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Editorial:

A Call For Independent Politics

The Guaranteed Annual Wage

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CONTENTS

A CALL FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICS
EXCERPTS FROM THE GUARDIAN STATEMENT
AFTER THE FRENCH VOTE by Our European Correspondent
THE GUARANTEED ANNUAL WAGE by John Darnell
BADLY NEGLECTED: THE NEED FOR CONTRACT IMPROVEMENTS
THE SPLIT IN THE SOCIALIST PARTY by Bert Cochran
CRISIS IN TUNISIA by Wm. Raleigh
TERROR-CAMPAIGN IN FLORIDA
THE TRUTH ABOUT RACE by An Anthropologist
THE STORY OF A GRASSROOTS MOVEMENT by Robert Henderson
BOOK REVIEWS
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

AMERICAN SOCIALIST
A Call For Independent Politics

ON January 10, the National Guardian, probably the largest progressive newsmagazine in the country today, published on its front page a "Call for Independent Political Action," portions of which we have reprinted on the next page. The statement, signed by Guardian general manager John T. McManus, who was the American Labor Party's candidate for governor of New York in the recent election, calls for an open national caucus, to meet no later than Labor Day week of 1955, for the purpose of putting a national progressive ticket in the field for the 1956 Presidential elections.

We hail this call, and propose to do what we can to make the new movement a success. We are for it on two counts: the proposal is necessary; and the reasoning behind it shows great progress in Left thinking about American problems.

The proposition to rally behind a national ticket in 1956 can become the means of halting the present trend of disintegration and demoralization on the Left, and of reversing it. Ever since the defection of a portion of the radical movement from independent politics to the policy of so-called "coalitionism"—in reality, support to the Democrats with no reciprocation—the Left has found itself badly shaken and disoriented. The policy has paid off in confusion, and in depriving progressives of an arena for work, without anything to show in return. Valuable cadres are being frittered away, or becoming inactive. And, on the other side, potential adherents to the camp of progressivism and anti-imperialism remain unallied, for want of a standard behind which to rally.

THE American Socialist has consistently favored the organization of a labor party in America. We have not altered our view that such a party, based upon the union movement, or at least upon a substantial section of it, is the kind of party which is necessary and will eventually emerge as the basic realignment in American politics. We are fully cognizant that the party proposed in the Guardian call is not and cannot be a labor party; that, as a matter of fact, this kind of a movement will be denounced and reviled by the official labor leaders and many of the union ranks, just as they maligned the Wallace movement in 1948. But it is no fault of the Guardian editors, or any other progressives, that the trade unions are tied by their officials to the old-line parties, and are supporters of the cold war abroad and the witch-hunt at home. Because we understand the need for a broadly based labor party is no reason to stand still and simply wait until such time as the official labor movement matures to the point where it is ready to break with reactionary politics. Were the Left to do that, it would become the tail instead of the advance guard of progress. Furthermore, such an abdication, such an abandonment of the political field, would mean that reaction could pursue its course without any challenge, and would discourage all dissenters and rebels who are continuing the struggle today. At the very least, it would delay the time when the witch-hunt could be halted and the pall of fear that has descended on the nation could be lifted.

It should be kept in mind that the Guardian proposal does not cut across any present movement towards a labor party, because there is none. We are not confronted here with an alternative between a labor party on one side or a party of the Left without a broad trade union base on the other. Our only present choice is to either go out and try to build a vehicle for political action, or to sink into political passivity—or even worse, to begin painting up the phony liberalism of the Democrats. A party of progressivism does not impede the formation of a labor party, and it can certainly, insofar as it penetrates into labor, Negro and other ranks, become a pioneering step in that direction. The British Labor Party was not formed at one blow either; it was preceded by a number of radical pioneering movements like the Independent Labor Party, which later merged into a broader labor party when the unions were ready to move.

THE Guardian appears to be on the right track in formulating the kind of program that would be necessary and proper for a progressive movement in America today. In the present conditions, there is no use for any progressive movement to try to pussyfoot on the basic questions of war and peace, or fail to give a clear-cut answer as to what we mean by coexistence, or on our stand on imperialism, police-statism, and unemployment. Any progressive party formed today that tries to act the evasive statesman, and to pick up support by double-talking and watering down its proposals, will simply fall flat on its face. The field of phony progressivism is pretty well pre-empted by the official AFL and CIO leaders and their political mentors in the Democratic Party.

The Guardian statement also makes a definite contribution in its reasoning on the question of co-existence. Co-existence does not and cannot mean that the Left will become supporters of the Democrats or any other reactionary forces as the price of co-existence.

The only chance the progressive movement has of harnessing the discontent and getting a grassroots response is in presenting itself as a genuinely independent leftist formation and frankly and boldly putting forward a program of far-reaching radical demands and basic solutions for the country's manifold ills. This does not mean that a movement of this character can be or should even try to be Marxist socialist. So far as the formation of a Marxist party is concerned, we repeat what we said in our
Editorial statement of last month: the time for that is not here yet. But a broad fighting progressive movement may very well evoke sufficient response to mitigate the wave of reaction and prepare the way for the next advances.

International developments—the threat of nuclear war, Washington's belligerent politics, the sweep of the colonial and socialist advances, all the new winds that are blowing in the world—are having an impact on the thinking of the American people. Just as McCarthyism was a reaction to the world march of socialism on the side of the Right, so there is an impact on the progressive side as well.

Many people are waking up to the meaning and consequences of the cold war and are becoming alarmed at the threat of nuclear annihilation. The situation thus cries out for the creation of a broad peace movement. The spectre of Brownellism and McCarthyism has frightened many into an understanding of the domestic consequences of the cold war, and is creating the pre-conditions for a counter-offensive in this field. In short, while no basic shift has taken place as yet in American politics, the objective conditions are literally demanding that the American people be presented with a political alternative.

Having said all this, the big question remains: Can such a movement succeed today? Every one of us realizes that these are very difficult times, that the Left forces have been decimated, and that a lot of people have been intimidated and frightened. Moreover, the official labor bureaucracy is very strong, and will do its utmost to discredit and destroy a movement of this character. Can these as well as other obstacles be overcome?

Of course, the experience itself will have to be the final arbiter. But we are convinced that if enough of the Left fighters and progressives get behind the venture to ensure sufficient forces and finances in the crucial months ahead so that the campaign can get started in a serious way, then there is every chance of winning an impressive following throughout the country. The stakes are high and the need is great—worthy of the best efforts of all true fighters for progress and liberty.

Excerpts from the Guardian Statement

This is a call—now, as we enter 1955—for a national independent political party on the ballot in the 1956 Presidential elections.

It must be a party of peace, jobs and rights. It must be anti-imperialist, understanding of and friendly to world socialism and itself prepared to consider socialist solutions for our own country's welfare.

It cannot await or expect mass breakaways from presently organized groups such as the labor movement or the Democratic Party for its impetus. It must be undertaken now—by those who believe in its inevitability—with the purpose of participating at every level of political argument in the 1956 campaign, and continuing thereafter until its objectives become those of a winning majority of the people.

We propose that preparations start now for an open caucus of all people and groups so minded, to be held no later than Labor Day week of 1955, at some place central in the country for the greatest convenience of all, with a view to starting the fight for independent ballot status in every state in the Union. No state, regardless of legal barriers, should be given up without a full effort. States where ballot access is no problem must contribute forces and funds where the fight is the hardest.

The proposition that anti-fascist forces can function effectively as non-ballot groups working within the two-party system has fallen flat in the four years since this stratagem has been employed.

- There is no mass peace movement in the U.S. despite all efforts at regrouping a-d new forms which have decimated the Progressive Party of 1948.
- Support of "liberals" for their apparent "anti-McCarthy" attitudes has not won a single commitment in the new Congress against the Smith and McCarran Acts.

- Dozens of Congressmen and several Senators and governors were elected in the last campaign without Left opposition and in most cases with uncritical Left support. Many, such as Harriman in New York, owe their victories directly and unmistakably to the anti-Republican swing of progressive voters; yet not a single voice of those so elected has been raised thus far against the re-Nazification of Germany and the proposal to arm it with atomic weapons—surely the ghastliest turn of events imaginable in the wake of the world victory over fascism of less than ten years ago.

If the concept of peaceful co-existence is before the American people in any guise at all, it rests on the bi-partisan condition that any movement by people anywhere to control their own destinies is on its face "Soviet aggression," and provocation enough for military intervention including atomic attack.

Any concept of co-existence based on "containment" is a fake. The peoples of the world have taken tremendous strides in the past ten years—against colonialism and exploitation, toward self-determination and toward socialism. They will not be contained or set back. Any enlightened view of peaceful co-existence, therefore, must be based on the comprehension that more acceptable ideas than capitalism are sweeping the world and in time coming our way—and must be met with full understanding.

Any less forthright view of peaceful co-existence lacks either integrity or full understanding of the course of the world. Hence a political party campaigning for peaceful co-existence must be prepared to understand the reality of socialism and further, not to rule out its application in confronting domestic economic problems as well as world relations.
After the French Vote

by Our European Correspondent

Paris

A DEATHLY silence hung over the French National Assembly when the vote for German rearmament was announced. There was no applause, no congratulatory speeches. There were no shoulders to carry in triumph Mendès-France, the man who had single-handedly won the "dubious battle." He had to use a side door to avoid passing the hooting Communist deputies and their defiant reminders of concentration camps and gas furnaces.

It was a grim way to usher in the new year. Twenty-odd deputies had, with heavy heart ("death in the soul" is the expression they used), switched votes to give a majority for the clause in the Paris Agreements. Actually, counting abstentions, the 280 votes were a majority of the total votes in the Assembly. They didn't change their minds, they swung—under murderous pressure from London and Washington. The sense of shame that pervaded the country was a mixture of humiliation and chagrin: humiliation at the sight of its sovereign parliament acting like a satellite body; chagrin that France had stiffened the lines of the cold war instead of taking the lead for peace.

Maurice Duverger, writing in Le Monde, described the Assembly's decision as an "appalling paradox." He says that the "victors of 1945, then determined to put an end once and for all to German militarism, have now decided to impose on the citizens of Bonn an army they do not want—all reports agreeing on the scope of the opposition of the German people to the projects for rearmament." He might have added, in view of the clear Russian warnings, that this fatal step closes the door to German reunification, perpetuating a Korean-type powder barrel in the very heart of Europe. And this too tramples on the deepest desire of the German people.

From a military point of view, Duverger writes, the twelve German divisions are "useless folly." Only a few days before the die was cast at the Palais Bourbon, NATO decided in its Paris meeting to use nuclear weapons in case of attack. Why then, asks the writer, all this haste and insistence on twelve conventional divisions? Because Washington had decided at the height of the Korean war to rearm Western Germany and could not reverse the vast diplomatic engine it had set into motion. Because Britain, worried about West German competition, hopes to equalize the race by a partial diversion of German economy to armaments. So runs Duverger's reply.

There is some truth in this—but it is strictly limited. Prestige was a factor in Washington's policy, and Dulles was in bad need of at least one diplomatic "victory." But the reasons, to which we shall return presently, for this "folly"—folly in the sense that it can blow up the world—go much deeper. As for Britain, it is quietly admitted in such a responsible organ as the London Economist that although Germany's exports have risen in four years from one-third of Britain's to two-thirds "it cannot be assumed that German rearmament will be to Britain's advantage." Bonn's financial circles, wary about the effects of rearmament on their industrial boom, are openly saying that the program will develop much slower in practice than on paper. (See Der Spiegel, Hamburg, January 9.)

WHAT WAS really at stake at the Palais Bourbon was the fate of the "cold war," of the Atlantic coalition based on strongarm diplomacy. The truce in Korea followed by the Geneva agreement and accompanied by spectacular Russian diplomatic moves, ranging from reconciliation with Yugoslavia to offers of free elections in Germany, brought the world close—"dangerously" close, some quarters said—to peace. The words "trade" and "coexistence" were beginning to overshadow "massive retaliation" and "rollback."

The French deputies, says Sirius (pen-name of Le Monde's editor) drew back before this "void," this "leap into the unknown," and many were "frightened for good reasons not only of a diplomatic or military order but also of a domestic nature." The question of confidence having been posed, rejecting the Paris agreement meant also overthrowing the government, repudiating, Sirius emphasizes, both the (Atlantic) alliance and the regime. Not having an alternative policy for an alternative government, they caved in.

There is the problem in a nutshell. Foreign and domestic policy are two sides of the same coin. The constellation of forces—anti-labor, conservative, anti-communist—which staffs the present governments of western Europe are the offspring and the troops of the "cold war," and they could not long survive its cessation. With the menace of war removed, the forces of labor would press forward irresistibly for satisfaction of long-outstanding grievances. The Left would find immeasurable strength in these struggles. For a brief moment, after the Geneva agreement and the rejection of EDC by the National Assembly, France trembled in anticipation of such a change. Mendès-France was no "neutralist," no Joshua to blow down the walls of the Western Jericho. The forces of the Left knew it, but they allowed themselves to be seduced by rhetoric, and they hoped, above all, for a miracle. The Rightists knew it too, but they were taking no chances, and their McCarthyite barrage against Mendès-France was only to make triply sure that no "accident" occurred. But if this wholly unintentional ambiguity of a Mendès-France momentarily put "death in the soul" of the French bourgeois and its international patrons, what would have been the effects of a genuine Left government arising on the ashes of the Paris Agreement and out of the fires of the "cold war"? Panicked by the prospect, the deputies again found the solution to their dilemmas in the continuation of the world conflict.
For Germany, as well as for France, the new Wehrmacht the French deputies presented the Bonn regime as a New Year's gift weighs heavier in the political-social scales than it does in the military. It seals the present division of Germany which is an indispensable prerequisite for the Atlantic coalition, and without which the Bonn cabal of Ruhr barons and ex-Nazis could not long survive. We pointed out in a previous article that,merged into a united Germany, the revolutionized property relations and the new political and social institutions of the Eastern Zone would shift the political balance of power in the country in favor of the Left, and particularly of the Social Democrats. Such a Germany would put a “new look” on Europe—instead of a reactionary whim, it would be a spur to social progress in the West, and a mighty influence for the liberalization of the regimes in the East. We can understand, therefore, why in the Bundestag vote, previously disident capitalist parties rushed into the fold of the Peace Agreement at the last moment. Only the Social Democrats fought to the end against this rearrangement that was designed to put an end to reunification.

The London Times breathed a long sigh of relief in its New Year’s Day editorial:

On both sides of the iron curtain, there is slowly but surely hardening the two worlds pattern called coexistence. The Western world remains largely dependent on the United States, though neither materially nor politically so much as it was twelve months ago. . . . The fulcrum of the opposing Western and Eastern worlds is still Germany. Following this week’s vote in the French Assembly, there is now at least the prospect of the final precipitation of Germany and Europe into two camps.

In that revealing “at least,” there is the whole program of the State Department and its (slightly less dependent) Downing Street ally. It shows the real color of Mendés-France’s carrot–negotiations in May—held out to the deputies to persuade them to vote “right.” There will be no such negotiations, not merely because the Soviet Union can now see no point to them. The Russian offer to bargain on free elections for Germany forced the hand of the Western diplomatic high command. Free elections was a good propaganda slogan so long as the Russians were against it. Now they must reveal their real demand, “negotiated from strength,” that the Russians bind over to the Bonn regime Eastern Germany as a conquered province. Since they do not dare to make that demand publicly, they don’t want any more conferences. Besides, as has been amply demonstrated, all these conferences have an “unsettling” effect in Western Europe. The Economist calls the decision at Paris a “vote of small confidence.” This is no moment for “exultation,” it warns: “the chasm, although bridged, has not been filled in.” The debates gave “little ground for optimism” so far as the “Frenchman’s [read: capitalism’s] confidence in France is concerned.” For France and for its friends, the editors conclude, “there can be small comfort in a technical victory that allows the strengthening of the West to continue on a technical plane.”

The analysis rings true. France hovers close to its biggest political crisis since “the liberation.” By his unorthodox, dazzling methods and deadlines, Mendés-France upset the immobility of French politics without thereby creating anew center of stability. The Right is engaged in a merciless vendetta. Carefully doling out their votes, foisting on him responsibility for all the unpopular decisions, they are tightening the political noose that will sooner or later hang Mendés-France. They hate this man like our Bourbons hated Roosevelt (although he is not even a Roosevelt) because he broke the rules and hurt their pride; they don’t like his “reform” talk because behind it lurks the danger of another “Popular Front”; they don’t like his tinkering in North Africa (and that’s all it is) because a few more pebbles dislodged can start another colonial avalanche for French imperialism.

Can Mendés-France be replaced by a venomous, McCarthyite Right fighting like cornered rats for the survival of French capital, blanketing the country with repressive laws and drowning North Africa in a sea of blood? Perhaps. Sirius believes there is a consistency in such a “political consolidation following the military consolidation.” How, he asks, “can communists continue to make laws in Paris when they are outlawed in Washington?” Why would they be allowed to infiltrate the factories when it is so simple—as was recently proved in Rome—to starve the rebels? And unless, he concludes, “things take a sharp turn for the worse, such a situation could last for a certain period.”

For a certain period, yes, but not for long. The Right, due to carefully doctored electoral laws, is a power in the parliament but not in the country. It speaks for vested interests, the North African lobby, but it has no mass following of the type Hitler inspired. Its chief strength has been derived from the weakness, disorientation and disunity on the Left where alone there is to be found the only viable majority of the French people.

That weakness has been due chiefly to the behemoth influence, and behavior, of the French Communist Party. In its years of dependence on Russian foreign policy, it has lost the skill of working class politics, the art of leadership. Instead of uniting and leading the workers’ movement in the struggle for much needed reforms, for housing and higher wages, it exhausted the workers by constant diversions for shifting political aims. The trade unions, rudely handled and with little to show for their sacrifices, have been reduced to a state of apathy. Thus when the big political fight against German rearmament rolled around, the troops had become so accustomed to ignoring the false notes that they didn’t respond to the real trumpet when it sounded. And the right-wing Socialists, frozen in a conservative, pro-American mold, had a good enough alibi to reject appeals for a united front and to shamefully cast the deciding votes for an anti-socialist Wehrmacht on the other side of the Rhine.

For all that, many far-reaching changes have been wrought in the European labor movement in the struggle against German rearmament. It is no longer the movement of five or even three years ago. At that time, there was no meeting ground between the Communist parties in the Soviet camp and the Socialist parties in the Western
FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY leaders, shown at a rally, confront the problem of declining rank-and-file enthusiasm.

A big turn occurred when the State Department’s determination to perpetuate the “cold war” by rearming West Germany became serious. The effects were visible first in the British Labor Party and the rise of the powerful Bevanite opposition which had already fought several battles against the bi-partisan foreign policies of the right wing. The turn came next, almost at the last moment, in the German Social Democratic Party and trade unions. Shortly before the vote at Paris, the German Social Democrats issued an appeal to their brother parties in Europe to join with them against this pernicious agreement which would bring war closer in Europe, set back the clock of democracy in Germany, and irreparably injure the possibility of unification of their country. This is the first appeal for international solidarity to come from a big working-class party since the end of the war.

Unfortunately, the German Social Democratic leaders were slow in appreciating the gravity of the situation. Had their appeal been issued two months earlier, its effects would have been sensational. Ollenhauer was present at the Scarborough conference, where a big debate raged on the position of the German Socialists on rearmament, but he did not speak. A word from him and the hairline vote in favor could have gone the other way. In France, Guy Mollet was expelling the SP deputies who voted against E.D.C., accusing them of being remiss in “internationalist” spirit toward their German brothers. Even so, the appeal started a new and deeper ferment in French Socialist ranks, although it came too late to give courage to the SP deputies who voted against their convictions in fear of the party guillotine.

The German Socialist action made its mark on the French Communist Party as well. L’Humanité published the appeal in large extracts and then ran a leading editorial whose theme was “proletarian internationalism” and which was singularly free of the customary sectarian epithets and qualifications. This completed a big change in a campaign that had at one time been saturated with French chauvinism. At a mass meeting held by the Movement for Peace at the Vel d’Hiv’ (Paris’ Madison Square Garden) the night before the ratification, there were a number of rank-and-file Socialist speakers who hailed the action of their German and British colleagues and made the hall ring with proud old language of class struggle and working class solidarity. They were new words for a meeting of a Communist-influenced organization. The sensation of the evening came in the speech of Claude Bourdet, editor of France-Observateur.

It was a quiet-spoken speech, blunt, straightforward without oratorical flourishes or subtleties. He began by self-criticism—for having had illusions in Mendès-France, but then he turned the criticism on the Communist Party for its incoherent and sectarian policies, for its failure to strive for a genuine united front. The audience listened in hushed, almost absolute silence. They were expecting thunderbolts from the Communist high command. But the CP spokesman, Raymond Guyot, made a remarkably cordial rejoinder, mildly criticizing Bourdet but emphasizing that his presence proved that “everything is possible.” The next day L’Humanité in its report of the meeting wrote in the same spirit a brief synopsis of the incident.

While it is not our purpose to exaggerate incidents, the significance of the new trends should not be discounted. Recent developments in the Socialist and Communist parties have had interacting effects. The Communist parties have been stirred by the stalwart, but unexpected, struggle of British and German Social Democrats against the new war-like moves of imperialism. Something may have been pried loose in the rigid Communist Party structures by this demonstration of European labor solidarity which for the first time was neither anti-Soviet nor made in Russia.

On the other side, changes in the Soviet bloc may possibly have had their influence on the Socialist parties. The Russian position on German unification and free elections has evolved considerably since the Berlin conference. In addition, the changed Russian attitude toward Yugoslavia, and the freeing of Socialist leaders in Hungary from prison have also undoubtedly had their effects. Finally we should not ignore the impact of the Chinese Revolution on the Western European Socialists. There is undoubtedly a greater feeling of freedom and confidence for socialist action than at any time since the “cold war” began.
T"HE DECISION of the CIO auto union leaders to go all-out for the Guaranteed Employment Plan in 1955 has national importance. It is an attempt to set the pattern of economic goals for many of the other CIO unions, and to a lesser extent, for the whole labor movement. Furthermore, the plan purports to be labor's most effective answer to the problems created by automation and layoffs.

The guaranteed annual wage, or the Guaranteed Employment Plan, as it is now called, has been talked about by other CIO unions—the steel and electrical unions particularly. But they never went beyond the stage of talk. For a time, it was not clear whether Reuther intended to duplicate this performance, or whether he was serious about it. Now it is clear that he means business, and that if the demand in some form is not granted in the spring negotiations there will probably be a strike in the auto industry.

Basically, there are two benefit features to the Guaranteed Employment Plan. First, all workers able and available for work shall be guaranteed 40 straight-time hours of work or pay unless they are notified in advance that they are to be laid off for the entire week. This is to apply equally to all workers, regardless of seniority. This feature of the plan represents an extension of present UAW-CIO contract provisions which require four hours “call-in pay” for workers sent home for lack of work. It is predicated on the proposition that employers are not justified in penalizing the labor force with short work-weeks and pay-cheques because of inability to plan operations one week ahead. The problem has assumed great importance in the auto industry during the past year as many companies utilize short work-weeks to deprive workers of their unemployment compensation in order to keep their payments to the insurance funds down.

The second feature of the plan provides that workers who have seniority will be covered by a guarantee against full-week layoffs, in accordance with their seniority, up to 52 consecutive weeks. This provision calls for benefit payments “sufficient to maintain the same living standards as when fully employed.”

The plan mentions no specific amounts, on the ground that benefit payments are to be reduced by an amount equal to the state's unemployment compensation benefit. Under the plan, workers will build up benefit credits on the basis of a one-week credit for each two weeks worked, up to a maximum of 52 weeks. The plan calls for joint administration by boards composed of equal representatives from union and management, headed by an impartial umpire or chairman, similar to those administering the UAW-CIO pension agreements.

The employer will pay weekly benefits directly out of his own funds, with the proviso that he will not have to pay more than a specified percentage of his weekly payroll. In addition, a reserve fund is to be established by regular employer contributions which continue until that fund reaches a specified amount. Neither the percentage of the employer’s liability nor the size of the reserve fund is set down in the union demand. This disturbing omission is defended on the dubious ground that there are too many factors which may change by the time of negotiations in April 1955. Apparently Reuther and his associates do not want to be tied down to any hard and fast minimum figures.

CONSIDERING all the surrounding circumstances and explanations of the plan and the evasiveness of the union leaders as to concrete figures, the conclusion must be drawn that the plan is essentially a supplement to unemployment compensation, with a by-product objective
being to goad the manufacturers into joining with the unions to support improved state unemployment compensation laws.

There can be no doubt that the plan’s benefit features fill a need. The past history of short work-weeks and “feast-and-famine” periods of employment in the auto industry cry out for action by the union to achieve at least some degree of stability in employment. Any steps in this direction represent important progress.

The plan is also important in that it throws a spotlight on questions of social consequence. The union contends that the employers have a responsibility to provide full employment. The companies either explicitly or implicitly reject this in favor of the idea that the economic and business institutions of the country have no responsibility to anybody—except to show a profit to the stockholders. Considered in this light, if this issue swells up into a big national debate, it can have progressive educational implications. And, though Reuther may be willing to settle for a plan in which the employer’s liability is very limited, even such a plan would have important consequences both as a precedent and also for the manner in which it would focus blame upon the capitalist class in periods of unemployment.

A basic shortcoming of the Guaranteed Employment Plan is that the greater the union’s success in winning it, the more it will tend to become a guaranteed unemployment plan for a section of the union. This conclusion flows from the fact that if the employers are compelled to provide 52 weeks of employment per year, or to pay sizable benefits to supplement unemployment compensation when they fail to provide employment, they will certainly try to lay off everyone they possibly can and to keep only those for whom they can provide full year-round work. No employers are going to send workers home on occasional layoffs and send them unemployment checks every month, if they can conceivably avoid it by drastically contracting the size of their work-force, and keeping that work force on steady work. Thus, the tendency will be to curtail the size of the employed group and increase the number of permanently unemployed workers.

GIVEN a fixed number of cars to be produced (the most optimistic forecast is six million for 1955), it is obvious that considerably fewer numbers of workers employed 52 weeks during the year would be required than has been the case with past practices in the industry. It appears inescapable therefore that an inevitable by-product of the plan would be the permanent displacement of additional thousands of auto workers, and increased difficulty for their re-employment in the industry.

The building of security for the high-seniority section of the union membership at the expense of the low-seniority workers and unemployed can spell serious trouble for the union. The creation of such a job trust would act as a barrier to young workers first entering the labor market, and provide fertile soil for anti-labor demagogues.

The plan furthermore does not come to grips with the main problem of the auto workers. Automation, mergers and liquidations in the industry have brought in their wake a permanent loss of jobs, pensions and seniority rights for literally tens of thousands of workers. This development can be graphically seen in the Dec. 3, 1954, report of the Michigan Employment Security Commission, which predicted unemployment in Michigan averaging around 200,000 throughout 1955. All union observers agree that a sizable percentage of this total has to be classified as permanently displaced from the auto industry.

Translated into the life stories of many auto workers, this trend has meant immense privation. Particularly hard-hit have been the older workers thrown on the scrap-heap by shut-downs or transfers of Hudson, Kaiser-Frazer and Murray corporations. The Detroit News of Dec. 5, 1954, puts the spotlight on this problem in an article headed: “It’s a Young Man’s World, 40-plus Workers Are Finding.” “Detroit’s older unemployed workers, growing in numbers since the end of the Korean War, are finding that retirement often comes early and involuntarily.” The story cited the plight of one 53-year-old worker who became unemployed a year ago when the firm for which he had been working left town. “I applied for nearly a thousand jobs, ranging from stock clerk to industrial sales engineer. When I told them my age, they practically slammed the door in my face.”

T HIS BASIC problem is not answered by the Guaranteed Employment Plan. It has been argued by proponents of the plan that the greater stability of employment which it can presumably achieve will result in a greater market for the products of industry. There is no denying that, insofar as the plan provides supplements to unemployment insurance as joblessness grows, it can have some effect on consumer purchasing power, just as unemployment compensation itself does. But, to take the other side of the coin, as it compels employers to reduce their working forces to only that number which can be kept at work all year, it can have a dampening effect on the economy. For, if any such plan is won, there will surely be a rush to cut every possible worker with short seniority off the payroll, and to speed up the remaining workers as much as possible, in return for the guarantee of full employment to these high-seniority workers.

Moreover, as the employer’s liability will be quite limited, the plan will not be able to bear any sizable load, in the event of a more serious depression. On the contrary, it would prove more profitable for an employer to shut down entirely if he finds himself in a position where he has to lay off three-quarters of his work force and pay them benefits. For, if he shuts down, he will not have to pay out anything from his earnings, since his responsibility will be limited to a percentage of his current payroll.

We therefore arrive at the conclusion that the plan is animated by the old John L. Lewis philosophy of providing maximum “servicing” for the union membership, even if it is of considerably shrunken size, while ruthlessly eliminating from the industry and union those that are displaced by the “rationalization” processes of capitalism. In other words, the plan, if realized, will undoubtedly provide benefits to the regular working force of the automobile industry. But it cannot be considered a serious attack on the unemployment problem.

EVIDENCE of American economic history tends to show that the producing powers of the nation have
a decided tendency to outrun our consuming market. And can we assume that this tendency has been stopped today? Quite the contrary, the present automation trends should make labor more wary on this score than ever before. The historical tendency of the American labor movement, considered over the decades, has been to fight for an increasing share of labor productivity through higher wages and shorter hours. The trend of American industry is such that productivity—what the workers can produce in a given number of hours, tends to increase at a little more than two percent a year, so that, compounded annually, this gain has come to about 25 percent in ten years. That was the size of the gain from the end of World War I to the start of the great depression, and as a matter of fact helped to start the depression. If not for the large gains in hours, working conditions and wages won by the CIO-spearheaded labor movement during the late Thirties and Forties, the present position of the economy, even with its big war program, would be absolutely impossible.

The most practical way in which unions can increase the number of jobs is by a cut in hours with no reduction in pay. Whatever the merits of the guaranteed annual wage proposal—and it has merits, particularly its insistence on the idea that the employing class is responsible for employment and unemployment—it cannot take the place of a determined fight for a 30-hour week at 40 hours pay. This demand, which has the scope and can have the substantial results demanded by the present situation of labor, has the additional merit of encouraging the solidarity of employed and unemployed.

BUT IT IS now clear that the union leadership has determined to fight for the more limited objective contained in the Guaranteed Employment Plan, and every union man and woman will have to get behind the effort. As the time draws near for the opening of negotiations with Ford and General Motors, it is sure that the union officials will have the overwhelming membership support for the battle. This stems from the broad understanding which has been growing in labor ranks that these are tough days in management-labor relations, and that a readiness to fight is essential to make even limited gains, and sometimes merely to defend past accomplishments. The ranks feel that way, although workers are still wary of strikes and don’t want them if they can be avoided.

The Kohler strike, now in its tenth month, the Ford of Canada strike, now in its fourth month, are grim reminders that the employers don’t yield easily under present economic conditions and in this reactionary political climate. But this very commendable solidarity behind the union demands, which every militant worker will hail, has its negative side as well. The union leadership has played upon this sentiment to place a damper upon any serious consideration of other proposals. The atmosphere is so unfavorable for discussion that even the leadership of Ford Local 600, which spearheaded the fight for the 30-hour week, yielded. This was reflected in a statement in Ford Facts of Nov. 20, 1954:

We in Local 600 feel that even though our program was not adopted in its entirety, the conference was held in a democratic manner, allowing full voice and expression to all shades of opinion, and that it now behooves each of us to solidly close ranks behind the majority thinking on the 1955 economic demands.

This is a considerable shift from the previous announcement in Ford Facts of a determination to carry the 30-hour fight right to the coming union convention, which will meet in March, fully two months before contract-termination time. Possibly the Ford local leaders have retreated too soon. Nothing happened at the UAW-CIO economic conference that had not been anticipated; Reuther’s extension of an olive branch to the supporters of the 30-hour week by proposing that it become the next major objective of the union had been widely predicted.

The fact that the union leaders have been forced to give up their position taken at the 1953 UAW convention, when they labeled the shorter-work-week proposal as a “Kremlin plot to cut production,” certainly represents progress. But a promise, carefully hedged and limited, to do something two years hence, does not alter the fact that this necessary demand will not receive consideration in this coming round of negotiations. Naturally, the prospects for getting a re-evaluation of union demands for this year are not bright. But the 30-hour demand will be raised again and again as the most effective answer to unemployment.

EVEN the limited nature of the auto union demands does not assure an easy time in the coming negotiations. A hard fight may be in the offing. The $25 million strike fund has already been discussed by many local unions, and everywhere, support has been overwhelming, although there are some reports of grumbling in some outlying locals. But a strike fund is only part of the answer. The auto barons intend to have hundreds of thousands of cars in dealers’ hands as the contract termination dates approach. If the union is forced to call a strike, it will be at a time when the companies have sufficient cars to meet orders for an extended period. If the union then repeats UAW HIGH COMMAND: Standing (l. to r.), Richard T. Gosser and John W. Livingston, both Vice-Presidents. Seated; Emil Mazey, International Secretary-Treasurer, and Walter P. Reuther, President.
its previous “one-at-a-time” strategy, as it apparently intends, it can mean a long strike before the struck corporation feels the effects.

The expiration of the Ford and General Motors agreements only three days apart (May 29 and June 1) provides an excellent opportunity for joint strike action. The UAW leadership argues that such broad strike action would nullify the effect of competition between the auto companies in forcing a settlement, and would increase the burden of strike relief. Past UAW history demonstrates, however, that in important showdown struggles, the employers suspend their economic rivalries and work jointly against labor. In 1945-46, when the UAW took the lead in the post-war labor upsurge, GM workers walked the picket-lines for four months under the “one-at-a-time” strategy. Even then, GM did not yield until strikes hit steel and many other basic industries.

Strike action on a massive scale brings matters to a head in a hurry, and forces the capitalists and government officials to press for a settlement. That is where the coal- and steel-union strategy of striking the whole industry is superior. It has been argued that steel is a basic industry, while auto is not. But the facts are that auto is a basic factor in the whole economy, and is the user of sufficient products of other basic industries, as to produce a crisis in capitalist ranks when it is shut down. An industry-wide auto strike, has a better chance of bringing victory far sooner and more decisively.

**Badly Neglected: The Need for Contract Improvements**

IN recent years, the UAW leadership has not pushed for contract changes dealing with standards and conditions of work in its negotiations. Such demands are generally wiped out for the sake of a few cents in monetary concessions. Yet the weak contract clauses which now prevail on non-money matters—such as representation, working hours, rest periods, safety and health conditions, seniority rights, discrimination in hiring, upgrading and transfers, compulsory overtime, etc.—can nullify economic gains. Without these union benefits, many workers cannot live and work long enough to qualify for a pension, or are easily victimized and discharged under one of the mass of arbitrary rules and regulations made legal by the existing agreements.

The following sentence from Paragraph 8 of the General Motors contract—and this paragraph is common to the contracts of the Big Three—restricts bargaining on certain fundamental questions and sometimes permits entire local unions to be wiped out: “In addition, the products to be manufactured, the schedules of production, the methods, processes and means of manufacturing are solely and exclusively the responsibility of the corporation.”

Employment at the Ford River Rouge plant has been reduced by fifteen thousand during the last five years. This has been done both through automation and the shifting of work to other plants. GM has transferred certain operations out of Detroit, leaving long-seniority workers without jobs. Under this clause, maintenance, construction and tool-and-die work can be contracted out while UAW members are unemployed.

The first sentence of Paragraph 117 of the GM contract lays the basis for disciplining and even discharging any worker or committee member who is determined to fight speed-up: “During the life of this Agreement, the Union will not cause, nor will any member of the Union take part in any sit-down, stay-in or slow-down, in any plant of the corporation, or any curtailment of work or interference with production of the corporation.”

DURING the five years that it has been in force, this paragraph has proved more than satisfactory to the corporation in forcing its arbitrary work-stopping rights on workers. The other manufacturers, with similar “security” clauses, are also rapidly bringing back the pre-union speed-up into the auto industry.

The words “the union will not cause or permit its members to cause...” mean that when the rank-and-file members want to refuse to accept standards imposed by management, the committee members and officers of the local will be held responsible for failure of workers to comply with the speed-up. Should a committee member or union officer encourage the workers to resist the speed-up, he is subject to discharge.

In the past seven years, many UAW officers, committeemen and large numbers of employees have received disciplinary lay-offs, or have been discharged, for resisting the speed-up. Today, the militants have been largely forced out of activity in the UAW because of such “company security” clausees. These clauses must be eliminated if the speed-up is to be successfully fought.

The top leaders of the UAW have two reasons for not being aggressive on contract changes. First, to raise such fundamental questions as full-time for committeemen in GM, to challenge the right of the companies to determine location of plants and methods of production and related questions, or to suggest the elimination of the “company security” clause, would arouse the wrath of the auto barons against the present UAW leadership. Any contract-change fight would mean an end to the “good relations” which now exist between the corporations and the UAW leadership.

A second and no less compelling reason for not raising these contract demands is the fact that this would be a signal for the militants to become active again. It would be adopting in large measure their program, and thus raising their stock in the ranks. The contracts, as they now are, can and often are used to wipe out any opposition.

IN A New Year’s article in *Ford Facts*, local president Carl Stellato stated:

> It has been a long time since September of 1950, when we hocked our future for five years... When you live under a five-year contract, you have an accumulation of grievances over a five-year period. You have an opportunity to learn all of the weaknesses of your present contract; the issues to be negotiated grow each day and become five times greater than with a one-year pact.... We could not begin to itemize all of the grievances which must be taken care of and which cannot be taken care of under the five-year pact, such as outside contractors, seven-day operations, pensions, medical and hospitalization insurance, wage increases, etc.

A great deal of talk and publicity has centered around the guaranteed annual wage, which is the major objective for 1955. But we have not forgotten the day-to-day, bread-and-butter problems which face our membership, and these problems must not be sacrificed in negotiations.

Since the GM contract is the worst of the Big Three, there is a real fear in the ranks of Ford and Chrysler workers that they may be forced to go backward instead of forward, in a horsetrade for some economic concessions. All Ford locals have full-time committeemen paid by the company. Ford workers express the fear that they may be asked to give this up and adopt the restrictive GM system. The same is true of the Chrysler workers, who have full-time committeemen and a steward system as well. Many are looking to the coming UAW convention to take a stand on the need for these contract changes.

GM Worker
Impact of the first World War and Russian revolution led to a split in the Socialist Party and the formation of the communist movement, which ran into trouble at the outset. Concluding our history of the pre-World War I Socialist Party.

The Split in the Socialist Party

by Bert Cochran

THE Socialist Party's near-unanimity on the war question at the 1917 St. Louis convention was unfortunately more apparent than real, as it rested on a bloc of basically conflicting groups momentarily held together, but moving in different directions. Within a month after the delegates had returned home, the Indiana Socialist Party state headquarters was raided and it became known that W. R. Gaylord, former Socialist State Senator in Wisconsin, and A. M. Simons, former editor of the International Socialist Review, had written Senator Husting of Wisconsin informing him that the St. Louis convention had adopted a "treasonable" declaration and asked that steps be taken to prohibit its circulation.

Dozens of the leading party journalists, lecturers and publicists—John Spargo, A. M. Simons, Phelps Stokes, Charles Edward Russell, Harry Slobodin, William English Walling, W. J. Ghent, Allan L. Benson—now deserted the party en masse and became shrill war propagandists. Soon they were joined by most of the leading socialist trade union figures, a number of whom were national powers in the coal-mining, machinists, garment and other unions. This crowd joined with Gompers and the AFL hierarchy to set up the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy for the purpose of lining up labor ranks behind the war, and to drown out all voices of protest. Pushed on by the logic of their position, these apostles for "labor and democracy" were soon in the front ranks of the howling mob denouncing all strikes, threatening all opponents of the war, and demanding of the government ever more ferocious suppressions.

The American rulers needed no urging on this score. Congress passed the draconian Espionage Law in June 1917, and the police machinery of the country began cutting into all democratic rights. People talking against the war were jailed right and left. All three leaders of the Socialist Party in Ohio, Ruthenberg, Wagenknecht and Baker, were imprisoned for advocating resistance to the draft. Kate Richards O'Hare was convicted because of an anti-war speech. According to Roger Baldwin's compilation, during the first year of the war most of the socialist papers were either held up by the Post Office Department or had their second-class mailing rights revoked. On Sept. 7, 1917, federal agents made simultaneous raids on IWW and Socialist Party headquarters throughout the country. The Department of Justice, charged with enforcing the Espionage Act, set up the FBI, which operated as a typical secret police under a despotic government. Charles A. Beard later wrote:

Judging by its official reports, the main business of the Department was not the apprehension of the people who gave aid and comfort to the Central Powers with which the country was at war but rather the supervision of American citizens suspected of radical opinions about the perfection and perpetuity of the capitalist system of economy at home. According to authentic evidence, every practice dear to the Russian police of the old regime was employed by federal agents: "tools" were "planted" among organizations of humble working people, supposed to have dangerous tendencies, and were instructed to incite them to unlawful acts; meeting places of such associations were raided without proper warrant, property was destroyed, papers seized, innocent bystanders beaten, and persons guilty of no offense at all rushed off to jail, subjected to police torture, held without bail, and released without recourse.

In addition to the campaign of terror wielded by the official minions of the law, was the unofficial mob violence organized on the sly by public officials and the upper class community, and incited by the newspapers. The IWW, which was organizing the unorganized and leading strikes for better conditions in a number of industries, earned the particular venom of the big capitalists, who deftly combined big patriotism for the war with squeezing big profits out of the war. The IWW became the victim of countless unspeakable atrocities: the Everett Massacre in May 1916 where five workers were killed and twelve drowned; the hanging of Frank Little in June 1917 at Butte, Montana, by armed vigilantes; the outrage at Bisbee, Arizona, where over 1,100 men were forced into cattle cars and dumped in the desert without food or water, and not permitted to return to their homes.

The Left Wingers carried on in the spirit of the St. Louis declaration and at first met with a remarkable response, considering the repressions. There were huge anti-war demonstrations in New York, Chicago and San Francisco, and anti-conscription meetings overflowed in many cities. The largest May Day parade in the history of Cleveland marched through the streets with anti-war banners and proclamations. The decimated right-wing leadership that remained in the party also continued its opposition to the war throughout 1917, but its activities were far removed from the spirit of St. Louis. Hillquit informs us airily in his autobiography: "War was declared and the Conscription Act was adopted. It was futile to cry out against the accomplished facts. The pacifist elements of America turned from a negative policy of protest against war to constructive proposals for an early peace."

Apparantly he numbered himself among these elements, because together with many prominent liberals like Judah L. Magnes, Amos Pinchot, A. C. Townley, David Starr Jordan, Fola La Follette, Roger Baldwin, Louis Lochner, he sponsored a conference held in the Garden Theatre
in New York on May 31 under the title, “The First American Conference for Democracy and Terms of Peace.” Similar conferences were held in a dozen of the larger cities. Out of this movement came “The People’s Council” which built up considerable anti-war sentiment in many parts of the country and stimulated the formation of hundreds of local “Workmen’s Councils,” consisting of local union bodies, peace organizations, fraternal societies and Socialist branches.

The Council scheduled a constitutional convention for September 1 in Minneapolis, whose mayor, Thomas Van Lear, was a socialist. But the owners of the auditorium cancelled the contract, and Governor Burnquist of Minnesota threatened to send in State troops to disperse the meeting. Then Governor Frazier of North Dakota, who had been elected through the efforts of the Non-Partisan League, invited the convention to meet in his state. But the local authorities at Fargo, the only city large enough to furnish the necessary accommodations, proved hostile, and the convention organizers decided the invitation could not be accepted. The convention finally held a quickie session in Chicago, and hurriedly dispersed after adopting a constitution when they learned that Governor Lowden of Illinois had sent out troops from Springfield to break up the gathering.

The peace program of the Council demanded that the government “announce immediately its war aims,” “to strive for an early, democratic and general peace,” and “to urge international organization for the maintenance of world peace.” The Council was also dedicated to work for the repeal of the conscription laws, for a popular referendum on the question of war or peace, and to safeguard labor standards. While it continued in existence until the end of the war, it went into a decline after its rugged experiences in trying to hold a convention in wartime America.

The essential spirit of the People’s Council was middle-class pacifist, and its peace program certainly left much to be desired from a socialist point of view. Nevertheless, pacifism that fights against war in time of war should not be confused with pacifism that opposes war in time of peace, only to turn jingo when war is declared. The People’s Council—disregarding the specific role of the right-wing socialists, which is another question—undoubtedly expressed the confused thinking of great segments of the liberal and labor public, and in the balance must be said to have probably contributed to the peace mobilization at least during 1917.

The last flicker of the right wing’s anti-war opposition came in the November 1917 elections. The New York Socialist movement put on a memorable campaign for Hillquit for mayor, in which he received 145,332 votes, or over 20 percent of the total. The large vote swept into office 10 Socialist members of the State Assembly, 7 members of the Board of Aldermen, and a justice of a local civil court. In Chicago, confronted with a fusion of all other political forces, the Socialists polled almost a third of the total vote. The SP also drew big votes in the elections in Cleveland and Buffalo.

But before many more months had passed, the right and left wings were drawing further apart. The September-October 1917 number of Class Struggle, a left-wing organ, was already full of bitter attacks against the party leadership. Louis Boudin ridiculed the People’s Council, and further demanded the recall of Victor Berger from the National Executive Committee on the grounds that he was pro-German instead of being anti-war. Ludwig Lore went after Meyer London because he “neglected every opportunity of manifesting serious opposition to war—in direct violation of the wording of our St. Louis program.”

When a new wave of raids and arrests followed after the November Russian revolution, Debs decided the time had come to make a dramatic demonstration against the war. Ray Ginger relates in his biography of Debs that when Noble C. Wilson, his former campaign manager, dropped into his office at Terre Haute in June 1918, he found the Socialist leader sprawling in a chair behind his desk, full of animation. He laughed and joked as he told Wilson his plans. The hour has finally come, Debs said, for him to speak out and accept the consequences. He had no doubt what the result would be. With the words bubbling through his clear, vigorous chuckle, he
concluded, “Of course, I’ll take about two jumps and they’ll nail me, but that’s all right.” And Debs spoke out on June 16, 1918, at Canton, Ohio, in a speech that will long live in the history of the struggle for freedom in America.

But while Debs and the left wingers were redoubling their anti-war efforts, the right wingers were starting to fold up. The seven Socialist aldermen of New York City, the symbol of anti-war feeling when they were elected in November, became champions of the third Liberty Loan six months later. At the Illinois state convention held in May 1918, the minority called for endorsement of the war and was only defeated by the close vote of 31 to 27. The New York Forward, the large influential Jewish daily, began giving qualified support to the war. Meyer London, the only Socialist Congressman, announced that Wilson’s declared objectives coincided with those of the Socialist Party. Nathan Fine, whose sympathies were with the right wing, confessed in his book, “Farmer and Labor Parties in the United States”: “In truth both as an independent socialist body, and through the liberal and pacifist People’s Council which it sponsored and supported, the Socialist Party did not stand in 1918 where it stood in April 1917. Whatever the reasons, the fact remained that by the middle of 1918 important sections of the party were no longer seriously, if at all, opposed to the war. By this time also the socialist needle trades unions came out quite openly in favor of the war.”

The end of the war did not produce an amelioration of the conflict between the two factions but preparations for a showdown. It was the Bolshevik revolution of November 1917 that was the big factor making impossible any reconciliation, and which snapped the last bond of kinship that held the left and right socialists within the fold of one party.

It is difficult to describe the feelings that swept the Socialist Party membership when the message was flashed that the Bolsheviks had taken power, had published the secret treaties for all the world to witness the greedy and rapacious purposes of the war, and had called upon all belligerents to attend a world conference and establish peace on the basis of no annexations or indemnities. Finally, out of the agony of the battlefields, and the muddying of socialism at the hands of its supposed leaders, came a new piercing message of light and hope, and the hearts of the rank and file went out to it. A report printed in the Socialist Call of January 5, 1919, vividly portrays the party feeling all the more reliably as the reporter was a hostile witness: “Eight thousand socialist voices shouted until they were hoarse at the Coliseum this afternoon at every mention of the word ‘Bolshevik.’ The occasion was the launching of the mayoralty campaign. . . . Kate Richards O’Hare and Ella Reeve Bloor were the principal speakers. John Collins, candidate for mayor, brought the house down first by an accidental mention of the Russian Bolsheviks. From that moment until the close the attention of the vast audience seemed directed more to the present happenings in Siberia . . . than it was on the municipal platform as outlined by the Socialist candidate for mayor of Chicago.”

The left wing welcomed the revolution, defended it, and associated itself with it. Debs voiced the common position when in a spirited article publishe in the Class Struggle of February 1919 called, “The Day of the People,” he took his hat off to Lenin and Trotsky, excoriated Scheide- mann and the German jingo socialists, and announced, “From the crown of my head to the soles of my feet I am Bolshevik, and proud of it.”

The right wing, faced with another uprising, tried to temporize and ride out the storm the way it had at the St. Louis convention. But the tide was running strongly against it.

The two sides squared off for a finish fight at the beginning of 1919, just as they had in 1912. But it was the left wing that was on the offensive this time. The relationship of forces was heavily against Hillquit and his friends. Their cadre had been badly splintered when so many of the leading intellectual lights and trade union figures had deserted the party during the war. Their prestige was at low point, because of their sorry record in the war, and the disrepute of their allies in Europe. The rising tide of revolution in Europe was now undercutting any standing with the membership for their type of politics.

In contrast, the left wing had the wind in its sails. The revolutionary events transpiring abroad imparted great vigor and self-confidence to its counsels. Their majority in the party, which had already been a fact at the time
of the St. Louis convention, had been steadily augmented since then with the growth of the organization. The party had been recruiting regularly, so that its membership rose from 80,000 in 1917 to 105,000 in the first months of 1919, but this recruiting was being done in the main by the language federations, who took advantage of the fact that the foreign-born workers had been extraordinarily stirred by the Russian events. By 1919, over half the membership of the Socialist Party belonged to the foreign-language federations, and these in their overwhelming majority were unyielding supporters of the left wing. While the predominance of the language federations became a big headache for the left wing later on, at this time it reinforced its factional position.

The fight blew up on February 15, 1919, when the Central Committee of Greater New York refused to ensure the local Socialist aldermen for their pro-war activities. The representatives of twenty left-wing locals thereupon met in conference, and after listening to reports by John Reed, James Larkin, Rose Pastor Stokes and representatives of the language federations, organized themselves as the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party, voted to issue a paper, and publish a manifesto. The New York Communist appeared on April 19 with John Reed as editor. The left wing can be said to have organized on a national basis at this time, as all the other major centers took the cue from New York and followed its example.

The membership then in two clear-cut contests repudiated the traditional SP leadership, and by an overwhelming majority handed a mandate to the left wing. First, the membership voted in referendum on the proposal: “That the Socialist Party should participate in an international congress or conference called by or in which participate the Communist Party of Russia, and the Communist Party (Spartacus) of Germany.” The proposition carried by a big vote but Hillquit held up the returns until May, two months after the conference had been held. Then, in early Spring, the membership voted by referendum for national officers, and again the right wingers were snowed under. Even the outstanding personalities like Hillquit and Victor Berger were repudiated. The National Office refused to make the returns public, but as finally authenticated by the left wing, Hillquit received 4,775 votes for the post of international secretary to 13,252 votes polled by Kate Richards O’Hare; Berger received 4,871 votes for international representative to 17,235 cast for John Reed. The left wing also elected 12 out of the 15 members of the National Executive Committee.

NOW CAME the supreme test of the vaunted democracy of Hillquit and his associates. Would they bow to the clear will of the majority, or would they resist it? Alas, these holier-than-thou democrats flunked the test, and flunked it badly. They proved anew that abstract ethical conceptions do not determine tactical procedures in vital political faction fights. Hillquit and his cronies, in danger of annihilation at the hands of a hostile political tendency, acted with no less ruthlessness, and with as little compunction, as a trade union bureaucracy determined to hang on to its posts and the perquisites attached thereto. On May 24-30, the lame-duck National Executive Com-

mittee went into session and coolly voted: 1) to “suspend” seven language federations; 2) to expel the Michigan state organization; 3) to instruct the Executive Secretary not to tabulate the referendum vote; 4) to refuse a request of the two left-wing members of the committee that they be permitted to print a statement of their position in the party’s National Bulletin; 5) to hold an emergency convention in Chicago on August 30.

When the Massachusetts and Ohio state conventions in June voted to back the left wing, these state organizations were likewise expelled, and charters granted to the “loyal” members. Also expelled in the ensuing weeks was Local Chicago as well as many locals in New York. In all, a minimum of 55,000 members were drummed out of the party as part of the right wing’s preparation for the emergency convention.

On June 21, the National Conference of the left wing met in New York at the Manhattan Lyceum to consider the party crisis with 94 delegates from 20 cities, representing the bulk of the SP membership, present. Immediately a sharp difference of opinion arose as to the next tactical steps to be taken. Dennis Batt of the Michigan organization and Hourwich, who was the dominant personality of the language federations, proposed to forget about the fight in the SP and proceed to launch a communist party in Chicago on September 1. They argued that there was no chance of capturing the Socialist Party as the right-wing officials would not abide by any majority votes, and that anyhow it was useless to capture a thoroughly discredited outfit; that the historic moment had now struck to form a communist party. The opposing group, which included John Reed, Charles E. Ruthenberg, Benjamin Gitlow, Charles Krumbein, Alfred Wagenknecht, tried to demonstrate that the tactic that the left wing had been pursuing to win the party leadership was gaining them increasing support from the ranks, was exposing Hillquit and his crowd as responsible for the coming split, and that in order to win over still more of the wavering groups, this tactic should be continued up to the August 30 convention.

AFTER THREE DAYS of arguing the question, the proposition to abandon the Socialist Party was voted down 55 to 38. The majority, by a vote of 43 to 14 with 14 abstaining, then resolved that “this conference shall organize as the Left Wing Section of the Socialist Party and shall have as its object the capturing of the Socialist Party for revolutionary socialism.” The decision was also made that if, with the aid of the courts and police, the right wing held on to control of the convention, then a communist party should be launched at once. The conference provided for the publication of its manifesto and program, established headquarters in New York, and made the Revolutionary Age its official organ. But the Michigan-federation group told the conference they were not going along with its decisions, and that for their part they were going to forget about the SP and launch a communist party in Chicago on September 1. The left wing, in the midst of its fight with the right, was thus rent in two, and over an issue of a purely tactical character, at that. This did not speak too well for the maturity of its cadre, and cast a heavy cloud over its future.
The new left wing as mirrored at its first national conference was by no means an ideal instrument for the building of a revolutionary movement in this country. In composition, it was distinctly inferior to the left wing of 1912. As against its predecessor, the membership was largely foreign-born, with small knowledge of American affairs. It was also to a considerable degree a movement of middle-class people who had little contact, and even less understanding, of the American working class. Politically, the left wingers had made progress. They had learned something from the Russian revolution, and were trying hard to absorb the important writings of its leaders.

The political thinking of the left wing at this period can be gauged by a study of the manifesto issued by the national conference, which was essentially a redraft of the earlier New York manifesto, and furnished the essential basis for the programs of the two communist parties that were founded shortly afterwards. Formally, the left wingers were a long way ahead in their political understanding from the days when "Industrial Socialism" by Haywood and Bohn was their bible. The 1919 document had a correct Marxist discussion of the state, the nature of the political struggle for socialist power, and of the dictatorship of the proletariat during the transition period. It also showed its authors had read to advantage Lenin's "Imperialism," and had learned a whole lot from the experiences of the war and the collapse of the Second International.

But as soon as they left the formal programmatic ground for a discussion of a practical policy for America, it was pathetically evident that they were suffering from all the ills of infantile leftism. The 1919 manifesto exhibited the worst of the sectarianism of the older left wing, and then some. The left wingers wanted to blow up the AFL and build revolutionary unions, they were against labor parties, they were against partial reform demands, they were for "parliamentary action" but only of the kind "which emphasizes the implacable character of the class struggle."

**The Ultra-Leftism** was induced in this case not only by political inexperience and immaturity, but by revolutionary intoxication. It is impossible to understand today some of the fantastic proposals and antics of these left wingers, many of them men of talent and considerable intelligence, if one doesn't realize that all of them were convinced that a revolutionary crisis was around the corner. John Reed, for example, had no doubt that the revolution was imminent. He told Roger Baldwin, who was being sent to jail as a conscientious objector, that he would be freed by the workers long before his sentence had ended. And John Reed, because of his American background and experiences as a journalist, knew more about labor's thinking than most of the other left wingers, and was not considered unduly optimistic. If one grants this assumption of a revolutionary crisis, a lot of the left wing's proposals and concepts fall into place and sound less foolish than what they were. But that was the rub: The basic assumption was a badly mistaken one.

It was indeed true that many countries in Europe were in the throes of revolutionary crisis, and capitalist statesmen were frightened of how far the sweep would go. But unfortunately for the socialist militants, it was not true of the United States. This country had emerged rich and powerful from the war, and its people soon embraced Harding's "normalcy," not social revolution. There was a big strike-wave in this period, and a labor party was even thrown up for a while by the Chicago unions. But a number of the biggest strikes were broken by lack of labor solidarity, and in any case, it was all on a primitive level of economic strikes for union recognition and small improvements in wages and conditions.

The left wing had other traits besides negative ones. It was fired with the vision of the Russian revolution. It understood that that was a historic event, destined to change the face of civilization, and that it was up to all socialists to learn from it, and get in step with the new world that was emerging. The importance of this knowledge should not be underestimated. Starting out with a largely foreign-born membership, and no influence in and very little knowledge of the labor movement, the communists in five years established themselves as the mainstream of the radical movement. As against this achievement, the IWW militants, who were mostly American, with far superior labor connections, with the prestige of great labor struggles fought, and the aureole of their prison martyrdom, distingreagent in this same period. The organizational and personnel advantages were all with the Wobblies at first. But they did not understand the new world and tried to turn their backs on the Russian revolution. As a result they ceased playing any role in the post-war labor movement. Communists did not join the Wobblies, but probably a few thousand IWW members eventually joined the communist movement.

The 1919 left wing was also the superior of its parent as an organizer. It introduced cohesiveness in its organizational relations, discipline in its planning and work, and an energetic devotion to the cause, so that in later years it amazed the whole country with its achievements in this field.

**But its revolutionary romanticism led it into making many mistakes in the conflict with the Socialist Party opportunists, and undoubtedly drove away many potential recruits.** One of the worst of these was the left wing's opposition to the party's amnesty campaign to free the numerous class war prisoners still languishing in the jails. The left wingers were so certain of early social revolution that they had no patience with egalistic methods. The Massachussets state convention voted to liberate political prisoners by "general strikes and demonstrations." The *Revolutionary Age* wrote: "We don't want amnesty for them. We want them to be released by the industrial might of the proletariat, by class conscious action." Debs, for one, was very antagonized by this sabotage of the amnesty campaign and felt that but for that, he would have been freed far earlier. Moreover, the left wing's misreading of the political situation distorted its tactics and general behavior in the fight inside the Socialist Party, and undoubtedly lost it support it otherwise might have had. As the revolutionary crisis was thought to be close by, there was simply no point in a good Bolshevik wasting precious time fiddling around with a lot of opportunists and social patriots. Hence, as we have seen, the federa-
tions decided to chuck the whole business even before the battle was concluded. But even prior to their decision, the left wing’s tactics were characterized by hastiness, impatience, and contempt for the party legalities. State organizations under the left’s domination disregarded and flagrantly violated National Committee decisions. It is true state organizations had been doing that since the party’s inception, but the situation required special adroitness and care in the prevailing civil-war atmosphere. After the New York conference in February, the left wing opened its own headquarters, although why it couldn’t have operated through the offices of the many left-wing locals in the city is certainly not clear. To top that off, it proceeded to issue its own printed membership cards, as if to hand the right wing additional ammunition for punitive action against the insurgents.

The impatient tactical course ignored the fact that many of the branches around the country were not as well acquainted with the issues as were the people in New York, were not yet convinced of the necessity of building a new party, and were in general moving at a slower pace. Then, the left wing was too involved in internal squabbling, and too split, to be able at the final stage to fully exploit the bureaucratic enormity of the right wing’s expulsions, and its illegal usurpation of the party leadership.

That the left wing could have done better became clear at the SP emergency convention which opened August 30, 1919, in Chicago. Even after Reed and his supporters were, with the help of police, ejected from the convention hall; and after thirty more Left delegates marched out in protest against the convention refusal to examine the contested election as the first order of business—even after this, Left influence was so noticeable that the convention passed a resolution unqualifiedly endorsing industrial unionism; and on the question of international affiliation, the majority report felt constrained to call for a new international that would exclude parties par-

On September 1, not one but two communist parties opened their conventions in Chicago. The division that started at the June left-wing conference persisted and led to the formation of two rival bodies. The Communist Party was set up by the language federations and the Michigan organization, with approximately 27,000 members. The Communist Labor Party was organized by the delegates led by Reed, Gitlow, Wagenknecht, who had tried to attend the SP convention, but were not permitted to take their seats, and probably represented about 10,000 members. The programs of the two parties were practically identical, each being based on the left-wing manifesto. Nevertheless, the two sides were trading accusations hot and heavy, and feelings were growing increasingly bitter. At the bottom of the conflict and the Communist Party’s refusal to unite into one party was the determination of the language federations to retain their control. These language-federation leaders had rationalized themselves into the theory that only the foreign born could guarantee the revolutionary purity of the movement, and their dominance was therefore indispensable. The Reed-Gitlow group had more of an American membership, and the one serious difference it had with the other side was its conviction that the movement would have to find an American leadership, and that the federations could not be permitted an autonomous status. Meanwhile, Batt and Keracher, the Michigan leaders who later formed the splinter Proletarian Party, got into a big hassle with the federation leaders inside the Communist Party, and several months later were expelled and took the Michigan organization out with them.

Thus, the communist movement was launched in this country under the auspicious circumstances of a senseless split, with mutual squabbling and recriminations occupying a good deal of the time and energy of the “workers vanguard,” and with both groups of leaders having their heads in the clouds so far as understanding the problems and moods of the American working people was concerned. There is no question that the infant of American communism was sickly and misshapen at birth. Within two months, the Palmer terror struck, and both Communist parties were forced into a clandestine existence.
Crisis in Tunisia

by W. Raleigh

Each spring a hot wind blows across Tunisia—the scorching Sirocco. It rises in the Sahara and sears its way northward to the Mediterranean. If it is timely and fierce enough it can be a boon to the Tunisian fellahin, for it burns and destroys the parasites which consume their crops. But the Tunisian peasant confronts a far greater pestilence—the French colons, who have descended on the land and who systematically eat up the wheat fields and the olive orchards.

In an effort to cool the temper of Tunisian nationalism, which has been rising since the end of World War II, Premier Mendès-France, in one of his first official acts upon assuming office, flew to Tunisia, and on July 31 promised the country internal autonomy. With the fresh lesson of Indochina in his mind, and with revolt seething in both Morocco and Algeria, Mendès-France moved quickly to forestall a rapidly developing crisis.

Mendès-France’s proposal to Tunisian nationalist leaders included continued French control of Tunisian foreign policy, and continued French army occupation to protect the economic position of the 180,000 French landowners whose huge estates cover the richest part of the land. Even this ungenerous proposal has met with stiff resistance from French capitalists, and although Mendès-France promised “immediate action,” negotiations have been in process for months.

Mendès-France’s plan was not new. In 1950 a similar proposal was made by Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, following outbreaks of nationalist demonstrations. For two years, negotiations produced nothing. When the Tunisian nationalist premier decided to appeal the question to the United Nations, he and three members of his cabinet were sent into exile. From that moment, the nationalist movement began to arm itself, and the National Army of Liberation came into being—contemptuously termed the fellaghos (bandits) by the French. These partisans were in actuality escaped prisoners of the French Foreign Legion, who hid out in the southern mountains, organized armed bands, recruited support from the agricultural laborers and small landholders of the steppes. For months the independence fighters harassed the French, and in turn have been hunted and hunted both by the 30,000 French colonial troops, and by the private mercenary army of the plantation owners organized in the “Red Hand.”

Upon Mendès-France’s promise to grant internal autonomy, Tunisian nationalist leaders called upon the armed bands to give up their rifles. Many have done so; many others have refused to comply. It is an unequal truce, since the Tunisian fighters are expected to disarm, but no move has been made to disarm the “Red Hand”—nor to remove the French Legion. On the contrary, Mendès-France has reinforced the French garrison.

It is also a tenuous truce, as Habib Bourguiba, leader of the nationalist movement, is still in exile, as are other officials of the Neo-Destour. Tunisian patriots remember only too well the outcome of the Schuman promise, which ended in bloody suppression. While Mendès-France has promised autonomy, he has taken steps to reassure the colons and their powerful backers in France that nothing important is going to change. With the troop reinforcements, he paraded General Juin, symbol of French imperialism, in Tunis on his trip there last July. The colonists have been told the “autonomy” plan will leave their economic position intact.

The policy was put in a nutshell by the Paris newspaper Le Monde: “The French of Tunisia know that, in spite of the first press reports, they will not be abandoned and serious guarantees will be required to counterbalance the new rights of the Tunisians.” In any case, even if the current negotiations between the French government and the nationalist leaders produce a temporary agreement, this cannot cure the diseases of three-quarters of a century of colonial rule.

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Much of the information in this article is taken from this excellent report, which, for the first time in English, gives both an historical report and economic analysis of Tunisia under the French protectorate. It is highly recommended as a factual source book.

18

American Socialist
Tunisia has what is probably the best organized nationalist movement in Africa. The Neo-Destour Party, organized in 1934, has the support of the Tunisian people in every city and village. Backbone of Neo-Destour is the 100,000-strong UGTT, the all-Tunisian labor organization composed of city and mine workers. In a country of 3½ million, a union of this size is a great power. The UGAT (Union General de L'Agriculture Tunisienne) representing the farm laborers and small landowners, also backs the nationalist party. The Tunisian Chambers of Commerce, composed only of non-French merchants, participate in the party work, and the feminist movement, which in Africa as in Asia is linked with the independence movement, provides additional forces.

The strength of this movement is attested by the fact that Mendès-France was forced to negotiate with its leaders despite the fact that it was banned in 1952. In January of that year, following the collapse of negotiations initiated by Schuman, the Neo-Destour leaders, then serving as ministers in the Tunisian government, were exiled, thousands of Tunisian professional people jailed, business men, labor leaders, and peasant spokesmen hunted down, whole villages pillaged, and thousands of victims killed or herded into concentration camps. The Neo-Destour press was suppressed; but today the French government is forced to meet with the very leaders it had outlawed only a couple of years ago.

Nor, by accepting Mendès-France’s terms as a basis of negotiations, have the nationalist leaders changed their program or outlook. Four years ago they demanded a 100 percent Tunisian executive branch of the government, a Tunisian Congress elected by universal suffrage, and a civil service system to give priority in appointments to Tunisians. Their key demand today, as in 1951, is Tunisian control of the executive arm of the government. This would mean an all-Tunisian Council of Ministers, now dominated by the French. To grant such a demand would have tremendous repercussions, as Algeria and Morocco, the adjoining French colonies, are ruled in naked colonial form.

Mendès-France is neither able nor willing to relax the French grip on Tunisia. But it is equally certain that nothing less than full independence will satisfy the Tunisian people. The driving force behind Tunisian nationalism cannot be negotiated away in Paris. Since 1881, when the French established their “protectorate” over the country, the subsistence forms of agrarian life have been harshly overturned by the ravenous colonial landgrabbers who have implanted capitalist land relations; but in place of the old ways—the ways of the nomad farmers, the small landholders and their village communes—nothing was provided for the Tunisians but slow starvation, pauperization, or a life of hard labor in the mines or fields of the imperialist ruler.

By 1937, almost two million acres of land had been taken from Tunisians and put in the hands of European settlers. Most of this land was in the north, where the rains are most plentiful and the soil rich. The Tunisians were driven from this rich region, and from the olive-growing areas of the south, into the arid central steppes, where it is a miracle merely to exist. On this poor land the Tunisian peasant must use the ancient wooden plow, while in the northern plantations, the big operators from France employ the latest machinery. In the steppes, on the mountainsides, on overworked holdings that average 35 acres, it is impossible for the Tunisian peasant, without modern methods and tools, to provide the bare necessities of life. The French plantation owners aggravate this plight of the Tunisian peasant by their cashcrop policy. The richest soil, which if used to grow food for the native population could provide sustenance, is worked instead for export crops.

Those Tunisian farmers who managed to hold onto productive soil, are unable to compete with the great agricultural enterprises owned by French bankers. Credit laws are designed to give ample credit to French landholders, but to deny loans to Tunisians. The result is the pauperization of the Tunisian middle farmer; he and the small peasants more and more crowd the cities seeking bread. Twenty percent of the Tunisian population is permanently unemployed. Every city has its populous shanty town.

One crop that is widely cultivated by native growers as well as the French is olives. In one area, Sousse, native groves produced about 2½ million bushels of olives; in European-owned estates in the area of Sfax, roughly the same amount was grown. But in the European estates this crop was distributed among 2,000 families, while in the native area it was dispersed among 110,000 families. To the Europeans, olive oil is money in the bank, but to the Tunisian grower, his meagre share means life itself.

It was always difficult for the Tunisian to survive. Natural barriers constantly presented themselves—lack of rain, lack of good pasture lands, etc. But French rule has aggravated the struggle to survive by superimposing upon the small-plot tillage system, upon the nomad sheepherders, upon the communally owned groves, the economic
structure of the modern market. Under the French laws and French system, the Tunisian must have cash. But he is not allowed the means to acquire it.

Instead of bringing civilization to Tunisia, the French have brought decay. There is a huge human scrap-heap: herdsmen without sheep, peasants without land, wandering tribesmen. Many thousands of them follow the crops; about 20,000 a year go to the grape arbors, and work for the right to eat the grapes which are their only food while they are fortunate enough to have such work.

It is difficult for an American to understand the plight of people such as the nomadic farm laborers of Tunisia. Perhaps it can best be shown by this fact: A subsistence daily caloric intake is estimated at around 3,000 calories for a man doing moderate work. Yet these itinerant laborers try to exist on 400 calories a day. Serious malnutrition sets in at 1,000 calories a day. It is not rhetoric to say that tens of thousands of Tunisians are literally starving to death. One out of every five infants born to Tunisians does not survive birth.

It is therefore most unlikely that the handing-over of a thousand rifles by fighters led to hope that independence will come through negotiations means a permanent armistice between the French rulers and the nationalist movement of Tunisia. The negotiations in Paris merely set the stage for coming events. Meanwhile martial law prevails in the country. The unions of city and land are intact; the Neo-Destour Party, no matter what its leaders may try to do, is a mass organization under constant pressure, not only from the workers and landless peasants, but from the Tunisian middle classes, to win complete freedom for their country. To live, they must expel the French.

**Terror-Campaign in Florida**

Miami

The House Un-American Activities Committee came to town in December amid a great blaze of publicity, but after the show was over, even the rabid witch-hunters had to admit that a wave of reversion had been generated. The inquisitors appeared baldly ridiculous when faced with the quiet defiance of some simple folk, such as a sixty-year-old tailor from Miami, or an unlettered cigar-maker from Tampa. Squabbles arose among the congressman themselves. At the end of three days, chairman Velve was found trying to justify his convenient mid-winter appearance in sunny Florida. The best he could come up with was the suspicious proximity of this southernmost tip of the U.S. to Guatemala and the Panama Canal.

Mr. Velve was trying to cash in on one of the most brazen local witch-hunts in the United States. George A. Brautigam, state attorney general for Dade County, had already issued about a hundred subpoenas to the accommodation of a blaring trumpeting in the press which was just a step removed from calling for a pose.

The subpoenas were issued almost exclusively to Jews. However, the anti-Semitic aspect of the inquisition is tied in with a campaign of terror against former supporters of the Progressive Party here. It is aimed at cutting down New Deal Democrats such as ex-Senator Claude Pepper and his adherents, who recently succeeded in electing Jack Orr to the State Legislature. Then too, there is the never-to-be-forgotten score to settle with the "traitors" of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, led in its time by Aubrey Williams, former New Deal official.

But the flagrant anti-Semitic features exhibited by this witch-hunt, in an area which has within the past few years seen the attempted bombing of eight synagogues and Jewish centers, has finally caused a stir in the Jewish community, which numbers 13 percent of the population in Greater Miami. The issuance of subpoenas to a cantor in a local synagogue and the director of a Jewish Community Center has aroused a considerable resentment.

The Florida Supreme Court ruled recently that witnesses who took the Fifth Amendment before the Dade County grand jury were not liable for contempt. This ruling quashed the previous convictions of the first batch of fourteen defendants, and set a precedent for the others. It appeared that the local gestapo had lost a round. But the Florida Supreme Court officially recommended that the same defendants were liable, and ought to be prosecuted, under the Florida Criminal Communism Law, which is even worse than the federal Smith Act.

First among the factors which account for a slowly increasing unpopularity of the witch-hunt is the brutal methods employed by the local boys. The lives of more than a hundred families have been utterly disrupted, in some cases traumatically. Subpoenas are often served after midnight; once to an eighty-four-year-old woman who has not yet recovered from the shock. In another instance, the county sheriff pushed his way into a hospital to serve a subpoena on a mother just one day after childbirth. Totally unwarranted refusals of bail were imposed in at least a dozen instances. Important legal decisions—the disbarment of attorney Leo Sheiner by Judge Vincent Giblin, and the contempt citation issued to Reverend Joseph Barth of the Unitarian Church at a time when he was acting as a friend of the court for a member of his congregation—such decisions are made on the spur of the moment, in the heat of anger.

A recent challenge to these medical procedures came from two defendants of most recent vintage, Shames and Robinson, who filed a brief with Judge Holt questioning the legality of their subpoenas. They claimed that to be called before the grand jury at this juncture, in an atmosphere of hysteria, with the attendant front-page publicity, amounts to a form of persecution which contravenes the intent of the law. Further, they contended that the function of the grand jury is to determine whether a crime has been committed on the basis of evidence submitted to the jury, and not to imply guilt of persons against whom no evidence has been submitted. Although their brief was thrown out of court by Judge Holt, it was favorably received in the community, and the Miami Herald, to its credit, gave this matter a fair play in its pages. Since the filing of this brief, the grand jury appearance of Shames, Robinson and a score of others has been twice postponed. Lest this be taken to mean that the witch-hunt is running out of breath, Attorney Brautigam, who is still in the saddle, continues to grind out additional subpoenas. On January 11 he issued 43 more.

The opposition to the witch-hunt here has been inadequate and dispersed, divided by sectarian interests, and weakened by fear of retribution. However as the roll-call lengthens, and the persecution is seen to be absurdly disproportionate, fear begins to lose its sting. After all, if the pace continues for very long, a lot of people will begin to feel just a bit uneasy if they aren't called before the bar of injustice.

Local resistance organizations were stillborn. During November 1954 a new organization took shape, sparked by Rabbi Skop and Reverend Ulrich, called the Council for the Preservation of the Constitution. On December 20, a joint meeting was held of this organization together with the individual members of the national American Civil Liberties Union. The merger of these two groups and their reorganization as a chapter of the ACLU can give stability and prestige to the resistance. This is the best thing that has happened in Dade County for a long while.
The Truth About Race
by An Anthropologist

Articles designed to clear up superstitions and myths about race are always timely in America, which, despite all its protestations of democracy remains one of the world strongholds of reactionary racism. This article was prepared for the American Socialist to mark Negro History Week, February 13-19, by a graduate student in anthropology.

UNDERLYING the various racist propaganda activities and anti-minority violence in this and other countries, is a deep bigotry, and a superstitious belief in the inferiority of different peoples. Yet the work of science in this field, the historical, cultural and biological evidence, constitutes a crushing case against the notion that any particular segment of humankind is superior to the other segments, or that any segment is inferior.

Ignorance in this field exists on many levels: the extreme level of exaggerated and pathological race hatred; the milder, but potentially virulent forms of prejudice, traces of which are found in practically all persons including even enlightened promoters of the fight for minority rights. Every person who seriously wants to rid himself of all prejudice and fight for equal rights should know the facts of the scientific refutation of the racists, which this article will set forth. In addition, an attempt will be made to give a simplified explanation of the racial differences that do exist, as well as an evaluation of the respective contributions of the different races to the total body of human culture.

The races of man represent the last significant step that we have taken in our history as an animal species, in our evolution from an older, different animal form to what we are today. The races are evidence of man's adherence to a universal law governing all living substances: the tendency of a species to differentiate as it persists through generation after generation, and as it spreads out in space.

The process, which might be described as a "budding" or "branching" evolution, works something like this: When an animal-type is young—that is, when it has not been differentiated long from its close relations—it is usually small in numbers and localized in a definite habitat. After it stays in that habitat for a long period of time, the various characteristics that the species has inherited from its ancestors undergo a process of natural selection. Those that are advantageous in the environment are fostered, and those that are not, being detrimental to the individuals who carry them, tend to be discouraged. After a period of time, a number of dissimilarities from the original parent stock are developed. These peculiarities become the ultimate source of the eventual differences which arise in the new group.

The passage of time, isolation, and inbreeding thus give rise to a new variety of animal. If conditions are favorable, it too will expand in number as did its original ancestor stock, will then spread out, and sections of the spreading population will isolate themselves anew and inbreed, and the process will be repeated, several new varieties thus forming. In this way, the luxuriant variety of animals we see in nature was produced. Other important mechanisms operated too, but this one is the most important for our present discussion.

MAN'S development on the earth conforms with these principles, as does his later differentiation into races. All living men belong to one species: Homo sapiens. But we know that at one time, about 100,000 years ago, there were several human species roaming the earth. Evidently what happened after man became definitely distinct from his great-ape cousins, about 500,000 to a million years ago, was the budding process described above. The earliest man gave way to these several varieties of men. Instead of the new species in turn moving about and "budding" into many more varieties of man, the sapiens man alone emerged. The complete story is difficult to find, because the fossil evidence is spotty. There is evidence, however, that 50,000 to 75,000 years ago, just as the last glacier was melting away, Homo sapiens was in command, and all the more primitive men who once lived on the earth were gone.

Then Homo sapiens began proliferating into new varieties, and this time it went far enough to produce the three large races of man occupying the earth today—the Negroid, Mongolid, and Caucasoid stocks. At this point, the process of differentiation came to an end.

The different branches of Homo sapiens emerged most probably at some point or points central to the areas of the world that the major races are still associated with. The Negroes probably came into Africa through the area known today as Abyssinia and were thereafter isolated from the others by the Sahara desert and the swamps.
of the upper Nile River. The Mongoloids resulted from spreads into East Asia, either through the central route or by a more indirect way through Europe to the north, over to Asia and then down. They got into North and South America apparently over the Bering Straits, when there was still a land bridge between Siberia and Alaska. The Caucasoids or whites inhabited North Africa, Europe, and the countries of the Middle East as well as northern India, in pre-Columbus times. Starting about 500 years ago, with the colonizing and exploratory ventures, they became very cosmopolitan in distribution. The other races have in part left their ancient homes during this period too, all of which has made the racial panorama of the world more complex, with many new intermingleings of the three primary races.

In addition to these peoples, the human world contains many other smaller biological groupings whose origins are puzzles. Some indeed show the most marked differences from the Homo sapiens norm as established in common by the three large stocks. The native population of Australia, the Ne- gritos or Pygmies who live scattered all through Southeast Asia and Central Africa, the Bushmen and Hottentots of Australia and South Africa, and the mixed racial blends that inhabit the islands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, are such groups. To discuss their characteristics and the scientific "problem" they represent, in their separate ways, would take us far afield. They are mentioned to suggest the richness of human forms which populate the earth, and the many-sided nature of Homo sapiens' differentiation since his birth. These numerically smaller segments of mankind can be placed, with reasonable accuracy, within one or another of the three primary races.

Just how far did the process of differentiation go? Just what, exactly, are the scientifically verifiable and important differences in physical features among the races? Did one or more of the races manage to evolve "further," to a higher plane, than the others? Is one more intelligent than the others? Is the ability to learn, and to create culture greater in one than the others? Or are the differences merely superficial?

We know from ordinary observation that races present their most conspicuous diversity in different skin colors. These differences involve a presence, in greater or lesser amounts, of a pigment in and among the skin cells known as melanin. The Negroes have a lot of it. The whites and Mongoloids have less of it, ranging from moderate amounts in the Mongoloids and Mediterranean peoples, to very little in the people of northern Europe. The Mongoloids' apparent yellow skin color is simply due to the location of the dominant deposits of melanin in the many distinct layers of skin cells, and to the way light is reflected by the pigmented and unpigmented parts of the skin. In certain compositions and in certain places on the body, melanin can produce a blue-colored skin.

The subject of why these different skin colors were formed involves important functional questions of the relation of the sun's heat and light to survival in the highly diverse climates of equatorial Africa and the cloudy, damp, snowy, and cold climate of Northern Eurasia. The greater the amount of melanin, the greater the filtering action against the harmful effects of the sun's ultra-violet rays. In some climates, less pigment in the skin may have had survival value, and this may have had something to do with the persistence of a far less pigmented condition in the Caucasian race: hence its "white"—really pinkish—skin.

It may seem only natural to many people that skin color comes to our attention first when we examine racial differences. They may suppose that it is universal to show an interest in this quality of appearance. But investigations of attitudes toward skin color and race shown by different people around the world reveals that this interest is by no means universal. It has to be taught to people. Some societies have cultural conditions within them that make for a consciousness of skin color by adults, and from being intimately associated with their parents for so long, children take on this consciousness. The ability to see or not to see color may not depend entirely on our learning experiences. What is important to stress, however, is that these learning experiences serve to channel and guide our sense of sight along certain limited, regularized paths. They train us to be aware of only part of what constitutes our total environment. The whole body of knowledge, moral rules, world concepts, man-made material objects and attitudes that becomes embodied in our behavior through learning experiences is what is known as human culture. The content of this culture, then, if we could analyze it deeply enough, pretty much accounts for what we select from around us with our ears and eyes and noses and senses of touch. It is only rarely that we can or even want to go outside of our culturally induced modes of thinking and perceiving.

If we look at American culture, what can we learn that will help explain our extreme consciousness of skin color? The United States has the dubious distinction of being the only modern nation which has had a well-entrenched institution of human slavery in its recent history, as distinguished from other forms of economic exploitation. That slavery here took the form of white-skinned men impressing black-skinned men into servitude underlies our present-day inheritance of skin consciousness, which is particularly strong in the U.S. Slavery in antiquity, in Greece, Rome, etc., did not involve the relationship of one class of men of one race exploiting another class of men of another race. The physical appearance of the slaves did not have much to do with identifying them, although their nationality, speech and dress may have. These latter characteristics of men are relatively easily changed after a few generations and not of the same order as the per-
manent characteristics of a man’s appearance. So, with the slavery of the Negro race as part of our history as a nation, there grew up among a segment of the white race in the South, ideas of the repugnance, social inferiority and animal-like nature of black men, to justify and bolster the slave system.

Thus the color line came to coincide with economic and social divisions in a large part of the United States, and the idea that color differences were really important gradually became a part of the thinking of a nation, and continued when slavery was abolished and a caste system was substituted.

Another physical feature that serves well for racial classification purposes, but which is more noticed by physical anthropologists and biologists than the public, is the color, texture and amount of hair. This class of characteristics also provides a basis to speculate on possible differences in evolutionary advance between the races, and with results that might surprise the believer in the superiority of the white race.

The white race is the hairiest of all, its hair being of many shades, very dark brown or black, on over to white or yellow. Generally it is of a fine texture and if not naturally wavy, can be artificially waved or curled rather easily. The Mongoloids have very straight, coarse, dark hair of small amounts, which appears round in cross section under the microscope. Negroes are not very hirsute either, with very kinky, spiraled hair, which appears flat in cross section under the microscope. It would seem most likely that the men “furthest away”—if such a claim could be made—from our gorilla and chimpanzee cousins would have the fewest deposits of hair, because the general direction the human species has taken since we struck out on our own has been to a loss of hair, a denudation. And here, what do we find, but that the noble white race is the hairiest of all?

In addition, the texture of the hair of the white race is closer to that of the great apes, and the Mongoloid and Negroid hair textures are more original and different. The theory of the white race being the most “progressive” biologically of all the races is thus definitely contradicted in terms of this particular characteristic.

The truth of the matter is that no one race has a monopoly on the distinctive new features developed by man as distinguished from his great-ape forbears. It is “more human” to have a well-developed chin and teeth which do not protrude, and in this respect the white race shows this new characteristic, peculiar to humans, more than the Negro. On the other hand, lips are distinctively human, and Negroes as a race have well-developed lips as compared to the relatively thin-lipped whites. Look closely at a gorilla the next time you visit the zoo, and you will see that he has no lips at all. In summary, while Negroid characteristics with respect to three chief characteristics that mark the races tend to resemble the great apes more than those of the whites (skin color, nose form and prognathism or mouth formation), the whites can claim closer resemblance to great-ape traits than the Negroes in four chief characteristics (hair texture, quantity of body hair, lips and ear formation).

Of course, this is a foolish game to play, involving as it does only superficial bodily characteristics which do not enroach upon the essential and distinctive features of human structure and capacity common to all men. It is discussed here merely in order to demonstrate that claims of any race to be “furthest developed from the ape” or that one or another race is “more ape-like” are nothing but the purest nonsense.

Sometimes, interest is shown in the subject of racially different body odors. This is a subject which has not been much studied, but some observations can be made on it. A famous anthropologist at Harvard, who did much work on the subject of racial differences, once asked a Chinese student if he noticed a particular smell in members of the white race. The reply was that he did, and that the odor was objectionable. This odor may be investigated by wandering into any gymnasium or locker room, where the entire place from floor to rafters is permeated with many years’ accumulation of this characteristic odor, and the smell is just as distinctive, overpowering, and objectionable to those not accustomed to it as anything attributed to members of other races. There is no monopoly of the characteristic—only acclimation to it between members of the same race so that it is not noticed. Diet may have a lot to do with differences in odor. In any event it must occur, by the simple urgencies of metabolism and the body ridding itself of excess heat and moisture.

We could go on to discuss other criteria: body size and build, nose and ear forms, and the differences in proportions between the length of arms as related to length of the legs among the races, but the enumeration of these and our extended discussion of the other physical features implicitly point up one thing; that is that most of our statements about race are exclusively concerned with the superficial features of the human body. All the races have the same human advantages of prehensile hands, a standing posture, and large skulls in which to house large amounts of brain tissue. There are slight differences in bumps and ridges here and there on various bony surfaces to indicate the race of a skeleton, but it takes an expert of a high order to distinguish them, and frequently he will not state his opinion flatly. He will just make a cautious guess.

The sizes of the internal organs are different in different races, but this is certainly not significant. If one of the races lacked some anatomical part which the others had, or if some of its members lacked it in greater numbers than the other races, then we might have reason to believe that the races differentiated beyond what is so far indicated.

How about intelligence? Any differences found to exist in this regard would of course be quite important. The results of almost 30 years of psychological testing in this country, scientifically interpreted, leave no room for the oft-expressed “theory” of racial differences in intellectual equipment. Lower median scores for Negroes than for whites are clearly the result of lower educational and other opportunities which the Negro people in this country are forced to endure because of our entire social scheme. Despite the naive claim of some that the so-called “intelligence tests” measure nothing but native intelligence, it has proved impossible to filter out environ-
mental factors. Thus Northern Negroes, with somewhat better educational opportunities, job openings and conditions of life, invariably score better on the average than Southern Negroes. Not only that, Northern Negroes score better than Southern whites. The World War I American Expeditionary Forces intelligence tests, for example, showed that Ohio Negroes scored almost 25 percent higher, on the average, than whites from Mississippi, Arkansas or Kentucky, a figure which only reflected the fact that Negroes in Ohio enjoyed superior economic and educational opportunities to those of Southern whites.

But psychological tests, designed to measure purely conventional concepts of intelligence, do not cut nearly as much ice as the far more concrete and objective data afforded by the cultural attainments of the various races and societies. Anthropologists, the scientists who study world distributions of various types of human culture patterns—as well as the purely biological aspect of man which has occupied us here—recognize many different levels of culture. The simplest level is the most ancient one, the way of life still practiced by only a few. That is the level characterized by a hunting and food-gathering economy. The highest level, or at least the one with the greatest number of culture elements, goes under the rather loose term “civilization.” This is a level of society and culture characterized by increased populations, with extensive division of labor—so that only a portion of the people engage in food production and some are freed for other pursuits—and by the use of writing, as well as by command of energy forms outside of human muscle power.

The first time a level of civilization was attained, in the above sense of the term, was about 6,000 years ago in the riverine lands of Mesopotamia, by Caucasoid peoples, and from there the stimulus for the cultural efflorescence of civilization was spread to India, China, the rest of the Middle East, and Europe.

However, in the New World, particularly in Mexico and Peru, there was developed a level of culture independent of North Africa, Europe and Asia, which certainly qualifies as a civilization in terms of our definition. These lands were inhabited by Mongoloids, the Indians of the Americas. Here again, we find that civilization was associated with a terrain which appears at first glance to be rather meager, which has to be irrigated in order to be productive, but which, once irrigated by much human effort, yields a great food surplus. On this food surplus was built civilization. That it happened independently twice, and both times in connection with a distinctive natural environment, leads us to conclude that this geographic factor—and not a racial one—is uppermost in importance in the phenomenon of civilization. The different racial types proved equal in capacity to respond to the demands of the environment in question.

What about the cultural attainments of the Negroids in earlier times? In Africa below the Sahara, the historic home of the Negroes, the dense jungle of the equatorial zone and the cattle lands surrounding it provided the background for a very rich culture, with a horticulture and animal-herding type of food production which made use of any advantages offered by the terrain. The kind of agriculture underlying the civilizations discussed above could not, of course, develop in the dense forest country of the Congo drainage. But the African Negroes worked iron, a very essential ingredient of the civilizations farther north. They had many social groups organized into empires along the Gold Coast area and just north of it. This takes a lot of people, and a big food surplus. Their religious thought was very complex, and they were probably the most litigious (legal-minded) people in the world. Their entire cultural repertory is so varied and fascinating that to think of them as having a “less advanced” culture than the Caucasoids of the West or the Mongoloids of the East simply does not square with the objective facts, or with a just evaluation of them.

Finally and most important, every racial type and its subdivisions have proved in modern times to be completely adequate to the demands and opportunities of the most advanced civilizations. Many whites, and especially the ruling, biased, capitalist-class whites, did not understand this, and greeted the spectacle of American Negroes reaching the top-ranks of achievement and capability, or of the Chinese, Indochinese or Koreans building and utilizing the most complex machines and weapons of modern times—and taking only a very few years to learn how—with consternation and incredulity. But this fact—the capacity for and striving for the highest fruits of modern civilization by all the world’s peoples—has become the biggest and most revolutionary fact of modern times.

What is important to understand about race today is that the old process of a purely biological evolution in response to environmental pull has been cut off by a process of social evolution. All of the races had a common origin, and later differentiated because different parts of the original common stock were separated into different regions of the world, with different environments and no possibility of inter-breeding. Had this situation continued over a long period of time, new species of men might have been the result. But, because civilization developed to the point where man changes his environment instead of being changed by it, and to the point where the different races have begun to pool together, the present process is one of hybridization, instead of further differentiation.

The relatively pure races that were kept separated by natural barriers at the dawn of civilization are no more. Not one of them remains in unmixed form; each has been, to a greater or lesser degree, blended with others. And, many anthropologists now agree, the eventual prospect for man is the formation of one common race in place of the differentiated types with which man entered his era of civilization. Whatever one may think of this process, it has been under way for thousands of years, and it marks a certain advance in the sense that the future human race will have a greater pool of advantageous characteristics to draw upon, rather than the narrower stock produced by inbreeding. In any event, man’s evolution is now primarily social rather than biological, and in this process of social evolution, man will rid himself entirely of the ideological vestiges of past eras. In time, race superstition and race hostility will have no more place in the mind of man than a tail now has at the base of his spine.
A Review-Article

The Story of a Grassroots Movement

by Robert Henderson


THIS BOOK is an informal history of the first McCarthy recall campaign. The author is the editor of the weekly Sauk-Prairie Star who suggested the recall of Senator McCarthy in an editorial and led the movement which mushroomed into being to do just that. The drive ended last June with over a third of a million valid signatures on petitions demanding the recall of Wisconsin's junior Senator. This was some 70,000 less than the required 403,000. While correctly viewed by the author as "the most successful failure in history," this effort was to be followed by a successful drive this year. The present volume was to serve the primary function of raising funds for this second effort.

But the author, and the thousands of recall workers who were waiting for the signal to go, reckoned without the Democratic Party and its union camp-followers. The second recall drive was killed, not by the efforts of the McCarthyite Republican machine—though, as we shall see, these are serious and unreleeting—but by professed anti-McCarthytites.

To this reviewer, one of the most serious defects of Gore's book is his attempt to excuse those in the Democratic Party and the labor movement who, while loudly denouncing McCarthy, refused to assist the recall drive. He probably did this because he was anxious not to antagonize them. Gore says that most of these gentry had stayed away because they didn't want to be associated with an amateur effort that must end in failure, and that they would happily jump on the bandwagon of a second drive which would be a sure thing.

IT MUST be emphasized that all observers believe that a second petition drive would go over the top. Because of the smaller vote for governor in 1954, only 280,000 signatures will be needed. But, subsequent to the publication of this book, the Wisconsin state CIO convention defeated a resolution endorsing the recall movement. In effect the CIO endorsed the position of its president, Charles Schultz, who refused to support the first drive, and who after its failure made the fat-headed statement that this demonstrated that "a recall drive is no substitute for the ballot box!" Then the Democratic state committee announced that a recall movement at this time would not be an effective means of fighting McCarthy. Since the Democrats' action, Gore has been compelled to postpone a second drive indefinitely.

The reason for this sabotage seems to be the Democrats' long-time fear of third parties or of any protest movement not under their control. It is only within postwar years that the Democrats have become the state's liberal party. All the way back to the turn of the century, the Democrats fought a losing battle for the liberal and labor vote against the Socialist Party and the La Follette Progressive Republican movement. In the heyday of the New Deal, when Democrats were riding high elsewhere in the country, the Wisconsin Democracy was virtually eclipsed by the La Follette brothers' Progressive Party. In 1938, the Democrats suffered the humiliation of seeing their candidate for governor withdraw in favor of the Republican. A substitute polled a mere 75,000 votes. Roosevelt channelled patronage to the Progressives in return for their support of the national Democratic ticket.

Only with the collapse of the Progressive Party during the war did the Democrats emerge into the ranks of major parties—and then only with a new leadership made up of renegades from the Socialist and Progressive movements. Since then, the emergence of a new third-party movement or even of a strong liberal Republican faction has been a recurrent nightmare to the state's Democrats. Today's liberals make much of the Communist Party's covert support of McCarthy in the 1946 Republican primary against Robert La Follette Jr. In fact, this crime was not that of the CP alone; the entire Democratic leadership felt the same way.

NOW, after eight years' hegemony among the state liberals, the Democrats faced the menace of a successful recall drive. Menace, because if enough signatures were secured to force a recall election, the problem of selecting a candidate against McCarthy would present itself—and surely a Democrat would not be acceptable to the many Republicans in the Joe Must Go movement. The Democrats would probably be forced to support a candidate selected by the Joe Must Go movement running as an independent or under some ad hoc ballot designation. Gore touches this problem only in passing, but what he has to say is of interest: "While the recall numbers among its leadership no one with Senatorial aspirations, and the movement has no ambitions to choose a candidate, the movement is prepared to make such a choice if the situation demands that remedy."

The nightmare of the Democrats
comes from the fact that if such an independent candidate polled over 1 percent of the vote (which he would certainly get: in fact the likelihood is that he would win the election), under Wisconsin law a new party would appear on the ballot in 1956.

The opposition of the Republicans is more readily understandable and has taken the form of continuing legal persecution of the recall movement. Gore devotes one of the final chapters of his book to the efforts of Harlan Kelley, McCarthytizer district attorney of Sauk County, to destroy the movement with a series of investigations, allegations of crimes, and finally legal prosecution. Kelley’s purpose was at least to tie up the organization in the courts indefinitely and bankrupt it if possible. Gore treats Kelley’s efforts as laughable, but since the publication of the book, the Joe Must Go Club of Wisconsin, Inc., has been found guilty of 21 violations of the Corrupt Practices Act and fined $4,200.

This remarkable decision came after all attempts to enforce these laws against the Republican machine have ended in failure. The only real charge against the movement was that it was incorporated to conduct the recall movement, and another section of the law makes political expenditures by a corporation illegal. The Milwaukee Journal has pointed out that there are 24 political corporations active in the state and that 16 of them are Republican. Needless to say, no action has ever been attempted against any of them. At present Gore and four other officers await trial on similar counts. (It is of interest to note that last fall the citizens of Sauk County voted to return Harlan Kelley to private life.)

JOE MUST GO is not a full-fledged history of the movement, but rather Gore’s record of the most hectic 70 days of his life. One wishes more space were devoted to the remarkable work of the 6,500 volunteer petition circulators. A disproportionate share of the book is devoted to Gore’s fund-raising trips to New York, Washington, Los Angeles and Chicago. We are given the complete transcript of his radio “interview” by Fulton Lewis, Jr. We also have lengthy reports of his appearance on other radio and television programs, his luncheon with Drew Pearson, etc. Throughout the book, Gore keeps marvelling that a country boy like himself has become so prominent. It must be said however that some of his observations are revealing. For example: “In Washington I talked with three Senators and a Congressman representing both political parties. One of them sneaked out to meet me at an out-of-the-way restaurant. Another almost had a heart attack when I showed up at his office. Two of them met me in the basement to avoid popping flash bulbs.”

We have already mentioned the legal harassment of the recall movement. This was only one phase of McCarthy’s counter-attack. As Gore says, “I have been threatened with eviction from my home town by a half-dozen neighbors and business men with a grotesque conception of democracy. My life has been threatened, my family has been threatened, my property has been threatened by hundreds of anonymous letters and telephone calls. Never since the days of the Ku Klux Klan have I seen anything like this. Never, I hope, will I see anything like this again.” It is worth noting that the “Door for Gore” movement apparently had the approval of McCarthy himself. This pattern of threats and even violence was encountered throughout the state by those who joined the recall drive. Gore’s discussions of this make sobering reading.

It would be easy to criticize Gore’s understanding of McCarthyism—it is not much different than the usual liberal position. What sets Gore apart from others of similar views is that he was not content to simply deplore, but set out to do something to eliminate this evil from American life.

His discussion of McCarthy’s past doesn’t add much to our knowledge, though it is amusing to read: “I recall the week Joseph Raymond left Waupaca to take up the practice of law at nearby Shawano. My old friend John Burnham, then editor of the Waupaca Post, recommended editorially that Joe line his briefcase in pink and equip himself with a copy of ‘Das Kapital’ and the Daily Worker.”

While the book is sketchy, it is worth reading if for no other reason than to remind us of how quickly a progressive mass movement like “Joe Must Go” can appear. Though this one is at least temporarily derailed, we can be sure that there will be others like it.
ing huge masses, formed a coalition with the liberal capitalist politicians, who by this time represented no masses, and gave the latter the majority on the joint ticket, and permitted them to write the program. This was carried through under the mistaken impression that this course would secure the support of the Spanish propertied classes and the governments abroad.

WITHOUT realizing it, Claude G. Bowers demonstrates repeatedly in this book the untenable nature of this conception and political strategy. Bowers, an American liberal of pre-World War II vintage, was Ambassador to Spain from 1933 until 1939. He had previously been a distinguished newspaperman, was keynote speaker and chairman of the 1928 Democratic Party convention, and author of several notable historical books. His sympathy was with figures like Azaña and his type. He believed, as they did, that Spain would have to advance very slowly and gradually toward reforms, and that property had to be safeguarded. He was in an exceptionally position to see that the policies of the government were extremely mild, not even as liberal in many respects as his home government in Washington. Hence, he could not understand the panic of the upper classes, and their uncontrolled hatred of the Republican government.

Through his contacts, Bowers knew in 1935 that plans were being hatched for the violent overthrow of the Republic. Count Romanones, a Monarchist leader, told him that active organization of the Fascist rebellion began "the moment the victory of the parties of the Left under Azaña was known." Bowers is absolutely beside himself with fury at this. In italized type, he tries to make the true situation absolutely clear: "There was not one communist in the government. There was not even one socialist of the mild type of Beistegui [an extreme right winger]. There was not one who could be described as an extremist; not one who was not a republican and a democrat in the French and American sense."

IN VAIN! All these same arguments repeated in those years countless times—that Spain was just trying to set up a democratic country on the British and American model—were all in vain! Neither the upper classes of Spain, nor the democratic governments of England, France, and the United States, would be convinced. Their class instinct did not play them false. They understood better than many liberals and leftists that the stormy movement of the Spanish masses, regardless of its initial leadership and starting point, would be directed against private property and special privilege, and that it was impossible to cope with this revolutionary mass by electoral means.

From his special vantage point, and his many contacts among the influential and rich, Bowers is able to document how the landowners, industrialists, financiers, the church hierarchy and the military officer staffs all rallied from the first before the Fascist rebellion. He pinpoints how Mussolini and Hitler, in accordance with previous agreements, threw men and supplies behind the Franco forces. He vents his indignation at the hypocritical farce of democratic "non-intervention" whereby England and France (and the United States through its embargo law) prevented the legally constituted government of Spain from purchasing arms, while Germany and Italy were pouring in armies and equipment to murder the democratic government and its supporters.

"From the first day of the war," he reports, "a very large proportion of the diplomatic corps was aggressively aligned with the enemies of Spanish democracy. . . . Convinced from the beginning that the alliance of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco marked the initiation of an audacious attempt to wipe out democracy in Europe, I was surprised by the complacency of some of my colleagues and shocked by the bitter pro-Fascist partialities of others."

WHAT IS the explanation of the mystery that the leading democratic governments threw their weight behind Franco instead of Spanish democracy? Bowers, as an old-fashioned middle-class democrat, cannot fathom the answer. More correctly, he refuses to admit it to himself, as the answer was supplied him by his ambassadorial colleagues. He writes: "Puzzled by the hysteria of an ambassador of a democratic nation, and his extravagant support of the rebel cause in the very first days of the rebellion, I asked him why he was so intensely bitter. 'We must stand by our class,' he spluttered.' Bowers remarks: "I was not conscious that property rights were so sacrosanct in Berlin and Rome." Bowers is mistaken. The Fascist upstarts enriched themselves whenever they could, and may have ruined numbers of individual capitalists in the course of their kampf. But property rights remained sacrosanct, and the upper classes knew it. It was not for nothing that Anthony Eden stated several years ago that he had no quarrel with what Hitler did in Germany but that he didn't stay in Germany.

"My Mission to Spain" is a contribution to the materials of the Spanish civil war. The author tries to tell the story honestly as he knew it, and describes his personal observations in his many travels through the country. He was moreover in an excellent position to learn of the moods and gossip in the governmental circles and ambassadorial staffs. The book is timely, however, of the helplessness and bewilderment of liberalism confronted with the modern revolution. Bowers tries to steer his way by means of the old liberalistic cliches, and these do not suffice.

B. C.

A Documented Study


THIS scholarly work issued under the auspices of the British Royal Institute of International Affairs is one of the studies now coming out of the Western universities like a flood. The capitalists have become intensely interested in subsidizing all manner of investigations into Russian affairs. Their interest is not animated by the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, but derived from an acute desire to rapidly transform such knowledge into the coin of strategy in its cold war diplomacy. The standpoint of the Western statesmen is also the standpoint of the author, who approaches all questions from the reasoning of the capitalist politicians, with the same common sense as to its rightfulness and naturalness as having his breakfast of eggs and toast after rising in the morning.

The book contains chapters on Soviet policy in China in 1945-46, the Soviet Union and the Chinese civil war and its subsequent relations with the Chinese Communist government, Soviet policy in Japan and Korea, and sketchy descriptions of the Communist movements in Southeast Asia. What impresses itself on the reader anew is the large degree of improvisation in Soviet policy. The Russian leaders foresaw the contours of the post-war world no more successfully than the capitalist leaders. But resting on a different social structure, they were able to adjust their policies to the swiftly flowing revolutionary currents, and to become the beneficiaries of them.

Stalin envisaged a post-war China, just as in the case of some of the East European countries, dominated by a bourgeois government. Hence, his initial policy was aimed at keeping China as weak as possible, dominating parts of its economy, and stripping Manchuria of some of its industrial equipment and installations. He had no faith in Mao's victory and ability to es-
establish an all-national government, and according to Yugoslav sources, strongly urged the Chinese Communists to come to an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek. Only after the event, did the Russians take full advantage of the revolution, and conclude an alliance with China on a new basis. Russian foreign policy towards China thus falls into two distinct periods, and the revision of its original policy derived from the changed world picture, rather than any previously marked-out time schedules or plans.

The author records the pertinent moves and counter-moves of the major powers with conscientiousness and reasonable accuracy. The book thus has definite value as a reference work. Unfortunately, he has little grasp of the mainsprings of the world conflict, and less knowledge of the makeup and activities of the Communist movements, or the Soviet leadership. Hence he exhausts his mission after summarizing some of the published factual data.

D. A.

**Courage and Principle**


The general attitude of those who are only distantly acquainted with Einstein's thoughts, or who are in disagreement with his political ideas, has been to assign him the role of specialist in some inherently non-understandable science, and of naive bête-in-the-woods with regard to the political and social world about him. Neither of these conceptions is accurate, as the collection of about 150 essays, speeches, extracts, and letters ably demonstrates.

In the United States, where the witch-hunt of independent thinking and expression has reached the level of legalized tyranny, Einstein stands as one of the very few lonely and courageously principled figures in the vulnerable field of science who has been able to see both his relationship with society and his own theoretical contributions as part of a deep historical process. Unlike Schrödinger and other scientists who have recently turned almost exclusively towards a conscience-stricken and God-searching attitude, Einstein puts the present problem in terms of a decaying social system unable to utilize the greatest advances in scientific history: "Is it not true . . . that we have stumbled into a state of international affairs which tends to make every invention of our minds and every national good into a weapon, and consequently, into a danger for mankind?"

It is under these conditions, Einstein points out, where creativity is hemmed by the stranglehold of an atavistic society, that the scientist "suffers a truly tragic fate."

"What," asks Einstein, "is the position of today's man of science as a member of society? He obviously is rather the center of the fact: that the work of scientists has helped to change radically the economic life of men by almost completely eliminating muscular work. He is distressed by the fact that the results of his scientific work have created a torment to mankind since they have fallen into the hands of morally blind exponents of political power. He is conscious of the fact that technological methods made possible by his work have led to a concentration of economic and also of political power in the hands of small minorities which have come to dominate completely the lives of the masses of people who appear more and more amorphous. But even worse, the concentration of economic and political power in few hands has not only made the man of science dependent economically; it also threatens his independence from within: the shrewd methods of intellectual and psychic influence that it brings to bear will prevent the development of really independent personalities."

In almost all his writings, Einstein is head and shoulders above the majority of his colleagues who have been herded ignominiously into the laboratories of the American Moloch. In "Why Socialism?" he presents a consistently clear social analysis. He writes:

"The economic anomaly of capitalist society as it exists today is, in my opinion, the real source of the evils we see before us a huge community of producers, the members of which are increasingly striving to deprive each other of the fruits of their collective labor—not by force, but on the whole in faithful compliance within legally established rules. . . . Production is carried on for profit, not for use. There is no provision that all those able and willing to work will always be in a position to find employment; an army of unemployed always exists. The worker is constantly in fear of losing his job. Since unemployed and poorly paid workers do not provide a profitable market, the production of consumers' goods is restricted, and genuine hardship is the consequence. Technological progress frequently results in more unemployment rather than in easing the burden of work for all. The profit motive, in conjunction with competition among capitalists, is responsible for an instability in the amount of the evil. We are thus led to see increasingly severe depressions. Unlimited competition leads to a huge waste of labor, and to crippling of the social consciousness of individuals. . . . I am convinced there is only one way to eliminate these grave evils; namely, through the establishment of a socialist economy, accompanied by an educational system which would be oriented towards social goals."

Such words sound as if they came from a socialist writer, and not from a Western scientist who in his field has gained unique insight into the nature of the capitalist system and who is subjected to the pressures of the top echelons of capitalist society. If therefore Einstein embraces at various times a Gandhi-type pacifism, or the "world government" concept (which seems so out of place for a socialist in the present context of mutual distrust and alignment against the rise of socialism), it is due to political naiveté, and perhaps to a certain distaste for the revolutionary implications of socialist analysis.

However, despite these inadequacies, Einstein's courage stands as an example to all those subjected to the battering ram of the Inquisition. One need only be reminded of the declarations he issued in 1933 when he voluntarily fled Germany. Or the recent letter to a Brooklyn teacher who refused to testify before a Congressional committee: "Every intellectual who is called before one of the committees ought to refuse to testify, i.e., he must be prepared for jail and economic ruin, in short for the sacrifice of his personal welfare in the interest of the cultural welfare of his country."

The wide range of topics covered by the book contributes to its singleness. Since Einstein has, aside from science, written only sporadically on other subjects, there is a lack of continuity, and some of the letters and excerpts, though of interest, are either too short or incomplete.

The scientific sections of the book, taken from his previous popular scientific writings, are, as can be expected, well worth the attention of the reader. These put into the broad base on which modern science rests. The evaluation and criticism of Newton's mechanics and classical physics is probably one of the best that can be found in present literature.

M. B.
Schoolroom Sociology


This book is addressed to the "dilemma" which "arises out of the fact that in troublesome times large numbers of [American] citizens disregard the philosophy of democracy that undergirds this nation's real greatness. . . . There is a deep schism between what they allegedly believe about America and the way they deliberately or unconsciously live."

This dilemma shows itself primarily in the fields of relations with minority groups, in religious conflicts, in questions of civil liberties.

The minorities of which the Coles speak include, according to their abstract from the 1940 census, 9 1/2 million foreign born, 13 1/2 million of foreign-born parentage, 13 million Negroes, and 600,000 Indians and Asians. The book contains a limited amount of information as to the trends in civil rights for minority groups. For example, the Coles make clear that there has been a certain backsliding after the war-spurred progress of the Forties:

"But in March 1953, the Industrial Race Relations Commission, appointed by the governor of Pennsylvania, after surveying 1229 diversified industrial plants employing nearly a million workers, reported that job discrimination against Negroes and other minorities is increasing. Ninety percent of the employers were 'unfair' toward at least one minority group in hiring, promoting, or restricting apprenticeship opportunities."

It can hardly be said, however, that the reader who goes to this book for a clear factual picture of the minorities issue will come away with it. There is not as much factual information as one would expect in a book devoted to defining this problem, and what there is goes lost through being scattered by the pseudo-scientific plan of the authors.

Mr. and Mrs. Cole, whose background is one of traditional university sociology merged with educational and social work, belong to that numerous body of American academic investigators who believe that to group the major surface phenomena of a social condition in charts, graphs and meters, and to categorize them in approved Harvard-outline style, is to elucidate them.

If there is anything more exasperating than this school and its pretensions to "social science" it has not yet been discovered. Science can add to our capacity to master any social or natural problem, either by collecting factual material or by explaining it. But this school does very little in either of these two respects.

For the gathering of factual information it substitutes the childish game of compiling lists, charts, graphs, which, when examined closely, yield nothing more than the oldest and most familiar facts dressed up with new and more complicated words and arranged in more or less ingenious styles.

For the function of explaining the known factual information, this school substitutes such a welter of thin and misclassified listings that even the cautious reader will be lucky to escape with his prior understanding intact. For those who think this is an exaggeration, see the meaninglessness of a portion of Chapter V on "Interpersonal Relations." Almost everything in the chapter is summarized in "Figure 11," which tells us:

1. The roots of prejudice are social customs, ethnocentrism (chauvinism), stereotypes, social class, hurt personality, sense of guilt, and/or others.

2. Prejudice in action shows itself in interpersonal relations, legislation, housing, employment, education, religion, and others. Each of these categories is illumined by an arrow, and a footnote tells us that "differences in the length of the arrows suggest that the strength of these activities may vary," a "suggestion" somewhat less than profound when pondered on for any length of time, but very dressy-looking on the chart.

3. The consequences of prejudice in the field of individual reactions include: the insensitive, the attacking and counter-attacking, the withdrawing and the socially-minded. These result in corresponding personality types, including the conservative, the authoritarian, the submissive and the democratic. In the text, this is amplified to show that, as a result of prejudice, you can develop into any one of the following "sub-types": the dominant conservative, the minority conservative, the dominant aggressive, the demagogue, the minority aggressive, the utopian, the neurotic, the seeker of sub-ordination, the victim of sub-ordination, the self-disciplined submissive, or the democratic personality, which is interpreted in a later chapter. This listing, the authors inform us, is "necessarily an oversimplification."

This brief sample should be enough to show the kind of bed of chicken feathers in which the Harvard-outline school of sociology has its heels firmly planted. Another favorite behavior pattern (to borrow a phrase) of this school is to try to elucidate a problem by complicating the terminology. Where the scholars ever got the notion that they add anything to science by compounding words or by inserting obscure ones is not clear—perhaps it is an outgrowth of frustration—but that they have it is clear enough. In this book interpersonal relations means personal relations, so that social plays becomes sociodrama. The authors never split or divide, they bifurcate, etc., etc.

Now, no one should carp at necessary compressions or word inventions that substitute for longer concepts and thus in the long run simplify the usages of science. But where the words are thrown in merely to give the appearance of science without its essence, they only cause irritation. No one has yet solved a scientific problem simply by inventing a new name for it, and the modern pedantic jargons can thus become irritating in the extreme, not because the words are difficult, but because, in some cases, are ten times out of ten they conceal the lack of anything but words.

This book is perhaps no worse than any of the other hundreds of recent examples, and is not singled out for special condemnation in these regards. But it is very annoying to pick up a book on so vital a topic and find oneself lost in a forest of meaningless, faceless superficialities, and worse still, to reflect that generations of our youth are being raised on such material.

H. B.

Nationalism and Oil


HALFORD L. HOSKINS, an American authority on the Middle East, grapples with the problems of this area from the point of view and needs of the U.S. State Department. The book is a commendable introduction to Middle East politics, but viewing the matter through the Washington lens leads him to a preoccupation with power politics and military strategy to the point of underplaying, and even ignoring such basic factors as the outmoded social structure, the rise of a working class, the aspirations of the peasantry for land and reforms, etc.

The dispute with Britain over the Suez Canal base and the Sudan Condominium, which was unilaterally abrogated by Egypt in 1951, were touted by Western diplomats as the only problems standing in the way of a reconciliation between the West and Egypt. Although both these matters have been resolved in Egypt's favor, Western hopes have failed to materialize. Anglo-American statesmen, and Hoskins too, are more than a bit baffled over a situation where force evokes counter-force, and concessions lead only in one direction—out.
The murder of William Walter Remington in the Lewisburg, Pa., penitentiary was murder. The fact that Remington was a Communist suspect doesn't keep it from being murder. The fact he was killed by two young thugs won't relieve the prison officials of their guilt. The fact that Remington was unsteady, vacillating, confused, won't justify his murder in this democratic nation. He had not been convicted of a capital crime. He was convicted at most of lying.

Nor will any amount of meercasphism by self-appointed fueleders blot from our nation's record the blood of the 37-year-old former government employee.

There is a very good lesson to be learned from this murder. But it won't be learned in this generation. It seems so simple it might be suggestive of subversion. The lesson is this: The American prisons stink to high heaven. Period.

It would be far better to set aside a Siberia in the wide wastes of the American prairies. It would be better to find an island in the Pacific Ocean for our political offenders. It might even be better to send the families of the accused to live with them in a more pristine state.

The murder of William Walter Remington makes American citizens appear like Chinese bandits of another era. We behave like the Turks of yesterday. And the often-made prediction that a nation that for so long a time tolerated the horrors of lynching of black men would someday turn to lynching men of all races seems to have come true.

—From the National Maritime Union's Pilot
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

A United Leftist Front

I am extremely sorry that owing to pressure of work I have not been able to reply before to your letter asking for a message for your January issue, or to send you such a message.

However, I always read the American Socialist with interest and do belatedly send you my best wishes for the new year.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Foot, London, Editorial Board, Tribune

Enclosed is payment for my first subscription to the American Socialist. I am very interested in the socialist cause and your periodical has been a great help. It is truly a beacon in this darkness of witch-hunting, McCarthyism, and the rest of the reactionary propaganda given out by the reactionary press.

Is your magazine associated with any one left-wing party? I've read articles by most of them and I wish they would get together in a united leftist front.

J. W. Geneva, New York

About Independent Politics

Some radicals attack the lesser-evil theory in arguing against joining a major United States party at present. They say it is never correct to follow a lesser-evil policy, but rather we should build a party that accords with our principles, and we should not accept any kind of evil. Now, I think it is a mistake to say that we should never support a lesser evil in a political campaign. It is obvious that when one party is better than another with respect to achieving radical goals, then, if it doesn't look practical to build a successful independent party, we should support the better major party. And it is just this fact which makes statements that we should never support a lesser evil seem so unconvincing.

We oppose joining a major United States party at present. But, to argue for that decision we do not have to argue against the lesser-evil theory. We must say, rather, that the lesser-evil theory does not apply in the United States at this time since 1) neither party has any good in it, and 2) we cannot assume that it is impossible to construct a third party.

W. C. H. Minneapolis

I have read, with unslacking interest, every issue of the American Socialist from its beginning. I want to congratulate you on publishing the finest, the very best socialist magazine.

Having gotten this long-overdue praise off my chest, I would like, with your permission, to discuss your recent article on the American Labor Party. The article in the December issue, "What Price Lesser Evil?" was politically 100 percent. It combined logical analysis with adequate documentation. However, I take exception to your categorical directive, offered in conclusion, that the independents must band together and tell the Communist Party people that if they want to go into the Democratic Party, to go there alone.

I don't believe it is the present role of the American Socialist to get involved in the organizational and tactical aspects of a situation. The editors, it seems to me, should only lay down the political framework around which ALP'ers could carry on a discussion in the pages of the magazine. Out of such a discussion there might emerge a unifying concept of a policy for independents.

The situation of the ALP remains confused and indefinite. My own approach is to continue the constructive, day-by-day neighborhood work, exerting my influence to give it as much of an independent flavor as possible. This I will continue unless I can no longer agree with ALP policy. If the day comes when the ALP, by its activities and program, is clearly transformed into a modified version of Americans for Democratic Action, then I will know the time has come to search out a new vehicle for the expression of my political energies. But there is hope that the realities of American politics will deal further blows to the ill-conceived "coalition" policy.

F. S. New York

Born A Socialist

I was born with a socialist or communitarian tendency—I don't mean the McCarthianite or capitalistic interpretation. I certainly don't like your magazine and would not be without it. The pithy with many such magazines is that too many people are not interested. I do try to get as many of my friends and acquaintances as I can to subscribe. In a way, it is a sad state of affairs when people are not reading.

Such papers are necessary today. Keep on, and I'll do what I can to get readers.


I received the September issue of the American Socialist as a sample copy and, as well as finding it politically stimulating, was grateful for the information it purveyed on the American domestic scene—there's a scarcity of this type of material on the "other America." Enter my subscription to the American Socialist. ...

F. R. I. Birmingham, England

Perhaps the letter idea can be used to advantage in understanding socialism, which I sincerely intend to do. Therefore, I am writing to you to state briefly what I understand by socialism. Wherein I may be in fallacy can be pointed out. ...

I am a young American with ideas about the faults, the unnecessary hardships, and the hopes of society. The following is the understanding the world concept, upon which I base these ideas.

I understand the earth to be a planet in a huge endlessness, which endlessness need not have any beginning and end, since beginning and end may be simply ideas of earthbound thinking. I understand earth to have been billions of years in the making, and humans to be some growth which developed along with fauna and flora.

I understand that man has created or devised, a society for himself, often separated societies. . . . I understand that man devised certain techniques whereby his existence can be quite pleasurable. I think it entirely possible that he can master the immediate endlessness, and . . . perhaps inhabit, in conjunction with this planet, others . . . .

I think it is possible that man's present civilization can decline and disappear as did the Roman; that all the processes and techniques and formulae of the present could conceivably become unknown, lost, for want of minds devoted to them, institutions . . . . Then man would have to start again . . . . Hydrogen-atom bombs could lay waste to the earth, and this does seem possible.

I understand then that enmity, as different from cooperative friendliness, is one of the basic, fundamental threats to the development, progress and happiness of man and his future. I understand that one of the central tenets of socialism is that the capitalist system has inherent in it certain social institutions which inherently are causative of enmity. I understand that socialism proposes that the socialist system would not only eliminate that type of institutions, but can replace them with institutions causative of the reverse; namely, good will and cooperative friendliness, while preserving social stability and initiative.

Thus far, I have heard socialism challenged to explain how it would put down the unscrupulous power blocs within its society, but I have not heard this answered.

That, then, is my present understanding of socialism. I would appreciate any advice, or comment, wherein it is incomplete, or faulty, or disagreeable.

J. R. H. Maine

Bevanite Socialist

The first year of the American Socialist has provided all of us on the Left with much information and inspiration.

While as a Bevanite member of the Socialist Party I do not at all times see eye to eye with you, the American Socialist has earned my sincere respect and admiration. Yours is always a voice of courage and quite frequently of imagination and vision. . . .

G. R. S. Bayport, N. Y.
Read This and Act

OUR REQUEST last month for readers to enlist as builders of the American Socialist met with a fair response. As a matter of fact, several readers came through in a big way.

A West Coast unionist who has been helping us for a number of months sent us a list of 147 workers in his industry who, he believes, may subscribe after seeing a sample copy. Being a practical-minded fellow, he also sent along the money necessary to mail copies to his list, as well as a covering letter of his personal endorsement to go out along with the samples. To us, he wrote: "As I see it, we are entering a sort of partnership at this point. Your part is to see that the American Socialist becomes the most vocal organ of the left wing and of labor in general, and it's our duty to see that it gets the mass circulation it deserves."

Another reader, who saw this magazine for the first time in January, has been circulating his sole copy among friends, has already sent us two subscriptions, and wants a small bundle to use in acquainting more friends with the American Socialist.

WE INTEND to strive for a substantial rise in our circulation during 1955. From the response which we have received, and from an analysis of the way we have grown until now, we know that a good part of our increased circulation will have to come directly from you, who read and approve our efforts. And we feel fortunate that people who like our magazine seem to be the type who want to get out and do something about what they like.

Those who still have not sent us lists of their friends should do so soon, and we will send them sample copies. Still there is no substitute for personal contact. We have found that if you see your friends personally and solicit subscriptions, you will get a much higher percentage of returns than we will by a sample-copy mailing.

If you want to become an American Socialist builder, fill out and mail the coupon in the space below. We will send you subscription cards, and a bundle of five copies of a recent issue, for which we will bill you at a reduced bundle rate.

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