The American Socialist

Suez Crisis:

Arab Nationalism Opens a New Front

Socialism: The Word and the Deed

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Special Report: SETTLEMENT IN STEEL
On August 16, Herbert Hill, Labor Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, spoke about the Negro and the Democratic Party to the convention of the California State Federation of Labor at Long Beach, California. Portions of his interesting talk follow.

* * *

I COME here this morning to talk to you as a representative of an organization that has a court order against it, a court order calling for the payment of $100,000 because we refused to turn over our membership lists in the state of Alabama to the murderers, to the killers, who openly declare their defiance of the law of this land, who spit upon the Constitution, and who shoot down Negroes in cold blood on the steps of county courthouses.

Think what it would mean to you as trade unionists if the state in this land could require you in your trade union organization to turn over your membership lists. . . . We have refused to do this. We have refused to do this because we know that the Negroes in that state, as in most of the other Southern states, have already been victimized by loss of jobs because they want their kids to get a decent education, because their homes and their land and farms have been foreclosed in many cases because they signed petitions asking for admission of their children to the schools to which Negro children have heretofore been denied admission.

I say to you that this is a fundamental responsibility of the American labor movement to today join with the NAACP in fighting these new attacks. Let me tell you that AFL and CIO will not be able to organize workers in the South ruled by trigger-happy sheriffs and Lynch mobs. It does not make any difference whether these mobs are run by the Ku Klux Klan or by the White Citizens Councils.

Let me tell you, for instance, that in Chapman, Alabama, the Woodworkers have been engaged in a year-long strike, and the cops are shooting the white men on the picket line and the police officers are ferrying the black men through the picket line.

In Dublin, Georgia, where Negro citizens cannot vote, the last time a Negro tried to vote the registrar pulled out his gun and smashed the gun on the registration book, and I quote—and this is from the affidavits presented to the Department of Justice—he said, as he slammed his gun down on the registration book, "Boy, no niggers are going to register in this book!" In Dublin, Georgia, the city council passed a law saying that trade union organizers must pay a license fee of $2,500, and $50 for every worker they bring into the union. Can you organize unions on these conditions? Of course, you can't!

In Florida, an organizer for the Amalgamated Clothing Workers was recently shot. Talk to the people from the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. Have them tell you about the strike in Tennessee.

One could go on and on.

The trade union movement is not going to organize in the South where there is no respect for law, where society is not run by the rule of law. . . . The fact is that the attacks against the NAACP and the defiance of the Supreme Court decisions in the school cases have now ushered in a whole new period of violence which is greatly endangering the entire labor movement in the North as well as the South.

Just let me say a word about the events of the past twenty-four hours. I am sure that as millions of our fellow citizens did, you and I did last night on television watch the events in Chicago. Let me say that last night the Democratic Party, which very soon will come to every citizen in every hamlet and ask for your votes on all sorts of pretentious reasons, that this Democratic Party—which I ridicule now as the party of the little man, the common man, the forgotten man—in that pathetic, that shameful alleged civil rights plank, that party betrayed its own traditions, betrayed the interests of every American citizen.

I know that many of us feel very strongly on this. There are Negroes in the South like Reverend George W. Lee in Belbony, Mississippi, who after he deposited poll tax receipts in Sunflower County, was shot down like a dog. And Lamar Smith, the NAACP organizer in Brookhaven, Mississippi, was shot down on the steps of the county courthouse because he deposited poll tax receipts of 29 Negro citizens—and Negro citizens are not supposed to vote. I will tell you that the federal government in Washington, the Republican administration, has been guilty of virtually complete paralysis in enforcing civil rights where the rights of Negroes are involved. The Department of Justice, the chief law enforcement agency in America, for the past two years has been virtually dead.

But last night the Democratic Party, which we looked forward to perhaps come up with an answer, to give leadership, did not distinguish itself from this Republican Party, which has a miserable record on this question. Last night's civil right's plank was not a civil right's plank; it was a mess of pathetic pettage that says nothing, that takes you back, that does not lead us forward.

I say to the Democratic Party and to the leaders of the Democratic Party and to the leaders of labor that play such an important role in determining the program of that party that the tragedy of this situation may well be that the Negro in America will be left to fight his fight alone. And this will have tragic implications for the whole country. Negro citizens are going ahead. The law is on our side. We take this very seriously. And Negroes in Michigan, in Chicago, in New York are going to vote on the basis of what happens to our fellow, to their relatives in Decatur, Mississippi, and in Jefferson, Alabama. Perhaps it is tragic that many Northern liberals will perhaps have their political careers as liberals terminated precisely because they belong to the party of Eastland, to the party of Talmadge—and the party's national leadership has not repudiated the Eastlands and Talmagdes.

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AMERICAN SOCIALIST
Arab Nationalism Opens a New Front

WHEN Western capitalism was in its heyday before the first World War, its projects appeared glorious, its statesmen distinguished, and success crowned its ventures as it drove the imperial standards deeper into Asia and Africa. Today, its most skilfully contrived designs are thwarted, and even its occasional victories prove ephemeral. It is not that its present statesmen are mediocrities, and its planners fools—although that is sometimes the case also. It is simply that the age of imperialism is passing, and all the king's horses and all the king's men cannot rout the new forces that are entering the historical arena and challenging imperialism's past pretensions and supremacy. The thing that Britain dreaded for so many years has now come to pass: Egypt has nationalized the Suez Canal and proposes to raze this rampart of empire. The fires of nationalism are rising higher and higher in the Middle East, and neither concessions nor threats seem capable any longer of putting out the blaze.

Facing possibly the most serious crisis that has assailed it since the war—greater than Korea, or the Berlin airlift, or the Iran oil nationalization—imperialism is without the strength to act that it possessed in these other affairs just several years ago. The statesmen started out with the trumpets blaring and the drums rolling as if we were back in the days of Rudyard Kipling. Our own gift to world diplomacy, John Foster Dulles, got the play into motion when he slammed the door in the Egyptian envoy's face and curtly let it be understood that good American money was not going to be wasted on the likes of those who had recognized Communist China and were purchasing arms from Communist Czechoslovakia.

When the Westerners recovered from their surprised shock after Nasser challengingly announced the nationalization of the canal, they began hurling epithets, shouting imprecations, and ordering troop movements—conduct that in the past invariably presaged war. Rarely have the government leaders of Britain and France been seen in such a state of undisguised panic and choking rage. Eden, who in past years said that the trouble with Hitler was not what he did in Germany but that he did not stay in Germany, now likened Nasser to a Hitler whose rule could not be countenanced. Mollet, a self-proclaimed socialist, no less, who is engaged in trying to drown the Algerian liberation uprising in blood, called Nasser “a permanent menace to peace,” while he ordered the French fleet at Toulon readied for action.

What is the issue that has sent the shivers down the spines of these gentlemen and has the Washington politicos scurrying in the midst of the political convention season? The N. Y. Times of August 5 puts it in a nutshell:

If the battle over Suez involved solely the control of a man-made, 105-mile ditch that links the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean and expedites world trade, the outcome would be tremendously important. But the stakes are far bigger than the canal. What is involved, fundamentally, is the political destiny of a vast world of wind and burning sun, of deserts, green oases and wild, rocky hills—the world of the Middle East.

The West European powers are completely dependent on controlling Middle East oil if they are to maintain their favored world position and hope for continued industrial progress. With the decline and in some cases exhaustion of their old coal resources, European economy has largely converted to the use of petroleum products. Western Europe however does not rate very high as an oil-producing area. At the outset of the Marshall Plan, the bulk of Europe's requirements had to be drawn from the Western hemisphere. But this arrangement ran into the snag that the proved oil resources here were declining and United States requirements were rising. The imperial economic network was therefore rearranged by mutual consent. By 1950, the Atlantic Pact nations completed the readjustment of their economies to the use of Middle East oil.

In an earlier period when the British fleet first converted to the use of oil, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was the main supplier of Middle East oil, the company constructed huge refineries and accompanying works at Abadan, which had the virtue at least of creating a tiny industrial oasis in the desert of Middle East backwardness. With the new postwar imperial pattern, involving the construction of vast networks of pipelines, and the tendency to build ever larger oil tankers, the oil was shipped in its crude state and processed in new major refineries constructed in Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Spain. This meant, as Halford L. Hoskins explains in his authoritative work on the Middle East, “the placing of strict limits on plans and ambitions for the industrialization of the Middle East producing states which thereafter for an indefinite time to come would be denied the opportunity and the advantage of processing at home the bulk of one of their main natural resources.”

Britain's career as a major world power rests squarely and immediately on its hold in the Middle East. If Nasser's nationalization were to set off a chain reaction of other nationalizations in the Arab world, Britain's days of empire will no longer be on the wane, but will have waned.
France lost after the war its old spheres of influence in Lebanon and Syria. Its direct stake in the Middle East is not quite as overwhelming as Britain's although its economy, as we have seen, is likewise geared to the use of Middle East oil. But it reacted, if anything, even more hysterically to Nasser's coup, and that is hardly surprising. The mortally wounded French empire, which has been eased out of the Middle East, which was hurled out of Indochina, now finds itself being rudely shoved to the wall in North Africa. If Nasser gets away with his act of defiance, how long can the French hold the fort in Algeria? That is a haunting question, and the jittery French politicians want to stamp out Arab nationalism while they still have troops and a fleet at their disposal.

The Americans, having more layers of fat, can act with slightly more circumspection, but not much more. While United States industry is not geared to Middle East oil, the over-all American stake in this area rivals Britain's. The latest published proved oil reserves of the world are about 190 billion barrels, and two-thirds of this is in the Middle East. At the present rate of outflow, the reserves of the Western hemisphere will theoretically be exhausted in thirteen-fourteen years, whereas Middle East reserves are good for a hundred years. Moreover, the consortium of leading U.S. oil companies now occupies first place in Middle East oil control and production. It has been estimated that they have invested more than $2 billion sunk into Middle East leases, production, pipelines and refineries, and possibly an equal amount in European refineries and oil tankers assigned to Middle East trade.

The British spokesmen are therefore guilty of no empty rhetoric when they proclaim this the biggest crisis since the Second World War.

What are they going to do? That is no longer easy for the Western powers to answer. It is no simple matter to impose the "energetic and severe counter-stroke" that Mollet demanded. Legally, the Western spokesmen haven't a leg to stand on. The Suez Canal company is chartered under Egyptian laws, and Egypt has a perfect right to nationalize the properties of any of its domestic companies. The whole transaction is doubly legal even under so-called international law, as Nasser has pledged to compensate the stock owners at current price quotations. In addition, under the terms of the original charter, the canal and properties are supposed to revert back to Egypt in 1968—just twelve years hence.

It is true that it is not a good arrangement to have international waterways under the control of one country which can utilize its monopolistic position to blockade the ships of another nation (as Egypt has illegally blocked Israel in recent years). But British imperial power has for over a century based itself precisely on such a monopolistic possession of a series of indispensable waterways, so Eden does not exactly come into court with clean hands. Obviously, if it is a good idea to establish international control of the Suez Canal, it is an equally good idea to internationalize the Panama Canal, the Kiel Canal, the Dardanelles, Gibraltar, etc.

It is not the absence of a sound legal case that is staying the hands of the imperialists. Where they have the power they have never disdained to employ the most barefaced acts of violence and brigandage. What is holding them back in the present crisis is not morals, but fear of consequences. Gone are the days when they could send down a couple of gunboats, shell Alexandria, and squeeze a capitulatory agreement out of the over-awed local officials. Eden and Mollet have not yet dared order the firing of a shot, but already the peoples of the Arab world are forming a ring of solidarity around Nasser. Sukarno in far-off Indonesia warns the West to keep hands off Egypt. Nehru of India, just as firmly if somewhat more diplomatically tells them they cannot get away with the use of force. And Russia representing the Soviet bloc says menacingly, "Don't get reckless, boys! This is not the age of Victoria. You have to come to an agreement with Nasser."

Undeniably, India, Indonesia and the Arab countries cannot deploy very much military power; nevertheless, any attempt to use force against Egypt would throw the whole Arab world into a frenzy of resistance—in the course of which the Middle East oil industry would be the loser—and the sparks of which could spread far and wide and consume a large part of the world. As late as a few years ago the imperialists could cut Iran to ribbons while the rest of the world stood by watching without lifting a finger on Iran's behalf, either because of indifference or helplessness. How things have changed even in these few intervening years! The Soviet bloc and even the Bandung bloc are realities that can no longer be ignored in the
reorganization of the affairs of the world.

It is a contradiction that Egypt should have advanced so far in its struggle against imperialism while its internal social development stays retarded. The social structure of the country has remained for all practical purposes untouched under Nasser. About 85 percent of the population is landless, eking out a living as sharecroppers or hired help—a life of “unrelieved horror” in the words of Doreen Warriner, the British scholar. Twelve hundred families own the bulk of the land, and half of the national income goes to 1½ percent of the people. Conditions are as bad or worse in most of the other Arab countries, with national incomes ranging from $35 to $100 per head annually. A recent UN survey summarizes conditions in these words: “A majority of the people, and especially three-quarters of those who live in rural areas, still largely continue to live according to patterns that were developed in the Middle East centuries ago.”

But the modern world is moving in more ways than one. Since the war there has been a certain spurt in industrialization in parts of the Middle East, so that Egypt, the most advanced of the countries, with a population of some 23 million, now has an industrial working class of over 600,000, and the value of its industrial production is approaching that of its fields.

All these countries have been traditionally dominated by their landlord cliques, and the first nationalist leaders came from the educated representatives of this class and of the thin upper crust of merchants and capitalists. With the growth of the working class, trade unions and labor activities have developed fitfully. But behind the facade of elections and parliamentary institutions, these countries continue to be run as tight dictatorships. Communist and labor parties are illegalized, and strikes are in practice largely forbidden. One strike leader was hanged for treason under Nasser.

With the rising tide of nationalism has come the ardent desire for a better life, and with the growth of the cities, the people are finding new outlets to give vent to their dissatisfaction and to express their aspirations. The inchoate movement of the city masses has shaken the traditional rule of the feudalists throughout the area. The consequent instability of political life has led to the emergence of new Bonapartist regimes, generally led by the military, in a number of the Arab countries. The Nasser regime in Egypt is simply the perfected specimen of this species of government.

Bonapartist dictatorships have arisen in history when conflicting classes were either deadlocked or mutually exhausted. The “man on horseback,” in such cases, creates a state power that lifts itself above the contending classes and arbitrates their conflicting interests, without disturbing the basic social status quo. In the Middle East the plebeian classes are not yet strong enough or organized enough to battle in their own name for the reforms that they seek, but they have proven strong enough to unsettle the political sovereignty of the feudalists. This tug-of-war and resultant disorganization has lifted the military time and again to the position of arbiter of the nation’s destiny. That is the character of the Nasser government.

Composed of aggressive nationalist-minded officers who are eager to wipe out the corrupt rule of their traditional landlord-politicians, they are equally determined not to cut into the vested interests of the landowners. They want to raise their country out of poverty and degradation, but are resolved not to give rein to the “mob.” They call themselves revolutionists, but the only revolution they are interested in is one which they will impose from the top, and in which the “lower depths” will gladly participate solely as recipients of their benefactions. It is the character of the Nasser regime—and not the fancied or real personality traits of Nasser—that has driven these men to place all their policy eggs in the basket of the ambitious Aswan Dam project which is supposed to reclaim 2 million acres of land and solve the land hunger of Egypt’s growing population. For the military-minded junta this project appears to solve, at one stroke, all the ills of their decaying society: The peasants could get land, the economy could prosper, the bloated feudal landlord cliques could be left in undisturbed possession of their piles of riches, and, miracle of miracles, the potentially explosive class conflicts inherent in Egyptian society could be laid to rest.

But history knows no case where a country has been able to lift itself out of the morass of feudal backwardness and particularism while leaving the power of the feudal hierarchy intact—and Egypt and the rest of the Middle East will surely prove no exception to the old rule. The attempt to oust the imperialists and blackmail them into financing an internal development has already led to an international crisis, and the end is not in sight. The further progress of the struggle will inevitably bring the masses into the political arena as subjects, not just objects, of history.

The Western powers are probably too weak to go through with their threats of force. In this case, Dulles is acting to cool off the British and French, as it is clear that any attempt to wage war on Egypt would inflame the whole Middle East and might throw the world into a cocked hat. If Eden needed any further convincing in the matter the sharp turnout at home did it. British public opinion quickly reversed itself after the first chauvinistic outburst, and the British Labor Party leaders, who in the first week of the crisis tried to out-Tory the Tories, rushed to shift course, and began to decry the use of armed force.

Let there be no illusions however that the imperialists are helpless. They still possess great reservoirs of strength and they intend to fight tooth and nail to hold onto their prerogatives. If the coming negotiations with Egypt—which are clearly in the offing—do not give them the international control over the canal that they seek, they will move heaven and earth to rearrange the world’s economic patterns and trade routes, they will wage economic war on Egypt, they will try to finance internal counter-revolution against Nasser as they did against Mosadegh in Iran. The struggle for the Suez Canal is bound to be a protracted and bitter one. We may avoid war over this crisis, and the powers may maintain peace for years to come, but it is a nerve-wracking peace, a peace without tranquility, without cooperation, and without good will. The world is still sitting on a powder keg.
The steelworkers got a pretty good package to end the steel strike, but they paid for it. The employers moved a step closer to their cherished ambition of making the long-term contract the rule in American industry instead of the exception.

**Settlement In Steel**

by Harry Braverman

Some of the labor developments leading up to this year's steel negotiations were ominous. A series of little strikes had developed which showed a new and tough attitude on management's part. The Kohler strike, still going on, is pure, old-style, Mohawk formula union-busting. In the Square D strike, an aggressive venture at strike-breaking was made in the heart of union labor, Detroit. At Perfect Circle in Indiana, strikebreakers and company officials equipped with an arsenal of weapons revived the schrecklichkeit which many had thought gone for good. And finally in the big and important Westinghouse strike, the tree seemed to be bearing a poisonous fruit. A prolonged effort was made to destroy an important regiment of organized labor in a battle that flared violently for over five months. In the period before the steel negotiations opened, there seemed to be every reason for apprehension.

But the talks proved to be perfunctory and lethargic. The objectives of the steel companies soon became clear, and it was obvious that no far-reaching designs or mad adventures were contemplated. They wanted to shut down the industry for a month or so, to give steel stocks a chance to dwindle, so that they could get back to their accustomed sellers' market and put over a hefty price increase. And they wanted a longer contract. From the first, they indicated readiness to pay a certain amount of what steel union President David J. McDonald called "sweetening" for the deal—as little as possible, naturally. The final settlement bore out these indications. The steel strike proved to be something less of a crisis than had earlier been anticipated, showing once again that the reserves of fat that American capitalism possesses make it hard to fit capital-labor relations in this country into any pat formulas or oversimplified reasoning.

The steel industrialists knew just what they were after, and remained in pretty cool command of their end of the scrap from the beginning. By contrast—let it be said with regret—McDonald walked into the situation with all the balance and aplomb of a man entering a room paved with ball bearings. When there was reason to be cautious and wary, at the beginning of 1956, he was completely, innocently, trustingly and pathetically asleep in his cradle of "mutual trusteeship" with the steel industry. By the time it was apparent to every experienced observer that this was a routine proposition, a strike the duration of which would be decided by the inventory situation, he was on his feet quivering with nerves and dancing with fright, wasting some of the most purple rhetoric of labor history. He started the year ready to lick any man who dared hint that he might have a falling out with the steel moguls this summer. And by July he was shrieking a hysterical summons to battle as though this were a second Homestead and the steelworkers would have to unlimber their hunting rifles and load them for Pinkertons. In January, speaking to the American Management Association, McDonald blurted:

I notice that reports in no less reliable source than the Wall Street Journal say that there is labor turmoil expected in steel talks this year; that a big battle is shaping up. Who is beating these silly war drums even before any proposals are known to the people who will make them? We've had peaceful relations in steel in recent years and I hope and pray they can continue on that plane. We neither contemplate nor anticipate "war," "a big battle," or "a strike."

In March, McDonald got flattered all to pieces when the U.S. Information Agency chose Ed Barnes, a millwright for United States Steel, as the typical American steelworker and sent an exhibit of color pictures about the Barnes family around the world to fight Communism. Steel Labor, the union's monthly paper, put the display on its front cover and spread it across two inside pages, despite the fact that Barnes, said to earn $6,000 a year, is anything but typical, as fully 84 percent of steelworkers earn less than that. It would seem elementary for a union not to step into so plain a trap just before negotiations. During the strike the union had to denounce the Barnes "typical steelworker" myth with facts and figures, but in March McDonald couldn't see that far ahead.
But only a few months of bargaining and the calling of the strike were enough to reduce McDonald to a state of overwrought frenzy. "Tired and weary from the ordeal of grueling bargaining sessions," his press agent describes him, "President David J. McDonald was on his knees praying to God, asking for guidance, when the zero hour of midnight, June 30, arrived." The next morning he addressed the International Wage Policy Committee:

Is this a simple suspension? No! This is a strike—this is a strike! Your mettle is being tried. Either you are men of putty or you are men of steel. Your mettle is being tried.

But we are not men of putty, we are men of steel, and we'll fight them, by the eternal gods, until the contract we desire is wrung from them.

Fight them, men of steel! Fight them and we will win! Fight them, by the gods, fight them!

Five months earlier, McDonald had been assuring the American Management Association that the "Marxist concept of class struggle" is poor philosophy, because the struggle for mastery can produce only strife, bitterness, uncertainty and eventual disaster. And here he was tearing the air like a stockyard Barrymore. Within a few days after the strike was settled, McDonald was back on his other kick, calling down a reporter who presumed to speak of a "battle" in steel; it was only a "dispute." The truth is that these great shifts were going on only in McDonald's nervous breast. We had not reached the millenium of class peace in January only to lose it in one great apocalypse in July and regain it again in August. The antagonism between the interests of labor and capital has been continuous throughout the time, but means have been found to muffle its effects.

If any of America's industries is well-heeled enough to part with a few extra pennies for labor, it is the steel industry. One of the gratifying, although lesser, by-products of the strike was the publication of two excellent booklets by the steel union, "Steel and the National Economy, 1956," and "Facts on Steel: Profits, Productivity, Prices and Wages, 1956." The picture of the industry laid bare in these documents should go a long way to show that the concessions which have been won in recent contracts are minor compared with the mountains of riches which the steel companies are wringing from their workers.

The engine by which the steel barons have been enriched is the swiftly rising productivity of steel labor. Speedup and faster production methods have had their effect in the rolling mills, but even more important has been the trend toward ever larger furnaces which, tended by roughly the same number of men, produce far more steel. The facts, based upon statistics for steel employment, hours, and output, are incontrovertible: An average man-hour of labor in steel today produces 32.7 percent more steel than in the 1947-49 period. In 1956, the average steelworker is producing nearly 70 percent more steel than in 1939. And the rate of increase is getting faster: Where the average increase in productivity over the last 16 years has been about 3.2 percent (a figure that adds up fast when it is compounded annually), in 1955 it was 11.2 percent higher than 1954. The result has been that in the first quarter of 1956, a steel labor force only 9.5 percent higher than in 1947 was putting out a steel-ingot tonnage over 50 percent higher.

Steel is at least as closely monopolized as other industries, but its monopoly domination is far more active than most. Steel prices move with a deadly uniformity, and the competitive factor is absent so far as prices are concerned. As a result, the steel companies have ordered, in the past decade, 12 general price increases and a number of selected price increases, during the very time when the rise of productivity should have been cheapening their product. From a price of $55.20 in 1946, steel has soared to $114.02 a ton (not counting the most recent increase) or more than double. Although the price increases have
always been blamed on increased labor costs, the facts show that prices have been raised $3.19 for every dollar more paid out in wages.

STEEL has therefore been among the most profitable of industries. Profits before taxes are 1,391 percent higher than in 1939, and even after taxes, run 812 percent above that year. Net profits (after taxes) were in 1955 a whopping 13.8 percent as a return on net worth, more than double the six percent usually taken to be a "fair" return. The union calculates a rise of 50 cents an hour to steelworkers would still leave the companies with profits higher than in any year of their history except 1955. The complete package won by the steel union, which according to the union's calculations will add up to 20.3 cents the first year, 12.2 cents the second, and 13.1 cents the third, pales a bit when set in this light.

The most important provision of the new steel contract is undoubtedly the three-year length. The steel union has been signing two-year contracts, but with a wage re-opening clause midway including the right to strike, so that they were in effect one-year pacts. Since Walter Reuther went statesmanlike in 1950 and decided to make things easier for himself and the companies by signing a five-year contract, the trend has been to longer contracts. Conditions deteriorated so badly in the auto shops during the long contract that the ranks were up in arms against it, and at the convention just before the contract ended the delegates voted to instruct the union negotiators not to sign anything for more than two years.

But the damage had been done; the corporations had a big opening toward one of their dearest ambitions. By 1952, one-fourth of all labor contracts were for three years or more, where prior to that anything longer than two years was very uncommon, and one year was the rule. Reuther signed a three-year contract in 1955; General Electric workers were horsedwagged into a five-year contract last year, and the same was forced upon the Westinghouse workers after their long strike this year. Now the three-year contract in steel seems to be locking the precedent into labor relations.

It is hard to see how this trend to long-term contracts can be justified among unionists. Workers find themselves tied hand and foot for a lengthy period of time at the very moment when changes are coming thick and fast in technology, and hence in all the conditions of employment. When contracts are short, the many grievances that pile up from month to month get settled periodically, and the air is cleared every so often by a show of union power which generally starts the new contract off—whether or not there is a strike—with the balance restored a little in the workers' favor. The most arrogant foremen and superintendents get calmed down by the negotiation period, new problems that have arisen during the contract term are dealt with, and the workers get a chance to catch up a bit.

But where the union is without serious recourse for a lengthy period of time, what usually happens is a prolonged offensive against the working force which pushes conditions back and weighs the balance of power heavily in favor of management. That was the experience in auto during the five-year contract. In steel, conditions in the mills have remained comparatively good over the past ten years, in part because the companies were kept off balance by a renewed union offensive every twelve months. The steelworkers may now find those conditions endangered by the three-year contract.

ON the other side of the ledger, there is no gainsaying the fact that the package which the companies paid for the long contract is a pretty fair one. The steel union is powerful—one of the two-three most powerful in the nation—by virtue of its position in the economy and of the union solidarity which is taken for granted these days but which is none the less a mighty fact. When a strike call goes out, it is a matter of course that not a single ton of steel is produced in any union mill, and to try to alter that would mean civil war in the mill towns. Dealing with McDonald's histrionics is not too hard, but dealing with the fact of the union and its power is something else entirely.

The workers get 10.5 cents now, 9.1 cents the second year and another 9.1 cents the third year. They get Sunday premium pay of 10 percent now, 20 percent next year, and 25 percent the last year. They get premium pay for working on holidays, supplemental unemployment benefits if they have two years seniority, most of them get an extra half-week vacation and those who are called for jury duty will not lose pay. Premium pay for afternoon and night work is going up a bit, and Good Friday is being added to six other paid holidays. Pensions will be raised to a $72 maximum for workers already retired with 30 years of service, and a few cents more for future retirees with that amount of time in the mills. Insurance benefits are to be improved, and a full union shop was also won. Finally, an escalator clause was written into the contract which guarantees a cost-of-living increase each January 1 and July 1 for the duration of the contract, if the cost of living rises. One knotty problem which is left unsolved is the matter of incentive rates, which are to be reviewed by joint committees. In an increasing number of jobs, incentive rates have turned out more important than basic job rates, and many workers will watch those negotiations with closer attention than they gave the present contract fight.

ALL in all, however, the contract is one which most steelworkers will probably find satisfactory, despite holes in it and despite its length. How did McDonald, who hasn't yet been nominated for any medals as a union leader by anyone but himself, manage to swing it? The answer is very simple: He is dealing with a fabulously rich industry which, by virtue of its monopoly position is able to get back two or three dollars in price increases for every dollar of extra wages paid out. And the industry is probably not averse to spending a few extra cents to keep David J. where he is.

America is a country of deep-going contradictions and vast contrasts. After the savage battle at Westinghouse, we have the sweetness and light in steel (along with a hefty boost in prices). The class struggle isn't disappearing, but for the time being the major capitalists are rich enough and strong enough to blunt its sharpness.
This summer was the twentieth anniversary of Franco’s counter-revolution. The events in Spain will long be remembered, chiefly for what can be learned from this defeat.

How Fascism Conquered Spain

by Elena de la Souchere

The twentieth anniversary of the Spanish Civil War recalls again to the Left the world over the momentous struggle that shook humanity for two years and ushered in the second World War. The author only hints at one of the key problems of strategy that the conflict posed, a problem not yet resolved by Western socialists: Whether a revolutionary war of that nature could be successfully fought by suppressing the social aspirations of the workers and peasants until after the war, or whether it could be fought to victory only by giving free rein to the movement for basic social change.

The author deals in passing with the internecine war inside the Left which has already found its reflection in English belles-lettres in such widely divergent works as Dos Passos’ “Adventures of a Young Man,” Orwell’s “Homage to Catalonia,” and Hemingway’s “For Whom the Bells Tolls,” and which will continue to be the subject matter of discussion of all partisans of socialism.

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SATURDAY-SUNDAY: July 18-19, 1936. Every town in Spain was a battlefield. Supported by civilian militia, Falangist-dominated garrisons had risen in rebellion. At the call of the Popular Front organizations, thousands of volunteers, male and female, took to the streets. Behind the barricades, blue and white blouses mixed with the navy blue uniforms of the Assault Guard.1

In certain cities, the first arms were obtained from looted arsenals. Others were picked up from dead soldiers, prisoners, and barracks. Crowds in Madrid stormed the Montana barracks and broke down its gates.

Driven from the streets of Barcelona, the rebels withdrew to the Colon Hotel and the telephone building, from which they fired on the Catalonia Square barricades. Six hundred loyalist guards—in green uniforms and black two-cornered hats—took up positions around the Colon Hotel in the afternoon. Doors and windows were shattered by the accurate fire of their machine guns. The radio, broadcasting communiques and news continuously, announced the surrender of the rebels. Fists raised, singing and waving flags, an exuberant crowd flooded the streets.

Twilight and tiredness dispersed the crowds. Fighting continued in the harbor area, on the Paseo de Gracia, in front of a rebel refuge in the Carmelite convent, in the Gothic quarter near the Ramblas where rebels were entrenched in the churches of Our Lady of Belem and Santa Maria del Mar. Illuminated by burning churches, night fell on a Catalonia beach strewn with dead men and horses. Fire-engines and shrieking ambulances raced through the streets. Intermittent gunfire sounded from the harbor area.

The aggressors did not benefit from the element of surprise. Their blow had been anticipated ever since the February 1936 Popular Front electoral victory. Surprised at the delays of the conspirators, the citizens of Madrid had dubbed them “the next-weekers.”

Contrary to a subsequently concocted version, the attack was not initiated (or rather, improvised) within a span of four days following the assassination of Calvo Sotelo—killed for leading a movement preparing for open revolt. The conspiracy was more than two years in the making. On March 31, 1934, the leaders of the Spanish Right had signed a pact with Mussolini in Rome. They were promised immediate delivery of guns, grenades, machine-guns, and one and one-half million pesetas.

Spain was ruled by the CEDA (Christian Conservative Democrats) which had won the 1933 elections as a result of middle-class decline and electoral abstention by the Anarchists, who had been disappointed by the 1931-33 Republican-Socialist government.
There remains the argument of strikes and their threat to production. But who would initiate a war in order to prevent the crippling of production? The CEDA brain trust felt that disorders might add to their vote. A “legalist” Right in power, however, would have to do away with the reforms of the left-wing legislature. A legal evolution would have threatened Catholic totalitarian concepts, and also the big landowners and military caste—two feudal forces which for over a century had made boundless demands on the State. These archaic interests could be saved only by the rise of violence, and it was they who swept into their war all those on the Right who were filled with fear and anger, and who believed only in the power of the “dialectics of fist and revolver.”

IMMEDIATELY after the February elections the Riff army and Navarra garrisons began to prepare openly for war. Calvo Cotelo’s goons perpetrated a series of assassinations (notably of Jiminez de Asua) and finally murdered Lieutenant Castillo. It was then that comrades of the young officer assassinated Calvo Sotelo on July 13, 1936.

One of the decisive factors that influenced the attempt on the State was confidence in a rapid victory. The conspirators had foreseen neither the weakness of the scripts nor the rise of the popular masses. Their attempt succeeded only in Galicia, the Navarra-Old Castilla region, Saragossa, the Baleares, and in Seville from where the Riff army was to set out on the conquest of Spain. Two hotbeds of rebellion remained in Loyalist territory—in Oviedo and in the Toledo Alcazar.

In Catalonia and the Basque territory, however, the support of autonomous forces headed by Companys and Augiriza quickly assured anti-fascist supremacy.

In the Republican zone, public power was destroyed, the administration disorganized, the State left without means of action. Disconcerted by the course of events, the rebel leaders had not yet laid the foundations for an opposing State. Armed militias created in the early days of the struggle faced each other: on one side, Falangists and Carlists; on the other, the UGT (Socialist) and CNT (Anarchist) trade unionists, Socialists, Communists. Those
who were not subject to discipline looted and killed. The respective military staffs secured the levers of control, furnished safe-conduct passes, requisitioned lodgings, food, cars. . . . Their men policed the streets.

In both camps, fear and spy-fever led to persecution. In Barcelona and Madrid, where for several days after the street fighting some obstinately continued to shoot from their windows, there was a general hunt for reputed enemies and traitors. After prolonged rebel resistance in the Carmelite convent of Paseo de Gracia in Barcelona, the workers viewed every church as a fortress, every priest as a seditionist. Crowds massacred clergymen, armed soldiers, landowners, suspect persons. On their side, Carlists and Falangist gangs and rebel soldiers, on entering a locality, engaged in mass executions of known republicans, trade-unionists, peasants belonging to the Federación of Agricultural workers.

In the Basque country the Carlists executed nationalists and parish priests. Executions were sometimes preceded by mock trials; in rebel territory these took place before a war council; in a Republican zone before a people's court. In both sectors extremists speeded the weeding-out operation. Moving always at night, and snatching their victims from homes or overcrowded prisons, they drove them to a remote spot and murdered them. This was the class *paseo*—the promenade—which, among many others, victimized Federico García Lorca.

In destroying all restraining forms the Pronunciamiento unleashed a social revolution. Peasants took over the large landed domains. Lands to the extent of 3,141,880 hectares [7,760,440 acres] were portioned out or collectivized. Agrarian reform, discussed for a century and a half, was accomplished in a few days. City workers attempted to run "their" enterprises in their own behalf. Whether dividing the land or tilling it collectively, the peasants engaged in cooperative production, buying, and selling. The collectivized factory also operated as a cooperative attached to a trade union and exercising economic functions: buying raw materials and selling finished goods. Both workers and consumers were organized in production or buying cooperatives. Large utilities, theaters and transportation were run by the CNT or UGT unions, depending on the dominant tendency of the workers involved.

New political structures arose spontaneously: village committees which assumed policing and, occasionally, money-coinng duties; state committees were substituted for governors; people's courts. . . . In all these, as well as in the factory and militia committees, delegates from trade-union headquarters were in a majority. All these organizations were linked by their common affiliation with labor federations. CNT and UGT each had its own regiments, divisions, finances, police, prisons. They constituted, in effect, two governments in a country where the legal government was deprived of power.

The replacement in September 1936 of the homogeneous Republican administration by a Popular Front cabinet under Largo Caballero represented a first step towards the restoration of the State. In its attempt to reconstruct political power, the central government had been preceded by the Commonwealth of Catalonia, a regional organ to which the 1931 Constitution had granted powers much inferior to those enjoyed by U.S. State governments.

**BOTH** Government and Commonwealth pursued the same line: at the base, ratification of an accomplished fact; on higher levels and on the political plane, resumption of control. Decrees by the Commonwealth (August 27, 1936) and by the Government (October 7, 1936) ratified the land occupations. A Commonwealth decree of October 24, 1936 legalized factory collectivizations by granting indemnities to dispossessed small landowners. Enterprises were subject to Industry Councils presided over by Commonwealth representatives.

The essential measures were of a military character: regularization of the militias, partial mobilization. Militia men and conscripts were united into a single army. Elected officers confirmed in their ranks were placed under the command of career officers. The Military Code was reinstated. Rank emblems were reestablished. Discipline was stressed. In the course of the ensuing months, the government took control of the police, strengthened the Assault Guard and replaced the ephemeral "provincial committees" with governors.

The restoration of the State was facilitated by the discontent that came in the wake of economic disorder. The collapse of the economic structure, incompetence, and red tape had, in effect, caused enormous waste, scarcities of goods, currency devaluation, price rises. Conscious of passivity and the need to strengthen authority in order to meet the military threat, Socialist and Communist leaders, as well as those of the UGT, gave precedence to organization and war over revolutionary objectives. The only resistance to this policy came from the Anarchists and their leaders in the FOUM. 3

Although the struggle for a unified command was sharpened by a worsening military situation. The arrival of planes and pilots of the German Condor Legion and of Italian war material enabled the rebels to overcome their critical situation following the failure of the pronunciamento, and even to extend their gains.

**THE** signing in August of the non-intervention agreement gave the rebels a new trump card. In Paris both partisans and opponents of a counter-intervention to frustrate an Italian-German foothold in the peninsula had fought
bitterly during the initial weeks of the war. Great Britain had indicated that in no case would she support a French counter-intervention.

The agreement committing all interested nations to a policy of non-intervention was viewed as a satisfactory solution by Leon Blum and his friends. After this, Paris and London were blackmailed into capitulation to the open violations of the agreements by Berlin and Rome by threats of war. While the Republicans received only driblets of supplies, increasing flows of Italian-German materiel and reinforcements enabled the rebels to consistently meet critical situations and regain the advantage. From 1937 on, the Italian expeditionary corps numbered three divisions. Including Italian-German squadrons and "technicians," and Moroccan volunteers, the foreign contingents of Franco's army in the last two years of the war must be estimated at a minimum of 70,000 men.

In the summer of 1936 the regular insurgent forces—because of their technical training and the quality of their materiel—outclassed the numerically superior but inexperienced Republican militias. In Aragon, Anarchist militias from Barcelona which had swept as far as Saragossa and Huesca were halted at the gates of these two cities.

IN the South, the Rif army effected a merger in Estremadura with the forces of Mola before entering Toledo. With the exceptions of the Asturias, Santander and Basque territory, the entire West of Spain was under rebel control. Swelled by a large number of refugees seeking safe-conduct documents, the Falange benefited from a disintegrating middle class frightened by grossly distorted accounts of factory collectivizations, executions of priests, and burning of churches. The party was enabled to enlist a great number of conscripts. The rebel "Defence Junta" in turn decreed partial mobilization. In October the rebel army reached Madrid. Republican reinforcements were rushed to the city. The first international volunteers arrived at the front. During the first months these were not numerous—two "brigades" or 3,450 men. Among them were former soldiers of the first World War who brought the techniques of modern warfare with them. Trenches were dug in the Casa del Campo and the University quarter. In Carabanchel, along the banks of the Manzanares, every house was a battlefield. Madrid was surrounded by a network of underground trenches buttressed by bricks and sandbags.

In an attempt to take the city by terror, the rebels subjected it to incessant bombardment by planes and heavy artillery. From gutted houses rubbish and utensils spilled over the sidewalks. Disaster struck families huddled on subway platforms. The rebels next attempted to starve the city by cutting off the last remaining road, that of Valencia. After the defeat of their first offensive on the Jarama, the insurgent forces launched a second attack on Guadalajara. Three Italian divisions participated in this action. But the Abyssinian legionaires were routed by the young Spanish army. The rebels despaired of taking the capital. The front gradually grew quiet.

In Madrid, Aragon, and on the Basque front, armies totalling 1,100,000 men faced each other over a continuous front bristling with barbed wire and casemates. In a span of eight months, Spain had passed from the barricades of 1848 to the trenches of 1916.

The conduct of the war required the Republican government to seek total control. It attempted to reduce separate police forces and prisons. A February 27, 1937 decree incorporated the "rear militias" (party and trade union shock troops) into the regular army. The Anarchists opposed the move.

To the struggle between political and trade union power there had now been added a latent war between libertarians and Communists. In 1932 the Communist Party had numbered hardly 20,000 members, as against 75,000 for the Socialists. During the enthusiasm following the Popular Front victory, the overall rise in left-wing membership had brought Communist membership to 85,000. The CNT and UGT each numbered 1¼ million members at that time.

Numerous alignments occurred during the first months of the civil war. Party strength exceeded membership. After the CGTU’s (Communist Trade Union Federation) self-dissolution, its 180,000 adherents had been ordered to infiltrate the CNT and UGT. While these tried to achieve leading trade union positions, the party placed its trusted men in commanding administration and army posts. In Madrid, where they lacked a majority, the Communists relied on three forces: the Fifth Regiment, formed right after the Pronunciamiento, and which as a training unit had instructed tens of thousands of fighters; the predominantly Communist International Volunteers; and the support of General Miaja, commander-in-chief on the sector.

The international situation also favored the party. Abandonment of the Republic by the Western democracies, Russian supplies, pro-Spanish Republic campaigns waged by Communists abroad, the influx of international volunteers—all these inclined the Spanish people to the belief that the Communists were their only allies abroad. Within the country, the Communists supported positions most
favorable to the government: unified command, left unity. Largo Caballero was to facilitate their efforts to gain strategic command posts.

The Communist Party had gained strength in the struggle between the political power and the trade unions. The party needed the continuation of this struggle. In the long run it offered an opportunity to crush the Anarchist movement—an obstacle standing in the way of a Marxist conquest of the working class. In the short run it was evident that a sharpening tension between Anarchists and government would lead the latter to depend more heavily on the Communists.

The attack was launched in Barcelona. The unified Socialist party (Socialist-Communist) forced the POUM leader, Andres Nin, to resign as Counselor to the Commonwealth. The POUM, the FAI and the intransigent Anarchists of the “Society of Friends of Durruti” persuaded the CNT leaders to leave the Commonwealth and call a general strike. During May 1-5, 1937, street fighting erupted in Barcelona. Once more, dead bodies were strewn over the enormous square of Catalonia. The CNT cabinet members in the central government forced a compromise and had two anarchist divisions from the Aragon front turned back from their march on Barcelona. But government forces arrived by sea and entered the city. They consisted of international volunteers from Eastern Europe detached from Mija’s Madrid army. Their mission was clear: liquidation of the POUM “Trotskyists.”

Largo Caballero in Valencia began to worry. Unwilling to risk a break with the Anarchist masses, he entered into conflict with his Communist cabinet members. But the Socialist and Republican cabinet members feared that a policy reversal might alienate the USSR. Largo Caballero was forced to resign. Repression began in Barcelona. Andres Nin was murdered by extra-legal Stalinist police. Summary executions decimated the Aragon army.

The Negrín government, of which Defense Minister Prieto was the most important member, faced military disaster. The “iron belt” of Bilbao collapsed under intensive artillery and air bombardment. The holy city of Guernica had been destroyed by bombs. The courageous Christian Democratic militias of Bilbao had to abandon the city. In Santona they surrendered to the commander-in-chief of the Italian expeditionary corps. The rebel army easily occupied Santander and the Asturias: an Atlantic fortification no longer existed.

On the Mediterranean side, the Prieto government, about to move from Valencia to Barcelona in the heart of the industrial zone, concentrated all its efforts on arms production. Progress in this field permitted new mobilizations. A diversionary offensive against Teruel was launched in December 1937. The city was recaptured by the rebels, but the government had succeeded in diverting to a minor theater of war troops which were readying a new offensive against Madrid. The war continued throughout the winter in the frozen mud of the Teruel plateau.

Supplied with fresh Italian-German materiel the rebels launched a spring offensive in Aragon. From the Huesca enclave armored tanks broke through the enemy front and advanced toward the Mediterranean Sea. The April 1938 Aragon offensive was similar to the sweep of German tanks on the Ardennes front in June 1940. The fragmentation of the Republican zone made Prieto’s war plan impossible to execute. He resigned. The general staff viewed the war as lost. Negrín felt that it could still be won on the diplomatic level. His program consisted in holding out until the outbreak of the World War.

But Catalonia could no longer resist. Barcelona was bombed daily by Majorca-based Italian planes. The influx of refugees from all over Spain, the mobilization of agricultural labor and devaluation of the peseta, caused famine conditions. Peasants refused devalued paper currency and produced only for their own consumption. The black market reigned supreme in Barcelona. Famished children and dogs roamed through the rubbish of the harbor area.

A FINAL Catalanian army, however, succeeded in gaining a foothold on the right bank of the Ebro, in an attempt to “immobilize” the rebel army advancing on Valencia. The Republicans fought with their backs to the river. To compensate for losses, 17-year-olds were mobilized. These kids—tattered and without ammunition—stuck to their positions with as much tenacity as their elders. The battle of the Ebro cost the Republican army 80,000 dead, wounded and prisoners. Catalonia could no longer oppose Franco’s offensive launched on Christmas Eve, 1938. Overcoming last-ditch Republican resistance in the Catalonia Sierra, Franco’s forces advanced to the Northwest coast. The Republican army was forced to abandon Barcelona lest it be cut off from the French border. Franco’s spearhead, however, was distrustful and remained in the suburbs for three days before venturing into the city.

In the North, a chaotic mass of soldiers and civilians, men, women, children and animals streamed toward the French border. Low-flying rebel planes launched furious attacks against the pitiful caravan.

Negrín was already on his way to Madrid. But a majority of the army rose against the government. Street fighting broke out between Communists supporting the “fight-to-the-end” policy of Negrín and the adherents of “peace at any price.” The latter won out. The “Junta” under the Socialist leader Basteiros may have believed that an honorable compromise was possible. Franco demanded unconditional surrender. The unconquered city threw itself at the enemy’s mercy after a 936-day siege. Insisting on sharing the city’s fate, Basteiros died a few months later in jail.

On April 1, 1939, Franco signed the last communiqué of the Spanish war. In Madrid guns were silent for the first time in three years. In an unaccustomed nocturnal silence the repression began its executions.

1 Civil guard created by the Republic as a result of constant insubordination by the traditional civil guard.
2 This figure is incorrect.
3 Close to the Trotskyists with whom they were often united, the POUM (Marxist Unity Workers Party) had grown especially in Catalonia, and was composed of revolutionary socialists and former Anarchists and Communists.
4 These brigades would eventually number 35,000.
Many apply the term "socialism" to the regimes in Russia, China, and Eastern Europe, as a convenient way of marking the difference between those countries and the capitalist world. But what is "socialism" and how may the term be accurately used?


Socialism: The Word and the Deed

by Bert Cochran

The world was startled several months ago by the public dressing down of the then Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov, over an obscure doctrinal point. It was found that embedded somewhere in one of his speeches was the formulation that Russia had built the foundations for socialism, whereas according to the official dispensation, Russia has already established socialism, and is moving toward communism. Western observers justly suspected that the incident was a contrived one. It furnishes a convenient jumping-off point, however, to review once again what we mean by the term, socialism. This discussion is especially timely right now in the light of the current upheaval in the world radical movement, and the widespread confusion as to what constitutes a socialist society.

According to the recent June 30 resolution of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee, "Socialism had already triumphed in our country [in 1937]." That would mean that the USSR was a socialist society when its living standards were incomparably lower than those of the Western capitalist countries, and its political life, as per Khrushchev’s revelations, was dominated by an all-powerful secret police that held the country in the grip of terror.

As a matter of fact, the Communist movement speaks in a vague sort of way about all the countries in the Soviet bloc as being socialist. This refers not only to the USSR or even Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, but also little Albania. This designation likewise envelops China, North Korea, North Viet Nam. The capitalists, for their own reasons, point to all these countries as examples of communism. And we ourselves have taken to calling these countries socialist, as this is a handy label that establishes in rapid-fire order the class dissimilarity and antipathy between their social systems and capitalism—even though we did not and do not consider the term strictly accurate in reference to these countries. If both Russia and Albania can be called socialist, or if East Germany and North Viet Nam can both be so designated, what is then the yardstick? On what basis can Russia be said to have triumphantly established socialism in 1937, or for that matter, in 1956? What is the criterion?

Following the precedent set by the founders of modern socialism, socialists of the pre-1917 vintage never went in for blueprints of the future society; such attempts were considered utopian. That does not mean that there were no landmarks at all, that it was simply an expression for a coming Shangri-La, and that everyone was free to paint his utopia, dabbling on any lurid colors and employing any lop-sided dimensions, that suited his fancy. While eschewing all detailed constructions, Marxists, of whatever shade, all assumed that socialism would be a superior social order in at least three essentials: 1) By eliminating the anarchy of capitalist production, by socializing the economy and running it planfully, productive levels would soar far beyond the best achieved by capitalism, assuring the people higher living standards. 2) The limited, and often spurious, democracy of liberal capitalism would be transformed into the more genuine, widely-applied and easily-accessible democracy of a socialist government representing for the first time in history the rule, not of an exploiting minority, but of the big majority. 3) With the lowering of the hours of labor, with the opening of educational opportunities to all, there would occur a new flowering of culture, there would ensue a new era of well-being, outdistancing the loftiest achievements under capitalism.

Right and left wing socialists disagreed violently on many questions, but these propositions were considered such truisms that they can be found in the writings of pre-World War I socialists of every persuasion. You can read them in Karl Kautsky’s “Class Struggle,” the authoritative explanation of socialist aims by the foremost theoretician of the Socialist International, or Morris Hillquit’s “Present-Day Socialism,” a popular exposition by the chairman of the American Socialist Party, or even in the essays of the British non-Marxian socialists, William Morris or Keir Hardie.

Current Communist ideology does not derive directly from any of these socialist figures, but quotes Lenin as its authority. Lenin dealt at considerable length with this matter in his well-known work, “State and Revolution,” which he wrote on the eve of assuming power, in August and September 1917, and whose main sections are presented in the form of an exposition of the thought of Marx and Engels on the subject.

Engels’ celebrated passage in “Anti-Dühring” contains the classic Marxian statement on the new society:
The working class seizes state power, and then transforms the means of production into state property. But in doing this, it puts an end to itself as the working class, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms, it puts an end also to the state as a state. . . . As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection, as soon as along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed, and a special repressive force, a state, is no longer necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the seizure of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of a state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then becomes dormant of itself. Government over persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not "abolished," it withers away.

Here, the whole future society is still encompassed in one sweeping bird's-eye view. It was only with Marx's 1875 brochure on the Gotha Program that he attempted to indicate several more specific landmarks of the post-capitalist society. Communism he explained, would not simply spring forth from capitalism like Minerva from the brow of Jupiter: "Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the former into the latter. To this also corresponds a political transition period in which the state can be no other than the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." Marx divided the future communist order into a lower and a higher phase. As Lenin elaborated the thought, in the lower phase of communism (synonymous with socialism), in which the state operates as a proletarian dictatorship,

The means of production are no longer the private property of individuals. The means of production belong to the whole of society. Every member of society, performing a certain part of socially necessary work, receives a certificate from society to the effect that he has done such and such a quantity of work. In accordance with this certificate, he receives from the public warehouses, where articles of consumption are stored, a corresponding quantity of products. Deducting that proportion of labor which goes to the public fund, every worker therefore receives from society as much as he has given it.

But inequality still persists in this socialist stage, because as Marx explained people are not alike; one is strong, another is weak, one excels over another physically or intellectually, one is married and has a lot of children, another is single, etc. "But these defects are unavoidable in the first phase of communist society when it is just emerging after prolonged birthpangs from capitalist society. Justice can never be superior to the economic conditions of society and the cultural development conditioned by them."

How closely does the Russia of 1937, or better yet, the Russia of today, correspond to the "blueprint" of Marx, accepted by Lenin in 1917, for the socialist stage?

Under socialism, all the means of production are to be state property. Does the USSR qualify on this count? Industry and transport are fully nationalized. But agriculture, which still employs roughly half the population, is at best a half-socialist, half-capitalist sector. Land, it is true, was nationalized with one of the first decrees after the 1917 revolution, but is this more than a legal fiction? The later law on farm collectives guaranteed its members the land in perpetuity, and allotted private midget farms to the individual collective farmers. Livestock, implements, buildings, are the private property of the collectives, which are free, as corporate bodies, to sell their crops, after meeting their obligations to the state. The individual collective farmer, moreover, can do whatever he wants with the produce of his own midget farm. In other words, here is a huge sector of the economy which operates as a semi-capitalist institution outside of the national plan. This big gap in the nationalized system of ownership and planning has been concealed by a leftist phraseology which dubbed the collective system as socialist. But changing the name does not change the actual state of affairs.

If the present Soviet system corresponded to Marx's lower phase of communism, the distinction between farmer and worker would have been eradicated, buying and selling on the open market would be unknown, and money would have disappeared as a necessary medium of exchange and commodity circulation. As a halfway house between capitalism and socialism, still containing features of both systems, the present Soviet setup is understandable, and its problems and difficulties make sense. As a flourishing socialist society operating within the Marxian concept, the USSR is neither fish, fowl, nor red herring; and its official ideology must perforce lead to a lot of double talk.
obscenarianism, and nonsensical formulations, like Stalin’s fanatic attempt to ‘expose the problem of Socialism in the USSR’ to demonstrate in terms of Marxist theory that the law of value continues to operate under social-ism.

The next characteristic feature of socialism in the Marxist system is the persistence of inequality. Here, Russa, has not only achieved its quota, but has surpassed it in too generous a measure by far. Marx’s phrases about the existence of inequality were set on during the Stalin era to justify the division of Soviet society into the working and the non-working, and inequality, rather than the temporary tottering of necessa-ry evil, became transformed, like John Calhoune said, into ‘a positive good.’

STALIN’S interview in 1932 with the German writer, Emil Ludwig—nothing less than a panegyric to in-equality—was widely reprinted as a ringing affirmation of what Russian socialism stood for. Stalin told Ludwig: ‘...the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and you too, Comrade Marx, have brought equality into the country. Equality!’ The expression of his remarks, their simplicity and truthfulness, and the logical character of his thought, were too easily applicable to his Soviet successors, he wrote: ‘It is proper to keep silent about it as if it were a piece of old-fashioned “naivete”’

U.S. Communist Party Prospects Given a Poor Rating

The following communication, which ap-peared in the July 28 issue of the Nation, is reprinted from the London Daily Telegraph. It is taken by permission of the Nation’s editor for the information of our readers.

It is characteristic of the essential para-chutalism of the American Communist Party that the Khrushchev revelations are considered solely the concern of the Com-|munists and of the Left-Wing as a whole. The characteristic that a leadership which now confines itself, liberal and cowardly should boldly be asking the present Soviet leaders to explain what they were doing in Stalin’s time, we think that they should main-tain its own house by offering to vacate its premises.

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With the decline, persecution and co-oper-ation of the United States, practically all radical voices in this country have been silenced. It is doubly unfortunate that a large number of all left-wing publications of every shade exceed one hundred thousand readers to-

day. We are a country without the gaudiness of social criticism, without the ferment of a ‘rising tide’ policy; the dangers of the party are no need ideas to mount since the radical ideas are reaching the masses of the people.

U.S. Communist Party Prospects Given a Poor Rating

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the beginnings of the destruction of class rule and of the construction of socialism. It begins at the very moment of the seizure of power by the socialist party. It is the same thing as the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Even Lenin, who emphasized the repressive feature of the proletarian dictatorship concept more strongly than Luxemburg, interpreted Marx in the same basic way. In his marginal notes on Marx's Gotha Program, he defined the capitalist state as "Democracy only by way of exception, and never complete"; but the transitional state of proletarian dictatorship represented "Democracy almost complete, limited only by the crushing of the resistance of the capitalists."

Here are the two key features of this new system of workers democracy as conceived by Marx and elaborated by Lenin: 1) Abolition of the standing professional army and its replacement by the popular militia or the people in arms; 2) The gradual elimination of the professional bureaucracy by combining legislative and executive functions of government, making all officials subject to recall by their constituents, and limiting salaries to those of workers. According to Lenin: "All citizens are here transformed into hired employees of the state, which is made up of the armed workers. All that is required is that they should work equally, should regularly do their share of work, and should receive equal pay. To destroy officialdom immediately, everywhere, completely—that is out of the question. That is a utopia. But to break up at once the old bureaucratic machine and to start immediately the construction of a new one enabling us gradually to abolish bureaucracy—this is no utopia, it is the experience of the [Paris] Commune. . . ."

WELL, this democratic ideal, as described in the Marxist classics, has never been reached, or even approached, in Russia.

The early Bolshevik regime experimented with workers militias in the first two years, but these were soon replaced with the creation of a new professional army. In the light of the Bolshevik experiences during the civil-war years, the savage struggle to hurl back the Nazi invasion twenty years later, the intermittent danger of war between the two World Wars and since, the uninterrupted advances in the art of warfare and the highly technical nature of the new war weapons and machinery—in the light of these considerations, it can be put down that this section of the old socialist program has proven to be, at least in part, unworkable.

On the other count, Russia has strayed even further from the Marxist norm. Instead of gradually reducing bureaucracy, the Soviet regime has called into being what is probably the largest, the most powerful, the most monstrous bureaucracy in the whole history of mankind. Of course, this was due not to the malevolence of any one man or group of men. By nationalizing much of the economy, the state took over functions heretofore exercised by private corporations, and a huge army of officials was needed to direct and administer these affairs. The backwardness of the Russian peoples and the meagerness of its economic patrimony then worked in the time-honored way to make officials masters over the people rather than employees of the people.

Some may think that juxtaposing Soviet reality to the ideals embodied in the Marxist classics is not a very meaningful or lucrative occupation. Certainly no automatic conclusions can be drawn by showing the disparity. But for whatever it is worth, it is clear that present-day Russia does not measure up to socialism if we accept the definition of Marx, and of Lenin in 1917. It is undeniable that no idea is realized in life exactly as it is in theory. Marxists have been fond of quoting Goethe: "Theory is grey, but eternally green in the tree of life." But when a theory erupts into life as its polar opposite in notable respects, we can no longer speak of its having been modified, enriched, or rendered more complex.

The semantic difficulty is solved if we realize that socialism involves not just nationalization of the means of production, but an all-around transformation of the whole social system to the point where it at least exceeds the best present levels attained by capitalism. It means that the masses not only enjoy superior living standards, but because the struggle for existence has been mitigated, they are able to participate in the political life of the country and the direction of its affairs far beyond what is afforded the common people under the most liberal capitalism. Only on such a high plateau can we envisage a privileged bureaucracy becoming gradually transformed into a simple employee of the people and democracy attaining a superior dimension and sweep.

IF WE accept this concept of socialism, the USSR would have to be defined not as a full-blown socialist society at all, but as a transitional society that is building socialism, and still bears many of the marks of its brutal capitalist-Czarist origins. If this is true of Russia, it needs no extended discussion to demonstrate that it is ten times more true of China, which is just beginning its industrialization, and the bulk of whose people still labor in the fields with the most primitive tools.

Many used to believe, and maybe still believe, that the more boastful formula made it simpler to gain sympathy for the Soviet Union, and helped convert people living in the capitalist world to the socialist ideal. Actually, the opposite was the case. The concept of socialism was cheapened in the West when it was wedded to poverty, injustice and Jesuitry, and it was rendered dubious when it did not compare favorably with some of the best that capitalism offered in the richest Western countries. Here was a case where the more accurate and forthright presentation would have been not only more scientific but also more effective. There are times when careful explanations go further than the high-pressure techniques of the huckstering fraternity.

We mentioned before that we have in the past employed the socialist designation for the Soviet-bloc countries, and we intend to continue doing so, as it is the most convenient and easily comprehended shorthand definition. At the same time, it is important if we are to maintain a proper Weltanschauung, to keep in mind that we are dealing not with prosperous socialist societies, but countries in various stages of transition from capitalism to socialism.
The world is being drenched by a silent rain, which is doing the human race harm in ways that are hard to foresee and harder to calculate with precision. But some of the facts are known or can be estimated.

### The Invisible Menace

#### by A Biologist

Among the fears which the atomic age has produced, none is more gripping than the fear of radiation. It is an insidious danger, unseen and unheard; and it is also a present danger, not restricted to a period of warfare. While the fear is widespread, specific knowledge of the danger is limited. This is due to two reasons. First, even specialists in the field are groping in the dark, and have succeeded in establishing only a few basic principles and vague quantitative estimates. Second, even such knowledge as is available is still restricted to a relative few. The object of this brief survey, therefore, will be to summarize the main features of what is known.

What is radiation? In the latter part of the last century, it was discovered that certain elements such as radium, instead of being stable, are in a process of disintegration and give off high-energy rays, gamma rays and others. While these are of the same general family as light rays, they differ in two respects that are important for our present consideration: They readily penetrate solids such as human flesh which are impervious to ordinary light, and they can work important changes in the chemistry and biology of the living cell. X-rays, having only slightly lower energy than gamma rays, have similar properties.

In nuclear fission, radioactive materials are produced which give off gamma rays. This occurs in the explosion of atomic weapons, whether as tests or in warfare, in atomic power plants, laboratories, etc. We are at present receiving radiation from the following chief sources: 1. Background radiation from cosmic rays, natural radium, etc. This source of radiation has been part of the natural environment of life on this earth from its earliest beginnings. 2. Medical x-rays. This source of radiation has been added by mankind during the last several decades. 3. Fallout of radioactive particles due to the testing of atomic weapons. 4. Atomic power installations. The last two categories have been added by man during the last several years.

The radiation dosage which men receive is measured in roentgens (abbreviated r). The report of the Genetics Committee of the National Academy of Sciences on "Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation," released on June 12, reported the best current estimates of how much radiation we are now receiving over a thirty-year period as being about 4.3 r from background radiation, an average of 3 r from medical x-rays, about one-quarter of one r from radioactive fallout, and none, as yet, from atomic power plants. (All of these estimates involve radiation received by the reproductive organs, the most important feature of radiation from the point of view of human biology.)

The damage which radiation does to humanity may be divided into a number of general categories: damage through corruption of food supplies, through causing radiation sickness directly in man, through shortening of the life span, and through damage to man's biological heritage. Of these four the latter is, in the absence of nuclear war, by far the most dangerous, and thus while we shall describe each category, most of our attention needs to be directed towards genetic damage.

First on food supplies. It has been reported by American experts assigned to study oceanic fisheries that tests of atomic weapons have not yet caused "serious damage" to the fisheries. They confess, however, that they do not know what effect disposal of radioactive wastes from power installations in the sea would have. Those who have studied agriculture and animals report that the radioactive content of foods has increased to a small, but "measurable and inescapable" extent. "It is not known at present," the N.Y. Times of June 12 summarizes the findings, "at what level food becomes unwholesome because of radioactivity and long-range research is urgently needed."

Strontium 90 rendered radioactive in H-bomb explosions, an element that tends to enter the bone marrow and cause
cancers, is the chief danger in this respect, and is known to spread around the world and persist for many years after an explosion. British scientists have found in the Welsh mountains sheep whose bones contain measurable amounts of radio-strontium from Pacific test explosions. "Detectable although biologically insignificant traces" of strontium 90 have been found in milk supplies thousands of miles from the explosions. And since more and more of this dust is being released with every explosion, scientists, who admit they do not know how much will render our food poisonous, have every reason to be apprehensive.

RADIATION sickness, the second case of damage to humans we wish to consider, is already well-known to mankind from the stories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, from the Japanese fishermen and the Marshall islanders caught in the radioactive fallout from Pacific tests, etc. The particular sicknesses involved include cancerous bone tumors and irremediable diseases of the bone marrow and of the blood cells such as aplastic anemia and leukemia.

These sicknesses generally result from large doses of radiation, on the order of several hundred r received over a relatively short period of time, which might be fatal and would certainly result in severe illness. Deaths from radiation sickness would far outstrip direct bombing deaths in the event of an atomic war, as the H-bomb throws its shadow of radioactive dust over an area of thousands of square miles. The U.S. military high command has recently testified that if its schemes for H-bombing Russia were ever carried out, such fallout would cause "several hundred million deaths" in Asia or Europe, "depending upon which way the wind blew."

But radiation is not a problem of a future war alone. It can become a general problem, according to the British Medical Research Council, which says:

"Recognizing all the inadequacy of our present knowledge, we cannot ignore the possibly that, if the rate of firing increases and, particularly, if a greater number of thermonuclear weapons are used, we could, within the lifetime of some now living, be approaching levels at which ill-effects might be produced in a small number of the population."

Apart from radiation sickness, there is the effect of radiation in shortening human life through a general aging of the organism and its being rendered more susceptible to all ailments and debilities. That such a phenomenon exists is made distinctly clear by the following table released by the committee on pathology of the National Academy of Sciences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Age at Death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. population over 25 years of age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians having no known contact with radiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialists having some exposure to radiation (dermatologists, urologists, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiologists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is not right to believe that this shortening of the life span is restricted only to those who are hit by relatively larger doses of radiation. Every dose, no matter how small, is known to shorten life. Nobel Prize-winning biologist Hermann J. Muller of the University of Indiana wrote recently in the Saturday Review that "for each roentgen unit of radiation received by the whole body at a given age, if delivered at a rate of not more than a few roentgens per day, there is on the average a loss of something like five days of life, perhaps as much as two weeks, depending on the age. There is still some uncertainty about the exact quantity, but not about the principle." This conclusion sharply emphasizes the fact, which government administrators have tried to play down, that there is no magic figure at which radiation becomes dangerous; it is all harmful.

This conclusion stands out even more strongly if we consider the last of the categories of radiation damage we want to take up: genetic effects. For the purposes of this section, it is necessary to review a little basic biology, without which the problem cannot be properly understood.

LIVING organisms pass their biological heritage from generation to generation through chromosomes contained in the cells and the genes which lie within them. In the reproductive cells which unite to start the new organism, these thousands of genes carry the many physical characteristics which form the biological inheritance.

Since each individual of the race carries in his reproductive organs the chromosomes and genes that will determine the shape of coming generations, each carries a portion of the heritage of the entire race. And since the genes are passed down from generation to generation in fixed form, the race thus always carries a stock of immutable characteristics which make it, biologically speaking, what it is.

The heritage is immutable except in one sense, and it is this important exception which has made possible the evolution of the various species from the most elementary one-celled animals to man in his present form. Various outside influences impinging on the chromosomes of the reproductive cells such as heat, chemical agents, and radiation, cause mutations which alter, generally very slightly, the characteristics implanted in the genes. Over millions of years, these mutations, or rather a process of natural selection of these mutations, caused the species to evolve.

In adding an artificial, man-made, radiation to those natural radiations which earthly organisms have always known, man is introducing into biology an element which was not previously present, with incalculable long-term results. The increase in mutations which is resulting will not "speed up the process of evolution." Almost every
detectable mutant which results from radiation is harmful; that is one reason. And also, modern civilization has tremendously altered the conditions of natural selection so that the harmful mutants are not necessarily bred out of the species by unfitness to survive—we no longer live in a natural jungle, but a civilized one.

THE extreme subtlety and insidiousness of this race poisoning cannot be understood unless a few further facts are made clear. First, every increase in radiation, no matter how small, results in an increase in mutations. Dr. Muller sets the rate down as one induced mutation among every 400 germ cells in an individual for each one r of radiation received. Second, it does not matter how many roentgens are received at any one moment, for the total dose is just as effective spread over forty years as it would be concentrated into a few seconds. The average number of mutations that we pass to our children is determined by the total amount of radiation we have received from the moment we are conceived to the moment each of our children is conceived. Third, the effect is cumulative, because the mutations all breed true, and any additional mutations in each succeeding generation must be added to the mutations inherited from earlier generations. Fourth, the effect is masked, because genes that have been changed by mutations are generally recessive, and only show their effects fully in later generations. And fifth, a small amount of irradiation received by a large number of people, even if spread over a long period of time, would have just as bad a genetic effect upon the heritage of the race as a massive dose of irradiation inflicted upon a small group.

This last point is so important that it is worth the simple arithmetic required to calculate some examples. If Philadelphia were to suffer the radiation effects of a full-scale H-bomb attack upon a nearby area, it is likely that, even if every reasonable precaution were exerted by a well-disciplined population, an average radiation of 200 r would be received by each of about 2 million persons in the city. Thereafter, each child of Philadelphia parents would inherit, as a direct result of this exposure, on the average of one induced mutation, so that a succeeding generation of 2 million would add 2 million extra mutations to the genetic stock of the human race. In this case, the damage would have been concentrated in a specific group.

IT will be recalled that mention has already been made of the fact that each person has been receiving from fallout due to weapons tests a total accumulated dose of radiation to the reproductive glands of about one-quarter of a roentgen over the thirty-year period which precedes the time of life when most people have children. There is considerable doubt about this figure, naturally; the National Academy of Sciences report bracketed it within rather large limits for error. But if we don’t go by these estimates we have none at all to go by, and as they are carefully arrived at and cautiously stated they have some general validity.

In comparative terms, this amount of radiation is small, but if we consider that this dosage is being delivered all around the globe, to the entire human race, the meaning for our genetic stock is considerable. At the mutation rates estimated by modern biology, this small amount of radiation over a 30-year period spread around the globe among its 2½ billion inhabitants would induce about 3,125,000 mutant genes in the next generation of 2½ billion births, or between 50 and 60 percent more than in the spectacular case of Philadelphia calculated above, where an actual bombing had taken place.

These hypothetical cases, calculated with very uncertain figures, have been cited to emphasize the chief point as it applies to radiation and biology: that any increase in radiation is harmful, and even a very small increase in radiation, if spread around the globe as is the effect of H-bomb tests, can work damage which we cannot begin to appreciate. Only future generations will be able to estimate the damage accurately, and even they may not be able to. For ourselves, the most we can say, as Dr. Muller said of shortening of life due to radiation, is that while the figures are in doubt the principle is not.

Nor is it helpful to cite the genetic damage from X-rays, which in America happens to be much larger. The human race as a whole is not getting the damage from X-rays that the American is, and should be able to work out restrictions to keep it down, restrictions which ought to be applied in this country as well. But where an increase in radiation is avoidable, whether from unnecessary X-rays or from H-bomb tests, it ought to be avoided.

There are many murky areas in the field, areas in which almost nothing is known. For example, the genetics committee of the National Academy of Sciences, in its June 12 report, makes the following brief and alarming point, upon which it does not elaborate:

The third aspect refers in still broader terms to the possibility that increased and prolonged radiation might so raise the death rate and so lower the birth rate that the population, considered as a whole, would decline and eventually perish. We are at present extremely uncertain as to the level of this fatal threshold for a human population. That is one reason why we must be cautious about increasing the total amount of radiation to which the entire population is exposed.

In summary of the findings which we have sketched here, we may say then that, leaving aside various uncertainties which cast a doubt over the eventual result of our leap into the atomic age, our situation with respect to radiation is as follows: Except for victims of direct fallout either by accident in the case of weapons test or by design in the case of weapons use, radiation diseases can be expected to be minor for the present. But delayed fallout is contaminating our atmosphere so that radiation sickness may, in time, become a considerable problem. Similarly, genetic mutations as a result of radiation cannot be expected in any dramatic quantities except where concentrations of radioactive fallout are concerned. But, here again, delayed fallout which spreads throughout the world may, in the course of many generations, have marked genetic effect in the form of a kind of “race poisoning,” soundless, invisible, slow and subtle, but effective nevertheless.

This little book originated as a set of lectures at Princeton University in 1925. It has gone through three previous printings, and the welcome publication of a paperback edition by Beacon should give it a still wider circulation among students of American history. It is an excellent book, one of the best historical essays ever done in this country.

Mr. Jameson begins by contrasting the “Frenchman’s study of the great French Revolution” with the American view of 1776. In this country, we have not concerned ourselves with the social aspects of the revolution, while the French Revolution “is now seen in its true proportions and effects, not simply as the downfall of monarchy or the securing of equal political rights for all individuals, but chiefly as a social movement, French and European, of vast dimensions and of immense significance.”

“Perhaps,” Mr. Jameson continues, “some may be moved to say at once: But this is precisely to ignore the most salient contrast between the American Revolution and the French. The men of our Revolution, they will say, were neither levellers nor theorists. Their aims were distinctly political, not social.” This leads Jameson to pose his most trenchant question, toward which this book is directed as a reply: “We might profitably consider... whether it is intrinsically probable that our revolution was unlike other popular revolutions, in having no social results flowing from the political upheaval.”

It is this question which Mr. Jameson discusses and clarifies, and it is to his credit that his clarification is not only accurate and definitive, but also that it is accomplished without a trace of pedantry, and with welcome grace and humor. While his discussion of the matter is by no means complete, and reference must be made to other topics beyond those he discusses and other sources of information to round it out, it is a brief and pithy education in socio-economic history. (Mr. Jameson holds the view that “economic phenomena are more often the cause than the effect of political institutions and arrangements.”)

Aspects of the American Revolution to which Mr. Jameson addresses himself have often been labeled “Marxist questions”: the relations of economic classes, the changes in social relations, and the whole economic foundation upon which society is built. Yet, strange to say, beyond a few primitive attempts in the days of the early Socialist Party, very little has been done in this sphere by Marxists. It has been left to the Beards, Par-ingtons, Nettels, Jamesons, Dodds, and others of the liberal school to make a profound impact upon the American mind with their re-interpretation of our history in economic and social terms.

While the Communist Party is cataloguing its sins, it might do well to add this one to the list as well. Primarily under its influence and direction, American radicalism virtually abandoned solid historical interpretation in favor of romanticized gushing. For many of the so-called Marxists, history became a flour bag to be sifted by hacks for quotations that are helpful in fighting civil-liberties issues, for rosy and generally inaccurate tales of noble deeds, and for oversimplified versions of past events that could readily be used to prove the rightness of the line of the moment. Admittedly, a civil-liberties article looks better dressed up with a few remarks by Jefferson, and there are tales of the past that have a genuine inspirational value, but the Left seems to have forgotten that there is far more to history than that. A real school of Marxist historical interpretation has yet to be founded in this country. This little volume by a professorial author contains more analysis of real value than most of the Left put together has yet produced on this score.

Mr. Jameson’s contention that the American Revolution was a social upheaval as well as a war for independence was put succinctly by Claude Halstead Van Tyne, an authority on the Tory party in the revolutionary days: “A state of war existed between conservatism and radicalism, and either might be relied upon to use any weapon, political, diplomatic, or physical, that was available and would secure success.” The existence of this civil war is proved by two basic indications: the size of the native American military forces on both sides; and the scope of the Tory emigration from the colonies as revolutionary victories occurred.

The Tories furnished a large proportion of the anti-revolutionary fighting forces at the disposal of the British. To cite first the most extreme statement, James Truslow Adams in his “New England in the Republic” says: “Tories in great numbers did
flock to the royal colors. Indeed it has been stated, although not wholly proved, that more colonials served in the imperial than in the revolutionary army." A claim that goes this far is certainly too strong. Charles A. Beard estimates that some 400,000 Americans served in one capacity or another in the revolutionary forces throughout the duration of the war, and none of the estimates of Tory military strength comes anywhere close to that. Flick and Van Tyne, the two authorities in this field, estimate that about 50,000 Americans served in the British forces, either directly as regulars in the army or navy, or as militia, guerilla bands, etc. Though this shows a strong balance in favor of the Revolution, still one cannot lightly dismiss a recruitment of 50,000 men, particularly when it is considered that Washington's total force at any one time never rose above 90,000 and often fell as low as 12-15,000.

In the spring of 1775 a Tory regiment was raised in New York, and in January 1780 the New York Tory militia was counted at 5,885, a powerful army in this war. Johnson's "Loyal Greens" and Butler's "Tory Rangers" fought some of the bitterest small-scale battles of the war in the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania and the Cherry Valley of New York. All through the Hudson Valley, throughout the South, and as far west as Vincennes, many small bands of Tory raiders operated. In the southern invasion, large numbers of the Loyalist troops were American Tories; nearly two-thirds of the army at Savannah in October 1779 were colonials fighting their fellows. Nearly 2,400 Tories took part in the terrible defeat administered to Gates at Camden, and one of the most famous Tory groups, Tarleton's Legion, carried the day. Benedict Arnold, who had been a New Haven merchant, organized an independent Tory regiment of 1,600 after his betrayal. Finally, the Tories fitted out a fleet of privateers against revolutionary commerce, guided by a board of directors consisting of the principal loyalists from each province. So that, far from the conventional picture of a united nation fighting a war solely against a foreign occupation, the revolution was indeed also a civil war in which the population divided.

EVEN more startling is the extent of the emigration from this country. The episode is hardly as famous as the great French emigration during the Revolution of '89, but if a comparison is made in terms of numbers, there is no reason why our own emigration should take a back seat. The estimates of the size of the Tory emigration during the Revolution vary between 100,000 and 200,000—none of the estimates fall below the former figure. If we compare this with the French emigration, which was estimated by a Harvard University Press 1951 study at about 129,000 over a ten-year period, we can see that even the smallest estimates of the American emigration are only a little smaller than the size of the French. If we consider further that the French population at that time was 28 million while the American was only 23¾ million, then the number of Tories fleeing these shores was proportionally ten times as great, in comparison to the size of the population, as the number of aristocrats who fled the French Revolution. Altogether, it is possible that we can pride ourselves on the greatest proportional emigration from any revolution of modern times.

Jameson gives a clear picture of the composition of the Tory party and of the emigration:

If we should investigate the Tory party in the several colonies in detail, we should be forced to the conviction that, in New England, it comprised in 1775 a very great share, probably more than half, of the most educated, wealthy, and hitherto respected classes. In March 1776, when Howe evacuated Boston, eleven hundred refugees sailed away with him. These eleven hundred, and the thousand or more who subsequently followed them, bore away perhaps a majority of the old aristocracy of Massachusetts. The act of banishment which the state legislature passed in 1778, to punish the Tories, includes among its three hundred-odd names some representatives of most of the families which had been distinguished in the earlier days of the colony. . . . In New England, in short, it appears that the Revolution brought new strata everywhere to the surface.

In New York it seems probable that, in the height of the war at least, the bulk of the property owners belonged to the Tory Party, and it was strong also among the middle classes of the towns and among the country population.

The early socialist historian, A. M. Simons, wrote in his "Social Forces in American History": "When a society begins to develop class antagonisms, it is a sign that it has reached a point where independent existence is possible. It has begun to have a social life and method of growth of its own." By the time of the opening of the Revolutionary period, the colonies had a well developed class structure, and the antagonisms that had appeared in such earlier rebellions as Bacon's in Virginia and Leisler's in New York,
flared hotly in the Revolution and gave it a lot of its motive power. Rebellions against foreign oppression can be very fervent, but there is nothing like an enemy closer to home to really warm things up.

WHEN the protests against Great Britain first began, as the French and Indian War closed in 1763 and the British began to put the squeeze on the colonies in general and the merchant class in particular, there was a widespread unity in the colonies against England. True, there were numerous groups that stuck with the Crown from the start. The large landholders and the patroons, manorial and semi-feudal lords of vast domains, never wavered in their allegiance. This was also true of the richer independent farmers, especially of the middle colonies. The host of Crown officialdom and hangers-on, who got their places, pelf, and prominence from the old regime, also backed the British, together with the high-church clergy. Even among the merchants, hard hit by new taxes and regulations and by the strict enforcement of old ones, some of the richest and most conservative such as the Grays, the Boylsts, the Hutchinsons, refused to go along with the protest movement. But the mass of colonials, the planters of the South, most of the merchants in the cities, the small and tenant farmers, and the city groups of shopkeepers, artisans, mechanics and laborers, were united in opposition. The first big movement, the Stamp Act protest of 1765, was broad and general, cutting across class lines with the exception of the reactionary groups named above, and the Stamp Act Congress of that year was a body fully representative of the colonies. However, in the years the followed, a change came about that was to make the Revolution possible and to deepen its course. Jameson writes, very wisely:

Allowance has to be made for one important fact in the natural history of revolutions, and that is that, as they progress, they tend to fall into the hands of men holding more and more advanced or extreme views, less and less restrained by traditional attachment to the old order of things. Therefore the social consequences of a revolution are

not necessarily shaped by the conscious or unconscious desires of those who started it, but more likely by the desires of those who came into control of it at later stages of its development.

At the outset, and indeed as late as the beginning of 1776, there was no public voice for independence. The formal program of the movement was reform, although many had begun to sense the extreme direction of the movement. The Revolution began to rely more and more on the city mass and the back-country small farmers, and the influence of these two forces was towards militant tactics, extreme goals, and social changes in the country.

The Stamp Act Congress was a gentlemanly affair, but the Stamp Act demonstrations were not, nor were the many violent boycotts of British goods, punitive actions against Tories, etc. And, as the months and years progressed, the mass participation became less and less spontaneous and more and more coherent, as a radical party, originating in New England under the direction of Sam Adams, spread throughout the colonies.

TOWN meetings, long an institution in New England, were taken out of the hands of the propertied voters by the general city population. Although there were only 1,500 people in Boston entitled by property qualifications to attend town meetings and vote, attendance reached two and three thousand, and in days of crisis six or seven thousand. The propertied voters began to stay away since, as one of them complained, when Sam Adams presided over a meeting there were "very few gentlemen" present.

Where, in earlier years, the four Boston newspapers averaged a circulation of only about 600 each, as the Revolution progressed the people turned to a new radical press, so that in the early 1770's the Boston Gazette and the Massachusetts Spy attained circulations of 2,000 and 3,500 respectively. When radicals got a faction in the legislature they caused a gallery to be installed, so that the people might attend. The popular organizations, increasingly powerful and tightly organized in some colonies, dominated the towns in times of crisis, and in general started to rock the settled order of things.

The reaction of the wealthy and powerful was a predictable one. Gouverneur Morris expressed the upper-class hauteur and fear: "The mob begins to think and reason. Poor reptiles! It is with them a vernal morning; they are struggling to cast off their winter's slough, they bask in the sunshine, and ere noon they will bite."

The inevitable result was that many moderates fled in fright back to the arms of the British, and the class lines that were to mark the Revolution drew tight.

Many New England merchants began to shy away from the revolutionary movement after the people showed their power in the Stamp Act demonstrations of 1765. Shortly after the colonial victory in that struggle, the
British imposed the Townshend taxes, and the merchants were dragged into the boycott movement of 1767-70 only with the greatest of difficulty. After the British were compelled to repeal the Townshend acts, the merchants abandoned the movement in droves, the New York merchants fleeing first, and others throughout the colonies following suit. They began to turn against the upheaval when, as it was described by Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr. (“Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution”) “it became apparent that their agitation for commercial redress was unloosing social forces more destructive to business interests than the misguided acts of Parliament.” When the next great boycott movement took place, in the form of a Solemn League and Covenant not to deal with the British after the Boston Tea Party, it was based upon what Sam Adams called “the two venerable orders of men styled Mechanicks and Husbandmen [farmers], the strength of every community.”

In the South, the planters did not take fright to the same degree as the merchants. First, they were too deeply involved in debts to British and Scotch factors to turn back, as their future was that of a ruined class under British rule. And second, situated as they were far from the cities and exploiting a class of slave labor which they had firmly under control, they were far less fearful of the rebellious sansculottes, a fact that could make a Jefferson, and later on the Andrew Jacksons, freer in language about the things that were dear to the city masses than the merchants and capitalists could ever be. The planters thus remained more or less firmly revolutionary (with the exception of the seacoast aristocracy) throughout the fight.

But in the cities, with large numbers of the richest merchants going over to the enemy, the line was sharply drawn as the Revolution progressed between radicalism and conservatism, wealth and commonalty, aristocrats and levelers. Even, as we have shown, large sections of that very capitalist class for whose benefit, enrichment, and ruling position the Revolution was of prime importance, shrank from the movement. The history of all capitalist revolutions is not too different in this respect.

T HUS far, the evidence points merely to a sharp social division before and during the War of Independence. Remaining open still is the matter of social consequences flowing from the war. In other words, when the country divided, did it divide solely on the question of independence from Britain, or were there also social and political issues, closer to home, about the shape of the nation, which were being fought out? Here too, the evidence is clear and overwhelming. A number of overall descriptions have been essayed which may serve to introduce the picture. James Truslow Adams writes:

A new social order and a new outlook on life were coming into being. . . . It is a mistake to consider the Revolution as merely a military struggle to decide the political question of the relation of the colonies to the mother country administratively. . . . The old order was gone for good, and a new order, intellectual, social, and political, had begun to form.

Charles and Mary Beard emphasize the point in their monumental history:

If a balance sheet is struck . . . then it is seen that the American Revolution was more than a war on England. It was in truth an economic, social and intellectual transformation of prime significance—the first of the modern world-shaking transformations . . .

What kind of a transformation was it? The colonies never had a broadly seated feudalism to contend with, but in its place they did have a collection of feudal privileges and monarchical practices that were a substantial barrier to the establishment of an unfettered capitalism, particularly in the field of agriculture. In the first place, large estates monopolized great tracts of land, in some places, as in the Hudson Valley, operated with a manorial tenancy; in others settlement was either prohibited or where permitted quit rents and other feudal dues were demanded and, surprisingly, often collected. Then, the great land area between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi, as well as great tracts on the near side of the mountains, were reserved as crown lands, a restraint which effectively held back westward expansion.

The revolutionary period saw a great wave of land expropriations. Manorial estates in New York aggregating over 2½ million acres were confiscated, including the Van Rensselaer manor, which alone was 2/3 the size of Rhode Island. The estate of Lord Granville in North Carolina, at least 1/3 of the colony, was taken away. New Hampshire alone confiscated 29 estates, including that of its governor, Sir John Wentworth. In New York, all lands and rents of the crown were confiscated, as well as the estates of 39 named persons, including most of the richest of the province. The 300 square miles of the Phillipse estate, and the lands of James Delancey, Roger Morris, John T. Kemp, Beverly Robinson, were among those caught up in the net. In Pennsylvania, the estates of 490 persons were seized, including the ungranted lands of the Penn family. Nor were all the confiscations directed against the Tories. The Fairfax estate consisted of some six million acres in Virginia, or close to one-fifth the present size of that state. Lord Fairfax was not a Loyalist, and was not molested during the Revolution; his estate was taken in 1781, however, because of what one historian calls “revolutionary opposition to feudal survivals.”

In addition to these land confiscations, large amounts of property in other forms fell to the Revolution, mainly as the fortunes of Tories and emigrés were seized. At the end of the war, a group of 2,560 petitioned the British Parliament for redress, claiming to have lost 9 to 10 million pounds sterling of property. The commission assigned to sift the claims reduced the amount to 8 million pounds and actually paid out about 3 million. This was only a portion of the Tory group that suffered expropriation. Altogether, our Revolution brought about one of the larger non-compensated confiscations of the revolutions during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Next matter to be settled was the question whether big proprietorships would be encouraged on the lands newly won by the independent nation. A test case came up early in the game. A North Carolina landowner, Richard Henderson, had employed Daniel
Boone in the early 1770’s to explore the Kentucky and Tennessee region. He sponsored the formation in 1775 of the Transylvania Company, which purchased from the Cherokees an area of 20 million acres, comprising parts of present-day Virginia and Tennessee, and most of Kentucky. He then erected a proprietorship of the Maryland type, retaining title to the lands and reserving quit rents (the type of rent paid in lieu of all other feudal obligations) to the company, and approached the Continental Congress for protection against the British in the name of the Revolution. Sam Adams and Jefferson led the fight in Congress against him, and the claim was rejected. The company then turned to Virginia, which promptly confiscated all the lands. This action sealed the doom of the proprietorship in western lands, a number of other companies being similarly defeated, and ensured that the western lands would be disposed through small individual land grants.

The confiscated estates were then broken up into small farms. New York, for example, discouraged the sale of parcels greater than 500 acres, and two of the giant estates went to 525 persons. Not that land speculators didn’t get their hands on some big tracts, but the overall effect was the establishment of a large class of small farmers.

The new farms were not encumbered with the old feudal restrictions, although many soon had weighty capitalist restrictions in the form of mortgages. Quit-rents, a feudal token payment ranging from a penny an acre to a shilling a hundred acres each year, were abolished. Payment had been widely evaded, but still about $100,000 a year was estimated to have been collected in this form. Also, the king’s prior right to the tallest and straightest trees for the royal navy was abolished. After the Revolution when a man held land in fee simple, he really owned it, and could do with it as he pleased within the limits of capitalist contractual relations and the civil and criminal law.

On the pre-revolutionary estates, the old devices for keeping an aristocracy going had been widely prevalent. Entail and primogeniture, which kept the estate intact in a direct line of succession, flourished almost as in old England. The laws drafted by Jefferson in Virginia in 1776 released nearly three-fourths of the settled land of the state from entail. By 1800, entail had been entirely destroyed, and primogeniture had been almost completely wiped out, except in two states where a partial favoritism was shown to the sons as against the daughters—a remnant of the primogeniture method. Altogether, the revolution on the land was sweeping, and the Beards summarize it dramatically:

Whereas it took a century of debate and then the corroding taxes of a World War to drive a wedge into the concentrated land monopoly of England, the American revolutionists brought many an ancient structure to earth by swift and tell ing blows . . .

Considered relatively, therefore, the destruction of landed privilege in America by the forces unchained in the War for Independence was perhaps as great and significant as the change wrought in the economic status of the clergy and nobility during the holocaust of the French Revolution. As in France country lawyers and the newly rich merchants swarmed over the seats of the once proud aristocracy, so in the United States during and after the cataclysm a host of groundlings fresh from the plow and counting house swarmed over the domains of the Jessups, Delanceys and Morris es . . .

Other conservative institutions received major blows. There had been an established church, protected, favored, and financed by the state, in nine of the thirteen colonies, and in most cases it was a church adhered to by a minority of the people. The Revolution destroyed this medieval vestige immediately in six states, and later in the other three. The right to vote was extended. Slavery, although favored and depended upon by a leading class in the Revolution, the planters, seemed for a while to be nearing the end of its rope as a result of the Revolution. Six northern and middle colonies abolished slavery, an action which freed about 11 or 12 percent of the slaves, Virginia set up a manumission law under which over 8,000 slaves were freed in 8 years, the slave trade was prohibited, the first anti-slavery societies set up, and had it not been for the peculiar turn later taken by Southern economy as the cotton supplier for the new voracious mills of England and the North, it is likely that the Revolution would have been the beginning of the end for the peculiar institution. As it happened, slavery was to take a new lease on life and a second revolution was required to complete the first.

Finally, and in some ways most important, the Revolution established the groundwork of an industrial capitalist class. Prior to it, merchant capitalism had held undisputed sway in the cities. The basic activity was not the production of goods, but the buying and selling of goods. But in the Revolution imports from Britain were halted, and the equipping and supplying of armies made extraordinary demands upon the nation, so that many manufacturing industries came into being and those existing expanded greatly. Symbolically, not long after the Revolution the principle of mass production through the use of interchangeable parts was devised by Eli Whitney. Many of the artisans and shopkeepers who had fought in the Revolutionary battles, men like the coppersmith Paul Revere, were laying the foundations for manufacturing enterprises; the first banks were established, and a new kind of capitalist was elbowing the old merchant out of first place. While the new capitalism did not outlive the old until a half-century later, it got a tremendous impulse from the Revolution, and from the weakening of the old merchant aristocracy.

The new capitalists, manufacturers, and bankers secured as their spokesman and leader possibly the most able statesman American capitalism has ever had at its disposal. Alexander Hamilton, in the early years of the Republic before Jefferson and the planters succeeded in wresting away a share of the power, used the new state machinery like a pliedriver to set the piers upon which capitalism would build. But that is a later tale. In the Revolution itself, however, social consequences of the most important kind were wrought, and the institutional soil of the country cleared for a great advance.

H. B.
The Great Tradition: American Labor's Long March


VOLUME Two of Foner's history takes in the two decades from 1880 to the end of the century. Foner's is a serious, scholarly and impressive work based on an enormous amount of research. In addition to studying the traditional literature and many unpublished manuscripts, he has examined the vast collection of correspondence in the basement of the AFL building and in the Samuel Gompers Memorial Room, as well as the important collection of Terence V. Powderly papers at the Mullen Library of the Catholic University of America.

Foner is here reworking material that has been worked up many times by other scholars. He hasn't come up with any startlingly new concepts as a result of his extended researches, although the perusal of Gompers' letters has enabled him to correct some minor inaccuracies of past labor historians, his numerous quotations from original sources at times add zest and cogency to the unfolding story, and he draws our attention in some detail to two important labor battles which have been largely neglected in the labor histories.

The first is the 1892 New Orleans general strike called by AFL unions, where 25,000 workers paralyzed the city for four days, and is noteworthy for the display of solidarity by colored and white, and skilled and unskilled workers, in the teeth of a fierce assault from the other side. On October 24, 1892, between two and three thousand workers, members of a Triple Alliance, Teamsters, Scalesmen, and Packers, went on strike for the ten-hour day, overtime pay, and a preferential union shop. The employers tried to sign up with the Scalesmen and Packers' unions, but declared that under no circumstances would they "enter into any agreement with n--rs." The press attempted to stampede the city by publishing fabrications about Negro assaults on whites. But surprisingly, the labor ranks held firm, and the other AFL unions threatened a general strike.

On November 8, after two postponements, the 49 unions called out their members demanded the union shop, and in some cases wage increases and shorter hours. Governor Foster of Louisiana called out the militia, but the employers finally had to agree to arbitration. Although the unions did not win the preferential union shop, they secured a substantial number of their other demands.

Foner does not indicate—and the information may not be readily available—the background events that produced this remarkable demonstration of solidarity. But that it could take place in the deep South as far back as 1892 is something to make us pause. Gompers, in one of his militant outbursts, which became increasingly unusual for him as time went on, wrote ecstatically to the AFL General Organizer in New Orleans: "Never in the history of the world was such an exhibition, where with all the prejudices existing against the black man, when the white wage earners of New Orleans would sacrifice their means of livelihood to defend and protect their colored fellow workers. With one fell swoop the economic barrier of color was broken down."

The other battle is the "Coal Creek Rebellion" which raged in eastern Tennessee from 1891 to 1893 against the convict-lease system. By 1891, most states had been compelled by labor to abolish the use of prison labor in private employment, but the system still continued in Tennessee and several other Southern states. Since 1889, convicts in Tennessee had been contracted out to the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railway Company, which owned or controlled nearly all the mines in eastern Tennessee, and the company, in turn, sub-leased its excess convicts to other companies at a profit.

The struggle began when the Tennessee Coal and Mining Company tried to break the four-month-old strike of its workers at Briceville, a short distance from Coal Creek, by contracting for and importing convicts. On July 4, 1891, forty convicts were brought in and put to work tearing down the houses formerly occupied by the strikers, who had been evicted, with the lumber from the houses used to build a stockade for 150 convicts due to arrive. This action aroused the whole community, and the ensuing battle quickly took on the features familiar in Western labor conflicts of this period: the solidarity of most of the community, laborers, merchants, small farmers, against the absentee behemoth corporation owners, and the naked violence that characterized the struggle on both sides.

Shortly after midnight, a determined band of three hundred well-armed miners and other workers appeared before the stockade and forced the outnumbered guards to turn over the convicts. Convicts and guards were thereafter marched to Coal Creek and loaded on a train to Knoxville.

The entire incident went off peacefully without a hitch. Governor Buchanan immediately called out the three regiments of state militia. Organized labor held mass meetings throughout the state and adopted resolutions condemning the Governor and demanded that all union men in the militia return home at once.

At a mass meeting on July 10 the miners perfected their plans and before daybreak miners from all camps of northeast Tennessee converged on Briceville. They were organized in strict military fashion and ready for battle. Impressed with the miners' strength, Colonel Sevier, the commanding officer, surrendered. In high spirits, the miners marched the convicts, guards, and militia to Briceville where they were put on a train of flat cars waiting for them and again dispatched to Knoxville.

Governor Buchanan now issued an order mobilizing the full military strength of the state and prepared for civil war. On July 25 the convicts were returned again under military escort. A special session of the legislature refused to repeal the convict lease system in face of the demand for repeal on the part of a clear majority of the people, and onerous criminal sanctions were imposed for interference with the system.

The next act in the drama occurred the last day of October when 1500 miners took over the stockade, and after furnishing the convicts with civilian clothes, set them free, and then burned the stockade to the ground. They did the same at the mine of the Knoxville Iron Company, but here the stockade was not burned, as the warden's wife was ill in an adjoining house. No shots had been fired throughout the operation and everything went off with military precision.

A reward of $5,000 was offered by the Governor for the arrest of the mine leaders, and $250 for each additional union member who participated in the attack on the stockade, but no one came forward to claim the rewards. For several months peace reigned in the area and most of the mine companies decided it was the better part of wisdom to settle with the United Mine Workers, which was now representing the men. (They had formerly belonged to the Knights of Labor.) The miners staged a gala celebration on July 15, 1892, the first anniversary of the freeing of the convicts at Briceville, and in the evening there was dancing on a platform constructed from the old timber of the convict stockade.

But the rejoicing was premature. The Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railway Company was not yet ready to give up its lucrative convict trade. It proceeded to buy up a number of the companies that had signed with the union, built new stockades, and again brought in the convicts. Free miners were reduced to one or two days work a week, and those who had been active in the convict fight were discharged and blacklisted. This time the explosion went off in the southeastern part of the state. On August 13, one hundred and fifty miners approached the stockade at

September 1956 27
Oliver Springs, and with drawn guns demanded the keys. The stockade was burned down and the convicts placed on the train for Nashville.

Again the Governor sent in troops and again the stockade was rebuilt and the convicts returned. On August 16 miners from all parts of eastern Tennessee and southern Kentucky poured into Coal Creek. Freight trains were taken over, and an army of 3,000 miners moved on Oliver Springs. Under a flag of truce, the miners agreed not to injure company property, guards or militia, provided the convicts were released. The guards and militia men surrendered, they were disarmed and permitted to leave. For the third time in a year, a carload of convicts was heading to Knoxville.

Regiments of troops were now ordered to Coal Creek and the governor instructed the sheriffs in all the neighboring counties to furnish large forces of men for duty. Soon volunteers, "all belonging to the best families," responded to the sheriffs' appeal. The miners entrenched themselves on Walden's Ridge and pickets were posted on the surrounding mountain top to prevent a surprise attack. On August 19 however, trains of soldiers arrived at Coal Creek along with field guns and Gatling guns. Overwhelmed by the shelling of their positions, the miners gave way, and the war turned into a pitiless man-hunt. The troops combed the hills and mining towns, taking hundreds into custody. Three hundred miners were indicted for conspiracy, murder and other crimes. After long drawn-out trials, a number were sentenced to the penitentiary.

But still the miners continued to drill in secret against the day when they would fight again for their jobs. On April 19, 1893, 150 miners attacked the stockade at Tracy City and for several hours a battle raged. As soon as word of this reached Nashville, large numbers of troops were again sent in, and the outnumbered miners took to the woods. Thus ended the final battle in the great convict war.

While apparently defeated, the long, grim contest had aroused the state to the point where public opinion became consistent that the convict-lease system had to go, so that when the contract with the Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company expired in 1896, it was not renewed, and the abomination was at an end. The two years of pitched battles had not been in vain.

Both the New Orleans general strike and the Coal Creek Rebellion were part of the complex of struggle that swept over this country in the fateful year of 1892, a year which included the Homestead steel strike, the mine strike at Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, the switchmen's strike in Buffalo, and the Populist rising in the farm belt.

The Foner study has some especially good sections on the Knights of Labor, as well as on the intermittent battle for the eight-hour day which dominated the movement through a large part of the eighties and nineties, and how the AFL helped to establish itself as the coming labor union body by its bold espousal of the eight-hour day cause, while the opposition to it of the Knights of Labor leadership became a contributing cause for the organization's decline. Gompers some years later authoritatively summed up the effects of the 1886 campaign before a Congressional Industrial Commission: "I have no hesitation in expressing my conviction that the movement of 1886 resulted in a reduction of fully one hour's labor of the working people of the United States."

The book touches briefly on the considerable civil liberties movement that was evoked on behalf of the Haymarket victims, involving influential sections of labor as well as prominent liberal personalities of the day, to be followed almost immediately by the political upheaval which saw the creation of labor and third parties in a number of the leading cities spearheaded by the memorable Henry George gubernatorial campaign in New York; then, with the decline of the labor party movement, the eight-hour day struggle burst forth again stronger than ever in 1889. This decisive series of events of the early movement has never been treated in comprehensive fashion as an integrated entity and could very well serve as the subject matter of a separate book.

Foner's chapter dealing with the economic crisis of 1893 carries special interest in its reminder that the organized struggle on behalf of the unemployed goes back many years, and that the older labor movement, while small and weak compared to the modern one, was in some ways more class conscious and militant.

In response to a trade union call, 100 delegates representing 100,000 union members in New York City assembled at a conference on August 20. Gompers, acting as chairman, called upon the cities and states to inaugurate public improvement projects. Three committees were set up by
mélange of the Communist Party evaluations of the past or positions of the present, and as the sermonizing is replete with the clichés of Communist slogan-mongering, the effect is often one of getting the historical analysis. Foner is also deficient at times in historical feel. The book, for all its virtues, conveys little impression of the dynamic development of American labor, and its enhanced position within the country as a whole from decade to decade. In this respect, Foner is like an orator who delivers a long and intricate speech in a monotone.

Sometimes, he has difficulty in properly evaluating his materials as in his exaggerations of farmer-labor unity in the Populist movement, sometimes, his addiction to sloganizing results in rodemontades about leaders constantly lagging behind their ranks. If Foner just stopped to ask himself why the American workers seemed to have such a penchant for invariably picking leaders who lagged behind them instead of leaders who were many ahead of them, or at least, abreast of them, his explanations and analysis would gain a depth that they presently do not always possess. If Foner could secure the services of an editor who would ruthlessly blue-pencil all the peuerle sermonizing, and recast some of the materials so as to bring out more objectively the historical pattern that they create, he might come up with a first-class labor history.

S A M U E L Yellen's book was published by Harcourt, Brace twenty years ago and is now re-issued by S. A. Russell. It consists of a study of ten separate labor battles, the railroad uprisings of 1877, the Haymarket affair, the Homestead strike, the great coal strike of 1902, the Lawrence strike, the Ludlow massacre, the 1919 steel strike, the 1929 southern textile strikes at Gastonia and elsewhere, and the 1934 maritime contest culminating in the San Francisco general strike.

Yellen does an excellent job of sketching in the relevant economic and social backdrops of each struggle, and presenting the dramatic interplay between the opposing forces in a logical and clean-cut manner. While each chapter is complete by itself, and no attempt is made to trace the trend of labor evolution, the studies are very well done within their limitations, and the reader can easily draw certain conclusions by himself.

It is incredible to read nowadays with what unabashed arrogance and uncontrolled violence the rising capitalists used to lord it over the “lower orders.” Capital was brash, self-confident and strong, and labor was divided and pitifully weak, and suffered the consequences. The Nation roared against the railroad strikers in 1877 in tones that no one would dare employ today: “The right to seize other people’s property and to prevent other men from selling their labor on terms satisfactory to themselves is denied by the law of every civilized country. Common sense does not allow any parleying over that fallacy, but insists that it be refuted with gun powder and ball whenever it takes the shape of combined robbery and public tumult. So long as this particular rate of wages to anybody.” The renowned Rev. Henry Ward Beecher asserted in a sermon at the fashionable Plymouth Church in New York: “We look upon the importation of the communistic and like European notions as abominations. Their notions and theories that the Government should be paternal and take care of the welfare of its subjects and provide them with labor is un-American.”

IT was a long painful climb for labor, and for years on end the great corporations proved too powerful to be successfully invaded by the unions. The United States, as a matter of fact, used to be called the country of lost strikes. Of the ten battles recorded by Yellen, he conceives only the Lawrence strike as achieving an unmistakable victory, and the longshore strike of 1934 as attaining a partial victory.

Here, Yellen is open to criticism of taking too doctrinaire a view. The picture was still difficult enough when he wrote his book without making it any more difficult by putting up unmeaning things. It seems to pay scant attention to the achievements of the Haymarket struggle in lowering the work day. He strongly implies that the arbitration award in the 1902 anthracite strike was a defeat, whereas most labor historians, with greater accuracy, describe it, at least, as a partial victory. He does not fully grasp the magnificent achievement of the 1934 strike in paving the way for West Coast maritime unionism, even though the longshoremen did not win all their demands right away. In other words, he does not take his own advice to heart to see the labor movement in its—to quote his own words—“unmistakable and steady cumulative development.”

B. C.

A Year to Remember


A BOOK which cuts a year out of time like a slice of lemon doesn’t fit well into anybody’s school of historiography. But while this volume may not win for its author a name as the modern Polybius, it is a worthwhile excursion. If one is to follow Mr. Postgate’s idea, there is hardly a better year out of the last century that could have been chosen, for 1848 was a year of high drama and historic significance.

Mr. Postgate ranges lightly around the Western world, touching briefly on news stories of interest and social customs of note, but the burden of his narrative is concerned with the revolutionary wave that swept over Europe in that year. When Napoleon was finally destroyed by the combined powers of Russia, Prussia, Austria, and England, the assembled feudalism and absolutism of Europe decided to pinion the populace firmly to the ground, and never again permit liberty to raise its head. Prince von Metternich, the dominant figure of the Austrian government, undertook to crush liberalism within the Austrian Empire, which sprawled across most of Central Europe. And, for a number of years, he was remarkably successful. Austria was hermetically sealed against outside influences by a Metternichian curtain, and the minds of the intellectuals were controlled against dangerous thoughts by an efficient police force. Through skilful diplomacy, Metternich extended this control throughout most of the rest of Europe; the Revolutions of 1830 loosened his grip in Western Europe, but in Central Europe he remained supreme—until 1848.

“The trouble started,” Mr. Postgate tells us with a try at making a very British joke, “as might have been expected, in Paris.” France, like every well-regulated country, had at this time a Government and an Opposition, neither very admirable. The Government was presided over by the historic Guizot, whose policy as prime minister was to do absolutely nothing and not to give way an inch to the dissidents in the populace. France was in a prolonged depression, one in four was out of work, people died in the streets of hunger and cold—and the Government did nothing. The people wanted the vote, and Guizot told them: “Get rich by work and you will have the vote.” But the Opposition, for its part, was a scrappily handful of journalists and deputies representing upper-industrialist and merchant opinion, “respectable and patient.”

THE Opposition had been conducting a feeble protest campaign—although no one could be sure what it wanted done—in the form of banquets. A banquet for February 22, at which the Opposition promised to expose the failure of the Guizot Cabinet, was prohibited by the Government, and the Opposition voted 847 to 1 to call it off. But a crowd of workers and students, either not knowing of this decision or not caring to recognize it, assembled to escort the participants to the scene of the banquet; for the next several days Paris was the scene of desultory street fighting; Guizot called out the National Guard but it went over to the people, and both the king’s first minister and his king were soon overthrown.

These events in France were the spark that set off a Europe-wide tinder box. The Austrian Empire exploded from Sicily to Germany. Republics and constitutions sprouted everywhere through that remarkable year. A revolution took place in Prague, and the Czechs won back some of local autonomy. In Hungary, the Magyars decided to set up independently of Austria; the Slavs then promptly split the Hungarian Kingdom and proclaimed their own South Slav state. In Italy, outbreaks took place in Lombardy, Venetia, Milan,
THE workers were virtually leaderless, insofar as genuine strategic direction is concerned. On the capitalist side, the battle was organized with great subtlety and malice by General Eugene Cavaignac, Minister of War, who hoped to become a dictator on the bodies of the Parisian artisans. To provoke the workers, the National Workshops were attacked and engaged in street fighting. Cavaignac deliberately planned things to build up to a large-scale war, despite the fact that the early barricades could have been easily destroyed. When he thought the time had come, Cavaignac turned the corrupt Garde Mobile loose, and soon gained the upper hand against the leaderless rebels; an attempt at a cease-fire was frustrated by a shot from the Government side which killed the archbishop who was making it; resistance was soon over. There then followed a massacre of thousands of helpless workers, prisoners were shot down through the bars of the prisons that held them ("duck shooting," the soldiers called it). A historian recorded: "There was shooting from windows, the streets, cemeteries, the quarries of Montmartre and Butte Chaumont." Postgate writes: "The silence that followed this deadly week-end seemed in a sense to spread all over Europe. Comment was hushed; the nations were horrified, but none of them as yet knew what to think or what would result. Nor could they, nor indeed can we; for the results of those four dreadful days are not yet over. They have been especially long-lasting in France; that nation has ever since been divided into two, the one section haunted by fear and guilt, the other by hatred and a desire for revenge. The Paris Commune, twenty-three years later, was nothing but a repetition of the days of June, on a vaster scale, crueler yet, and lasting for two months. The French bourgeoisie and proletariat, by a tradition starting in June and since passed from father to son, have each believed that the other would kill him if the chance came, and that behind the large speeches of the politicians was a real fear and death which should never be forgotten. . . . There were two young theorists," Mr. Postgate continues, "who were in no way surprised—or so they claimed—by the 'June Days.' Marx and Engels had written their famous 'Communist Manifesto' at the end of 1847 for a small international Socialist League; it had been published without attracting much interest; but now it seemed to them, and has seemed to many people since, that its thesis had been proved within a few weeks of appearance. They had the prestige of prophets whose prophecies are fulfilled within a month or two, while the public still remembers them." 

The brutality of class war. Postgate outlines it: "Up till now . . . the revolution had been led by members of the middle class and had had for its objects those rights most necessary for a middle-class society—freedom of the person, freedom of trade, the abolition of feudal laws and relationships, and in general the end of the rule of royalty and the landed aristocracy. This type of revolution, so led and so mauled, was now being overtaken by another kind of revolution . . . That was what had happened in June. The bourgeoisie had only gaily started in February with the old slogans; in June it had had to face the demand of the workers to take over its property and form a classless society. In the future, the same thing would always happen. The role of the bourgeoisie as a progressive force was over; it was now conservative. Also (they added) it was doomed."

The revolutions of 1848 ran into many troubles, but basically they split on this rock: the division between middle class and worker. The fright which the capitalists took at that time has lasted the rest of their days. It is a job of setting up a society that suited them from the hands of such liberal revolutionaries as Mazzini, Kossuth, Ledru-Rollin, and entrusted it to conservative statesmen like Cavour and Bismarck, who a decade or two later were to create modern Italy and Germany out of the petty principalities into which they were broken. And from 1848 on, the European capitalists never made another important social move without calculating the effect upon its relationship with the wage workers. A. S.

Polycentric System?


The Russian Institute of Columbia University has issued a timely and valuable book. Besides Khrushchev's "secret" speech to the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, it contains many of the important editorial articles and articles of the American, British, French and Italian Communist press bearing on the campaign. Particularly interesting are Togliatti's interview in Nuovi Argomenti, and his report to the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party on June 24, 1956, as well as Pietro Nenni's analysis of Khrushchev's speech in the Italian Socialist paper, Avanti.

The one document which has not been extensively reprinted in the American press is Togliatti's report to his central committee. In this speech, he cautiously projects a new relationship inside the Communist movement when he calls for "a polycentric system, corresponding to the new situation, to the alteration in the world make-up and in the very structure of the workers' movements, and to this system correspond also new types of relations among the Communist parties themselves. The solution which today probably most nearly corresponds to this new situation may be that of the full autonomy of the individual Communist parties and of bilateral relations between them to establish complete mutual understanding and complete mutual trust."

A. S.
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Answer on Fluoridation

The following reply has been received from the author of our recent article on fluoridation, to which a number of readers objected:

There is little doubt that so-called civilized diets are poor and that dietary deficiencies and abuses result in many diseases. But to argue that poor diet is the root of all disease is as absurd as to hope to achieve immortality by eating "proper food." Despite these illogical, unscientific, egocentric (note: one must always distinguish between descriptive adjectives and "name-calling") arguments, a measure of truth is to be found in most of them. One of the major causes of dental decay is poor diet, but unfortunately not all dental authorities agree on what a proper diet actually is. But all authorities recognize that diet is not the only factor in this process. Heredity is a factor, as well as the psychiatric status of the individual. There is no doubt that tension and stress also result in decay—in teeth, internal and external organs and mental processes.

The individual who drinks rainwater is not only consuming dust from the atmosphere but quite likely radioactive dust from H-bomb tests. There is good evidence that rainwater is beneficial to automobile batteries but nothing to suggest it is superior to chlorinated water in humans.

Food faddism is a remnant of eighteenth century rationale medicine. Carried to its logical conclusion pasteurization alters natural milk and vaccination introduces into the body poisons in the form of dead bacteria or attenuated bacterial and viral substances. Rationally speaking, this is wrong; scientifically speaking, it has practically doubled the life-expectancy of mankind. Fluoridation is as scientifically sound as pasteurization, if not quite as effective. To approach these problems in terms of logic is to return to eighteenth century rationalization and to ignore the enormous accomplishments of twentieth-century scientific method.

It is both curious and instructive to note this dichotomy among a small number of socialists. It is a process of "selective intelligence." On the one hand they will accept socialist theory as the logical product of scientific (objective) social and economic analysis. On the other hand, they will cling to mystical concepts of naturalness, as though Nature had a monopoly on righteousness. It reminds me of the grandfather of a friend of a friend who used to say, with wisdom and patience, "All damn fools ain't died yet."

Dr. Jay W. Friedman

I like the American Socialist; believe it to be very realistic. I will support it as much as possible, but I am a steelworker and our masters keep us pretty close to bare subsistence.

I was just reading a success story in our great Chicago Tribune about Averell Harriman; this sums up the story: Although his father was a multi-millionaire and owned a 20,000-acre estate, in spite of such terrific hardips Harriman made good. He is a Governor and has been pushed for President of the U.S. several times.

This makes me feel very bad and hurts my ego. I wonder what's wrong with me. I had such a wonderful start. My father was a poor sharecropper in southern Indiana who degenerated into the slums of a small town and became alcoholic; my mother took in washing so I could have a little to eat. With all these assets to begin with, here I am at the age of 45 after 26 years in foundries and steel mills at back-breaking labor. I have worked my way up to the vast sum of two dollars and forty and one-half cents an hour, before the last raise.

With such a good start as I had, according to the capitalist formula, I should be President by this time. I feel that I am a failure.

J. N. Chicago

I am enclosing a money order for a one year renewal on my subscription to the American Socialist with a small contribution. I would have liked to make it larger but am somewhat financially embarrassed at the moment being one of the many laid off in Detroit during this period of "prosperity."

I really appreciate the existence of the American Socialist at this period and your efforts towards the formation of a broad non-sectarian Left movement, which movement in my opinion will have to be more American in character in that it is more concerned with the needs and the difference in development in the American scene independent of European and world developments, but at the same time we should study and profit from their accomplishments and mistakes. At times when things on the home scene look gloomy, a little reflection on socialist strides in other parts of the world brightens up the day.

I attribute much of the present weakness in the American Left to its past division into various sectarian groups devoting and wasting too much energy over petty differences and irrelevant issues beyond the understanding and needs of the average Joe, and his consequent turning away from and rejection of the Left. To me it seems that the average person is quite pragmatic and that for him to accept socialist concepts let alone to listen to them he has to feel that there is something in it for him along with the moral issues.

The American Socialist is doing an excellent job and taking a step in the right direction. Although I don't always agree with you, you have given me a better understanding on events, issues, and concepts.

C. J. B. Detroit

I wish you and your contributors would stop referring to Soviet Russia as a socialist country. It is obviously fascist. Calling it a socialist country is a slander upon the socialist movement in those and other countries. The Russian regime is a vicious dictatorship, whereas socialism stands for complete democracy and cooperative human brotherhood. They are opposites. Soviet Russia is the most anti-socialist country in the world. You should recognize this obvious fact and write accordingly.

John M. Work, Milwaukee

Having read your August issue through, every article, letter, book review, etc., I am prepared to give you a little of my reaction to the contents.

Pages 3 to 7 ("The Great Debate Goes On," "A Message to the Polish Government," and Pierre Hervé on the French Communist Party) could have been better devoted to a frank and blistering discussion of the monumental injustices existing in our own "way of life," than to those said to exist in countries thousands of miles away, behind the supposed-to-be-impeneetrable "iron curtain." How come we know so much about conditions prevailing there, when we at other times are so insistent in declaring that we know absolutely nothing about them. What strange inconsistency! You certainly are aware of the machinations of such organizations as "Radio Free Europe," "Voice of America," etc., whose primary aim is to stir up exactly such riots as occurred in Poznan. . . .

Everything else in this August issue is appropriate. The article "War and Peace" by George H. Shoaf is simply superb. Every word of it rings with truth; even the "average American morons," if they engage their brains long enough in the function for which they were intended, would eventually be able to discern the truth, that rare thing almost always absent from the columns of the poison press. I have always admired Shoaf's direct approach to his subject, and am very glad to see he is still in the saddle.

A. A. Los Angeles

I just got my first copy of the American Socialist from a friend and I think it is something the American people should have today. I am an elderly woman, not in good health, but less much I can do, but I am sending you these fifty names and addresses so you can send samples. Of course there are some scared ones in the bunch, and some are too busy making American dollars, but I have tried to pick the best ones.

I myself have been a socialism idealist all my life and nothing can change me, but I have been getting the name communist and etc. for it. The time is getting riper and riper to do something. . . .

Mrs. A. A. Michigan
A Price Increase

SINCE we began publication nearly three years ago, the AMERICAN SOCIALIST has been one of the lowest-priced magazines of its production quality in the country. There is hardly a single comparable liberal periodical on the newsstands for 25 cents, and there are many that cost much less to produce selling for 35 cents and more.

We strained every financial nerve to make this possible—although at times we were hard put to continue in such a low price range—because we wanted to give this periodical the widest possible circulation, particularly among workers.

But publishing, like politics, is limited by the possible, and it is just not possible to continue our very low price any longer. We have had to meet and absorb a series of cost increases in every expense involved in this undertaking, from engraving to magazine wrappers, and we are forced now to increase our income in order to cut the gap between our expenses and income.

We are therefore introducing a new price schedule. Beginning with the October issue, the cost of a single copy on the newsstands will go up to 35 cents. The full schedule of new rates is as follows:

- Single copy $ .35
- One-year subscription $ 3.00
- Two-year subscription $ 5.50
- One year by first-class mail $ 5.00
- One-year foreign subscription $ 3.50
- Two-year foreign subscription $ 6.50

WHILE these new rates bring us more into line with prevailing prices of periodicals, our price is still low. In fact, we believe we are offering one of the best reading values in this country. The many who have found our outlook and analyses to be important in getting a new start for radicalism will pay the few extra cents gladly if they know it enables us to keep producing.

After October 1, subscriptions will have to be paid for at the increased price scale. So, if you have a subscription or renewal to send in, you can save by mailing your payment right away. Also, we are going to continue for the time being our special introductory offer, for new readers only, of six months for $1. Use it to start your friends reading the AMERICAN SOCIALIST.