Disarmament Maneuvers in the Cold War

Six Pages of Proposals and Views on the Problems of U.S. Radicalism
O PPOSITION to continuing nuclear bomb tests, which has swept the world, is beginning to show itself in this country as well. An open letter of protest has been sent to President Eisenhower by nineteen prominent Chicagoans, including Bishop Sheil of the Catholic Church; Dr. Ross, executive secretary of the Methodist World Peace Board; Dr. Graubert, prominent rabbi; Professor Riesman of Chicago University; Dr. Davidson, chairman of the Chicago Atomic Scientists.

The N. Y. Times carried another protest, as an advertisement, signed by forty individuals including Roger Baldwin of the International League for the Rights of Man; Reverend Donald Harrington of the New York Community Church; Lewis Hoskins and Clarence Pickett of the American Friends (Quakers); Reverend A. J. Muste of the Fellowship of Reconciliation; Norman Thomas, Socialist Party leader; Dorothy Day, editor of a Catholic Worker; and Freda Kirchwey of the Nation.

THE May 11 Dispatcher, paper of the West Coast Longshore union, carries this comment on the new security regulations issued by the Coast Guard:

"For the past five years the Coast Guard has been administering a wholly illegal waterfront front-screening program against longshoremen and seamen. On the basis of secret accusation, suspicion and rumor, it has blacklisted thousands. . . .

"Last October the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled these procedures to be, in violation of the Constitution. In the face of this decision the Coast Guard sent out secret orders to its hearing officers to pay no attention to the ruling, but to carry on as usual. Then, near the deadline of time for appeal, the Department of Justice and the Coast Guard decided not to risk taking the matter to the Supreme Court, where it feared an even stronger ruling. . . .

"Instead of appealing, the Coast Guard announced it would revise its regulations to conform with the ruling of the court. The new regulations . . . retain with new language all the abuses of the old regulations.

"Knowing it took five years of litigation to reveal their unlawful acts in court, the Coast Guard banks now on another five years of litigation over its new regulations. . . . All of our membership should be aware of what the Coast Guard is doing. It has changed the language, but not the intent or the method. They want to allow it to go on with further union-busting blacklisting while we spend our energy and money in court for another five years it is our own fault.

"Let the Coast Guard pass go stick, and if we are then violating the law by protecting ourselves against illegal procedures, let the Coast Guard go to court."

A. PHILIP Randolph, president of the Sleeping Car Porters and vice-president of the AFL-CIO, has announced a national campaign to raise $2 million from union sources to fight discrimination. George Meany is campaign chairman, and David Dubinsky is secretary. Dubinsky's garment union is starting the campaign with a $10,000 contribution, and the 12,000 members of Randolf's union will each be asked to contribute an hour's wages. Meany, in his Atlantic City address to the garment union convention, rejected the "go slow" urging of Southern unionists. He said labor has to "go all the way" for civil rights. In New York, many AFL-CIO local unions are backing the mass civil rights rally at Madison Square Garden, May 24, sponsored by the Sleeping Car Porters, the NAACP, and others.

LITTLE energy is being shown by the Department of Justice in the case of Dr. Jesus de Galindez. Missing since March 12, Dr. Galindez was a faculty member at Columbia and a columnist for the Spanish paper El Diario. It is widely suspected that he has been assassinated by agents of the Trujillo regime of the Dominican Republic. The AFL-CIO, the American Civil Liberties Union, and numerous other organizations have called for action but Brownell has evinced little interest. The Inter-American Press Association, which includes over 400 papers in the Western Hemisphere, has called the matter directly to Eisenhower's attention. Its board of directors demanded an official inquiry. The board statement recalled that when he disappeared Dr. Galindez was "in the process of publishing a highly caustic and critical thesis" about the Dominican dictator. It added that in the last few years there have been five mysterious assassinations and disappearances of opponents of the Trujillo regime.

Washington, which has a military pact with Trujillo and keeps him well-stocked with arms, continues to parade this Latin American dictator as a hero of the "free world." When the Dominican ambassador presented his credentials, Eisenhower praised Trujillo for his "determination to defend the historic traditions of the free world," and assured him that he would "enjoy strong support from the government of the United States."

THE independent United Electrical union is having a grim time holding its own. Brownell is trying to bust it under the anti-Communist law. It is still not all in the clear from the exhausting five-month Westinghouse strike, as its Local 107 at Essington, near Philadelphia, is now in the seventh month of a gallant fight to ward off a company attack to slash wages.

Several weeks ago, the negotiations for unity with the IUE of the AFL-CIO broke down. Then, the leaders of District 4 of the UE, which comprises some 18,000 members in New York and New Jersey, voted to dissociate and join the IUE. This is the same thing that happened last year when the International Harvester Board voted to join the CIO auto union; and in both cases it was reputed Communist influence that was responsible for the switch. The Carey leadership of the IUE is following the deliberate strategy of trying to atomize the UE and take in its locals on an individual basis. James Matles, UE organization director, states that his union will fight the secession movement local by local and contract by contract.

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AMERICAN SOCIALIST
Disarmament Maneuvers
In the Cold War

At the moment when the Soviet announcement of a 1,200,000-man cut in Russian armed forces hit the front pages, Defense Secretary Wilson was involved with assorted army, air force and naval brass in an argument over whether aircraft carriers or advance bases in Europe, Africa and Asia would be better for bombing Russian cities. With this important matter still unsettled, the Administration naturally was irritated by the Soviet move, and met it with what the N. Y. Times correspondent in Washington called “consistent caution tinged with gloom.” In his May 16 dispatch this reporter enlarged on the Washington attitude:

... there was no rejoicing here. With the $34,900,000,000 defense appropriations request and the $4,900,000,000 foreign-aid request still before Congress, the Administration was being careful not to encourage the economy advocates on Capitol Hill by assigning too much importance to the Moscow announcement.

Dulles’ line, which the commercial press parroted with a uniformity that hardly could have been improved by a rigid totalitarian censorship law, was simple: What counts, he said, is not men but arms. A cut in the Russian army, releasing more than a million men for factory and agricultural production, makes Russia more of a threat than ever, as the economic substructure for the Soviet military machine can be strengthened, and the men can always be called back. By this reasoning, Russia’s big army demobilization is an aggressive move of the first magnitude. If we resist a mood of levity that has a tendency to grow upon us whenever Mr. Dulles makes one of his celebrated analyses and examine this matter more critically, a number of conclusions emerge.

Walter Lippmann granted the contention that a large land army is not the crux of modern warfare quite readily. But, he added, “the more it is proved by Mr. Dulles that the Soviets have lost nothing by economizing military manpower, the more impressive will be the example they have set. For Britain, France and Germany are short of industrial manpower. Military service is regarded as a wasteful and tiresome thing.” He then goes on to question whether Russia may not have grasped the nature of modern warfare more quickly than the United States, and thus have been quicker to capitalize upon it.

As he generally does, Mr. Lippmann has here ended an analysis at the very point where the line of thought he opens becomes most interesting. There has been a revolution in warfare wrought by nuclear bombs, and from that point of view it is true that Russia has not crippled her own military potential by the reduction in armed forces. But the United States has realized the meaning of the revolution in warfare too, as its own reductions in the land-army establishment over recent years testify, together with the stepped-up program of super-plane, super-bomb, and super-missile development. The big difference between Russian and United States attitudes on this matter has not been military but political. The Pentagon has made every move towards a reduction in land armies with great fears and trepidations that somebody might get the impression this was being done out of a desire for peace and a relaxation of tensions, and Washington has accompanied the military cuts of recent years with a barrage of flaming warnings and exhortations.

Thus, while what Russia is doing may be good military doctrine, as Lippmann indicates, it is also being used as good disarmament propaganda, while the steps that the Pentagon has taken on the path of the same military doctrine have been taken more surreptitiously, and with the greatest of care that neither our allies nor the neutrals be permitted to take them as a sign of a relaxation of international tension and as harbingers of more significant disarmament moves. While Russia has been trying to bring the cold war to an end, Washington has frankly made it clear that it is trying to keep it going until its world designs are attained—a prospect increasingly difficult to visualize—and that is the difference between the Soviet and Pentagon army cuts of the past few years. Military doctrine may have a strong hand in the Soviet demobilization plans for almost two million men announced in the past months, but the Russian leaders have also made it clear that they are not averse to seeing their moves snowball towards a deeper disarmament plan, while this is just what the Pentagon is afraid of. The N. Y. Times Review of the Week for May 20 hinted at the point:

In response to this changed outlook there have already been sizable cutbacks of manpower on both sides. The U. S. has scaled down from a high of 3.5 million in January, 1953; Britain reduced service personnel by 50,000 last year, and is planning a further cut of 22,000 and an end, in 1958, to conscription; Russia last year announced a cut of 640,000 men. But whereas Russia represented her cut as a move toward disarmament, the U.S. and Britain acknowledged their reductions were an adjustment to changed strategic considerations—a “new look,” placing, as Secretary Dulles put it, “primary reliance” on “massive retaliation.”

Gushing “internationalist” liberals of the ADA variety will quickly come forward now to complain that “we lack imagination” or “our diplomatic footwork is too slow” because Washington has failed to picture its own army reductions as a step towards disarma-
ment while the Russians have “cleverly” done so. We wonder how many instances of this kind are required before it becomes clear to them that Washington policy is aimed at precisely what it wants accomplished, and that certain roads are closed to it which are open to Russian policy by virtue of its objects.

The full U.N. Disarmament Commission is meeting in mid-June, and if this occasion is taken to examine the chances for actually getting a bit of real disarmament in the world, it has to be conceded at the outset that the history of the past four decades doesn’t offer too many grounds for hope. The twenties and thirties were also a time of considerable disarmament discussions, but the record is a sorry one.

The most celebrated peace achievement of the inter-war years was the Kellogg-Briand pact “outlawing war.” By 1932, 62 nations, including all the most important ones, had signed it. The hollow mockery of the instrument became fully clear in the light of later happenings, but even at the time, little trust could be placed in the sincerity of the signing nations when they deemed it necessary to hedge the pact with the following exceptions: War was permissible 1) in “self-defense,” 2) in executing obligations under all previous treaties, 3) in all other cases arising under the League of Nations Covenant or under the Locarno agreement. Finally, Britain added a special reservation with regard to “certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety.” Thus in sum, the Kellogg-Briand pact provided with more or less open hypocrisy that war would not be used as an instrument of national policy by the signatories except where they felt they had a good reason. But there are few who believe that the outcome would have been different even had the pact been iron-clad and copper-riveted with guarantees.

Then there was the naval-limitations story. In 1921-22, President Harding initiated discussions which led to an agreement to declare a holiday on all capital-ship construction, and set a limit on the capital ships possessed by the major naval powers. For a while it looked as though the barefoot lad from Marion, Ohio, had shown all the European slicksters how to do it, but the sordid tale has unraveled to a different effect.

The conference achieved America’s aim of naval parity with Britain and restricting Japan to a lesser position. But even this limitation, not abolition, of naval armaments broke down in a couple of years with the increasing rivalries of the major powers.

During most of the inter-war period, British military and diplomatic policy was directed towards its traditional aim of preventing the rise of a great power on the Continent, and playing off France and Germany against each other. With the Allied victory in World War I, France became the big threat to British supremacy in European affairs, and the British rulers were out to cut that country down to size. The disarmament negotiations all the way down to Hitler’s precipitation of the arms race were directed to that end. The British strove to set severe limits on the size of the French army and navy, and Washington was cunningly drawn into this game. The naval limitation of French capital ships to about one-third of Britain and the U.S.—the same parity level set for Italy and far below that accorded Japan—was an effort in that direction.

At the same time, the British were interested in their own freedom to build a large number of light cruisers, very useful to the Admiralty in patrolling the long lifelines of Empire, and to keep down the number of heavy cruisers permitted to the United States, as these were a type the British feared most in American hands as a threat to naval supremacy. In September 1928, the N.Y. American uncovered a secret London-Paris deal in which the French agreed to back the British stand on the unrestricted building of light cruisers, while the British in return agreed to relax their attitude on French army reserves. Exploding with indignation over this revelation, Congress a few months later appropriated more money to build a new aircraft carrier and 15 heavy cruisers.

When Hitler came to power in 1933 and showed his intention to rearm, the British rushed in to secure “justice for Germany” by calling for the doubling of the German army while cutting down the size of the army permitted to France. This was the last “disarmament plan” before the feverish race began. A more sordid story can hardly be imagined.

Meanwhile, during all this period of “disarmament,” world armaments expenditures were vastly higher than even during the arms race which preceded World War I. Here are the comparative figures (1928=100):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>World Armaments Expenditures</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>107</td>
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This was before the arms race had started.

In actual fact, the disarmament conferences and agreements of this period were nothing but cynical jockeyings for military advantage and position, played out with very little thought for world public opinion. When in 1928, Maxim Litvinov, the Russian delegate, urged upon a conference complete and absolute disarmament, including the abolition of all military, naval, and air forces and ministries, and the destruction of all heavy weap-
ons, fortresses, and war-material factories, he was turned upon with indignation for mistaking the purpose of a disarmament gathering. A historian relates:

The Soviet proposal was tabled after a bitter speech by Lord Cushendun, who intimated that the real motive of the scheme was to enable the Bolsheviks the better to carry on their international propaganda. When Litvinov thereupon advanced a second plan, providing for gradual and proportional disarmament according to a fixed scale, Dr. John Loudon, president of the commission, requested the Soviet delegation to attend future meetings "in a constructive spirit and not with the idea of destroying the work . . . already done."

When the second World War ended, disarmament again came to the fore with a peculiar urgency, as the threat of the atom bomb had frightened millions and the search was on for some means to prevent its use or further development. A series of negotiations ensued in which the two sides had such opposite motives that agreement was impossible. Russia, feverishly trying to develop its own atomic weapons, was interested mainly in a pact which would outlaw the use of A-bombs, in order to create a moral and public-opinion barrier which might delay or prevent the employment of the bomb by its sole possessor. The United States, on the other side, was resolved to prevent such a commitment, as it was counting heavily upon the bomb to enforce its will on the rest of the world. The negotiations, in all their intricacies, were guided mainly by these antagonistic lines of policy. In his objective "History of the Cold War" the British writer Kenneth Ingram has summarized the by-play quite fairly:

The popular impression . . . current in Western circles that the Soviet Union had proved obdurately obstructive in the course of these negotiations, had raised difficulties merely for selfish ends and had refused to give any consideration to Western criticism, was not factually accurate. The Soviet objections were understandable, in so far as the Western plan would have placed Russia under a grave disadvantage with respect to the peaceful use of atomic development for industrial purposes; and the Soviet Government did in fact offer concessions and make constructive proposals, unsatisfactory in many respects as these proposals may have been. Secondly, the failure of the negotiations was yet a further expression of the deep distrust on each side as to the motives of the opposite group. Given that distrust, none of the schemes presented could have been acceptable to all parties concerned.

The negotiations broke down completely in 1949, by which time Russia already had the bomb. For a long time there was little motion on the disarmament front. But, as the next years passed, as the H-Bomb horror was added to the A-Bomb terror, the powers were increasingly forced towards their present mutual "non-suicide pact," as it has been called. In this situation, the disarmament front became fluid again, all the more so as the new Soviet diplomacy after Stalin's death began to fill the international air with proposals and initiatives.

Prior to 1955, the Russians had made a ban on the nuclear weapons the chief focus of their argument, an approach which the West rejected indignantly as leaving Russia, with conventional-weapon and manpower superiority, predominant in Europe. But, just before the Geneva conference of heads of state, the Soviet Union on May 10 startled the Western diplomats with a policy change which virtually accepted the West's plan, particularly the schemes of the British and French. Priority was given to disarmament in non-nuclear weapons, the parity levels of armies and the timetables proposed by Eden were largely agreed to, the idea of smaller-scale "pilot" projects was generally accepted, and the way was opened for motion along the lines previously laid down by the capitalist nations.

The result: consternation. Joseph Alsop reported that "the Pentagon is up in arms now because serious disarmament talks seem to be a possi-
much-developed art, it is not up to such a job. It would take tens of millions of photographs to cover the areas of each of these nations. There are not enough planes and pilots in the world to carry on the inspection of any one of these nations with sufficient care so that missile-launching bases or H-Bomb installations could be discovered with any degree of sureness. There are not enough specialists trained to interpret such a flood of photographs.

2) Under any such plan, a nightmare of alarums and excursions would ensue that would keep the world in a state of tension and on the brink of war; a nightmare so tangle and dangerous that it is happy to think this is one scheme that has absolutely no chance of being put into practice.

3) The Russians would never accept the prospect of flotillas of American planes flying over their territories (to avert war and calm things down), and one can hardly blame them. And would we? Can anyone conceive of the U.S. Congress, or the American people for that matter, acquiescing in the name of a “lessening of tensions” to the actual beginning of flights of Russian planes by the hundreds and thousands over America’s cities? Were the Russians to suppress their laughter and actually do Eisenhower dirt by accepting the plan, would it have any chance of American acceptance?

The Eisenhower plan was good for a certain amount of what James Reston called “propaganda mileage,” but not much else, all the more so as it has been coupled with a refusal of the Soviet offers to cut conventional armaments, halt all H-Bomb tests, and make good on previous disarmament commitments. It was nothing but a shield to ward off all disarmament talk—which looked as though it was getting too serious.

So long as the present Pentagon stand continues, it is not likely that there is any prospect for real disarmament negotiations, let alone actual disarming. In the meantime the West continues to put its anti-war faith in one nostrum: deterrent power, or the balance of terror. This line of argument has been most plainly put by the London Economist, with that insistent British upper-class logic that only Jonathan Swift has succeeded in satirizing adequately. Having concluded that the best which could be salvaged out of this precarious age was a brink-of-the-abysse tentering sort of peace, the Economist has even argued against the cessation of H-Bomb tests, on the ground that the state of terror, if further perfected, would make war still more unlikely.

It cannot be denied, as the whole world recognized after Geneva, that the prospect of a war has been functioning as its own greatest preventive, and without it we might already be in the third World War. But can the people of the world feel genuinely safe so long as this is the chief safeguard? The great theorist in martial matters, Clausewitz, explained long ago in the opening chapters of his major work that if wars could be settled in advance by a mere casting up of accounts as to the power disposed by the antagonists, there would not have to be any wars; but, he added, each side hopes to bring sufficient force to bear in its military blows to alter the balance of power, and miscalculations as well as shrewd estimates are often involved. The old concept of the “balance of power” failed repeatedly to avert war and the reasons why it never worked may be found at some future date to apply as well to the present “balance of terror.” While it is doing yeoman’s duty today to stave off the immediate prospect of war, who is so bold as to assure us that it will always work?

The record does not offer much room for hope that top-level disarmament negotiations can be the independent means for reducing the danger of war. The nations are not likely to surrender their war-making powers so long as the more basic antagonisms, and the reasons for those antagonisms, remain. Only when an uncrasable movement for peace has arisen in all the countries, and particularly here in the United States where the most crying deficiency in recent years has been the absence of such a broad peace movement, will a new form of security be shaped to replace the precarious balance of terror that hangs over all our heads.

Six Months of Labor Unity

Following trade union affairs has been a depressing business in recent times, and the half-year history of the great united American labor movement has provided no exception to this rule. The millenium is certainly no closer since Meany and Reuther clasped hands before the cameras at the New York 71st Regimental Armory last December.

The Teamsters, forced to abandon their alliance with the East Coast longshore union, are still on the prowl for jurisdictional snatching; the Building Trades are holding up unity in the city and state federations to try to blackmail the industrial unions; Petrillo’s Musicians are still scabbing on their striking brothers at the Miami hotels; and the long-threatened organization campaign is still in the threatening stage. Livingstone, in charge of organization, has a staff of some 320 organizers. What they are doing except drawing pay nobody knows.

Of course, Meany figures on being a Sam Gompers, not a Bill Green type of labor leader. He intends to have his presidency taken seriously. So when Beck and Hofa went tearing around defying federation decisions, he wasted no time in calling a special Council meeting on May 1 which “endorsed all the actions taken by AFL-CIO President George Meany up to this time.” And the brethren over at the Teamsters had to disgorge for the time being. The Council also told the brothers of the Building Trades to lay off and let unification of the city and state central labor bodies proceed as per convention decision.

But are we really justified in criticizing the worker on the job for not tossing his hat in the air and giving three loud huzzahs for Meany’s stout defense of the “principles” of the AFL-CIO constitution? Maybe he doesn’t even know about Meany’s heroic efforts on his behalf. Or if he has heard or read about them, maybe he doesn’t think they mean too much either for his personal welfare, or in the general scheme of things.
The trouble with Meany is not lack of decision or strength of personality, but myopia and narrow-mindedness—the occupational diseases of the American trade union bureaucrat. He's the man, let us remember, who never called or participated in a strike, and is proud of it. A good part of the time of this national spokesman for organized labor is spent in adjudicating the jurisdictional bickerings of the labor chieftains and harmonizing the power jockeyings of his fellow-pay-rollers. Meanwhile, secondary matters are let slide: There is no organization worthy of the name going on; and labor is still saddled with Taft-Hartley and right-to-work laws. The 17-million-member giant isn't going anywhere for the moment.

The special Executive Council meeting on May I was called primarily for a showdown on the Teamsters' projected alliance with the Longshore crowd. But you couldn't generate too much excitement on this issue as the Teamsters backed out before the meeting and Beck had too many previous engagements to find it possible to attend. A lot of the spare time consequently got consumed by a first-class squabble between Meany and Reuther on American foreign policy toward Nehru and India, in the course of which good points were developed—such as what authority Reuther's brother, Victor, had to call the AFL publicity head; and who wrote Meany's foreign policy speeches (an oblique reference to Jay Lovestone). Most of the Council members were bored stiff and wondering whether Meany wasn't straying off the reservation.

The tiff originates in a growing breach between the Dulles-Knowland and ADA-liberal Democratic approaches to American foreign policy which now finds its echo inside the top labor hierarchy. As the papers reported, Meany, last December, publicly denounced Nehru as an "ally of communism" and demanded that the liberals put more juice in their anti-communism. In recent weeks during his trip to India, Reuther associated himself in a sympathetic way with a lot of Nehru's policy, and he called for a more liberal line in his remarks to the UAW Educational Conference in Washington. Meany, to underscore the rift, sent a letter to the N. Y. Times while Reuther was in India, reiterating his sharp stand.

Reuther's evolution on these questions has a larger interest as he possesses an exceptionally keen sense of which way the wind is going to blow. Reuther was an anti-communist 100-percenter when the cold war got under way, and in that period a hero of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists. His brother, Victor Reuther, was perigrinating up and down Europe in those years taking a lead in splitting the trade unions of France and Italy. The Reuthers were of the vanguard to line up the European labor movement behind "our side." The State Department could ask for no more faithful disciples. Anti-communism was the end-all and be-all of their labor internationalism.

A couple of years ago, Victor Reuther and most of the other CIO representatives were suddenly pulled out of Europe. What happened? It dawned upon the CIO heads that they were resented as busybodies and interlopers, and were making enemies instead of friends. American labor ambassadorship was left pretty much in the hands of the AFL crew. But this set of bureaucrats was even further removed from the European workers and carried through the policy of unrelenting anti-communism with even more lunkeheaded zeal.

The CIO officials got another rude awakening as to the true state of affairs at last summer's world congress of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Here, in an assemblage of Europe's hard-crusted right-wing trade union officials and Social Democrats, all of whom had been out in front plugging the cold war, the AFL representatives were bitterly excoriated as war-mongers! (See "Labor Statesmen Abroad," American Socialist, July 1955.)

The Reutherites in the CIO leadership, and by that term we mean the more socially conscious trade union officials, began playing their foreign policy pronouncements on the low key for a while. It was obvious they were reconsidering some of the cold war propaganda, or more correctly, wondering whether the climate wasn't changing and whether it wasn't time to change one's ideological wardrobe accordingly.

Reuther's putting on a show of disagreement with Meany signifies that there is a lot of pressure in the ADA-liberal crowd for a more flexible foreign policy. This pressure is going to grow because it arises from the bankruptcy of the American line, and the imperious need to find a more suitable alternative. Stevenson, in one of his oratorical flights, said that the Republicans had been dragged screaming and kicking into the twentieth century. It can be said with equal justice that Reuther's switch presages that the labor leaders will be shoved and kicked as time goes on into the realization that the cold war represents something less than the highest wisdom of man.
The drive to efface Stalin's authority and heritage may be cutting deeper than the new Soviet leaders intended. This can even result in the exoneration of the old oppositions to Stalin of the "spy" charges, says this analysis by a foremost writer on Russian affairs.

Since Stalin Died

by Isaac Deutscher

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are shaken by a political fever which is not likely to subside soon. The Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party has set in motion new processes and new forces which work towards a further transformation of the post-Stalinist regime.

The most important new development of recent weeks consists in the fact that the Communist Party as a whole has begun to discuss its affairs. It has begun to do so only after the Twentieth Congress; and it does it for the first time in nearly thirty years.

Until the middle of February, when the Congress was convened, only the top leaders had argued among themselves within closed circles.

Since the end of February the debate has been carried down to every cell and branch of the party, where the rank and file wonder over the meaning of the break with Stalinism.

Millions of members are involved in the argument. Further millions of non-party men are drawn into it. And in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and other Communist countries the ferment has reached an even higher pitch of intensity.

The last impulse to this momentous debate came from Mr. Khrushchev when at the now famous secret session he attacked Stalin's political record. Yet, it looks as if he had not at first intended to make the attack; and as if he had not expected his own words to stir so much commotion.

He had opened the Congress with a rather shy report in which he did not even once criticize Stalin explicitly. Mikoyan alone of all the party leaders demanded frankly that Stalin's whole record should be subjected to critical review. On the other hand, Kaganovich warned the Congress against excess of anti-Stalinist zeal.

Khrushchev at first placed himself prudently half-way between Mikoyan and Kaganovich. It was only before the very close of the Congress, at one of the last sessions, that he came out with his bombshell.

Had Khrushchev beforehand intended to launch his attack, he should have done so at an early stage of the proceedings, when pronouncements of great importance are usually made and set the tone of the debates. As things were, it was not Khrushchev who set the tone of the debates—it was rather the debates that set the tone of Khrushchev's closing speech.

What happened between Khrushchev's first and second speech, between the opening and the close of the Congress, to bring about the change? The proceedings of the Congress were evidently more turbulent than one could judge from reports in the Soviet press. Khrush-
Chev's inaugural address left the Congress lukewarm and disappointed. Mikoyan's more outspoken remarks on the Stalin era evoked a much stronger response.

The debates brought into the open the force of anti-Stalinist emotion which ran through the party. Only when this had been revealed did Khrushchev adjust himself. Then, anxious to demonstrate that he was as good an anti-Stalinist as Mikoyan or anyone else, he delivered a diatribe against Stalin which was more violent than on sober reflection he might have liked it to be. The words he spoke in secret session leaked out almost at once and burst upon the country with shattering effect.

Whatever the truth of the matter, his closing speech has created a new situation. It has given fresh impetus to the anti-Stalinist currents of thought and emotion. It has incidentally also provoked the epigones of Stalinism to come out in defense of their fallen idol.

The pro-Stalin demonstrations of the Tiflis students was an event rich in historic irony. Was it not a quirk of fortune that the first free street demonstration which any Soviet city has seen in decades, the first spontaneous expression of dissent and opposition, should have taken the form of an homage paid to the man who had mercilessly suppressed all dissent and opposition?

The young Georgians may resent the desecration of Stalin as a blow to their patriotic pride; they have no inkling of the fact that their famous countryman was also Georgia's relentless Russifier.

This paradoxical piety for Stalin, however, is not likely to be widespread. Nor is it likely to become a serious political factor. It can hardly be found among the working classes, not even among Georgian workers who did not, it seems, join the students in their demonstration or down tools to defend Stalin's memory.

It is the reaction against Stalinism, not the attachment to Stalinism, which counts at present.

What makes the situation look incongruous is that it is the old leaders of the Stalinist faction who are in revolt against Stalin's ghost.

Willy-nilly one thinks of another revolt which took place in Rome well over four hundred years ago, when Cardinals eager to reform the Church from the corrupt condition in which the Borgia Popes had left it denounced the memory of those Popes, whom they themselves had served.

Cardinal Gaspar Contarini, one of the famous reformers of the Church, wrote then to Alexander Farnese, Pope Paul III, in terms strikingly similar to those in which the "cult of the individual" is now denounced in Moscow: "Can that be called a Government whose rule is the will of one man by nature prone to evil? . . . A Pope ought to know that those over whom he exercises power are free men."

When other prelates feared that discredit thrown on the memory of Popes would confuse the faithful and benefit Protestantism, the Cardinal retorted: "How? Shall we trouble ourselves so much about the reputation of two or three Popes and not rather try to restore what has been defaced, and to secure a good name for ourselves?"

"To restore what has been defaced and to secure a good name for ourselves"—this concise formula expresses well the purpose of Moscow's party leaders today.

The problem of the Russian leaders is how to define what exactly has been "defaced" by Stalinism, and what should be restored. Only three months ago it was still the fashion in Moscow to swear by Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin; and although it was admitted that the end—but only the end—of the Stalin era was marred by grievous abuses of power, Beria, not Stalin, was blamed for these.

This was still the tenor of Khrushchev's inaugural address. Within the fortnight during which the Twentieth Congress was in session came the change in the canon: Stalin's name was definitely deleted from the Apostolic succession; and he himself came to be blamed for abuses of power.

What followed was an iconoclastic outburst, one of the greatest in all history. This is not surprising: iconolatry always leads to iconoclasm.

The emotional outburst need perhaps not greatly worry Stalin's successors. The debunking of Stalin may even serve them as a safety valve for pent-up discontent.

Yesterday's idol may be conveniently turned into the scapegoat of today—and what a gigantic scapegoat he is!

What is politically much more serious is the critical scrutiny of the Stalin era which is going on at various levels of the party and which aims at discovering the facts and fixing the responsibilities. To that scrutiny no halt can be called. It delves deeper and deeper into the record. It ranges over it irreverently, backward and forward. It threatens to leave no fragment and no aspect of the Stalin era intact.

And it may turn from Stalin himself to his disciples, accomplices, and successors.

The anti-Stalinist revisionism works with the momentum of a chain reaction. The party leaders could not achieve, for instance, the final reconciliation with Tito without rehabilitating Rajk and Kostov, who had been executed as "Titoist traitors." They cannot rehabilitate Rajk and Kostov without rehabilitating Slansky and Clementis as well.

They cannot declare null and void all the Czech, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and other trials and "confessions"
without declaring null and void the models on which these were based, the Russian purge trials of the 1930’s. They must rehabilitate the victims of these trials too, the “traitors” and “enemies of the people”: Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Rakovsky, Rakosky, Tukhachevsky and the eminent generals who perished with him.

The problem for Khrushchev and his colleagues is whether by doing this they will “secure a good name” for themselves or, on the contrary, disgrace themselves.

An issue of staggering dimensions is involved—the judicial murder not merely of a handful of leaders, but of hundreds of thousands of party members who were executed or have perished in concentration camps. The families and friends of the victims are now clamoring for posthumous justice.

In his inaugural address to the Congress Khrushchev still described the mass of those victims, Trotskyists and Bukharinists, as “enemies of the people.” Thus in the middle of February he still refused to contemplate a revision of the purge trials.

Only by accepting those trials as legitimate could he speak of “enemies of the people”:

Khrushchev had in fact come to the Congress ready to restore the honor only of the Stalinist faction itself who had perished by Stalin’s whim, not of anti-Stalinists.

But the tide of anti-Stalinism has been moving fast. According to circumstantial evidence, only a few weeks or even days after the Congress it had already been decided in Moscow to proceed with a revision of all the purge trials of 1936-38 and to rehabilitate the defendants.

It is now virtually certain that the memory of Trotsky, Bukharin, and their comrades will be cleared of the crimes imputed to them: terrorism, sabotage, espionage and high treason.

The question which is still unresolved is in what form and by what degrees the rehabilitation is to be carried out. This is going to be the most delicate and, morally, the most risky of all the revisions of the post-Stalin era. And it will pose at least as many problems as it will solve.

In an article which echoed Khrushchev’s secret speech, Pravda has already declared that Stalin was guilty of “gross violations of the law.” Some Communist leaders (for instance, Mr. J. Morawski, secretary of the Polish party) speak more bluntly about the “crimes” which in his “morbid suspiciousness and revengefulness” Stalin committed.

The question of constitutional responsibility for those crimes, which rests not only with Stalin, may thus arise; and when the Soviet leaders talk so much about the rule

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I Have No Basis for Believing Anything . . .

The Polish weekly, Nowa Kultura, recently published a letter from an 18-year-old student at Warsaw Polytechnic, Michael Bruck, that reflects some of the thinking in the younger generation in Poland, where the reversal on the Stalin era has cut deeper than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc. The following excerpts from the letter appeared in the N.Y. Times for May 11.

WHEN I was 10 I was told that my beloved brother Lech was killed in the Warsaw uprising for falsehood. In my childish imagination he was always the embodiment of heroism, courage and uprightness. When I was 10 they told me in a history lesson that he was killed fighting for the blue cause of the London Emigré Government and not for the real Poland. I have thought there was only one Poland and now it appeared that there were many.

When I was 10 I ceased to believe in the hitherto sacred word Fatherland because I did not know which of these many Polands was my Fatherland. I no longer had a Fatherland.

I had God. When I was 15 I ceased to believe in God. God had proved to be an ally of the murderers of Lech. For long hours I kneelt in a dark empty church. My soul cried, threatened, implored. I hated Him and at the same time I loved Him so much. My poor betrayed Lech also loved Him.

You must know how terrible it is to feel one’s faith slip away, vanish, and yet crave for it to remain. You must know those sleepless nights, that desperate struggling in the soul of a child. The day finally came when the cross became to me only a piece of wood.

Thus I was 15 I ceased to believe in God. I believed in the idea and its executors.

THERE have passed. Now I am 18. It has turned out that what my family said was true—about the cruelty of secret police investigations and about the dictatorship of Stalin. It has turned out that history was really forged. Those who looked at my personal questionnaire with suspicion when I begged them for an explanation now speak of the “Stalin era” and the “time of Beria.”

They are recommending jazz, which they opposed two years ago as a symptom of the decayed culture of the West. They are discussing youth organizations in Yugoslavia, about which they sang satirical songs a few years ago.

And I? I do not know how to change my soul for the fourth time without fear that it will become a rag. Now I cannot stand in the ranks with my face up high although I would like to. I am ashamed of my older colleagues, ashamed for the whole party, for all those who waited, sniffed and looked around and for those who deceived. I am ashamed of all of you and above all, of myself, for my stupidity and credulity.

I no longer know how to raise my head. If I ever raise it again—but this is impossible for I have no basis for believing anything.

Our era was not easy and although we had no rifle in our hands we did not have a rosy path. It is not through effeminacy and prosperity that our cynicism was born and it is not egoism and desire for comfort that have ordered us to reject the political leaders. We, 18-year-olds and 20-year-olds, although growing up in new conditions, are not happy because we have perceived that this newness is very old and it deceived our dreams. It is distressing to lose everything in which one believed.
of law, the inviolability of constitutional rights, etc., this aspect of the matter may perhaps not be altogether negligible.

Two men, in the first instance, bore the burden of constitutional responsibility for the great purge trials: Kalinin, former head of state, who is dead; and Molotov, Prime Minister from 1930 to 1941, who is alive.

Molotov’s place, it might be argued, should be in the dock. He is nominally answerable for the “violations of the law” which took place during his tenure of office. The actual responsibility rests, of course, with all members of the Politburo of those years: Kaganovich, Shvernik, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Khrushchev. (Khrushchev, however, was appointed to the Politburo only in 1938, when the trials were coming to an end.)

STALIN’S successors plead force majeure. They say that all resistance to Stalin was useless. Even as Prime Minister, Molotov would have paid with his head if he had clashed with Stalin. He might even argue that he did at the outset oppose the purge trials, and that he desisted only when Stalin threatened to-place him, too, among the purged. In 1936 it was widely believed in Opposition circles that this was indeed how Molotov had behaved.

Khrushchev has invoked the same argument in his self-defense when he related to Eastern European Communists how he, Malenkov, and Bulganin interceded with Stalin in 1949 in order to save Voznessensky, their Politburo colleague and chief Soviet planner, from Stalin’s wrath.

Voznessensky had mysteriously vanished after Stalin had assailed him as an “enemy agent.” Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Bulganin allegedly pleaded with Stalin that Voznessensky was innocent. “Do you wish to inform me,” Stalin replied, “that you, too, are enemy agents? Voznessensky was executed this very morning.”

Khrushchev is reported to have concluded the story by saying that for some time afterwards he felt ill at ease at the Kremlin, and expected to be arrested any moment.

Such revelations and pleadings may shelf the issue of constitutional responsibility but they cannot dispel misgivings in the minds of millions of Communists. What Stalin’s successors are now anxious to establish is their political rather than their legal alibi. Can they establish it?

In the Communist Party cells their revelations were received with the utmost stupefaction. Rank-and-file Communists are expected to show absolute devotion to Communism, frankness towards their party, and a readiness to sacrifice themselves and lay down their lives for it. They cannot but ask now whether their leaders have lived up to these standards, and whether it was not the leaders’ duty to go down fighting against Stalin’s crimes rather than condone them.

No doubt, the party cells are relieved to see that an end has been made to the hypocrisy which surrounded Stalin’s terror and that the terror has been exposed in all its nakedness. But if Stalin’s successors deserve credit for revealing the truth, the truth does not reflect much credit on them.

HAD there existed anything like a genuine independent party opinion, the cry would by now have gone up for a radical change in the leadership. Had any organized opposition existed in the ranks, it would by now have declared that there must be no room for Stalin’s accomplices in the Central Committee and in the Presidium.

The essence of Stalinism, however, lay precisely in this, that it did not allow any independent opinion to form itself or any opposition to crystallize. The cry for a change in the party leadership is therefore not likely to go up soon. There is probably nobody there to raise it.

Moreover, Stalin destroyed the men who were able to form an alternative leadership and his regime did not allow potential leaders from the young generation to come to the fore. Consequently in the near future leadership can be provided only by that Stalinist elite which forms the present ruling group.

No matter in what light Khrushchev, Bulganin, Malenkov, and their team may have shown themselves, they are not likely to have shaken their dominant position in party and state. On the contrary, their revelations enable them to rid their Government of the liabilities of the Stalinist legacy.

The situation may be different in the People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe, where remnants of the anti-
Communist parties may perhaps be in a position to benefit from the disarray in Communist ranks. In the Soviet Union not even a trace is left of the old pre-revolutionary parties.

How far do Stalin's successors intend to go, and how far can they go, in dissociating themselves from their own past?

Even while they are making ready to pass a sponge over the purge trials, they still declare that Stalin was right, and his opponents wrong, up to the time of the purges. He was right, they say, in advocating "socialism in one country" against Trotsky, and in furthering industrialization and collectivization against Bukharin.

When precisely, at what moment did Stalin then go wrong? Party ideologues discuss this question with the fervor with which some theologians once argued over the exact moment at which man's fall had occurred.

The fall occurred, Krushchev replies, at the moment when Stalin, having defeated the oppositions, freed himself of all democratic control and "placed himself above the party." Up to that time, that is up to the year 1934 or perhaps 1932, Krushchev claims, Stalinism preserved its innocence, and it is that innocent Stalinism, untried by the blood of the Old Bolshevik Guard, that he seeks to recapture and to reinstate.

This answer is not likely to satisfy searching minds for long and many searching minds are at work on these issues in the Soviet Union. Even at the Twentieth Congress, Mikoyan suggested that the "fall" may have begun much earlier, at Lenin's death, in 1924, or shortly thereafter. And at cells in the Soviet party and in foreign Communist parties members have already posed further embarrassing questions which have raised Pravda's ire.

WHEN Communists are told that "Stalin placed himself above the party," they ask how it happened that he succeeded in that. How could one man impose his will upon a party which prides itself in holding the doctrine that masses and social classes, not "great individuals," make history?

Where was the party and where was the working class, when Stalin subjected them to autocratic rule? Were they taken by surprise? Many a Communist reflects over one of Marx's famous *obiter dicta*: "It is no excuse to say that a nation is taken by surprise."

Marx wrote this when he probed into the origin of France's Second Empire. "Neither a nation nor a woman is forgiven for the unguarded moment in which she allowed a chance comer to seize the opportunity for overpowering her. Such shifts do not solve the riddle; they merely thrust the problem a stage further back. It becomes all the more necessary to explain how a nation of so many millions can have been surprised by a thug and irresistibly carried off to prison."

The conclusion which inevitably occurs to many a Communist is that there must have been something wrong with his party even before Stalin "placed himself above it." What was it? And had not both Trotsky and Bukharin, each in his own way, warned the party that this was Stalin's ambition?

The inquest on the Old Bolshevik Guard goes on; and these are the lines upon which it proceeds. The archives are being thrown open in Moscow and elsewhere, and those who conduct the inquest find in them plenty of new ammunition.

*Pravda* fires back and thunders that it will not allow old deviations to be resuscitated. But *Pravda* now "allows" many things to happen which it did not dream to allow barely a few months ago. It will "allow" many more.

The original protagonists of the strange dispute, Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and their immediate disciples, are all dead. Yet it looks as if they were back at the contest posthumously, and as if a new generation were to fight their battles again.

This is not just a case of *le mort saisit le vivant*, of the dead gripping the living. The inquest on the past is essential to the clearing of the moral climate of post-Stalinist Russia. And its results have a bearing on practical policy. In some respects the events of the last twenty years have settled, transcended, and rendered outdated the old inner-party controversies. But in other respects these controversies are still relevant to the issues which occupy the Soviet Union today.

THOSE, for instance, who are inclined to favor distinctly the peasant interest are likely to embrace some sort of an up-to-date version of the Bukharinist doctrine—Bukharin once led the pro-muzhik school of thought in the Bolshevik party.

Those eager above all to fight inequality and to further a "proletarian democracy" may draw inspiration from the ideas of Trotsky and Zinoviev.

The orientation of Communist policy in foreign affairs, the extent to which the policy acquires an active internationalist character or remains colored by the nationalism of the Stalin era, is also bound up with old alignments.

Finally, even a partial rehabilitation of the old opposition saps that monolithic outlook which Stalin gave to the party and may pave the way for a different conception of the Communist regime, one which admits a certain diversity and contest of ideas, views and policies.

The inquest on the Stalin era, involved and obscure as it may be at times, is therefore of vital importance for the Soviet Union and the world at large.

I WAS chiefly disgusted with modern history. For having strictly examined all the persons of greatest name in the courts of princes for an hundred years past, I found how the world had been misled by prostitute writers, to ascribe the greatest exploits in war to cowards, the wisest counsel to fools, sincerity to flatterers, Roman virtue to betrayers of their country, piety to atheists, chastity to sodomites, truth to informers. How many innocent and excellent persons have been condemned to death or banishment, by the practising of great ministers upon the corruption of judges, and the malice of factions. How many villains have been exalted to the highest places of trust, power, dignity, and profit.

I have often read of some great services done to princes and states, and desired to see the persons by whom those services were performed. Upon enquiry I was told that their names were to be found on no record, except a few of them whom history hath represented as the vilest rogues and traitors. As to the rest, I had never once heard of them, they died in poverty and disgrace, and the rest on a scaffold or a gibbet.

—Jonathan Swift
Twenty-Five Years
Of the Socialist International

by Bert Cochran

G. D. H. Cole continues his ambitious history of the world socialist movement with two books on the period up to the first World War, which constitute Volume III of "A History of Socialist Thought." The first volume concerned the period from the French Revolution to the "Communist Manifesto" and the events of 1848. The second (reviewed in December 1954 American Socialist) continued the story with the decline of the workers' movement after the 1848 defeats, the rise and fall of Marx's First International, and the emergence of new socialist parties in Western Europe in the 1880's. Cole now proceeds to discuss the high-tide of Social Democracy when the Socialist Second International reached its apogee, and the socialist parties were at their greatest right up to the outbreak of the war in 1914.* As in the previous books, Cole is eminently readable, and presents the various conflicting positions with fairness and clarity. If he occasionally misses the mark, or if his appreciation of a working-class trend lacks depth, it is obviously due to his academic background, and not to malice or lack of scholarly integrity. Cole tries to present the picture objectively without intruding himself too much into the narrative.

The volume opens with two chapters on the Socialist International as a whole, followed with fairly comprehensive chapters on the development of the socialist and labor movements not only of practically all the European countries, but also the United States, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan. This volume, which includes a splendid bibliography, is thus a gold mine of information. Unfortunately, in trying to present rounded historical accounts of so many diverse movements, Cole spreads himself too thin, and the book suffers from too great diffusion and text-book superficiality.

Marx's First International was primarily an organization of the advanced political groups in Western Europe plus the British trade unions, which at this time were largely confined to the skilled trades. It was finally shattered by the defeat of the Paris Commune and the frenzied tug-of-war between Marxists and anarchists. The Second International came into being when socialism had built or was in the process of building sizable influential parties in Europe's leading Western countries, and the British trade unions, growing remarkably in strength, already had a parliamentary representation. Anarchism was pretty well on the wane and was relegated to a fringe problem, although it reappeared in the form of syndicalism in some trade unions, and continued as an important philosophy in the workers' movements of the Latin countries, and for a time in the United States.

The Socialist International officially dates from the Paris Congress of 1889 organized by the Marxist leaders of Western Europe. This gathering endorsed the struggle for the eight-hour day and called for strikes or other suitable demonstrations in all countries on May 1, which was declared to be an international workers' holiday. The original impetus for the idea came from the United States where agitation for the eight-hour day had been going on since the 1860's. In 1883 the Knights of Labor had adopted the eight-hour plank in its immediate program and fought a number of strikes on the issue. Five years later, the AFL, emerging as the leading trade union body, decided to launch a campaign for the eight-hour day with

the thought of making May Day the occasion for calling strikes all over the country in a single industry, the strikers to receive financial aid from the trades which remained at work, until finally the reduced hourly schedule would be universally achieved. The French trade unions, the driving force for the eight-hour program in the International, were already involved in a number of struggles before the Paris Congress and preparations were in full swing for a one-day general strike the following year. The Second International was thus launched on an impressive note of international solidarity and working class struggle.

Great demonstrations for the eight-hour day were held [on May 1, 1890] in many countries and in many cities within them, and there were extensive stoppages of work not only in France but also in Austria, in Hungary, in parts of Italy and Spain, in Belgium and Holland, and in the Scandinavian countries, as well as in the United States. The British Trade Unions, however, contented themselves with great meetings on the first Sunday in May, so as to avoid any stoppage of work. In some places the workers limited themselves to orderly demonstrations and meetings; but in France, Spain and Italy, where the Anarchists were to the fore, there were serious clashes with the police and the soldiers... Only in the United States did the movement of May 1, 1890, achieve immediate practical success. Considerable bodies of workers—especially carpenters—won the eight hours' day; and many more were successful during the next few years, as the American Federation of Labor followed the policy of throwing a particular type of worker into the fray each spring.

Up to 1896 the International congresses, following in the footsteps of Marx's First International, included not only the Marxist Socialist organizations of the Continent, but trade unions as well as various libertarian and reform societies, some of which had a strong anarchist bent. Consequently a lot of the time of the congresses continued to be consumed by the old debate with the anarchists. But the Socialist organizations were gaining hegemony, so that at the 1896 Congress a motion introduced by Liebknecht of the German party was adopted for the exclusion of anarchists and trade unions that opposed the necessity of political action. From that point on the Second International was under the aegis of the Marxists. While the International maintained under this aegis its formal unity up to the smashup of 1914, it did not thereby achieve political homogeneity. It was soon rent by new struggles and lineups.

The next (1900) Congress was held in Paris at the high-tide of the militancy of the socialist movement when the German Social Democratic Party was accepted as the model for socialists everywhere. The Congress decisions were commonly accepted as representing the triumph of the revolutionary wing. Actually, as later events demonstrated, the process was already under way which converted ostensibly revolutionary Marxist organizations into parliamentary reform parties operating within and as part of the capitalist system.

The most important matter before the Congress was the crisis arising out of the Millerand affair. Involved was the question of whether socialists ought to participate in a capitalist coalition government. What happened was that in 1899 the struggle over the Dreyfus case brought to power in France a liberal government of Republican Defense. The new Prime Minister, Waldeck-Rousseau, offered the Ministry of Commerce and Industry to the Independent Socialist, Millerand, who accepted without consulting any of his colleagues. Millerand's move provoked a storm in socialist ranks. The Independents and the followers of Jaurès supported Millerand's action. The Guesdists and Blanquists denounced Millerand as a betrayer of socialism.

The German party leadership at this period was firmly opposed to any coalition policy. It was driving to win an electoral majority and rightly believed that alliances with liberal capitalist parties would deflect it from its course. At the same time the goal of an electoral victory made obligatory the preservation of party unity at all costs. The Germans were therefore interested to record opposition to coalitionism, but not to force out of the International its supporters. "It was Kautsky's task," states Cole, "to devise a form of words that would satisfy the Center and disarm the extreme Left without driving the right wing out of the International, and without making Jaurès's position impossible." The Kautsky resolution which finally carried 29 to 9 read in part as follows:

The entry of a single Socialist into a capitalist Ministry cannot be considered as the normal beginning for winning political power: it can never be anything but a temporary and exceptional makeshift in an emergency situation. Whether, in any given instance, such an emergency situation exists is a question of tactics and not of principle. The Congress does not have to decide that. But in any case this dangerous experiment can only be of advantage if it is approved by an united party organization and if the Socialist Minister is, and remains, the delegate of his party.

Whenever a Socialist becomes a Minister independently of his party, or whenever he ceases to be the delegate of that party, then his entry into the Government, instead of being the means of strengthening the proletariat, weakens it, and, instead of being a means of furthering the winning of political power, becomes a means of delaying it.

The Congress declares that a Socialist must resign from a capitalist government if the organized party is of the opinion that the Government in question has shown partisanship in an industrial dispute between capital and labor.

Guesde for the left wing moved the following amendment:

The Fifth International Congress at Paris declares again that the winning of political power by the proletariat, whether it takes place by peaceful or by violent means, involves the political expropriation of the capitalist class.

Consequently it allows the proletariat to participate in capitalist government only in the form of winning seats
by its own strength and on the basis of the class struggle, and it forbids any participation whatsoever by Socialists in capitalist governments, toward which Socialists must take up an attitude of unbending opposition.

This policy had been taken for granted up to this moment. But once the Congress confronted the question as a practical not a theoretical matter, it shed away lest it make it impossible to achieve a united party in France and provoke splits elsewhere.

Once the Congress navigated safely past the perilous rocks of coalitionalism, it let itself go in verbal fireworks against imperialism and militarism. Resolutions were carried unanimously urging determined struggle on both fronts. In the closing session the Congress began the debate that it carried on intermittently for the next decade concerning the general strike against war. Interestingly enough, the debate was led off by Briand, who at this time was on the extreme Left and ten years later, as a capitalist Prime Minister, broke a railroad strike by drafting the strikers into the armed forces.

The remaining important action was the establishment of an International Socialist Bureau designed to coordinate the activities of the Socialist parties between Congresses. The Bureau played an increasingly important role, but it had no power to instruct the national parties as sovereignty was lodged in the latter, and the overriding desire to preserve unity prevented any attempts at disciplinary action. Congress decisions were expected to be followed but were not formally binding on any of the parties.

Cole correctly sums up the 1900 Congress by observing that it was notable "for the passing of a series of resolutions which made it appear a good deal more militant than it really was. When the Kautsky resolution had been steered through to success, the delegates were allowed to have their heads about colonial and militarist issues, and were stopped only when it came to a practical question of authorizing the general strike as a revolutionary weapon."

The German delegation came to the next (Amsterdam) Congress in 1904 covered with double laurels: their electoral successes the year before where their Reichstag membership increased from 32 to 55 and their popular vote increased from 18 to 28 percent of the total; and their smashing repudiation of Bernstein revisionism at their 1903 Dresden convention. The famous Dresden resolution declared:

The Congress decisively condemns the Revisionist attempt to alter our twice-tested and victorious tactics based on the class struggle. The Revisionists wish to substitute for the conquest of political power through the victory over our enemies a policy of meeting the existing order of things half-way. The consequences of such Revisionist tactics would be to transform our party. At present it works toward the rapid conversion of the existing capitalist order of society into a Socialist order: in other words it is a truly revolutionary party in the best sense of the word. If the Revisionist policies were adopted it would become a party content with merely reforming capitalist society.

Further, our party Congress condemns any attempt to gloss over the existing, ever-increasing class conflicts for the purpose of turning our party into a satellite of capitalist parties.

The debate between the Marxist and reformist wings was renewed all over again with the Germans and the Jaurès section of the French delegation as the main protagonists. Jaurès, who was probably the foremost orator of the Second International, made one of his greatest speeches at this Congress. He was particularly caustic in his attack on the Guesde Marxist party in France for its narrow doctrinaire policy of turning its back on the defense of the Republic during the Dreyfus crisis on the ground that that constituted an internal quarrel of the capitalists which was of no concern to the socialist movement. Bebel, the German leader, defended the policy of his party in his reply to Jaurès, but stressed that the Germans had not expelled a single person, even among the extreme Revisionists, for his views. They wanted unity, not expulsions. All they had done was to insist on the minority accepting the discipline of the majority. The Dresden resolution passed overwhelmingly, but an amendment that watered it down thoroughly was defeated only by an even vote of 21 to 21.

The other noteworthy position of the Amsterdam Congress was the unanimous adoption of a resolution declaring it to be indispensable for each country to have only one socialist party and affirming the duty of all socialists to work for unity "on the basis of the principles laid down by the Congresses of the International."

Cole's summation of this Congress is again highly cogent: "The Amsterdam Congress has often been described as the high-water mark of the Second International, on account both of its repudiation of Revisionism and of its lead toward Socialist unification within each country. These two much-acclaimed decisions were, however, in fact quite inconsistent. The insistence on unity within each country meant, as we saw, that no substantial body of Socialist opinion could be expelled or left outside—though out-and-out Anarchists could be excluded because they did not belong to political parties.
in any event. But it was impossible to silence the Revisionists and Reformists while keeping them within the national parties; and accordingly the Dresden resolution could only be declaratory; and could not be enforced. What Amsterdam did bring about was more unity, not more discipline. The French parties [there were six in all, roughly divided along reformist vs. revolutionary lines] came together in 1905, and stayed together with Jaurès as leader and Guesde, the promoter of the Dresden resolution, as a grumbling second-in-command. . . . In general, the policy of Socialist unity made headway, at the expense of the Reformists but of the self-styled Revolutionaries.

The 1907 Congress meeting in Stuttgart is chiefly famous for its thunderous proclamation against war. All the Western Socialist parties had made considerable headway by this time and comprised large organizations in their respective countries. In Britain, the Labor Representation Committee had by now evolved into the Labor Party and had a contingent of 30 MPs in Parliament, even though the party had not yet formally committed itself to socialism. In Austria, the Socialists won an extension of the franchise which enabled them to send 87 representatives to the Reichsrath. In France, Jaurès presided over a growing united party and the trade unions were in their golden period of militant action. But these electoral and organizational successes were threatened by the growing danger of war between the major European powers. The war question thus necessarily dominated the proceedings of the Congress.

Four resolutions were introduced, by Bebel for the Germans, by Vaillant and Jaurès for the French majority, by Guesde for the French minority, and by Gustave Hervé for a small extreme leftist group in France. The Guesde and Hervé resolutions played a minor role in the debates. Guesde, in line with his doctrinaire understanding of Marxism, and his negative role during the Dreyfus crisis, expressed opposition to any special campaign against militarism as diverting the working class from the essential task of taking power. As a short-term proposition, he admitted however that socialists should work for the lowering of military service duration, against all credits for the armed service, and for the people’s militia as a substitute for standing armies. Hervé proposed to respond to any declaration of war with military strikes and insurrection.

The Vaillant-Jaurès resolution contained many fiery declarations against war and militant formulations for organizing an international struggle against it, not excluding the general strike and insurrection. Its Achilles heel was a clause which supported war for self-defense against an aggressive attack. Bebel’s resolution contained an excellent Marxist statement on the causes for imperialist wars and a firm declaration to fight them. But while not spelling it out as clearly as the Vaillant-Jaurès resolution did, it also implicitly recognized national defense as a duty, and drew a distinction between aggressive and defensive wars. (Lenin after the 1914 experience came to the conclusion that the distinction between aggressive and defensive wars was meaningless in modern big-power struggles. All the European Socialists rallied behind their respective capitalist governments using self-defense as their justification. Modern diplomacy is so skillful in cloaking its aggressive designs and provocations that it often becomes literally impossible to determine who “fired the first shot.” Lenin concluded that the socialist attitude toward a given war had to be determined from the essential nature of the war, whether it was a Great Power struggle for markets, colonies, spheres of influence, etc., or a war of an oppressed people to free itself from its overlords, or a colonial war against an imperialist power.)

At the end of a long debate, Luxemburg, Lenin and Martov, on behalf of the Russian Social Democrats, submitted this amendment to Bebel’s resolution:

*If a war threatens to break out, it is a duty of the working class in the countries affected, and a duty of their parliamentary representatives, to make every effort to prevent the war by all means which seem to them appropriate—means which vary and develop naturally according to the intensity of the class struggle and to the political situation in general.*

*Should war none the less break out, it is their duty to intervene in order to bring it promptly to an end, and with all their strength to make use of the economic and political crisis created by the war to stir up the deepest strata of the people and precipitate the fall of capitalist domination.*

The final draft of the Stuttgart resolution proved long and involved, as the committee attempted to incorporate all the main sections of the original resolutions, except Hervé’s and the specific references to general strikes and insurrections; but it did include the two paragraphs of the Russian amendment where insurrection can be regarded as implicit. The resolution was adopted by an almost unanimous vote and was viewed as a heroic triumph both by the delegates and the Socialist movements throughout the world. But as Cole with the prescience of hindsight remarks, “The remaining proceedings . . . throw some doubt on the reality of the unanimous endorsement.” A resolution unambiguously opposing imperialism and colonialism carried by only 127 to 108 votes, and the opposition to the resolution included the Germans (who voted solidly despite disagreements in their delegation), the Dutch, Belgians, South Africans, while the French, British and Italians were divided.

Cole concludes: “On that question [war] the Congress did arrive at a momentous agreement, though when in 1914 the time came for acting on its brave words, its apparent unanimity proved to be void of both the will and the power to act up to its declarations. It had, in effect, allowed Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin to commit it to a great deal more than it was really prepared to do. In transforming the letter of Bebel’s original resolution the Russian leaders had no power to transform the real attitudes of the parties which nominally endorsed their policy.”

When the Copenhagen Congress assembled in 1910 the war tensions were accumulating unbearably. Britain and Germany were in a naval armaments race,
the Moroccan crisis had erupted, Spain had engaged in a full-scale colonial war, Eastern Europe was boiling after Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Congress had a listless debate on the general strike against war all over again, initiated this time by Keir Hardie of the British Independent Labor Party and Vail-lant of the French Socialist Party. The Congress was ready to vote the proposal down but, to assuage the left wingers, decision was postponed again to a future date.

"The Copenhagen Congress, taken as a whole, clearly meant a move toward the right," explains Cole. "Although it reaffirmed the essential clauses of the Stuttgart resolution on war, it did nothing to clarify them or indicate that there was any real intention of acting upon them beyond parliamentary protests. It came much nearer than the Stuttgart Congress had done to identifying itself with the bourgeois Peace movement; and its discussions on industrial and social legislation and on unemployment had a markedly more reformist tone than those at earlier Congresses. . . . To the student of its proceedings forty-five years after the event, it gives the impression of a movement conscious of being faced with a mounting crisis in many parts of the world and highly uncertain of its power to confront the situation with success."

The International assembled for the last time in an Emergency Congress in Basle in 1912. The gathering was chiefly intended as a demonstration of a socialist united front against war, which had already broken out in the Balkans, where Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece had combined forces to partition among themselves the European portion of the Turkish Empire. The Congress championed a Balkan Federation and called for the Socialists to prevent intervention by the great powers. Another Congress was planned in August 1914 for Vienna, but was washed out with the outbreak of the war. Almost at once, after a few symbolic protests against the war, the Socialist leaders of the main belligerent countries forgot their fiery declarations and fell into line behind the war cabinets. The banners of socialist internationalism were trampled in the dust while jingoism and chauvinism had a field day. The leading parties of the Second International succumbed to the nationalist fumes and the International fell in ruins.

COLE attempts in his last chapter an explanation of this rank debacle of socialist internationalism, a problem which has occupied socialist thinkers for so many years. But in offering that "In effect, West European Socialism, whatever it called itself, was a reformist and not a revolutionary movement," he is providing us with an elementary truism rather than an analysis. The analysis has been drawn by many Left writers and recently restated in an excellent study of the German Social Democracy by Carl Schorske (reviewed in American Socialist, August 1955).

The period of the growth of these parties, 1890-1914, was one of unparalleled capitalist expansion and progress. The leading Western countries were able to conservatize their trade unions with wage concessions and social improvements. The Socialist and labor parties were domesticated when they were able to exude a privileged elite. Marx had written that the workers had nothing to lose but their chains. But a vast trade union and Socialist bureaucracy now decided that it had a whole lot to lose, and each national group rallied behind its capitalist state to safeguard its vested interests in the status quo. The environmental pressure proved more decisive on the bulk of the leadership than its preconceived ideology.

The British laborites and trade unionists were steeped in opportunism, and it was no special surprise to anybody that they supported the war in 1914. But the Germans, who had valiantly fought and voted down Bernstein's revisionism, proved to be thoroughly infected with it themselves, and when the testing hour struck, demonstrated that despite national peculiarities, they had essentially the same type of movement as the British. The catchwords were different. One had sworn by the New Testament, and the other by Karl Marx. But the practice ran close together.

Thus, the era which had seen Marxism converted from a set of ideas and battle cries of small sects into a purposeful and practical program of mass organizations throughout Europe and even beyond, which had witnessed the rise of Socialist leaders enjoying world-wide repute, superb organizers, skilled parliamentarians, dazzling orators and impressive journalists, which had inspired the creation of far-flung Socialist cultural fraternities representing a new socialist "way of life," that same era saw the slow corruption of the movement into nationalism and opportunist adaptation, until it ignominiously collapsed when the powers plunged their peoples into the bloodbath of the first World War.

In a coming issue I shall summarize some interesting features of British and French Socialist developments in this period discussed by Cole; and on another occasion I hope to contrast the conceptions and achievements of the Communist Third International with that of the Second, and their respective places in labor history.
The Fluoridation Controversy

by Dr. Jay W. Friedman

Over 25 years ago, investigators noticed that in certain areas of the country where fluoride ions happened to be naturally present in water supply, dental decay was markedly lower—as much as 65 percent lower—than in the rest of the nation. This discovery led to the idea of adding fluoride compounds to the water supply in order to guard the population’s teeth against decay and cavities, a process known as “fluoridation,” about which there has been a certain amount of controversy.

Although there are many social do-gooders among the opponents of fluoridation—individuals whose scientific intelligence falls far short of their good intentions—most of the opposition comes from reactionary circles which oppose anything remotely resembling cooperative efforts for the common good. They call fluoridation “mass medicine,” “socialized medicine,” “forced medication,” etc., and proclaim their God-given right to keep their “liberties” and their dental diseases intact. Generally speaking, these people make an occupation out of opposing anything which resembles intelligent, cooperative social action.

Fluoridation is such an open-and-shut beneficial proposition that the opposition to it is not very influential. Fluoridation is backed by the American Dental Association, the American Medical Association, the New York State Department of Health, the United States Public Health Service, the National Research Board, etc. But, as it must be adopted city by city and community by community, the discussion over it is renewed each time it comes under consideration by a health board or the administration of a particular locality. New York City is now in the process of adopting it, and the eminent public health authority in that city, Dr. Haven Emerson, recently charged that opposition to it has been coming from the kind of self-appointed “fuzzy-minded nitwits” who have tried to obstruct every advance in public health.

As many communities are considering the matter or will shortly do so, it is worth knowing the facts. Those who now adopt fluoridation are not engaging in any daring experiment. Over 35 million citizens are today drinking fluoridated water. Eleven years ago the New York State Department of Health started the Newburgh-Kingston Caries Fluorine Study in an effort to verify claims already made by fluoridation advocates. This program is of particular interest.

Newburgh and Kingston were chosen because of similarity of their populations regarding comparable age, sex and color distribution. The two cities have approximately 30,000 citizens each. They are situated about 30 miles apart on the Hudson River and have separate water supplies. Newburgh had sodium fluoride added to its water to bring fluoride concentration up to 1.2 parts per million beginning May 2, 1945. Since the final reports will not be completed for another two years, the full facts about the program will not be known until then. However, preliminary reports covering the first eight years have been published. Here are some of the findings:

1) After an average of eight years of fluoride experience the Newburgh caries (dental decay) rate was not more than half that of Kingston, based on clinical and X-ray examination of over 800 children in each city.

2) About 200 children have been studied who have had fluoridated water from birth through early childhood and whose mothers drank fluoridated water during the prenatal period. No significant differences were observed in extensive medical examinations among the children studied in these two cities. Tests included blood examination, urinalysis, and X-ray studies of bone development.

3) There is no relationship between fluoride ingestion and maternal or infant mortality.

Other states are engaged in detailed studies of their fluoridated areas. Foremost among them is Illinois. In April 1952 the Illinois State Department of Health published a statistical review of mortality rates from all causes as well as from specific causes for residents of 22 cities, including fluoridate and non-fluoridate areas. The report states: “Mortality statistics show that there is no significant difference in the general death rates between areas where fluoride is present and those where it is absent. Similarly, there is no significant difference in the risk of death from specific diseases such as heart disease, cancer, nephritis and diabetes.”

It is necessary to cite these facts to relay the specter that has been raised to the effect that fluorine is a poison, and placing the fluorine ion in our water supply will poison us either quickly or slowly. (It has even been alleged that fluoridation is one of the methods of “communist warfare”!) There is no doubt that fluorine is a poison—just as is the chlorine which is part of sodium.
chloride (table salt), just as aspirin, sulfa, and iodine can be poisonous. But no one would suggest that you stand in sunshine until your skin is lobster-red, blistered, and you are sick to the point of death from sun poisoning, nor does anyone suggest that you could drink fluorine in such large quantities that it will make you sick.

When scientists and doctors speak of fluoridation we refer to minute quantities of the fluoride ion, the ideal amount being between 1 and 1.5 parts per million parts water. There is no difficulty in maintaining this controlled and minute level of fluoride in the water. Present equipment in the water works is easily adaptable at an average cost of $2,000 to $4,000 for smaller cities (for a city of two and one-half million the cost ran to $15,000). Frequent checks by the proper health authorities insure the public against faulty administration.

Questions have been raised about bone fractures, tumors, etc. These have been thoroughly investigated, and there is no scientific evidence that fluoridation has any harmful effects on our general health when consumed in the proper amounts. The only observable medical fact directly attributable to fluoridation is that dental decay is markedly decreased.

Apparently the sole and most sensitive indicators of any deleterious effects of fluoride are the teeth themselves. The condition caused by excessive fluoride in water is known as mottling. This is a pitting, grooving of the teeth which readily stain dark yellow and brown. In areas where fluoride is controlled at 1 part per million, approximately 10 percent of the children showed some slight mottling, which is revealed only on close examination by the dentist. It is nowhere considered esthetically objectionable. In concentrations greater than 2 parts per million, the mottling is more prevalent, and reaches 80 percent above 4 parts per million. This is the only deleterious effect evidenced thus far, and it is not considered pathologically significant. Thus there is a wide margin of safety, one which need cause no concern regarding the general health of our children and ourselves.

As against the unproven allegations, there are the well-founded evidences of effectiveness in cutting dental decay. There are not enough dentists in this country to keep up with the rate of dental decay, and fluoridation offers, through prevention—which is the best kind of medicine—a way to get healthier mouths and allow dentists to catch up on the vast backlog. At a cost of ten cents per person per year, it is quite a bargain for the protection gained.

Of course, teeth can be filled when they decay, and there will still be quite a bit of periodic dental treatment required. But no one enjoys the dental drill. Teeth are not isolated appendages; they are an integral part of us. The pain of the dental drill or the fear of the needle is not felt in the tooth alone. It is felt in the entire body, as evidenced by quicker breathing, moist palms, the universal dread of the next dental appointment. We now have it within our means to reduce the number of these experiences by as much as two-thirds.

To return for a few final words to the opponents of fluoridation. Their hysteria is not at all inconsistent with the stated ideals of American capitalism. When they say that fluoridation of the water supply is “mass medication,” or “socialized medication,” there is no getting around it that they have a point. The only way to fluoridate water entirely consistent with private enterprise in its most extreme form would be to have it administered on a medical-prescription basis to any individual who can decide, in a huddle with his doctor, that he wants it. In that case it would cost a hundred times as much, and would become that kind of medical refinement which would only be used by five or ten percent of the population.

In a sense, this is the trouble that afflicts the entire medical—as well as economic—aspects of our present society, and restricts the full benefits of science to the few. Of course, fluoridation in private hands is a very extreme example, but is not the principle the same?

What progress there has been in public health is a tribute to the inroads of socialism. Certainly there are no better examples of what can be done than the large-scale, well-financed public health services. Chicken pox, smallpox, diphtheria, typhoid fever, dysentery are but a few of the diseases which are controlled and prevented by public health services. And the United Nations World Health Organization has done important work in actively and effectively combatting and quarantining disease epidemics in several portions of the world.

These are only small examples of what a socialist government, that is a government of, by, and for all the people, can do through collective action for public benefit. One cannot help but sense that behind the dams of private greed and power there is a flood-tide of good will. The dams are leaking and what progress trickles through is a mere suggestion of the enormous wealth and health for all men if only they have the courage to grasp it.
A National Left-Wing Caucus
by A Northwest Reader

I HAVE found the American Socialist to be a valuable magazine of a calibre that is badly needed at the present time. I especially enjoyed the article on the back page of the April issue and the editorial, “The Russians Revolt Against Stalin.” I agree basically with the position you take on the need to work within the present framework of working-class organizations and engage actively in the struggle for civil rights and civil liberties as a means for laying the basis for a really strong mass socialist movement. I also agree with the premise that now is the time for education, to clarify socialist principles in the light of the new exigencies of our times. I also realize the time is not ripe for launching a third party that can really be successful.

However, I cannot accept your de-emphasis of political action and failure to point out the need for at least a temporary preliminary organization to be active at all times, even during the present period of a highly sterile social atmosphere. Let such an organization, if necessary, be merely a loosely knit Radical Socialist Caucus, but at least let’s have such an organization working.

It is not enough to have periodicals like your own, Monthly Review, and several others to serve as rallying points for a new radicalism. Concrete organizational forms must exist to continually bring the socialist message to a politically ignorant public. Political action serves as one of the best means to accomplish this.

I am not advocating that socialists put all their eggs in a fragile basket while sliding on the thin ice of a frigid political climate. I am merely saying that local party apparatuses should be placed in operation wherever possible as a means for bringing the socialist message to the public. The work of the local organizations should be coordinated so far as possible on a national basis by the Radical Socialist Caucus. Under the circumstances, it should be remembered that the winning of elections would not be important. The socialist conditioning of sensitive elements would be the underlying purpose.

POLITICAL action also affords another educational possibility which is even more important. It could provide the basis for working out a program of unity among the bulk of the innumerable socialist factions. A general feeling seems to be growing that unity and a new program of strength need to be worked out among socialists in view of the radical changes that have taken place in recent years. That feeling is expressed not only in your publication and Monthly Review but also by the Independent Socialist League, Young Socialists, some Socialist Workers Party members and even by the appearance of a few radical voices in the Socialist Party and the Young People’s Socialist League.

If unity is ever to be achieved among any of these elements, it will actually be done by engaging in common action on a multitude of fronts against a rampant reactionary capitalism.

A True Perspective on Stalinism
by A California Reader

YOUR comments on the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party showed a quick appreciation of the new policies promulgated there. To Communists, this Congress is surely one of the most hopeful and most important events in recent world history.

There are of course those who always believed that in a less tense international situation and with a greater prosperity, the “disease of orthodoxy” (as Sidney and Beatrice Webb once called it) and the arbitrary powers of the Soviet police would gradually wither away. But for many socialists, both inside and outside the Communist Party, there has been for many years now a tragic conflict between their desire to assist and defend the first great hopeful attempt at socialist economic planning, and their more or less conscious fears that its very success might well lead to the disappearance of personal liberty and freedom of expression. Whatever our personal solution this conflict weighed upon us all, indeed I would say, upon every sensitive person of our generation. We wanted socialism and we wanted liberty, and it sometimes seemed as though we could not have both.

Now we can all of us begin to see this Stalinist period in its true perspective, not as the normal, permanent and inevitable type of regime emerging from Communist-led revolution, but as a temporary phase in the socialist transformation of a very backward peasant country which has had to grapple with the immense problems of two cruel and devastating invasions, civil war and international isolation.

But more than this, the Twentieth Congress was no less remarkable for its international implications. As you have so rightly said, the emphasis on new roads to socialism and on the importance of co-operation with non-Communist Marxists means that there is now the chance of frank discussions between both. Such discussions are essential to establish confidence lost by so many tragic mistakes on both sides. I am well aware of the huge mountains of distrust on both sides and the real differences of opinion which still exist, but I believe that the way is at last open for us to begin the reconstruction of a united socialist movement in the United States. I do not see how we can get peace, socialism and liberty except by cooperation between Communists and socialists. It will have to come in the end, so can we not make a start now?
I may add that I have been a member of the Communist Party for more than 15 years, but for professional reasons I must employ a pseudonym in writing to the press.

Economic Parallel with 1929
by A Student

In the March issue of the American Socialist you published a very interesting article by Harry Braverman titled "Is the Boom Losing Its Balance?" In it you quote figures from various sources comparing the spending rates for consumer goods and for producers' goods prior to the collapse of 1929, and also for the present nine-year period beginning in 1947. You use the years 1921 and 1947 as the base years from which final comparisons are made.

I believe these base years are rather arbitrary and perhaps the period of years discussed much too long. A glance at the record of the Dow-Jones stock-price averages for the period preceding 1929 indicates that the most dramatic aspects of the boom are confined to a five-year period ending with 1929. If we therefore start with 1925 as a base period and note that this is also seven years after World War I, we have an index that looks like this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Consumer Expenditures</th>
<th>Producers' Durable Equipment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>108.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>104.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>108.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>132.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, using 1952 as the base year, which is also seven years after World War II, we have:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Combined Government and Personal Consumption Expenditures</th>
<th>Producers' Investment In Plant and Equipment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>109.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>105.9</td>
<td>100.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>111.1</td>
<td>112.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956*</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Estimates based on forecasts and business announcements)

The similarity in the two periods is even more astonishing when put on graphs, as I have done in the accompanying illustrations.

The value given above for producers' investment is based on a 22 percent increase over 1955, as forecast in the recent joint survey of the Commerce Department and Securities and Exchange Commission which came out after your article appeared. This figure also happens to be approximately halfway between 13 percent and 30 percent, the two extremes given in the McGraw Hill survey your article quoted.

I believe 1952 is a good base year because it marks the beginning of the leveling off in government spending. Thus it appears that government spending merely served the purpose of preserving the long outdated capitalist economy for nothing more than a repetition of its past performance in the late twenties.

I think it will be agreed that the year-to-year parallel behavior indicated by the graphs I have charted is nothing short of remarkable, and when you consider that government spending is therein included it is almost fantastic.

The startling implication which can be drawn from this is that the bust is much nearer than many people imagine. However, all of this is unsatisfactory and incomplete from the rigorous standpoint of a full analysis, and certainly the matter should be further studied. I believe, though, that the whole matter of government spending should be cast in a different light from that generally given to it. Could it not be, for example, considering the great increase in labor productivity, the greater concentration of monopoly capital, and the broader decay of capitalism as a world system in this period as compared with the twenties, that our own contemporary years are equiva-
lent with those of the twenties? And that the popular conception that government spending alters the behavior of capitalist economy to the point where it goes beyond Marxist analysis is entirely false and unjustified? I believe so.

On Radical Propaganda
by Ben H. Williams

Several articles and in particular two book reviews in the February and March issues of the American Socialist attracted my attention.

First, there was your review of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn’s book “I Speak My Own Piece” in the March issue. Not having read Flynn’s nor Brissenden’s books, I cannot offer any first-hand criticism. But from your review, and from having known Miss Flynn constantly during her IWW career, I sense a lack of real understanding of the basic factors in the origin and early development of the IWW. I did not attend the organizing convention in 1905, but took an active interest at the time and for thirteen years thereafter, seven of them as editor of the IWW’s official publication, *Solidarity*. So I hope to make an attempt soon to write fully on the IWW, its origin, development, and decline. It was a vital and significant part of the One Big Union movement, beginning with the Knights of Labor, and it cannot be dismissed with the label “anarchist” fastened on it by Daniel DeLeon of the Socialist Labor Party in his sorry IWW role.

In the February number of the American Socialist, your review-article, “When the Farmers Raised Hell,” interested me greatly. Regarding the farmer’s revolt and the People’s Party movement: I had first-hand observation of it and since then have been mostly quite skeptical of third-party attempts in general. While the Populist crusade caused some perturbation on the part of the capitalist oligarchy, that oligarchy now seems to have our electoral machinery working quite effectively to keep any danger of third-party interference in abeyance.

Even in the days when Debs was polling nearly a million votes, I pointed out how the American electors were set on the two-party system, and that probably the only effective political action would be bringing mass pressure on whichever of the two parties was in the ascendency. While Populism was quite a movement, today we have a multitude of “splinter parties” with no economic foundations or other roots. Each splinter thinks it has all the answers, but the mass of low-income groups passes them all by without the slightest recognition. The Communist Party, though a party in name only, gets much advertising as a “goat” and because of its namesake’s connection with the worldwide upheaval of the common man in the Eastern hemisphere.

While I have never considered radical propaganda useless, I have observed its fate in America for some 65 years. Take for example the aforesaid “Farmer’s Revolt.” No one who was not there in the wheat and corn belt can realize the extent of the vast flood of literature circulating among the farmers at that period. I had access to that literature in my brother’s printshop as a boy in Nebraska as far back as 1889. Scores of radical newspapers, vast quantities of leaflets, pamphlets, and books came pouring out of publishing houses all over the country. From Bellamy to Marx and all the way between, the farmers literally were inundated with “educational literature.” Much the same was true in the period when the Socialist Party seemed to be coming into something big.

The jazz period of the 1920’s again dissipated all remembrance of that considerable flood of socialist literature. So, I have long since reached the conclusion that radical propaganda (which of course we shall keep on erupting) will not become effective until social pressures have first forced the American proletariat into revolutionary motion. Then, if handled realistically, it will help keep the revolution from going astray. Any lapse into sectarian dogmatism at this time or at the time of crisis will prove fruitless or reactionarily dangerous. About all we may hope for from our present radical propaganda is to possibly wise up the potential leadership now mostly dormant in the big mass organizations.

I see today in America a probable near basis for that working class unity talked about and devoutly sought after (by some of us) even before the beginning of the present century—viz: large organized labor groups, ditto for farmers, social security seekers, etc., facing the most unstable economic and social status quo the American proletariat has ever faced. Something is bound to give, and soon (I set no date or dates). Until then, however, we can’t expect much change in the conservatism of the unions, as you describe it in “What’s the Matter with the Unions?” in your March issue.

The principal matter, as I see it, is insufficient economic pressure to roughen up the still waters. But signs of change are at hand: The old techniques of union busting now being used, difficulty with contracts, layoffs on a vast scale, advance of “automation,” and plenty of other irritants in increased momentum are bound in combination to bring action.
Cash and Carry Justice

by Buford W. Posey

It seems to me that something is drastically wrong with the proper administration of justice when an American citizen is forced to pay an attorney to go into our courts in order to secure those rights which are guaranteed him by the U. S. Constitution.

To cite a few examples of what I’m speaking of: The Constitution guarantees the right of peaceful assembly, yet if a peaceful meeting is broken up or disturbed by a bloodthirsty mob then the aggrieved party is forced to spend his own money to employ an attorney to file suit in court so that the victim may exercise his lawful rights. Another example of what I’m referring to is the fact that in May 1954, the U. S. Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that it is unlawful to segregate children in our public schools merely because of their race. Yet here in the South colored parents are being forced not only to spend their own money in order to see to it that the Court’s ruling is enforced but are also being forced to risk the loss of their jobs and in many instances their very life itself.

Surely something is amiss when the Constitution and Supreme Court guarantee a right and still citizens are being charged actual cash for same. Is this justice? I think not. Instead it is a useless and extravagant form of free-enterprise individualism which hinders and in many cases completely blocks the legal exercise of human rights. We here in America who are so fond of boasting of our numerous different freedoms are in reality duping ourselves as to the true facts concerning this situation. In actual practice our present judicial set-up means: Yes, you have certain inalienable rights IF you have the money with which to purchase them. In other words, we are forced to pay in cash for our constitutional rights much in the same manner as we buy our groceries at the supermarket. If we cannot afford steak (constitutional rights) then we must settle for the baloney sausage (reading about our rights), but we can still easily taste the difference between steak and baloney.

If we really cared enough to see the administration of true justice then any citizen or group of citizens who have had a particular right clearly defined by the courts as being a constitutional right could, when this right was violated, file a simple affidavit with either the local U. S. District Attorney or the U. S. Attorney-General’s office stating the manner in which their constitutional rights were being violated, then when a preliminary investigation revealed that their rights were indeed being violated, the Department of Justice attorneys should be required to file a petition with the proper federal court requesting relief for the complaining parties. This could be done in the same manner in which citizens file affidavits alleging criminal acts and warrants for arrests are issued by our state law-enforcement officials. This procedure should apply to ALL civil rights matters, in civil cases as well as criminal violations. Indeed is it not a crime to deprive a person of his civil rights?

It is especially vital that this procedure be adopted in the present segregation crisis in our public schools. Because unless this method is followed then in many areas of the deep South any Negro who files a desegregation petition with a local school board or a federal court is risking his life and at the very least can be expected to be run out of town, as were all 32 signers of such a petition addressed to the local school board at Yazoo City, Mississippi. However, if those Negroes had been represented by a federal attorney and been given the status of federal witnesses then no one could have intimidated them without being in contempt of the U. S. Court.

How could the above-mentioned legal procedure be initiated? It could be begun in either one of the following ways: (1) By an executive order signed by the President directing the U. S. Department of Justice and all of its employees to follow this procedure. (2) By an act of the U. S. Congress. (3) By a judicial fiat issued by the U. S. Supreme Court.

I don’t believe that a citizen should be compelled to obtain the fulfillment of his civil rights in this manner but this legal Remedy should be available in case he cared to use it.

Do you readers agree or disagree with me on how to solve the problem of securing and safeguarding constitutionally guaranteed civil rights for ALL Americans, rich and poor alike? Or do you feel that American justice should continue to be sold as if it were just another commodity on the market?

Buford Posey, a young Mississippi farmer, is a contributing editor to Don West's New Southerner.

JUNE 1956
Why the Left Went Wrong
by J. Barrie

SINCE I am one of the Communists “in turmoil” of whom you speak, I find your magazine to be both extremely helpful and stimulating in its discussions of the theory and tactics of the American Left. I should like to join your discussion by raising certain questions which arise from Mr. Braverman’s fine article, “Which Way to a New American Radicalism?” [April 1956].

In discussing the incorrect economic analyses of the U.S. economy made by the Left and others, Mr. Braverman states: “But undoubtedly the weightiest of all considerations has gone unmentioned: the conservatism of the human mind.” This conservatism may indeed be a deterrent to correct Marxist analysis, but it did not permit us to ignore the objective realities of the American scene in making an analysis. The fact that the expectations of the Left can not be justified seems to be a more fruitful approach to the problem. Wrong expectations were the result of the substitution of slogans and doctrinaire “Marxism” for careful scientific examination of the facts of the American economy. In the field of economic analysis, just as in any field, a true Marxist approach must start with an examination of reality.

Had such a basic examination taken place, the expansive features of American capitalism might not have been underestimated. Also, the temporary maneuverability of American capitalism, and the possibilities for private investment in non-military durable goods (i.e.: the auto industry and housing construction) which influenced the continued expansion of the American economy, might have received the attention they deserved. I think Mr. Braverman attributes too little importance to these factors in the expansion boom.

In no way do I wish to negate the importance of the military program. But the other factors such as the war-created backlog of demand for durable goods and housing, the effects of wartime destruction, and the reduction in the renewal of capital equipment, must be given their proper place. In the “Communist Manifesto” Marx and Engels wrote: “And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction. . . .” In one sense the war created just that kind of destruction, which acted as a stimulus to increased capital investment. It is necessary to know all the factors which precipitated the expansion, in order to be able to estimate how long it can be sustained.

In attempting to “revivify its Marxist economic perspectives,” the Left must seek out factual information dealing with such questions as: the growing impact of automation, the concept of the “absolute impoverishment” of the American working class, changes in the rate of profit, and the effects of government intervention.

I AGREE with Mr. Braverman’s overall thesis that “The unique feature of the Marxist analysis is that it describes a basic disproportion in capitalist economy which cannot be lifted out of the system short of doing away with capitalism.” And I do not argue that “a new slump can be fought by another increase in the government sector.” However, I do not agree with Braverman’s position that “should the attempt be made in the form of welfare spending of major proportions, that would involve a great political struggle which would inevitably become a struggle for socialism.” In the last depression, the militant

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"Truth Has a Habit of Catching Up with the Cleverest Distortions…"

The following letter appeared in the May 18 issue of the Daily Worker. Because it strikes so accurately upon the very point that seems to the editors of the American Socialist to be most important in current discussions, we reprint it here for the information of our readers.

* * *

New York

Editor, Daily Worker:

ANNA Louise Strong’s recent article strikes me as a generally balanced and illuminating discussion of the Stalin era. But in one respect she seems to be still kidding herself. She says that had the present Soviet leaders spoken out sooner they might have been “rightly shot” because “whether in a strike or in a war . . . there are times to criticize and times to shut up and take orders.”

As to soldiers in a war, this is true—sometimes. As to strikes, Miss Strong is talking through her hat. Sure—when a strike is voted everybody is expected to go out—and scabs can expect rough handling.

But does this mean that those who disagree with the leadership on strike tactics, or on what terms to sign a contract should “rightly” be plugged? Not in any decently run union! There is a big difference between holding criticism within certain bounds—where a crisis situation makes it necessary—and suppressing it altogether. Does anybody doubt that the USSR would have been stronger, not weaker, had it been possible for Soviet citizens to criticize the jailing and shootings of honest people?

Miss Strong seems to be trying to rationalize away her own responsibility in helping to spread the incomplete and distorted picture of the USSR which too many of us accepted for too long. All of us “laymen” certainly ignored many obvious facts—notably the ridiculous and disgusting adulteration of Stalin. But on many things we have the excuse that we did not know—because we relied on the good faith of the “experts” (such as Miss Strong, Joe Clark and others) who had studied the USSR or even lived there.

MISS Strong did know—she admits it—that there was “something wrong in the USSR.” But she never told us, because it was “not the time to spread suspicions of the first socialist state.”

This argument is based on the assumption that there is a “time” to tell the whole truth and a “time” to tell half-truths. It is a false argument—first, because truth has a habit of catching up with even the cleverest distortions, as Dulles and Brownell are finding out. More important, it is an argument which implies that the people can’t understand the whole truth—even including the bitter facts—but have to be spoon-fed on syrupy half-truths. Anybody who believes the American people must be spoon-fed is wasting their time preaching socialism. The capitalists will always have bigger and shinier spoons than any socialist group can afford. Telling the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth is not a political tactic, depending on the “right time.” It is, or ought to be, a fundamental principle of anyone calling themselves a socialist.

Alex Leslie

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struggles of the working class for "welfare spending" did not prevent nor correct the slump. Neither did they become a struggle for socialism. Although these measures did not prevent suffering, they alleviated it. And if the present struggle for welfare spending should be transformed into a struggle for socialism, by all means let us participate.

The fight for welfare spending today should be viewed not as an attempt to ward off economic crisis but as an attempt to alleviate any such crisis when it does come. Even though the struggle to achieve a program of public works, lower taxes, reduced military expenditures, increased trade with the socialist world, higher wages, a shorter work week, etc., does not constitute an "anti-depression program," it is the type of struggle in which every American radical should participate.

The question asked by Mr. Braverman as to whether or not radicalism would benefit from a depression is not to the point. It is because "Communists fight in behalf of the immediate aims and interests of the working class" ("Communist Manifesto") while keeping in mind the goal of socialism, that it is incumbent upon us to fight for every economic demand being raised by the labor movement. If we Communists have made it appear that we view this program as a panacea for the ills of capitalism then we are in error. Actually we neither believe it nor say it. It seems to me that Mr. Braverman's position errs in the opposite direction and leads logically to a "wait it out till the final conflict" approach.

I suggest that active participation in the struggles of the labor movement for economic betterment under capitalism is a vital part of the "correct approach to re-creating a virile, principled and confident socialist cadre in America."

Winning Students to Socialism
by A College Reader

This is the story of a group on a college campus. Their college is very small. It varies from 85 to 100 students. Yet for several years this has been probably one of the strongest campus socialist groups in America.

The unusual thing here is that it has been relatively easy to win over these young people to socialism. This rather strange state of affairs is not a result of brilliant leadership on anyone's part or even of exceptionally hard work. It results from special methods of work and a particular combination of circumstances.

Situations in which it is easy to get together large groups to discuss socialism and to get large numbers of subscriptions to socialist magazines are today relatively few and far between. For that reason all American Marxists might do well to look closely at all such instances in order to see just what sort of circumstances are most favorable to the growth of socialism at the present time.

There are various noteworthy facts about the circumstances which produced this youth group. In the first place these young people are nearly all from big cities. Thus they know from their own experience the main currents of American life. Yet their college is in a rural setting far removed from any metropolis. They are a long way from any of the centers where the remaining fragments of the American Left still have strength enough to cling to their old quarrels and divisions.

From time to time spokesmen for various of the fragments of the Left come to this college. But when they get here they are so far away from home that they are unable to dominate or dictate to the students. No one controls these students. They decide things for themselves.

Of course it would be foolish to pretend that a development of this sort can take place without the presence of someone who really knows Marxism and has had experience with organizational problems.

Fortunately there have been several people near at hand who have had experience in the Marxist movement and could give guidance of one sort and another. Yet the founder of the group was not one of these experienced people. He was simply a student who wanted to do something for the cause of socialism. He also held to the belief that there should be some connection between the educational principles known as "progressive education" and the cause of socialism.

This group usually had meetings of a free discussion type rather than listening to anyone present material. There was a very low-pressure approach to outsiders, always letting them know that one was a socialist, but making no effort to push them into accepting one's own views, on the contrary letting them see that how they felt about the matter was up to them. Along with this went an extremely non-sectarian spirit, the attitude that any sincere socialist, no matter what his "brand name," was welcome to come and say his piece.

While the group has had its ups and downs during the three years of its existence, at times the discussion meetings have swelled to one-third of the student body. Twice last semester public meetings were held with outside speakers. At one a Communist leader who had been victimized by the Smith Act was heard. At another someone spoke on behalf of the American Socialist. Each was attended by about two-thirds of the student body.

That same semester a delegation of fourteen students
went to attend the Debs Centennial Meeting in New York City. At the end of that semester many students had subscriptions to the American Socialist.

Despite the unusual vitality of this youth group, its future has been uncertain from one moment to the next. This is because even though these young people have always rejected outside domination, no matter from what direction it might come, they also feel the need to be oriented toward some movement or organization greater than themselves.

This need for something greater than themselves has at times led some of them to seek friendship with the Communist Party. In almost every instance, thus far, they have not found what they wanted in that organization, and they have turned away in disappointment. They will never be satisfied until they find an organization which is non-sectarian and which practices internal democracy.

The young socialist group here probably can not grow much beyond its present scope because, even more than an older group, it needs an outside organization to give moral leadership. Still for three years now socialism has been one of the strongest influences on this little campus. In this America of the cold war and the witch-hunt that is quite a claim to be able to make. And because it is so unusual, the important thing is to see what lessons can be drawn from this.

In the first place the experience of this group shows that it is much easier to win American young people over to socialism now than most people dream. If all colleges in America were as far along as this one little college, it would mean about 700,000 young people taking part in socialist discussion groups, and 400,000 subscribers to the American Socialist on college campuses.

NEEDLESS to say it is not possible simply to apply the same methods at all other colleges and immediately look for the same results. As has already been observed, a group like this could never have been formed had there not been someone around who had a good knowledge of Marxism plus a considerable amount of organizational experience. Such leadership is at this moment pitifully scarce.

This scarcity of leadership forces for the local level is perhaps the main roadblock that stands in the way of the building of a powerful American Marxist movement at the present time. Yet the building of new experimental groups of this sort is one of the few ways in which we can go about training leadership for the future.

Here we come to the second big lesson which the experience of this group of young people seems to teach. On this second point perhaps we should be less certain than about the first. Yet it looks as if it were true.

Probably the building of a non-sectarian and truly democratic socialist youth group of this sort could not have taken place so easily if its location had not been far removed from any of the metropolitan centers where the Left retains some strength and where its quarrels and divisions still have importance. On this campus those quarrels and divisions are felt, it is true. To some extent, they disturb the minds of these young people. Yet these disturbances are too far away to be able to halt or destroy what these young people are doing.

This suggests that Marxists who find themselves forced to live in remote out-of-the-way parts of the country should not feel that for that reason they are out of things. At the present time in America Marxists in remote areas of the country have a special opportunity to begin building a movement of a new type which cannot yet live in the atmosphere of a center like, say, New York City, where the past is still too strong.

Then, as the new growth in the outlying places begins to show itself, it may help the great cities, where the heart of the American Left is located, to find their way onto a new path also.

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**Painted White Elephants**


THERE have been many scores of anti-monopoly books issued in this country. But Mr. Quinn is an exceptional treat, for a couple of reasons. In the first place he is the master of a completely engaging and sympathetic style, writing the American language the way Mark Twain’s countrymen sought to write it. And in the second place, he is uniquely equipped for his task by his background.

For T. K. Quinn has been, let it be known, a card-carrying, paid-up member of the corporation elite, an insider in the councils of malefactors of great wealth, what we socialists call a plutocrat or, when we get good and mad—which is too often for the good of our writing styles—a Wall Street imperialist. He has been around and about in the seven levels of the corporate heaven, and got so close to the Throne at one time that as a vice-president of General Electric he was being groomed to succeed Gerard Swope. But he couldn’t stomach what giant business was making of the country, and stepped aside to make way for someone whose conscience wasn’t so much of an obstacle. Since that time he has been in small business of his own, and has been doing his best to make life uncomfortable for his former friends among the minions of Mammon.

Like the boy who cried out that the Emperor was naked, Mr. Quinn has been bearing down on what everybody knows but few will tell. The country is under the domination of an ever smaller number of business firms. They are big, they are sacred, and they are kept well calcined by brush-wielders assigned to that job; hence, Mr. Quinn calls them “painted white elephants.” “You must not smile” when you talk about them, Mr. Quinn warns, for they “mean mighty serious business.”

WHEN Mr. Quinn tells us that “as few as 200 non-financial corporations own outright well over half of all the assets of all non-financial institutions,” that this is only a tiny fraction of all the corporations, and other nuggets of fact on this order, he is not enlightening us much beyond what we can get from any standard handbook of statistics. But when he draws on his store of first-hand knowledge and observation, he is a joy and delight. Consider for example his authoritative settlement of a little tiff with Adolf Berle Jr., the noted economist who has recently made the discovery that corporations are growing souls.

“I explained,” he writes of an earlier book which Berle had reviewed, “that when supplies are short the big corporations are able to get them and the smaller ones are not; that it is a matter of influence, capital and market power and, if you please, a disposition to act soul-lessly. Mr. Berle com-
mented tersely, 'I am not convinced.' The facts did not agree with his theory of the corporation's righteousness. I was sorely tempted at the time to disillusion him and send him the names and addresses in my possession of completely fake warehouses and the people who operated them, set up by corporations in order to secure unfairly supplies of steel allocated by the government to warehouses for the use of small manufacturers. The government knew where the steel was going and so did the producers. When the smaller companies failed... General Motors and General Electric were just as guilty, though they had directly effected the failure; even more culpable, since they tried to hide their unethical conduct. They thrived on what was wrongfully taken from the starved smaller companies, and more dollars were added to their glamorous sales and profits for the unknowing to admire. This is included in the definition of efficiency. A conscience indeed! Actual experiences like these and scores of others, some of which are related in my Giant Business book, make the use of the word 'soul' in connection with giant, impersonal corporations a sham and a desecration to me."

Mr. Quinn drives his point home: "After forty years in the heart of our industrial system with both big and small business, in worker and official and consulting capacities, I consider it wholly unrealistic to expect a corporation to manufacture a soul for itself. I should sooner anticipate a growth of carbuncles." And he does well to remind his readers, who, I hope, are many, of the truth that the white-elephant painters are paid to cover: "It is sheer folly to forget that the purpose of a business is to make a profit."

THE corporate executives, Mr. Quinn points out, "are caught in the complex and momentum of conditions that leaves them with little alternative but to continue on as best they can. They are victims of the times and circumstances, much as others are... They have little time for reflection and should not be expected to have any comprehensive knowledge of the significance of what they are doing in relation to the country or its effects upon people generally." And then, in a few well chosen words, he disposes of one of the new myths about "corporate responsibility": "More and more executives are coming to appreciate social obligations—that is, responsibility to society—and to aspire to be statesmen. We find them issuing public statements of a magnanimous nature which they do not back up. This has come to be regarded as good public relations."

Interpreting Society


IT is unfortunate that there does not exist, at least to my knowledge, a modern elementary textbook on Marxism, written for the uninitiated, even for the skeptical. A partial aim of the present book, a product of the Russian Research Center of Harvard University, is to fill this gap. The author's stated purpose of "... explaining the Marxist terminology in modern and accepted terms [and] searching for the ideas and images that are represented by this terminology" is certainly commendable. Of course, Dr. Meyer does not wish to give a passive summary of Marxist doctrine. He also wishes to point out "... the connections and coherences that have not been made explicit by Marx and his followers..." and to probe "for the unexamined attitudes, preconceptions, and traditions, psychological and ideological, that underly the entire thought structure."

The book is thus to be a critical essay, as the subtitle, in fact, states. That, in itself, would be unexceptionable if the expository and critical parts were kept separate. Unfortunately, a categorical promise of the author to "... first make an exposition and criticize only afterwards" is not kept. That is the major defect of this book.

The opening chapter, which is more expository and less argumentative than those which follow, begins, after a few preliminaries, with a weak explanation of Marxist economic theory (one has the feeling the author does not really understand it), soon followed by a remarkably clear exposition of historical materialism; the latter, unfortunately, is tempered by a later slip, in which historical materialism is casually identified with economic determinism. Some critical passages, about which more later, bring the first chapter to a close.

THEN follow some chapters devoted to the "psychological" assumptions underlying Marxism; in these, Dr. Meyer announces the discovery that Marxists are radicals (i.e., they think of society as something changing rather than something static) and optimists about the potentialities of human nature. The section on radicalism includes a very lucid discussion of the meaning of dialectics as applied to social phenomena. What Dr. Meyer undoubtedly has in mind in calling radicalism and optimism "psychological" assumptions, is that persons who themselves are of radical and optimistic disposition are more likely to formulate radical and optimistic hypotheses in their social studies. Drawing connections between the psychology of a scientist and the type of hypotheses he advances to explain phenomena is undoubtedly a fascinating subject. However, if one believes that a scientific hypothesis, if it is to survive and become a theory, must be a partial description of real relations in the real world, then the psychology of Marxism has more to do with the truth or falsity of Marxism than the psychology of John Dalton with the truth or falsity of the atomic theory of matter. Marxism is either (at least partially) a correct theory of social dynamics, or it is wrong, like the phlogiston theory of combustion, and deserves a like fate (i.e., to be scientifically eliminated, first historically, not to be taken seriously).

Dr. Meyer, however, declines to take such an approach; according to him, Marxism is an "interpretation" of social dynamics, i.e., one of several possible, and equally valid, ways of looking at society. As the concept of "interpretation", used in this sense, is completely foreign to the realm of science, one must infer that Dr. Meyer does not believe that social dynamics admit of understanding by the scientific method; their study belongs, rather, to the domain of art and literature. This feeling is further strengthened by Dr. Meyer's concluding section, which is along the lines of A. M. Schlesinger Jr.'s dictum that "most important problems cannot be solved."
SEPARATING the "psychological" chapters from the conclusion, is the section entitled "The Disintegration of Marxism," openly devoted to criticism. By "disintegration," the author has two things in mind: (1) the incompatibility of fundamental assumptions; and (2) the development of Marxism into divergent ideologies ("The Marxist House Divided"), depending upon which of the fundamental assumptions of Marxism is emphasized. Attacking the compatibility of fundamental assumptions is a standard method in the mathematical sciences to criticize a theory. However, Dr. Meyer's criticisms are concerned less with internal than with external inconsistency, i.e., with the alleged failure of the predictions of Marx, at least in the original form of the Manifesto, to materialize. These criticisms include many valid, though by no means unanswerable, points. Most of them have been debated for over a century, and do not warrant a summary here.

Dr. Meyer's synopsis of the divergent ideologies which issued from Marx includes a satisfactory statement of the revisionist position. Revisionism is a generic term used to describe the ideology of right-wing socialists, but bureaucrats, et al., who have "revived" Marx by accepting the permanence or quasi-permanence of capitalism. Revisionists think in terms of liberal opposition within the capitalist framework, rather than in terms of socialism in our time. The clarity of Dr. Meyer's presentation of anti-revisionist arguments is again mitigated by the fact that it is largely couched in psychological terms, rather than in terms of content. The discussion of the ideological succession of Marx stops just before World War I. One can only laud the wisdom of such a step in a book the central thesis of which is the failure of Marxism.

Dr. Meyer's book contains several specific criticisms of Marxist doctrine as usually presented, the validity of which, in my opinion, Marxists should acknowledge. In fact, similar criticisms have already been raised by some modern Marxists.

(1) "Marx and his followers . . . failed to present their doctrine in a systematic fashion . . ." and habitually use a "curious Hegelian jargon" which makes it "difficult for such people to communicate to those not initiated. . . ." I might add to Dr. Meyer's comment that the status of assertions is usually not explained explicitly in the works of Marx and his followers. They will say: "We know that . . ." or "This is so . . ." without clarifying whether a received or observed fact, a hypothesis to explain facts, a conjecture, or an analogy, is involved. A small amount of reflection will usually supply the answer; but modern scientific usage has become extremely pedantic along such lines, and quite intolerant of anyone who deviates from accepted practice. In general, as a science matures it leaves the trail-blazing stage, greater emphasis is put on rigor of formulation. I believe that this emphasis on precise expression is all for the good, provided one does not make a fetish of it. I do not believe that our admiration for the classics of Marxism should lead us to imitate them in their occasional looseness of presentation.

(2) "Marxism is divided into a set of purposes and ideas, a set of social institutions, and a scientific method . . . which is quite independent of purpose and ideas. . . ." Dr. Meyer does not criticize Marxism for including an ethical goal, only for not stating that goal explicitly. However, some Marxists deny that any ethical assumptions are included in Marxism; they point out that according to the analysis of Marx, the objective laws of social development are such as to bring about the socialist ideal; this they interpret to mean that Marxism is entirely free from human judgment. But it should be obvious that a doctrine which proposes not only to interpret the world, but to change it, cannot be free of a fundamental axiom of purpose. . . . It is one thing to recognize a necessity, and another thing to work for this necessity. . . ." The fact that purposes and ideals also arise historically and socially, and that comparatively few nowadays would openly disagree with the humanist aims implicit in Marxism, does not give any a priori validity to such aims. It is one thing to explain why certain people work for certain goals, and quite another to accept such goals. The former belongs to the realm of history, sociology, and psychology, while the latter constitutes an individual ethical choice.

In a review of Fromm's "The Sane Society" (American Socialist, November 1955), Harry Braverman suggested that the posing of a dichotomy between methods and goals in science is a "masquerade," as if medical scientists were to say: "I can make you sick and I can make you well, but I can't tell you which you ought to be; that's a moral choice and outside the purview of science."

Mr. Braverman adds that "Man has definite concepts . . . of what is best for him. Almost any individual man can tell you . . . ." I agree with Mr. Braverman that science can indeed ascertain what mankind considers best for itself; but science cannot decree that mankind ought to have it. That decision is an ethical choice. The fact that most people will make the choice does not confer any absolute ("scientific") validity upon it. There are schools of thought (fortunately they have few adherents) which explicitly resolve that ethical choice the other way. One cannot logically refute such people; one can only disagree with them. The propagation of medical ethics which orders the physician to cure wherever possible is logically distinct from his purely scientific knowledge. It is true, as Mr. Braverman points out, that fixing the purpose is usually not the difficulty in science—the difficulty is how to reach the goal. But I think that Marxists have nothing to lose, and everything to gain, by clearly and explicitly stating every assumption, ethical as well as scientific, which underlies Marxist approach. (3) Attempts at drawing detailed connections between economic, social, and historical trends on the one hand, and the ideological superstructure on the other, have not been too successful. In any case, Marxist social science has not yet reached the stage where reliable predictions about the development of ideological trends can be made from the knowledge of the economic and social base. Among the most interesting work in this respect is that of Christopher Caudwell; but most of his analysis is devoted to drawing connections between past developments, not to predicting anticipated trends.

OTHER criticisms of Marxism, presented by Dr. Meyer, will find less acceptance among most Marxists. Thus, the author chides Marx for apparent methodological inconsistency in combining the "functional approach" (the view that the complex under study—here society—functions as a whole) with the "mechanistic" approach ("mechanism" here being used as a dirty word to denote the attitude that things happen because of sufficient cause); likewise, Marx is taken to task for combining rationalism (here used to denote the doctrine that understanding of the world is derived from pure reasoning) with empiricism (the doctrine that understanding is derived exclusively from recording facts); for combining the absolute and the relative, the accidental and the teleological. Far from denying this accusation, Marxists will suggest that Dr. Meyer open almost any serious scientific treatise, ranging from A. Somerfeld's lectures on theoretical physics to A. J. Carlson and V. Johnson's standard text on physiology: There he will find the same sins, proudly displayed. For the modern scientific method, in which hypothesis and experiment, analysis and synthesis, accident and necessity, are blended into a harmonious methodology, was largely used by Marx and Engels in their study of society.

Despite serious shortcomings, Dr. Meyer's book is interesting reading—but only for those who already have some familiarity with Marxism. They will find in this book some fairly serious, if not earthshaking or always original, criticism, which cannot help but invigorate their understanding. As for the modern elementary textbook on Marxism, it remains to be written.

HANS FREISTADT

Explosion in the Making


WITH a population of three million whites, nine million Africans, one-half million Indians and over a million of mixed origin (coloreds), the Union of South Africa is the largest multi-racial society of our day. The only country in which the ruling white man is indigenous but greatly outnumbered by non-whites, it pursues the most repressive and explosive racist policies in the world. White settlers first appeared in the area (already inhabited by Hottentot tribes)
in 1652, when the Dutch East India Company established the Cape Colony as a way station for its ships. The Dutch community came to consist of Company employees and free burghers. A section of the latter grew restive in the face of rigidly monopsonist Company practices, and in their search for economic independence as free boers (farmers) began to trek inland. These frontiersmen soon met Bantu tribes who were coming South, seeking grazing land. Ensuing attempts by the boers to rob the Africans of their land and cattle touched off a prolonged series of so-called “Kaffir Wars.”

In the Napoleonic period Britain occupied the Cape. In line with the Industrial Revolution sweeping their country, the English introduced free trade, reduced taxes and stabilized the currency. Slavery was abolished in 1834; this action had been spurred on by the earlier arrival of 4,000 immigrants from Britain, half of them farmers driven from the countryside by the dislocations of the Industrial Revolution.

Within two years thousands of Afrikanders (those of Dutch origin who speak Afrikaans) trekked North, often under incredible hardships. After ruthless decimation of resisting Africans, the independent Boer republics of Orange Free State and Transvaal were established.

The author goes exhaustively into the three-pronged wars which took up most of the nineteenth century. One of the highlights of his tale centers around the Basuto leader Moshesh, an exceptional statesman who long maintained a measure of independence for his people by playing off Boer against Briton. But by 1880 the last vestiges of African independence had been destroyed.

The exclusively agricultural economy which had prevailed until then began to decline with the discoveries of gold and diamonds in the Boer republics. This period marks the rise of Cecil John Rhodes, pioneer of the South African mining industry and railroads, and one of the most extraordinary figures in the history of capitalism. His decretal pledge he made at the age of 24, to strive “for the furtherance of the British Empire, for the bringing of the whole civilized world under British rule, for the recovery of the United States, for the making of the Anglo-Saxon race into one Empire.” His persistent dream was to create a “British Africa from sea to sea.” In a famous speech before Queen Victoria he asked him: “What are you engaged on at present, Mr. Rhodes?” she was informed: “I am doing my best to enlarge your Majesty’s dominions.”

British imperialist designs on the newly-discovered wealth in Afrikander lands led to the outbreak of the South African or Anglo-Boer War of 1899. In spite of initial Boer gains under Kruger (who clung ferociously to his Bible when told the world was not flat), British military superiority won the day. Mr. Gibbs, whose book throughout reflects a strong pro-British bias, admits that 20,000 women and children perished in English concentration camps (other writers give a much higher figure), but calls them “victims of ignorance.” He quotes Conan Doyle to the effect that “mothers screamed and refused to be parted from sick children, refused to open their tents for fresh air,” a display of emotion that must have shocked Her Majesty’s civilized citizens. The panic in London, abetted by the inflammatory writings of Rudyard Kipling, Conan Doyle, and Edgar Wallace, subsided as news came that the Empire was safe: “Sane and sober City financiers tossed handfuls of golden sovereigns into the streets from office windows.”

Transvaal and Orange Free State became British colonies but obtained self-government four years later. In 1910 the Cape Colony, Natal and the two former Boer republics joined in the Union of South Africa. The stage was now set for a period of intense imperialist activity, and as elsewhere, Britain traded a measure of political independence for a secure economic foothold. With such men as Louis Botha and General Smuts at the helm (the author calls the latter “the greatest Afrikander and the greatest South African”), it wasn’t long before the London financiers recovered the gold pieces they had cast to the masses.

The paramount need for cheap mine labor brought the enactment of the Native Lands Act of 1913, which confined Afrikaner within certain areas, thus ensuring tremendous over-crowding and starvation, and a forced migration to the mines. The Afrikander farmers began to find their labor supply shrinking, and their economic interests found political expression in the formation of the Nationalist Party in 1913. A Transvaal preacher by the name of Daniel Malan became first editor of the party’s paper and soon began to rise in Nationalist councils.

Post-war depression brought on the Johannesburg mine strike of 1922, which developed into a full-fledged attempt to seize the city. The action was marked by extreme militancy, immature leadership, and faint echoes of the Russian Revolution. It provided the strange sight of a banner reading “Work of the world, fight and unite for a White South Africa.” Smuts, well known for his philosophical speculations, succeeded in uniting mind and matter by employing machine-guns and planes to drown the workers in blood.

From then on the powerful Afrikander farmers who controlled the Nationalist party decreed an ever-increasing anti-African and anti-British policies. This was paralleled by the formation of the Smuts-dominated United Party, which became a mouthpiece of the mining interests and of some prosperous farmers whose fortunes were closely intertwined with those of the mine owners. As Mr. Gibbs deals with some further aspects of Nationalist policy, and clearly expresses his intense dislike of the present regime. His general appraisal, however, fails in coming to grips with essentials.

The most significant social fact in the country, grossly underemphasized by the author, is its growing industrialization. Secondary industry (manufacture) developed considerably through two world wars and contributes now about 25 percent of the national income, as compared with 12 percent and 14 percent for mining and agriculture. The need for semi-skilled labor (the low figure of three million for the entire white population should be kept in mind) has made these industries receptive to more liberal treatment of non-whites. Between 1936 and 1946 the number of Bantus employed in manufacture rose by 75 percent.

It has been authoritatively estimated that in 1940 the 400,000 non-Europeans in manufacture earned more than the 1,400,000 non-Europeans in mining and agriculture. These new opportunities produced a small layer of educated Africans and often helped to soften the demoralization which follows the sudden transition from semi-tribal to urban life (one of the favorite topics of current South African literature). Largely controlled by the British, who constitute 40 percent of the white population, the new industries are still too diversified and subordinate to mining capital to generate political power. In the flux of prosperity they leave “politics” to others.

Confining himself to “historical” narrative, Mr. Gibbs deals very inadequately with the 11 million Africans, Indians and Coloreds. He hardly touches on the increasing unity between these groups, the many revolts, the magnificent resistance movement. These, however, involve the great issues in South Africa.

The Nationalist victories in the 1948 and 1953 general elections were greatly facilitated by abstention on the issue of racial policy on the part of the United Party. Although “apartheid” (the entire body of legislation and practices directed against non-whites) makes urban life extremely difficult for these groups, and is basically a device to siphon cheap labor from the cities to the mines and farms, it thwarts the non-whites in pressing their demands. Secondary industry, and Britain and the United States with their vast investments in the Union (which is a very important source of uranium, a by-product of gold mining), would prefer a mitigation of the conflict. But the Nationalists are stinging the tide of revolt, and the owners of industry, although increasingly uneasy, reluctantly support them.

What Mr. Gibbs in effect advocates is a policy of studied concessions designed to brine a thin layer of non-whites and take the edge off the resistance. This approach underlies the British-engineered Central African Federation, bitterly opposed by Africans and described by John Gunther as “an attempt to keep Nkrumah from coming East and the inheritors of Malan from coming North.” But with the Nationalists solidly entrenched, free to manipulate electoral arrangements, and backed by a United States which refuses to exert even “moral” pressure, such concessions are unlikely. Strydom, who succeeded Malan in 1954, insists that such a policy will cause the volcano to erupt.
The author is quite aware of the explosive situation and bemoans the fact that "bitterness has become a heritage, hardening more noticeably in these years, and only the Kremlin can rejoice." He often wields an impressive historical axe that chops down non-British trees with dazzling skill. But the reader interested in a basic analysis of South Africa's social crisis, and of the regime's relation to the forces of oppression in the world, will be disappointed.

F. G.

The Gelded Age


HISTORIANS who, a few decades hence, write the story of this Gelded Age will have to be good psychologists as well as researchers to portray the mania that has befogged this land during the past ten years. Never has radicalism been so weak in number and direct influence—never at any time during the past half-century. And yet there has been more legislation dealing with "communism and subversion," more judicial proceedings and litigation, more impassioned political debate, more newspaper furor and more general uproar over this issue than, possibly, over any single issue that has hit this land since the founding of the Republic.

The truth is that we radicals are for the moment hostages in the hands of an infuriated ruling class which has found it impossible to lay violent hands on the popular world uprising of the common man in Asia, Africa and Europe, and we're being treated like hostages always are in the hands of a side whose war is going badly. And the result is that traditional liberties enjoyed for almost two centuries are being destroyed for all Americans. The radical and liberal hostages are getting the works, but every single American is materially less free to have and express opinions about social, political, economic, trade union, racial, artistic, pedagogical, scientific and other matters—that's the keynote of the story related in this book by Dr. Lamont, and it's the unvarnished truth that every American should wake up to.

This book is a survey of the laws, court decisions, administrative outrages, etc., of the past ten years of the witch-hunt, and also of the ups and downs of the battle for civil liberties as waged by the victims and by the greatly reduced forces of true liberalism who have entered the fray out of idealism. The picture is not a pretty one, as the drive has been pushed with deadly steam-roller effectiveness. And yet the story is not without its lighter sides. Mr. Lamont recalls the story of Hiawatha:

"In the same year [1950] Monogram Studios of Hollywood canceled the filming of a script dealing with the life of Hiawatha, fifteenth-century Onondaga Indian Chief immortalized in Longfellow's classic poem. The studio thought the production might be construed as Communist propaganda. To quote the New York Times: 'It was Hiawatha's efforts as a peacemaker among the warring Indian tribes of his day, which brought about the Confederation of the Five Nations, that gave Monogram particular concern, according to a studio spokesman. These, it was decided, might cause the picture to be regarded as a message for peace, and therefore helpful to present Communist designs.'"

In 1953, when a play written almost 2,400 years ago by the Greek dramatist Aristophanes was produced in New York, it had to be bowdlerized for fear of getting the "communist" label. The Board of Directors of the Academy of Dramatic Arts cut out the following exchange:

Praxagora: The rule which I dare to enact and declare
Is that all shall be equal and equally share
All wealth and enjoyments, nor longer endure
That one should be rich, and another be poor,
That one should have acres, far-stretching and wide,
And another not even enough to provide Himself with a grave: that this at his call
Should have hundreds of servants, and
That none at all.
All this I intend to correct and amend:
Now all of all blessings shall freely partake,
One life and one system for all men I make.

Blepurus: 'Tis those that have most of these goods, I believe,
That are always the worst and the keenest to thrive.

Praxagora: I grant you, my friend, in the days that are past,
In your old-fashioned system, abolished at last;
But what's he to gain, though his wealth he retain,
When all things are common, I'd have to explain.

In the opening years of the witch-hunt the picture was exceedingly dark. But one of the advantages of Dr. Lamont's survey from the present vantage point is that it enables the embattled defenders of American rights to begin to get some idea of how their efforts are paying off. Had there been no resistance, the picture would have gone from bad to worse, but the few who risked jobs and liberty to stand up and resist have made possible a number of favorable court decisions, a slight turning of the tide, a curtailment of the worst menaces and threats of the reactionaries. And the returns aren't all in yet. Even leaving aside the big events in America which are due to come and alter the entire picture, the appeal to fair play and to traditional American procedures is beginning to make itself felt, the unions are beginning to take a hand, some of those who went along unthinkingly at the beginning are reconsidering, and the resistance plus the international scandal of the U.S. witch-hunt has even forced the top plutocracy to think things over and set a few bounds to their repressions.

Dr. Lamont's book is an excellent compendium. It makes a fine handbook for civil liberties fighters, and, for the average American not yet awake to the danger it is in, a real pack a terrific wallop. Its wide circulation would help to stem the tide.

In addition to its overall and general value, this book posses a number of special merits. Dr. Lamont speaks out firmly against the stand of the Communists in the Smith Act persecutions of the Trotskyists in the Minneapolis case of 1941. The Communist Party supported the prosecution, and with what base motives can best be judged from this excerpt from a Masses and Mainstream review of Lamont's book:

"Why did we not vigorously defend the Minneapolis Trotskyites? (At best, our position was ambiguous and at worst it cheered on the prosecution.) This not only proved to be a serious tactical error; worse, it was a deep error in principle."

"In my judgment we committed a consciously or unconsciously, the non-Marxist, 'super-clever' theory that the Smith Act could be a 'dialectical' instrument, i.e., 'could be used both ways.' There were some simple enough to believe that the Government could employ the Smith Act against reactionaries, against certain people in the labor movement and, perhaps, never against us. Those who held that belief (and during the Roosevelt Administration such illusions were not uncommon) are today wiser.

Another valuable feature of the Lamont book is the chapter devoted to the internal struggle in the American Civil Liberties Union, where Lamont was a director for many years, and writes some of what appeared in Lucille Miller's "Education of an American Liberal," he adds much to the story and brings it down to more recent times.

And finally, it should be added that Dr. Lamont's book is a supplement to important actions he has taken, as an opponent of McCarthy, as a founder of the new Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, and by establishing the Bill of Rights Fund.

A. S.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Back to Socialism

Youthful exuberance and lack of intelligence led to my early disillusionment with the socialist movement in the U.S. After a useless four years in college, my education began; muddled, disorganized and confused, I educated myself and am happy to say that I am back on the road to recovery. I wish to re-establish contact with socialists and organizations in my vicinity. I am cleansed, re-dedicated, and anxious to extend my talent (historian, geographic, cartographer, urbanologist) to, in service of, the socialist movement in any way possible. I would greatly appreciate knowing of organizations in New York to whom I may present myself to offer my support.

The American Socialist is beyond any doubt, in my own opinion, the first truly intelligent organ of socialism since the 1920's. I shall remain an ardent reader.

W. J. Brooklyn

Correction on Auto Article

The article, "Skilled Trades Revolt in Auto," which appeared in the May issue of the American Socialist, contained an error.

The article states correctly, in discussing the 1955 GM contract, whereby production workers obtained improved seniority provisions for entry into the skilled trades, that "The contract also contained a detailed schedule breakdown for the various trades indicating time on job required to achieve full rights in the classification." It errs when it continues, "In every case requirements were substantially lower than called for under the UAW apprenticeship program." The apprenticeship program requires four years. The policy of the UAW Skilled Trades Department requires those who do not have an apprenticeship graduation certificate to produce proof of a minimum of ten years job experience. Only then will an application for a journeyman card be considered. In some plants there is a question whether upgraders can get into skilled trades even if they have 20 years time in.

The GM agreement represents a big step forward because it definitely accorded upgraders and trainees the opportunity to receive full rights in the skilled classifications in the reduced time of four to six years, depending on the particular skill.

Another point to consider is the fact that the apprenticeship program is open only to younger men, while upgrader and trainee programs are open to older workers as well.

D. L. Detroit

Your publication is more critical of the Soviet Union than it is of capitalism in the U.S. Like the Socialist Call, it has no program, no specific issues, plans, or organization—political party—to change the economy of this country from capitalism to socialism. If the factions of the Left don't get together (and soon) with a specific program to which labor and the farmers can rally, we will, presently, by default, be impelled into a bureaucracy or dictatorship of the Right. Yes, I'm very much concerned.

H. R. D. Stockton, Calif.

I am hoping that the different groups will unite and stop trying to discredit one another. By dividing ourselves we have weakened ourselves completely. No wonder that W. E. B. Du Bois suggests a sit-down strike against voting.

Among the groups there are many fine persons. It would help in the long run if these active persons would be willing to aid in bringing about a united front of socialists, labor, farmers. Cooperation instead of division.

J. W. Jacksonville, Fla.

The article on cooperative medicine in the February issue of the American Socialist [1956] by Dr. Jay W. Friedman] was the best I have ever seen.

W. F. S. California
A Letter to All “American Socialist” Readers

Dear Friend:

THE American Socialist has been published for two and one-half years. During that entire time, we have never rushed to our readers with gongs and sirens proclaiming a financial crisis. In fact, we have never had one, and hope we can continue to arrange things so that we never will. But that doesn’t mean we have no money worries. Like all the radical and non-conformist journals published in the United States today, we wage a constant fight to keep on an even keel financially.

Our annual fund appeal to our readers is an iron necessity, not just a luxury. If our readers don’t respond to it generously, we are in trouble. If they don’t respond to it at all, we can be put out of business. We say this not to scare anybody. Our readers have responded generously right along, and we have no reason to believe they will not do so again. We say this simply to clear up any misconception that because our publication is not surrounded by a constant crisis atmosphere, we are on easy street. Not at all. We need your help in reply to this appeal.

In our last fund appeal, we gave our direct costs of producing the American Socialist at 33½ cents a copy, and indirect costs at an additional 8½ cents a copy, bringing the average cost to about 42 cents on a magazine, for which we realized about 18½ cents average return. While this may sound odd to people unaccustomed to the publishing business, we can assure you that if it is out of line at all, it is on the side of cheapness, as almost any magazine of our production quality is produced at a much higher cost. What we do not have that the commercial magazines have is large advertisement revenues (or subsidy from a foundation or business concern).

Since our last letter on this subject, all three of our main production costs have been increased: printing cost, engraver’s cost and photograph cost. While we have not bothered to calculate the new figures in detail, it is obvious that our deficit has increased materially, as our selling price per copy and per subscription has not been altered. For this reason we must ask all who donated last time to dig down just a bit deeper if possible, and for new readers or old readers who didn’t contribute last time to join the ranks of those who make this publication possible.

THERE is one thing more: We don’t want to make this letter a political tract, but it should be evident that the tide of affairs has been moving in the direction of the kind of socialist movement we have been plugging for. The American Left is in a process of change, and the chances for the emergence of a new socialist movement are getting better. If the response to this appeal is generous enough, we will be able to devote a few spare dollars to promotional efforts which will help expand our circulation. We know all readers will realize the importance of this at the present time.

The terms of last year’s fund appeal still stand: For every donation of $10 or more, we will extend your subscription by one year when it expires; for every donation of $15 or more, you will receive in addition a bound volume of the American Socialist for 1955. For every donation of $50 or more, you will receive a permanent subscription and a bound volume.

But every contribution, no matter how small, counts. In the response to our last appeal, the smaller contributions added up to quite a sizable sum. So, whatever the amount of your contribution, be sure to let us hear from you by return mail.

Sincerely yours,
The Editors

Name ______________________________________
Address ____________________________________
City and State _____________________________ Amount ______