates standing against the Tritunites. The role of the $C P$ has been, in no way qualitatively different from that of the TRibunites. They have not relied on the mobilisation of the messes but on the contrary completely subordinated that to parliamentarist oppositiobal. illusions and manoeuvres within the bureaucaray. The CP has withdrawn from even the iimited appositian shown under the last governemnt in such actions as the strikes against In Place of Strifis, the lobbies of the TUC, etc. There is no basis either in general frogremmetic considerations or immediate needs for giving critical support to candigates of the CP .


## 4.

(iii) Irdividual Labour lefts, The most marginal and difficult cose taat of a small number of individual left Labour forces whi trve vac ted between purely bureaucratic manoeuvres and supporting oi uncura : $s$ action ageinst the government's policies. These range from forces wit have simply voted against the gavernment without taking decisive ste. s outside this but are nevertheless clearly seen by the wotking class. $s$ oppositional elements (e.g. Thorne), through forces who have undoutt:supported such mass actions as have occurred although not necessari i. i. itiating them (Maynard, Knight, Livingstone), to forces whi have ofis iv advocated mass action against the governemnt's policies (Kelly, Rolevts, Nicholson, Scargill, etc). In these cases, the problem is whether it 3 best for taking forward the calss struggle and exposing these elements now and in the future, as they turn from vacillating allies to open strikebreakers, to run candidetes against them now or not to run candidates eut make demands on them while urging a vote for them. Such an issue can orly be decided tactically. At present to run candidates against such elements would not be understandable aven by advanced forces of the workers muvement and far from getting our ideas to most people, $\quad$ : we would be able to do this most effectively by not runing against them. Tr is position must be decided individually in aach case however and must te reviewed also in the light of events between now and the election. (iv) The Sillars SLP; The Sillars SLP essentially falls into the same category as the individual Labour lefts. The Sillars forces have mere or less consistently voted against the governemnt on issues such as cuts, unemployment, etc. They have also followed in the wake of mass actions against the governemnts policies

- although they have
initiated none themselves. The tactical protlem is how best to tike forward the struggle against the goverment's policies and expose the role of the Sillarsites. As with individual Labour lefts, at present the beat way is to call for a vote for the Sillarsites, and not run candidates against them while at the same time placing demands on then. This must however be looked at continously between now and the election in terms of the evolution of the SLP, its relations with the SNP, etc. (v) The extreme lefte This consists of possible class struggle candidates in a locality, the organised revolutionary left, the SLP(SF), and the Militant group. In a few areas, it may be possible to secure the putting forward of independent class struggle candidates - forces not necessarily revolutionary but supporting the most decisive demands of cur action programme and with a record of struggle and base in an area or nationally. We should encourage any such possibility and give full backing to any such candidate. However realistically apart from a few areas (e.g. Newham if Prentice is reselected, areas of high fascist influence), it is unlikely that anything other than one or two such candidates would be put forward. Instead we will primarily be cohfronted with organised forces of the extreme left. The only other extreme left force than the IMG likely to run more than one candidate in the election is the IS. It is quite clear that the IS meet the criteria outlined above - despite sectarian deviations, the IS does not at all rely on parliament and has clearly been carrying on a struggle against the goverments policies on the decisive issues. We call for a vote for the IS candidates ageinst those of the LF. Within this framework, of course, however, we criticise the prigrammatic inadequacy of the Is on a number of major questions, their sectarian oriantation to the mass organisations and the extreme left, call for their campaign to tue oreanised in a democratic fashion ard based on the forces engaged in the vanguard of the class struggle, etc. (Footnote 1). The SLF (SF) stands on the cecisEootnote 1. We should be risar however in the motivation we give for votine $\bar{f} \subset \bar{r}$ Ehe $\bar{I} S^{-}$in this election. The question of our motivation for voting for IS is a separate questior from our general characterisation of them as an organisation. Even if we concluded that they should be characterised as a revolutionary organiszition, this would not be the motivation for calling for a vote. To call fir a vote for the IS on the grounds that they are reaolutionaries is to mike the touchstone of the election for or against reeolution an ultre-]aft deviation.
ive demands of our action proframme and fights $f a r$ them. We clearly call for a vote for this organisation and urge it to run as mony candidates as possible. Despite its centrist character and absorftion in Labour infighting, the Militant current clearly fights against the rolicies of the gavernment. In any constituency where a MIlitant supporter was candideto (e.g. if Bevan were selected in NEwham NE), we are not in favour of unning a candidate against them. The only other current which mey run a candidete is the WSL. Thoenett, for example, would be an excellent caiss struggle candidate and we should urge the WSL to run him - pledging full IMG support to such a campaign.

The WRF im the present situation cannot be considered as an organisation fulfilling the criteria for a vote against Labour. It has engaged in no serious initiatives against the Labour Govt. Its chief campaigns are not those corresponding even remotely to the needs of the working class but to its sectarian interests and fantasies. Its campaign for the downfall of the Labour Govt is actually contray to the interests of the working calss. There is no correct basis for calling in this election for a vote for the WRP against the LP. 11. The position of the IMG embodying its analysis is to seek to maximise the number of candidates running on a programme of socialist opposition to the policies of the Labour Govt. For tactical reasons, these alternative candidates should evidently be run in seats whose loss could only be attributed to the demoralising loss of votes created by the Labour Govt and not to an electoral intervention of working class forces dipposed to the Labour Govt's policies. Apart from this, we only oppose running candidates against a few individual LP forces of the Maynard, Knight, Livingstone, Kelly/Devan/Nácholson type. We call for a vote for the SLP(Sillars), the SLP (SF), the IS, the IMG, and other forces of the extreme left against. the LP. We call for a vote for the candidates of the LP against those of the WRP.

