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THE Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, 421 Seventh Avenue, N. Y. 1, is trying to raise bail to get Carl Braden and I. O. Ford out of jail. Both are among the seven victims of the so-called Louisville "sedition" case, one of the most incredible frameups of the current witch-hunt drive. Carl Braden is a white newspaperman employed until recently by the Louisville Courier Journal who helped a Negro friend, Andrew Wade, to purchase a home in a "white" neighborhood. Ku-Kluxer elements proceeded to dynamite the house in order to terrorize Negroes into staying in their ghetto. But instead of going after those responsible for the violence, the government prosecutor indicted seven people who either helped Wade purchase his home, or participated in the Wade Defense Committee to help him hold it under hoodlum attacks.

Carl Braden has already been convicted of "sedition"—whatever that is—and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The case is being appealed, but Braden remains in jail as he has thus far been unable to raise the $40,000 bail set in his case—the highest in Kentucky history. The Emergency Civil Liberties Committee has already been offered $3,000 in the form of government bonds. It states in its appeal: "These cases are among the most important that have come to the committee's attention. They demonstrate clearly the importance of the committee and why we must continue to function."

Recantations of former government informers who confess that they lied under oath are not going to stop our public prosecutors and judges from continuing the terror, or cause them to release the victims from jail who were put behind bars on the basis of perjured testimony. Harvey Matusow, who filed an affidavit confessing that he lied last year in the case of Clinton Jenkins, an official of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Union, finds that instead of securing a new trial for Jenkins, who is serving a five-year sentence, he himself has been condemned to three years in jail for "contempt." At the same time, Jenkins is denied his appeal for a new trial.

Federal Judge R. E. Thomason apparently believes that he is a mind reader. He has infallibly determined by methods known to himself that Matusow told the truth in the original Jenkins trial, but is purging himself now in order to further sales of his recently published book, "False Witness." Mrs. Marie Natvig, who confessed that she had been "brainwashed" by Federal Communication Commission attorneys into giving false testimony, is now under federal grand jury indictment. Willard Shelton, CIO editorial writer, remarked in the February 16 Labor's Daily: "[the Congressional investigating committee] act as if they merely want to get the recanting witnesses shut up as quickly as possible, thus sparing everyone except their victims from fresh embarrassments."

Researchers for AFL unions have issued a report that "a shorter work week is one of the keys to a prosperous and expanding economy and preventing widespread unemployment"... The CIO News states: "The brave new program of the Defense Department set up recently to speed security clearances for industrial workers and cut down on unnecessary suspensions looks pretty much like the same old stuff."... The CIO oil and chemical unions met at a convention in Cleveland to form a union of 215,000 members. The convention expressed the hope that AFL-CIO unity would lead to a big organization campaign in these industries. A constitutional clause barring "members of any communist or fascist organizations" was passed without opposition. Both AFL and CIO executive boards have been venting their spleen against the AFL Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union for voting to merge with the independent Fur and Leather Workers Union. The latter was expelled, with ten other unions, from the CIO in 1950. George Meany said the AFL is not going to provide an umbrella for the companies to come in under until the rain stops.

The CIO board criticized the meat-cutter leaders for "uncrushing opportunism."

Six major rail unions representing 350,000 AFL shop workers will demand a guaranteed annual wage in their 1955 contract negotiations...

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AMERICAN SOCIALIST
Spotlight on the Stock Market

TWENTY-FIVE years have passed since the cataclysm which the theatrical paper, Variety, summed up so neatly in a famous headline: "Wall Street Lays an Egg." In that quarter-century, the nation has been reassured again and again—how many times, it would be impossible to reckon—that what happened in October 1929 "can never be repeated." Safeguards, watchdogs, built-in stabilizers, etc., would never again permit either the speculative frenzy or the disastrous collapse. But this reassurance, like many others that are cheaply given, was in plentiful supply only so long as the problem remained a remote one. Now that the stock market boom has made it pressing, the guarantors are fewer and more cautious.

For two decades after the Dow-Jones index of the average price of industrial common stocks had crashed to a low of 441 a share from a September 1929 peak of $381, the stock market maneuvered cautiously in the $100-$200 range. A moderate increase which began in 1949 was encouraged by the Korean War, and moved upwards until it was close to 300 by 1953. But the rise was still comparatively gradual. Starting from the end of 1953, the rise became steeper.

At first, the boosts in stock prices were encouraged by various tangible factors which added more actual value to the shares. For one thing, dividend payments to shareholders were on the increase; for another, the interest rate on bonds was falling, thus making stocks a more attractive investment relatively speaking. In this, the present bull market is akin to that of the twenties, which also, during its early years, was stimulated by an actual rise in the value of stocks, and became largely speculative only later on.

Since the fall of 1953, stock prices have risen 54 percent; this is a rate of increase which has been exceeded only once—in the feverish year before the collapse of 1929. The overall boom of the market from 1949 to the present is roughly analogous to the period of the same length from 1922 to mid-1928—a rise of about 150 percent.

It is objected that comparisons with the twenties are misleading, because all values are inflated today in comparison with that time. It is true that economic comparisons are relative and must be made in proportional terms if they are to be made at all. But, even in this respect, the comparison with the twenties is not too misleading. Stock prices can be measured against the yield in dividends. A price equal to ten times the yield is considered roughly "normal"; the average price of common stocks at present is almost fifteen times the yield. To be sure, this is not yet the same as September 1929, when the average price was over nineteen times the average yield. But it is almost as inflated as the price-yield ratio in the beginning of 1929, when prices were sixteen times the dividend. The market is definitely speculative; it has departed from a base of tangibles and is soaring into the blue sky.

THE most wonderful thing about a bull market," one economist has written, "is that it creates its own hopes. If people buy because they think stocks will rise, their act of buying sends up the price of stocks. This causes them to buy still further, and sends the dizzy dance off on another round." That's the force which is in operation in the present market. A man who bought an average cross-section of stocks in November 1952 to the extent of $100,000 would have about $154,000 in stock "value" today, or $140,500 in cash if he liquidated successfully, even after paying the maximum capital gains tax. That kind of news gets around and feeds the boom.

Another difference from the twenties which is cited is that today the Federal Reserve Board has the power to regulate margins; in other words, it can curtail buying on credit by raising the amount of cash required to purchase stocks. The margin (cash) required at present is 60 percent. But in a rising speculative market, people find ways to get the money from other sources of credit. Experience of twenty years with margin regulation has not yet proved that the market can be controlled very much by this means. It is true that in the twenties people were buying stock with as little as 10 percent margin, but in the summer of 1929, the brokers themselves, alarmed at the fabulous volume of credit they were extending, raised margins to 50 percent—without any effect.

In certain respects, the controls over today's market are stronger than those of the twenties. Curbs on margin buying, while they may not slow down a rise in the market, help to slow down a falling market, because shareholders will not be wiped out as quickly if they have more cash behind their holdings. In addition, the present regulations on "short selling" (an operation which is based upon an expectation of falling stock prices) make it harder for the market to be driven down and demoralized by determined speculators in a falling market, as was done with great profit to a few in 1929-30.

Another presumed difference with the twenties sometimes mentioned is that at that time "everybody" was in the market. This is really in the class with the "silk-shirted workingmen" myth; actually the number of speculators did not exceed one million, which is probably less than the total today. And now the fly-by-night uranium and oil stocks that are beginning to appear, the competition among brokerage houses for customers, the growing volume of credit issued by brokers to their customers—all of these features are beginning to sound the more hysterical notes of the twenties. Nothing like a comparable pitch has been reached, but the characteristics are all present, including even the mass tipsters like Winchell.
HAVING drawn all of these parallels with the twenties—and many more could be pointed out—the questions remain: Are we heading towards a stock-market collapse like that of 1929, and if there is such a collapse will it bring in its wake a cataclysmic depression like that of the thirties? Without entering into predictions of the future course of stocks—we leave that to those who play the market (the percentage of these among our readers is very small, we are sure)—this much can be said: The peregrinations of the market over a long period are a reflection of confidence or lack of confidence in the economy. It is thus the prospects for the economy which are fundamental in the matter.

Here too, there is a similarity to the twenties. The productive capacity of the economy has expanded more rapidly than the purchasing capacity of the population. But in one most important respect, the difference with the twenties is great. At present, the government budget, mainly for the military, guarantees a market for fully onefifth of the products of the economy. In addition, the governmental apparatus is permanently alerted to increase its spending in case of danger. These special factors make a cataclysmic and dramatic bust like that of 1929 unlikely. It is more probable that the inner diseases of the system will continue to eat away at its core in the form of an extended stagnation, lack of growth, gradual swelling of unemployment, slow attrition against the living standards of the people, etc. In other words, the war budget and the other governmental measures may subdue the more volcanic manifestations of capitalism's fatal disease, but cannot alter the basic trend of decline.

The stock market boom may itself very well reflect that basic disease. Competitive bidding for shares in the nation's industry such as has pushed the price of stocks up during the past year can reflect a plethora of capital looking for fields for investment; this at the very moment when the expansion of the nation's industry is running up against barriers in the form of limited consumer purchasing power. If that turns out to be the significance of the present bull market, it can have the gravest import for the prospects of the American capitalist system.

In the face of this situation, the recent developments around the Fulbright hearing on the stock market show that the administration's policy is one of continuing to encourage the boom even at the risk of a disastrous bust. Every authoritative administration voice at the hearings has stressed Washington's worry—not about the market itself, but about the hearings and what they may do to impair "confidence." In obtuseness, this is a line which rivals the celebrated Hooverian "the economy is sound" prologues to the plunge of 1929.

The most significant feature of the Fulbright investigation—or "friendly study" as the Senate committee prefers to call it—is the revelation of the shakiness of confidence. Much of the expert testimony has been to the effect that "it can happen again," contrary to the heavy blanket of propaganda of recent years. The committee's prize witness, Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey—probably the most authoritative voice in Washington on domestic matters—told the committee that, as the N.Y. Times summarized it, "Confidence in this country's economy is such a fragile thing that it can be lost in a day."

This lack of confidence in the economy contrasts so sharply with the official and semi-official propaganda with which the ruling coterie bombards the country that it should make those who have been impressed by that propaganda sit up and take notice. The present worried consideration which the stock market has been getting in the committee hearings and in the press is more important than a thousand glowing predictions coming from Eisenhower, from the Joint Congressional Committee on the Economic Report, or from Fortune magazine. It has momentarily stripped away the pretentious and boastful facade and shown the cankers of fear and insecurity behind it.

H-Bomb Diplomacy

Our political leaders are dwelling in a never-never world. They continue out of old habits to draw up budgets, to discuss internal improvements, to allocate moneys for public education, sanitation, highways. The politicians continue their usual game of petty maneuvers in a play for votes. The generals and admirals continue to perfect their strategic schemes. All this time, humanity stands on the edge of the abyss of nuclear war, and the key question remains: To be or not to be. There is no point worrying about highway construction for the next decade if most of us are not going to be around that long.

Not only have our public leaders not made an inch of progress toward a solution but their H-bomb madness seems to be entering a stage of greater acuteness. Last year, some consciousness of the horrible pass to which they have brought humanity seemed to have trickled into the minds of our shapers of destiny. That was when President Eisenhower declared to the UN General Assembly on Dec. 8, 1953,
that to accept the possibility of nuclear warfare was to accept "the probability of civilization destroyed—the annihilation of the irreparable heritage of mankind." Several months later the British Tories, faced with the proposed American adventure to use the atom bomb in Indo-China and the grim prospect of the annihilation of the British Isles in any spreading war, made their supreme gesture to free themselves from Washington's overlordship, and to set in motion a diplomacy to work out an agreement with the Russians. After the Geneva Pact in mid-1954 the whole world breathed a little more freely, and the hope expanded that negotiations would begin looking toward a reduction of tensions and a modus vivendi between the major powers.

But the policy makers of American capitalism had apparently decided that all this talk about peace and co-existence was no good for the vested interests of the plutocracy they represent. They decided that capitalism cannot live at peace with the rival social system of the Soviet bloc, and that they had to get busy brandishing the H-bomb and psychologizing the people for coming military adventures.

**LAST** December, Washington lined up the European capitalist powers, and the NATO Council officially let it be known that its forces were being organized on the basis of atomic warfare. In plain English, this meant that any war in Europe was bound to be a nuclear war. The maniacal contribution and statesmen solemnly assured the world that this was a real contribution to peace, as it equalized the striking power between the East and West, and would therefore deter aggression. Then on March 1 Churchill dropped the thesis about co-existence and how war could mean the mutual annihilation of mankind, and took over the Dulles line of massive retaliation, which he now opined was the best deterrent to war, and announced that Britain was proceeding to manufacture its own H-bomb. As we see, after a couple of sharp tugs at the leash, the British Tories gave up their show of independence from the American colossus.

With this the whole propaganda machine of capitalism, both here and in England, has been thrown into high gear. The word has obviously gone out from the centers of power to stop scaring the people with talk about the horrors of nuclear extinction, and to instead bear down hard on the "new line" that the "free world" is stronger and can stop the enemy cold. There will be no war, because we have the Russians surrounded, and if there is, we can win out anyhow. Churchill assured Parliament that for the next three-four years the West has the big jump on the Soviets. Dulles goes on the radio to warn the Chinese that we have more military muscle and they had better get on their knees. Eisenhower, in his press conference a week later, broadcasts to the world that the United States will use atomic weapons in the next war. U.S. News & World Report comes busting out in its March 18 issue with the "new line": "Russia, finally, is checkmated in her plan to attack and overrun the West. . . . Russians today are ringed by new U.S. retaliation bases. . . . No Russian attack on the Western world could get all these bases. . . . If bases remain under attack, Russia faces certain destruction from built-up U.S. forces." (We thought all the Russian talk about encirclement was just anti-American propaganda.)

**DULLES** and Radford have come out on top, and the "free world" for the time being is committed to threatening Russia and China to retreat or be wiped out. This is a naked policy of imperialist aggression and blackmail. What if the intended victims do not get on their knees and grovel? What is the next move? Is it to be nuclear war?

The Atomic Energy Commission—after scientists all over the world have been sounding warnings for months—was finally forced to issue an official report in February that an H-bomb explosion could not only wipe out instantaneously every person in an area like New York City and environs, but the deadly radioactivity resulting from pulverized earth and bomb material—the fall-out—would contaminate for an indefinite period an area of 7,000 square miles. As a matter of fact, even the present H-bomb tests are endangering health and safety around the entire globe, and prominent scientists are beginning to cry out in alarm. And as the speeches of Val Peterson, our Civil Defense Administrator, make all too clear, it's not just the other fellow who will be on the receiving end.

Churchill, in his speech to Parliament, admitted, "There is no absolute defense against the hydrogen bomb, nor is any method in sight by which any nation or any country can be completely guaranteed against the devastating injury which even a score of them might inflict on wide regions." General MacArthur, in his Los Angeles speech on January 27, said: "War has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides."

It is an unpleasant thing to have to say, but the fact is that our destiny is in the hands of irrational gamblers and irresponsible adventurers. The German masses are up in arms against this infamy of war. A great movement of resistance is gathering in England to fight this H-bomb insanity. The masses in a number of other countries are beginning to stir. It is time the American people woke up to what is happening, and made their voices heard, and the pressure of their numbers felt in shaping the policy of the American government.
German re-armament scheme has had tough sledding and is not in the clear yet; the biggest and most impassioned opposition has developed in German people themselves.

Germans Say:

"We Don’t Want A New Army"

by Our European Correspondent

Bonn

AFTER four days of debate, the Paris Agreements for German re-armament were adopted in the German Bundestag by a substantial majority. Thus, it would appear that after five long years of high-pressure diplomacy, of an unceasing debate that has spilled over from the parliaments into the streets, we have now come to the end of the trail. Don’t believe it. The infamous compact of reaction, conquest and war is not in the bag—not by a long shot. In fact, the very attempt to impose on a western Europe burgeoning with gigantic class struggles the overlordship of the new Ruhr gauleiters, and to make of a permanently partitioned West Germany a juggernaut of conquest against the East, may yet dissolve the whole framework of imperialist alliances.

The squabble over the Saar, bringing a cabinet crisis as the very aftermath of the Bonn vote, put the taste of ashes in Adenauer’s victory over his working-class opponents. It lays on top of the conflict between people and rulers a nationalist conflict among the rulers themselves. To accept a sovereignty which excluded 18 million East Germans was a hard enough pill for Adenauer’s coalition allies to swallow; to lose the Saar in the bargain was too much. At the peak of the debate, unnerved by the recalcitrance of his partners, Adenauer blurted out that he had secret assurances from the Anglo-Americans that would guarantee eventual German hegemony in the Saar.

If these assurances are not properly denied by the State Department and Downing Street, then the crisis may very well rebound into the French Senate which has still to ratify the pact. The narrow margin that assured its passage in the Assembly was due in considerable part to the agreement on the Saar which Mendès-France had wangled first out of Churchill and then Adenauer. If the nationalist elements, who reluctantly conceded to France being outclassed by a spanning-new Wehrmacht, are to be confronted with a preliminary German “conquest” in the Saar, their reactions are unpredictable. With elections coming up in May, the French Senators have already been in a mood to postpone the vote so as not to face their public on the issue of German re-armament. Now the Saar imbroglio has increased their apprehensions.

LET us allow, however, that the Paris Agreements will succeed by diplomatic legerdemain in hurdling the

final obstacle. Is the decision then final? Or will this brazen provocation to the peace of the world, undermining in the process living standards and democratic rights, lead to a political uprising against the governments responsible? A rapid review of the West German scene on the eve of ratification should provide us with some of the necessary facts.

The situation today is vastly different from that of 1933, when the Nazis began to re-arm Germany. First of all, the youth is not in the desperate mood that was created by years of unemployment and of political and economic crisis. Generally employed and trying to wrest some security and comfort out of a hard existence, they have no desire to be again dragooned into the barracks. This feeling is reinforced by the brutal experiences in the Nazi Wehrmacht and the terrible ordeal of the last war, into one of militant hostility to rearmament.

After three months of intensive investigation in West Germany, a top-flight French journalist concludes that four out of five young Germans are against a new army and military service, and that the remaining small minority accepts it without enthusiasm. A public opinion poll taken among adults (men and women) on the question “Do you believe it right to become a soldier or for your husband or son to become a soldier?” gave the following results: 71 percent answered no, 26 percent yes and 3 percent had no opinion. The opposition among the youth, the reporter says, would be even higher.

The resolution against re-armament adopted last October by the German Trade Union Federation was prompted in good measure by the youth, more than a million of the six million enrolled trade unionists being under 25 years. Aufwärts, bi-monthly organ of the young trade unionists
published in Cologne, openly advises the youth to refuse military service and it gives practical advice to resisters including legal pointers for use before military tribunals.

LAST November, the Blank Office (the office named for Theodore Blank, the future Minister of Defense, which since 1951 has been preparing the groundwork for the new army) held a public conference in Cologne with the aim of convincing the youth that there would be no Prussian-Nazi features in the new Wehrmacht. Several hundred young Germans of military age were present. Their unanswerable questions and arguments were put with such force and conviction that the militarists were completely routed. The press reported the debates in detail, and since then there have been no further conferences of this kind.

A few weeks later, Blank came to Augsburg to deliver a political speech in the Bavarian election campaign. He was attacked and beaten up by the public composed largely of conscriptable youth. His face covered with blood, he had to leave the hall and city under police escort. Quick, a popular illustrated magazine, reproduced a photo of Blank in this condition on which was mounted the caption: “The First Casualty of the New German Army.”

Adenauer met a similar reception this year when he attempted to address meetings designed to counteract the great anti-militarist campaign of the socialists and unions. Angry mass demonstrations besieged his meetings in Frankfurt, Hanover and other industrial centers, and he escaped with a whole skin thanks only to huge cords of Shupos.

One of the best-sellers in post-war years, hitting over the 350,000 mark, has been H. H. Kirst’s novel “08/18” (Zero hour fifteen). A story describing life in the barracks and then the experiences of a German artillery regiment in the Russian campaign, it is a scathing attack on the sadism and brutality of the feldwebels and the entire officer caste. Made into a film, it played before full houses for months last fall. Almost at every showing there were incidents between the anti-militarists and the few defending the army tradition. A French writer describes one such scene at a Stuttgart movie house:

“This is an offense and a slander against the memory of our army,” a man of athletic build beside me called out in an embittered voice. At once from three sides at the same time the reply came back: “We spit on your army...”—“if you like it so much, why don’t you join up?”—Then an ironical voice asked: “The gentleman was undoubtedly a Herr Offizier or a Herr Unteroffizier to take the film so much to heart?”

THE official resolution of the German trade unions warns that the re-birth of a German army constitutes a danger “that a militaristic authoritarian state will thereby be created which would mean the end of the effort of the German labor movement to create a political, social and economic democracy.” This resolution was adopted by 287 votes against 4 after a three-hour report by Viktor Agartz, the federation’s chief economist. “We should stop repeating continually,” he said, “that the German Democratic Republic (in the East) is supported by Russian tanks. It is surely to the same degree that we owe to the Western occupation powers the structure of West German economy.” Then followed the vivid but sombre picture of the rise of “The Restoration”—the Krupps, the Konzerns, the Cartels, all back in business again; the government honey-combed with the old Nazi gang; the parliament increasingly substituted by committees employing authoritarian means; the parties subsidized by Big Business; “an absolute identity of state and economic leadership” which thrusts the unions into the background as “secondary, disagreeable phenomena” and meets their demands “with strong resistance.” “Let this tendency accentuate,” he warns, “and the door is wide open to a new totalitarian experience.”

Two events at the Congress indicated the temper of the trade union movement. First, the resolution opposing re-armament was not a proposal of the outgoing leadership; it originated from a loosely organized Left opposition whose primary strength is among the metal workers. Second, this opposition decided only at the last moment not to contest for the post of president to replace Christian Fette, in general disfavor because of his “neutralism” in politics, and collaboration on the economic field. The new president, Walter Freitag, received, however, only 241 votes out of 384 voting, well over one-third of the delegates abstaining.

The prod for action that precipitated the thousands of anti-militarist rallies in West German cities came from Bavaria. In the state congress of unions, which followed that of the national federation, a motion was adopted calling on the top leadership to put teeth in its anti-re-armament resolution. They demanded an emergency conference of the unions to be held at Bonn for this purpose. For Bavaria, they set into motion a signature campaign for a popular referendum against re-armament and for immediate re-unification of the country. Other state federations met in the following weeks, and to one extent or another similar positions were adopted. There was also talk of strike action to force talks on unification before the passage of the Paris Agreements.
ALTHOUGH reaching great heights of mass activity, the plans for referendums and strikes were dropped in mid-passage. They were restrained in part by the fears of Social Democratic leader, Erich Ollenhauer, who was not insensitive to Adenauer’s charges that the opposition was trying to settle the issue in “the street” and not in parliament. They were also inhibited by the crescendo of broadcasts from the East German radio urging general strikes and plebiscites. Molotov’s note calling for four-power negotiations on the basis of free all-German elections under international control had been a stimulant for the West German movement. However, the attempts of the East German government, in bad repute particularly since the June 17, 1953, events, to “get in” on this movement, put the left wing on the defensive; nothing is so embarrassing in West Germany as to appear to be open to the charge of acting “under orders from East German communists.”

In any case, there is little discouragement after the passage of the Paris Agreements, as few expected that the popular agitation, intensive as it was, could change the outcome of the Bundestag vote. At best what was expected was a sufficient weakening of Adenauer’s coalition to prevent an implementation of the pact once passed; at the least, it was to create such a force of public opinion as to compel Adenauer to seek negotiations after the final signature of the Paris Agreements but before re-armament actually got under way.

Behind all these considerations, there was perhaps a more significant one for launching a movement that had no chance of immediate victory. It was to accustom the German working people, adult and youth, to action, after the long years of suppression under a totalitarian regime and the passivity engendered by the occupation. It was a dress rehearsal for the big battles that are to come if the “restoration” is reinforced by a new Wehrmacht. The experience will be invaluable in fighting for the defense of democratic rights against “emergency” dictatorial legislation now awaiting only the last seal on the Paris Agreements; in fighting for the protection of the youth against the tyranny of the new officer caste; in fighting for the 40-hour week (the present average is 52) and for other social improvements which will meet more aggressive resistance than ever.

* * *

I SHOULD like finally to concurn the opinion of your London correspondent on the hypocrisy of the A.F. of L. in urging the German unions to accept a new army while working to keep it “democratic.” The French writer I cited above made a visit to the Blank Office at Bonn. This planning staff for the new army (which will not be called Wehrmacht or army but “Streitkräfte”—fighting forces—in order to take the sting out of it) has a personnel of 900. In large part they are top echelon officers of the former Wehrmacht, ex-generals, admirals, commandants, technicians in tactics and strategy, experts in the whole gamut of military questions. They are divided into two groups, “the reformers” and “the realists.”

The “reformers” are talking of abolishing the salute, permitting the soldier to change to civics in the evening or on furlough, to have the right to vote in elections and participate in political activity, to appeal against punish-

ment or illegal orders right up to the Bonn Parliament. They propose to eliminate the famous hob-nailed boots, and with it all the petty barracks tortures, and even to replace the court-martial by a type of civilian court.

The “realists,” far more numerous, consider all this “strictly for the birds,” but they are remaining in the background and letting the “reformers” do the talking for the present so as to sweeten the pill of German re-armament for Western and German opinion.

Of a hundred thousand former officers and petty officers inscribed on the list for future call-up, there are perhaps a hundred “reformers” in the Blank Office. The optimists think they can find a few hundred more among the outside cadres to apply the reforms. But even this is doubtful as the most “democratic” of these elements have had a bellyful of war and have found positions in civilian life. The real cadres will come from that group who, as after World War I, embittered by defeat and unemployment, have established a network of the neo-Nazi Steel Helmet type of organization, maintaining contact by correspondence throughout the country. They meet frequently in the backrooms of beerhalls, salute one another, speak with contempt of the Western allies and with hatred and fear of the Russians, engage in armchair discussion of military strategy in the next war. These will form the backbone of the new army. But even if the “reformers” should win out, says a former colonel interviewed by the French reporter, the result will eventually be the same, because the “reformers” also have been soaked in a two-hundred-year Prussian military tradition, and permeated with the Junker philosophy that the army should dominate the state. They have little use for democratic ideas.

To this might be added the fact that the new army will in the first place be a civil-war army intended for fratricidal conflict against Germans in the East, and in the second place a “liberation” army to retrieve German territory from Poland and the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, and in the third place a counter-revolutionary army to wage a “holy crusade” against communism. Such armies, as is known from experience, have never been hot-houses for democracy.

A POLITICAL battle more significant than Dienbienphu is now being fought in Vietnam. The United States, with all its prestige, is actively engaged. It is no secret that we are openly intervening at almost every level on behalf of the existing government in the South. . . . The position perhaps may no longer be described as chaos. But it remains remarkably close to anarchy. . . . This country remains largely parceled out in feudal strongholds. The two religious sects, Cao Dai and Hoa Hao, maintain their own armies and control considerable areas. The insidious Binh Xuyen gang actually runs the national police and dominates Saigon. . . . What exists in South Vietnam is a barren dictatorship—barren because there is no effective dictator. Premier Ngo Dinh Diem [the U.S. puppet head of the state] doesn’t dare install real political freedom because anarchic centrifugal forces would rip the state apart. Yet this leaves everything in a condition of moral paralysis. . . . General Collins, our Ambassador and now the real boss here, has been given the job of sweeping out an Augean stable with a whiskbroom. . . . And the Geneva fixed date of all-Vietnam elections. These really will never be held . . . the non-Communist South cannot afford the slightest risk of defeat. Nobody likes to talk about this. But when the time to admit it arrives a grave crisis must inevitably develop.

C. L. Sulzberger

N.Y. Times, March 12 (Emphasis added)

AMERICAN SOCIALIST
How the international oil cartel carved up the oil resources of Iran after the overthrow of Mossadegh. A full account of a little-known story by an expert in the oil-industry field.

The Iranian Oil Grab

by Harvey O'Connor

Back in the 1920's it was called Dollar Diplomacy when the State Department forced the British to move over and let Standard Oil in on Iraq's petroleum. Decent people either deplored such strong-arming or preferred not to contemplate it. Nowadays when the State Department forces the British to move over and let Standard in on Iranian oil, it comes under the heading of Fighting for the Free World, and our chief agent in the deal is appointed Under Secretary of State. His name just happens to be Herbert Hoover, Jr., the fellow who now runs Uncle Sam's foreign affairs when the peripatetic Secretary is peripatting around the globe, sticking his fingers into holes in the dikes to hold back the Red Tide.

The leading facts about Iran are pretty well known, even if not openly acknowledged. The Persian oil-field job, from the day in 1901 when an Australian soldier of fortune, William K. D'Arcy, cajoled a concession covering most of the country from the Shah, has been perhaps the single biggest bit of legal larceny the world has ever seen. (This statement is made putatively and will be cheerfully withdrawn on adequate proof that a bigger job was pulled elsewhere.) On the deal rose Anglo-Persian Oil, later known as Anglo-Iranian, now *hexas*, merely British Petroleum. Anglo's assets of $1,016,400,000 and its 1953 profit of $70,000,000 contrast with the poverty-stricken land, the bankrupt government and the squalid company town of Abadan on the Persian Gulf. For years the nervous Nellies of the State Department had feared that the Russian Bear would descend on this corrupt mess and take it over by default, but the steady fellows in the British Foreign Office knew the situation was under control. Wasn't the Shah their man, and weren't the headmen of the tribes of southern Persia in their pay?

When the boil finally burst, it turned out that the Russians were nowhere around; the needle was wielded by a bunch of nationalists allied with the atavistic Moslem Brotherhood people (who think that Persia about the time of Omar's "Rubaiyat" was a pretty ideal place). It was Ayatollah Kashani, the Moslem leader, who said that oil stank in Persia and he'd prefer any day a rose blooming by the ruins of the Temple of Solomon to a noisome oil well. The new prime minister, Mossadegh, was by no means so other-wordly; he believed against all the evidence of Iran's past history that something good might come out of the petroleum Nature had stored so lavishly beneath her rocky soil, so he promptly nationalized it and drove out Anglo.

What happened when Anglo-Iranian—and then all the brothers of the international oil cartel—tried to rescue Iran from a fate worse than death is something for the historians (and don't think they're not busy grinding out a lot of dry books fully exhuming dates and personalities, in which all the relevant facts are marshalled and no conclusion worthy of an eighth-grader is drawn). One relevant fact which is mentioned, but barely, was the bothersome business that led to Mossadegh's abrupt overthrow.

You may remember that Anglo-Iranian and its business agent, the Foreign Office, had been speculating on Mossadeh succumbing because his government would become bankrupt and his people hungry. These hopes, so flattering to the Christian gentlemen in charge of Anglo and the Foreign Office, turned out fruitless, for bankruptcy and hunger are the rule and not the exception in Iran. It was at a certain point that Action with a capital A became imperative. That point is usually slurred over in the published accounts although it sticks out obviously enough, like a thorn in the thumb. The nationalized Iranian oil company was beginning to sell appreciable tonnage of oil products to the Italians and the Japanese. Although Her Majesty's Navy was hauling the tankers into Aden, Singapore and other convenient ports because they carried "stolen goods," a good bit of the oil was seeping through the international cartel's embargo. All negotiations having snagged, Mossadegh was about to play his trump card—he would sell Iranian oil to all comers at half price. This was a good bit like a five-alarm in a firehouse—all hands turned out immediately.

Just what happened is not known publicly. It is a cloak-and-dagger story in the files of Allen Dulles' Central Intelligence Agency, which has been bragging a good bit lately of its proficiency in such situations. Suddenly the Iranian

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Army was swung over from nationalism to the cartel’s service, Mossadegh was out, and quite a few people were hanged. General Zahedi, the new dictator, announced publicly that Iran would not commit the Sin against the Holy Ghost, the unpardonable transgression, selling oil below the price fixed by Standard, Royal Dutch/Shell and Anglo. After that it was merely a matter of detail.

To say that is not to detract from the difficulty of Herbert Hoover, Jr.’s, task or to bedim the shining medals he won for his achievements in Teheran, London and New York. It took Junior from September 1953, to August 1954, to unravel the tangled skein. First, he had to accept the fact of Iranian nationalization of its oil. Whatever may be the prowess of our CIA boys with generals and colonels in Guatemala and elsewhere, they didn’t even try the gargantuan task of trying to make the Persian people love Anglo-Iranian. A formula had to be found that left the title of ownership to Iran and the fact of ownership to the oil cartel. Finally it was agreed that the new oil consortium would act “on behalf of” the National Iranian Oil Company.

The second job was to reconcile Anglo-Iranian to the facts of life, or, to be blunt about it, that the big U.S. companies wanted in. The British can be stubborn on such things, particularly when pelf supports pride, and especially when uncouth Yankee cousins from across the sea demand their share of the swag. Anglo-Iranian stood in de jure, if not de facto, ownership of Iranian oil, according to the tenets of the international oil cartel. But the cold fact was that as a result of expropriation and dislocation of the world oil trade caused by the drying up of the Iranian supply for more than two years, this oil could come back on the world market and find adequate outlets only if the U.S. companies agreed to absorb some of it. The wells of Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq had been opened to make up the Iranian deficit; there was no current need for Iran’s oil. If Anglo hoped to market Iranian oil, it could do so only with the consent of Standard and its U.S. allies, and that consent had a big dollar sign on it. Anglo put up a long and bitter fight but was forced to yield. That took months.

In the final deal, a consortium (this sounds better than trust or cartel) was set up, in which Anglo-Iranian had a 40 percent share; its sister company, Royal Dutch/Shell, 14 percent; and the five U.S. companies, Standard of New Jersey, Socony, Standard of California, Texas Company and Gulf, 8 percent each. As the Compagnie Francoise des Petroles was a partner with the British companies and Standard of New Jersey in the Iraq Petroleum “red-line” agreement, it had to be cut in for 6 percent. So Anglo, which had had 100 percent, emerged with only 40 percent; with Shell’s help, it had 54 percent.

The consortium values its properties (technically, the property of the Iranian government) at $1,000,000,000. So Anglo’s share of this is $400,000,000. Profits for 1957, based on stipulated production, will be $89,700,000 for Anglo, $26,600,000 for Royal Dutch/Shell, and a mere $15,200,000 apiece for the five U.S. companies, plus a pourboire of $11,500,000 for the French company.

The consortium will make a payment equal to its profits to the Iranian government which, for the first time in history, will get an appreciable sum for its property. Before Mossadegh, Anglo was paying about 12½ percent of its take to Iran in return for the oil it gathered. The government will be obliged, however, to forego some of its revenue, which is to be applied as compensation to Anglo for nationalizing the oil. This amounts to some $84,000,000.

JUST who owns Iran’s oil is a nice question. Vice President Howard W. Page of Standard of New Jersey, who was one of the three top negotiators, said it was something “that even top-notch lawyers will argue themselves silly about.” As he put it, the difference between outright ownership and the consortium agreement is “about the same as whether someone sells you a car, or sells you full rights to its use for the life of the car.” Obviously a fine legal point!

Given the state of affairs at the moment in the Middle East and the propensity toward assassination cultivated by many Moslem Brotherhood members, it would take a born optimist to believe that the agreement General Zahedi signed for 40 years will last that long. The members of the consortium are realists, not optimists; they have cheerfully taken the attitude of “after us the deluge.” They conserve their stockholders by pointing to the rate of profit—a $200,000,000 a year by 1957 on something which in reality cost them not a penny, as Anglo-Iranian had amortized its investment many a time over before 1951.

There are a few angles to be considered. One is the internal situation in Iran. About that there are only a few hints from time to time in the business press, but World Interpreter, Devere Allen’s paper up in Connecticut, which has unusually good sources around the globe, reported January 14:

The background weakness in the current situation is the Zahedi regime, which is more cooperative on the oil question, but which is regarded internally as corrupt, repressive, harsh with political opponents whether or not these are pro-Communist or anti-Communist, and hostile to long-needed social reforms. Individual Americans and other outsiders are treated courteously, but there is popular animosity toward the United
States, which has taken credit for putting and keeping Zahedi in power. Objective observers do not exclude the possibility of another political upheaval, later, unless the regime changes its ways.

Zahedi himself is quite a type. It was he whom the Allies had to push out of the way during World War II because he was openly pro-Nazi and had made Teheran a base for Hitler. A strange bedfellow now! Characteristically, when Zahedi needed an informed adviser during the negotiations with the consortium, to whom did he turn but to Capt. Torkild Riecher, one-time head of the Texas Company! Torkild had to get out of Texaco shortly before the war because of his too open pro-Nazi sympathies, and he now heads a minor U.S. oil company. Another fitting bedfellow!

The New Statesman and Nation of London, which has protested the Iranian terror, carried a letter in its January 8 issue from a “Persian Student,” which makes interesting reading:

It was the Americans, rather nervous at the time that the oil agreement was being concluded, who discovered a Communist plot. They were probably right, for there is always some plot or plan afoot amongst our extremists. It was, however, when the Americans insisted on arrests that the Administration, almost deliberately, rounded up the wrong people. There was, indeed, something frivolous about the whole affair until the Americans insisted on sanctions, and 21 alleged ring leaders were shot after a secret trial. The Persian Government sensed the reaction and almost in hysteria organized more arrests. There followed a coup of suicides and, to complete the pattern, a series of letters were published from detained persons proclaiming their abhorrence of the Socialism that had ensnared them, their reconversion to the true faith and their loyalty, admiration and affection for the Shah. These ridiculous letters, much publicized in the Persian press and available for anyone to read in London, usually procured the liberty of their writers if they were fortunate enough to have friends at Court or amongst the wealthy.

Ah, how we let our government endear America to the world!

Another angle of interest is whether the creation of this outright international oil consortium is not open evidence that it is indeed a trust, something very specifically forbidden by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, so far as the five U.S. companies are concerned. But think nothing of it! Attorney General Brownell, who is quite acute in detecting violations of the Smith Act and other laws for thought control, has declared formally that the consortium does not violate the Sherman Act. That, apparently, makes it final: The public prosecutor has set himself up as judge and jury to decide which laws are to be enforced rigorously and which are to be ignored among gentlemen.

A RATHER comic fillip was given this business when the U.S. partners in the consortium offered generously to “transfer, at cost, a portion of their participation” to other qualified U.S. oil companies. This proved indeed there was no trust—anybody could get into the consortium if he had a few lousy millions to spare. So far there have been no takers. The domestic independents look on the offer with some disdain. What many of them have been urging on the State and Justice Departments is, not that they have to buy into the consortium to be given access to Middle Eastern oil “at cost,” but that they have a chance to buy the Middle Eastern oil at a reasonable price. The consortium charges the same for Middle Eastern oil as for Texas oil, although the Iranian product probably costs half or less to market.

Another angle of interest is the plunge in British prestige in the Middle East. By refusing to deal with Mosadegh, Britain has had to surrender control of Iranian oil to a consortium in which U.S. companies predominate in numbers. The effect was electric in Iraq, which borders Iran. The Iraq government, which has been Britain’s best friend in the Middle East, promptly announced that it would seek to repeal the Anglo-Iraqi treaty and kick the Royal Air Force out of the country. Now it has teamed up with the Dulles Turkish-Pakistan axis. So far as the British Lion is concerned in the Middle East, he seems to be on the outside looking unhappily in on what used to be his own preserve.

Another interesting sidelight on the Iranian business is the rapid rise to fame of Herbert Hoover, Jr. He was a director of Union Oil, the big West Coast firm, had served as consultant to the Venezuelan, Iranian and other governments on oil problems, and had quite a reputation as a petroleum engineer. Upon his triumphant return from Teheran he was hoisted upon Dulles’ shoulders and made Under Secretary of State. There is nothing wrong about that, of course. Why shouldn’t a successful defender of oil’s private interests become the tribune of the public interest? What is good for Standard Oil, as well as General Motors, must be good for the country.

What was extraordinary about the business was that he was confirmed as Under Secretary without even an open hearing before the Senate foreign affairs committee. After his confirmation he refused to have a press conference, although there were plenty of reporters with plenty of interesting questions. Some of the questions would have been of the old-fashioned God and Mammon stripe—how did the Under Secretary keep his right hand from knowing what his left was doing? Other questions might have speculated on whether he agreed with his illustrious father, whose Fortress America ideas are rather well known. Does he believe, with the old man, that Europe and Asia are just a lot of spinach and that a Monroe Doctrine America, from Greenland’s icy mountains to the Patagonian deserts, is what we should defend, with a concomitant heavy cut in taxes on business and the wealthy, and a drastic reduction in military expenditures? It is unfair, of course, to saddle Junior with Papa’s notions, but the public would seem to be entitled at least to a candid look into Junior’s mind before he is elevated to such a sensitive post. But what young Hoover believes apparently is not considered fit for the common herd to know—ours but to pay the taxes and die, for the greater glory of the international oil consortium.
Malenkov's Fall and the Agricultural Problem in Russia

by Harry Braverman

It is characteristic of the tense state of world affairs, and of the USSR's key position, that the news of Malenkov's removal created a disproportionate wave of shock and bewilderment throughout the world. The early radio reports from the U.S. capital reiterated hourly during the first day: "There is no panic in Washington." Speculation ran a wild gamut from predictions of a vast blood purge rivaling that of the thirties, paralyzing Soviet society and opening it to conquest by imperialism, to a military dictatorship which would soon launch a war.

As the events recede in time and as additional information bearing on the policy of the new administration comes our way, it is increasingly clear that Malenkov's removal neither represented nor presaged so cataclysmic a break as many at first thought. There has been no bloody falling-out such as world capitalism hoped to see. In fact, one of the most impressive aspects of the event is the comparative ease—judging at least by those signs available to outsiders—with which a serious conflict over course and policy has been resolved. It is apparent that a concerted effort is being made to settle an important policy dispute without recourse to the violent measures of the Stalin era. This attempt may yet break down under the pressure of sharp antagonisms and habitual modes of operation, but to date it stands as a definite step away from the practices of the past.

There are those who have tried to speak of Soviet affairs as though the USSR were a fixed and monolithic entity, not subject, like the rest of the world, to social evolution and social antagonisms. William Z. Foster for example, in an article in Political Affairs at the time of Stalin's death entitled "Malenkov at the Helm," thought he could portray the Soviet Union like a well-regulated branch of his own party:

The Soviet system is supposed to be in a crisis, which will be especially aggravated by the "inexperience" of Malenkov, etc. Let us, therefore, analyze briefly this political nonsense. . . .

Malenkov has been trained in the very best Marxist-Leninist tradition. He long had the tutorship of the greatest teacher of them all — Stalin — and he got his experience in the heart of the world Socialist movement, the Soviet Union. This constitutes the very best preparation for the heavy tasks of leadership that have now come to him. . . .

Under the leadership of the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with Malenkov standing at its head, the perspective of the Soviet people is for a rapid march into Communism. . . .

But now Malenkov, in his own words, has turned out to be "insufficiently experienced." The reason for Foster's plain blunder is that he disregarded the fact that the Soviet Union, being still in the process of taking the most gigantic social leap ever attempted by man, remains an evolving, self-contradictory society, with important disproportions, remnants of the past, internal conflicts, and today with the problem of working out a substitute mode of rule for Stalin's authority still unsolved and still hanging over its head.

European left-wing opinion places the responsibility for Malenkov's downfall on the refusal by imperialism—particularly American—to move toward an end to the cold war. Malenkov, it is said, represented that trend of opinion in the regime which hoped to soften the international situation by means of proposals, gestures and negotiations to avert a war and lead to a more stable world situation. His consumer-goods orientation, it is reasoned, was dependent upon the negotiation of such a détente. When he could not get it, the ground was cut away from under his feet, and he fell. Thus Bevan wrote an article entitled "We Left Him with No Cards to Play,"

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and Claude Bourdet's analysis in *France-Observateur* was headed: "Malenkov Liquidated by the West."

Certainly there is much truth in this. The ultimate responsibility for the distortions of Soviet development, for the political dictatorship and the hardships, rests in the last analysis upon the encirclement of Russia from the beginning by hostile capitalist forces. And, in the more immediate sense, there is no question that, relieved of capitalist pressure and the threat of a new war, the country would take a great upward leap in standard of living and civil liberties. The failure of all attempts to relax the basic world tensions, Washington's continued insistence upon war preparations—including that most dangerous of all measures, the re-creation of a German Wehrmacht—undoubtedly weakened the hand of the "consumerists" in the Russian debate.

Thus the approval by the French Assembly of the Paris agreements for German armament may have been the final straw that tipped the scales in favor of Khrushchev, Bulganin and their supporters. But would it be right to conclude from this that there will now be a basic change in Russia's foreign policy? There is no evidence that either the differences or the Khrushchev victory had very much to do with foreign policy, despite the role that foreign events may have had in precipitating or deciding the debate. On the contrary, every indication points to the continuation of the same basic policy of striving to end the cold war on the basis of the present big-power positions, although, if German rearmament becomes a fact, Molotov's tactical moves will have to conform to this altered position.

A COUNTRY in which most things relating to internal affairs are done secretly can easily leave the impression that it is one big foreign-policy machine. But it should not be forgotten that the Soviet regime steers a massive land of 200 million people in a complex and revolutionary transition period, and that most of the time its big preoccupations are necessarily internal; and the big debates and decisions are over these preoccupations. So is it too in this event, where the big change is in domestic course, and the big debate—although it undoubtedly was influenced by foreign factors—was fashioned basically by domestic problems. The deposing of Malenkov was clearly meant to serve as a resounding signal to the people of the Soviet bloc that the increase on a large scale of consumer goods was not to be expected in the immediate future, and that the general air of relaxation and "thaw" is to be dispelled in a renewed emphasis on a hard-driving policy of heavy industrial development.

There are many good reasons to place the agricultural situation at the heart of the recent events. The attention of Khrushchev, who is apparently the central figure of the new alignment, has been riveted to this field for a number of years. And Soviet agriculture has necessarily been the key to the entire consumer-goods drive. First, agriculture, and especially animal husbandry, form the base of the foodstuff industries. Second, many of the light industries that supply consumers with other basic articles of consumption—shoes, clothing, household textiles, leather goods, tobacco, beverages, etc.—are directly dependent upon agriculture. Thus farm products come first before one even begins to speak of refrigerators and washing machines. It wouldn't make much sense, for instance, to produce millions of refrigerators while it was not possible to supply better food—meat, dairy products, etc.—to go into them.

To take Khrushchev's word for it, Soviet agriculture is in a crisis. It is not, of course, the old-style crisis of famine and starvation. The essential food needs of the cities have been guaranteed by collectivized agriculture, and guaranteed with a far smaller working force supplying a far larger population than before collectivization—a fact many of the so-called experts don't usually bother to take into consideration. "As regards the gross output of wheat," Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet in February, "our country leads the world. She has outstripped the U.S.A. both as regards gross output and output per head of the population." The collectivized farm system has thus made possible the rapid industrialization of the country. In that sense, the new agricultural form has been a decisive success without which the economy could not have progressed to its present level. The statistics as well as the testimony of even hostile observers, such as Harrison Salisbury of the *N. Y. Times*, William Randolph Hearst, Jr., and Marshall MacDuffie, show this to be true. Virtually all first-hand accounts agree that the Russian people are provided for so far as basic diet is concerned, and that there has been a big improvement during the past few years.

The Russian agricultural crisis consists of this: Agriculture has not risen proportionately with the growth of industry and the cities, and in some respects has even fallen behind. Hence, the basic diet of the population cannot be improved, and the surpluses for export are smaller than what is required. Furthermore, the lopsided growth of heavy industry at the expense of the consumer industries and agriculture has imposed a standard of living far below the norms of Western Europe. The peasantry, which after a certain point cannot convert its surpluses into manufactured goods and services, lacks incentive for increasing its production. This is the vicious circle which constitutes the long-time crisis of Russian agriculture. In Khrushchev's words (September 1953 report):

...it must be said with all frankness that the enormous potentialities latent in our large-scale socialist agriculture are being utilized unsatisfactorily. ... A marked discrepancy has arisen between the rate of development of our large-scale socialist industry, of the size of our urban population and the material standards of our working masses on the one side, and the levels of agricultural output on the other.

Russian agriculture is not organized on the same economic principles as the rest of the economy. Soviet industries are completely state owned and state operated; for an American to visualize them he must think of something like our public schools or post office. Every detail of operation is conducted by the government, and the products of the enterprises belong to and are sold by the government. But agriculture is different. The peasants, in deference to their long-standing traditions and ingrained petty-capitalist suspicions and aspirations which couldn't
be eliminated in a day, are organized into cooperative enterprises called "collective farms"; 95 percent of the Russian farms are that type while the rest are state farms analogous to the state-owned industries. In addition, a good many peasants in the collective farms continue to till their private midget farms and to own livestock, the produce of which is their personal property, and can be legally sold by them on the open market.

The collectives, despite the close government control and the strict legal regulations governing their behavior, retain an element of independence. The government supplies and maintains tractors and farm machinery, which it owns and controls; and collectives sell their produce partly in the form of compulsory sales to the government, partly in free sales to the government, and partly on the open market. The inevitable result of such a system which stands halfway between socialist and capitalist economic forms is that the government does not have nearly so much control over what is raised and what is sent to the cities as it does over the rest of the economy.

ON the collective farms there are many Communist Party members and officials responsible to district and central powers, but even these succumb to the pressure of the environment from which they themselves come. Contact with the cities is often slight and episodic; district officials give their rounds cursory attention and are content to let things go along as they are, perhaps because they have seen how hard it is to get them on a new track.

"In practice," said Khrushchev in his massive report to the Central Committee a year and a half ago, "the guidance of the collective farms is nobody's responsibility; the form it most often takes is that some official of the district party or executive committee makes a tour of the collective farms in an automobile, covers half the district in one day, and not infrequently gives his instructions without even stepping out of his car."

A number of attempts have been made to get a firmer grip. Five years ago, Khrushchev came up with his proposal for giant "agro-cities," which were to be formed by amalgamating the collectives wholesale, reducing the private peasant plots, urbanizing living conditions in centralized towns, and in general appeared to presage a concentrated drive toward statizing the rural economy. Indeed a certain step was taken in that direction by a program of mergers, so that the 254,000 collective farms of January 1950 were, by October 1952, amalgamated into only 97,000 farms (this in place of the 25 million small farms of the pre-collectivization days).

But Khrushchev's agro-cities were accounted too hasty and adventurist a course, and likely to lead to heavy resistance from the peasants. The entire matter was aired quite fully in the discussion around Stalin's article "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" shortly before his death. Ostensibly a discussion of "the imminent transition from socialism to communism," it was really concerned with the problems raised by the remains of capitalism, foremost being the peasant collectives and commodity exchange with the peasants. Stalin, while holding out hope for a gradual future improvement via an exchange of goods with the collectives in place of present money payments, quite emphatically laid down a "go slow" line; for the present, he had nothing to propose.

WITH Stalin's death and the opening of the new course came the really serious attention to the critical agricultural problem. At the Central Committee meeting of September 1953, Khrushchev delivered a voluminous report entirely devoted to agriculture; from this emerged a bulky decision on measures to be taken. The Central Committee re-opened discussion in a February-March meeting in 1954, again at a June meeting, and finally once again at the recent meetings of the Supreme Soviet at which the government was reorganized.

The sweeping proposals for a fundamental alteration in the organization of agriculture have been dropped, at least for the time being. All attention is concentrated upon negotiation and jockeying with the peasantry on the basis of the present set-up. But a move which may have considerable future importance is the settling of the virgin Siberian lands. These are being organized as huge state farms (124 new ones made their appearance last spring and another 280-300 are in process of being organized). Khrushchev is quite careful not to place too much stress upon this last fact, since, with his "agro-city" background, such a move could be taken as a sign of a trend towards statized agriculture by a more indirect route, and the touchy peasants might become alarmed.

The effort to raise agricultural output, which can be dated from the Khrushchev report to the Central Committee of Sept. 3, 1953, was aimed at producing rapid results. The peasantry, it was calculated, is capable of producing a far greater supply on the basis of the existing level of equipment and land under cultivation, and there were even many hints put forward by Khrushchev to indicate a belief that more is being produced but is just not being reported and delivered. The report—which must be read in large measure as a shrewd colloquy with the peasants—told the farmers: Come, we know you aren't really extending yourselves; we know what can be done. He proved his case repeatedly with comparisons between farms of similar size and soil conditions. Among the dozens of examples he gave: On certain collective farms, the milk yield per cow is as high as over 5,000 kilograms, yet Khrushchev cited four regions and five entire Soviet Republics where the yield (for all nine) averaged below 700 kilograms, and in one Republic averaged only 373!
Throughout the country, milk yield is only 1,000-1,070 kilograms. In his most recent report, Khrushchev cited these comparisons:

In 1954 the advanced collective and state farms in the most varied zones obtained average milk yields per cow that were three times above the all-Union indices, from four to five times more pork per 100 hectares of arable land, and from two to three times more wool per sheep than the average yield of all the collective and state farms.

Having proved his case, Khrushchev went ahead to propose measures. These were many sided. Thousands of agronomists were to be sent from desk jobs into the farm regions, the Machine and Tractor Stations were to be overhauled, farm machinery shipments were to be increased, innovations in planting to be introduced, virgin soil to be brought under cultivation, etc. But the trump card of the regime in its jockeying with the peasantry was a sweeping revision of the terms of trade between the collectives and the government. Announcing that “the principle of giving a material incentive to collective farms” had been infringed, Khrushchev made it known that the prices paid by the state for deliveries (both obligatory and voluntary sales to the government) were being raised very sharply, in some cases as much as 500 percent. Arrears of deliveries were being written off, compulsory quotas being reduced, but it was made clear that the delivery quotas would become more uniform throughout the farms, and that, most important of all, the state expected to collect them.

HAVING thus thrown out a considerable program of financial encouragement to the rural population, and having buttressed this with an all-sided program of improvement and investment in agriculture, the state awaited a very substantial and rapid rise in agricultural produce. More than that, it counted on such an increase, and based upon it the promises of a big rise in the standard of living within “two-three years” as the Central Committee orators repeatedly put it in mid-1953. But such an improvement was not forthcoming. Only small gains were registered, and it began to appear that the problem of increasing farm production on the basis of the collective farm system as it is now constituted is a far more stubborn than had at first been calculated. The peasants do not appear to have been either convinced or encouraged to extend themselves. Why this is so is a matter for conjecture, but that it is so is clear from the facts.

In the field of livestock breeding, only the goal for hogs was attained in 1954, and that had been set quite low. Only 69 percent of the planned increase in large horned cattle was attained, 47 percent of the proposed increase in cows, and 27 percent of the planned increase in sheep and goats. So far as the important fodder situation is concerned—upon this depends the success of the animal husbandry program—Khrushchev, after calling it “unsatisfactory for many years on end,” added: “Neither has the past year seen any radical change.”

A target which both Bulgainin and Khrushchev now reiterate many times in their current reports is: 10 billion pooods of grain by 1960 (a poood is equal to approximately 36 lbs.). This, they say, would be adequate to all basic livestock, human and industrial needs. Now Malenkov reported to the Communist Party congress in late 1952 that already in that year grain production was 8 billion pooods. And Khrushchev says now he expects to get from the newly pioneered grain lands alone close to 2 billion pooods by 1956, not 1960! This forces the following conclusions: 1) Grain production probably hasn’t risen materially since 1952. 2) The goal has been cut down considerably and the period of time allotted to its completion has been extended. 3) The biggest part of the increase in grain production is expected to come from the virgin land areas where youth and shock workers are now setting up huge state farms, and not from the existing collective farm structure.

It may be that it is impossible to get drastically more out of the present collective farm system, regardless of the administrative forms employed, until the peasant can be supplied with sufficient manufactured goods and services to appreciably raise his standard of living and to modernize the Russian countryside. At present, he lacks the incentive to produce over a certain level on the collective farms, as the manufactured goods are not there to purchase, and his surplus will be confiscated by the state in one form or another. It is significant that where the Malenkov-Khrushchev policy of 1953 tried to break out of the vicious circle by extensive concessions to the peasantry, the present policy rests its main hopes on by-passing the peasantry, and on expanding the agricultural base outside of the present collectives with a new extensive state farm organization.

THE problems of the regime, and the fundamental forces which led to the dramatic change of premiers, can be better understood on the basis of the above facts. Confronted with a situation in which agricultural goals which had been figured for two-three years now stubbornly stretch out to at least six-seven, and with other growing internal defense needs and international commitments (arms for a Chinese mass army, etc.), the government had to scale down on its promises, and deflate the mood of expectation and relaxation in the population. And what better way to do that than by a removal of Malenkov—the individual who had come, justifiably or not, to represent “consumerism” in the public mind?

With the slower tempo in agriculture, the increased defense budget, with the heavy-industry advocates in power, what will happen to the consumer goods program? In both light and heavy industry, 1954 was a good year for the Soviet economy. As even the conservative British Economist pointed out, with the present vastly increased urban working class and output of basic industrial products, the government planners have “a good deal of room in which to maneuver” that they didn’t have before. And so no one can say that the entire program will be scrapped.

But, with the change in emphasis, it will again take a back seat to basic-industry needs. With that will come repercussions in every field in which the thaw has been felt: political, cultural, etc. For a while, it can be expected that the film will wind in reverse in the Soviet process which has been under way since Stalin’s death.
The Lightfoot Case

by Rev. William T. Baird

On January 26, 1955, Claude Mack Lightfoot was convicted by a Federal jury in Chicago under the previously untested membership section of the Smith Act. He was sentenced to "five and five"—five years in the penitentiary and $5,000 fine—by Judge Phillip L. Sullivan about three weeks later and immediately released under bail of $30,000 pending the decision of the Court of Appeals and ultimately of the Supreme Court. Over objections of the prosecutor, Judge Sullivan granted the defense attorneys' request that their client be permitted to report personally to the Court monthly rather than weekly as heretofore.

Although the arrest of Claude Lightfoot on June 26, 1954, was practically ignored by those who are supposed to keep the public informed, the case has since gained recognition as being vitally important to the Justice Department—as well as to defenders of the Bill of Rights. It should be asked, however: Why did the news agencies fail to ring the clarion, when the historic significance of the arrest of Lightfoot under the membership section of the Smith Act should have been apparent at once? And why was it that the shroud of silence enveloped every effort of the Defense Committee to bring his case to the attention of the public? Supposedly well-informed persons in the Chicago area, not to mention the rest of the nation, were unaware of his imprisonment in Cook County Jail while attempts to secure a reduction of the $30,000 bail went a-begging. Finally, after he spent nearly four months in prison, bail was raised, and on October 1 Lightfoot was released. During the same time, Chicago gangster Roger (The Terrible) Touhy, convicted of kidnapping and jailbreaking was released in the same court house on bail of $10,000. In refusing to reduce bail, Federal Judge Samuel Perry stated, "The government needs to produce very little evidence, if any, in order to establish the defendant is guilty of the charge in the indictment." Though one is prompted to consider this a highly prejudiced statement for a judge to make before any trial has been held, the wording of the indictment is such as to justify the judge's opinion. This is the indictment which was voted by a Grand Jury May 14 and presented in Judge Sullivan's Court June 28:

The May 1954 Grand Jury charges:

Rev. Baird is minister of the Essex Community Church in Chicago.

1. That from on or about July 26, 1945, and continuously thereafter, up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, the Communist Party of the United States has at all times been a society, group, and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit.

2. That from on or about July 26, 1945, and continuously thereafter, up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Northern District of Illinois and elsewhere, Claude Mack Lightfoot, the defendant therein, has been a member of said Communist Party of the United States of America, the defendant well knowing during all of said period that said Communist Party of the United States of America was and is a society, group, and assembly of persons who teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit, and said defendant intending to bring about such overthrow by force and violence as speedily as circumstances would permit.

Thus, as is plainly evident, the formula is foolproof: the Communist Party is guilty; you are a member of the Communist Party; therefore you are guilty. Truly, what more evidence is needed? Claude Lightfoot, a 45-year-old Chicago Negro, is executive secretary of the Communist Party of Illinois; although, except that it made proof of his being a Communist easier, his official position had nothing to do with the case. The fact of membership in that party is all that concerned the prosecution. This Lightfoot had never denied.

During depression years he was a leader among the Negro people of the South Side of Chicago in their struggle for equal rights in a society which had condemned them to second-class citizenship. As a Communist candidate for the State Assembly in the mid-30's, he polled more than 33,000 votes. For the past twenty years he has been an aggressive fighter on every front affecting the lives of his people. His three and a half years in the army during the second World War may have served to increase his determination to fight Jim Crow. It is a tragic fact that for many Negroes the program of integration in the armed services has come as "too little, too late." But that is another matter.
Shortly after sentence was pronounced on February 15, the Illinois Division of the American Civil Liberties Union issued a public statement which read in part:

On recommendation of one of its committees which had carefully read all the evidence introduced by the Government against Lightfoot, the ACLU expresses grave concern because it sees in this prosecution a restriction upon the individual's right of free assembly with other persons just because such persons espoused an unpopular course of action. There was no charge nor was there any proof on the part of the Government of any overt act. There was no charge nor was there any proof that the defendant himself believed in or made preparation for the overthrow of the Government. The proof presented by the Government was that Lightfoot read and disseminated information from certain books which in the opinion of the informants espoused the revolutionary Marxist-Leninist theory, which theory in the opinion of the witnesses, by necessity is to be equated with force and violence.

There can be no doubt any longer that the Lightfoot conviction will be used to march those Communists who have served their prison terms under "the teaching and advocacy" provision of the Smith Act right back into prison under its membership clause. Never mind about "double jeopardy." Judge Sullivan has opined that these are times which "justify an invasion" of the Bill of Rights. Chief Justice Warren is quoted to have said in St. Louis recently, referring to the refusal to permit the Bill of Rights to be posted on a state employees' bulletin board, "It is straws in the wind like this which cause some thoughtful people to ask the question whether ratification of the Bill of Rights could be obtained today if we were faced squarely with the issue." When one considers that the First, Fifth and Eighth Amendments have been impaired in the prosecution of Claude Lightfoot, one realizes how far we have come toward accepting precedents which could be used to destroy our traditional heritage of American democracy. It should not be too difficult to project what can happen if this membership conviction is allowed to stand. First, of course, it can be used against all Communists; then, under the Communist Control Act, come the "communist-front" organizations; then the communist-infiltrated; then those who endorse anything which vaguely resembles "the communist line"; until finally those who do not show the proper enthusiasm for "the new era" will need to be eliminated.

It is especially disturbing to the writer that while Claude Lightfoot was incarcerated, the World Council of Churches was meeting at Evanston where it issued a solemn pronouncement that "Christians should work for the embodiment of the responsible society in political institutions by emphasizing the following: 1) Every person should be protected against arbitrary arrest or other interference with elementary human rights. 2) Every person should have the right to express his religious, moral and political convictions. This is especially important for those who belong to minorities." The churchmen seem to have been aware that this directive was as applicable to Chicago as to Moscow, although the U. S. Attorney, Mr. Robert Tieken, failed to see any reason why a minister of a Christian church should be concerned that Claude Lightfoot be released from jail. As he vehemently expressed it, "I'm a Christian, too, and I don't care if the dirty liar rots out there!"

Thus far attempts on the part of the writer to arouse Christian clergymen to register a protest against the persecution of Lightfoot because of the unpopularity of what he believes have not been marked by any enthusiastic response. For the most part they fail to see that they should be at all concerned in the defense of an "atheistic Communist." Many, in fact, expressed whole-hearted support of any program that would either imprison or deport every Communist in the country. Others thoroughly disapproved of extending to Communists the protection of the Bill of Rights, which in their opinion should be reserved to safeguard the rights of "patriotic" Americans only. There were frequent irate telephone calls from God-fearing ministers to remind the writer that no such rights would ever be extended to him if Communists were in control.

It was useless to attempt any kind of reasoned explanation; nor did it prove helpful to quote the renowned German clergyman, Martin Niemoeller, who was reported in the newspapers to have said at this very time to an audience here in Chicago: "When Hitler jailed the Jews, I wasn't concerned, for I wasn't a Jew; when he jailed the Communists, I said I wasn't a Communist. When Hitler jailed the union leaders, I wasn't a union leader. When he jailed me, I realized it was too late." It would seem that the Protestant clergy of Chicago have very little appreciation of the fundamental tenets of democracy; at least, that is, so far as it would involve them actively in its preservation—or must they wait till it is too late?

Since he is himself a minister, the writer can with some degree of understanding be highly critical of the Protestant ministry for its failure to rally to the defense of the rights of Communists. At the same time it does need to be said that the Protestant clergy have, through the courage of a few, earned enmity of several Congressional committees. As a professional group it could be argued that they have met the test with a higher rating than any other profession. At least those who have been attacked have not been read out of the church even when efforts were made to do so. The record does not appear so unfavorable when compared to that of organized labor—or education—or law. One would think that organized labor should long since have recognized where hunting "reds" would ultimately lead. Yet even the passage of the Communist Control Act has not opened the eyes of labor to the handwriting on the wall. If it fails to remove the blinders soon it will be "too late" for labor as well as for radical churchmen.

The Lightfoot case may offer one last chance to break the chain of reaction that seeks to compel conformity. In a sense it is the weakest link that has yet been forged, because it is such a clear-cut repudiation of long established jurisprudence. His conviction is based solely on guilt by association. He was found to be guilty because he belonged to the Communist Party. Unless this verdict is reversed a new precedent will have been established which may well haunt the nation for decades to come.
British Labor at the Crossroads

London, March 16

When the right wing of the Labor Party announced it would seek to purge the most authentic spokesman of British radicalism, there was immediate, massive support—from the Tory press. While there had been some voices for moderation when a similar plot was hatched against the Tribune editors last November, they are now crying in unison for the guillotine: Bevan must go, his continued presence in the party is bad for the discipline of the party, worse for the morale of the people, the country must know once for all whether it is he or Attlee who leads the Opposition.

The imperialist Daily Express leads the pack with the challenging headline: “Dare they expel Bevan?” Then comes the “liberal” Manchester Guardian: “The [Labor] leadership shows strength in at last gripping the Bevan nettle”; this must not be “spoilt by shilly-shallying and weak compromise”; after the expulsion they “must not let all their energies be absorbed in Bevan-chasing... Better they should resign themselves to losing the election than try to outbid him in his dangerous anti-Americanism and pro-Russianism.” Ditto in the conservative London Times: “The decision... is a desperate but logical measure. Experience has shown anything short of this is ineffectual... The prospect [of Labor Party disunity] also does no good to the nation. Whatever government is in power, British administration and British politics are at their best when there is a healthy, keen, efficient Opposition.”

It is plain as a pikestaff that this is no disinterested advice. The Tories look upon Bevan’s expulsion, and the split or demoralization of the Labor Party, as the golden opportunity for the election they have been so long postponing. They are as frightened as the right wing at the prospect of Bevan gaining a majority in the Labor Party which would make the next government determined to end the Cold War. They are more apprehensive than ever about a continuation of the divided command within the party in which the right wing has formally held the reins of power while Bevan, speaking over their head in the parliament and in the press, has time and again rallied labor’s millions against threatening acts of war.

If the Tories themselves had to decide the timing of the showdown in the Labor Party they could not have picked a better moment. It coincided with the moment they had decided for a general showdown on foreign policy. That was the meaning of Churchill’s speech on the H-Bomb in which, as Bevan said, “the mediocrity of his thinking was concealed by the majesty of his language.” Churchill was writing off the legend that his last act before leaving this world would be to bring peace to its peoples. The man who had made war his life’s vocation was now being true to himself. If he met the Soviet leaders, as he had so often promised, it would be to talk tough and then go out to supper—“the last supper,” Bevan aptly remarked.

The period of Tory equivocation in foreign policy had a come to an end, but this fact was still being hidden by a cloud of Churchillian rhetoric. It remained for Bevan to clear the air. In a powerful speech he laid bare the hypocrisy of rearming Germany when nuclear weapons would decide a future war, the illogic of the “negotiators from strength” who refused to negotiate today although in three years they expected to lose their superiority over the Soviets in these weapons. His major triumph was to have torn from Churchill the admission that his policy was being made in the State Department, that Eisenhower had vetoed his meeting with Malenkov.

The end of the period of Tory equivocation has put the right-wing labor leaders on the spot. From now on, Labor can take the road of an independent foreign policy which, reflecting popular sentiment, can sweep it back into power, or it can capitulate to the H-Bomb maniacs. But so long as Bevan is in the party to proclaim these alternatives, it can no longer hide behind a fig-leaf of diplomatic subtleties.

The determination of the right wing to drum Bevan out of the Labor Party shows the road they have taken. The simultaneous move to “steal Bevan’s thunder” by a motion of censure against the government for not undertaking three-power negotiations is a maneuver to strengthen this decision. Its purpose is to attempt to limit the dispute to Bevan’s “irresponsibility” and thus to confuse the party ranks and divide Bevan’s following. This move is encouraged by the fact that five Bevanites did not join with Bevan and 62 other dissident Labor MPs in breaking with the Shadow Cabinet and voting against the Government’s White Paper.

Ramsay Macdonald’s ghost presided over the right wing’s decision. That famous apostate of British Labor bolted his party in 1931 to become Prime Minister by virtue only of Tory benevolence. Morrison, Gaitskell, Attlee and the trade union bureaucrats behind them will follow this iniquitous path if, at the behest of the Tories,
they throw the radical wing out of the party, thus guaranteeing a Conservative victory at the polls and stripping labor in opposition of all socialist political content.

The cry of discipline is nothing but the hoary pretext of bureaucrats to suppress democracy in the party when, seeking to betray its principles, their power is threatened from the Left. The fact that the Attlee motion of censure (against the government) is being introduced after Bevan’s speech and pointed questions in parliament shows that Bevan reflected party policy more than its official guardians. The fact, furthermore, that the right wing has refused to follow up its own Scarborough resolution to subdivide German re-armament to negotiations for re-unification shows who has been in violation of party decisions. What in essence is being demanded is not discipline to labor’s will, to which Bevan has been most loyal, but discipline to Tory policy which he has violently disrupted.

The decision by the narrow vote of 141 to 112, with ten abstaining, to “withdraw the whip” from Aneurin Bevan, in other words to exclude him from the Parliamentary Labor Party caucus, means that the right wing is clearing the decks to wage civil war in the party. The further announcement by Drakin, head of the Transport and General Workers Union, and Williamson, head of the National and Municipal Workers, that they are increasing their Labor Party representation between them by another 415,000 votes, shows that the right wing machine is getting ready to pack the coming October Labor Party conference to push through the split. But the close vote in the parliamentary caucus, a pale reflection of the enormous popularity and support that Bevan enjoys, means that between now and the conference, a struggle to the bitter end will be waged.

In the very first hours after the announcement of expulsion, the large Birmingham, Manchester and Coventry parties registered their opposition. They are only the beginning of a snowballing movement that would follow any attempt to politically assassinate Bevan. The unions, moving slower than the party branches, are inclining increasingly to the Bevanites.

With tensions at their height and pressures so great, there have been some tremors in parliamentary circles close to Bevan. The outstanding case is that of R. H. Crossman, who rushed into print to warn Bevan not to go too far. Naturally this wavering, along with statements of some other leading Bevan supporters that they would remain in the party if Bevan were expelled, has emboldened the right wing. These will be nothing but fugitive whispers if in the next weeks Bevan sounds a clear, hard call on the trumpet. A strong lead will result in a revolt that will either force the right wing to back down, and thus insure their eventual defeat, or lead to the formation of a new socialist party that will write a new beginning for Western labor.

Flint Locals Send Opposition Delegates to Convention

ELECTION of delegates to the 15th convention of the CIO auto union, scheduled to open in Cleveland on March 27, shows the local Reuther leadership has hit a low in the estimation of the ranks in this area. This has more than merely a local significance, as General Motors members represent a fifth of the total auto-union membership, and Flint locals represent about 60,000 of these members.

Opposition candidates won 24 delegates to the administration’s 3 in the big Buick Local 599, and 17 delegates to the administration’s 3 in Chevrolet Local 659. In the two Fisher Body locals, the opposition took half of the delegates in each case.

Less than a year ago an administrator was put over the Chevrolet local. The International Union leaders did not like the local’s criticism of the contract procedure. Officers of the local were suspended and barred from holding office for a period of up to five years. But since that time the opposition has bounded back.

The Buick local opposition is the most progressive in the city. It fought a clean-cut campaign in spite of the use of race-baiting and red-baiting by administration supporters. Most heartening has been the consistently progressive stand of the Negroes in the local. The election results, in part, constituted punishment meted out to the Reutherites for their refusal to support a Negro board member for City Commissioner in the recent election. The work of such active union men as Nat Turner, John Hightower, Edgar Holt and Floyd McCreer in fighting against all aspects of discrimination, in and outside of the Negro community, has gained widespread recognition.

A number of different factors account for the dissatisfaction of the rank and file mirrored in these election results: general cynicism and lack of faith in the union leadership; indifference and apathy concerning the guaranteed annual wage program, which has not stirred the union ranks here; grumbling about the $25 strike assessments; a general feeling that the unions are not doing all they ought to be doing. As the administration forces conducted a very vigorous campaign with full-page ads in the local press and aggressive use of the union’s daily two-hour radio program for their own campaign, the conclusion is inescapable that the election was no fluke, but accurately represented the workers’ mood of frustration and opposition.

THE UAW has had tough sledding in the past two years, despite its growth to approximately 1½ million members. There have been more strikes lost than in any other period since 1940. In spite of peak production, 35,000 are still looking for work. Automation is hanging over the workers like a black plague.

Reuther advanced the guaranteed annual wage as the most adoptable proposition in a difficult situation. He probably considered it an adroit proposal which would not require a great outlay of money on the part of the corporations, and yet was an opening wedge in a new field of bargaining. At the same time, the union administration has stubbornly resisted any inclusion in the bargaining program of fundamental contract changes, as the union leaders know the corporations would fight tooth and nail over any changes in their prerogatives over ruling the shops. GM, in the past, has frequently granted small wage concessions in return for iron-clad controls over working conditions. That is the cornerstone of the five-year contract now coming to an end.

The opposition forces are too disorganized, and the dissatisfied section of the membership is still too confused in its own thinking, for any clear-cut alternative program to be presented to the coming UAW convention. But these local elections are symptoms of a churning in the ranks, and a reflection of the fact that despite the greater numbers in the unions today, the leaders do not command the respect and authority today that the CIO leaders enjoyed in the thirties when union officials relied upon deeds and achievements and not upon machine control.
Brain-Washing in the United States

On the adjoining page, we print excerpts from an address by one C. B. Hanscom before the American Academy of Forensic Sciences meeting in Los Angeles, February 17, 1955. Hanscom is director of the Department of Protection and Investigation at the University of Minnesota, or, as he is known on the campus, the "head University cop," which is a plainer identification.

Hanscom's speech is a truly appalling account of what he calls "narco interrogation," which means simply an advanced technique for the use of drugs in police questioning. He thought so well of his effort that he had the University of Minnesota news service mimeograph copies of the speech. Attention was drawn to it when a zoology instructor, Joseph G. Gall, wrote a letter of protest to the University daily newspaper. "All of us who naively feel that brain-washing is confined to far distant corners of the world," wrote Mr. Gall, "or to fanciful accounts of the future, should ponder the implications of this talk.

... I seriously question," he concluded, "that Hanscom's scientific activities are in the best interest of the University."

One must ask: Where is America heading that such callous and horrifying techniques of inquisition are being "scientifically" developed without an alarm being sounded? "Narco interrogation" is clearly a police-minded throwback to the most medieval practices of enforced self-incrimination in the guise of "scientific crime detection."

One of the longest-established principles of our form of jurisprudence—and one which would be worth continuing under any juridical system—is that a man may not be compelled to testify against himself. In his recent book, "Fear, the Accuser," Dan Gillmor relates how a printer, William Bradford, brought before an infuriated colonial governor for printing the charter under which the colony was supposed to be governed, when pressed for an answer as to his own "guilt," replied: "Governor, it is an impracticable thing for any man to accuse himself; thou knowest it very well." The governor—yes, even the tyrannical British governor who was flouting the very basic law he ruled by—immediately backed down, replying, "Well, I shall not much press you to it. . . ." How far America has come from that tradition!

All forms of enforced self-incrimination which have long roused nothing but a feeling of revulsion in Americans are today becoming legalized, recognized, regularly practiced. Wiretapping, nullification of the Fifth Amendment, coercion by threats of prison and loss of livelihood and now—narco interrogation.

We will leave to others, better able to judge, the question of the scientific merits or defects of Hanscom's experiments—and we welcome letters from qualified readers on that score. But as to the social and judicial characteristics, there is no question—it is the police mind incarnate. Just as in brutal third-degree techniques, the object is to reduce the victim to a helpless, idiotic mass of putty in the hands of the police. The aim is to smash the "perceptive and integrative personality functions," to distort the "integrative functions," to "confuse the orderly thinking of the suspect" (in Hanscom's own words). It is characteristic of the times, when the governmental apparatus is trying to make of us a nation of informers, that Hanscom finds one of the more important uses of his technique in encouraging people to become informers with the excuse that they were drugged at the time.

Bad as all this is when confined to the routine crime investigation, consider what it means when applied to that class of "crime" which is increasingly coming into being by governmental fiat today, the political offense. Politics, when dragged into the criminal arena, does not involve a specific and easily pinned-down act, but a complex of opinions and shadings of opinions. For the police to take a politically unorthodox person and to render him helpless under drugs, his personality broken up, his judgment and individuality pliable in the hands of trained manipulators, his sense of "guilt" awakened as his scale of values is blacked out by those of his police interrogators—in what way is this different from the "brain-washing" to which our professional patriots point with horror? And can any objective person view American trends today and guarantee that we are far from a very real brain-washing?

Apogetic or easily intimidated persons may excuse the use of such techniques on the ground that "they will make the detection of crime easier." But so would a system of internal passports. Wouldn't it make the work of the police easier if every person were required to register his place of residence with the police, to report to the police immediately upon arriving in another town for a visit, etc.? Or if priests, doctors and lawyers were compelled to reveal things told to them in confessional or in confidence any time the police thought they needed the information? Or if the rack, the bastinado, and the Iron Maiden were standard equipment in every police headquarters? To make the convenience of the police the determining factor in our legal structure, to say that an individual—guilty or innocent (and he is presumed innocent until the state can prove him guilty by objective evidence and not by words extorted from his own mouth)—has no rights which the police are bound to respect, that is the road which leads straight to the police state.
Narco Interrogation

THIS is a PROSPECTUS: an analysis, and an accounting of the methods developed at the University of Minnesota for interrogation of criminal suspects during narcosis. Some of you will accept the challenge we offer, to try our methods, to duplicate, and to improve upon the results we have obtained. My missionary duties will be fulfilled if you only listen to the proposals which follow and recognize the tremendous usefulness this technique has in your criminalological activities. The possibilities and potentialities we are to discuss are so broad and sweeping that just a brief review and summary are possible today.

On the 28th of September, 1948, I began one of the most interesting experiences in more than 25 years in the field of investigation. In essence, a young man, with a long record of arrests and convictions was charged with the brutal murder of a boy and girl he surprised in unusual circumstances on a golf course. The conviction of this man finally depended upon locating the murder rifle. Our polygraph examinations disclosed his guilt, and he reacted to any possible location of the rifle which involved a body of water. We were at a loss to select the correct lake, river or pond into which we could send divers.

In desperation, we turned to the only other method of investigation we had not tried in this case—an interrogation of the suspect while he was influenced by anesthetic drugs. After three or four hours of questioning we had a complete confession of the crime, a description of the location of the gun, and the post-hypnotic suggestion that the suspect actually would lead us to the spot from which he threw the weapon into the pond! As promised, he helped us locate the rifle, and the case was prosecuted successfully.

More than thirty different tests under narcosis have followed this dramatic beginning. They have been concluded to our satisfaction and validated by the facts subsequently disclosed. We have no evidence of a failure in the series! Although this record is unusual, the Minnesota technique is based upon a firm historical background.

The process began as long ago as 1200 B.C. After the early explorations of opium, mandragora, the fumes of hemp, carbon dioxide, and potions of wine, there were few additions until after the Dark Ages. Later the Mexican Indians extracted a crude form of mesaline, called PEYOTL, from the cactus plant. They derived not only religious hallucinations from its use, but also used it as a means of obtaining confessions and social secrets. The priests who served these Indians reported these facts to the Old World in the seventeenth century. Psychiatrists of the twentieth century rediscovered the modifications of personality that mesaline could produce and are now studying its effects on the accessibility of repressed information.

An untold degree of the success achieved by an interrogation team depends upon their thorough knowledge of the confession mechanisms available to the conscious (and thus, the unconscious) suspect. Most of you are aware that the more frequent admissions of guilt come from the criminal's inner desire to compromise with the community. Surely, a little persuasion from friends, relatives, attorneys, and skilled officers helps. Each of these associates helps to soften the emotional conflict of the subject and reduce his fear of punishment. This mechanism is produced easily under narcosis after the perceptive and integrative personality functions are depressed.

Besides this group of delinquents who confess readily, or with little assistance, are informers and malingerers, the psychopaths, and the addicts, who welcome narco-analysis as an excuse to divulge their knowledge without fear of reprimand by their "friends." The knowledge that narco-analysis is available for the solution of cases involving these persons has been of immense value to our local officers.

Narcosis has been used to create, facilitate, or hasten, each of the above confession mechanisms by distorting the integrative functions along several pathways. Early in depression there is a reduction of the perceptive apparatus, which also diminishes the response to emotionally unpleasant stimuli, and produces a stage of heightened anxiety, or well-being, according to the ego efforts. At this drug level, skillful questioning may evoke the discrimination of the subject and obtain sufficient facts to indicate culpability. Later the drugs attack integration directly, further depress the apprehensive ego, and allow the deepest inhibitions to be released painlessly.

Because this multitude of reactions is possible, some evidence of guilt usually escapes even the the most hardened, repetitions offenders who feel no remorse. These men have little knowledge of the successful rules, and they consent to the examination because refusal might indicate complicity, or because they believe they can avoid detection and strengthen their case in court. This challenge has been met time and time again by careful manipulation of the psychological and pharmacological layers—by rapidly fluctuating the questioning and drugs to coincide with the mood—and by patient repetition of this process over and over through all the levels of personality and anesthesia! Application of these theories has helped us develop techniques and methods which extract the maximum from our tests.

The actual narco-analysis is conducted in an operating-room suite. Although it is difficult to avoid the apprehension created by this location, the safety and convenience to the patient and physician are more important. Every effort is made to alter the furniture, etc., to create a better atmosphere. A thorough physical examination and medical history are evaluated by the anesthesiologist—just as he does for routine surgical anesthesia. The suspects seem to derive additional comfort from this precaution too.

Pre-anesthetic medication with intravenous barbiturates, scopolamine, and occasionally morphine, is just as essential for these examinations as it is for surgery. The dosage of scopolamine is increased slightly, but otherwise the quantities required for routine anesthetic premedication are used. Basal narcosis is accomplished with a 1/2 percent concentration of sodium pentothal in the medication, intravenously because of the rapid onset of effect and easy control achieved. The sodium pentothal is gradually injected as we converse with the suspect about anything BUT the crime. As the first stage of anesthesia is passed and the suspect finds it more and more difficult to hear and answer our questions, the conversation is changed to more critical events. At this stage he may repeat the same story he told before anesthesia. With some persuasion, as we described in the theoretical discussion, he may begin his confession. Usually it is first necessary to traverse the whole first and second stages of anesthesia before incriminating information is released. The interrogation is varied, just as anesthesia is deepened and lightened, according to the decisions to attempt an emotional outburst, or to confuse the orderly thinking of the suspect.

Most of our confessions have followed reactions of fear, extreme anger, boasting, love, etc. Once the admission of guilt is begun, we attempt to hold the suspect on the same train of thought, and bring him slowly out of the anesthetic until we have a clear, intelligible record of the entire confession on a tape recorder. Occasionally pyrotoxin, metrazol, benzodine, and thorazine have been used to accentuate certain of the responses. More experience will be necessary with these drugs to outline the precise role they play in the interview.

The post-anesthetic interview offers the team an excellent opportunity to confront the suspect with recordings of his guilty knowledge. When properly presented to him, this surprise often produces an admission of an admissible extra-judicial confession. Reviews of the tape recordings also frequently suggest new avenues for police investigation.

Not all interviews end in confessions, of course. We are quite proud to say that MOST of our suspects were innocent...
India's fight for political independence was successful, but, with the capitalists still in power, progress in social and economic fields has been slight.

India's Economy at a Standstill

by David Edwards and Fred Gross

INDIA'S Prime Minister Nehru was recently quoted as saying that he had "a feeling of staleness" and wished to regain "freshness of thought and outlook." This mood of stagnation appears to extend beyond Nehru to his party.

Where the ruling Indian National Congress used to command the affection and confidence of the overwhelming majority of the Indian people, it is today in effect a minority. It maintains itself in power by increasingly authoritarian methods and manipulation of legalistic weapons. It went so far recently as to prohibit the use of Satyagraha, the Gandhian technique of resistance by mind-power. Nothing, to Indians, could expose more dramatically the insecurity that permeates the ruling party.

The Indian National Congress was formed in 1885 as an instrument by which the Indian capitalists hoped to win greater privileges within the colonial framework. As its influence grew, the tempo of struggle against the British was stepped up, and differentiations began to appear among the leaders. Gandhi ultimately became the most prominent leader of the nationalist movement and succeeded in placing it on a mass basis. He was strongly backed by the country's rising industrialists, notably Birla, India's textile tycoon.
The business interests required such a mass movement as a weapon against the British. In view of the explosive situation obtaining in the country, however, they needed a movement that would not get out of hand. In spite of Gandhi's very important historical role in activating the masses, he consistently (and some claim consciously) confined the nationalist movement within the bounds favored by his conservative backers.

In her valuable book "Halfway to Freedom," Margaret Bourke-White gives a first-hand account of the puzzlement of the incredibly exploited textile workers over Gandhi's close association with Birla. "During my stay in India," she comments, "I never ceased to wonder why Gandhi, who symbolized the simple life for millions, should live at the house of India's richest textile magnate."

To be understood, modern India must be viewed against a background of British imperialism which regarded the sub-continent as a source of raw materials and a market for its own commodities and financial investments. Attempts at native industrialization were actively stifled. Existing handicrafts were destroyed. As a result, the economy is overwhelmingly agricultural, with pronounced feudal characteristics.

The population is undernourished ("scarcity" is often a euphemism for starvation), burdened with staggering debts to landlords, and has a per capita income of barely $60 a year. Life expectancy at birth is about 32 years, as compared with 65-70 for Americans. About 84 percent of India's 370 million inhabitants are illiterate. Agriculture is primitive, fragmentized, and marked by a very low yield. From one acre of land in 1947, the Indian ryot extracted half the wheat, less than half the rice, and a third of the cotton of his American fellow-farmer. It has been estimated that the majority of Indians are more poorly fed now than in 1901.

Although there was some industrialization through the two world wars, it has by no means assumed significant proportions. However, such Indian industry as has developed is highly centralized, modern and monopolistic. There is a greater concentration of economic power than in most European countries, as a matter of fact.

The industrial working class constitutes less than three percent of the population. Much of the labor force is only intermittently employed and has strong ties to the land. Professor R. Mukerjee, a leading Indian authority on his country's working class, describes the situation as follows:

"There is in this country the employment of contract labor to an extent unknown in other lands. The proportion of casual, temporary hands even in the most organized industries is also very much larger than elsewhere. The large turnover, casualness of employment, low industrial efficiency and the presence of a large floating, unskilled labor force form a vicious circle."

A hint as to working conditions can be gleaned from the fact that absenteeism in the Bombay cotton mills reached almost 14 percent in 1948. Prof. Mukerjee estimates that 40 percent of the workers in the Tata Steel and Iron Works, the largest enterprise of its kind in Asia, did not get a living wage in 1951.

*WHEN* the Congress Party assumed political power in 1947, the capitalist class was firmly in the saddle. The basic problem confronting India was to infuse the nationalist victory with an economic content that could materially develop the country and lay the basis for a rapid development of its productivity and standard of living.

The Congress Party has long been identified with welfare-state policies. At the height of the struggle against the British it sharply emphasized the need for comprehensive planning and often went on record in favor of socialism. When political independence was achieved, a number of substantial economic plans had been evolved.

In 1947 the country was still operating under regulations which had been in effect during the war. These could have constituted a solid initial basis for a good deal of planning. In a country which is predominantly agricultural, and whose main products are food grains, cotton, oil-seed and sugar cane, strict controls on precisely these items are indispensable to planning. Far from maintaining these controls, however, the government abolished them in the main. In 1947, food grains, textiles and sugar were decontrolled, with disastrous effects upon the economy. Prices shot up, and the protest was so vigorous that, in 1948, controls were reimposed on food and textiles, but not on sugar. At the same time, the government permitted loopholes by closing its eyes to trade in kapas (seed cotton). The resultant speculation and hoarding proved detrimental to the production of food and introduced widespread anarchy in the economy.

The prevailing food policy had envisaged the transfer of several hundred thousand acres from sugar cane to the raising of food crops. This induced speculation which pushed up the price of sugar. The sugar syndicate created an artificial scarcity, and in spite of a national uproar, succeeded in almost doubling the wholesale price of sugar, and dumped it at lower prices in foreign markets while maintaining peak prices in India. During 1947-51 the index of sugar profits rose from 171 to 420. Here, too, planning collapsed in the face of capitalist profiteering which the government appeared unable or unwilling to curb.

As a result of a serious decline in industrial production during 1946-47, the government called a conference on industrial development toward the end of 1947. The conference adopted a report which placed the blame for the ills of industry on a number of factors, among which figured inadequate transport facilities, shortage of raw materials, and the defective procurement and distribution of these materials. In view of this analysis, one fails to see how the later policies would increase production.

In January 1948, cotton textiles were decontrolled. In March 1948, the first national budget after independence proposed a reduction of taxes on industry. That same year the administration announced a policy of "protection" of private enterprise, in the form of permitting prices and indirect taxes on consumers to increase, and taxes on higher incomes and industry to decrease. These measures strengthened the industrialists and emboldened them in their profiteering. Needed production, not always the source of greatest profits, thus suffered new blows.
Decontrol, moreover, added materially to the difficulties of the transport system, a major cause of declining production according to the conference report. In a 1949 budget speech, the railway minister commented on "the disorganization of traffic which has been caused by the policy of decontrol." Under controls, the government had given top priority on the railroads to essential items. With controls removed, transport of food grains became disordered, seriously disturbing all planning efforts.

Between 1947 and 1950, the perspective of nationalization of industries received severe setbacks, and the wholesale price index rose 400 percent above the 1939 level.

In 1950, the administration announced the first draft of a five-year plan which envisaged "an economic and social order based on equality of opportunity, social justice, the right to work, the right to an adequate wage and a measure of social security for all citizens." Such were the objectives projected in the report of the planning commission headed by Nehru.

The plan was to lay the foundation for the creation of a modern economy. The Congress Party considered the most important step in that direction the achievement of self-sufficiency in food. This is to enable India to devote her income to industrial investment. The final plan aims at the increase of food-grain production by about 2 million tons. The savings thus effected on food imports are to be used to import machinery. The plan also calls for increases in cotton, jute and oil-seed production. This is to be achieved through land reclamation, irrigation works, more abundant and efficient use of fertilizers, and the development of community projects which seek to implement planning on a village level through cooperative and educational methods.

The plan distinguishes between a public and a private sector. The government is to invest $200 million as its share toward the development of industry, while private enterprise is expected to invest $500 million toward the maintenance of existing industrial facilities and their expansion; of this, about half is intended to maintain existing equipment. The total investment is roughly equivalent to an investment of 30 cents per Indian per year for industrial development, and compares with $100-150 per head per year in the United States. The final draft shows a distribution of 17 percent for agriculture, 27 percent for irrigation and power, 24 percent for transport and communication, 16 percent for social services, and only 8.5 percent for industry.

These figures highlight the narrowness of the plan, which has been widely heralded as the answer of "free" Asia to the methods of the new China, whose capital investment is proceeding at a rate about seven times that of the rest of Asia. The United Nations "Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East for 1953" emphasizes this point when it states:

"Even in its final form as published in December 1952, the five-year plan appears rather modest in the scale of expenditure it contemplates, both absolutely and in relation to national income. An outlay of 20 billion rupees [less than $4 billion] over a five-year period represents little more than five percent of national income, which is not much more than the rate of investment prevailing before the plan came into effect."

The plan, if successful, would do no more than restore the standard of living prevailing in 1939, and is not expected to prevent a growing rate of unemployment. Its inadequate scope is summarized in these words by H. W. Singer, a member of the UN Secretariat:

"Even if the plan were completely fulfilled, national income per capita, at the end of the five-year period, would be only five percent higher at most. Even this modest improvement might be completely upset if the plan were even slightly underfulfilled, or if the rate of population increase should speed up during the next five years, or if external circumstances should be somewhat less favorable than is assumed. . . . The distinct possibility emerges that the end of the five-year period, even with the plan largely executed, may still find per capita income in India no higher than it is at present."

Alluding to India's population increase of five million a year, Prof. Mukerjee recently shocked a gathering of prominent Indians by declaring that "the entire five-year plan will be nullified unless each married Indian couple assumes responsibility of bearing not more than three children." This is an unlikely perspective, for a falling birth rate usually parallels an increasing standard of living.

Actually, to use Mr. Sirger's expression, the plan is a "pre-plan," since it "does not yet tackle what is clearly the major Indian development problem, namely, structural change—shifting the emphasis away from primary production and building up industrial and other non-agricultural activities."

This is of crucial importance. A serious plan for the industrialization of India under the present regime requires enormous grants and loans that would have to be underwritten by American sources. Western financial circles, however, are not likely to foster potential competition in a contracting world market, and prefer to pursue the tra-
ditional colonial policy of having underdeveloped countries concentrate on the production of raw materials. This lies at the heart of the relationship between the advanced industrial capitalist economies and the former colonial areas. It constitutes basically a refinement, in the face of political pressures, of the more brutal traditional imperialist methods.

Proponents of the plan—among whom figure prominently numerous American liberals—make much of the claim that savings on food imports will enable the country to introduce machinery from abroad. It should be noted, however, that, midway in the plan, unemployment has assumed drastic proportions and industry has been operating far below capacity. One fails to see what machinery imports would contribute under these circumstances. India shows no evidence of being able to absorb what is produced by existing industries.

The Indian capitalist class prefers to invest its capital where it will realize the greatest profits. The index of profits in jute, for instance, shows a sharp rise from minus 89 in 1949 to 679 in 1951, achieved largely through extensive profiteering in the course of the Korean conflict. Indian capital gets a return of about 20 percent on most "legitimate" investments and as much as 150 percent on black market operations. This helps to account for the fact that the Indian capitalist lacks a long-range investment orientation and the incentive to plow his profits back into indigenous industries. Nor is this course likely to attract foreign investments which require a "responsible" framework of operations. Professor A. K. Das Gupta of Banaras University has pointed out that "despite all the liberal measures taken by India to attract foreign capital the response has been meager. Over a period of 4½ years ending June 1952, foreign capital approved in new projects amounted to only 551.7 million rupees. What is more revealing is that the major part of this investment happens to be 'direct' and in projects in which the majority of shares are held by foreign companies, only about 10 percent being in projects promoted and controlled by Indians." The clamor by Indian sources that they are opposed to investments with "strings attached" is actually often motivated by their concern with maintaining their exorbitant profits.

When agrarian revolts erupted in Hyderabad, the government promptly dispatched troops to restore prevailing feudal relations.

The refusal of the present government to disturb social relations underlies its inability to plan the nation's economy. In spite of all its professions of socialism—usually dispensed during election campaigns—it tends to abandon serious planning wherever it interferes with profits. The peasant has not ceased to bear most of the burden of the economy. The five-year plan has developed into a scheme to lull the Indian people into believing that the Congress Party is heeding their urgent needs. The Indian economist S. R. K. Ras has given a trenchant appraisal of the plan's real character. He writes:

... Very little progress has been made in the economic development of the country. Neither industrial production nor agricultural output has shown any appreciable increase. The balance of payment position of the country has been unfavorable for the last two years. Standard of living in the country shows no increase and the population is increasing rapidly. Rampant unemployment and chronic underemployment are threatening the very foundation of the country's economy. The plan has become a mere verbal juggling at academic levels, a platitudine with political parties, and a happy compromise of interests for the capitalists of the country. The common man is nowhere in the picture....

The government, under the pressure of the masses, knows of the urgent political need for social action. But India's industrialists have stepped up their campaign to bring economic policies even more overtly in line with their interests. As reported in the Hindustan Review for April 1954, a committee appointed by the powerful Reserve Bank of India, and headed by A. D. Shroff of the Tata enterprises, has made the following recommendations:

The Committee considered that a major factor impeding private investment is the variety of additional obligations to compensate labor imposed by legislative measures... The Committee feels that while these measures may from the welfare point of view be good in themselves, their cumulative impact on industries is onerous, and, therefore, it urges that early steps should be taken to remove the confusions and uncertainties in regard to labor legislations....

That this method of dealing with social problems has pervaded the highest levels of the administration was revealed as recently as a year ago. In an unusually blunt speech, Planning Minister Nanda declared that conscription of labor was "not ruled out."

The Indian common man, meanwhile, is beginning to turn his eyes toward his neighbor in the North. For there the very ills that beset the Indian people are in the process of being radically tackled. The impact of the new China can no longer be denied, and the most conservative sections of the Indian press report regularly on the achievements of Asia's great revolution. Numerous Indians find occasion to visit China, and increasingly they return to their countrymen with the message: "We have seen our future, and it works!"

APRIL 1955
Classes In America

by Bert Cochran


THE concepts of a class division of society and a struggle between the classes as a motive force of history are considered as specifically Marxian by capitalist social scientists today, and as such naturally damned and rejected out of hand as a self-evidently outlived 19th Century dogma. As Joseph Schumpeter states in his chapter on “The Problem of Classes,” “The very term class struggle, let alone the idea behind it, has fallen into discredit among the best minds in science and politics alike.” Actually Marx pointed out on many occasions that neither he nor Engels were the discoverers of either the existence of classes in society, or of the struggle between them furnishing the fuel for the fires of history. The great thinkers of bourgeois enlightenment, writing when capitalism was a great emancipating system and not a scourge threatening the very existence of humanity, have the credit for that. Before Marx, they had perceived these relationships at the foundation of society, and with this theory, had opened a window on the past history of peoples. What had been an unintelligible jumble of chronicles, myths, and romances was for the first time transformed into a coherent, systematic and rational explanation of man’s past.

Marx and Engels never systematically set down their theory of social classes. Their ideas can be found scattered through various of their writings dealing with other matters. The editors of this volume attempt to remedy this lack by gathering together in one short essay a number of the pertinent quotations. Their effort is commendable. Unfortunately, they are incapable of understanding what Marx is talking about. College sociology has become so stultified and formalistic that it is simply beyond our two professional sociologists to follow a dynamic mode of thought.

FOR Marx, a class is formed and derives its social position from its role in the social organization of production. Every individual belongs to this or that class by virtue of his place in the productive and social process, irrespective of his own opinions on the subject. But, as with all his concepts, Marx viewed classes, including the modern working class, in motion: He was interested in its origins, its development, and its future. In “Poverty of Philosophy,” Marx states:

The first attempts of the workers to associate among themselves always take place in the form of unions.

Large-scale industry concentrates in one place a crowd of people unknown to one another. Competition divides their interests. But the maintenance of wages, this common interest which they have against the boss, unites them in a common thought of resistance—unionization. Thus unionism always has a double aim, that of stopping the competition among themselves, in order to bring about a general competition with the capitalists. If the first aim of the general resistance was merely the maintenance of wages, unions, at first isolated, constitute themselves into groups as the capitalists in their turn unite with the idea of repression, and in face of always-united capital, the maintenance of the union becomes more necessary to them than that of wages. This is so true that the English economists are amazed to see the workers sacrifice a good part of their wages in favor of unions, which in the eyes of the economists, are established solely in favor of wages. In this struggle—a veritable civil war—are united and developed all the elements necessary for the coming battle. Once it has reached this point, unionism takes on a political character.

Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The domination of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In this struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases, this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests.

Whether one agrees or not, Marx’s thought seems perfectly clear. The working class is formed and exists through the organization of the social process. It is an objective fact regardless of anyone’s understanding, or how various individuals picture to themselves their class position. But for a class to understand its own interests and engage in political battles in its own interests, it needs class consciousness. This consciousness is attained however in the course of its inevitable experiences and conflicts with the employing class.

But our authors simply cannot grasp Marx’s distinction between objective class position and class consciousness, or follow his mode of thinking. They juggle a few more quotations to arrive at the incomprehensible conclusion that "It will be apparent from the preceding discussion that Marx did not simply identify a social class with the fact that a large group of people occupied the same objective position in the economic structure of a society . . . Subjective awareness of class inter-
ests was in his view an indispensable element in the development of a social class.” That this obfuscation derives not from personal obtuseness but from the social function of college sociology is driven home to the reader as he buckles on his armor and proceeds to fight his way through the sixty-odd essays of different authors that comprise theorizing, and all integrated viewpoints, became suspect now. Sociology was chopped up into little compartments: the family, population growth, juvenile delinquency, etc., and the colleges began turning out like sausages monographs on a thousand-and-one unrelated subjects. “In this more ‘exact’ and ‘scientific’ treatment of social phenomena, the problems of class were largely neglected,” writes Charles H. Page in his study on American sociology. The researchers operated on the basis of an eclectic jumble of half-baked “multiple-factors” explanations for all phenomena, or simply limited themselves to an empirical gathering together of statistical data. They no longer aspired to be soaring eagles, but contented themselves with being burrowing moles and hired specialists.

With the social convulsions of the New Deal and the rise of the CIO, our sociologists felt constrained to rediscover the existence of classes in our society. Using the sampling-poll techniques and other new devices that have become popular in the past years, they set out with their sets of questionnaires and IBM machines to chart the social stratification which they could no longer ignore. Several highly valuable studies were written, notably the Lynds’ survey of “Middletown,” and a little later, those of C. Wright Mills on the middle class and the white collar workers. It is not accidental that both these scholars were considerably influenced by Marxist thought. But the main trend is not with them, but with the so-called Warner approach.

W. LLOYD WARNER and a number of associates made elaborate studies of the class structure of three communities, a New England town of 17,000 (Yankee City), a Southern city of 10,000 (Old City), and a mid-Western city of 6,000 (Prairie City), in order to establish the social organization of the typical American community. While it was undoubtedly simpler for the researchers to gather data in small towns, these can hardly serve as examples of the typical American community of present days. Then Warner employed a purely subjective concept of class—determined by what class a person thinks he’s in and what others in town think about it in terms of prestige status (a favorite hobby horse of our college sociologists). After a lot of complicated weighing of indices and sub-indices, and totalling of the weighted ratings, Warner comes up with the earth-shaking division of the community into the following classes: upper-upper, lower-upper, upper-middle, lower-middle, upper-lower, and lower-lower. (Others have discovered 9, 11 and 16 “status-classes.”) Warner insists: “The social levels are not categories invented by social scientists to help explain what they have to say; they are groups recognized by the people of the community...” and that this same pattern of organization exists throughout the country.

Warner’s studies have become the basis for a host of derivative works. For example, Alison Davis and his collaborators have focused on child-rearing practices of middle and lower-class parents. The tenor of the studies and conclusions can be gauged by the following quotations from Davis:

Almost all the good things in American life... are the achievements of middle-status persons: care of and pride in property, careful child-training with emphasis upon renunciation and sacrifice for future gains, long and arduous education, development of complex and demanding skills, working and learning one’s way up in the complex processes of business, industry, government, church, and education—all of them administered... by the upper-middle class in the American status system... In order to make low-status children anxious to work hard, study hard, save their money and accept stricter sex mores, our society must convince them of the reality of the rewards at the end of the anxiety-laden climb.

Warner’s theories have been shot full of holes by a number of critics. C. Wright Mills and others demonstrated that his definition of class is a hopeless muddle, that the analyses of relations in a small town do not furnish a sufficient field for generalization, that even here the class structure is described through the eyes of upper-class residents, that his study is tendless, and an elaborate rationalization for the status-quo. (In “Social Class in America,” Warner writes: “It is the hope of the author that this book will provide a corrective instrument which will per-
mit men and women better to evaluate their social situations and thereby better adapt themselves to social reality and fit their dreams and aspirations to what is possible.)

NEVERTHELESS, we learn that “Warner’s studies have been accorded widespread acclaim and his concepts and methods have been adopted by a large number of investigators.” And in the wake of Warner and the researchers come the slick salesmen of the status-quo like David Riesman. He asks the question, “Who Has the Power?” in the United States, and answers: No one has the power, or if you prefer, everyone has the power.

“In the amorphous power structure created by veto groups it is hard to distinguish rulers from the ruled, those to be aided from those to be opposed, those on your side from those on the other side.”

Such is the new wisdom coming out of the colleges, the research teams, the educational foundations. It is pathetically evident that their supercilious scorn for Marxism derives not from superior knowledge or methods that they have discovered, but from their clinging to the established capitalist society, where the center of power is only too clearly evident, and where its retribution is swift and certain upon all transgressors against its vested interests.

This is not to say that the world has stood still since Marx’s time, and that American society can be understood in all its complexities and tendencies by simply referring to Marx’s classical works. Marx did not know about many recent manifestations of capitalism, and it is possible to analyze more precisely, or more correctly, all sorts of things on the basis of greater knowledge and experience that we possess today. But all writing in sociology and related fields, if it is to be scientific, has to rest on the methods and contributions of Marx, just as all progress in biology perforce rests on Darwin and his epochal theory of evolution.

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BOOK REVIEW

The Peasant Road to Power


THIS book, a product of the Center for International Studies at M.I.T., is another of the “how-to-do-it” books that are being ground out in such numbers by the various foreign policy study centers. It advises the State Department and instructs the reader in the tactical intricacies of reaction and counter-revolution. Gone are the days when the professors made their claim to superiority to the Marxists on grounds of “non-partisanship” and “objectivity.” We are all partisans now.

The factual material it contains is of value, and does not appear unreliable in the main. But the analyses, in most cases, add little to our previous understanding of what happened in China. Communism is treated almost exclusively as a “power conspiracy,” and the feeble efforts made to connect it with the previous development of China are nothing but a sophist’s tangle of superficial analogies with events of many centuries past.

Modern Chinese history opens with the Taiping Rebellion, which began in 1848 and continued until its final failure a decade and a half later. The Manchus were not overthrown until a half-century afterward, in the Revolution of 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen’s National People’s Party (Kuomin-tang). But that revolution, and the regimes which held power as a result of it for the next 38 years, did not accomplish any of the substantial changes required; did not succeed in unifying China and creating a strong national state, did not drive out imperialism, did not reform land ownership or modernize agriculture, did not begin the process of industrialization. The basic elements of Chinese existence—in which the nation was the torn and bleeding victim of imperialist exploitation, the regime was corrupt and the conditions of life deteriorated—remained as before. This fact was the seed of the Chinese Revolution of 1947-49, and of the present People’s Republic of China. The entire proposition can be summed up in a few words: The capitalists had a chance to modernize China and couldn’t do it because their ties with imperialism and landlordism were too close; that is why the Communists got their chance.

ROSTOW grapples, as so many have, with the question of the peasant orientation of the Communist Party in its drive for power. Of course, the small size of the Chinese working class and the vast ocean of Chinese peasantry would appear to dictate a considerable attention to the rural areas on the part of a revolutionary movement in any such country. And yet this in itself does not appear to be a full explanation of the extremely minor role of the workers in the turnover. In other similar countries, such as Russia during its revolutionary upheaval, and India, North Africa, Guatemala, Bolivia, Iran, etc., during the present period, the nationalist and revolutionary movements are spearheaded by the city working classes which, while they cannot provide the all-national mass base, provide at least the shock troops and leaders. But this did not happen in China, and the explanation of this difference has not been provided in most literature on the subject.

It appears to this reviewer that the effects of the defeats of 1927 upon the city workers are not sufficiently taken into account. For the first decade after its foundation in 1918, Chinese Marxism made its inroads in the normal and to-be-expected channels: among the university students and industrial workers. Its influence was thus largely urban, its mass base was proletarian. After 1923, Chinese Communism, with Russian diplomatic help, was sufficiently powerful to negotiate a bloc with the Kuomin-tang Central China regime. It aided Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition, and led the insurrection which captured Shanghai from within—a working-class rebellion—and turned it over to Chiang. But the Chinese Communist Party, in one of the most tragic and decisive strategic miscalculations of socialist history, trusted Chiang Kai-shek—partly as a result of very bad advice from Comintern headquarters—and was totally unprepared when Chiang turned treacherously upon the Communist and labor movements.

In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek’s troops let loose a frightful butchery of the Shanghai workers who had just turned the city over to him. The coup was repeated in other industrial cities, and the cream of
the working-class leadership, together with many of the ablest Communist workers' leaders and tens of thousands of rank-and-file workers, lost their lives. The unions were completely smashed, the Communists driven underground or into the countryside, and the entire movement virtually wiped out. With this decisive turn of events, Chinese Communism ceased to be a major force in the cities and among the workers.

MAO TSE-TUNG managed to work out a new perspective, a perspective which, in effect, bowed to the accomplished fact. On the basis of a peasant orientation he re-created a Communist movement of a military-peasant type, with which he was able to surround and inundate the cities, while the workers remained largely passive. Meanwhile, the various leaders of the Communist Party who attempted to recoup the losses of 1927 in the cities by a frontal attack upon the problem failed badly, and Mao eventually came to the nationwide leadership of Chinese Communism in January 1935, after seven years of comparative experience between his line and that of the old people's leaders. Mao's line may not have been orthodox, but it was called forth by an "orthodox" situation in which Chinese Communism had suffered a massive defeat. And it did work. But, to this day, as the industrialization program is pushed in the cities where the main reliance must be upon a working-class movement, the Chinese Communists continue to feel the effects of the defeat of 1927, and of their special road to power.

The most informative portions of Rostow's book come at the end, in a section on the Chinese economy. In his discussion, Rostow pays unconscious tribute to the new economic structure by discussing his problems and prospects entirely in terms of technical and political factors. At no time does the question of unemployment, crisis, depression due to the malfunctioning of the economy enter the picture, as it does immediately when a capitalist economy is discussed.

The chief problem of the economy, in Rostow's view, lies in agriculture. That the industrialization plans can succeed, that 1952 industrial production will be more than tripled by 1962, and that gross national product will rise significantly—all this he does not doubt. But he doubts the regime's capacity to raise agricultural output sufficiently to meet the test of the coming years.

The problem is posed something like this: Elementary methods of hygiene and control over disease and plague will cut the death rate sharply, as in the Soviet Union during the Twenties, so that the population will rise more rapidly. At the same time, industrialization will increase the urban population and thus the food demands of the cities. The existing problem exists—and it certainly not insuperable given the cultivation of new areas and the use of chemical fertilizer—cannot be denied. However, what Rostow overlooks in his rancorous pages is that these are problems of progress. How different from the problems of the old China!

ON the other side, the authors take note of the fact that Chinese Communism has learned from the experience of Soviet forced collectivization during the Thirties. Collectivization is the definite goal of the regime, but at a more gradual pace. First come mutual-aid teams, at least one member of each of which is a Communist cadre. In 1953, half of the peasant households had been organized in such teams. The mutual-aid teams, through experience and education, lead to cooperatives. It is planned to have 20 percent of all peasant households organized into cooperatives by 1957. In 1953, the regime initiated compulsory grain deliveries from the peasants of the East European type. In those latter countries, there has been considerable difficulty associated with these collections; it remains to be seen how they will work out in China.

It is interesting to note, from Rostow's own figures, the disparity between U.S. and Chinese military budgets. In 1952, Washington spent $46.9 billion on military outlays, and Peiping spent $2.1 billion. This was while China was holding the U.S. in a military stalemate in Korea! Even on a relative basis, the U.S. doesn't show up too well: China spent in that year some seven percent of its gross national product on the military, while the U.S. spent 14 percent, or just double. Needless to say, Rostow does not make these comparisons.

H. B.

Ex-Communist Confessional


THIS is a sad book of a once splendid woman who lived bravely, and then had her spirit broken, and began to regret her whole past life.

In 1921 when she was seventeen, Bella Visono entered Hunter College, and was soon caught up in the intellectual turmoil of the Twenties. She was elected president of the Student Council in her senior year, and in 1925 graduated with honors. She began teaching first in the high schools and then at Hunter, and by all accounts was excellent at her work. She recalls: "I loved my students, all of them, the dull, the weak, the strong, the conceiving, the twisted. I loved them because they were young and alive, because they were in the process of becoming and had not yet been frozen into a mold by a cynical society or by a conserving power."

While teaching she attended New York University law school, and in 1930 began to serve a law clerkship at a nominal salary. By 1932, Mrs. Bella Dodd, now a married woman, returned to teach at Hunter, as the depression had wiped out her father's business, and her husband was also in financial trouble. Then, as so many thousands of others, she got caught up in the radical sweep of that period, and became a communist. For many years she was the leading spirit of the New York teachers' organization, and its legislative representative. In 1944, she was elected to the party's National Committee, and served for a time, as its state legislative representative. She is well remembered by thousands in New York for her once passionate devotion to the cause of the common people.

AFTER Browder's fall from power in 1945, Bella Dodd became very disgruntled and friction developed between her and the party leadership. The book tends to confirm previous impressions that she was not too clear about the political issues involved, but she had been outraged and disillusioned with the sycophancy and carreeristic spirit that the Communist Party leaders betrayed in the whole affair, and her faith had been deeply shaken.

By the latter months of 1947, while little dissident groups were forming as an aftermath of Browder's expulsion, Bella Dodd became increasingly inactive, and tried to immerse herself in her law work. The Communist Party leaders didn't simply drop her from membership and let it go at that. They had to expel her with a great fanfare of accusations that she was anti-Negro, anti-Semitic, etc. This policy of calculated brutality has boomeranged more than once against its authors.

Mrs. Dodd, cut off from all friends and associates, in troubled mind, finally flung herself on the bosom of Mother Church, fell into the clutches of the Vatican hierarchy, and became a tool of the witch-hunt machine. This book is a description of the author's evolution written from her present position.

D. A.

A Classic Study


THIS book was first published in Italy in 1905 and has been accepted for many years as an authoritative study of the French Revolution. It is translated into English for the first time from a new revised text which seeks to incorporate a lot of new information brought to light on the subject in the last half-century by scholars and investigators.

Salvemini, professor of history at the University of Florence and emeritus professor at Harvard, a member of the Italian parliament from 1919 to 1921, and an active opponent of the Fascist regime in his twenty years abroad, belongs to that distinguished, although almost extinct, school of bourgeois liberal scholarship which absorbed many of the basic propositions of Marxism, and tried to integrate its historical materialism with its own outlook and earlier training.

This study of the classic capitalist revolution is excellent. With broad, incisive strokes are drawn the social and economic causes
of the revolutionary outburst, the character, makeup and role of the leading class forces—the feudal nobility, the monarchy, the church, the capitalists, the peasantry, the sans-culottes—when caught in the whirlpool, and the new social and political order which issued out of these tempestuous events. Salveanni's middle-class outlook is too ingrained for him to appraise justly a revolutionary figure like Robespierre, but he cannot pretend to understand the indispensable role of the mass in the unfolding panorama of the events.

He writes: "As each new struggle began, some who had been revolutionaries hitherto refused to go beyond the positions already won and became the conservatives of the day; while others went on to swell the ranks of rebels and newcomers, only to become the conservatives of tomorrow. Through this constant process of attack and defence, of enthusiasm and reluctance, the French people, in the end, found that, almost unawares, they had brought about a real republic and a genuine democracy. The greater part of this radical destruction was the work of the people. The workers thought—of the two Assemblies, but of the mob, which was swayed by the deputies' will only in so far as the latter accorded with its own destructive fury... The revolution was born carrying within it the seeds of another conflict far greater than that just brought to a close. . . . Gracius Bubeuf, who was the first to organize a revolutionary movement against the privilege of private ownership, was to leave his head upon the guillotine. . . . As the feudal classes had already been in their last throes before the Revolution, and the revolutionaries had only to register their death, the working classes found in the new economic, social and political order that succeeded the old regime, the requisite conditions for their own rise and organizations, and for their growing power. Babeuf's ideas were not to perish with him."

B. C.

CAN a similar "double revolution" take place again in some of the backward countries of the world still dominated by feudalistic landlordism? The Russian experience of 1917 and the Chinese of 1949 pretty clearly demonstrate that the "double revolution" nowadays can only occur by a convergence of the aims of the peasantry in the countryside with that of the new commons of the cities, the working class. This aspect of the matter is naturally outside the scope of Salveanni's work, but as a historian, he is well aware that the creation of modern capitalism did not end the class struggle, but ushered in a new one. The book closes on this significant note:

"The new regime was born carrying within it the seeds of another conflict far greater than that just brought to a close. . . . Gracius Bubeuf, who was the first to organize a revolutionary movement against the privilege of private ownership, was to leave his head upon the guillotine. . . . As the feudal classes had already been in their last throes before the Revolution, and the revolutionaries had only to register their death, the working classes found in the new economic, social and political order that succeeded the old regime, the requisite conditions for their own rise and organizations, and for their growing power. Babeuf's ideas were not to perish with him."

B. C.

WHAT made the French revolution the capitalist revolution par excellence was the clean-cut extirpation of all feudal institutions and power, and the reorganization of agriculture along capitalist lines. In this, the French bourgeoisie distinguished itself by its alliance with the peasantry against the feudal classes, in contrast to the conduct of the capitalist classes on all our present day who ally themselves with the landowners against the peasantry. But this alliance was forced through by uncontrollable events, rather than having been planned, or organized, or consciously accepted by the French capitalists or their political spokesmen.

The National Assembly of 1791 was dominated by the rich bourgeoisie and tried to share power with the old monarchy, which rested on the upper circles of the clergy and the army. It abolished some of the most odious laws oppressing the peasantry, but sought to maintain many of the features of feudalism. Salveanni explains: "Many contradictory and mutilated laws, of advantage only to the property-owning classes who formed a majority in the Assembly, were passed... But the peasants, unable to follow distinctions and exceptions set forth by legal experts, cared nothing for the Assembly's decrees... They accepted the one article declaring the feudal regime entirely suppressed, and refused to obey the rest... When National Guards were sent to check their destructive fury, they repulsed them by force of arms."

Every law passed by the Assembly with the aim of breaking down their stubborn resistance was without effect: the havoc they wrought, or such restraint as they showed, being the outcome, not of the Assembly's decisions but simply of their own needs, desires and passions. It was not, therefore, one revolution only but two independent revolutions: in the towns the aim of the commons was to deprive the privileged classes of their political power; and in the countryside, to root out every vestige of feudalism and to win personal freedom and full ownership of the land. The two revolutions at times became merged together, but were often in conflict; not seldom each disavowed the other, but in reality they gave one another mutual support... By taking place together and with converging aims, the two revolutions assailed the privileged orders and the Government from every side, bewildering and overwhelming them with a flood of revolutionary action impossible to stem."

F OR this act of martyrdom, Connally pointed out, Roosevelt sent him one of the pens with which he signed the lend-lease law. Miraculously, to Connally and all the Senators who crossed the fateful line with him survived the vote.

As much as Connally appears even in his own self-portrait as an anarchistic Southern blow-hard, the fact is that this Claghrorn complete with flowing white mane was a powerful figure in American political and governmental affairs. His reign as chairman of the Senate committee on foreign affairs was very real, and as an important figure in the Democratic party, his weight was strongly felt in determining its policies. Thoroughly reactionary in his social views, he and the forces he represented provided the decisive counterweight to the pressure of the labor movement on the Democratic Party. Today his continuators in the South look fearfully at the North where the CIO-AFL merger threatens even heavier political power for the labor forces. A biography of Connally is a worthy project to record an important period in American political history. But this one is written by the wrong man. His biography should be written by someone who is not so impressed by the clarion notes of his oratory.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

"In the Shadow Of the Blackjack"

That was an excellent article on the West Coast maritime picture ["In the Shadow of the Blackjack," by Al Burton, March 1955]; the best documented I have seen, on the level. Arranges things chronologically, very much needed picture for the younger members. It's the Johnny-come-latelies, those who entered this industry in the war forties, who provide the bureaucrats with their unquestioning following. I enclose a subscription for a buddy and a donation.

J. T. Seattle

I have gone over your maritime article thoroughly and can't see where a thing could have been added. You have done a delightful job. I have been a member of the Green Slate in the firemen's union from its inception. I shall forward a contribution so that you may continue your good work.

S. M. Seattle

Two Views on China

Bert Cochran, in "The Alternatives for Asia" [American Socialist, December 1954, p. 20], says: "Mind you, I do not say this in order to kid anybody that the New China is a political democracy. No one-party regime can be!"

This statement seems to me to be quite unnecessary in the, up to this point, very fine and factual article on China. At least, it sounds a bit like capitalistic propaganda. The idea that no one-party regime can be a political democracy does not make sense to me. There are many questions that arise in my mind in connection with this statement of Mr. Cochran's. What is a political democracy? Certainly not the right to vote for candidates who have been put on the ballot by machine politics, or in some other way, by a minority ruling class. If not one party, then how many parties in a democracy? Is the number limited? What makes a political party? If by some magic the spoils system were taken out of politics in this country, what would happen? Would we all become either Democrats or Republicans?

I am thinking that the Democrats and the Republicans are really only one party and that the people of this party have only chosen sides to play the game and keep any other party from participating. If socialism were to come to power, would Mr. Cochran insist on an opposing party so that we might have a political democracy?

R. W. Tennessee

Bert Cochran will write more fully about the entire problem in a coming issue.

I question your policy towards the People's Republic of China—and I think many others should question it.

H. W. Boston

You bluntly say (that's one good characteristic of the American Socialist—you're frank) that we should give critical support to said country because of its anti-capitalist revolution. Many non-supporters of China approved of the "anti-capitalist" aspect of the worker's and peasants' revolt, so that alone is no reason for "support."

Did a democratic, free socialist government arise? No. The present government is not democratic, the people are not free, they do not control the government. You do recognize the undemocratic features of the "communist" state in China. You do recognize the very real party dictators, but you do not oppose the present "communist" government. In your December 1954 issue, reporting Mr. Cochran's speech, you printed that political advancement brought by state control of the means of production—that the makings of democracy lie somewhere in the present dictatorship. I disagree.

Of course this is only the foreign policy; I approve of some of your domestic policies—I'll write of those another time.

V. A. C. Chicago

Peronism in Argentina

Your article on colonialism ["What the Colonial People Want," by Harry Braverman, March 1955] was surly that it answered some problems I couldn't figure out clearly, as regards Peron's role in Argentina, where I lived for one year. I knew he was no 100 percent spokesman for landlord reaction, nor a "fascist" in the Marxist sense, as claimed by some, and I thought he would break with some elements of the church, as he later did, but I couldn't understand what class he did represent.

Your article was a masterpiece of clarification, showing as it did the role of politicians like Peron who represent various elements of native capitalists, landlords, with obeisance (generally) to foreign capitalists and lip service to workers and peasants. And the article showed why.

I don't know if this article was a set of original ideas, but I have never seen, either in Lenin's Imperialism or in later works of this sort, any such analysis, and it seems to me to represent, if this is original, a higher development of Marxist thought, and, as such, should be intensively studied by leading Marxists everywhere. It may be that these ideas have been put forth and explained in other places, but if so, I am not familiar with these writings.

The entire March issue was good. I enjoyed the good editorial on the unions, too.

H. O. Kansas

From the time I received the first copy of the American Socialist, I have appreciated your . . . broad outlook. I think when true appraisals of issues or individuals are given for the benefit of your readers, you have then helped him or her understand what to do or what to expect. I liked your clarity on the Formosa crisis in the March issue, and many other articles that I have read in previous issues . . .

But I will say that if many more people in Youngstown would buy and read the American Socialist, I believe more thinking and action could be made possible by those in and out of the trade union movement.

I am happy to know that my thinking measures up very close with many articles in the American Socialist, and I am being informed on many things that I knew nothing about. I will try some time later to give you an appraisal of some special articles that you have handled in a way that I like very much. I shall check them and tell you what I like about them.

P. T. Youngstown, Ohio

Political Control Inadequate

I am renewing my subscription to your very interesting publication for another year. I feel that your magazine is doing a fine job in laying bare the contradictions and inadequacies of contemporary capital-ist society. I find the American Socialist an excellent source of reference in supplementing my scholastic activities . . .

In criticizing the American Socialist, I might say that I feel it has been inadequate in offering an unambiguous program for the reconstruction of society in the transition to socialism. Mere political control without a corresponding degree of economic control—as has taken place in the various socialist experiments in the western European democracies—has proven to be woefully insufficient in consolidating the social power of the working class. Thus far, I have yet to discover in the pages of the American Socialist a suitable program for the economic organization of the American workers whereby, in the event political power could be democratically won by the working class, a corresponding establishment of economic power could be realized so as to preclude the miscarriages so prevalent among hitherto attempted socialist experiments. In my opinion the democratic control of the industries by the workers is the foremost tenet of legitimate socialism . . .

R. N. Sacramento, Cal.

Worthy of Consideration

Your publication is the only one besides Monthly Review on the Left (and Stone's weekly) that I feel is worthy of consideration. . . . I have been an MR subscriber since '49, and have looked with a jaundiced eye on other left-wing publications which seem to be concentrating on splintering splinters and red-baiting. I am glad to add your magazine to my reading list which has become all too small.

H. O. Kansas

APRIL 1955
What You Can Do

This is addressed to supporters of the AMERICAN SOCIALIST, both old and new (we know we have quite a few new ones by the growth of our subscription list and from the letters we receive): Are you doing all you can to help build a stronger Left by helping this magazine? If you are not sure just what you can do, here is a recapitulation of suggestions we have made in past issues which bring important results.

- Show this magazine to your friends and get their subscriptions to it. This is the most important single aid to a stable and continuous growth.
- Send us lists of people to whom we should mail sample copies. If possible, select a few of the best of these and present them with gift introductory subscriptions.
- Check newsstands in your area to see if they carry the AMERICAN SOCIALIST, especially those stands which carry other radical and liberal publications. In recent months, we have secured several new outlets, in Los Angeles, Sacramento, Philadelphia, etc., and these stands have sold a remarkably high proportion of their initial bundles.
- Consider whether you can write an article on a local topic, particularly a labor topic, or on something in which you are especially interested. In recent months, we have received quite a few unsolicited manuscripts; a number have been publishable, all have shown the marks of serious work.
- Send us a contribution, as small or as large as circumstances dictate, to help us continue our work without financial obstruction.
- Renew your own subscription before it expires, thus lightening the load of office work.

NEW YORK READERS

MAY DAY PROGRAM: American Socialist celebration will feature entertainment, a speech by Michael Bartell, and refreshments, dancing.

Date: Saturday, April 30, at 8:30 p.m.; Place: 863 Broadway (near 17th Street); Donation: 75c.

Be sure to attend; be sure to bring a friend.

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