

XS: Jack, MA, Doug, (Gus), B/C, Peter C, IO

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Fred Murphy
IP
New York

Dear Fred,

A belated note on the Pare in Peru for your knowledge and estimation of the situation there.

The PRT, along with most of the far left, underestimated or didn't recognize a series of political factors that, in my opinion, played an important role in the "fracaso". Hugo's post analysis is more political than most others I heard in jail or out, but doesn't touch on at least one very important question.

The situation in Peru was no longer "pre-revolutionary" at the time of the Pare. Actually, the failure of the Miners' strike was undoubtedly the critical turning point in a process of "defusion" begun with the installation of the Constituent Assembly.

This was Hugo's position, but he was in a minority, a small one. Going into the Pare, the PRT et al elaborated a line for the Pare based on this fundamental error--that Peru was in a pre-revolutionary situation.

The result was a widely ultra-left orientation and isolation. I collected various leaflets and articles to send to you but "lost" them to the police.

In general the PRT et al posed overthrowing the generals as the fundamental task of the Pare. The longest list of economic demands alongside the "overthrow" call couldn't salvage the latter. The role of the ultra was clearly seen as participating in the Pare for different reasons than the workers.

An example of our work. On the Sunday before the Pare, during the state of emergency, the PRT called a secret march in COMAS. For over an hour we marched through the barriada under a banner, the only slogan carried that day, of "For The Socialist Revolution". No wonder not a single in-

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pendent joined us!

This ultra left error played into the hands of both the CP and the government. The CP, who used it to justify the exclusion of the ultra from a unified command. For the government it made it relatively easy to characterize the whole strike as ultra and push their "the workers have some just x grievances line, but ..."

In general, both the CP and government had a better appreciation of the level of consciousness of the masses than the far left.

Why this error on our party part? First, there was a tendency to underestimate the magnitude of the defeat of the miners and its impact. I think the CITE march shortly after was disorientating in this sense and was misinterpreted as evidence our class as a whole ~~wasn't~~ hadn't suffered a defeat with the miners' and that morale wasn't affected, etc. Later in the fall, subsequent CITE parades and marches grew progressively smaller, evidence, I think, that the September affair was a dramatic exception to a downward trend, rooted in particular factors, such as the shocking announcement of the massive layoffs.

Another error was to underestimate the impact of the sheer existence of the Constituent Assembly and the call--albeit without a date--for elections on the consciousness of the masses. All the speculation of candidacies for the presidency, ledesma or blance, etc, couldn't but have fueled illusions in the "transference", etc. With "democracy" so close and seemingly so sure, why hit the call now to risk one's neck to overthrow generals who will be gone in a short while, etc...

In general the party had no idea what the masses were thinking, it was isolated. How could this be with the top leader of the masses in our party? ~~From what I could see~~ From what I could see Hugo tends to play a Debsian role to a certain extent. He has a tendency not to intervene in the internal discussions too much. He plays the role of mass leader, but not leader inside the party. He maybe avoiding what he thinks is mere type caudillismo, perhaps confusing it with Leninist leadership, or simply sitting back and letting the young leaders make their errors. But he doesn't play a big role internally.

Conrad, Mike

[Kelly]