


YOUNG SOCIALIST

REVIEW

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INFORMATION AND DISCUSSION
BULLETIN OF THE
YOUNG SOCIALIST LEAGUE

EDITORIAL NOTES

1

WHAT THE YSR IS

The Young Socialist Review is the information and discussion bulletin of the Young Socialist League. The YSR is prepared by the YSL National Office and is edited by Owen Morse.

The aim of the YSR is to constitute a forum for the expression of all points of view within the YSL. It is, therefore, completely open to any member who may wish to contribute his views -- and to any group of members. Contributions from non-members will be accepted, if of sufficiently high interest. (The editor reserves the right to decide on the case of each such article.)

For obvious reasons it should be understood that articles signed by individuals do not necessarily represent the views of the YSL. Any material that is "official" will be clearly labelled as such.

Copy should be submitted to the YSL national office, Third Floor, 114 W 14 St., New York 11, N.Y. If at all possible submit copy already stenciled, single spaced. If this is not possible, then submit material type-written, double-spaced. Non typwritten copy will not be accepted.

It should be clear that the YSR is not restricted to members of the YSL. Though issued primarily for members it is open to all friends and other interested individuals. Members should make every effort to get copies into the hands of this wider audience. Send in your bundle orders now.

All labor expended in the publication of the YSR is donated by members of the NY Unit of YSL.

THIS ISSUE

This is the first issue of YSR this year. Although ^{we aspire} to regularity in its appearance, the comrades only seem to hit the typewriter just before and after a National Convention or a National Executive Committee Plenum. We had one apiece last year, and it was at those times that YSR appeared. In between these momentous events, it has been a rare comrade indeed who was moved to write. For what it is worth, the editor acknowledges that little has been done to solicit specific articles from specific comrades to fill out the editorial box. The comrades should be warned, however, that since YSR will continue to be put out by a volunteer editor in time spared from NY Unit activities, no basic change is likely from the top.

After many many months with three articles on hand, we were suddenly flooded with material directed toward our coming Second National Convention. This issue was gotten out in one hectic week, and will undoubtedly be followed by at least two more prior to the convention. So be it.

Owen Morse, Editor

CONVENTION CALL

2.

June 13, 1955

To all Units and Members of
the Young Socialist League:

Dear Comrades:

The Young Socialist League was founded almost a year and a half ago as a result of the merger of the Young People's Socialist League and the Socialist Youth League. The developments which followed the founding of the YSL have completely justified the YPSL-SYL merger and the organization of our Young Socialist League. During this period we have organized new units, established roots on several campuses where they were previously absent, experienced slow but steady recruitment, furthered the socialist education of many comrades, participated in some struggles on the campus, and continued to bring the ideas of socialism to students and young workers.

The founding convention of the YSL, of necessity could not thoroughly deal with many of the usual convention tasks, for it was concerned almost exclusively with the problems of uniting the YPSL and SYL and establishing the YSL. That convention could only therefore adopt a tentative program for the organization and lay the foundations for the organizational structure of the YSL.

The time has come for the YSL to assemble again in convention, to assess the results of the work of the last period, to draw up the League's political program, to decide other political questions facing it, to make whatever changes in the Constitution and structure of the YSL that may be desirable, to plan our work for the coming period and to renew the leadership of the organization.

For the accomplishments of these tasks, the National Action Committee calls a National Convention of the Young Socialist League to be held in the city of Chicago on September, 3, 4, and 5.

The National Action Committee proposes the following as its draft agenda. The National Executive Committee will make the definitive agenda proposal to the Convention, which shall make the final decision.

Agenda

- I. Organization of Convention, election of committees, greetings, etc.
- II. Draft Program
 - A. International
 - B. National
- III. Organization
 - A. National Report
 - B. Unit Reports
 - C. Press
 - D. YSL - ISL Relations
- IV. Tasks and Perspectives
- V. Constitution
- VI. Anvil
- VII. Elections

3.

Election of delegates.

All units shall elect a number of delegates proportional to the number of members they have in good standing as of August 1, 1955. Units shall elect one delegate for each five members or major fraction thereof. The procedure for electing delegates in those units in which there exist differing political tendencies shall be in accordance with Article V, Section 1 D of the Constitution. "Units should also elect alternates."

A member in good standing is one whose dues to the unit are paid up through within three months of this date (August 1, 1955) and for whom the unit has paid its per capita dues to the National Office through within three months, of this date.

The system of Proportional Representation that the NAC recommends is that each unit break up its representation on the basis of opposing resolutions and views in the pre-convention discussion. Any tendency gains its representation in proportion to the number of members who decide to join together on the question the group has decided to divide upon. The separate groups will elect their own delegates.

Members - at - large shall be balloted by the NAC. They shall be entitled to a number of delegates proportional to the number of such members in good standing as of July 15, 1955 on the basis of one delegate for every five members or major fraction thereof. Only members-at-large shall represent members-at-large; those desiring to run for delegates shall so notify the National Office by August 1, 1955.

The National Action Committee will place the various resolutions and documents to be considered in the convention in the hands of the comrades during the next few months. It is our hope to get out several issues of YSR during this period containing these materials as well as discussion articles on the various questions by YSL members. All members are invited and urged to avail themselves of their right to inform the League of their views by submitting articles for the YSR. Units should schedule discussions of the various questions to come before the convention so that all members will be informed of the various convention questions and so that the convention delegation can represent the views of the League's membership.

FORWARD TO A FRUITFUL CONVENTION.

Fraternally,

Max Martin
National Chairman
for the
National Action Committee

4

ON COMRADE WALKER AND THE MCCARTHY RALLY

By Don Harris

(Editorial note: the following article was submitted some time ago, but did not appear for lack of other material at hand to fill out a full issue of YSR.)

In the last issue of Challenge, comrade Walker of the Berkley Branch of the YSL made a further contribution to the discussion of the socialist attitude toward the rights of fascists. As an abstract presentation of our tactics under certain conditions (specifically, a period of social crisis, an immediate fascist danger, and a working class movement conscious of this danger and prepared to fight militantly to defend its rights), comrade Walker's article may have added a necessary correction to previous articles which failed to deal with such a situation.

However, the art of politics consists at least partly in being able to distinguish between different types of periods, and different forms of movements, and adapting tactics to the particular situation. Any value that comrade Walker's discussion might have with respect to past or future situations, is vitiated by the way in which he tries to apply his point of view to the problem of McCarthyism.

Unfortunately, the form in which comrade Walker poses the problem tends to confuse the matter, attacks the YSL's leadership for its lethargy, its failure to take advantage of political opportunities, etc. The failure to call a counter-demonstration to the N.Y. McCarthy rally.

With these preliminaries, let us go directly to the proposal of comrade Walker, and see where it leads and what lies behind it.

The New York McCarthy rally was, very specific in both character and aims. It aimed at protesting the censure resolution then being debated in the Senate. Together with the collection of signatures, it was part of the campaign to mobilize public opinion against this censure. Thus, the first thing that must be established is its entirely legal and parliamentary character. Furthermore, it was entirely defensive, unlike the opposition to the recall movement in Wisconsin, in which McCarthy's supporters there undertook legal persecution, economic sanctions and personal harassment against the anti-McCarthy forces. But with respect to the N.Y. rally, from the standpoint of its activities, no objection whatever could be raised against the right to organize or "petition for redress or grievances" or assembly in meetings to express this opposition. Even comrade Walker, I am sure, would agree to this. That is, he would agree unless he believed that the Committee for Ten Million Signatures was merely a cover for the organization of a more clearly defined fascist tendency, in other words, that the movement and its campaign were those of an "incipient fascist" group. This is one possible rationale for his proposal.

While it is really irrelevant, this view needs to be discussed, if only because at the time of the censure move, many people were led to believe that this was the case by a couple of specious analogies. The most important was the pre-eminent role of retired military figures. Their role undoubtedly had political significance, but not that attached to it. Indeed, as Labor Action pointed out, the military's inexperience and political ineptness were in large measure the cause of the rally's flop as any kind of mobilization of fascist sentiment (which certainly was present in abundance).

Such formal reasoning, comrade Walker might well argue, however, ignored the nature of the political forces involved in the censure debate, and the sentiments which both sides appealed to. And in this he would be right. Whatever the limitations of the censure motion, its passage marked a distinct defeat for the

McCarthy brand of Republicanism, and despite the fact that in the Senate, the motion was the product of completely bourgeois political interests (i.e. the factional interests of the Eisenhower Republicans and the party interests of the Democrats), in the country as a whole, the pro-censure feeling was represented by genuinely healthy sentiments. McCarthy was entirely right in his charge that the censure motion was dishonest in intent, and that he was really being convicted of "crimes" other than those charged in the motion. From our standpoint, we would say that, particularly among the general population, the sentiment for censure was based on opposition to Joe McCarthy's more general anti-democratic crimes that merely his violation of Senate protocol.

For this reason, and despite our criticisms of the Senate motion, in my opinion the YSL should have participated whole-heartedly in the campaign for censure. It should have sent its members to the spontaneous groups which distributed petitions. It should have circulated those petitions on campus. It should have tried to involve SDA, the Young Liberals, Young Democrats, campus NAACP chapters and all other such groups in a common effort to distribute them among students, parents, high schools, etc.

A campaign this basis could have brought the YSL into contact with broader, and healthy, even though limited, sections of the youth. The YSL might not have played the "leading" role, but it would not have been entirely isolated, either. In fact, the whole virtue of such a campaign is that it would have been undertaken together with other real forces -- most of them entirely fresh and interested in political activity (even in the narrowest sense) for the first time.

Comrade Walker's proposal for the YSL to try to organize a counter-demonstration to the McCarthy rally not only lacks a political basis, but because it ignores (or misunderstands) what its basis could have been, projects an entirely false role for the YSL. Just as the rally itself was entirely within the framework of the bourgeois democratic process, so was the anti-McCarthy opposition. It limited its efforts entirely to collecting petitions, and similar activity. And this was entirely proper. McCarthyism is a political sentiment, even a movement, if you will, but it is a political movement, not a bunch of silver shirts. And it must be combatted politically. Just as there is a time "to go into the streets" there is also a time to stay off of them, and this was one of those times. To establish this, however, we must go somewhat further.

Any disagreement over whether the YSL should have called such a demonstration as comrade Walker proposed would seem to be of minor significance, and it would be if it were not logically related to what seems (from a previous article by comrade Walker) to be other differences over "the rights of fascists".

While no democrat is for unlimited rights for fascists (i.e. to terrorize their opposition, beat up Jews, wreck working class meetings, etc.) we are for certain rights for them, that is, the same right we demand for ourselves and for any other political tendency, as long as it confines its activities to "peaceful" or ordinary political means. When it goes beyond those limits, we are for the state suppressing its activities (at least we call upon it to do so) and we call upon its victims to defend themselves, whether the state sees fit to protect them or not. And, when under the cover of ostensibly peaceful meetings such a movement prepares or agitates for violence, we may even seek to organize pressure against it by demonstrations, picketlines, etc. But what we do not and cannot favor is suppression of its regular democratic rights.

To come back once again to the McCarthy rally, and ask in this context

what the purpose of a counter demonstration would have been, the answer is obvious. Its purpose would not have been to present our position to the entering audience (as say, we seek to do when we distribute challenge or a leaflet at many different kinds of public meetings). For it was not an audience with which we had something in common, for which reason we could hope to convince or influence it in some measure. Rather, in whatever small way was possible, it would have been an attempt to oppose the holding of the meeting and keep people away. To do that, is to attempt to prevent the McCarthy forces from exercising what are no more than their democratic rights, (remember, they were merely protesting a certain Senate measure) at a time when the danger to civil liberties in general does not emanate from McCarthy, would serve no purpose but to create confusion about the YSL's position on McCarthyism and on civil liberties in general. It might even serve to create doubts in the mind of comrade Fredrickson who has belatedly discovered that we are not against civil liberties for fascists (or in this case, for reactionary Republicans). Now certainly, our position in favor of such rights does not preclude our democratic right to call such a demonstration if we wish to do so. But it would signify a kind of "militancy" toward the McCarthyites which no other political forces are at present prepared to exercise, if only because they do not recognize it as a fascist danger. And to push for such a proposal, with the motive presented by comrade Walker--to get publicity for the YSL--would certainly lend credence to the belief among other anti-McCarthy forces that the YSL is interested mainly in promoting its particular interests rather than the broad fight against McCarthyism. And they would be right, if only because any demonstration of the kind proposed would simply have played into the hands of the rally's sponsors by allowing them to link the motion for censure with "red forces such as we see outside this meeting".

A counter demonstration would make sense only from the standpoint of the Socialist Workers Party's viewpoint at that that time, namely, that McCarthyism represented an immediate fascist danger, before which the other bourgeois forces were impotent, and which only mass workers' opposition could defeat. It is significant that, with this position, even the SWP did not do what comrade Walker proposes. This may have been because by that time, they were in full flight from their "analysis" of McCarthyism. A short time afterwards they had to admit that their whole "campaign" had been a political flop because it had misjudged the entire situation, the forces involved, and the methods of struggle. With that party's example before us, the YSL should be thankful that it did not try to engage in a kind of activity which led the SWP to a small-scale disaster. It can do this, as we stated above, without in any way being complacent about its actual role in the anti-McCarthy campaign, or about its general political immaturity and lack of militancy.

But what transpired at the rally, and the subsequent disintegration of the committee argue against any fascist perspective by its organizers. The use of a Jewish rabbi and the "spontaneous" appearance of the hero Cohn may have been intended only to set fears of anti-semitism at rest, but it did preclude any blatant Jew-baiting. Furthermore, it was not intended as a rally around the figure of Mc-

Carthy as the new Feuhrer, since a large number of the organizers broke with McCarthy demonstratively a couple of weeks later when the latter made his tentative break with the Republican Party by appologizing for having supported Eisenhower in 1952. The last heard from the remnants was that they had formed an organization called Americans for American Action, and were seeking to raise the really piddling sum of \$25,000. Whatever AAA may be, it certainly is not the mass fascist party of the present, and presents no threat requiring the organization of defense guards.

In our opinion, the Committee represented nothing much more (at least in its leadership) than a mobilization of opinion within the Republican Party, that is, within the traditional framework of bourgeois politics in America, and its two party system. And, again in our opinion, those are the real limits and potentialities of the McCarthy movement at present. As such, of course, it certainly represents a reactionary danger, but not in the form of a fascist movement toward which the tactics that comrade Walker discusses abstractly might apply.

To return to the proposal to demonstrate against this rally, the question immediately arises as to the character and slogans which the YSL would have to propose for such a demonstration. What would we be demonstrating against? What would we demand on our placards and leaflets?

I hope that no one would propose that we protest the right to hold this meeting, or call for the police to prevent its being held. This is what malicious or misinformed people attribute to socialists when they talk about "being opposed to the rights of fascists" and hence it is very important that we dissociate ourselves from this idea. The obvious demand of such a counter demonstration would be that the Senate censure McCarthy. Concretely, however, this was not exactly our opinion on the censure. If comrade Walker will recall, the terms of the censure motion, and think about their implications, its dangers will be apparent. McCarthy was not censured for his abuse of citizens, but of senators and senate procedure. The "club" was censuring his violation of their rules, rules which from a socialist and democratic standpoint do not represent the ideal handbook of political conduct. A socialist senator might face the same kind of charges (personal abuse, refusal to collaborate with a hostile investigative committee, etc) that were raised against McCarthy as the formal basis for the censure motion. The charge which was dropped (abuse of the military) was even more dangerous as an abstract precedent.

Given what should have been our criticisms of the censure motion, we could not raise the simple slogan of "for censure". Indeed, if the pro-censure forces had held their rally, it might have been advisable for the YSL to distribute a leaflet which criticized the nature of the censure motion and its sponsors, and calling for censure for McCarthy's real crimes against democracy. At least this would have had some political sense to it.

ON GERMAN UNITY

by CHARLES M.

Socialists everywhere recognize the overwhelming right of the German people to unification of their imperialistically divided land. The demand by Germans for national sovereignty of a united Germany is a just and progressive one.

In a united Germany it would be possible, although not immediately inevitable, for a militant working class to make progressive steps which the present subordination of the country to the two power blocs -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- makes more difficult. Such steps could benefit the entire European working class and lead European politics in a progressive direction.

As a result of certain recent shifts in the cold war jockeyings of the Soviet Union and the United States (in particular, the recent changes in Soviet tactics as a result of West German inclusion in NATO -- as illustrated by the Austrian state treaty and the visit to Belgrade) there will now be Big Four negotiations for a reunification of Germany. Undoubtedly, neither side is bargaining in good faith, but rather as a result of pressures from within and without to which it is responsive.

While we recognize that at the present time both sides have, in fact, the power to decide Germany's fate through imperialist negotiations, we of course reject any concept implying their right to do so.

For the Soviet Union the loss of her East German satellite is certainly undesirable. In the light of the Austrian treaty we may predict that the least she will demand in exchange for a reunified Germany is some form of guaranteed neutrality and a withdrawal of all armed forces from the country. Whether the arming of West Germany is a sufficient threat to force her to live up to her proposal, remains to be seen.

For the United States, the reunification of Germany under such conditions would be an even greater blow. Her entire European military strategy and the politics of the last five years would be shattered. The withdrawal of the tremendous force now in West Germany would undermine capitalism on the Continent, both economically and militarily. Whether the combined pressure, exerted both by her allies and by the Russian offer, will force her to agree to the above terms, also remains to be seen.

We can only condemn the present line up of world forces which makes such imperialistic dealings possible. However, we call upon the working class of Germany and of Europe to make the most of the possibilities offered by these negotiations.

(continued)

(ON GERMAN UNITY - continued)

To the working class of Germany we say: you should demand the unconditional reunification of Germany, the full withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany and a full return of national sovereignty to Germany.

To American left-militants of all kinds, we put forth the notion that pressure must be brought to bear in all ways possible upon the United States to force her to return full and unconditional sovereignty to the German people.

The aim of the peoples of the world for a just government and enduring peace, free from imperialist maneuvering and control, can only be brought to realization through the exertion of pressure by them upon the governments of the world and not by such imperialist deals as now face us.

During April-May this year the NEC passed the following resolutions through a referendum. The history of these resolutions, and the discussion about them will be summarized in the following pages.

In the Ysr issued just prior to the NEC Plenum of September, 1954 Comrade Harrington introduced the text of his proposed resolution (printed on the next page). At the plenum discussion of it, though most NEC members were favorably inclined toward it, a few comrades (notably comrades Martin, Taylor and Radetsky) had vigorous objections. Plenum decided to postpone action until time had elapsed so that a full discussion could take place. The National Action Committee was instructed to initiate a three month discussion of this question immediately.

(The following section is taken from Comrade Martin's introduction to the referendum ballot.) "We have to record that unfortunately, little, if any discussion was subsequently held.

"At the Jan. 18 meeting of the NAC, Comrade Harrington announced that since more than the envisaged number of months had elapsed, he was calling a referendum of the NEC on his resolution. The NAC then began a discussion of the resolution, so that it might go out to the NEC with statements from the NAC majority and minority on the question as the opinions of the NAC. The discussion was concluded at the January 25th meeting of the NAC, at which time NEC alternate Hacker introduced a resolution of his on the subject. The majority of the NAC opposed the Harrington resolution by a vote of 4-2. The Hacker resolution was not carried, there being however no majority or minority: the vote was For: 2, Against: 2, Abstain: 2.

Other Discussion on the Question

1. The first text of the Harrington Resolution, YSR, Aug. 1954, Vol. 1, #3, pp. 17

2. NEC Plenum, Sept. 1954, pp 10-11 of the minutes. The text of a resolution by Comrade Radetsky which was defeated is missing from the minutes and the recorded action on the Harrington motion is garbled.

3. Article on Plenum discussion by Comrade Bob Bone, member of the NEC: YSR, November, 1954, Vol 1, #4, pp 3-5. This is the only article other than the discussion on the following pages and should be referred to by Comrades interested in the question.

4. Unit discussions were held in New York, Pittsburgh, Chicago and Berkeley.

5. Action by the NAC: Minutes of Jan-Feb 1955.

Copies of back issues of YSR are available from the National Office.

Copies of NEC and NAC minutes are available to members who request them. However, ~~XXXXX~~ only a few copies of back minutes are on hand.

-- Owen Morse

HARRINGTON RESOLUTION:

The Young Socialist League is not a pacifist organization, although it includes and welcomes pacifists into its ranks.

However, the development of modern armaments has reached a point where even non pacifists must take a principled and categorical stand.

The use of atomic weapons against cities is an act which is morally and politically unjustifiable. We therefore categorically condemn such weapons, no matter what government may use them.

We therefore affirm an absolute rejection of this use of such weapons at any time or under any circumstance.

HACKER RESOLUTION: ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The development, testing and stockpiling of atomic weapons is today essentially one tool of the world-wide imperialist struggle between the United States and Russia.

1) We condemn all preparations for such imperialist struggle and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, the most destructive and anti-human explosive weapons to date.

- 2) We condemn the present testing of such weapons,
- a. its demoralizing effect on human values - the fear it strikes into the hearts of the people of the world;
 - b. the cynical and undemocratic movement of populations to clear areas for such tests;
 - c. the possible physical dangers of resulting radiation and fall-out.

3) We condemn the use of atomic weapons on civilian populations in cities (as for example practised by the the United States in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in World War II) because it destroys mass civilian populations, men, women, and children as well as the best artistic and material products of man's civilization. Such bombings are destructive, therefore, of human values, and are to be condemned morally and politically. The present contest for nuclear supremacy by Russia and the United States underlines the basic cynicism and contempt for human values and potentialities by these two destructive, war-like, and imperialist powers.

STATEMENT FOR THE HARRINGTON RESOLUTION
by Mike Harrington

The socialist, as distinguished from the pacifist, approach to the question of war has always been relative. The issue is raised in terms of this war, its class content, its politics, etc., rather than in terms of an abstraction, "war". Within the context of this

relative approach, the determining criteria have been: political: does this war serve the cause of socialism, and therefore of peace. ^{12.}

It is my contention that even with this relative approach the socialist is now obliged to an absolute statement of opposition to certain weapons; or better, that because of this relative approach, such an affirmation is now necessary.

The basic reason behind this is the same one which has been determining in all socialist analyses of war, i.e. a political criterion.

Stated bluntly, it is now impossible for the strategic use of atomic weapons to serve any socialist political aim under any circumstances.

II. The Development OF Technology

There is no necessity to emphasize vague and futuristic hypotheses when discussing this point. It is not even necessary to include the estimation of some scientists that the continuation of hydrogen tests may cause a basic genetic change in the human race.

I take it as a matter of fact that an atomic war between any powers for whatever reasons contains within it the probability of the destruction of the main centers of urban life and the very real possibility of the annihilation of the human race through the fall out.

I take it as a matter of fact that the strategic use of these weapons necessarily involves the destruction of entire cities. As such it not only means the destruction of human life on an unparalleled scale, but also the destruction of the material basis of socialism. Without human beings socialism is impossible; without cities socialism is impossible.

These are facts about the strategic use of such weapons. This does not include the possible result of the fall-out, in terms of genetic change and human life.

Comrade Mel's resolution, for example, is much more palatable. It repeats the familiar sayings, its emphasis is on this war, it attempts to disguise the actual change in politics. In section 3, however, it agrees without qualification with my position.

This, I believe, stems from the absolutism of the comrades opposed to my resolution. They are unwilling to face the consequences of their own relative kind of analysis. They must reassure themselves that it is still the same old world, that it is imperialist atomic weapons which they opposed, just another case, the bow and arrow parlayed a thousand times. They refuse to recognize that quantity has become quality, that this is not another kind of weapon, a species to be handled under the familiar genus of the socialist movement, they refuse to recognize that it is a new genus, a new reality, a revolutionary, transforming, containing within it the possibility of destruction and even of annihilation.

For this once, let us abandon the qualifications, not out of a spirit of whimsy, but because the reality which we discuss has abandoned the qualifications. For once, let our eyes be as simple and as plain as the nose of an ox. Those who see the question at all are interested in a plain answer. Let us give it to them.

IV. On Absolutism

It is charged that my resolution is absolute. So it is. So also is the reality of atomic weapons. Relativistically considered, the result is an absolute conclusion. This paradox eludes the comrades and makes of them absolutists of the relative when the relative, in the area of atomic weapons, ceased to exist some years ago.

V. Conclusion

In the face of the possibility of the end of the habitability of the world;

in the face of the possibility of the end of human life;

in the face of the probability, in war, of the end of cities and all they contain, men, women, children, the material level of civilization;

what qualification, what critical support, what temporizing, is alid for a socialist?

STATEMENT AGAINST THE HARRINGTON RESOLUTION ON THE H-BOMB

by Sam Taylor

The threat of nuclear war and the test of nuclear weapons by both the U.S. and Russia have produced at least one common reaction among people over the entire world - a fear and horror of these new weapons of war. Both supporters and critics of the two imperialist camps, have raised their voices in opposition to any use of nuclear weapons and even to testing of the bombs. Only the most reactionary forces have openly proclaimed their reliance on these instruments of political policy. There is almost a one to one ratio between those who have openly waved nuclear weapons as an instrument of political policy, and those governments which have, as a result of a lack of real political policy, placed their defense of their "way of life" upon means which can very well mean its end.

One of the things that has characterized the socialist approach to politics and to international conflicts is a rejection and opposition to the militaristic and sword-rattling policies of imperialist powers. Non-pacifist socialists have recognized the horrors and dangers of war just as they have acknowledged that violence often means that a terrible social price must be paid for achieving democratic and progressive goals. All justification of wars,

violence and force have to be in terms of what the results will be or what are the consequences of the alternatives if those methods of political and social policies are not pursued, and also what alternatives are open for the achieving of the goal of socialism. But the most valid generalization that can be made about those problems is that each situation and each choice of action has to be considered in the concrete case. Almost every generalization or "absolute" principle on how to proceed in a certain type of situation will run into circumstances when it will have to be altered or modified or directly violated. This does not mean that generalizations and principles are of no use or that we should eschew developing them, but rather to be realistic and realize their limitations. It is with these thoughts that we must approach the question of an absolute position on the question of nuclear weapons or to the politics of the H-Bomb such as has been raised by Mike Harrington's resolution.

The problem of the H-Bomb is not one of the H-Bomb alone, but one of the worldwide crisis of conflict between two imperialist camps. Therefore, we cannot look at the problem without dealing with the reasons for its existence. In a real way the H-Bomb is the symbol of world civilization delicately balanced on the razor's edge between nuclear warfare and the potentialities for a tremendous drive forward in the development of human society represented by atomic energy. Atomic energy has brought forth the greatest fears as well as the greatest hopes. It is the fear of a destructive power far surpassing anything previously developed by mankind that threatens the hopes of what atomic energy can mean for the creation of the material conditions capable of raising the living standards of people all over the world and bringing about a greater freedom.

The crisis that embodies this delicately balanced position is more than another imperialist struggle but one between two conflicting social systems. The crisis before mankind is one that has been building up since the first World War with each world conflict becoming a greater threat and more barbaric. No more are civilians by-standers or casual participants in these struggles. The demands and technology have made the entire country the front lines. No more is there any place to hide for the technology of modern war can seek out and destroy from bases thousands of miles away.

It is the very threat of nuclear warfare that re-emphasises our opposition to the imperialist politics leading to this danger. In fact no one can really be an opponent of an atomic devastation without being an opponent of the two imperialist camps, who are threatening the world.

It is this fact which makes our struggle for the Third Camp and for socialism more important and meaningful, and a slogan "socialism, the hope of humanity" is not a mere slogan but the absolute necessity for a world of peace.

In the struggle for peace, we have to keep in mind the nature of the imposing forces and the nature of the conflict between them. As socialists we believe that the struggle against war has to be part and parcel of the struggle against the social forces that engenders the conflict. To be for peace and against war as such is all very well, but it does not get to the heart of the matter - the social basis of war. In the world today, it means an opposition to both capitalism and stalinism - the United States and Russia.

Those who have expressed their opposition and horror at the present conflict without really understanding the nature of the conflict and the forces involved have ended up with all sorts of alternatives leading to reactionary "solutions" or end up by capitulating to the war policies. For example, the neutralists who have made only the first step in opposition to those war policies and politics and up by vacillating one way, then another, depending on the particular pressure of the cold war, and end up pursuing the utopian dream of "peaceful co-existence" at best. It is this that makes the point of view of pacifists who approach the war question from the viewpoint of horror and abhorance of violence alone so futile notwithstanding the best of intentions. And also the supporters of the two imperialist blocs who express the horror at nuclear warfare and even at the testing of atomic bombs are at best "well wishers" because their political position makes them the proponents and defenders of politics leading toward an atomic war.

As against those briefly stated considerations which influence politics, we have to consider the Harrington resolution. The resolution seeks to say that at any time and under any circumstances, socialists would not use nuclear weapons against cities. That is, it wants to lay down strictures or rules of action which would be applicable under circumstance and at any time in the future. Now in politics, we attempt to deal with situations and issues at hand and do not attempt to formulate answers to situations which may arise in the future. We seek out the consequences which may arise in the future of actions and attitudes we adapt today. But what we try to avoid is formulating policies applicable to future situations of an unknown character. The reasons for this are self-evident and almost common sense propositions. For if it were not so, then we could very easily have a long and even interesting discussion of all kinds of hypothetical situations: some may want to discuss here and now the exact policy a socialist government in the United States would embark upon in the first months after coming to power: while Mike Harrington wants to have a discussion of what would be the socialist policy in respect to use of weapons in an undetermined type of struggle, or else what weapons we would not use.

But the Harrington resolution claims a special exemption from this consideration because of the very nature of nuclear weapons. The statement made by Comrade Harrington is that modern technology burst the seams of politics, and it follows that while the resolution talks of the future, it is one that has immediate importance and practicality. We have, to take new weapons into account, it is claimed, because they have made present politics outdated. The old politics was directed toward relative weapons (perhaps like the block busters and more atomic bombs of the second world war), but the new weapons are absolute in their destructiveness and therefore we have to have new politics. The inferred reasoning is that for absolute weapons, we must have absolutistic politics.

Now, if we grant everything that is stated or implied about modern technology and its effect upon politics, the question remains as to what we have to say about this phenomena. Certainly if the effect is so shattering there must be much more to say or conclude in terms of political action than that socialists will never use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances in the future. First, what effect will it have upon our politics here and now, that is the claim of immediate consequences made for the resolution. Even

if we did say what the resolution wants us to say, will the seams of politics then be firmly joined together. The conclusion of what to say about the H-Bomb is contained in the Harrington resolution certainly seems to be of no immediate political consequences for what the YSL has to say about the present threatening conflict, and its opposition and denunciation of the imperialist politics that lead the world to the present crisis. Unless of course, we are now to take the position you can not take a position in opposition to an immediate phenomena, such as war for example, without renouncing in advance opposition to all war. Or else, the resolution can serve the immediate purpose of staying the hand of "socialist generals" who are just itching to get their hands on some H-bombs.

Now, of course, any fundamental or significant change in technology is bound to be reflected in politics and influence political thinking. And without doubt, this nuclear weapons have done. But even after this is said and done, we must remember that each new technical development does not automatically change everything. We are still left with the job of concretely analysing or attempting to analyze what are the actual consequences and how we should change our politics and political thinking if such a change is needed. Also if some things do change, many things do remain unchanged. Without trying to make a little of the problem of nuclear weapons, it is important to remember that this is not the first that the development of new weapons have led to the initial belief that a decisive change will take place in politics as a result; for example, the machine gun and dynamite. Changes there were and will be, the question is what they will be?

In discussing the H-bomb one thing should be kept in mind. It is not a question of a division between those who are for dropping the H-bomb, if not now, then at some future time, and those who are for its absolute prohibition. No one is for the use of these weapons as such, no more than those who oppose the Harrington resolution are for block busters or flame throwers. The use of weapons and techniques in a struggle is a matter of political policy, and what the consequence of these techniques will be if used and/or not used. The real question is how to conduct a political struggle. Non-pacifist socialists are not for violence, nor do they believe that the best way to solve a political problem starts when you reach for your holster or blackjack. We are for other and non-violent ways of solving political problems.

As against taking an absolutist position, the NAC majority felt that the question of how to deal with future political problems about how to defend a socialist government, ought best be left for actual determination to those times when such a situation may arise. It is felt that there might be circumstances which we cannot foresee, or at best engage in hypothesizing when their might be the justification for using all the means at its disposal as a matter of defense. It would be possible at this point to list a whole series of circumstances which may arise justifying the use of some form of nuclear weapons, or at least situations in which we believe socialists would be forced to give consideration to its use. It may very well be that all of us would come to the same decision of what to do. Each from his own point of view, but it would be a mistake for the socialist movement to make its choice based on abstract principles.

And if we believe that such situations can or may arise, then no one in good faith can be for the Harrington resolution because it would exclude in advance any such a consideration. It is possible of course, to vote for this resolution with the mental reservation that this is the way I see things now, that there isn't any situation I can foresee on the horizon or even further on, when I would use these weapons, but if the situation changes and new circumstances arise, then I feel free to change my "absolutist" position and consider the new developments. To approach this question with this kind of reservation, then the decision will be an opportunistic one if the Harrington resolution passes. In that case it becomes perfectly "legitimate" to take any position which is currently popular irrespective of whether it is right or wrong.

The socialist way of conducting a political struggle is to attempt to win over the support of the people; to make an appeal to the exploited peoples against their ruling class. Socialists who are not pacifists are not jingoists nor saber rattlers either. The social cost of war and violence is recognized, and it is one of the reasons why we look upon war as a means of last resort. A militaristic policy is not the political policy of socialists, as it is for reactionary classes. For socialists, military policy, tactics, and techniques are always subordinated to the political program: under certain circumstances it becomes an adjunct, but never the ultimate weapon to win the particular struggle. Therefore, to claim as the supporters of the Harrington resolution do that to oppose it means the abandonment of the political struggle for socialism, is to be making the claim that the only way to struggle for socialism is through pacifist means. It can only mean that any time anyone has to resort to war or violence, the political struggle has ceased. But since when do socialists believe that you can separate war or violence from the politics which initiates it? The political struggle goes on during a conflict, for war is only a form of the conflict. (War is the continuation of politics by other and violent means"). And even during a conflict, when have revolutionary socialists believed that you cease making the political appeal to those on the other side of the firing line? Or perhaps this argument means that you can not have an adequate political program if you do not take an absolutistic position on the H-bomb. But this does not follow at all.

This took the form of a question raised during a discussion in New York: "Can you conduct a political war when you drop a bomb on a city?" To pose the problem in this form is to put it in the form of an argument for or against pacifism. Now of course you can not carry on a certain type of political struggle when any form of violence is used, of which wars are only one type. Any time one person aims a gun at another, say in the period of a civil war, and then pulls the trigger, the verbal political struggle is at an end, if it did not occur before; the non-violent form of the struggle has degenerated to the point where it is a matter of survival, and the struggle can only be resolved in the conflict which in all likelihood would be forced upon a socialist government. This argument is valid, if valid at all, when dealing with anything from a bow and arrow to a single shot rifle to nuclear weapons. But then we will not have a discussion about any one weapon, but any weapons at all.

Perhaps the most important problem raised by the development of

nuclear weapons is whether they can mean the end of a modern industrial civilization and spell the doom of socialism. Perhaps it will, or at least a great deal of the known evidence indicates that it will go along way toward destroying an industrial society. But once this is acknowledged, it doesn't mean that all political problems are at an end, and all that remains for socialists as well as everyone else to do is to call for peace. The third world war has not entered the phase where nuclear weapons are being employed, and there is no "guarantee" that it will. It is not too late for the potential victims of the atomic devastation to organize to prevent its outbreak, and it is not too late for the socialist movement all over the world to intervene and bring a progressive solution to the cold war. But the resolution before us does not deal with these considerations. Instead it wants to answer the question of what a socialist government would do if it were threatened with H-bomb warfare, - in the future.

In determining this futuristic policy, there seems to be one thought behind the resolution; anything is better than an atomic war. To deny this, I feel it is necessary to state, it does not mean that atomic war would be a good thing or that it occupies just about the same position as the French and Indian War. To deny it means that this is not necessarily the only alternative before us. For example, in the NAC discussion Comrade Harrington stated that faced with an atomic war, rather than use similar weapons in defense, a socialist government should surrender even if it be to slavery. Slavery is better than destruction because at least life is possible and, therefore, socialism is possible.

Slavery or atomic destruction can be the alternatives only if socialists deal with the political problems that arise in such a way as to make certain that these are the alternatives; that is by proceeding as if they are the only alternatives. This "willingness" to pose these alternatives is a consequence of a political attitude embodied in the Harrington resolution, and not the resolution itself. It is assumed that it would be possible to avoid atomic destruction by an announced intention not to use these weapons. This may stay the hand of a socialist government, but what about the reactionary enemy who has no such absolute principles? Such a government even in the face of this refusal to bear atomic weapons may well decide to wreak atomic destruction on this socialist state so as to eliminate it as a threat in the near future. Therefore another alternative may be destruction and slavery.

To think of the problem, or to pose these alternatives, in this way, can spell the end of socialism as a perspective. For if a socialist state announced in advance a refusal to use all means at its disposal for its defense, this fact could be used by a reactionary power to force the capitulation of socialist power. What would be involved for defense in such a situation in addition to the political appeal to the working classes in the enemy state? It would not necessarily mean that the socialist state would use nuclear weapons. It would to an extent consist of the knowledge that under certain circumstances a socialist government would use atomic weapons of one kind or another. Perhaps nine out of ten, or 99 out of a 100 times, or even at all times, there would be unanimous agreement not to use these weapons in this situation. But it is in one possible case where these weapons might be used or its use would be

considered that might spell the difference between the triumph of progress or reaction. This knowledge may restrain the hand of the reactionary power and thus allow time for a non-violent or even non-nuclear resolving of the struggle. Therefore another alternative may be slavery or socialism.

In addition to whatever may be said about the resolution, there is a certain ambiguity about the scope it covers. Is it really meant as a prohibition against the use of these weapons against cities as the resolution states, or is it a prohibition against nuclear weapons as such? If it is a prohibition of possible use against cities, then it would seem to be morally and politically justifiable to use it against other targets. Would it be justifiable to use them against troop concentrations or bonafide industrial targets which are not cities in the usual sense of the word? If the prohibition is on H-bombs, then what about other nuclear weapons such as smaller atomic bombs or atomic artillery and tactical weapons? These do not have the absolute destructive power of the "grand daddy" hydrogen bombs, but still they end a certain form of the political struggle. Therefore if a strict reading of the resolution is held as one applicable to cities because of their role as the seat of modern civilization, then why is it necessary to pose the alternatives of destruction or slavery? A socialist government therefore would have means of military defense even if it did pledge that it would not use them on cities. But from the discussion of the resolution, it would appear that this 'liberal' interpretation cannot be made.

It would seem that there would be a clear position on the stockpiling of the nuclear weapons if you have an absolute prohibition against their use. But this is hardly the case. It would also appear that if the resolution was only concerned about the problems of the destruction of cities, then its supporters would be for stockpiling of these weapons for use in other circumstances if the need should arise. Mike Harrington, for example, said that he had no strong attitude on this, but rather the problem was one of use. On the other hand there was Shane who said that while he was not for stockpiling, he would let others think that we were; that is, keep the enemy guessing. It would appear that if you are willing to allow stockpiling, then the door has been opened for consideration of use at some future time. And if you do not stockpile, but try to keep everyone guessing (except of course enemy spies and agents), then the political consequences are little different than if stockpiling were actually going on. The point in this is that the door is now open for maneuvering around the question of nuclear weapons. There is room for politics and for seeking of ways of dealing with the political problems raised by the threat of these weapons against a future socialist United States. This is not possible in the Harrington resolution. And whenever those who believe they support it start to talk in terms of what to do, they begin to abandon the rigid and apolitical strictures.

For example, it develops that there are in actuality three positions on the resolution. One, the rigid imperative that nuclear weapons cannot be used at any time and under any circumstances; two, the 'absolute relative' position opposing their use "under any circumstance we can visualize"; and three, the relativistic position that while not being for the use of these weapons under any one particular situation, there may be a case where these weapons may have to be used. The second position of the 'absolute relative' is in no sense any variant of the Harrington motion, but only a variant of the third position. Harrington's resolution precludes any variants.

The political problems raised by the H-bomb are not of a kind to be settled in a short and snappy resolution of a categorical imperative. If we are not to get into a discussion of futuristic political science, we have to deal with it in the way in which the problem comes to us as part of the imperialist struggle between the U.S. and Russia. It is our analysis of the struggle and of the need for continuing the fight and the work to build the third camp and a socialist world that unites the independent socialist movement. The international crisis and all the factors which contribute to it should be joined together in a resolution

such as will come out of the next convention of the YSL, and not attempt to deal with only one part of it in the sketchy manner in which it is now being presented to us.

STATEMENT FOR THE HACKER RESOLUTION

by Mel Hacker

The Need for a Resolution

The development and testing of nuclear weapons by the imperialist governments of Russia and the United States is a political act in its own way as much so for example as is the U.S. "defense" of Formosa or the Russian occupation of Hungary. The nuclear weapon development is certainly part of the general preparation for a Third World War by these two power blocks. It should therefore certainly be condemned as one aspect of this preparation.

It is now generally known however, that the destructive power and potential of nuclear weapons, especially the H-bomb, are unbelievably greater in certain respects than previous weapons known to man. For example the March 1, 1954 H-bomb tested in the Marshall Islands, exploded with the force of between fourteen and twenty million tons of T.N.T. The "explosion had left an area of total destruction about twelve miles in diameter with light damage extending in a circle with a diameter of forty miles". (Rep. Zandt of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) And recent articles in the New York Times indicate the development of infinitely more destructive bombs.

Such a weapon has had political effects, centering on its own existence, which we must understand and help develop:

a. The existence of nuclear weapons has steered neutralist and third camp forces, somewhat more than they would have been, against the outbreak of a new world war. It has led to some friction within the western war block, with England and France, as well as the neutralist Asian countries toward U.S. war maneuvers. Indeed, it has given anti-war elements, especially in England and Germany a sharp political weapon against a more complete imperialist and war-like domination by the United States.

In the U.S. it has strengthened feelings of anxiety in the general population and has sharpened any anti-imperialist, anti-war sentiment and general anti-war sentiment existing among students and working youth. Needless to say, it has also given Russia political capital, but has also quited down Russia's own nuclear weapon threats and discouraged her use of this means of destruction.

b. The testing of nuclear weapons by the U.S. has been done in a crude, callous, imperialist way with the bland assumption of control of huge areas of international waters, the arbitrary movement of native populations from one area to another, with the eradication of whole areas of Japanese fishing grounds, not to speak of a number of boats and seamen.

Therefore a resolution on nuclear weapons: a. helps sharpen such anti-imperialist-war sentiment among the people we reach, b. helps attract such people to us, c. attacks the particular atom-rattling and crude imperialism of the nuclear tests.

There has been a variety of criticism of this resolution. Martin indicates

that he considers the resolution as unnecessary "repeating as it does ideas which we utter every day in our press" and because of wrong formulations and implications. What are these wrong formulations and implications? Alas, in debate in NAC and before the N.Y. unit, Martin and Taylor have refrained from any specific analyses so that unfortunately we cannot comment here on this criticism.

On necessity: Martin and Taylor see no necessity for such a resolution. These comrades evidently see no necessity for any agitation or campaigns on this question. They appear to be content with occasional L.A. or at most Challenge articles on this question. These comrades thus neglect the need for a firm organizational attitude toward war-mongering, atom-rattling, imperialism and apparently real fall-out problems of the atomic testing program. There is genuine political indignation against these tests in pacifist and certain liberal organizations. We can work with this indignation and with anti-war sentiment in a socialist political and organizational manner at this time. We can publicize and circulate our politics by uniting in campaigns with such organizations on these questions. A resolution on nuclear weapons helps give us this orientation.

What Sort of a Resolution - A Socialist Approach to the Nuclear War Question

What this resolution attempts to do is to explain from a socialist point of view the political development and current use of nuclear weapons. Thus, we analyze the development and testing of nuclear weapons by Russia and the United States as part of their imperialist struggle for world power. We thus orient ourselves and educate other readers of the resolution towards the understanding of the imperialist basis of the current contest for nuclear weapon supremacy. (Note: Our position on wars of national liberation should not obscure our basic horror of war.) In this case we express our moral and political condemnation of the use of nuclear weapons upon civilian populations in cities as destructive of human values, goods and potentialities. As indicated, we attack the testing of nuclear weapons in an agitational manner, i.e., possibly joining with other groups against these tests.

Inadequacies of the Harrington Resolution

I. The Harrington resolution is essentially absolutistic and metaphysical. It speaks for all time and for all conditions when it absolutely rejects the "use of such weapons at any time or under any circumstances." As such, it shows a complete lack of understanding of a socialist approach to a political problem.

As socialists we have certain moral and ethical values. We believe in democracy, human equality and rights, the preservation of man and his values, the liberation of all people from oppression. Nevertheless, we do not write abstract resolutions in favor of these values. In our resolutions and articles we apply these to specific historical and current problems and tasks and relate these to appropriate forms of political and class struggle. The Harrington resolution does not attempt to treat the use of atomic weapons against

Section E

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cities in this manner because in this area Mike does not have a socialist approach, but a metaphysical, absolutist one.

The Harrington resolution in this respect has three other inadequacies.

(a) It precludes further discussion about the nature of nuclear weapons, the political milieu which gave them birth. You're either for or against these weapons - there is no middle ground or no understanding either.

(b) Because of its absolutist nature it attracts absolutists to us, i.e. those against nuclear weapons, those against nuclear war. It does not attract or appeal to socialists who have some understanding of the current imperialist struggle. Note: it might be relevant at this point to note that Mike could have precisely the same position and yet analyze the social basis of the current nuclear weapon development and contest. But Mike's interests lie elsewhere.

(c) Because of Mike's lack of a socialist approach he cannot analyze or struggle against the nuclear weapon development in a socialist manner. The pacifist analyzes and struggles against nuclear weapons because they are Evils which produce further Evils. The socialist places the problem (and the Evil) in historical and social context, analyzes the class struggle and the imperialist conflict which utilizes this horrible weapon. The pacifist appeals to People of Good Will to halt this Evil. The socialist appeals to the working class (and to liberal people of Good Will, i.e. liberals and radicals) to utilize the politics of the class struggle in order to destroy this weapon and the class conflict and imperialism which gave birth to it.

In his resolution, Mike approaches the question of nuclear weapons from a pacifist point of view.

II. Why does Mike have an absolutist approach? In NAC discussion after NAC discussion, Mike reiterated that the H-bomb has "burst the bounds of current political reality" or words to that effect. There are two confusions relevant to the Harrington resolution in this remark:

(a) The resolution does not specifically treat the H-bomb at all specifically but all atomic weapons, presumably of any size, shape form whatever. Because of the all-inclusive nature of this resolution, Mike asks us to categorically reject all atomic weapons, presumably those of a "small" tactical nature being included. Weapons of this nature may be developed which may very well approach the power of precisely-known explosive weapons.

If Mike is against the use of all explosive weapons in modern war at any time or under any circumstances he does not say so in his resolution or in his defense of his resolution.

If Mike is against only the larger "A" and "H" bombs at any time or under any circumstances he does not say so.

If Mike is against the saturation or super-saturation bombing of cities or of civilians in cities he does not say so.

b. For Mike is incorrect again! As far as the destruction of cities and of civilian populations in cities, the development of nuclear weapons has not "burst the bounds of current political reality." If all atomic weapons and plants were destroyed today, there is only minor doubt that a combination of advanced germ warfare, super block-busters, radar-guided missiles and whatever new death ray or what-have-you that the imperialist butchers of the American and Russian war blocs have developed could do a rather effective job of destroying cities and civilian populations therein.

Again, if Mike is against the saturation or super-saturation bombing of cities or of civilian populations in cities at any time or under any circumstances by any weapon he does not say so.

Indeed, Mike restricts his statement to atomic weapons which appears inconsistent with the genuine moral sentiment that Mike has.

III. Thus, Mike's failure to analyze or attack the present barbarous testing program again reflects an apparent lack of interest in a socialist political approach. Mike's moral sentiments appear to lead him into abstractionism. Has Mike suggested an agitational program in relation to nuclear weapons? If not, why not? This resolution does so, at least in the area of the present testing program.

IV. Finally, we come to the final problem raised by the supporters of the Harrington resolution: "If you do not support the Harrington resolution, can you conceive of yourself in any way supporting the use of an atomic weapon, say by a "socialist government"? If not, then why not support the resolution?

The question as posed in this manner unfortunately gave the NAC a great deal of difficulty. Various tactical situations were discussed, e.g. the socialists in control of New York, Chicago and San Francisco, the Stalinists in control of Washington, threatening to nuclear bomb the socialist strong-holds (or something to that effect). What should the socialists do?

It is hoped that the discussion sounds as ridiculous and fruitless to you as it turned out to be. For the essence of a response is that as democratic socialists, we are not in a position to pass resolutions for socialist governments. Not through fear of speculation or a hypocritical moral attitude but because only with a complete understanding of the socio-economical-political milieu - the situation as regards class conflict - could we hope to be able to pass a resolution. Write speculative articles, books? Yes. Resolutions? No.

Why not a resolution? Because we're for a socialist government using nuclear weapons? because anything a socialist government does is morally acceptable to us? No! No! No!

If Harrington doesn't understand by this time, we shall repeat again a sentence from this resolution: "Such bombings are therefore destructive of human values and are to be condemned morally and polit-

ically." Does this apply to a socialist government? Of course it does. We are socialists. We believe in the preservation of human values and potentialities, not in their barbaric destruction. We believe socialists should fight a political struggle for what they believe in, only by political overturn of the rulers and exploiters by the industrial and agricultural workers can eliminate war. Only a democratic political struggle for socialism and democracy alongside of the movement of the masses can ever bring socialism and democracy closer to the world.

Nevertheless, we still see the possible necessity of our support of armed struggle in wars of national self-liberation and determination and wars of socialist self-defense. Yes, we condemn the use of such bombs, morally and politically in both these situations. Do we, however, reject the use of such weapons at any time and under any circumstances?

First, are these two last sentences the same? No. Do we condemn a socialist government's imprisonment of political opposition elements? Of course we do. We are for full freedom and political discussion and spread of ideas at all times. Do we categorically and absolutely reject this? No! If the opposition takes arms and tries to overthrow a socialist government undemocratically, it may be necessary to restrain them. And don't forget this. Armed rebellion will undoubtedly occur in 100% of 100% of thorough-going political revolutions. It may not be a widespread or intense armed conflict - and then so much the better for a democratic revolution.

Can we categorically deny nuclear weapons to a future socialist government? We have already, though in passing, noted the not too inconceivable possibility of relatively small, tactical nuclear weapons.

Again, if Mike believes in the impossibility of defending any sort of military warfare under conditions of modern technology, then he has not said so.

Again, we note that although we condemn such usage, it will be the total socio-economical-political, scientific, military and class conflict situation at the time that will enable a socialist-oriented government to decide whether use of nuclear weapons would further or impede the movement toward socialism and democracy.

At this moment, we cannot see how the use of this monstrous, inhuman weapon can advance socialism and democracy. We therefore condemn its use in the strongest possible way, both politically and morally. We analyze it in its role in world imperialist conflict today.

We close with a plea for political agitational struggle against the testing and development of this weapon which can destroy us all. As democratic socialists, we can do no more.

Why I Will Abstain on the Hacker Resolution

The resolution of Comrade Harrington on the H-Bomb should, in my opinion, be defeated for reasons presented in Comrade Taylor's statement. The resolution of Comrade Hacker on this subject is another matter.

While it lacks the specific feature of Harrington's view which lends it an objectionable position, the Hacker motion in my opinion has several defects. It contains from incorrect formulations; for instance. What makes it more questionable, above all, in my view, is what I regard to be its raison d'etre, namely the idea that the YSL needs some official position on the H-Bomb in revolutionary form and needs it quickly, for its work and functioning.

In my view, the H-Bomb poses many problems about which the YSL needs to be able to do some clear thinking and therefore should discuss. I am by no means certain that it is even possible to draw up an "official position" or a resolutions on those problems, nor that it is desirable to do so. It is my view that, in any event, the Hacker resolution does not accomplish the task of dealing with this problem.

For these reasons, I voted against the resolutions in the NAC. Because, however, of a feeling on the part of some comrades that we need a resolution on the question, and because I do not feel that the Hacker resolution is really damaging, and because it will be possible to make changes in it at the forthcoming convention, should it carry in the referendum, I have changed my mind and will abstain, rather than vote Against it, in the NEC referendum.

-- Max Martin

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(This is intended as a draft of a political line for the YSL Convention, not as a finished resolution. It is part of a larger statement on the entire international question. I am submitting it for circulation now so as to be able to benefit by any discussion which takes place. - Mike Harrington)

(1) Since World War II, Stalinism has followed a policy of expansionism and open hostility to the non-Stalinist world. However, in the last few years - since the death of Stalin - there has been a reversal, at first primarily confined to statements about the possibility of co-existence, more recently expressed in acts such as the Austrian Treaty. It is necessary to analyze this development even though the evidence is so meagre that conclusions can only be tentative. In doing so, we must not lose sight of the basic fact about Stalinism: that it is a reactionary, totalitarian social system, and no matter how it changes, its policy is motivated by the self-interest of an exploitative ruling class and not by concern for the people of Russia or of the world.

(2) It is this basic reality of self-interest which is the persistent element in Stalinist policy since 1945. In the period between 1945 and 1948, all of Eastern Europe was brought under the control of the bureaucracy in Moscow. Until the Tito break, these countries were ruthlessly exploited and looted, their political freedom was destroyed.

(3) After the Tito split, there was some let-up in the tempo of exploitation by the Russian Stalinists. However, the systematic destruction of the remnants of political freedom went on and penetrated into the various satellite Communist Parties. In 1953, these purges culminated in the openly anti-Semitic trials of Slansky and the other leaders of the Czechoslovak Party. Today, Eastern Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia is firmly in the control of Moscow.

(4) With the death of Stalin, changes in the pattern which had persisted since 1945 began. Co-existence propaganda (which had begun while Stalin was alive) increased. When Beria was arrested and Malenkov became the spokesman of the government, a new "consumer-orientation" was announced. This year, with the demotion of Malenkov, it was widely thought that the ascendancy of Khrushchev signaled the end of the "soft" policy and a return of the Stalinist terror leading to an increase in international tensions.

(5) The very opposite has taken place. Since Khrushchev has come to the fore, the Austrian Treaty has been signed, a Big Power Conference arranged, new proposals made on disarmament, Bonn has been given some recognition by Moscow, etc. For reactionary bourgeois analysts, these events are a calculated fraud, a stratagem in Russia's unswerving revolutionary policy. For some liberals and socialists, they have been taken as an indication that Stalinism is "democratizing."

(6) We must obviously reject both points of view and turn to a careful examination of the questions which the change in Stalinist line raise.

(7) We must begin with the assumption that a clear and accurate appraisal of the significance of these events is impossible. At this point, we can only discuss tendencies and probabilities. In the main, two broad categories of analysis are relevant: the recent events are a tactical shift in Stalinist imperialism; or, they signify a deeper change, perhaps in the institutions of the totalitarian state itself.

(8) There is considerable evidence to support the notion that the changes in Stalinist policy are a tactical shift. The ratification of the German re-armament agreements obviously required a revision of policy, for all previous Stalinist policy in Europe had been designed to make this eventuality impossible. If this is the main cause of the policy change, then the aggressive peace and co-existence campaign is explicable as a brilliantly designed maneuver to break up America's system of military alliances.

(9) Another hypothesis within this general conception of a tactical shift would locate the cause in internal Stalinist crisis. The serious problems of Russian agriculture are no secret - they are openly referred to in the Stalinist press. It is possible that an aggravation of this - or any other - crisis would cause the Stalinists to mark time in foreign policy until they had solved their domestic problem.

(10) However, there is some evidence which the concept of a tactical shift has difficulty in handling. The visit of Krushchev-Bulgadin to Tito, and the admission that Yugoslavia is a "socialist" country is one fact. The historical revision of the Polish Communist Party in which dead "Trotskyites and Pilsudskyites" of the '37 purge are now once more "leaders of the Polish workingclass" is another. The extent to which these changes revise basic Stalinist ideology seems in excess of the demands of a mere tactical shift in policy.

(11) Nevertheless, the judgement that the recent changes in Stalinist line are tactical is still the most probable in light of the available evidence. Still, we must consider the hypothesis that a more profound change is indicated.

(12) Stalinism is not imperialist in the strict sense of the word. Its bureaucratic collectivist social order does not require expansion as a condition of its existence. It has obviously enjoyed the benefits of such expansion in Eastern Europe, but this does not mean that the expansion is a necessity. In terms of its social ~~system~~ system, then, Stalinism could stabilize at its present boundaries, or even withdraw from some of its satellites.

(13) There are reasons which might impel the Stalinists toward this step. Chief among them would be the desire of the bureaucracy to enjoy the fruits of its power. No doubt the dictatorship of Stalin must have seemed whimsical and capricious to the ruling class after World War II. There is evidence, for example, that there was considerable sentiment

in the Party against the tempo at which Stalin was driving the economy. A more forceful expression of such sentiment, now that Stalin is dead, could well have a stabilizing effect, both internally and externally.

(14) The recent events do not, in any way, justify the opinion that this has happened. It is important, however, to see that it could happen. And basic to this notion is the concept that Stalinism can stabilize within its present borders, or even withdraw on the periphery, without necessarily running the risk of an economic crisis.

(15) A final word is in order about another hypothesis: that the Malenkov-Kruschev-Bulganin revisions amount to a "democratization" of the regime, or even of a tendency in that direction. Not one of these changes has altered in any way the political tyranny under which the Russian people live. All of them are explicable in terms of the self-interest of the ruling class. At the present time, then, there is no evidence that would lead us to consider these events as indicating a "democratization."

(16) The fact that the "democratization" hypothesis has arisen should return us to the fundamental fact about Stalinism: that it is a totalitarian, exploitative society, motivated by the interests of its ruling class. This is the basic recognition in our political attitude. Because we do see this, we therefore reassert our fundamental socialist opposition to this society.

Note on the Above Document

In the draft statement above, there is one section which deserves explication. That is the fact that I considered Stalinism in Russia as "expansionist" and not as "imperialist." Before undertaking this, let me make one point clear: if the meagre evidence of the last few months is reason enough for a basic revision of our understanding of Stalinism, then that understanding was deficient long before these events took place. The change which I propose follows from more fundamental considerations.

I. Nature of the Russian State.

This is not the place to attempt any kind of protracted discussion of the nature of the Russian State. However, a brief analysis of this theme relates to the question of Stalinism and imperialism. It is in this limited context, and for this purpose, that these remarks are brought forward.

Russia is a bureaucratic collectivist state.

Comrade Shachtman has made an excellent formulation of this fact: (New Internationalist, November-December, 1952);

"The bureaucracy's seizure of power in the state, when the state owns the means of production, automatically, by the very act, assured a radically different distribution of the conditions of production."

And therefore a different mode of production! And therefore a different mode of distribution! As under the early Soviets, so today, there is production for use and not for profit in the capitalist sense, production of products and not of commodity values. But production is for the use, first of all and primarily and predominantly, of the ruling class, of the bureaucracy."

In spelling out this thesis, Stalinist society is distinguished from capitalism primarily on the basis that it does not produce commodities, those

"objects which, within a society composed of private producers, are produced and exchanged against each other by these private producers for their private account." (Anti-Durhring, p 225)

And it is, of course, clear that commodity production is an essential characteristic of capitalist society. (See, e.g. Capital, Vol II, 44-5)

To cite but one example of this fact that commodity production does not prevail under Stalinism: investment in the Stalinist state is not based on the "private account" of Engel's definition, i.e. the "profitable" light industry is subordinated to the "unprofitable" heavy industry.

Summing up this brief outline: Stalinist Russia is a bureaucratic collectivist state, an economy of production for use based on the needs of the bureaucracy.

II. Imperialism

Imperialism, as socialists have traditionally defined it, is a characteristic of a social system. It is not a simple question of conquest (biblical war, for example, is hardly imperialist conflict), but of conquest arising out of the necessities of a social system.

Thus, in the case of Rome imperialism was a necessary tendency of the mode of production, the slave economy: "...the low level of technique in Graeco-Roman civilization had led to the development of slavery as a means of purchasing the leisure necessary for comfort and culture; and... this institution operated on both slave and master to rule out the possibility of releasing new productive forces on a scale adequate to change the material conditions of the society...the restricted internal market, which followed inevitably from a social structure of the kind (brought) its own nemesis in the shape of an outward drive to seek fresh markets away from the old centres of civilization..." (The Decline of the Roman Empire in the West, by Frank Walbank, p. 37)

In the case of capitalism, imperialism was defined as capital export necessitated by the decline in the rate of profit which in turn depended on a change in the organic composition of capital. Thus, Lenin, who coined the term, imperialism, to capitalism, wrote: "Imperialism emerged as the development and direct continuation of the fundamental attributes of capitalism in general." (Imperialism, p 88, International Pub. Ed.)

III. Stalinism and Imperialism

Is Stalinism imperialist in this sense of the word?

To answer this question in the affirmative, we would have to relate the fact of Stalinist expansion, as in Eastern Europe, to an inherent tendency of the social system at a given historical period. The previous discussion has made it clear that this tendency could not be a function of commodity production, as it is under capitalism. Rather, the Stalinist social system is a bureaucratic collectivism based on production for the use of the exploitative bureaucracy.

Therefore, in order to describe Stalinism as imperialist, it is necessary to relate the expansion to such a mode of production. In doing this, it is not enough to point out that Stalinism suffers from crisis. It is rather necessary to show that it suffers from a persistent and fundamental crisis which cannot be solved without expansion. Given the power of the totalitarian state apparatus, I do not think that this is true with regard to the almost inevitable inefficiency of bureaucratic planning or to the agricultural crisis. In other words, we have not clearly defined a Stalinist crisis which is insoluble without expansion.

Given this lack of a definition justifying our characterizing Stalinism as imperialist, why then, in fact, did Stalinism expand into Eastern Europe? The answer is, to a large extent, circumstantial. At the end of World War II, the Red Army was in de facto control of Eastern Europe. The continuation of this ~~stare~~ control as a ~~base~~ basis for looting and exploitation was clearly to the advantage of the Stalinists. To say that expansion is not a necessity for Stalinism does not, in any way, imply that it will not expand, or that the ruling class is opposed to expansion. It simply means that we must locate the cause of the expansion in some factor other than an inherent tendency of the social system.

IV. Stalinism and Expansionism

If Russia has been, as I have tried to demonstrate, expansionist and not imperialist, then there is a possibility that it can reverse this policy in a fairly fundamental fashion. This does not imply that this is the case. It does imply that it could be the case. As of now, the evidence that it is the case is clearly insufficient. It is stated here in the form of a hypothesis, a possibility, nothing more.

Within such a hypothesis, there are two factors which could be at work in Stalinism today and which would tend toward such a reversal of policy: (1) An institutionalization of the rule of the bureaucracy after the death of an arbitrary dictator; (2) internal crisis requiring an immediate concentration on domestic problems.

We should at least be alive to the possibility of a basic reversal of policy.

Stalinism, Imperialism and Expansionism II

by Mike Harrington

(In the brief, informal discussion that has already taken place in New York over my discussion of Stalinism and imperialism, it has been made clear that some supplementary remarks are necessary at the very outset in order to set my position in proper perspective.)

(1) The main intention of my point of view is to discuss certain conservative tendencies within Stalinism which might cause it to stabilize the present situation, or even allow for some withdrawal at the periphery. This in no way implies that the Stalinists can, or will, dismantle their entire East European holding. It does mean that certain tendencies are at work within Stalinism, as a result of its social system, which tend toward stabilization.

(2) It should be noted that the theory of Stalinist imperialism developed in a polemical situation in which the ISL was quite rightly attacking the illusions of World War II about Stalinism. Thus, in 1949, the ISL resolution considered that its characterization of Stalinism as imperialist had been borne out by events: "Russia has not merely 'expanded'; it has set out to build and has already acquired in part a far-flung empire on every side of its borders, consisting of states which are not merely 'satellites' but subject nations held in chains by the same totalitarian terror that operates within Russia itself." (New International, April 1949)

Note, however, that the basis given here for characterizing Stalinism as imperialist is that of the extent and thoroughness of Stalinist expansion. This is not related to bureaucratic collectivism as a necessary tendency. At the time in which this theory was emphasized, it was of the utmost necessity to challenge illusions about Stalinism. Moreover, during this period, Stalinist expansion was most virulent. This, I think, is the context of the definition.

As a consequence of this characterization, however, it was necessary to jettison the main element in the socialist theory of imperialism: the necessary relation between expansion and the social system. Thus, an article in the New International (by A. Kimbay and G. Blackwell, May-June, 1952) endorsed this definition of imperialism: "The policy, practice or advocacy of seeking to extend the control, dominion or empire of a nation." Such a definition clearly encompasses any expansion on the part of any nation; it makes imperialism synonymous with national aggressiveness.

Such a definition was understandable in the particular polemical situation and period of the cold war in which it developed. To maintain it today, however, is to lose sight of important aspects of the political reality of Stalinism.

(3) Let us turn now to the actual reasons for Stalinist expansion.

In a remarkable article in the New Internationalist (October, 1943), Comrade Shachtman more or less predicted the policy of Stalinism in Eastern Europe after World War II. His accomplishment was all the greater given the volume of "Teheran" propaganda at the time. He wrote: "No country in the world today, whatever its social character, can stand still and remain independent, at any rate, not for long. The present world tends more and more to be divided into a few of the advanced and powerful economic countries which enjoy independence, and the others that stagnate or retrogress economically and inevitably fall into economic and political dependency on the few. For a country (and the ruling class in it) to survive as an independent entity, in our time especially, requires an expansion of its economic (and therefore its political) power. This holds for capitalist countries. This holds for Stalinist Russia which is not capitalist. (This would hold for a working class republic, even if in a different sense)...In other words, for all the social (not socialist!) differences that mark her off from the capitalist world, Russia is nevertheless confronted with the same problem and driven by the same impulsion as every other country in the world." (My emphasis--EM)

In addition to its general brilliance, Shachtman's formula deserves our respect since it provided the basis for an astonishingly accurate appraisal of future tendencies. Its main point is certainly true: that both the United States and Russia are impelled by common forces, chiefly the economic and political polarization of the world, the gravitation of power to two major centers. Yet, it must be noted that Comrade Shachtman is here describing tendencies which operate independent of the social systems. If we turn now to the differences which distinguish Stalinism from American capitalism, we will be at the heart of my discussion of Stalinism, imperialism and expansionism.

In the United States, the Permanent War Economy provided a solution to the problem of domestic crisis. A protracted period of peace - or postponed war - would make the political justification of this Government sector increasingly difficult. It would, therefore, probably confront the United States with considerable economic problems. Thus, there is a strong internal pressure in American society which moves in the direction of imperialist policy.

Russia poses a different situation. There are fac-

tors within the Stalinist economy which would make a detente, and, say, disarmament, stabilization, normalization, etc., beneficial from a domestic point of view. For given the nature of Stalinist society, war production does not play the same role it does in America or rest on the same necessity. In Russia, that production plays more of a political, than an economic, role. A slackening of the armament pace, in economic terms (and especially if there is a deep crisis now), is therefore possibly desirable. If a social factor is also at work - a desire on the part of the ruling class for a stabilization of their own position - then the tendency which we are describing is a strong one. At the present time, we cannot estimate how strong; we can however indicate the basis of possible strength.

It would be absurd to adopt a mechanistic attitude that the economic necessity is simply translated into foreign policy. Many other factors, political and social, intervene and modify. Nevertheless, to the extent that the economic is operative, there is a profound difference between the United States and Russia and one which could form the basis of differences in foreign policy. To simplify: in the United States, guns and butter, in Russia, guns or butter.

I am not interested in a semantic argument. The factor which I am describing - call it a phase of expansionism or imperialism - is a relation between the Stalinist social system and its foreign policy which could make for the Stalinists seriously offering a long-term detente, a stabilization of the situation and perhaps a withdrawal on the periphery. This is what I mean when I define Stalinism as expansionist and not imperialist.

Comments On Comrade Harrington's Theories On
Imperialism and Bureaucratic Collectivism As
Aspects Of Stalinism

-by Shane

(This is not meant to be a systematic presentation of an alternative viewpoint to that expressed in the Harrington document. My position will be presented in a draft, "International Resolution", which will be available in about two weeks.)

I. State Capitalism In Russia

Comrade Harrington's grounds for denying the existence of capitalism in Russia are the weakest possible; defining capitalism commodity production on the account of private producers, he adduces the fact that such production does not exist in Russia as proof of the non-capitalist nature of Stalinism.

This is assuredly a most fetishistic use of the category "commodity" capitalism, as every social system is, first of all, a system of production relationships. The significance of the commodity is that it embodies these capitalist social relationships. But this is not equally true of all commodities. Commodity production has existed throughout the history of civilization- it was very widespread, for instance, in Greece and Rome. The slave economy of the pre-Civil War American south was completely dominated by commodity production. There is only one commodity which exists only under capitalism and whose existence is in itself sufficient to define capitalist production relationships.

This unique commodity is labor power. The essence of capitalism is that the mass of workers are "free" from ownership of the means of production and are forced to work for wages in order to live. (The capitalist epoch is therefore characterized by this: that labor-power takes, in the eyes of the laborer himself, the form of a commodity which is his property; his labor consequently becomes "wage labor." Capital, pg. 189.)

Wage labor (although subject, as in many private capitalist states, to totalitarian repressive legislation) is both juridically and in reality the dominant mode of labor in the Russian economy. It is hard to find a significant difference between the status of labor in Nazi Germany and in Stalinist Russia, let alone a difference in principle between the two.

Yet such a difference is to be shown if the Russian social system is to be considered qualitatively different from capitalism. If the social relationships at the point of production are essentially the same in two social systems, those systems must belong to the same historical category, whatever their concrete divergencies from each other.

Comrade Harrington's argument against the existence of capitalism in Russia should have been intensely suspect at first sight. For, according to a definition of capitalism as consisting basically of commodity production by private producers, the very category of "state-capitalism" is self-contradictory. Yet the great Marxists have always maintained that state-capitalism was not only theoretically conceivable, but also was a real tendency of capitalist evolution. As Trotsky put it: "The ownership of factories, railways and so on by diverse capitalists would be superseded by an ownership of the totality of enterprises, railways and so on by the very same bourgeois firm, called the state." (First Five Years Of The Comintern, vol. II, pg. 245)

It is also strange that he presents as an argument against the state-capitalist thesis the existence in Russia of one of the most profound tendencies of modern capitalism - the dominance of heavy industry over light industry.

In conclusion on this point, it should be pointed out that Russia has, in fact, an economy characterized by commodity production, and governed by the law of value. (See, on this point, the articles by F. Forrest in the New International of 1942, '43, '44, and '47.) The Stalinists themselves admit this unhesitatingly. (See the pamphlet, "Political Economy in the Soviet Union", Intntl. Pub., 1944.)

While the internal bookkeeping and economic ideology of a ruling class certainly do not determine our characterization of a social system, it is significant that in Russia both are essentially bourgeois in nature.

2. Bureaucratic Collectivism and Stalinist Imperialism

The most novel aspect of Harrington's analysis is his definition of Stalinism as not "imperialist", but "expansionist". This position flows logically from his theory of Stalinism as a "bureaucratic - collectivist#society based on production for use. The trouble is, that several other things also flow from this theory, which comrade Harrington has evidently not yet thought through.

If, following Harrington and Shactman, we accept the profoundly fallacious view that the Stalinist economy is based on "production for use", we must necessarily admit that it is superior to capitalism and progressive against capitalism. For not only is it impossible, on this basis, to demonstrate an inherent imperialist drive within the system, there is also no reason why, over a long historical period, Stalinism could not so develop the productivity of labor so as to bring about, if not socialism, at least an enormous historical advance. Furthermore, every ruling class plays a necessary historical role, progressive or reactionary. If the role of the Stalinist bureaucracy is progressive, we can no longer define the working class as the only progressive force in modern society; and this casts the very possibility of socialism into doubt.

The direct import of this on our position on war is enormous. We can no longer define the power struggle as imperialist if it is on one side only, and on the conflict between imperialist and non-imperialist states, socialists should defend the non-imperialist side, especially if it is defined as historically progressive.

Therefore, Harrington's resolution leads necessarily to "defense of the Soviet Union", and on a pro-Stalinist basis!

I characterized comrade Harrington's view that under Stalinist production takes place "for use", not "for profit", as profoundly fallacious. It should be plain that Russian society is desperately poor in precisely those products which are useful to, and desired by the ruling class: i.e., not only "luxury goods", but even ordinary consumer goods. At the same time, enormous expenditures are made on heavy industrial plants.

The real reason for this contradiction is that backward Russia, irrespective of the subjective wishes of its ruling class must compete on the world market with advanced industrial capitalist nations. The penalty for failure to do so is inferiority in the weapons of war and, ultimately, conquest by the western imperialists. Modern jet fighters and bombers can be bought by backward nations only at the price of those "use-values which both peoples and rulers desire. The law of value, supremely expressed in the world market by the productivity of labor of the most advanced producer, is inexorable

Because of the international capitalist competition, Russian Stalinism must be imperialist. The rate of accumulation in Russia tends to decrease, as a result of both bureaucratic inefficiency and the fundamental tendency of capitalism, the fall in the rate of profit. The pressure in the world market, as outlined above, forces Russian Stalinism to overcome this tendency. To do so, it must plunder and exploit any other nation that it can.

IN conclusion: The basic law of capitalism is production, not for use, but production takes place for the sake of future production for the accumulation of capital. How ironical that of all nations of the world this holds true most rigorously for "non-capitalist" Stalinist RUSSIA!.

subscribe
to the
YOUNG
SOCIALIST
CHALLENGE

Resolution on German Unity

(Introduced at the NAC by Comrades Gale and Harrington: carried.)

I. Recent political events make it clear that a significant shift is taking place within the context of the cold war. The Austrian Treaty, Stalinist proposals on disarmament, the visit of the Stalinists to Yugoslavia and the release of American fliers by China are examples of this change.

At this point, it is impossible to make an accurate definition of the causes of this shift, or how far it will go. Various hypotheses can, and should, be considered with regard to both points.

Yet, given this necessary theoretical imprecision, it is possible and necessary for us to define our political attitude toward these events. In particular, we must state our position with regard to the issue of German unity which will probably be on the agenda of the Big Power Conference this summer.

II. We support the unification of Germany even if it is achieved through an imperialist conference and because of imperialist motives.

III. It should be made clear at the outset that the proposed negotiations do not alter our basic analysis of the cold war as an imperialist struggle between the United States and Russia. They may well alter the form of this struggle, especially in opening up the possibility that the two power blocs desire a detente for imperialist motives. If this is true, we must not confuse our opposition to the cause of this change - imperialist politics - with its possible effects - an increase in the opportunity for building an anti-imperialist, anti-war movement.

(a) There is not sufficient evidence for us to decisively characterize the basic cause of Russia's change in foreign affairs. Two main factors probably lie behind this shift. One is domestic crisis. The other is a political reaction to the ratification of the German rearmament agreements, an event which symbolizes the emergence of Germany as the second industrial power of the capitalist world.

We must be equally imprecise as to how far this change will go. Specifically, are the Stalinists serious about their slogan of a unified, neutralized Germany? Certainly their East European Empire would be menaced in the most concrete fashion by the political gravitation exerted by a united Germany, especially a socialist Germany. Whether they are willing to run this considerable risk cannot be determined at this time.

(b) In the case of the United States we can be more accurate. A unified, neutralized Germany would mean the frustration of America's basic policy of the last five or six years. Washington would certainly not seek such a result. The question here is whether there is a possibility that they might be forced into accepting it.

Such pressure would come from other nations in the Western bloc. It could threaten the United States with the loss of its entire Nato structure unless it accepted a Nato without Germany. The basis

of this intra-bloc opposition would be two-fold: (1) the bourgeois co-existence tendency within the Western camp based on the exigencies of trade and the world market; (2) the growing mass anti-war sentiment within the Western camp.

Again, we cannot be specific as to how far these negative considerations might push the United States.

(c) The foregoing should make it obvious that our political position cannot be based on any certain predictions. For it is plain that there are many factors making it unlikely that the big powers will give Germany its freedom - and yet, there are other elements at work which at least make it possible that they are willing this price for a detente.

IV. Our politics, however, should be oriented much more toward the present reality of defining an immediate position on these negotiations and the movements which have called for them. In order to do this we must (a) define a democratic policy toward Germany; (b) formulate this policy in terms relevant to the political movements, especially socialist, which seek a unified Germany.

(a) German unity on any democratic basis would constitute an enormously progressive step. In a united Germany, the dominant political force would, in all probability, be the working class parties. The Eastern section of Germany has always been the stronghold of the extreme left and, as was indicated in the June days of 1953, this does not appear to have changed under Stalinist rule. Indeed, through the proletarianization of other classes the power of the East German workingclass has probably shown a relative increase under Stalinism.

That such a unified Germany would be "neutralized", i.e. would pledge to limit arms to those necessary for the maintenance of internal order, does not change the progressive consequence. For one thing, such an agreement is something of an abstraction; its real worth is that of the social forces involved, and the power of a unified Germany should make it clear that limitations upon its sovereignty are temporary. We should, therefore, be willing to accept the neutralization of Germany as a means to its unity.

In all of this, as a matter of fact, we should see a unified Germany as a step in a progressive direction. We should not lay down a schematized version of sovereignty and demand ~~ex~~ all or nothing.

(b) Concretely, this should lead to the following political orientations:

1) In the United States, we should challenge the Government to accept the Russian offer of German unity and free elections in return for neutralization. If America refuses to do this, it will demolish all of the "free world" pretensions of Nato and the rest of U.S. policy in Europe and expose its militarist and imperialist basis. This kind of approach can be especially meaningful when directed toward liberals who have traditionally manifested doubts about German rearmament (even though these doubts are too often based on undemocratic, chauvinist considerations).

2) In Europe, we call upon the socialist movement to demand that their Governments firmly commit themselves to German unity on the basis of free elections plus neutrality. In doing this, it will be possible to expose the nature of the ties between these Governments and the United States. Thus, the effect will be an intensification of

the pressure on the United States.

In the case of our German comrades, the situation is somewhat different from that of other European socialists. The West German workingclass has already responded to the rearmament policy with mass opposition. The youth, in particular, have waged a militant campaign. We hope that these campaigns will intensify on the issue of unity, demanding German freedom from the imperialist powers. Also, we look to a continuation of the non-cooperation with rearmament which the Germans have already carried out.

At the time of the Conference itself, mass pressure for German freedom, led by the workingclass, can be tremendously effective.

3) In all of this, it is crucial that the campaign be conducted so as to take into account the probability that the Conference will not result in a unified Germany. Therefore, the campaign itself should be articulated as one phase of a larger, anti-imperialist struggle which must continue especially if the Big Power negotiations fail. Short of sabotaging our own efforts, every emphasis should be placed upon the fundamental pessimism with which all imperialist negotiations should be viewed.

In this context, German unity provides a powerful talking point vis-a-vis the neutralist sentiment which exists in Europe. Essentially, we can challenge the Russians to take their own propaganda of a unified Germany seriously. If they do not, the imperialist basis of their politics will be once more revealed. If they do, the result of a unified Germany and its ultimate significance for the Third Camp should off-set any immediate Stalinist political gains.

4) In all of this, we particularly hope that our European comrades will lead a mass campaign while the Big Powers are in Conference, as a popular, militant pressure upon the imperialists.

WRITE FOR YSR

THIS IS YOUR ORGAN

THE PRE-CONVENTION DISCUSSION IS ON.

PLEASE SEND IN COPY STENOILED, SINGLE SPACED. IF THIS IS ABSOLUTELY PRECLUDED, THEN SEND IN COPY TYPED ON BLANK PAPER, DOUBLE SPACED. NON-TYPEWRITTEN COPY WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED.

In accordance with the YPSL-SYL unity agreement and by the decision of its founding convention, the YSL was established as an independent socialist youth organization unaffiliated to any adult or general socialist party or organization. This decision flowed from certain very concrete considerations and not from any theory that the independence of socialist youth organizations in general and the YSL in particular is permanently desirable.

On the contrary, the YSL did not and does not hold that an organization of socialist youth should in general be an independent group. Such independence leads to the youth organization itself becoming a "youth party", that is, a general socialist organization which sets itself up as the socialist party or organization in the country, as a separate socialist tendency which seeks the adherence of the workers to its banners, as opposed to the banners of other socialist groups. For a section of the working class and socialist movement based on an age group and its special problems and needs (that is on the younger members of the working class and population), to attempt to become the socialist organization of the working class as a whole, is absurd.

In general, and where specific factors do not indicate the contrary, a socialist youth organization has to be the youth section of a general or adult organization. Youth groups of adult organizations or parties do, and where they do not, they should have autonomy with respect to the adult party in certain respects, but nevertheless they are the arms of general socialist organizations among the young workers and students.

That the above was the viewpoint of the founding convention of the YSL is demonstrated by the fact that the convention decided to have the question of the unaffiliated status of the League brought up again at the second convention of the organization; the YPSL-SYL unity agreement had specified that any proposals to affiliate the YSL to an adult socialist group could not be raised until then.

There can be no doubt that the only organization to which the YSL could affiliate, if that were to be its decision now, is the Independent Socialist League. At the same time that it declared itself to be an independent group, the YSL made clear that it is not neutral or indifferent with respect to the various socialist parties and organizations. It declared itself to be in the closest possible fraternal relationship with the ISL and implemented this statement by endorsing an exchange of fraternal representatives between the leading committees of the two organizations and between YSL Units and ISL branches where this is feasible, by announcing its support of the Independent Socialist weekly, Labor Action, and by making practical arrangements for the publication of the YSL organ, Challenge, which is independently edited and published by the YSL, in the pages of Labor Action and for the League's sharing office space with the ISL. These relations and arrangements have worked very well during the past period and have been a source of gratification to the YSL, and have constituted evidence, if any is needed, that the YSL attitude towards the ISL is correct.

In this connection we wish also to note the aid which the ISL has rendered the YSL in the organization of several new YSL Units, in the day to day work of the YSL, and in other ways. Likewise, YSL-ISL cooperation on specific tasks in various localities has been beneficial to both organizations and to the cause of socialism.

The estimation which the ISL enjoys in the eyes of the YSL and the arrangements and relations flowing from it are not accidental; they rest on a firm political foundation. The YSL and the ISL are the sole organizations of revolutionary

democratic socialism in the United States. They, and they alone, are united in their opposition to imperialist war, to the two imperialist war camps, and to the regimes and social systems of these camps. They stand for the struggle of the Third Camp of international labor against capitalism and Stalinism and for a socialist world of peace, freedom and plenty. They, and they alone, stand for full civil liberties in the face of the witchhunt now raging in the land.

In addition, the two organizations are in substantial agreement on most major political questions of the day. For these reasons it is accurate to say that in a political sense the YSL and ISL are parts of one movement and that together they constitute one tendency in the working-class movement.

We wish to make clear, however, that the YSL is open to all young socialists who agree with the principles and program of the YSL and accept its discipline, whether or not they share our estimation of the ISL and our attitude towards it. Further, closeness to, or even membership in other adult socialist organizations than the ISL does not necessarily preclude membership in the YSL. In this respect, as in others, the YSL is a broad organization and opposes the conception of a monolithic organization.

II

The second convention of the Young Socialist League decides to continue its independent and unaffiliated character for the coming period. It takes this decision, despite the general views it holds on the question of "independent youth organization", which are outlined above, because of a number of considerations that pertain at this time. The most important ones are as follows:

A. The YSL is and aims to be a broad socialist youth organization, embracing students and young workers who adhere to the ideas of Third Camp socialism, regardless of the differences which may obtain between them on certain theoretical and historical questions. Now while youth sections of adult or general socialist organizations are always broader and less homogeneous than their adult parties, the independence of the YSL enables it to have a still broader stamp and character. There can be no doubt that in the eyes of the students and young workers who form the arenas for YSL work, affiliation to the ISL would be regarded as a narrowing of the nature of the YSL.

B. The formation of the YSL involved the merging of two ideological tendencies, the Marxian socialism of the SYL and the more general left-socialism of the YPSL. The resultant of this is that the YSL combines these two tendencies as its ideological life. Affiliation of the YSL to the ISL at this time would give the YSL's audience the impression, that one of these tendencies had disappeared from the YSL, which is not the case.

C. Above all, the fact that the YSL is the only national organization of socialist youth in the country, the fact that the ISL? SWP? SP? SLP? SDF? etc. do not have national youth organizations, enables the YSL to be the socialist youth organization in the country, creates for it the role of the organization of all socialist youth, despite the YSL's pronounced and definite views on the outstanding political problems of our period.

III

While remaining independent, the YSL reaffirms its closest fraternal relations with the ISL and looks forward to a period of even closer collaboration

and joint work. The YSL endorses and supports Labor Action and the New International; it declares its firmest solidarity with the ISL in its efforts to be removed from the Attorney General's so-called Subversive List and to end all other witchhunting measures against it.

Therefore, the YSL looks forward to a continuation of the closest fraternal cooperation with the ISL in their common struggle for socialist democracy.

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NAME..... SCHOOL.....

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CITY..... ZONE..... STATE.....

I WANT TO JOIN THE YOUNG SOCIALIST LEAGUE.

I WANT MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE YSL.

I WANT TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE YSL WEEKLY NEWSPAPER, THE YOUNG SOCIALIST CHALLENGE. (TO SUBSCRIBE TO CHALLENGE, CHECK BOX AND ENCLOSE \$1.00 FOR A FULL ONE YEAR SUB.)