A Physicist Writes On:
Albert Einstein—Scientist, Philosopher, Socialist

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War or Peace?

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- The Next Ten Years

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AMERICAN SOCIALIST
Soviet Peace Offensive

THE action-packed month from mid-April to mid-May has opened up a new stage in the international situation. For almost a decade, the cold war has developed as an increasingly frenzied pressure-battle between the two sides, mainly in the form of bitter conflicts at the perimeters of the two spheres of power. At no time in this period have the central issues of the struggle been subjected to serious bargaining; but that is what we may be headed for now. This means that in the coming months—and probably years—the world and the separate forces within it will have a chance to re-examine the fundamentals of the cold war and where it is heading.

From the Bandung conference of Asian-African states to the arrangements for a “meeting at the summit,” the diplomatic duel has developed apace. The catalyst in the reaction was the completion of the first step in the Washington-London campaign to reconstitute a German Wehrmacht. The Soviet Union, forced to bring out further cards in its peace offensive, played them with a flourish! An Austrian state treaty, a plan for withdrawal of occupation troops by both sides from both zones of Germany, a comprehensive disarmament scheme which went far toward removing all the objections which the West has raised to previous Russian plans, a top-level conference the offer of which came only ostensibly from the West as everyone knows it is the long-standing Soviet offer, and finally, the announcement that Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan were packing their grips and briefcases for a trip to see Marshal Tito in Belgrade.

All the news from Bandung with which the lively month started was not—despite their every effort to put the best face they could on the matter—very good for the imperialist powers. The barrage of speeches which several smaller puppet regimes laid down, undoubtedly by pre-arrangement with their imperialist mentors, did not obscure the essential significance of the meeting. It was demonstrated at Bandung that half the world has awakened to a new status after being subjugated for centuries. The states represented there varied from one end of the social spectrum to the other; from Communist China, which has smashed imperialist rule and is committed to a new social system, to Thailand and the Philippines, which still cringe in the grasp of imperialism and would like to draw the rest of Asia back in. And so the main conference declarations were of a vague and largely meaningless character. But the significance of the conference was not in what it decided; it was in the fact of its having been held.

Chou En-lai came to the conference from Peiping with two main objects: to allay the fears of neighboring states which have recently won political independence, such as Burma and Indonesia—to assure them that China would not interfere in their internal affairs; and to gain the greatest possible sympathy for China in the Formosa Straits. Both objectives were apparently achieved. The guarantees which Chou gave of non-interference in the rest of Asia, the agreements on the role of the overseas Chinese, all of these backed by his conciliatory air at the conference went far towards achieving the first aim. And Chou’s closing offer to negotiate with the U.S. over the Formosa crisis, without prejudicing China’s right to throw the Chiang Kai-shek capitalist-feudal leftovers from the Chinese civil war off that island, achieved much of his second objective.
For the headline writers, the anti-communist speeches made by a number of the vassal powers at Bandung were good material, but the more serious analysts who really wanted to know the meaning of what happened there came up with a somewhat different picture. Business Week for April 23rd wrote:

... Bandung has great historic significance. It's the first time the Asians and Africans have attempted to create a forum in which they can shape their own future... If the West can't do a better job than it has done so far of joining forces with Asia's genuine nationalist movements, then Bandung might go down in history as the occasion when Communism took over the mid-Twentieth Century revolution in Asia.

The most tangible results thus far of West German sovereignty and the stepped-up Soviet peace offensive are the Austrian state treaty and the military alliance of the East European nations with Russia under a single military command.

The Austrian draft treaty was virtually completed in 1949. But the Russians obviously feared to withdraw their troops to their own boundaries lest all of Europe outside of its own immediate spheres of influence be organized again into an anti-Soviet bloc. With the Anglo-Americans now driving ahead to remilitarize Germany, the post-Stalin ruling group has decided to gamble on a tactic of building up a huge neutralized zone between itself and the NATO military bloc.

There are some who have said that Russia is not really worried by the prospect of West German rearmament, but the facts belie that notion. It is true that the balance of industrial and military power has shifted in Europe, and Germany can never be the kind of threat to Russia that it was in two previous wars. Nevertheless, allied with America and Britain, it can dangerously tip the balance of strength to the other side. The Russians are therefore pushing hard to prevent the emergence of a new re-Nazified Wehrmacht. At the same time, the setting up of a unified military command in the East is a clear warning of their determination to counter threat with threat, and military force with military force.

In the midst of the jockeying with states and treaties, the Russians threw several resolutions into the United Nations hopper—a real diplomatic bombshell. Besides the proposal for withdrawal of occupation troops by all the powers from both zones of Germany, a comprehensive disarmament plan was presented. The Russians abandoned their insistence on a reduction of armies by a fixed percentage, and accepted instead a proposal which had originated with the West: top limits on the size of the armies of all the big powers. So far as inspection in each country to see to it that the provisions for banning atomic weapons are carried out, the Soviets proposed that international commissions have inspection posts at the key spots in each country in the first stage, as well as access to all budget data, and in the second period, when the banning of atomic weapons becomes effective, that a staff of inspectors "within the bounds of the control functions they exercise, would have unhindered access at any time to all objects of control." This latter provision has been all but ignored by the U.S. press.

Washington officialdom has already begun to sniff at the disarmament scheme, and its objections are worth examining, not because disarmament itself appears as a realistic prospect, but because the diplomatic duel over it has been very revealing. First, it is claimed that the provision for freezing all arms at the level of Dec. 31, 1954, is objectionable, because it would prevent German rearmament. Then, Washington has expressed disapproval of the proposal to dismantle "all foreign military, naval and air bases on the territory of other states." Washington is apparently ready to sign a "disarmament" pact which would limit Russian arms, but would make generous and thoughtful provision for a rearmed West Germany and for American bomber and warship bases in an iron ring all around the USSR.

Among the most sensational of the new developments is the announcement of a trip by the Soviet heads of state to Yugoslavia. Almost like Henry IV of the Middle Ages who traveled to Canossa and stood barefoot in the snow three days outside the Pope's castle, Khrushchev and Bulganin go to Belgrade virtually in the role of penitents.

The original split between Tito and Stalin arose from Yugoslav resistance to being reduced to the satellite status of other Eastern European countries. When Stalin tried to smash the Titoists, they broke away and gave vent to their accumulated bitterness, going back to the period of the partisan revolution during World War II when Stalin showed a lack of confidence in their revolution and urged them repeatedly to come to agreement with the pro-fascist Cheniks and the Yugoslav monarchist government-in-exile. After the break with Russia, Yugoslavia proved too weak and its leadership too disoriented to play any kind of an independent role, and Tito's policy evolved rightward, making some concessions to the capitalist West, and depending in part on a military alliance with Greece and Turkey.

With Stalin's death, a persistent effort was begun by the new Russian leaders to bring Tito back into their camp. Relations have been normalized, embassies re-established, and, when Molotov was so indiscreet as to attribute this to Tito seeing the error of his ways—a proposition which naturally angered the Yugoslavs—Moscow virtually repudiated the faux pas by printing Tito's rejoinder in full in its press. Now comes this latest development, which has the Western powers sitting at the edge of their chairs. The Rus-
sians are clearly intent upon re-establishing close friendly relations with Yugoslavia, and enlisting Tito’s support for the setting up of a neutralized sector in central Europe.

Finally, the arrangements are going ahead for a top-level meeting of the chief powers. The circumstances of its coming into being are those which we have come to expect from Washington. Dulles and Eisenhower are being dragged “slowly and reluctantly,” in the words of the N.Y. Times correspondent in Paris, to the conference table. “In short,” wrote the political analyst of the Times, James Reston, on May 11, “the long-delayed and highly controversial meeting at the summit is being arranged at last, but a lot of persons in Washington are still in the dumps about it.” Wall Street suffered its to-be-expected break in stock prices, led by oils, aircrafts and rails. The summary impression which American capitalism has given the world is that of a ruling class forced against its will to contemplate a slackening of the cold war.

What can come out of the top-level talks? Are we really coming to a turning point in the cold war? Will co-existence become the order of the day?

In an interview with U.S. News and World Report last December 24, Senator Knowland, the leader of the preventive-war crowd in Congress, speculated on what could come out of a meeting of the Big Four. He very realistically estimated that the chief Soviet demand would be “that we recognize the existing frontiers of the Republic of China be recognized as the legitimate government in that area of the world. Naturally the very thought of being asked to pay such a “price” for a relaxation of tension threw him into a towering rage. While Dulles and Senator George differ with Knowland on many policy questions, they also favor the “liberation” of the peoples in the Soviet bloc—in other words, the eventual restoration of capitalism in these countries.

What about the other side? The Austrians who went to Moscow to negotiate their state treaty report that Khrushchev told them the Soviet Union wasn’t going to stand by and watch allies peeled away “leaf by leaf, like an artichoke.” Kingsley Martin, editor of the British leftist periodical New Statesman and Nation, just returned from China, relates in the May 14 Nation the universal reply he got from everyone there he spoke to when he tried to convince them to accept a gradualistic compromise over their territory of Formosa. The U.S., he was told emphatically, is out to reconquer China and re-establish capitalist world domination. “Any concession, any compromise with imperialism such as you suggest would be fatal,” he quotes them as saying.

We thus arrive at the basic proposition that the cold war can be ended only if Wall Street gives up its insane plan to re-establish capitalism in those lands where it has been destroyed since 1917. A settlement over Germany would be a sign of such a reconciliation to the facts of life by America’s capitalists; so would a complete settlement over Formosa in which Washington would give up maintaining the Chiang government-in-exile and recognize the new China. But we are very far from such settlements, and the arrangements for a top-level conference haven’t altered that fact.

So long as the U.S. insists upon its present role in the Far East, we will continue to teeter on the edge of war. The Chinese government cannot possibly agree—no sovereign government can agree—to the mighty fleets and air armadas that roam up and down her coastline at will, sent there by a government which has repeatedly declared its intention of overthrowing the present Soviet world” and that the People’s Chinese regime and which keeps a substitute government in reserve under its protection a hundred miles off the coast. And in Europe, the United States and England continue to push full steam ahead to place a Germany armed to the hilt on the Soviet’s doorstep.

In short, the underlying causes that brought on the cold war and have kept it going this past decade, are still very much in operation. American capitalism, which used to be rather unconcerned about politics in the rest of the world, has become very deeply imbued with its counter-revolutionary world “mission,” and it is not ready to reconcile itself to the new reality of the twentieth century.

What has changed in the past year is the growing mass pressures in the West against the provocative war moves. Washington’s allies have consequently had to become increasingly insistent that Dulles go slow and not involve them in military adventures which their peoples would not support. The Kremlin’s bold diplomacy of recent months has augmented this campaign for peace, and has forced the American government to pull in its horns. This mass pressure is a potent force and can work to ameliorate the war tensions, and produce partial, secondary agreements even if an overall settlement is not effected right away.

In the meanwhile, one of the most encouraging signs here at home has been the rising opposition to new Korea. It showed itself first over Indochina and again, even more explosively, over Quemoy and Matsu. For the first time in a long while, differences over foreign policy are beginning to show up, in part the result of the floundering and debates in the ruling class itself. But these differences, so long as they remain in the unformed state in which they now exist, can never serve as a real guarantee that our country will not slip into war. For that, a strong and independent anti-war movement is required to liberate us from uncertain dependence upon the Morses and the Georges, to raise a shout that we will not hold still like insects for our extermination, and to turn the tide in America from dictatorship and war to freedom and peace.
The Next Ten Years

by Bert Cochran

WHAT is going to happen in the next ten years? What will the world look like in 1965? Before taking the plunge into the unknown, let us review some of the important changes of the recent past. The past is not always a sure indicator of the future, but it provides clues: a conscientious study discloses some of the long-term trends. One can make out the main lines of historical development through the myriad, unceasing movements of peoples, and establish laws governing the sphere of social relations.

I do not need to dwell very long on the miracles of scientific progress and achievement in the past fifty years. These are being trumpeted and heralded unendingly by our public figures and Rotarian after-dinner speakers. They have become part of today’s consciousness, and their importance is fully appreciated by present-day humanity, and if anything, over-appreciated and viewed too one-sidedly and uncritically by most Americans. The genius of man has flowered above all in the sphere of natural and applied science.

Albert Einstein wrote his first paper on relativity at the turn of the century. Forty years later, the power encased in the atom was unlocked on the testing grounds at Alamagordo, New Mexico, and humanity entered the atomic age. The contours of the atomic revolution are still too indistinct to project a firm picture of what is to come. We can only vaguely glean some of the potentialities of this dread secret forced from the hitherto sealed lips of nature. But unless this knowledge shall prove too overwhelming for the mind of man to encompass, so that it unhinges his reason and becomes the tomb of civilization—and I cannot bring myself to believe that—we know enough right now to declare with assurance that the atomic revolution will pale the achievements of the past, and will thrust humanity forward in its material progress with a speed that will beggar comparison with anything that has preceded.

Poets have written of the existence of a golden age in the dim past. This was just poetic license and an effort to escape from an unsatisfactory present. There never was such an age in antiquity. Man’s ascent from the jungle has been painful and slow, and his history since the dawn of civilization is written in agony, in perfidy and in violence. But a golden age has become a realistic possibility. The means are now at hand to abolish poverty, to eliminate want, to escape from drudgery, to alleviate the struggle between man and man for the good things of life by providing abundance for all. Will we be able to enter the shining porals by employing the same power of reason and thought that is brought to bear in the laboratory and the research establishment on behalf of the social organization of humanity?

Heretofore, the social evolution of man has proceeded just as blindly as the natural evolution of species. The law of one was natural selection. The law of the other was class struggle. The element of conscious organization and planning was not much greater in the social sphere than in the natural. Capitalism, the system under which we are living in this country, and which still dominates the greater portion of the globe, came into the world as an emancipatory, revolutionary system, breaking down the old hampering restrictions and sweeping clean the Augean stables of feudal particularism and pollution. Its flaming banners proclaimed a new liberty, equality and fraternity.

In a number of passages in the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels go into a veritable paean of praise for the historic accomplishments of capitalism in its progressive heyday. “The bourgeoisie,” states the Manifesto, “during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than
have all preceding generations together.” But the system exhausted its progressive mission and went into historic decline when the major imperialist powers opened up the epoch of world wars of mutual annihilation. The glories of scientific achievement, the magnificent new tools and machines, the conquest of hitherto mysterious natural forces—all turned into a Frankenstein monster, which proceeded more efficiently and mercilessly than any ancient barbarian horde to put millions to the sword, and the monuments of centuries of civilization and enterprise to the flame.

Despite the tons of editorials and the mountains of learned essays and books tearing to shreds the views of Karl Marx, the capitalist system cracked up in Russia in 1917, in Yugoslavia in the course of the second World War, and in China in 1950. All these countries proceeded to abolish capitalism and start new planned economies in accordance with Marx’s forecasts. Marx’s uncanny projection of the next stages of social development has been demonstrated as a work of genius, of a magnitude equaled by few in man’s history.

But, alas, historical developments did not follow Marx’s theory precisely. Life proved more complex, more multi-colored than the book. Marx thought the workers would first take over in the most advanced countries of Europe and build on the considerable cultural heritage of capitalism. That is the way the latter system came into being. The capitalist revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries occurred in England and France, which at the time were the most advanced countries in the world. The capitalist system was thereby enabled to display its superiority over feudalism almost at once—in military prowess against its enemies, and in capturing the imagination and loyalty of the peoples because of its economic and cultural pre-eminence. By contrast, the modern revolution introduced socialism as a practical alternative to capitalism under a grievous handicap. The turnover took place in the most primitive country of Europe. Russia had to start building socialism on Asian backwardness. And today China has to build on an even more barren foundation.

Socialism has unfortunately been presented, at least in its first manifestations, as a system not of abundance but of scarcity, as a system not of increased leisure and comfort, but of unusual sacrifice and back-breaking toil. Moreover, encircled by hostile capitalist powers dedicated to its destruction, boycotted, blockaded and reviled, Russia had to start industrializing by a forced march at the expense of the peoples’ living standards, and by using force and dictatorial pressures on often apathetic and sullen masses. For over three decades Russian socialism has therefore appeared as a system which offered not greater political democracy and a wider freedom, but conspicuously less freedom than exists in the most advanced capitalist countries. The socialist experiment could not have started under less auspicious circumstances or taken root in less promising soil.

The first crude automobile was probably slower and less efficient than the horse-drawn carriage. But its potential was vastly superior. Similarly, Russian socialism, building on the heritage of Asian backwardness, and forced to repair the devastation of two world wars, has in a quarter of a century by means of its superior social engine hoisted itself from the depths to emerge as the second industrial power in the world. History draws no comparable achievement! Its economy is still considerably behind the United States. But its planned system has already revealed its superior potential. Can you imagine the magnetic pull on the world’s peoples when socialism wins out in one of the Western countries and can demonstrate its economic and political superiority in absolute terms?

History accepted Marx’s basic prescription, so to speak. But it played a nasty trick on him and the rest of us. Instead of starting the new system, as the doctor had indicated, in France and Germany, then spreading it in rapid order to the other advanced European countries, and then pulling the backward and colonial nations into its orbit, it went to work from the wrong end. The capitalist chain first broke in its weakest links, and these proved to be the backward, not the most advanced countries.

In Western Europe the workers are organized today into powerful parties of their own, socialist or communist, or both. But they are held back from taking over by narrow-minded opportunist thinking and leadership, or disillusionment bred from past defeats, or lack of independence from Russian diplomacy, or fear of upsetting the applecart and precipitating a new war, or a combination of all these reasons. In the United States, labor is truly a sleeping giant. The workers still listen to the propaganda of the Chambers of Commerce. They know they eat and live better than the Russians, or anybody else, for that matter, and that’s been good enough up to the present to hold them as camp followers of the capitalists.

But the American plutocrats are wiser than the workers. At least, they have a far better-developed class sense. They have a foreboding that the existing state of affairs and relationships is transient. They see the threat to their way of life in the new system that is building up in the Soviet bloc. They can mouth for public consumption a lot of blather about the glories of “free enterprise.” But they don’t seem to have too much confidence that they can win out in peaceful competition as a long-term proposition. That is why Mr. Moneybags in America is in a state of high fever and demanding in stentorian tones that “something must be done.”

This crowd of panic business men has turned the world into two armed camps and is bracing itself for a fight to destroy the new system which it fears. The second half of the twentieth century has thus opened with two immense phalanxes facing each other panoplied in full battle array. This is a lineup for Armageddon that neither Marx nor anyone else foresaw. How will the world extricate itself from this impasse?

The first question that calls for an answer is: Will there be a third world war? If the answer is yes, we can stop right here, as this obviates any necessity for weighty analyses of further matters. Let us begin our inquiry by asking: Who is threatening a new war? Both sides point the accusing finger at each other as being the aggressor. Which side is lying? Or are both lying? Or are
both telling the truth—about each other? The facts absolve the Kremlin people of responsibility for planning or threatening war. The blame has to be placed on the shoulders of imperialism, led in the main by the Washington-Wall Street axis. Don’t let us forget that there was a world war in 1914 before anyone ever heard of the Soviet hobbgoblins. Don’t let us forget that the second World War erupted without any provocation on the Soviet side, and without its initial participation. We have had in other words two shattering world wars brought on by the rivalries and conflicting ambitions of the leading imperialist powers. Now Washington is trying to construct a united imperialist front to wipe out an anti-capitalist bloc of states. That seems to me to be the root cause of the present war tension.

We are told that Russia is imperialist too, that it expanded into Eastern Europe and the Far East. Its expansion at the end of this last war is an indubitable fact. But if we don’t permit ourselves to get mesmerized by the cold-war propaganda, we can discern that Russia simply took advantage of the exceptional set of circumstances that obtained at the end of the war to build up spheres of influence both in Eastern Europe and the Far East. The almost four decades of Soviet history both before and after the second World War demonstrate that the basic impulse and dynamic of the Russian system is for internal development, not toward expansion, and certainly not in hunting for military adventures abroad. We may certainly take issue with some of the policies and acts of the Russian heads on the eve of the second World War, but the evidence is conclusive that their motivation was to try to stay out of the bloody mess. We see the same impulse at work today in the Soviet maneuvers to neutralize Germany and create a vast zone between itself and the NATO capitalist bloc. Now, this would certainly be a foolish and self-defeating course if the Soviets were planning to send their armies marching across the continent to the Channel. Whatever the Soviet leaders may be guilty of, war aggression is not one of their crimes. The drive for war comes from the other side.

Next, let us look into this matter whether nuclear warfare is as destructive as some have represented it. Are hydrogen bombs, as Krishna Menon of India stated, “suicide for the nations who used them, genocide for those against whom they were used, and infanticide for posterity”?

I will begin by quoting a man who on this subject knows whereof he speaks, General MacArthur, one of America’s foremost militarists, a man who has never been accused of either pacifism or secret pro-Soviet proclivities. I believe that even Attorney General Brownell would unqualifiedly agree that MacArthur is definitely no security risk. In a speech delivered in Los Angeles on January 26th under the sponsorship of the American Legion, MacArthur said:

War has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. No longer is it the weapon of adventure whereby a short cut to international power and wealth—a place in the sun—can be gained. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess the chance of the winner of a duel—it contains rather the germs of double suicide. Science has clearly outmoded it as a feasible arbiter.

On March 21st, General Grunenther, who replaced Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, let us in on this additional bit of cheery news in a speech delivered before the Advertising Council:

We have an overwhelming air retaliatory capacity in the event that war should break out today. Thus, to make the most pessimistic assumption, namely that the Soviets might be successful in over-running a part or all of Europe now, the Soviets would still be defeated because of our great air capability. Please note that I do not say that we would “win.” I recognize all too well that if a world war should break out now, there would be no such thing as a “winner.” But definitely the Soviets would be defeated.

That’s certainly consoling! We’re going to be blasted to Kingdom Come, but we’ll drag the Russians in with us. How nonsensical can you get? This is the stuff of the raving of madmen, of the jabbering of fools.

The next lurid account was printed in the N. Y. Times of March 25th based on a UP dispatch from Washington: “The government withheld a report on the deadly results of hydrogen bomb radiation for nearly three months for fear it would ‘adversely affect certain international situations.’” So testified Chairman Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commission before a Congressional sub-committee. After months of alarums and warnings by scientists all over the world, the AEC report was finally made public on February 15th, which confirmed how one H-bomb exploded in the Far East spewed deadly radioactive fallout over a 7,000-square-mile area.

On March 16th, Professor Linus Pauling, Nobel Prize chemist of the California Institute of Technology, warned that radiation from the atomic tests was polluting the earth’s atmosphere so that it could endanger life and lead to an increase in the birth of abnormal babies. A few days later, on March 21st, Professor Frederick Soddy, Nobel Laureate physicist, stated in an interview in London that the hydrogen bomb explosions “are fouling the air with radioactivity. . . . It is nonsense to say it is harmless.” He declared that these radioactive gases might devastate the natural resources of the countryside and bring economic chaos and ruin. “Politicians and technicians are rushing into experiments without the faintest idea of what the results might be.”

Five damage suits have been filed against the Federal government by shepemen of Cedar City, Utah, charging that their animals sickened and died as a consequence of the fallout from the 1955 tests. The Atomic Energy Commission disclosed that it had received 571 claims for medical and hospital expenses resulting from injuries caused by radioactive fallout from atomic tests in Nevada since the beginning of the tests in 1951, and has paid almost 400 of these claims.

But these warnings of the scientists and these damage suits are about the bomb tests. What happens when the real shooting starts? An ordinary-sized H-bomb would
know for sure, because time and again we seem to approach the rim of the abyss, but I think we can. For the time being, the common ownership of this dread weapon acts as a deterrent. Fear of nuclear retaliation is holding back the rulers, and has produced a deadlock in the international struggle. Out of this stalemate arises the possibility of the two blocs coming to a new practical agreement, a *modus vivendi*, co-existence. We have had a number of little wars since 1945, and the war of nerves goes on without respite. I am afraid that this generation will see more of these little sectional wars, and that the diplomacy of blackmail and threat will continue for the decade ahead. I am also aware that fear of retaliation is not an absolute deterrent. Decaying social classes sometimes get irrational. But the organized anti-war movement is growing abroad, and if we reinforce it from here, and make it harder for public figures to rattle the atom bomb, it can well be that this present unique, unprecedented combination of circumstances will save humanity the harrowing ordeal of a nuclear world war. I am trying to make a sober estimation of the situation. I hope I am making no mistake.

**WILL** this stalemate between the two power blocs freeze the *status quo* everywhere—in other words, will the present line-ups endure intact? And a corollary proposition, will the masses in Western Europe and the United States continue to see socialism exclusively in the grim and dictatorial visage of the present Russian and allied states?

Experience since the end of World War II has answered the first part of the question. The overhanging war clouds may have affected up to a point the workers in Western Europe, but the struggle against ancient wrongs continues to blaze brightly in the colonial world. Chinese Communism swept that country clean. The IndoChinese cleared the French out of half their country. Civil war continues in Malaya. And even Africa is stirring from its century of enslavement and degradation. Imperialism is wounded from the blows dealt it by the colonial freedom movement in Asia. But that continent, trying to lift itself by the bootstraps from centuries of backwardness and decay, cannot give socialism its more advanced imprint along the lines originally conceived by its founders. Neither Chinese Communism, nor Russian, can be the trail blazer of democracy and abundance of the present-day revolution. That will have to come from the West, with its advanced economies, its trained labor movements, its democratic background. Have we reason to expect the socialist struggle to revive in Western Europe in the next period?

G. D. H. Cole, the old British socialist historian, has written recently a provocative article appearing in the *Nation*, where he complains that the old internationalist spirit that animated the socialist movement when he joined it as a young man seems to have got lost. Socialism, he says, "has renounced its old ambition of world revolution and has shrunk into a number of separate national movements" for the furtherance of minor welfare reforms within capitalism; while communism has turned into a totalitarian tyranny in the states that it dominates. Cole tries to find a solution for this very real dilemma.
by proposing the organization of a small intellectual elite international society which could hold itself aloof from the mass parties and do their thinking for them, because he, for one, doesn't think the masses can think, anyway. I doubt that Cole's idea is a very happy one. In certain periods and under certain conditions, socialist educators can profoundly influence the thinking and direction of a movement, but never by standing aloof from the existing organizations in a posture of snobbery or superiority; only connected with them, and basing their thinking, in every case, upon the actual dynamics of the workers' movement.

There actually has been a remarkable revival of the workers' movement this past year in England and Germany. Both these movements are controlled by right-wing socialists who want to convert them into pressure groups operating within capitalism, but left wings have sprung up in both parties and are contesting with the old-line leaders. On the other hand, the strong communist movements in Italy and France lack independence from Russian tutelage and they're very short on internal democracy. But the Italian CP has also felt the tremors of rank-and-file opposition. If the next decade witnesses massive upheavals in these four countries, there is bound to come a political regrouping signifying the rise of a revived militant socialism prepared to tackle the tasks of this second half of the twentieth century. Bevanism is a small forecast of the new socialism that will reappear and renew the battle with the old, still-unevanquished institutions and antagonists challenged by Marx a century ago.

Who can doubt that Western Europe will pass through these struggles? The huge armaments programs do not ensure elimination of the boom-and-bust cycles, but transpose them into a lowering of living standards and the frittering away of the substance of the nation's wealth. The imperialists' attempt to hang on to their empires will become a drain on the workers' living standards instead of a source of higher wages. At a certain point, the economic crisis will inevitably merge with a political crisis.

How about the U.S.A.? Are we foredoomed to be represented forever by Republicans and Democrats? Is our current golf-playing Harding to be succeeded by a McCarthyized Coolidge to be followed by a Brownell-model Hoover? It was the unprecedented 10-year economic boom that accounted for the sweep of conservatism and Babbitry, and generated complacency in the face of McCarthyism. It will be, first of all, the whiff of economic insecurity that will reverse the process. And economic troubles are now building up.

The similarity in the present trends to those of the 1920's is being more widely recognized every day. With a sizable and growing unused industrial capacity typified by the automobile industry's ability to manufacture 9 million cars annually as against its best recent output of about 6½ million, retail prices continue to stay high due to monopolistic control; corporation profits remain abnormally high for the same reason, and personal consumption has continued to rise, propped up by installment buying and mounting accumulation of consumer debt and mortgages. The parallel with 1929 is absolutely deadly. But there is one big difference: government spending, which in 1953 was 46 times greater in dollars than in 1929, accounting in that year for a sixth of the gross national product. The federal government spent $1.3 billion in 1929 and $60 billion in 1953, and of this figure $52 billion went under the heading of "national security."

You don't have to be a financial wizard to figure out that without this big chunk of government spending, we would be heading for depression right now. But this type of "built-in stabilizer" is not something new. Hjalmar Schacht, Adolf Hitler's banker, knew all about it, and administered this same kind of medicine to a sick German capitalism back in the thirties. They even had a big road-building program, too. But you're in bad shape when you have to depend on "shots" of dope all the time, and increasing doses of those. Even at the height of government spending, sizable unemployment reappeared in 1953 and has persisted since then, enormous dislocations showed up in certain industries, and falling prices and mounting surpluses became the rule in agriculture, the main non-monopoly branch of the economy. In other words, dry rot is eating away at the foundations. The danger ahead is not "creeping socialism," but "creeping depression."

I am not going to speculate on whether the capitalists have grown smarter in the last quarter century, and whether they will throw out some concessions when up against trouble. I am sure they will. Even crusty old Henry Ford had enough flexibility to sign a contract with the union when he found he couldn't operate his plant at River Rouge without doing so. I am going to concern myself with how labor will react to the growing economic difficulties. I believe that we will see for a while greater strike movements in an attempt by workers.
to reverse the trend and safeguard their economic status. This will bring heightened social awareness and alertness, and sharper clashes and mounting resentment against the political forces which pretend to represent the people, but are in reality the watchdogs of the special interests. Before many more national elections pass, I think we will see a split from top to bottom in this unnatural monstrosity which calls itself the Democratic Party, and the resultant political re-alignment will produce the long overdue labor party, roughly similar to what they have in Britain.

The Democratic Party is based on an unnatural alliance and an archaic system of control. Here is a party whose most powerful contingent is organized labor. With the ADA liberals and professional elements, this sector accounts for probably over 85 percent of the party support in the North, which in 1948 elected Truman even after the Dixiecrat secession. Yet the Southern Bourbons run the congressional machinery of this party to suit themselves, and on the most important matters, either dictate the Democratic policies, or team up with the Republicans to defeat the Northern Democrats.

The Southern Bourbons are not only arch-reactionaries and racists, but organizationally disloyal to the party and openly contemptuous of its majority decisions. They only maintain the right to dictate to the party. The truth is they don't want a Democratic presidential victory, as the present situation gives them greater power both in the party and in the Congress. There was a kind of two-party system in this country in the heyday of the New Deal, but the two-party system is a hoax today. The Southern oligarchy is in the saddle and has blocked the operation of even the mildest milk-and-water ADA variety of opposition to Eisenhower. The Democrats don't deserve to elect a dogcatcher on the basis of the opposition they have furnished to the Republican administration.

This conspiracy is so blatant that even a Truman, who, as an old-time Pendergast-trained politician, likes to see his candidates get into office, felt impelled to lash out against the oligarchy. "I have got tired a long time ago of some mealy-mouthed Senators who kiss Ike on both cheeks." William White, the N.Y. Times correspondent, added: "Mr. Truman did not name these Senators. The implication seemed inescapable, however, that he was far from satisfied with the restrained partisan activity of the present Democratic leadership of the Senate headed by Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas."

And yet this scandalous situation continues, and the Southern oligarchy remains in the drivers' seat, because the weak-kneed Northern liberals continue kowtowing and capitulating to the stiff-necked Walter Georges and Lyndon Johnsons, and the labor leaders continue chasing after the liberals.

Of course, I read recently the report of a speech made by the president of the CIO that a labor party is all right for Europe, but has no place in this country, because we have no rigid class lines here. Whom has Reuther been talking with recently? Hasn't he read, or been told, about the writings of Robert Lynd, or the studies of C. Wright Mills on the middle class? Why, even conservative sociologists and investigators have become so impressed with the stratification of this society that they have stopped talking about opportunity and are concentrating on trying to reconcile the "lower classes" to their lot, lest people strive for the impossible.

I direct Reuther's attention to the recent testimony of Theodore K. Quinn, former Vice-President of the General Electric Corporation, who testified before a congressional committee that the small independent business man was "going the way of the American Indian." Quinn stated: "As few as 200 industrial giants own outright the most important half of all American industry and are transforming the organization of our society into a kind of American feudalism." Reuther's blooper may rank in the days to come alongside of Hoover's famous aphorism that "prosperity is just around the corner."

The misalliance labelled the Democratic Party is not called forth by special social needs of the country. It is strictly a product of "cultural lag." What is holding the party together and bending labor to its coat-tails is not absence of rigid class lines, or renewed opportunity to rise into the middle classes, but the inertia of a working class, born of the complacency that enjoyment of the highest standard of living in the world produced. Begin threatening that—and this whole edifice will start to totter. Subject this party to social tensions, and it will split apart at the seams.

In Britain, the Labor Party was formed at the turn of the century, and another four decades elapsed before a Bevanite left-wing movement arose within it. Is it therefore implied that a labor party will appear in the United States somewhere along 1965, and that a left wing will come up around the year 2000? Such a timetable would ignore the differences in the two periods of world history. The British party organized at a time when the poet Browning wrote that "God's in his heaven, and all's right with the world." We are living in an age of the destruction of the colonial system and the rise of anti-capitalist states. The fat cats of the American plutocracy who preside over an enclave of comparative stability and plenty in an ocean of turbulence and poverty are nevertheless rocked daily by the eruptions abroad, and have thrown up a garrison state to ward off the dangers crowding in on them. For good or for evil, events are enormously speeded up nowadays, and important changes loom ahead in our lifetime.

At the 1935 AFL convention in Atlantic City, John L. Lewis and his associates told the assembled hierarchs that if they, the conservative, safe-and-sound labor leaders, did not organize the workers of the mass-production industries, the radicals would. A similar threat will bring a labor party into being. And because that is the only way a labor party will be born, it will necessarily be accompanied with the mushrooming of radical left-wing formations both inside and outside the labor party itself. It is in this context that I view a labor party organization as the prelude for a rebirth of a mass socialist movement.

That is the perspective ahead of us, as I see it. In the meantime, as we pass through the valley of the shadow of death, what is necessary is to keep our vision undimmed, our courage high, and our resolve unbending.
In Einstein, the scientific community has lost its most eminent member; philosophy a thinker of rare keenness; socialism a good friend; and mankind the model of itself a thousand years hence.

Albert Einstein: Scientist, Philosopher, Socialist

by Hans Freistadt

A GREAT scientist is one who significantly changes our picture of the universe, from a traditional and no longer adequate view, to a new outlook, in terms of new concepts, which provide a better approximation to the truth than was possible heretofore. It does not matter whether he himself is concerned with the applications of his discoveries, or whether, as is more common, his chief motivation is knowledge for its own sake. A better understanding of nature invariably leads to applications which, under proper social conditions, benefit mankind.

When Albert Einstein died on April 18, 1955, hardly a single fundamental concept of physics had not been altered under the impact of his contributions. Besides Einstein, only Newton and Maxwell so completely overhauled physical theory, each tying together, by a prodigious display of insight, a loose and haphazard structure into a systematic theoretical framework.

Einstein was born in Ulm, Germany, on March 14, 1879, educated in Munich, Milan, and at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. He became a patent examiner at the Swiss Patent Office in Berne, a post he held for over seven years, until he became a professor at the University of Zurich. His most famous papers, dealing with the special theory of relativity and with the photoelectric effect, were published in 1905, while he was at the Patent Office. He subsequently held professorships in Prague, again in Zurich, and in Berlin, where he lived during the

first World War. Berlin was nominally his home until 1933, although from 1921 on he did a great deal of traveling. He came to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton in 1933.

EINSTEIN is best known, and rightly so, for his special theory of relativity (1905). The developments of nuclear energy (so far, alas, primarily for military purposes) have made his discovery of the equivalence of mass and energy common knowledge (E=mc²). This consequence of the special theory of relativity marked a radical departure from the traditional point of view, according to which matter was indestructible, while energy was stuff of an entirely different nature. The recognition of the equivalence of these two concepts (matter and energy) paved the way to an understanding of the basic energy sources of the universe and of nuclear reactions.

Another revolutionary aspect of the special theory of relativity, less well known to the general public than the equivalence of matter and energy, is the blending of the concepts of space and time. Prior to Einstein, it was generally believed that the question “Did two events happen at the same time?” has an unambiguous answer. Likewise, space, in the Newtonian model, has an absolute character. These Newtonian concepts, however, lead to predictions which contradict experiment, in particular the experimentally verified constancy of the speed of light. Numerous efforts were made to remedy this discrepancy, the most famous one by Lorentz, until Einstein proposed a re-

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vision of the absolute character which space and time possess in the Newtonian model. In the Einstein model, the answer to the question “Did two events happen at the same time?” depends on the state of motion of the observer. The fact that this idea violates the “common sense” of laymen, most of whom think that there can be only one time sequence to events, shows how bold Einstein’s step was at the time he took it.

The special theory of relativity is now universally accepted, and forms the foundation stone for all major subsequent developments in physics. Contrary to a widely held prejudice, the special theory, even in its more technical aspects, is understood by many college graduates in natural science (probably at least 100,000 on a worldwide scale).

The general theory of relativity (1916) is the first theory of gravitation. Newton had understood the basic law of gravity, but had not explained it, i.e., reduced it to anything more fundamental; Einstein did. The acceptance of the general theory among scientists never became quite as universal as that of the special theory. Three experimental tests of the theory are considered by many physicists to have confirmed it, while others argue that the effects are so minute as to be unconvincing, considering the lack of reliability of the measuring instruments. One striking feature of the general theory is that it provides a unification of the force of gravity with its effect on the motion of objects, a result first established by Einstein, L. Infeld, and B. Hoffmann in 1937.

Einstein spent the last 30 years of his life in the search for an even wider synthesis, which would include the effect of other forces, such as those of electromagnetism, and quantum phenomena. This hope has not been fulfilled so far, but the search is going on, on the basis of interesting preliminary results.

Einstein’s contributions outside the field of relativity, taken by themselves, would have insured him a place of honor in the history of physics. In 1921, he received the Nobel Prize for his discovery (in 1905) of the photoelectric effect. Applying an earlier hypothesis of Planck, Einstein showed that the laws governing the emission of electrons under the influence of light from certain surfaces could be understood by assuming that energy of light waves is not absorbed or emitted in arbitrary quantities, but in definite bundles, which are called “photons.” Einstein also offered the first satisfactory mathematical theory of Brownian motion, that is, the erratic motion, under the impact of molecules, of particles intermediate in size between molecules and objects that can be readily seen with a microscope. He is also the author of a very interesting, though no longer accepted, theory of the specific heat capacities of crystals.

Einstein well realized that most genuine scientists are also interested in the philosophy of science, that is, in the meaning of their scientific contributions in terms of basic ideas about the nature of the universe, and of the methods of gaining knowledge about it.

At the time of Einstein’s early work, the language of operationalism, launched, I believe, by Ernst Mach, was very popular. Operationalists insist that physics should only involve concepts which can be ascertained by experimental procedures (“operations”) available at the time, avoiding constructs of the mind. Accompanying this outlook, there was usually the insistence that science is concerned exclusively with the prediction of observations, not with real relations among real things, a point of view known as positivism.

I do not know whether Einstein ever personally espoused operationalism as a philosophy of science; if he did, he completely reversed himself in his later writings. It is true that his original formulation of the special theory of relativity is couched in operationalist terminology. However, in 1905, there was considerable justification for a criticism, in operationalist terms, of Newtonian concepts of space and time, even by one not in sympathy with the general outlook of operationalism; for at the time, it was not generally known that absolute space and time could not be ascertained by experimental procedures; it was important to point this out. To an operationalist, this circumstance would compel abandoning these concepts; to others, it would merely indicate that they may be abandoned in the construction of new theories.

In his later writings on the philosophy of science, Einstein categorically rejected extreme positivism, pointing out, in numerous discussions on quantum mechanics, that it is akin to solipsism—the doctrine that only “I” exist, everything else being a dream. Quantum mechanics, founded by de Broglie in 1926, and developed by Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Born, Pauli, and Dirac, has been interpreted by many to entail, as an intrinsic part of its logical structure, an irreducible indeterminism. Quantum mechanics does not, in general, assert categorically that a certain physical event is going to happen; rather, it predicts the probability with which each of a certain number of possible results may be expected. The predic-
tions of quantum mechanics are statistical rather than fully causal.

However, this apparent acausality is manifested only at the atomic scale. Practically all phenomena that we can perceive with our senses involve so many atomic systems that the statistical laws lead to a seemingly regular and causal behavior; in general, as insurance companies know, statistical predictions become very much like regular laws when applied to many individuals.

There remains, however, the question of principle: Is the behavior of, for instance, an individual electron, causal or erratic? Most quantum physicists, led by Niels Bohr, adopted the positivist outlook, according to which causality was no longer a conceptual necessity. Einstein never accepted the positivist outlook of the "younger men." He insisted that the entities with which science deals exist objectively; erratic behavior of real things was unthinkable; therefore, quantum mechanics, despite its many successes, could only be a stepping stone beyond which there must lie a more fundamental, fully causal, theory.

**Albert Einstein** believed that he was a religious person. Whether one can accept that statement at face value depends on one's definition of religion. Einstein defined a religious person as one who has "liberated himself from the fetters of his selfish desires, and is preoccupied with thoughts, feelings, and aspirations to which he clings because of their super-personal value . . . which neither require nor are capable of rational foundation . . . regardless of whether any attempt is made to unite this . . . with a divine Being."* Einstein dismissed insistence on the Bible as an intervention of religion into a realm that properly belonged to science. While conceding that "the doctrine of a personal God, interfering with natural events, could never be refuted," he stated his personal belief that "the more a man is imbued with the ordered regularity of all events, the firmer becomes his conviction that there is no room left by the side of this ordered regularity for causes of a different nature."* Others who share this set of beliefs have called themselves humanists, rather than religious.*

Much as Einstein's outlook on the philosophy of science and on religion may resemble dialectical materialism, he categorically rejected the latter philosophy, or at least the name.*

Any attempt at drawing connections between the philosophy of science, and historical and political trends, is necessarily difficult and fraught with the danger of schematic oversimplification.* As a general rule, trends of thought connected with rising historical movements have been optimistic and rationalist (in the sense of having confidence in the ability of the human mind to gain knowledge of the world), while trends of thought connected with a decadent social order have, in the main, been pessimistic, obscurantist, and mystical. In his basic philosophy of physics, Einstein (with Planck, until the latter's death in 1947) was the leader of the school which rejected any intrinsic acausality, or any absolute limit to the knowability of the universe. By that very fact, his influence on the philosophy of science was a progressive one. This basic point is often forgotten by some Soviet critics* who, in the name of orthodox dialectical materialism, pick on picayune points in his early works, or on obvious and fairly minor inconsistencies.

In the realm of political philosophy, in which Einstein never claimed to be an expert, he nevertheless grasped the two key problems of the 20th century: How can production and distribution be rationally organized (socialism)? And how can the fundamental political equality of all people and all nations be achieved (the abolition of the color line)?

On the first subject, his short article in *Monthly Review* is likely to become a classic of socialism. As to the second subject, his veneration for Gandhi, his friendship for Nehru, as well as some published comments on the plight of the American Negro ("there is no greater satisfaction for a just and well-meaning person than the knowledge that he has devoted his best energies to the service of the good cause") attest sufficiently to his interest.

On the subject which so unfortunately divides the socialist movement—the attitude towards the Soviet Union—Einstein clung to a moderate middle position. He recognized the immense value to socialists of a large-scale demonstration of "the practical possibility of planned economy."* He expressed gratitude for the consistent anti-Nazi policy of the Soviet Union at a time when Munich was the official policy of the Western powers. At the same time, he insisted that things Soviet were not beyond criticism, and that no advantage could accrue to the socialist cause by defying the leadership of the first socialist state, or by encouraging a "fanatical intolerance on the part of all the 'faithful' by making a possible social method into a type of church which brands all those who do not belong to it as traitors or as nasty evildoers."* He expressed great admiration for Lenin, but voiced severe criticism of Stalin for what he termed an excess of centralism.* He believed that the state of internal democracy in Russia left much to be desired, but pointed out that "the people in Russia did not have a long political education, and changes to improve conditions had to be carried through by a minority, for the reason that there was no majority capable of doing it. If I had been a Russian, I believe I could have adjusted myself to this situation."*

**Three subjects in particular occupied much of Einstein's attention during the last decade:** Zionism, world government, and civil liberties.

His interest in Zionism was primarily humanitarian. A refuge had to be found for what was left of the Jewish communities of Central and Eastern Europe; the state of
Israel appeared to be the most practical solution acceptable to the victims. His compassion included Arabs as well as Jews. He never shared the designs, reminiscent of the doctrine of "manifest destiny," of some advocates of Zionist expansionism.

Einstein looked towards the creation of a supra-national organization (world government) with a military monopoly and limited powers adequate to prevent war, guaranteeing to each nation autonomy in the regulation of its internal affairs. 2

While many, including the present author, 10 have questioned the practicality of such a program, no one will question that Einstein's support of it stemmed from a sincere belief that he could thereby halt the drift towards a third World War. He never gave any comfort to those who saw in world government merely an anti-Soviet coalition on a larger scale, or a more palatable slogan in support of a preventive war. Einstein did not confine his efforts towards world peace to the world government movement. He steadily appealed for a more calm, rational, and self-critical approach to foreign policy. He desired negotiations between the great powers in a spirit of genuine give and take. 2

Einstein's support for civil liberties was not of the cheap variety of those who roundly condemn violations in far-off lands, while conveniently blind to the injustice happening under their very noses. He saw and deplored the steady deterioration in this field since the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, and deplored it under Democratic as well as under Republican auspices. He realized that the inquisition was "ruining the country," 10 and did his best to stem it, even urging defiance of the inquisitors at the risk of jail.

In universal compassion, Einstein exceeded even Jefferson. Einstein could work alike, and simultaneously, to aid the professor who had fled from Eastern Europe because of his anti-communism, and the professor who was fired for communism in the U.S.

Einstein could discern the current forces that were shaping the movement of history, and sense in which direction lay the interests of the overwhelming majority of mankind. Yet it is doubtful whether he could successfully have led any great political movement, had he wanted to. He was too saintly, too concerned with ethical points, too full of sympathy even for his opponents, to tolerate the rough-riding political leaders such as Robespierre, Lincoln, or Lenin found necessary. While accepting in its essence the Marxist analysis of capitalist economy, 9 he rejected the overall vision of a history actuated by class dynamics, in which "force is the midwife of progress."

Rather, his socialism had a purely ethical basis, as the incarnation of civilized humanism, certain to come; for Einstein believed that the civilizing urge of mankind is bound to triumph, if only man's bestiality can be held back long enough to prevent a total holocaust. 9

In Einstein, the scientific community has lost its most eminent member; philosophy, a thinker of rare keenness; socialism, a friend; and mankind the model of itself a thousand years hence.

2 A. Einstein, "Out of My Later Years" (Philosophical Library, New York, 1950), which also includes many reprints, in particular the article "Why Socialism?" (Monthly Review, May 1949).
5 For instance, C. Lamont, "Humanism as a Philosophy" (Philoosophical Library, New York, 1949).
7 The author has attempted such a connection in Science & Society, vol. 17 (1953), p. 211.
8 "On the Philosophical Views of A. Einstein," M. M. Karpov, Voprosy Filosofii No. 1, 1951 (Translation published by the Jefferson School of Social Science). See also some speeches by A. A. Makimov, reported in the press.
9 Interview with the author, February 4, 1950.

Resolution on Independent Political Action

The following resolution was adopted unanimously by the Minnesota state conference of the Progressive Party on May 13:

The state conference of the Progressive Party of Minnesota endorses the National Guardian's call for an open national caucus for the purpose of putting a national independent party on the ballot in the 1956 Presidential election.

The state conference further endorses the declaration in the Guardian's call that such a party "must be a party of peace, jobs, and rights."

The Guardian's call presents the only alternative to the policy of so-called "coalitionism" which in reality means support to the bipartisan cold-warriors and witch-hunters. An independent campaign—developing a clear-cut appeal for co-existence and social progress and against imperialism, police-stateism, monopoly, sagging farm income, and unemployment—is an absolute necessity in 1956.

Such a campaign can produce no miracles. But it can halt and reverse the trend toward confusion and disintegration of the progressive forces which has been so marked since a portion of the progressive movement turned toward the Democratic Party. And such a campaign can attract potential adherents to the progressive camp who will otherwise remain inactive for want of a party behind which to rally.

The state conference takes note of the sincerity of those who hope that entering the Democratic Party can promote the formation of a labor-farmer party. But we deplore the shortness of their memories. Entry of progressives into the Democratic Party has never promoted anything except the Democratic Party. The mighty Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party was destroyed in just such a maneuver ten years ago. Do the proponents of coalitionism imagine that with their relatively meager forces they can accomplish anything within the Democratic Party today which the much larger progressive forces of the Farmer-Labor Party could not achieve in the more favorable political climate of 1944-48?

The progressive movement would be ill-served by the blind repetition of a disastrous error.

Welcoming any and all mutual support among farmer, labor, and other independent groups, the state conference appeals to all progressive organizations to join it in endorsing the National Guardian's call for a caucus in 1955 to prepare for a Presidential campaign in 1956. It recommends Chicago and Labor Day week as the time and place to start the great job that lies ahead for progressive Americans.
The recent French elections show that the Left has held its strength, and prospects of joint Communist-Socialist action are improving. But the Poujade movement warns of rightist moods in the middle class.

**Currents in the French Left**

by Our European Correspondent

THE recent French cantonal elections provided the first barometer of the European political climate since the ratification of the Paris agreement. Taken together with the defeat administered to Premier Scelba in the Italian presidential elections, they indicate the emergence of two important phenomena in the western part of the continent and in Britain.

First: The decision to rearm the Bonn regime has not greatly strengthened the capitalist right-wing friends of John Foster Dulles. In fact, the constant assurance that ratification was only the prelude to negotiations has taken the sting out of the diplomatic victory. And now, Molotov’s sensational switch on Austria has once again thrown “the negotiators through strength” back on the defensive.

Second: The Paris agreements were drawn up and then ratified in great haste so as to keep them from becoming an electoral issue. With this accomplished fact, the terrain has shifted from foreign to domestic politics, and this in Europe is bad ground for the capitalist Right. Here, shouting about the “free world” is no substitute for homes, good wages, social progress.

The first test came in France. The elections, marked by a certain dullness and apathy, are rather indicative of forces in gestation rather than a fully delineated trend. With the overthrow of Mendès-France, French politics appeared to have been overcome with its old numbsness. The new government blossomed out with all the colors of the right-wing rainbow, and with a ministry each for a round dozen unemployed ex-premiers. Having pushed the Paris agreement through the Senate, they settled down to business-as-usual: a meager wage increase which left the trade unions dissatisfied but unable, because of disunity and uncertainty in purpose, to resist; a small witchhunt against the left-wing weekly, France-Observateur, for its courageous journalism during the Indochinese war; emergency legislation providing special repressive powers against the Algerian people. The only worrisome problem was the dramatic tax strike run by M. Poujade.

Although the government pendulum had swung to the right, the elections showed an unaltered popular sentiment, with the Left as strong as it had been, and possibly a little stronger. The one big loser, dropping more than 50 percent of its seats on the cantonal councils, was the badly divided Gaullist movement which only a few years ago appeared to be the focal point for a huge nationalist, semi-fascist party. Its followers broke in all directions, and as a result all parties showed gains in the final tally without, however, any new reactionary combination of the same kind rising to take its place.

NOTEWORTHY is the continuing strength of the Left. The Communist vote, 1,316,701, fell off slightly as against the last cantonal elections in 1949, but the CP remained the largest single party in France. The Socialist vote rose slightly to make a total of 1,113,400. Together they received 38 percent of the total vote. One political commentator added to this figure the 16 percent received by the liberals (Radical Socialists and others), who have been traditionally classified as “Left,” to get a majority of 58.4 percent for a Popular Front combination, 1936 model. This is still only a mathematical calculation, as the Radicals are divided in a right and left wing of their own, and as there is no present chance of a combination between the three parties. However, it does provide a rough indication of the political temper of the country, the three parties increasing their vote by 4.4 percent as against 1949, while a combination of right-wing party votes fell off by a similar percentage.

This commentator further points out that while a similar switch in votes would put the Labor Party in power in Britain, it does not in France push the right wing out of the government. This is because its electoral system for cantonal elections is so devised as to discriminate against the Communist Party. The SF receives seats proportional to its popular vote, the Radicals gain 10 percent and the right 7.5 percent, but the CP gets only 2 percent of the
seats for 21 percent of the votes. In National Assembly elections, a twisted proportional-representation method gives it 15 percent of the seats for 25 percent of the votes.

To alter this balance of power, which has permitted the Radicals to make majorities for right-wing governments, a unity of Communists and Socialists is indispensable. The first hesitant, half-hearted, reluctant steps in this direction were taken in the cantonal elections. This came about as the result of a Communist Party appeal to Socialist candidates to make common front against the reactionaries. Concretely this meant that the party receiving the lower vote in the first round would withdraw in favor of the other to give it a majority in the second round.

Guy Mollet, SP National Secretary, at once rejected the proposal, declaring it immoral to pact with a "totalitarian party," satellite to a foreign power. He did not accompany the injunction with his customary threat of expulsion of recalcitrant party branches, and he could see no objection to accepting Communist votes—on the condition of no reciprocity. Nevertheless, the good sense of the Socialist rank and file prevailed, and in some 120 cantons tacit or actual agreements were reached at between the two parties. In the majority of these cases, the SP was the beneficiary and gained more than 20 seats in this way. The instances of SP withdrawal in favor of CP candidates were much less numerous, but the significant fact is that they took place. The SP also continued to join with liberal and right-wing parties in the "anti-communist barrier," a policy designed uniquely to defeat the CP, which more often helped elect notorious reactionaries than Socialists. In a few instances, but these were the exception, the CP also indulged in this shameful tactic. Nevertheless, it was the de facto unity, swelling the votes of the two parties, which has claimed public attention.

If the prospects of joint action between Socialists and Communists look somewhat brighter today, the road is still encumbered with the suspicions and antagonisms of years of cold war. In this time both parties subordinated their domestic program for social reforms and for the establishment of socialism in France to the foreign policy of the camp to which they were allied, the Socialists to the Atlantic alliance, the Communists to the Soviet bloc. The labor movement became an arena of the cold war, but in the process it lost its dynamism. Although only a minority of the workers followed the Socialists, the remainder being anti-war and hostile to Western war preparations, the general effect of this division was to breed the belief that the fate of France would be settled by the two hostile blocs of nations. The policies of the two parties aided mightily in fostering this passivity.

In 1947, the Socialist Party, on the instigation of the State Department, threw the Communists out of the tripartite government (Socialists, Communists, and the clerical MRP). Shortly thereafter, with the aid of CIO and AFL officials, they split the CGT and set up their own trade union federation. From that time onward, the Socialist policy began to degenerate to one plank: anti-communism. The result was to strengthen the capitalist Right. The Socialists were soon unable, without irrevocably compromising themselves, to participate in governments dominated by big financial and agricultural interests, the colonialists, the reactionary clericals. But, resolutely hostile to any unity with the Communists, the Socialists helped by their action if not their votes to keep the reactionary governments in power. The dry rot of stand-pat reaction began to rust the structure of French politics.

In the summer of 1953, the first big revolt broke out against this policy in the strike of government employees (postal, telegraph, telephone and railroad workers) sparked by rank-and-file Socialists. Frightened that this might lead to some form of spontaneous working-class unity, Mollet issued an appeal for the constitution of a "Democratic and Social Front." This was to be an alliance for social reform of all left-wing forces—but specifically excluding the Communists who represented some 70 percent of the organized workers and who had received some five million votes in the 1951 elections. Naturally, the "Front" was still-born. But when Mendès-France turned up the following year, the Socialists thought they had arrived at last. They were quickly to be disappointed. Representing at best an enlightened conservatism, Mendès-France rejected Communist overtures but solicited support from the right wing of his own party (the Radicals) and from other right-wing parties who were thus able to compel him to subordinate even his mild program of "economic renovation" to the foreign-policy needs of the Atlantic alliance. Since the collapse of Mendès-France, the Socialists have been again thrust into the opposition and have voted regularly with the Communists against the government. This created the conditions for the informal unity in the recent elections, but it has not yet changed the hardened anti-communism of the Socialist leaders who are still seeking their alliance on the Right rather than on the Left.

The Communist policy, on the other hand, while being clear on foreign policy has been incoherent on domestic problems. Their agitation has been concentrated on peace, a four-power pact, ending the Indochinese war, opposition to German rearmament, pledging to support any government that would pursue such a foreign policy. They have talked mostly about "a change in policy," rarely about a change in government. Their national economic and social program was played in a minor key or played down altogether. It began to appear that the Communists had no other interest than foreign policy and this led to a hardening of divisions in the working class and on the Left. Like the Socialists, the Communists placed a shift in cold-war allegiance as a pre-condition for unity. While they constantly appealed, for example, for unity against German rearmament, they never proposed unity for a big social-reform program of low-cost public housing, massive aid to education and to the health services, a socialist renovation of agriculture to succor the poverty-stricken areas of France, an extension of nationalization and eventually government planning to organize the rich and varied French economy for the prosperity of its people.

Such a program would have caught on among the Socialist ranks, and beyond them to the entire proletarian and lower-middle-class population of France. By insisting that this program be given budgetary priority instead of pouring government funds down the rat-hole of arma-
ments and the Indochina war, it would have become a powerful popular force for effecting a change in foreign policy. It would have further had the effect of separating the Socialists from their right-wing allies whose hostility to such a domestic policy goes hand-in-hand with their satellite attachment to the Atlantic alliance.

This lack of clear domestic aims has placed the Communists in a contradictory position and has permitted the Socialist right wing to justify its divisive policy by endless discussion about the lack of democratic freedoms in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Thus, for example, the Communist deputies in the National Assembly, in the vain hope that Mendès-France could be swung against German rearmament, voted him emergency economic powers from which the workers had so little to gain that a minor revolt was touched off among the Communist rank and file against their leaders. But when the Socialist Christian Pineau attempted to form a government after the fall of Mendès-France, the Communists voted against him, despite his very ambitious, radical social program, because he had committed himself to the passage of the Paris agreement in the Senate.

The current election, however, was the scene of a Communist turn in policy. The CP proposed a seven-point platform for unity with the Socialists: 1. Immediate opening of negotiations to substitute a policy of international détente and cooperation for that of force; 2. Controlled reduction of armaments, prohibition of the manufacture of weapons of massive destruction, struggle against the preparations for atomic war; 3. Increase of the minimum guaranteed wage to 145 francs an hour; 4. Elimination of regional inequalities; 5. Defense of working peasants’ demands; 6. Abrogation of the “state of emergency”; 7. Abrogation of clerical laws and defense of the laity.

As there was no mention of the Paris agreements or German rearmament, the Socialist leaders in rejecting the offer asked the Communists to explain why they had voted against Christian Pineau, who had proposed an identical foreign policy to the one set forth above but a far more radical domestic program. If the Socialist ranks, against advice from their leaders, joined forces with the Communists in the elections, it was solely to defeat reactionary candidates, but they could hardly have been inspired by the Communist seven-point platform. In fact there are few “liberal” capitalist politicians in France who, although committed body and soul to preserving the status quo, would hesitate to accept such a mild policy.

Recent developments throw further light on the thinking of Communist leaders on this question. The first is the growth of an organization called the “New Left.” Composed mainly of intellectuals and professionals, but with a fair sprinkling of trade-union support, it is a merging of tendencies coming from different political directions: split-off groups of left-wing Gaullists and of MRP dissidents who have moved leftward in opposition to the Atlantic war policy, and former Communist sympathizers who have come to take a more independent, critical view of the Soviet regime and policies. They have courageously opposed German rearmament, French colonial policy in North Africa, and fought for an end to the Indochina war. They consider themselves more of a “ginger group” to effect reforms in the two major left-wing parties, and to lead to a Popular Front, than as being the basis for a new party. France-Observateur is the principal public organ of this movement.

The “New Left” began to gain in strength during and immediately after the Mendès-France experience. It now has branches in 18 departments of France. At this point, Communist Party leaders who had previously ignored this movement suddenly began to shower it with advice. One of them, François Billoux, proposed that the “New Left” join in alliance with the CP, but as a kind of middle-class auxiliary. He urged that it drop all reference to socialism as a goal, that it eliminate from its program such planks as planning, the extension of nationalization, workers’ participation in management, etc. His argument was that the CP alone represents the working class and that if the “New Left” spoke about socialism it would divide the middle class and might end up as a rival party.

Space is lacking to develop at length the reply of Gilles Martinet in an article entitled “The New Left Will Not be the Party of Small Businessmen.” Analyzing the sad experience of the Popular Fronts of the Thirties and in the immediate post-war years, he pointed out that only a bold social program could mobilize millions of workers...
who do not now follow the CP, as well as the middle class which is fed up with the years of hopeless political crisis. To accept the Billoux conception of the function of the “New Left” would be to reduce it to the kind of satellite which has existed in Eastern Europe, and nothing could be better calculated to repel the French middle class and intellectuals. Martinet and the “New Left” weren’t interested in this advice.

But does the CP consider the advocacy of nationalization, planning, workers’ participation in management and socialism its own private function, and therefore find it superfluous for much smaller movements to echo these ideas? This itself would be a rather dubious notion but a second development, a conflict within the Communist-controlled CGT, provides us with additional facts as to the orientation.

The dispute was summarized by Alain Le Leap, General Secretary of the CGT, in a May Day speech at Paris. After denying rumors about splits and removals and insisting that the CGT as a democratic organization will freely debate the differences at its national congress to be held next month, he says:

Various opinions have been expressed reflecting certain trends of thought among our membership. Some believe that the CGT should have a thorough economic and financial program and that it is possible through the application of this program to improve the workers’ living standard in a capitalist society. Others, on the contrary, deem that to allow it to be thought that a program conforming to the workers’ interests can be imposed without being in power and against the interests of those who actually hold power, is to deceive the working class, and that it is necessary to confine oneself to practical measures which have a chance to be carried out. The latter thesis has won out.

According to Le Leap, the working class is to confine itself to a few meager crumbs such as the 145-francs-an-hour minimum wage specified in the Communist election platform, and for a few sops to the hard-pressed peasants. The British Labor Party, the German Social Democrats have programs that are further to the left. Even the cautious head of the French Socialist unions, Bothereau, called in his May Day speech for the nationalization of steel and road transport and demanded that the trade unions be given a greater part in the management of the economic affairs of the country. But above all, the thesis which “won out” in the CGT is girt to the mill of reaction in a country sick with social crisis, frustrated with long years of economic stagnation. It will not be satisfied by a few piddling “practical” reforms.

All of the classical conditions for fascism are now present in France. The country has been thrust out of the ranks of world powers, it has been defeated in one colonial war, and another catastrophe is in the making in North Africa. Living conditions are hardly equal to pre-war standards and housing is worse. In large areas of the country, now called “underdeveloped,” there exists a grinding poverty. The people have grown cynical as they watched first the grand promises of the liberation vanish into thin air and then the succession of unscrupulous politicians drain the substance of the country while begging hat in hand for aid from a foreign power to make the ends of the budget meet. They have grown apathetic to working class parties turning in a void, quarreling about foreign policy but rarely concerned with the pressing problems at home.

The Poujade movement is a warning signal. Overnight, this movement of small shop-keepers has swelled to larger numbers than the Communist Party, the biggest party in France. It is full of the vagueness, the contempt for intellectuals, for parliamentary institutions, full of the anti-Semitism that marked the Hitler movement in Germany. It is the movement of the “enraged petty-bourgeois,” the small man who feels himself in a blind alley and turns to mystical solutions. Obviously the tax strike which served as a dramatic anti-governmental gesture, is no solution. Nor is any other palliative, granting slight relief but changing nothing fundamentally. France has too many small shopkeepers and peasants to provide them with a decent living, but it has too few openings in industry, the services and professions to offer them an alternative. The Poujade movement has gone through its first phase and is now suffering a temporary decline. If no big social changes are forthcoming in France, it may rise again in greater strength with more serious leaders and a more comprehensive fascist-type program. Meanwhile the “stab-in-the-back” hysteria is being cultivated against left-wing intellectuals, and bitter officers and mercenaries are returning from defeat in Indochina to provide the fighting squads of fascism if it becomes a national movement.

Yet such is the nature of social crisis that the time of the greatest danger is also the time of the greatest opportunity for the socialist movement. The capitalist politicians are discredited. The old order is played out. The people, still overwhelmingly on the Left, are looking to the working-class parties for a bold lead, for radical solutions. And, for the time, French labor benefits from favorable internal and external factors. There is no severe economic depression to impel millions into the arms of a fuehrer. There are no strong fascist nations on the borders of France as before the last war, but there are vigorous labor Socialist and Communist movements in Britain, Germany and Italy, and further away there is the influence of the powerful Soviet bloc of nations and the constant stirring of the colonial world. And there is the general hatred of Nazism which took deep roots under the German occupation.

These factors are not however fixed for eternity. They are useful only if the French left-wing parties can find a way out of the blind alley. A certain easing off of the cold war gives them the opportunity to put old divisions aside, to cement their ranks and to rally the support of the country behind a socialist program.

KINSHIP: Sir Ronald Howe, Deputy Commissioner of Scotland Yard, has a death mask of Himmler. He used to exchange visits with the Nazi police chief. Howe explained that the police chiefs of all nations enjoy a unique relationship. It has nothing to do with the relations between their nations. A cop is the same, everywhere.

Leonard Lyons, N. Y. Post
Apathy on the Plains

by Arthur Wallace Calhoun

FORTY years ago, the strip beginning with Oklahoma and running through the Dakotas was making history. Oklahoma had about as many Socialists in its lower house as it had Republicans or Democrats. Kansas, with the Appeal to Reason circulating hundreds of thousands of copies every week, was the fountain-head of Socialist propaganda in the United States. North Dakota put some of its Socialists in office through the Farmers’ Non-Partisan League, which established state marketing facilities, a state bank, and a state housing project.

Today this whole strip is in eclipse. Oil in Oklahoma and Kansas offers a plausible substitute for waning land fertility, but North Dakota is definitely in decline, and nothing notable is heard from Nebraska and South Dakota. There seems to be no good reason why the region as a whole should expect to play a significant part in the future of the United States.

When William Allen White asked sixty years ago “What’s the Matter with Kansas?” he was disturbed by the Populist disposition to raise hell instead of corn. If he were alive today, he would be dismayed by the acquiescence that characterizes Kansas, as it does the other states that we did not leave to the buffalo. The “socialism” of forty years ago turned out to be little more than belated Populism, really irrelevant to the times, and its subsidence leaves the region a prey to inertia and indifference.

Take Kansas. It has an Industrial Development Commission, but this body manifests no integral purpose, as indeed it can hardly be expected to do in an area so far from markets and devoid of most of the obvious raw materials of industrialism. The family farm is disappearing with the soil fertility, and there is no well-defined economic development to take its place.

TWENTY years ago a prosperous Kansas farmer was asked when he and his neighbors would have to start fertilizing. He said, “We ought to be fertilizing now.” A dozen years later he was asked whether he had begun to fertilize, and he said, “No.” His son had left to become an engineer, and there was no reason for the old man to bother about the future of the farm. Recently a young farmer remarked: “My grandfather robbed the soil; my father robbed it; and I’ll rob it.” So much for free enterprise in its most notable field. There are good farmers, but they are not numerous enough to save the day. Soil conservation on the farm might make huge dams unnecessary by keeping the water where it falls, but it will not actually come fast enough to cope with the crisis. Last year a large local flour mill closed because the quality of the local wheat will no longer meet the demands of the milling industry. The supremacy in wheat that Kansas won from Minnesota is in jeopardy.

There is no indication that anybody cares what happens to Kansas. The state educational institutions are not practicing any effective public relations and there is no sign of citizens’ pride in them. The only really vital farmers organization, the Farmers Union, which fraternizes with the CIO and AFL even in Kansas, has a very small membership. The socialist vote, which held up well for years, is now below a thousand.

There is a rudimentary labor consciousness, which offers glimmerings of hope, but it is not massed in any large-scale industry that might produce effective solidarity. There has been this year a rather effective rallying of forces against the mis-named “right-to-work” bill, with which it was hoped to cripple the unions, and the Republican governor vetoed the measure. There is just a possibility that labor in alliance with the Farmers Union may serve as a nucleus for a program for Kansas, but there is as yet no ground for assurance.

The point is that it is too late for individual enterprise to save the day on the High Plains. Even if individual effort were capable of saving the soil, such effort cannot be enlisted fast enough, and unless the region is to be returned to the buffalo, there will have to be a mandatory program directed by government. It is too bad that there is no vitality in county or state government and that Washington will have to intervene. Whether statism is better than surrender to the desert remains to be seen.

It is not merely the fertility that is gone. The small community that used to socialize the child is also gone, and there is nothing between the small family and the great world to bridge the personality gap that is broadening.

Dr. Calhoun, the author of “A Social History of the American Family,” “The Social Universe,” and other sociological and labor-education works, served as Director of Studies in the famous Brookwood labor college at Katonah, N. Y.
Work will have to start at this point if there is to be any retrieving of losses, any re-establishment of High Plains' culture, which is now an aimless reflection of the ways of the city as transmitted by movies, radio, and television.

The problem is actually the same as besets American life everywhere, the question whether it is possible to reawaken a concern for social values such as was in evidence when states were adopting the initiative, referendum, and recall (which have been abandoned to what Grover Cleveland called "innocuous desuetude"). It may be that if in every village of two thousand, three or four people will sacrifice all their leisure for the next dozen years to reawakening in their neighbors the dormant sense of community, government may be restored to the people and given a shape that will facilitate the recovery of lost values.

This community sense is not entirely dead. Within recent years one Kansas village has twice voted against selling for business purposes a small central park used as a children's playground, even though in one instance the would-be investor threatened to take his capital to a sizable city if he did not get what he wanted. Without any fanfare, the civic consciousness awoke and thwarted the reactionary measures. There is undoubtedly a residue of community consciousness that can be tapped if right occasions are seized.

Those Americans that are as yet unwilling to surrender completely to the "American Way of Life" must needs realize that there is no use spending time theorizing and writing and talking unless they are willing to get busy in a small way at innumerable points throughout the country to recover what was thrown away by participation in two world wars at the instigation of heady power politicians. If the best we can hope for is something handed down from Washington, we might as well leave political action to the professionals.

Skilled and Unskilled

The Bureau of Labor Statistics, the UAW, and the corporations give the average hourly wage in the automobile industry as $2.07, the annual earnings as about $4,200. Both of these figures conceal the wide gap that exists between the earnings of production workers and those of the skilled-tradesmen. The average rate for a production worker in the Big Three—General Motors, Ford and Chrysler—is about $1.95 per hour. The average for the skilled trades is at least $2.55.

One of the main reasons for this gap is that the skilled workers, being for many years in greater demand in the labor market, were able to use this position to advantage even when the union as a whole was marking time. Several times in the Detroit area, the skilled workers organized rump groups and broad agitation and strikes which won them higher wages, to which the companies had to accede, and which the union merely ratified. That was in periods when the union failed to utilize these special circumstances to obtain general wage improvements for the membership as a whole.

The GM Department of the UAW recently published a pamphlet entitled "In GM, Forward, Forward, Forward, in '55." On pages 10 and 11, are figures on "Some gains of General Motors workers since 1956; typical job classifications 18-year period, 1936-1954." Here, in a summation of the wage gains on an hourly basis, the assembler, production worker, it is shown to have gained $1.04 per hour over this 18-year period. The die-maker gained $1.30 per hour and the electrician, a maintenance worker, $1.29 per hour. The figures given are based on two assumptions given in a footnote on page 11: "That the worker worked 40 hours per week for 52 weeks per year," and "that he remained at the bottom of the pay schedule in his job classification throughout the entire period except as noted." Both of these assumptions are false.

Today, the regular base pay-rate, not including cost-of-living wage increase, is $2.05 for the assembler, $2.55 for the die-maker, and $2.40 for the electrician. In 1936, before the UAW was recognized in GM, the earning rate for the assembler was 90c per hour, the electrician earned 90c and the die-maker $1.05. According to these figures, which can be checked with the records of local unions as well as those of the International Union, the die-maker has gained $1.50, the electrician $1.50 and the production worker $1.15 per hour. In 1950 the skilled-trades worker received 9c wage increase, while the production worker received 4c. In 1953 the increase was 15c for the tradesman and 5 for production.

While this difference in hourly rates is an important factor in the wide gap between the annual wage of the skilled and unskilled worker, even more important is the overtime worked by the higher-paid worker. For the year 1953, while the average production worker in the Big Three earned less than $4,000, the skilled worker averaged $7,000.

This difference of $3000 per year in income between two groups of workers creates one group far more satisfied with conditions as they are. But even this difference in income is not the most important that exists between production workers and skilled tradesmen. Working conditions mark the big difference between the two groups.

A production worker has to follow a conveyor line all day, and meet the production standards set by the company. The skilled worker may sit by his machine or work at his bench, and pretty much set his own pace for moving around. The skilled worker moves about in his department freely without first asking permission of the foreman. The production worker must get permission from the foreman who in turn must get a relief man before the worker can leave his job. In GM there is no relief system such as exists at Ford and Chrysler.

The speed-up is the burning issue among production workers. It is not directly a problem of skilled workers.

In 1937 the uniformly low wages and bad working conditions did much to unite all the workers for strike action. Today after almost 14 years of full employment at relatively high wages and good working conditions, the skilled tradesmen feel no urgency for strike action if necessary to improve working conditions.

During the first week in April 1955, there were five unauthorized strikes of UAW members in the Detroit area written up in the press. Since there are many of these strikes the press never mentions, one gets an idea of the widespread discontent that exists in UAW shops. In almost every case, "work standards"—the workers refer to it as "speed-up"—is given as the cause of the strike action.

While the Guaranteed Annual Wage may in some measure raise the yearly pay of the production worker, it will in no way improve his working conditions. If the UAW fails in the present negotiations to improve those sections of the contracts governing working conditions, it gives ammunition to those high wages and good working conditions, the skilled tradesmen feel no urgency for strike action if necessary to improve working conditions.

It is not in the best interest of the UAW to make the skilled worker feel that he is sacrificing either wages or working conditions by being in the same union with production workers. However, if the union has failed the production worker, the entire union is undermined, threatening wages and working conditions of skilled and non-skilled alike.

GM Worker
Echoes of the vindictive trial and execution of a brave young couple who wouldn't lend themselves to the witch-hunt are still heard in the land.

ON the evening of Friday, June 19, 1953, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were led into the death chamber at Sing Sing Prison and executed in the electric chair.

Up until the very minute before they walked the last few steps, wires were kept clear to the White House in case they "confessed" and named names. Two FBI men stood by the couple all afternoon waiting for them to break. They were instructed that they could win a reprieve at any time before they actually stepped into the execution chamber and the doors closed behind them.

But the Rosenbergs had stated that they were absolutely innocent of the crime charged: espionage in behalf of the Soviet Union. Hence they stated that they would choose death rather than "confess to a lie."

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had been convicted primarily on the testimony of David Greenglass, Ethel's brother. Greenglass said that Julius and Ethel had recruited him into a Soviet spy ring to steal the secret of the atomic bomb, but the Rosenbergs insisted that this was false.

David Greenglass, the Rosenberg defense maintained, had become implicated in a spy plot, and, fearing his own execution, had named his sister and brother-in-law as spies in order to escape death.

David Greenglass was named as a spy by Harry Gold in testimony in which he stated that he had met Greenglass, a mechanic working at the atomic energy project in Los Alamos, in June 1943, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and that Greenglass had delivered to Gold some secret of the atomic bomb. Harry Gold was supposed to have been traced from information given by Dr. Klaus Fuchs, a German-born scientist living in Britain, who, in turn, was alleged to have been implicated by certain persons arrested in the Canadian "espionage" trials.

ALL the circumstances of the trial and appeals show the extremes of bias and ferocity on the part of the judicial authorities involved. Judge Kaufman behaved as though he were in the front-line trenches of a war rather than

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An Invaluable Study of the Spy Trials


FROM the very day of the first explosion of the atom bomb before the eyes of the world, at Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, the scientists who made the bomb stressed repeatedly that there is no "secret" to the bomb. The weapon is based upon scientific principles known to the physicists of the world since 1940; the only basic secret was revealed by the explosion itself: the fact that such a bomb could be built and would work. America was told repeatedly in the summer and fall of 1945 that the rest of the world—and the USSR particularly—could break the A-bomb monopoly, simply by allocating sufficient personnel and resources, within "three to five years."

The prediction was remarkably accurate, for within four years of the Hiroshima explosion almost to the month, the U. S., Britain and Canada announced simultaneously that Russia had succeeded in exploding an atom bomb.

Although every government employs spies and although every major government is undoubtedly trying to keep track of atomic developments in other countries by getting information in any way possible, the above record shows that the role played by "spying" in the breaking of the monopoly was undoubtedly negligible, if not entirely nonexistent. We have the testimony of all the top scientists that such secrets of manufacture and construction as did exist could not be conveyed in a parcel of documents or a sample of material. A whole library of books in fine print plus an apprenticeship in the plants would alone be of substantial value. One top scientist ventured the opinion that spying would be next to useless; the Russians, he said, would get there faster by staying home and working in their laboratories.

Despite all this, there are today millions of Americans who have been firmly convinced by a flood of propaganda that the Soviet Union "got the secret" of the atom bomb by "spying." In part, this myth soothed the vanity of the capitalist-minded, who don't like to think that Russia is as scientifically advanced as she really is. In part, it helps drive the machinery of cold-war anti-Communist hysteria. Most important of all, it was pushed by the shrewdest of the witch-hunters as one of their chief weapons in destroying civil liberties by raising a scare on the most fear-charged topic of all human history.

Mr. Reuben's book investigates the circumstances of all the A-bomb spy trials since the Canadian Royal Commission of early 1946. He demonstrates how headlines were made around cases which later turned out to have nothing to do with atom-bomb information. One such case was that of a Soviet naval lieutenant, Nicolai G. Redin, who was arrested by the FBI in March 1946, while the Canadian furore was at its height, and smacked for four months in headlines and by innuendoes as an "atom-bomb spy." When the case came to trial, it became clear that all that was involved was an unsubstantiated accusation by a shipyard engineer that he sold to Redin data about a naval vessel which he acknowledged was freely available to the public elsewhere. Redin was acquitted, but the excitement over the "atom-bomb spies" was initiated in the public mind.

Reuben's examination of the evidence in the series of cases which began with the trial of Klaus Fuchs in England and continued through the Rosenberg and Sobell cases in America discloses huge gaps and contradictions in the government evidence and charges, and should prove to any objective person that the Rosenberg couple was not convicted beyond any reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against them. The prosecution case in the Rosenberg and Sobell trials was weak in the extreme, and, in any other atmosphere but that which prevailed in America during those trials and appeals, might never have been brought into court and could hardly have secured a conviction. In view of this, the imposition of the death penalty for the first time in a peacetime espionage case can only be interpreted as a piece of vindictiveness seldom matched in our courts.

Mr. REUBEN'S work is an exhaustive and invaluable study of all the trials involved in the atom scare. Despite its great merits, it suffers from being built around a thesis which is far too broad to be substantiated by the knowledge available. This is the generalization, threading through every chapter, that there has never been such a thing as atom-bomb spying at all—at times Mr. Reuben even seems loathe to believe that there is really such a thing as spying in any field. He attempts to apply this thesis not just in the Rosenberg and Sobell cases, there are many who see reason to accept it, but in every case which has arisen since 1945. Even more, he appears to dispute the existence of such a category of secret agents altogether, and seems to feel, rather naively it must be said, that proof of the employment of spies is to the discredit of a nation which employs them.

Besides being rather implausible on its face, such a generalization is entirely superfluous, as it is far beyond the ken and the concern of the American liberal and radical movements. Socialism in America can only succeed as a movement springing from the needs and interests of the people of this country, and cannot hope to be successful as an indigenous movement if it gratuitously makes itself responsible for the actions of any government, or feels called upon to apologize for what a government does in the game of big-power politics. Such a thesis as Mr. Reuben undertakes to defend is, in short, beyond our knowledge, beyond our interests, outside of our sphere, and would prove nothing even if it could be established.

By espousing such a broad and irrelevant notion, Mr. Reuben only detracts from the force of his important arguments: the use of A-bomb spy scares to destroy civil liberties for all Americans, the conviction of accused persons in an atmosphere of hysteria, upon the weak and unreliable testimony of intimidated informers, the vindictive use of the death penalty against a man and his wife who were not proven guilty, and the fascist-like theme of all the prosecutions that every left-winger is a spy or potential spy. These are things which certainly happened, which can be proven to have happened, and which must be carried to the nation. Mr. Reuben's book supplies much of that argument in sober, convincing and factual form.
rather than die himself. His sentence was fifteen years in prison, and he may get out much sooner.

In the trials, there was not one whiff of concrete evidence, such as microfilms, secret plans and data of atomic secrets of high order, etc. The evidence was personal testimony, and always by some one who stood to save his neck or otherwise gain. The Rosenbergs put it this way in regard to David Greenglass: "We have always said that David, our brother, knowing well the consequences of his acts, bargained our lives away for his life and his wife's. Ruth goes free, as all the world knows; David's freedom, too, is not far off."

The foremost scientists in America and elsewhere thought it preposterous that David Greenglass, a mechanic who failed all his courses at Brooklyn Polytech, could deliver the "atomic secret" or any part of it to the Soviet Union. Dr. Harold C. Urey and Dr. Albert Einstein, after looking into the trial evidence, and after looking into the qualifications of Greenglass, publicly stated that the whole idea was preposterous. "Detailed data on the atomic bomb," Dr. Urey declared, "would require eighty to ninety volumes of close print which only a scientist or engineer would be able to read."

ONLY if one reads the entire trial manuscript and thus sees the atmosphere of hysteria that went into the arrests and trials—only then can one properly visualize how terrified a young man like David Greenglass might be. If he protested his innocence, refused to cooperate, would not his fate, in the atmosphere of hysteria enflamed by his past pro-Communist connections, be certain death? It was certain death for the Rosenbergs, who protested their innocence, at any rate.

David Greenglass gave testimony which contradicted in important details the testimony of his wife, Ruth, and of Harry Gold, and even contradicted some of his own statements. Personal relations between the Rosenbergs and Greenglass had been antagonistic long before the arrests. Greenglass said that the Rosenbergs had a console table given them by the Soviet embassy (never produced) with a built-in microfilm camera (never produced) with which they made microfilms (none ever found).

Aside from the Greenglass testimony, the evidence against the Rosenbergs was entirely hearsay. A young former leftist named Max Elitcher, himself under threat of a perjury indictment for having falsely signed a non-Communist affidavit to get a job, remembered after FBI questioning that Julius Rosenberg had asked him to spy, and had said that "Sobell is in this, too." The Sobell referred to was Morton Sobell, who, almost entirely on the basis of this vague testimony, is now serving fifteen years in Alcatraz. The circumstances under which this Elitcher incident supposedly happened are enough to raise dire suspicion. Rosenberg had never been a particularly close friend of Elitcher, hadn't seen him in years, yet is supposed to have made a special trip to Washington, D.C., and immediately tried to recruit him. The indictment for perjury against Elitcher was dropped as a reward for his testimony.

THE Rosenberg Case became an international issue, and awakened into action many thousands who normally had no special interest in politics, because these thousands pierced through all the legal technicalities and understood the essence of the case. They saw plainly that this young couple was being sacrificed to the hysteria of the American ruling class, which, infuriated because the USSR had manufactured the same weapon which they thought they could monopolize, looked for victims upon whom to vent their rage.

The universal sympathy felt for the courage and the quiet eloquence of the Rosenbergs caused the Rosenberg defense campaign to extend far beyond the normal circles of leftists and progressives. Tens of thousands of people, many even believing the Rosenbergs guilty, joined the campaign on the grounds that the execution for this gentle-seeming young father and mother was punishment too severe. Actually, the law under which the Rosenbergs were executed was clearly meant to apply only to espionage in behalf of an enemy power. Some people, even believing that the Rosenbergs were guilty, still believed that it was shameful that the first alleged civilian spies ever to be executed in America were accused of helping a nation with which the U.S. was allied at the time of the alleged crime.

So many people thronged into the work of the National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case that the situation was not under control of any one group. Several outstanding lawyers, the devout Roman Catholic lawyer of Los Angeles, Dan Marshall, and the crusading lawyer Fyke Farmer, strongly criticized the tactics of defense attorney Bloch. While the papers screamed that the Rosenberg defense was Communist agitation, in actual fact so many non-Communists had come into the defense that, in time, they took over much of the work. The most variegated sectors of progressive, liberal America were in the Rosenberg fight right up to the finish and beyond. The final motions before the Supreme Court which won the last stay of execution by Justice Douglas were made under the brilliant legal leadership of Dan Marshall and Fyke Farmer and with the aid of a rank-and-file worker, Irwin Edelman.

ON the final Friday when the Rosenbergs bravely went to their death, there were three thousand people picketing the Federal Building in Los Angles, and greater thousands keeping final vigil in New York City. Facist-minded hoodlums were displaying signs saying, "Today is Fry-Day—Fry the Rosenbergs." But the thousands of progressives, liberals, socialists, Communists, and others paid no attention. They were a united front for principles of decency, for the right of people to trials free from hysteria. This was the essential cause for which the thousands and the tens of thousands were united. Every one knew that the Rosenbergs had been tried in the atmosphere of terror, not in the atmosphere of justice and law. Everyone sensed that they were victims of the cold war and the witch-hunt.

Today, imprisoned in Alcatraz, is another man convicted in the same trial: Morton Sobell. He was sentenced on evidence so slender that only times of terror made the outrage possible. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg cannot be restored to life. But, in partial vindication of them and in tribute to their kind of people, progressive mankind will work for the freedom of Morton Sobell.
The Modest Privilege Of Keeping Silent

by George G. Olshausen


The idea of progress has vanished from non-socialist thinking; civil rights are in retreat. These are the conclusions to be drawn from Prof. Erwin N. Griswold’s “The Fifth Amendment Today.”

Prof. Griswold is dean of the Harvard Law School. In 1954 he gave three lectures expounding and defending the use of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The first lecture, delivered early in the year before the Massachusetts Bar Association, gives the history of the privilege, and tries to explain why invoking it is not a confession of guilt. The second lecture, constituting the Phi Beta Kappa address at Mount Holyoke College, argues the need of orderly procedure in Congressional investigations. The last lecture, given successively before New Jersey and Connecticut Bar Associations, combines the first two, and sets up the Fifth Amendment as a symbol of due process of law generally.

Clearly, Prof. Griswold is a man of good will who believes in civil rights and the privilege against self-incrimination. Yet a direct attack could hardly be more devastating than his heart-centered defense. His lectures spotlight two developments: First, there is no longer a contest of conservatives and progressives. The progressives have disappeared. What remains is a clash between two conservatisms, the conservatism which wants to preserve capitalism, and the conservatism which wants to preserve civil liberties. Second, civil liberties have lost ground largely because the “defenders” are afraid of their own position. Prof. Griswold makes a good legal analysis of the Fifth Amendment, but it is overshadowed by the historical tendencies which his lectures reveal. Each of these two trends will bear separate examination; strictly legal issues will then require little additional comment.

Prof. GRISWOLD upholds individual rights in matters touching both political beliefs and the criminal law. Old habits of expression might lead one to call him a “liberal” or even a “progressive.” Whatever may be encompassed by the vague term “liberal,” Prof. Griswold is certainly not a progressive, because he is not interested in progress. The privilege against self-incrimination is presented as old and well established, due to be honored for that reason. Thus the first lecture begins:

Old friends are good friends . . . the Fifth Amendment. It has been with us a long time. It is rather comforting to have around. . . . Before going further it may be well to introduce our old friend itself. . . . We are not dealing with either an alien or a novel doctrine.

The lecture concludes:

And so I come back where I started. The privilege against self-incrimination, embodied in the Fifth Amendment, has been a long time with us. It embodies a sound value which we should preserve. As we increase our understanding of it, and the part is has long played in protecting the individual against the collective power of the state, we will have a better appreciation of some of the basic problems of our time.

In the final lecture, Joseph N. Welch and Senator Watkins are given credit for helping to preserve individual rights against McCarthy. Both are impeccable conservatives and fought McCarthy without ever challenging the underlying propositions of McCarthyism.

Free thought receives a passing nod in the first lecture (p. 9). The author believes the privilege against incrimination to be especially valid when a witness is questioned about his political beliefs (pp. 8-9). But not once in the series is there a reference to free thought as the cornerstone of progress. In fact, progress does not enter the discussion. Unconsciously, Prof. Griswold seems to echo Gertrude Stein’s observations in the France of World War II (“Wars I Have Seen,” pp. 73, 75):

Peace and no progress that is what the twentieth century might do. Peace and no progress. . . . In 1914-1918, it was still the nineteenth century, and one might still think that something that would happen might lead one to higher and other things but now, the only thing that any one wants now is to be free, to be let alone, to live their life as they can. . . .
The current controversy over the Fifth Amendment is a controversy over the right of non-conformity. The course of American democracy has seen the espousal of this right in three diminishing stages. First, a recognized right of revolution; then, the right of free thought and free speech; now, the right to keep silent. Over the years, the “defenders” of free thought have retreated to successive prepared positions. The latest retreat seems to be made because they do not trust their previous position.

As a starting point we may take Shays’ Rebellion of 1786 in western Massachusetts. In that State it was not safe to remain silent: Everyone had to shout opposition to the rebellion. On February 25, 1787, James Sullivan wrote from Boston to Rufus King:

Every countryman who comes in and offers to apologize for his son or brother deluded, is railed at and called a rebel . . . the powers of government are so united in the metropolis that [it] is dangerous even to be silent; a man is accused of rebellion if he does not loudly approve every measure as prudent, necessary, wise and constitutional.

(Works of Rufus King, Vol. I, pp. 213-14; author’s italics.)

But while this represented one extreme, public opinion ranged across the entire scale. In other parts of the country, there existed not only outspoken opposition, but resolute voices in favor of the right to revolt. Jefferson’s famous eulogies on revolution came as a direct response to Shays’ Rebellion. On February 22, 1787, almost exactly when Sullivan was writing to King, Jefferson wrote to Abigail Adams:

I hope they pardoned them. The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions that I wish it to be always kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be exercised at all. I like a little rebellion now and then. It is like a storm in the atmosphere.

And later in the same year, to William Stephens Smith (Nov. 13, 1787):

I say nothing of its [Shays’ Rebellion’s] motives. They were founded in ignorance, not wickedness. God forbid we should ever be 20 years without such a rebellion. The people cannot be all and always well informed. The part which is wrong will be discontented in proportion to the importance of the facts they misconceive. If they remain quiet under such misconceptions it is a lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty. . . . What country before ever existed a century and a half without a rebellion? And what country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The remedy is to set them right as to facts, pardon and pacify them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure. Our convention has been too much impressed by the insurrection of Massachusetts and in the spur of the moment, they are setting up a kite to keep the hennyard in order. (Jefferson’s Works, Vol. V, pp. 263, 360)

These words are impressive because they were not uttered in a time of safety and quiet. Jefferson had taken part in the revolution against England; he did not flinch when revolution was turned against the government which he had helped to set up. At the threshold of the Republic, its leaders approved revolution as an expression of dissent.

Almost three-quarters of a century afterwards, Lincoln could still do the same, though faced with a much more serious rebellion than Daniel Shays’. In his first inaugural address he even affirmed the right of revolution:

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember and overthrow it.

Fifty-odd years later, in World War I, the country again faced the question of how much dissent it can tolerate. Now free speech is the dominant issue. It is held that there may be opposition by speech so long as there is no “clear and present danger” that speech may lead to illegal acts. A last spark of the old “right-of-revolution” idea flickers and dies out in Zechariah Chafee’s objection that “clear and present danger” is too restrictive (Chafee, “Freedom of Speech,” pp. 92-3), but the rule announced by Justice Holmes is soon accepted as the extreme limit to which opposition may be allowed.

Having formulated his test, Holmes applies it with complete assurance. He upholds punishment for supposed obstruction of the draft. But it is precisely pro-Soviet propaganda and leaflets protesting the presence of American troops in Russia which lead him to say:

Even if I am technically wrong, and enough can be squeezed from these poor and puny anomyities to turn the color of legal limius paper—I will add even if what I think the necessary intent were shown—the most nominal punishment seems to me all that possibly could be inflicted, unless the defendants are to be made to suffer not for what the indictment alleges, but for the creed that they avow—a creed that I believe to be the creed of ignorance and immaturity when honestly held, as I see no reason to doubt that it was held here, but which although made the subject of examination at the trial, no one has a right even to consider in dealing with the charges before the court. (Abrams v. U.S. 250 U.S. 616, 629—1919.)

Ten years later he refers to communism as “the now-dreaded creed,” and states the essence of free thought without any attempt at softening or euphemism:

... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate. (U.S. v.
Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654—
1929.)

Nor was this merely courage in
the absence of "danger." Holmes could
contemplate the coming of communism
with equanimity:

If in the long run, the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship
are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community,
the only meaning of free speech is
that they should be given their
chance and have their way. (Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673—
1925.)

By 1955, all this is changed. Not
only has the right of dissent re-
ceded once more; the controversy now
centers not around free speech, but
around the right to keep silent. Worse
yet, defence of what remains is half-
hearted and apologetic. No violence
has taken place on American soil, but
the country is again like the Massa-
chusetts of Shays' Rebellion: "The
powers of government are so united in
the metropolis that [it] is dangerous
even to be silent; a man is accused of
rebellion if he does not loudly ap-
prove every measure as prudent, neces-
sary, wise and constitutional."

Prof. Erwin Griswold's lectures on
the Fifth Amendment may be said to
represent the opposition to the demand
for ironclad conformity, just as Je-
ferson's letters represented such op-
position in 1787. It is by comparing
Griswold to Jefferson, that these lec-
tures can be put into their proper
perspective. While they defend a much
more limited form of dissent (the mere
right to keep silent, instead of revo-
lution) there is a more intense in-
sistence that dissenters are ignoramuses,
if not imbeciles, while the intellectual
climate of the cold war is presented
almost as a revealed religion. Justice
Homes' "free trade in ideas" has given
way to an implacable capitalist ortho-
doxy. Failure to trumpet the greater
glory of capitalism is excused only as
a personal shortcoming. Thus: "A man
is a college teacher. He is an idealist
and perhaps slow to recognize real-
ities, as idealists sometimes are." (Com-
ing from a university dean, this is a
complete surrender to the anti-intel-
lectualism which currently forms a
tenet of capitalist orthodoxy.)

Political or economic disagreement
is presented entirely in the framework
of individual soul-struggles. Capitalism
itself is beyond the range of discussion.
While "defending" the modest privi-
gle of keeping silent, Dean Griswold
regrets that it should be invoked:

It may be a serious error of judg-
ment for an academic person to
claim the privilege of the Fifth
Amendment, or to refuse to answer
questions; but the conduct, regret-
table as it is, does not show the
existence of treason, espionage, sabo-
tage, or any serious crime.

And then the key:

The great misfortune from all
this, I believe, is that charges are
made against our universities and
other educational institutions, and
more or less believed by some seg-
ments of our people. I think myself
that it is easy to overestimate the
extent of that belief, but it cannot
be denied that there is disagree-
ment, uneasiness, and even fear in
some quarters...

We have been frightened, bad-
ly and understandably frightened by
communism... because we have
been frightened, we have succumbed
too readily to the thought that com-
munism could be wholly stamped
out at home, and that the way to
do it was to stamp, and to stamp
without too much concern lest some
of the stamping not be confined to
communists.

Jefferson was not frightened. Lincoln
was not frightened. Holmes was not
frightened. But the generation of the
1950's is frightened. So frightened, in
fact, that the "defenders" of civil rights
are worried because "charges are
made against our universities and other
educational institutions, and more or
less believed by some segments of our
people." Lincoln in his day recognized
the fear of labels. But he castigated
it as "less than... American." (Speech
at Peoria, Ill. Oct. 16, 1854, Complete
Works, vol. III, pp. 177ff.) Today the
"defenders" of civil rights confess
to this fear and seek to justify it.

These weaknesses are emphasized
by the very reasons which Prof.
LOUIS P. Lochner is not an uninformed pen-pusher. He is an important man. For 14 years he was chief of the Berlin Bureau of the Associated Press. He served as a member of the Hoover Commission to Germany and Austria in 1947, and has been president of the Overseas Press Club of America. His current book was inspired by crude motives for self-expression, but by the need of doing an important “public relations” job on the American public. Mr. Lochner goes to work in methodical fashion, like a professional.

He tells us: “Publicists have an understandable passion for simplifying events and personalities. . . . Thus German industrialists, who alone must create, which is a ruthless, bellicose, given to intrigue, uncultured, devoid of idealism, and devoted solely to business and the amassing of fortunes, at which they are masters.” But Lochner, who fortunately is free from this passion for oversimplifying complex matters, proceeds in a special chapter to draw from his pen portraits of the leading German tycoons, where he does for them what Fortune magazine does for the American plutocrats.

Many of the leading German industrialists, it can’t be denied, Searches, with the Nazis, but that was because they were naively. You understand, they were busy people who spent all their time in their business, and didn’t know too much about politics. But they were all very “human,” and above all, interested in broad social welfare projects of all kinds. The old reactionaries skinflint, Von Siemens, the electrical king, is described in these touching terms: “Though not opposed to trade unions he, at the same time, fought their idea that merely years of service, irrespective of efficiency, must determine wages, vacation time, severance pay, and allied matters. He acknowledged the workers’ right to strike but was opposed to purely political walkouts.”

Having laid the proper background of sympathy for the dramatic personae, Lochner proceeds to explain about Hitler’s well-known speech delivered to the Industrieclub at Düsseldorf on January 27, 1932. This speech marked a turning point in Hitler’s drive to power. By providing him with the forum of this top industrial organization of Rhineland-Westphalia, the big industrialists announced in effect to all of Germany that Hitler was no longer to be regarded as a lunatic-fringe politician, but was now in the big time, and enjoyed powerful backing. Lochner knows Germany well enough to be fully conversant with this fact, yet he hedges and weaves page after page in an attempt to prove that it was just a chance meeting with no special significance.

FRITZ THYSSEN, one of the first major industrialists to get on Hitler’s bandwagon, wrote in his autobiography: “As a result of the address, which created a deep impression, a number of larger contributions from heavy industry sources flowed into the treasury of the Nazi party.” Fritz ThysSEN was certainly in a position to know, but Lochner goes into a Philadelphia lawyer’s courtroom act to demonstrate that ThysSEN’s authorized autobiography was written by a ghost-writer, and issued without ThysSEN’s proper approval!

In the event that this line of argumentation does not convince you, Lochner produces another clincher: “Besides, their positions did not place them in a position to determine Hitler’s political fortunes. Without an electrifying idea and a dynamic leader a mass movement cannot succeed. National Socialism appealed to both the national and social instincts of the German people and had as leader a man with compelling magnetism and unbounded energy.” Which is all very true, but a deliberate effort to divert attention from the question at hand: Were leading German industrialists and bankers guilty or not guilty of helping Hitler to power?

On January 4, 1933 took place the fateful meeting between Hitler and Von Papen, the political broker for the big industrialists, at the home of Baron Von Schroeder, the former Cigarette magnate who was already evidence to the power that-be the Von Schleicher police government couldn’t last, and that Germany was on the eve of decisive events. The deal was closed, and the fat boys smoothed Hitler’s way to taking power by legal appointment as Chancellor. "Wir haben Hitler engagiert!" (We have hired Hitler), chortled the overjoyed Von Papen. But to explain, they were only partially right. They had hired Hitler all right, but the price for his services came higher than they had anticipated. He wiped out communism, socialism, trade unionism. But in return for safeguarding private property and capitalist privileges, he disfranchised the capitalists politically, and ran the governmental show with his gang of Nazi freebooters and a swollen bureaucracy subservient to them.

Lochner sums up the conduct of Germany’s industrialist class before and during Hitler’s rule by quoting an anonymous high American official who served under Roosevelt and Truman and has been retained by Eisenhower: “By and large, I believe German businessmen could act only from the way American, British, French, or any other industry would have acted under similar conditions. The German industrial leaders were not worse than those of other countries, but they faced a situation which the leaders in no other industrialized nation had to face. They did the best they could.”

For once Lochner, with the help of his anonymous high official, comes clean. That is absolutely right. The German plutocrats acted no differently than would the American, or British, or French, under similar circumstances. Nazism was not the result of defects in the German national character. That accusation was just slapdash humbug. Nazism was the result of a decaying capitalism. What were the special circumstances that turned cultured upper-class Germans into moral monsters? It was the social crisis, and the threat of communism to their privileged “way of life.”

B. C.
An Accommodating Marxist


HAROLD J. LASKI was an outstanding example of the middle-class intellectual socialist who was strongly attracted by consistent and thoughtful Marxist ideas, but who at the same time shrank from their application in practice. He could write carnivorous prose, but, in daily politics and activity, he scaled his appetites down to a more vegetarian diet. For all his attributes of learning and intellectual vigor, one can only be thankful that the mantle of leadership of British left-wing socialism has passed from the intellectuals of his school to a radical ex-miner. Anæurin Bevan may not be as erudite as Laski, nor even as far “advanced” and formally “correct” in his outlook on many matters, but he at least has shown that he knows how to put up a fight for left-wing ideas, and that is worth a dozen exhaustive treatises.

Laski was not just a man; Laski is a type: a present-day current example is R. H. S. Crossman. Crossman, widely regarded as the leading Bevanite intellectual, has been translating the ideas of radical Bevanism into polished prose in the pages of the New Statesman and Nation; he has been the most formidable and subtle of the protagonists of more socialism inside Britain and more neutralism outside. Yet, when put to the shock test in the recent nerve-wracking crisis of the Labor Party, the best advice he was able to fish out of the profundities of his mind was that Bevan ought to be more accommodating in his conduct towards the Morrisons and the Gaitskells. For that kind of advice, Bevan doesn’t need Crossman; all he has to do is ask Atlee. It was a revealing incident in the too-neglected political realm of those qualities of nerve and temper which are the first ingredients of a fighting socialist, taking precedence even over learning and grace of prose style.

In his early years, Laski, as befits a youthful intellectual, was a ferocious nihilistic libertarian, urging every individual to be a judge of the state, and disobey it when it came into conflict with the dictates of his own conscience. But, in applying this doctrine, he was not attracted by the consistent philosophical anarchism of the Bakunin, Kropotkin, or even Tolstoy varieties; he cautiously took his stand with the Proudhonist advocacy of a federal republic of district and industry assemblies. During and after World War I, Laski was a lecturer at Harvard; when the Boston police strike of 1919 occurred, he issued a statement in which he deplored the strike’s risk of rising wages and his resignation. He was later to write of the United States: “I saw there, more nakedly than I had seen in Europe, the significance of the struggle between capital and labor.” During the twenties, his evolution toward Marxism continued, and was given a sharp impetus by the collapse of capitalist economic stability in the depression. By 1935, he was able to write:

“‘No tool at the command of the social philosopher surpasses Marxism either in its power to explain the movement of ideas or in its authority to predict their practical outcome. On the nature and function of the State, on legal institutions, on capitalist habits, on historiography, on the development of philosophical systems, Marxism holds the field against any of its rivals. On the breakdown of capitalist democracy, the decline of bourgeois culture, the rise of Fascism, the role of non-revolutionary socialism, it has insights not possessed by any alternative method of analysis.”

Laski had come to the point where he described himself as a revolutionary socialist, and in truth his writings and speeches qualified him for that description, for he argued against the illusion that the transition to socialism will be a gradualistic process of social reform by acquiescence, and warned the working people to be prepared for shocks ahead, as the capitalists would never submit, even if outvoted, without a violent resistance.

YET, even leaving aside periodic lapses from this viewpoint in his writings, Laski managed to merge this Marxism with a life of active and almost daily collaboration with the leadership of the Labor Party, in which he was himself a prominent figure. He became a member of the National Executive Committee in 1936, and in 1945, when Labor came to power, he was Chairman of the Executive Committee, and remained closely associated with the tops of the party until his death in 1950. Yet, through this entire period, his published writings were in sharp contradiction to the major policies followed by the Labor leadership.

In 1939, for example, he was closely associated with the Stafford Cripps-Anæurin Bevan view for a broad leftist front against the Conservatives, for a different policy towards Spain, etc. When Cripps, Bevan and George Strauss were expelled from the Labor Party for advocating their views, Laski made no move of solidarity with them, and remained a member of the Executive for another 11 years.

He disagreed with the prevalent reformist view, and ridiculed the Attlees and Ernest Bevin for inviting “the capitalists to cooperate in their own abdication.” He disagreed with much of war policy (during the war he detected a superiority in British imperialism in that it was already sated and therefore not so voracious), feeling that the Labor Party was yielding too much in the coalition, and would emerge weakened from the war. In the post-war period, he held neutralist opinions, and deplored the line of Churchill’s Fulton speech, at a time when the Labor Party leadership was carrying on the cold war with a vigor that almost matched that of Wall Street. Yet, during all this time, he never broke with the party leadership, never tried to pioneer a left wing, never even saw the need for that salutary exile which political figures must take from the centers of power when they have no say over its exercise and are in sharp disagreement with those who do.

In view of this, one is entitled to ask just how much Laski contributed to left-wing socialism in his lifetime. His fatal flaw is plain: He thought that all political strategy and all political thought should be conducted in an atmosphere where it was assumed that a socialist always has the duty of showing himself to be more reasonable than the other guy. Hence his radical socialism became nothing more than an endless series of accommodations to those who were not so accommodating or reasonable—and right-wing bureaucrats are notoriously unreasonable.

Still, it cannot be denied that Laski did a considerable job of work in making socialism more popular, in buttressing left-wing ideas with arguments and facts, in spreading the basic ideas of Marxism. His long years of tenure at the London School of Economics and Political Science and his lectures elsewhere brought Marxism to many young students, some of whom have gone on to service in the socialist movement. He was a prime factor in weakening the hold of Fabianism in the British Labor Party and restoring Marxism to prominence.

Laski was a very prolific writer, pouring out a steady stream of pamphlets and articles, many of which contained much that is interesting and thoughtful. One need only dip into his last major work, “The American Democracy,” to find hundreds of pages of absorbing interpretation of United States society. In this respect, his contribution cannot be denied.

MR. DEANE has written his book about Laski as an academic chore. At the risk of sounding totalitarian, one is tempted to advise that such labors should be prohibited, or at least discouraged. Work that is undertaken without real interest or un-
nderstanding is bound to be formal, stilted, and flat and discouraging to the reader. To Mr. Deane, Laski is not a political or intellectual personality, not a figure in the evolution of the British socialist movement, not a theorist to whom one may turn for enlightenment, stimulation or even disagreement; Laski is merely a . . . Topic. And since no one has yet found a way to write a doctoral dissertation without a Topic, Laski can serve as well as another; even better than another, as Mr. Deane won with it the Clarke F. Ansley Award for 1953 at Columbia University.

His book is rigidly constructed on a scheme of parts (to cover periods in Laski's life) and categories of thinking, and is written with all the mechanical certitude and failure to comprehend social nuances that seem to attach so naturally to most opponents of "mechanical Marxist dogmatism." His ideas appear in far more flexible, lively and compact form in the writings of Columbia's Professor Robert M. MacIver, who, while also a Marx-killer, is at least of an older and more thoughtful breed and can be read with nostalgia compared with the arrogant log-choppers the schools are turning out nowadays.

H. B.

The Loyal and Discreet

Security Risk


THE growth of science over the last fifty years has, like an enormous snowball rolling downhill, achieved a tremendous self-generating force, but it has proved unable to determine its own course. The hope which many scientists had shared that this overwhelming weight of scientific achievement would help bring widespread abundance and a rational relationship among humans has become, in a short space of time, a fragile and distant illusion for them. The pressure of capitalist development has shifted from its former role as an emancipating force to the burden-some yoke of a declining system that chooses new studies and new goals for science. This is evidenced both in the insane pace of weapons development and in the pall of fear that hangs over the centers of learning.

The Oppenheimer case has drawn a new all-around picture of the American scientist. In a field where ingenuity and boldness are prerequisites for new advances, the web of intimidation has set a premium on mediocrity and conformity. Their vaunted freedom has been denied American scientists more than any other social group. They are checked and-crosschecked by government informers and agents from the cradle to the grave.

An important effect of this has been to reduce what was originally a large group in opposition to the new mass-destructive weapons to only a very few notables. The mainstream of the scientific community has been whipped into line, and functions as the deaf-mute computing machine for the government. Those who might have served to crystallize any sentiment against this course were effectively purged. Which picture is more lamentable, whether Galileo on his knees in the Vatican recanting that the earth goes around the sun, or Oppenheimer recanting his opposition to the manufacture of the hydrogen bomb would be hard to determine.

Yet the atmosphere is not entirely unredeemed. Many scientists have rallied, if not on the broader issue of super-bomb warfare, at least on the defense of Oppenheimer, their most noteworthy and representative victim. And, in this general spirit of a liberal crusade, the Alsop brothers, widely syndicated columnists, have written, with a ruling oligarchy bent on crushing the smallest crystal of independent thought which could distract from the war build-up.

The Alsops prove conclusively that the substantial legal charges necessary for the dismissal of so important a personage as Oppenheimer were never really advanced: neither espionage nor disloyalty, nor even indiscretion. Surely, they assert, "it is an insane contradiction in terms to say, as Gray and Morgan said, that a man is devotedly loyal to his country, conspicuously discreet in dealing with secret matters, and a public servant whose contribution the nation cannot hope to repay, and then to add, as a sort of afterthought, as it were, that he is also a security risk."

In this book we are conducted through the maze of documents and hearing testimony, and learn some remarkable things. We see how Oppenheimer earned the hatred of the head of the AEC by disputing his thoroughly stupid attempt to ban the use of radioactive isotopes as a "security measure"; how the Air Force heads turned against Oppenheimer because he didn't favor the building of the atom-powered aircraft ("I don't challenge his technical judgment," remarked the General plaintively, "but at the same time he felt less strongly opposed to nuclear-powered ships."); how Oppen- heimer's initial opposition to the crash program to build the H-bomb was later used against him.

To this day, however, it can hardly be said that the liberals, including the Alsops, understand the implications of this case which they have to try to probe so fully and which they have so incompletely. They have fought it with something less than full honesty, attempting to pretend that Oppenheimer differed with his military and business superiors solely on technical grounds, had a different appreciation of specific scientific matters, or at most differed with them on the concept of America's defense.

The fact is that Oppenheimer, with his dissident past and humanistic sentiments, was out of step with the callous militarization of the nation, and, although he tried to hide this fact and conform in sufficient measure, he didn't always succeed in making his conformity complete, unreserved, peaceful. To his enemies, his misgivings about the H-bomb, and for a while he opposed it flatly because of the fear that it would lead to a race towards the destruction of mankind. Despite this fear and opposition, Oppenheimer cooperated in full, in his efforts and activities. His brain was theirs, but he tried to keep a little corner of his soul for his own-his "arrogance of intellectual judgment," they called it. Nor was Oppenheimer alone in this; it is the attitude of probably a majority of the top scientists, most of whom, however, manage to conceal it rather better than he does.

In this sense, the Oppenheimer purge was not the "mistake" or "miscarriage of justice" it is often pictured. The witch-hunters are driven by hysteria, yes, but behind that hysteria there is a guiding force of cold calculation. When they are told that actions like the Oppenheimer purge can only result in the destruction of cultural and scientific freedom, and in the production of a monstrous caste of mechanical men, thoughtless, ruthless, indifferent, invariable, "the citizens," of clothes—thatch doesn't deter them because that's exactly what they want.

In driving out Oppenheimer, the industrial-militarist cabal hoped to intimidate many others. One of today's better signs is that they did not entirely succeed. There has been much intimidation, but also a courageous reaction of opposition; witness the boycott by scientists of one university which refused to let Oppenheimer lecture, and witness the cordon sanitaire with which the scientists have surrounded Oppenheimer's chief scientist-opponent, that prime example of the hardened robot for whom no program of destruction has been too absurdly, Edward Teller.

But the scientists still, like all other sectors of the population, lack a political rallying point, an opposition which rejects the insane crusade against communism at the risk of humanity's life. When there is such an opposition, many scientists will join it, as they have in other Western countries.

M. B.
The Company We Keep

I have just seen, by chance, the April issue of the American Socialist. I like it. Please enroll me for a subscription. . . .

As fine as many articles were, especially the analysis of Khrushchev's agricultural policy ["Malenkov's Fall and the Agricultural Problem in Russia," by Harry Braverman], what impressed me most were the letters. I have never seen a letter column at once so full of confidence and action and also of information. I don't exaggerate to say that, important as everything in the issue was, that was its finest page.

If a magazine is known by the reader-company it keeps, you have a fine family, and I'd like to be in it. I hope the future issues are as good.

B. L. Ann Arbor, Mich.

Award for a War-Monger

On April 14, I attended a public forum at Museum of Modern Art on the topic "Is Coexistence Possible?" The chairman was the Oregon Senator Richard Neuberger, who confessed in a witty manner that he, like the rest of the Senators, doesn't know much about this problem and would like to hear the opinion of the distinguished experts in this field. The panelists were: the historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Harry Schwartz of the N.Y. Times, Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer, and Bertram Wolfe.

The first two panelists took the affirmative position regarding the possibility of coexistence, with all the reservations, of course, for the necessity of "acting from positions of strength." Dr. Niemeyer (closely connected with different agencies of the State Department) developed the historical background of the cold war as an unavoidable result of the existence of two powerful nations which can destroy each other and are both afraid of it.

The high point of vituperation against the possibility of any kind of coexistence was reached by the renegade from socialism, Bertram Wolfe, who called the notion a "venomous semantics" invented by the demons in the Kremlin to lull the "free world." When asked by one of the panelists whether he is for throwing atom bombs and starting a war over Quemoy-Matsu, he said that this country should draw a line somewhere—in accordance with strategic considerations—over which this country should not hesitate to use force (which is the precise answer that Senator Knowland, the extreme right-wing Republican, gives).

Then at the end of the evening, appeared Norman Thomas, who delivered to Bertram Wolfe a check for $5,000 from Tamiment Institute (which had organized the forum), in appreciation of his "fight against totalitarianism." All of us know the evolution of Norman Thomas, but nevertheless, as a socialist, I felt deeply disturbed to see the leader of the Socialist Party taking on himself the shamefaced role of presenting an award to a rabid instigator of war.

A. B. New York

A Dry-Run Trial

I have lent out a few copies of the American Socialist and it has met with a favorable response, even among non-socialists. I find that people are tired and annoyed with the official and semi-official views, which are about all that reach the public here from the U.S. Why don't you, as a dry-run trial, send me about five copies of the next issue, and I will see if I can get them placed.

M. D. Rio de Janeiro

The Use of Doublethink

I am under the impression that we in America have freedom of speech only so long as we do not try to exercise that right. However, if we are to have in reality the freedom which we are told that we have, we must exercise this right even though it is rather dangerous that we do so. Your views are, as mine, on the unpopular side. Washingtonians do not approve, it would seem, and if a man is not a clear-cut Republican or Democrat he is, by the use of "doublethink," a communist revolutionary and subject to unlawful laws. Quite a problem.

A. S. Minneapolis

I Felt Lost Without It

It is with great pleasure that I am sending (belatedly) my renewal to the American Socialist. I thought much of it, and felt lost without it. No one can live without contact with the socialist or communist (depending upon what some people would like to interpret it) point of view. So, good luck to you, and would like to see more readers and thinkers and believers. . . .

J. R. W. Penna.

The articles in the American Socialist have been very informative and revealing. Well written. It fills a definite need.

R. J. Hawaii

Socialist Reaffirmation

In expressing my appreciation of your journal, I would urge—perhaps mostly for the benefit of other high-school students like myself—a reaffirmation of socialist theory and history, especially in this time of indictment by those of the Max Eastman stripe. . . . Please send me a bound Volume I of the American Socialist.

E. J. T. St. Louis

Credit to its Publishers

The American Socialist does credit to its publishers. With an expanded literature and art section and with more foreign coverage, it would soon match a publication like the New Statesman and Nation of the British Labor Party's left wing.

R. E. Chicago
MEMEINGS sponsored by the AMERICAN SOCIALIST in various cities have proved to be popular with our readers. Attendance is slowly growing, and those who come once often return and bring a friend.

In New York, a series of four lectures has just been concluded, and all of them were profitable both for those who attended and for this magazine, resulting in new subscribers, new friends, new supporters. Bert Cochran spoke at two of these meetings on the history of the Debs socialist movement, and Harry Braverman on certain basic trends in the American economy (the material in these lectures will be published in coming issues). In Detroit, Bert Cochran spoke recently to a well-attended and enthusiastic meeting of auto workers, university students and others, and, while there, spoke also to a meeting of the Detroit Review of the Month Forum.

Those who attend are able to meet staff members, become acquainted with other readers and supporters, and, in addition, get the benefit of a more detailed analysis than we often have space for in our pages (even those speeches which we do occasionally publish are considerably abbreviated). They may ask questions and participate in a discussion.

Not every meeting sponsored by the AMERICAN SOCIALIST is advertised in these pages. Those which are arranged too late to meet our deadline do not receive notice.

Therefore, if you wish to be informed of all meetings held in your area under the sponsorship of this magazine, you should send your name and address to our business office in New York, and you will be sure to receive notification. In addition, if you would like to arrange meetings for the AMERICAN SOCIALIST among your friends, let us know and we can help with the arrangements and sometimes send a speaker.

NEW YORK READERS:

Book review and social evening: Hear Irving Bein in review Murray Kempton's "Part of Our Time." Be on hand at 863 Broadway (near 17th Street), on Saturday, June 11, at 8:30 pm. Refreshments will be served, and all readers and their friends are invited. Contribution: 50 cents.

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