SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY

A debate between Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois and the editors.

JANUARY 1957
CLIPPINGS

THE December 15 “Nation” carried an editorial which should be of interest to all on the Left. It stated in part: “The editors of ‘Dissent’ magazine, a quarterly of socialist opinion, recently sponsored a forum in New York City on the developments in Eastern Europe. A stimulating group of speakers, including A. J. Muste, Lewis Coser, and Milton Sachs, presented different aspects of the situation, and the floor was then open for discussion. Sadly enough, there was no discussion—only recitation and harangue. Strung through the audience were the deadwood representatives of official Socialist ‘splinter groups’ who rose to the day’s occasion with the worn-out phraseology of their own particular sect, shaking their fists as of old, condemning the discussion for being only a discussion, for being a ‘waste,’ a display of soul-searching and a harbor of heresy from their own splintered orthodoxy. As the fists waved and the afternoon wore on, most of the people who had come out of interest to hear—and not to harangue—had left the hall... It was a discouraging experience to watch one of the few honest attempts at dissenting discussion dry up in the stale language of the splinter-off-of-splinter groups.”

To which we say, Amen! Our editors were not present at this particular meeting, so we have no first-hand knowledge of what transpired. But we have been at other meetings where we have witnessed the same sorry spectacle. If the discussion on the Left degenerates into various groups simply haranguing each other, it is guaranteed to be abortive of any useful results.

NUCLEAR maniacs are still around in high places. General Alfred M. Groeneweg, recently retired NATO head, told newsmen at the Pentagon on December 16 that “the people of the United States might have to choose whether to respond to attacks with conventional weapons. Nuclear retaliation might mean the death of X millions in United States cities.” The night before on a television program, General Groeneweg addressed the Soviet leaders that the West would retaliate “with all we have.”

WALTER Reuther’s “United Automobile Workers” ran an important editorial in its December issue, entitled, “Let’s Stop H-Bomb Tests Now.” The editorial stated: “Each H-Bomb exploded any place on the globe may bring the human race closer to extinction; the strontium 90 released by these blasts is a cancer-causing substance.” The editor quotes “Newsweek,” which, on the authority of Dr. William F. Neumann, one of America’s leading biochemists, declares: “The testing of hydrogen bombs may have already propelled enough strontium 90, the most pernicious aftermath of nuclear fission, into the stratosphere to doom countless of the world’s children to inescapable and incurable cancer. This may occur as the fallout sifts to earth over the next 10 or 15 years.” The UAW paper goes on to say: “Strontium 90 is falling on fields—not just in faraway places—here in America. Two counties near Chicago apparently have the heaviest concentration of the stuff yet discovered. It sticks to the foliage and grasses. Grazing cattle get strontium with their milk... It would be tragic beyond all understanding if the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration refused to heed Stevenson’s warning on H-Bomb testing—simply because a Democrat first made a big public issue of it. This would be one mistake there would be no chance to correct.”

NORMAN Thomas’ Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Federation announced that they plan to merge at a convention in New York City on January 19 and 20. The SDF was formed in 1936 when the so-called “Old Guard” walked out of the Socialist Party because of displeasure at what it considered the party’s too radical course. The SDF is associated with the magazine “New Leader,” which is extremely anti-communist and rightist in its views.

THE International Association of Machinists, which has recently absorbed a number of locals from the independent United Electrical Workers, is now dumping officials and members of the latter union. Nine officials have been refused membership, and ten have been dropped as union representatives. The union explained its action by quoting the anti-red clause of its constitution, which reads that “no person who advocates or encourages communism, fascism, or nazism, or any other totalitarian philosophy, or who by other actions gives support to these philosophies, is eligible for membership.” The fusions into the “mainstream of labor” of the old Left unions or locals are not working out very happily in many instances. In the case of the Fur Union’s entry into the AFL Meatcutters, a few of the old officers are saving their jobs by crawling and becoming old-line labor officials. In the case of the Machinists, they are apparently not being permitted to do even that.

DAVID J. MacDonald, President of the CIO Steel Union, threatened to expel the leaders of the protest movement seeking repeal of the recent dues increase. MacDonald determined, through some system of deduction known only to himself, that the protest movement represented a “dual union” movement, and the union’s attorney, Arthur J. Goldberg, promptly furnished him with a tortured legal ruling that a special convention which the opposition is seeking would not have any authority to repeal the dues increase. He opined that there was just no way to change the higher dues scale except at the next regular convention which is four years away.

SENIOR Eastland’s sub-committee on “internal security” got a hot reception when it moved its witch-hunt operation into Honolulu. Seventeen thousand longshoremen and apple dockers, members of Harry Bridges’ Longshore Union, walked off the job on November 30 as a protest action, and over 3,000 attended a mass meeting at the Civic Auditorium. After the meeting, the protesting unionists converged on the hearing and demanded that Eastland keep his hands out of the union’s private affairs. Samuel Wilder King, Governor of Hawaii, testifying before the committee, asked that it recommend that the ILWU be listed as a Communist-infiltrated organization under the Communist Control Act of 1954. If the whole labor movement took the same militant stand on Eastland’s witch-hunting show as the Longshore Union has adopted, we would be miles ahead in retiring all fascist aspirants to private life.

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A House Divided

In fitting conclusion to the confused elections of 1956, the commentators have been forced to conclude that both parties showed great strength, and also that both parties showed desperate weaknesses. The Republican Party swept the national election powerfully behind Eisenhower's great popularity—a popularity which we are forced to accept as a fact but which we prefer to let others explain. At the same time, the Republicans failed, for the first time in more than a century of political history, to carry Congress in the sweep. The Democrats, conversely, chalked up a good score, with their showing in the Congressional, Senatorial, and gubernatorial races. But the Democratic Party saw also an augury of decline in the weakening of its vote among Negroes and city populations; the solid South was cracked too, and the old Democratic coalition is not what it used to be.

The trepidations for the future which have arisen in Republican Party circles arise from the question: What kind of a showing can Republicanism make when it no longer draws upon the amazing popularity of Mr. Eisenhower? The Democrats, for their part, are confronted with an even more pressing and serious difficulty, for if the coalition upon which that party rests were to break up, it would become incapable of winning national elections, and, in the last analysis, of carrying on as a national party.

The Democratic Party has always faced difficulties inherent in any coalition made up of disparate elements pulling in different directions. But now, a number of new and important complications have set in:

1. The Negro people in the South have gotten to their feet and are demanding a change in no uncertain terms. This is putting an unbearable strain upon the different wings of the party, which includes at one and the same time those elements of the political spectrum most favorable to the Negro's fight for equality and those most opposed to it. With the Northern liberal Senators and the Southern Eastman-Talmadgeites, the labor organizations and the White Citizens Councils all in the same party, an explosive mixture is ready and fused for trouble.

2. As the Roosevelt-Truman coloration declined in the Democratic Party and its special message of liberalism and social change got increasingly weakened, its appeal to the electorate declined, and it is not winning national elections as it used to. Without victory—which is a good balm for any coalition—to grease the frictions, conflicts and recriminations flare in mounting intensity.

3. The big-city machines of the North have been declining in importance with the rise of labor and Negro organizations. The industrial vote is passing out of the hands of political bosses, with whom it was comparatively easy for the Dixiecrats to deal, and into union hands. As the unions are diametrically opposite to the Southern Bourbons on most national issues, the frictions are intensifying on this front as well.

4. An authoritative national leadership, which can transcend the differences of the coalition elements and arbitrate among them, is notable by its absence. Such a leadership was, in the past, based upon a unifying national program or outlook, and the punitive-or-rewarding power of federal patronage. But the patronage is not available for the present, and the possibility of a new common outlook which can unite the party is very slim.

The elections results highlighted the troubles of the Democratic Party. The biggest voting switch on the part of any large grouping in the electorate took place among the Negro voters, of whom there were about 4½ million, 3 million in the North and 1½ million in the South. Chicago's Southside witnessed a shift of 8 percent to Eisenhower as compared with 1952; in Harlem the shift was 16 percent. It has been estimated that where, in 1952, the Negro vote went to Stevenson throughout the nation by some 78 percent, this year it is believed he only got some 55 percent. It was in the South that the greatest shift took place. Henry Lee Moon writes in the Dec. 3, 1956 New Republic:

Significantly, the closer the Negro lived to White Council areas, the more precipitous was his flight from the Democrats. In 1952, Adlai Stevenson carried the Negro precincts in many Southern cities by higher majorities than in most Northern cities. This year most of these precincts gave handsome majorities to Mr. Eisenhower. In Atlanta, predominantly Negro precincts which gave the Republican candidate only 31 percent of their votes four years ago returned 82 percent of their votes for President Eisenhower this November 6. "Intensive campaigning by the Republican ward organization with practically no opposition from Negro Democrats" is credited as the reason by one Atlanta
WHAT DEMOCRATIC PARTY?: Adlai Stevenson (right), flanked by Michigan’s Governor Mennen Williams and Senator Pat McNamara, address the big Labor Day audience in Detroit. Senator Eastland of Mississippi is one of the nation’s leading racists and reactionaries. Can they all stay in one party, and if so, who will run it?

observer. That story was repeated in the Virginia cities of Norfolk and Richmond: 89 percent of the Negro voters in Norfolk supported the Democratic nominee in 1952, as contrasted with 20 percent this year. Sixty-eight percent of the Negro ballots in Richmond were cast for Mr. Stevenson four years ago; 69 percent for Eisenhower in ’56.

... Unlike most white voters in the South who switched to Eisenhower, Negro voters not only voted for the President but also for Congressional and local GOP candidates. In 11 Atlanta Negro precincts, Randolph Thrower (the Republican candidate for the House seat held by Rep. James C. Davis) ran slightly ahead of the President. Richmond Negro voters gave only slightly fewer votes to the Republican Congressional ticket than to the head of the ticket. In Durham, N.C., Negro citizens voted overwhelmingly for Kyle Hayes, the GOP gubernatorial candidate.

NEGRO voters were not alone in shifting out of the Democratic column. Although workers probably continued to vote Democratic in the presidential race by a majority, that majority has undoubtedly become much slimmer, else there is no accounting for Eisenhower victories in such cities as Chicago, Flint, Jersey City, Birmingham, Milwaukee, and Lorain.

Democratic strategists have tried to reply to these election results by pointing to the surprising victory of the Democrats in Congress, where the party continues to hold control. Those victories were indeed impressive, and the evidence shows that particularly in the western part of the country they were due in no small measure to the activity of the united labor movement. But Democratic control of Congress may contribute still further to the decomposition of the party in the years ahead.

National control over the office of the Presidency has in the past given a measure of cohesion to the Democratic Party; it is in Congress that the party splits most readily into its component parts. As Congress heads towards re-convening this January, its Southern wing returns with the pretended conviction that the Congressional victory resulted from a “wise and moderate” policy of supporting President Eisenhower’s legislative design. The Northern liberals return convinced that they owe their victories in the North to liberal policies (“the bad results Tuesday were in those states where the leadership got away from liberal principles”—Herbert Lehman). The major conflict expected at the coming session is thus not between the Democrats and Republicans but between the reactionaries and liberals in the Democratic Party.

ALREADY the two wings of the party in Congress have clashed up and down the line. At the end of November, the Democratic Executive Committee decided to name a 17-member advisory board to draw up a legislative program for the new Con-
gress. This was the scheme of a group of Northern liberal Senators, together with Stevenson’s campaign manager, James A. Finnegan, Mayor David Lawrence of Pittsburgh, and Paul Ziffren, California national committeeman. But the Democratic leaders in Congress, Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn, both Southern conservatives, advised waiting for Eisenhower’s program instead of acting independently, and consequently refused to serve on the advisory committee. Their lead was followed by most of those invited to the committee, and it thus became a dead letter.

At the same time, a group of six Northern Democratic Senators, Humphrey, Douglas, Morse, Murray, McNamara, and Neuberger, later joined by four Republicans, announced that they would make an effort to break the filibuster rule of the Senate during the opening days of the session.

The prospects for the Senate liberals do not look good. When this same issue was contested in 1953, only 15 Democrats voted to change Rule 22 so that it would be impossible for a measure to be talked to death by a minority of Senators. Seventy-five of those who were in the Senate in 1953 are still members of the body, and of those 75, only 16 voted for a change in the Senate rules. The liberals, in other words, command only a minority of Senate Democrats, and they face the further handicap that most of the Republican Senators vote with the Dixicrats too. In this way, a small group of Southern Senators continues to dominate the procedure of that body, and repeatedly uses the filibuster to prevent a vote on civil rights measures.

Further, the liberal leaders in the Senate are far from determined about the matter, and one could almost believe, were it not for his well-known sincerity, that such a man as Hubert Humphrey is interested in the matter mainly as a matter of show rather than as a serious battle. Humphrey followed his announcement of the contest on Rule 22 with a statement on December 8 in which he recorded: “I am a warm friend of Lyndon Johnson and I hold him in the highest regard. I will support him as the best man for our leader in the Senate. I’m certain,” he added, “that we agree on many more things than on which we disagree.” At the same time, his remarks about the civil rights issue were couched in a spirit of flabby obsequiousness to the Dixicrats: “Even if we can’t change the rules we ought to put up a fight for a reasonable civil rights program. We will ask our Southern friends to at least give us a vote on the issue.”

Clearly, the Congressional front does not promise a militant fight from the Democratic Party liberals. But despite all cowardice, the forces which are tearing the Democratic Party asunder will intensify rather than decrease in the near-term future. Foremost among these is the growing responsibility of the labor movement for the Northern Democratic Party.

The merger of the CIO and AFL appears to have brought some results in the political field. Of course, the 1956 elections were an inconclusive test, because only in some of the states have the two bodies assumed any working unity. Still, in those states where unifications were carried through and the united body went into action in the campaign, results were clearly improved. “The year-old united labor movement,” concludes N.Y. Times labor writer A. H. Raskin on December 3, “made its strongest political showing in the states west of the Mississippi, where the greatest progress toward regional union mergers has been made. In the industrial East, where units of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations are still apart at the local level, the election results were far less heartening to union leaders.”

“In certain areas—notably Oregon, Washington, Michigan, Colorado and eastern Pennsylvania—,” Mr. Raskin continues, “evidence was strong that intensive union activity had been crucial in carrying Democrats to victory against the Eisenhower tide.” In Michigan, labor strong point, G. Mennen Williams piled up a record majority of 300,000 to return as governor despite Eisenhower’s equally big majority in the state. In Detroit itself, one of the cities in which labor dominance of the Democratic Party is most complete, Stevenson actually increased his majority over 1952. There is every evidence that labor showed a lot of potency in the November voting, despite being saddled with a party which has lost the social appeal of the thirties and forties, which has trouble deciding whether it wants to be more or less warlike in foreign policy than the Republicans (although it leans to the former) and which has become badly compromised with the Negro people.

With the solid South cracking, with the city machines declining in importance, with the old bloc of urban voters in disarray, with even the Negro voter, long the most faithful supporter of the Democrats, backing away, the specific weight of labor in the Democratic coalition is bound to increase. But as yet, labor has no consistent idea as to how to carry on its fight within the Democratic Party. Its resources and energies have been concentrated mainly upon the techniques of getting out the vote, and keeping in step with the Northern liberals. Its few forays at national conventions have been too weak and indecisive to give it any measure of victory. Its several positions of strength on a local level have not yet raised it to a position of independent power. Its vote-getting strength remains unrecognized and largely unrewarded by the policy councils of the party. In truth, while labor carries a greater specific weight in the voting of the electorate than it used to, its influence upon the actual operation of the party is probably less.

But the Democratic Party, a house divided as badly as ever a house was, will not be able to continue this way indefinitely. Some form of explosion is in the making, whether it takes the form of a realignment within the party or its breakup. The election results and the post-election picture of American politics underline that conclusion.

**Socialist Vote**

A TABULATION of the Presidential vote in the 1956 election, nearly complete, showed that about 60 percent of those eligible to vote cast ballots on November 6. This represents a decline of about five percentage points from 1952. The votes for socialist candidates were reported as follows: Eric Haas, Socialist Labor Party, 36,362; Farrell Dobbs, Socialist Workers Party, 5,717; Darlington Hoopes, Socialist Party, 1,991.
The meaning of socialism and the import of recent events such as de-Stalinization and the Hungarian uprising are debated by a noted Negro scholar and the editors.

# Socialism and Democracy

## A Debate

by W. E. B. Du Bois

The other night I attended a meeting of a group of socialists who were seeking to build a unified socialist movement in the United States. There were perhaps a hundred and fifty persons present, and I told them that a social revolution from privately owned capitalism to socialism had been in progress in this nation since the beginning of the century; that it had been retarded by the first World War; greatly accelerated by the Depression, attacked by a counter-revolution after the second World War, but that it had not been halted; it was spreading in the world and still progressing in the United States. That here its greatest hindrance was preparation for war.

My audience listened politely, but was not convinced. The other speakers were eloquent but vague and indefinite. The questions showed the areas of disagreement. First, there was evidently basic disagreement over the meaning of "socialism." One person said to me: "You call the New Deal socialism, but it made no effort toward government ownership of capital." One vehement young man asserted that the Soviet state was not socialism since it was not democratic.

Evidently some of the speakers should have started with definitions. Socialism emphasizes public instead of private ownership of capital goods; the return to the labor of production of the full value of the product and the refusal to let part of that value go to the private owners of capital as profits. Socialism regards the object of the state as the welfare of its citizens and promotes industry and trade only as these efforts increase that welfare of the citizens. But who are the citizens and what does their welfare entail? This calls for knowledge and planning; it means the efforts of workers by hand and brain and it regards these workers as the chief citizens of the state, responsible for its existence and maintenance. For such a state a government must be set up capable of carrying it on and the ultimate object of such a socialistic government would be: From each citizen, effort in accord with his ability; and to each citizen, an income suited to his need.

If now we are going to confine the word "socialism" to the states which have fully reached this ideal, we could say that there are as yet no socialistic states. Certainly the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics approaches nearest today; Czechoslovakia, Poland, China, and the Balkan states follow in varying degrees; and then come a series of states which are on the path toward more or less complete socialism. Among these, India and Scandinavia follow most closely; France and England less clearly, and the United States even less; and yet certainly all are on the way toward the socialistic state. The triumph of such states the world over, in the next century, cannot be doubted by serious students of history.

Here from my audience of the other night and my readers now will come a caveat: No state can be socialistic unless it is also democratic. This is sheer nonsense, and arises from the historic fact that the modern dream of socialism originated in the minds of those thinkers who were also nurtured on nineteenth-century democracy. There is, however, no absolute connection between the two ideas. A tyrant can establish a welfare state, socialistic in that it owns capital, plans industry, and distributes income in accord with need. Of course if we refuse to call this socialism, our problem is one of semantics, not of fact.

On the other hand, commonsense calls socialistic all efforts to achieve some of the main objects of socialism, even if not all; and even if the progress toward socialism is not completely conscious.

Also it is clear that if the socialistic state rests on dictatorship of a person or of an oligarchy, or of a class, its chances of survival are less than if it rests on the democratic consent of the mass of the people. But to ascertain this consent, there must be economic equality; and to be sure that the mass vote for what is really best for them
they must be intelligent. So far in modern history, ignorance and the wage system under private capital have made the adoption of socialism by popular vote impossible.

There is, however, strong reason to believe that in the future this may be accomplished. If this hope proves true, it will be due to the fact that a dictatorship in Russia succeeded in setting up in this century the first successful state which can without question be called socialist, and thus proved that socialism can work, and when it works have the support of the mass of the people.

Thinkers and doers who were trained on the freedom-cry of the French revolution, and on that anarchy which characterized much of the actions of the colonies which formed the United States of America, believe that all good can be accomplished by democratic methods. This is not true. Freedom in France led to rule of the rich; democracy in America led to Negro slavery; and democracy in modern Europe led to colonialism and disastrous world war. It is begging the question to say that in these cases democracy was not permitted to work: Without knowledge and discipline, democracy cannot overcome class interests, greed, and concentrated power. Socialism then means discipline: stern, unrelenting discipline, and without that no socialist state is possible.

In my audience the other night was a typical young radical of today: He was “free”; he brooked no trammels; he took no orders; he said what he believed and was determined to do as he chose. He never could be a socialist; he never could even be a true member of a democracy. In the sixteenth century he might have found a career of usefulness as an “adventurer”; in the twenty-first century he might find himself in jail; because in society, there must be plan and discipline or society dissolves.

There is grave misunderstanding about freedom; in areas of life which have to do with physical survival of the race, freedom must be sternly curtailed by need and technique. Therefore in work for food, clothes, and health, the state logically must ask work from all who can work. But if waste and crime are reduced to a minimum, we can with modern science reduce such work to a few hours a day. In the remaining fields of activity, the area of freedom is wide. Among an educated, thoughtful and humane people the area of free activity will satisfy all normal persons. Indeed in such case the very necessity of the power of the state may dwindle. But so long as a vast proportion of the inhabitants of even civilized nations are greedy, envious, careless, and inexperienced, the governing state must function widely under a dictator or an oligarchy or under the majority rule of citizens.

Therefore in the so-called democracy of the nineteenth century, no socialist state could arise by democratic methods because the clashing individual interests would not yield. The early attempts to establish a socialist state in England, France, and Germany had to resort to force and failed ignominiously; until it was regarded as axiomatic that socialism was an amiable dream impossible of accomplishment in the everyday world. Then there came in Russia the opportunity to establish a socialist state under the dictatorship of a small group. This group did not expect or try to establish a socialist state immediately. They expected a socialist state in the future; but they were willing to wait, to compromise, to advance slowly until their masses were intelligent and skilled enough to take the responsibility. But no. Not only did the privileged classes of Russia, the dogmatic and reactionary church, and the greedy bourgeoisie refuse all compromise, but sixteen foreign lands sent troops to force Russia back to slavery. These elements were reinforced by traitors, spies, and scoundrels of every type. The socialists won. They crushed the power of religious dogma and superstition; they planned an economy with the government owning capital and guiding industry and with distribution of income on the beginnings of a logical basis. The government was a dictatorship of the Communist Party, with the leaders of that party elected by a limited democracy. But with the surrounding dangers and the inner ignorance and inexperience, the effective power passed from limited and disrupting democracy to personal dictatorship: from the dead Lenin to Stalin.

JOSEPH Stalin, an artisan with no broad background of education, but with steadfast adherence to the principles he had learned and willingness to seek more learning; with courage to suffer persecution and misrepresentation and stubborn determination to build a socialist state at any cost—this man by tireless work, ceaseless vigilance, by expropriation, exile, imprisonment and murder, established the first successful socialist state in the world and defended it against the world. This job was no Sunday School picnic. It was a fierce and bloody fight against ruthless and powerful opponents like Winston Churchill and against Russian spies and traitors. Stalin battled with every tool he could find. He pleaded, begged, forced, and killed; he succeeded to a degree which astonished civilization. His monument stands in the Soviet state today: A people welded into unity out of mutually hating fragments; an industrial giant; the most progressive agricultural organization in Europe with the best system of education in the world; with the widest distribution of literature for the masses which the world has seen and with wide encouragement of art.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not a perfect state: its literature has been limited in breadth; its art has been curtailed in depth; its democracy has been strictly limited and the methods by which this miracle has been done involved much injustice, suffering, and death. Nevertheless, never before in history have the peoples of Russia been so content, so well-fed and clothed and with so much freedom. For men to complain that this gigantic
effort was not democratic is sheer nonsense. It was not intended to be democratic; it could not have made democracy work by the popular vote of ignorant, superstitious, sick, and poverty-stricken peasants and wage slaves, threatened by every organ of modern civilization in world-wide conspiracy. The uplift of the Russian people was deliberately planned to start with a dictatorship and Stalin was the first and the successful dictator.

But neither Lenin, Stalin, nor any of the masters of Russia ever planned that this dictatorship should last indefinitely. They expected increased participation of the mass of people in democratic control as Russia became more intelligent, more experienced and in less danger from interference from without. The death of Stalin brought opportunity and demand for change; for yielding to the rising demand for more personal freedom of discussion, thought, and action; for more freedom in literature and art; for the devotion of proportionately more government income to consumers' goods and less to industrial expansion and defense. Such change should of course come slowly and with awareness of the still wide fear of socialism in the world; especially with full knowledge of the studied determination of the United States to treat socialism as a crime, report it as a failure, and plan to overthrow it by force.

The actual attempt thus to broaden the basis of democracy in the Soviet Union proved an ill-considered blunder. Its laudable appeal to the world for peace and disarmament was accompanied by an attack on the dead Stalin and on the methods by which the Soviet state had been built. The very men who launched this attack upon a dead man had been Stalin's co-workers, and shared with him some responsibility for his acts. It is possible that as Stalin aged, his personal power grew and his weaknesses showed; but the institution of dictatorship which he made effective was the plan and purpose of the socialists who founded the Soviet Union, and without it no socialist state could have arisen in Russia in the twentieth century.

If the new democracy and freedom started by the Twentieth Communist Congress could have begun its work of reform quietly, with reverence for the great dead and repudiation not of the man, but recognition of the fact that now a change in Stalin's methods was necessary, the enemies of socialism would not have been given new weapons for attacking it and the West would have had less success in trying to renew efforts to conquer Russia and re-establish private capitalism in East Europe.

We do not know just what happened in Hungary. I saw Hungary in 1892 and in 1936. I believe there was an attempt of former landlords and private capitalists, helped by funds from America, which had openly promised aid, to stir up discontent and overthrow socialism in Hungary. If this is true, the Soviet Republics are rightly summoned to help Hungarians to self-defense.

The gradual displacement of dictatorship by increasing democracy was recognized by every intelligent thinker in Russia; when the change began in recrimination and unfair attack on a great man, a large part of the socialist world and its Communist parties who were working for socialism began to beat their breasts and howl like savages against the memory of the man whose unselfish devotion to a great cause made socialism possible in our day. This seemed to many enemies of socialism just the time to make a frontal attack on the whole program of socialist progress which was spreading over the world. France had already determined to crush North African nationalism, Britain, in a last misguided effort to save her empire and retain her ownership of land and human labor especially in Africa, had determined to re-seize the Nile Valley and regain her vast horde of military stores in East Africa; and the United States redoubled her efforts to encourage revolt in East Europe. Yugoslavia had already lightened the sterner aspects of her dictatorship and the Soviet Union now recognized the justice of these actions; Poland and Czechoslovakia followed, with some difficulties but no surrender of socialism.

Hungary proved different. Her dictatorship had not functioned successfully; an antagonistic and powerful church was still active; and her educational system was not turning out the type of leadership which has made the Soviet Union so conspicuous and so outstanding in our day. When Austria became "free" to serve as a port of entry to a Communist land, money to encourage revolt began to pour in and civil war on a limited scale started. I do not know all the facts; but this is my interpretation from what I do know: At first the Soviet Union was willing to keep hands off and let the Hungarians settle their own destiny. Soon it was clear that this revolt was
not against failure of socialism, but against socialism itself, with the help of former Hungarian capitalists and landholders now gathering in Austria, together with the great capitalist and colonial interests in America and the West. That was the start of an attack on Russian socialism on its very borders.

The Soviet Union moved in and crushed the revolt. It was a hard task from which the Soviet Union recoiled and hesitated. Yet unless the whole socialist movement was to fall before a new armed attack of the dying capitalism of the West, the bloody job had to be done and it was done. There is no doubt in my mind but that the interests and wishes of the great majority of the Hungarian working people were served by this overthrow of the landlords and fascists of a former discredited regime.

AGAIN not only socialists but Communists in many areas joined predatory capitalists in hysterical criticism of the Soviet Union. The New York Times repeatedly heralded a “revolution”; in New York City on the birthday of Russian freedom, hordes of teen-age hoodlums were let loose under police protection to insult the Russians and their friends. American military preparation is being increased and we stand on the threshold of the third World War.

What now should be the program of socialists and Communists throughout the world and especially in the United States? First they should agree to as wide an extent as possible on just what socialism is and how far it is a desirable form of society for their own nation. Next they should search for methods of realizing socialism and finding the roads toward socialism here and now. They should unite to refuse the charge that the socialism on which they agree is a crime or a reason for war. What form socialism takes in foreign lands is not our prime business. The form it takes in America is our prime business and we have a right to pursue it under the law. Next we should work to form a socialist party to which all persons should be welcome who work for its objects. The platform of such a party should aim at steps which it should take to make progress toward socialism definite and sure: peace; state control and eventual ownership of capital; government in planned business; and the welfare state.

A Reply by the Editors

DR. DU BOIS’ article has an importance going beyond its stated positions. We are convinced that with variations it represents the thinking of many people who are either in, or have been in the Communist movement, or influenced by its propaganda over the years. In this sense, we are dealing here with a whole mode of thought, which has by no means died with the Twentieth Congress, which unfortunately continues to exercise an important influence on sections of the Left.

We have stated on more than one occasion that in our opinion it was this kind of an approach that was largely responsible for destroying the effectiveness of the American Communist movement and smearing all of American radicalism in the process. The damage has been done. The Communist Party is a sham. American radicalism has hit rock bottom. And nothing we can say or devise today will undo the mischief and roll back the years. What we can do is learn from the past blunders, so that we can go forward on a more mature basis. That is the chief value of inquests into the past, and in re-hashing the results of the Russian experience.

We cannot see how anything meaningful is accomplished by defining socialism in the nebulous way that Dr. Du Bois does and enveloping a dozen contradictory social processes within the confines of one vague formula so as to be able to arrive at the startling conclusion that India and Scandinavia, the United States and France—are all moving "toward more or less complete socialism." We believe that socialism is indeed the next stage of human society and that all countries will sooner or later reach this order. But a sociology that includes in one grab-bag advanced imperialist countries, and under-developed semi-feudal countries, as well as the Communist-run countries, only succeeds in slurring over vast social differences, in muddling existing trends, and leaving the question of what is and what isn't socialism in a cloud of uncertainty and confusion.

EVERYONE is free, of course, to define socialism any way he wants to, just as the National Association of Manufacturers is free to define American capitalism as "free enterprise." But the concept of socialism has a history, and it is an historical fact that socialists from Marx on, whether of the Left or Right variety, all conceived of socialism, up until the beginning of the Stalin era, as involving not just nationalization of the economy and social planning, but the attainment of greater production and wealth than under capitalism, the realization of higher living standards and more leisure for the people, and the conquest of a superior democracy because of mass participation in production, planning, administration and government. And it was with this concept that socialists, particularly in Europe, rallied millions to their banners and parties.

Now, one can say, of course, as so many disillusioned intellectuals have said, that this was a utopian proposition, this proved to be "the dream that failed." But to refute this by calmly asserting that socialism has nothing to do with democracy, that the worst horrors of Stalin's Russia are all according to Socialist Hoyle, and that anyone who disagrees is simply splitting semantic hairs, is to twist the traditional notion of socialism, and to make socialism
something unpalatable and unattractive into the bargain.

Dr. Du Bois says that "The uplift of the Russian people was deliberately planned to start with a dictatorship." He couldn't be more mistaken. As a matter of fact, no Marxist in 1917, Russian or otherwise, would even have been capable of approaching the problem in these power terms. The fact is the Soviet leaders had the opposite idea. They started by forming a coalition government in 1918 and permitted other laborite parties to operate. It was only when their coalition partners launched armed warfare against the Soviet state that Lenin and his co-workers regretfully concluded that they could not permit democracy to the other parties. In the past, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was considered as synonymous with workers' democracy. The one-party system came about not because of the design of Marxism, or Leninism, but due to the harsh conditions of defending Soviet power in a ruined country during a period of foreign intervention and civil war. Even so, Russia enjoyed some measure of democracy until Stalin consolidated his power in the late twenties.

To speak of the possibility of having socialism and tyranny at one and the same time means to discard the half-dozen essential aspects of the system and reduce the meaning of the term to simply planning and nationalization of industry. The proponents of the new semantics go further in junking the traditional concept that what socialism would nationalize would be a highly developed industrial complex, and content themselves with the bare mechanics of the process even though nationalization might take place in a poverty-stricken country with scarcely any industry worth speaking of. But this new definition caricatures the conception. What's the point of revamping the term "socialism" in this manner? Stalin did it in order to dress up his crisis-ridden transition regime, and to fool a lot of gullible people abroad about the Workers' Paradise in Russia. But why do Dr. Du Bois and others do it?

We are not of the school that says that Russia has nothing to do with socialism, that it will all have to be junked, and that we will have to start all over again from scratch. On the contrary. Without a doubt, Russia is a country of the socialist type, because it has abolished capitalism in the decisive sectors of the economy and because it is operating a nationalized economy in accordance with a plan. Without a doubt, this is a great gain that the socialists of the coming generation will build on. But it is also necessary to add that it is a very misshapen model of the new order because it is riddled with desperately poor living standards, bureaucracy and police rule.

It has become very difficult to arrive at a dispassionate viewpoint on this matter as the air is rent with the war whoops and battle cries of the partisans on both sides of the cold war. On the one side, which includes Social Democrats and various socialist sects, are those who insist that because Russia falls far short of the model as drawn by the classical writers of socialism, it has to be rejected in toto, it has to be cursed and execrated and its name made a byword among all honorable men. On the other side, up to yesterday, were the unabashed apologists who straight out of Voltaire's *Candid* insisted that Russia was the best of all possible worlds, and that anyone who voiced the faintest criticism or doubt was either reactionary or a fool, or both. After Khruschev's revelations, these Russian patriots of all countries retreated to their second-line trenches. Their apology now runs along this line: "Yes, Stalin made a lot of mistakes, but the new crowd is correcting them. And without Stalin's tough policies, Hitler's fascism would be triumphant in the world today."

In our opinion, both extreme partisans are wrong. History will reject both viewpoints as one-sided, exaggerated and incomplete, although a scientific approach will probably employ some of the arguments of both sides. If we look at the problem historically, we can see that Russian socialism degenerated into bureaucracy and police rule in the first instance because the country wasn't ready for socialism, because it had to industrialize a ruined, poverty-stricken peasant country as a beleaguered fortress surrounded by a hostile capitalist world. In the quarter-century that has elapsed since the inauguration of the first Five Year Plan, Russia has been a transitional society moving toward socialism, but never having attained it to this day, and retaining as many characteristics and features of its old feudal-Czarist past as it has erected of the new socialist order.

We cannot agree with those who pooh-pooh the herculean achievements and loftily inform us that industrialization is not everything. (Eating is not everything either, but you can't move very far without it.) We are unable to follow the reasoning of these socialists who can look at Russia today—risen from a backward peasant country to the second industrial power in the world—and say it was all in vain, it was all a mistake, it doesn't mean a thing, and nothing worthwhile has come out of it all. This certainly strikes us as a case with a vengeance of trying to dump the baby along with the dirty bathwater. But we don't see that the other Anna Louise Strong extreme is any more correct when it becomes hypnotized with the industrialization progress, and denominates a country still behind the Western world in living standards, productivity, and political rights, as full-blown socialism. It is false to identify the new social order with the ruling bureaucratic personnel, identify oneself in turn with this personnel, and then shrug off with supreme aplomb frameups, crimes and atrocities that time and again horrify the world.

This over-simplified analysis of Russia which saw all things in black and white, this desiccated Marxism which divided humanity into worthy progressives (if they were uncritical admirers of Stalinism), and fascists, potential or actual (if they were not such admirers), has made a shamibles of the American radical movement, which at best was never very strong or influential. Most people couldn't follow the devious dialectics. All they could see was that Communists thought frameups were bad in the United States, but good in Russia, that Communists were for free speech under capitalism, but against it under socialism. Is it any wonder that the American Left is in the shape it is in today?

Let us grant that all human organization requires a measure of discipline, and that depositing paper ballots
once every four years is not the alpha and omega of existence and history. But it is incorrect to counterfeit discipline to democracy, and to blame on the latter colonialism and war. Dr. Du Bois doesn't drive his argument through to the end, but it would be logical if he concluded by calling for a socialist dictator. Democracy is necessarily very restricted under capitalism; the newspapers, educational system and mass media of communication are in the hands of the rich; the people are often confused, and at times caught in the throes of chauvinism and jingoism. Socialists have often used such illustrations to demonstrate the limited nature of democracy under capitalism, and to show why a socialist system which has eliminated private monopolies will make possible the creation of a higher and more genuine democracy. But how does an illustration of the limited character of capitalist democracy become an argument for doing away with democracy under socialism? This notion is particularly inopportune today when on the one hand countries in the Soviet bloc are showing the difficulties of economic planning without the democratic participation of the people involved, and on the other hand, when the Western opinion-makers are turning peoples against socialism because of the dictatorial practices of Stalinism.

Democracy is not an esoteric luxury item, like a bottle of rare wine, which will improve a good dinner, but without which one can withal have a good substantial meal. Without the initiative and wide participation of the masses in all phases of production and government, society inevitably falls under the sway of a new elite, a privileged bureaucracy. And bureaucracy under these conditions, just as the bureaucracy of Russia and Eastern Europe, is not a matter of bad psychological habits, it is not a question of rudeness, or inefficiency, or red tape. Bureaucracy means the elevation of a new privileged social stratum, an aristocratic caste, that has vested interests of its own, extends its tentacles into all reaches of society, and utilizes both planning and nationalized property to promote its own caste privileges.

This is the key internal problem of the Soviet bloc, and, whatever their solutions may be, is admitted to be such by Tito, by Gomulka, and, at times, even by the Russians. Stalin demonstrated how the whole excellent machinery of socialism can be subverted by bureaucratism into a nightmare and a horror. And yet after the Khrushchev revelations, after the events in Poland, after the Hungarian blood-bath, Dr. Du Bois and others like him can obdurately refuse to see that their idea of socialism was terribly oversimplified in the past, and in the face of the contrary evidence, stubbornly insist that Stalin's bureaucratic autocracy, which brought Soviet Russia to the edge of disaster, was necessary for the building of the Soviet state.

D R. DU BOIS tries to deal with the Twentieth Congress in a way he would not dream of treating with Southern Reconstruction. All social background is expunged and we have returned to the history of moralizing and moral exhortations. If the Twentieth Congress could have started its work quietly and unobtrusively and with reverence for Stalin, everything could have gone off smoothly—so writes Dr. Du Bois. He has slipped here into the method of thought of those of his fellow historians who ignored and
never understood the social forces of American history, who wrote of our Civil War that if only the Abolitionists had not been so fanatical, and the Southern slaveholders so unyielding, the so-called “irrepressible conflict” could have been peacefully adjusted by reasonable men on both sides.

What the old-time Soviet friends cannot grasp is that a new revolutionary wave is passing through the peoples of the Soviet bloc in Europe, not to destroy or undermine the social foundations or accomplishments of the Soviet system, but to cleanse the system of bureaucratism and police rule, and give government back to the control of the people. It is not a revolt against unworthy individuals alone, but against the bureaucratic system which has fastened itself like an incubus on the socialist setup. The change may come relatively peacefully, as it has been so far in Poland, or it may come with fire and sword, as in Hungary. In either case, it is a herald of the fact that the masses are finding the Stalinist system intolerable.

It is fatuous to imagine that Khrushchev, Bulganin and the other Russian leaders have it in their hands to simply go slow or go fast, that they can destroy the Stalin legend or preserve it, as they will. They are now caught in a revolutionary whirlpool and are desperately maneuvering to preserve their rule, while giving as much ground as they have to and dare to, without encouraging an explosion. The essence of a revolutionary period is that the masses of people take a hand in the important decisions which ordinarily are the exclusive prerogative of diplomats, generals and bureaucrats. Every revolution dramatizes its aspirations by its symbolic heroes and villains. To suggest that if more finesse were employed, Stalin might have remained a symbol of reverence to the new generation means that one does not comprehend the dynamic of the present events in Eastern Europe.

It seems to us that it behooves all those who wind up justifying Russian butchery in Hungary to re-think their premises. When a set of premises leads to such untenable positions, it is certainly high time for a reappraisal.

THE information that has become increasingly available is definitive that the accusation that Hungary would have gone fascist but for Russian tanks is a slanderous fable. The on-the-spot testimony of Peter Freyer, London Daily Worker correspondent, that he saw no evidence of fascist terror in the Budapest streets, carries great authority, considering that Freyer is an experienced correspondent and that his sympathies were all with socialism. The Budapest correspondent of the New Statesman and Nation, a paper that takes a friendly attitude to the problems of the Soviet bloc, also rejects the allegations of a fascist danger. What the evidence seems to point to is that in the swirl of the uprising excesses were committed and some innocent Communists were killed or injured. But in the light of the testimony of these two and other reputable correspondents, the specific weight of the reactionary hooligan bands that were roaming the streets in the first hectic days was apparently of a secondary character.

Now, as to all the wild talk about “Project X” and Allen Dulles’ Central Intelligence Agency. No specific evidence has yet been adduced. The story that 60,000 counter-revolutionaries infiltrated into Hungary is exploded by Joseph Clark, foreign editor of the New York Daily Worker. He testifies that he picked up the story from a Prague dispatch which alleged that 60,000 persons had crossed the Austrian-Hungarian border over a period of months, including all tourists, delegations and persons whose politics probably ranged from Communist to Fascist. Nagy, when he was still Premier officially accepted the Austrian aide-memoire that adequate precautions had been taken by the Austrian authorities to prevent emigrés from entering Hungary.

We go along with the general proposition that a number of espionage agents, emigrés, and fascists were busy on the scene of action, as the evidence indicates. (Such cross-currents have occurred in every revolution in history.) To jump from this to the suggestion that the State Department can export a revolution to Hungary at will, or even play a decisive role in one that starts under its own impetus, is to say goodbye not only to Marxism, but plain common sense as well. Where is the evidence that this revolutionary people that took command of the streets arms in hand was manipulated by isolated nests of provocateurs or refugees? The allegation springs not from evidence, but the unspoken thought that people are too dumb to know their own interests and must be kept in check by the mailed fist of socialist dictators who know best what’s good for the people.

What is the nature of the struggle in Hungary since the November 4 bloodbath? Is it between fascists and socialists? Or is it between the Workers Councils—the only body with authority among the Hungarian people—and the Russian puppet regime that has no support except the Russian troops and the police? The desperate struggle which at the time of this writing is going into its sixth week is not for a return to the old exploitative society, but demands that the Workers Councils be recognized and permitted to publish their own newspaper, the return of Imre Nagy, who apparently was kidnapped by the Russians and exiled to Rumania, and the withdrawal of Russian troops. The six weeks of struggle prove that if the Soviet leaders accepted Gomulka only after they were faced
with the alternative of a war with Poland, they have thus far refused to come to terms with the independent Workers Councils whatever the cost.

RECOGNIZING these facts, recognizing the responsibility of Stalinism for the unholy mess and rejecting the fabrications about a fascist counter-revolution, was there nevertheless a danger that the Hungarian people would have returned the country to capitalism if left to their own devices? Especially in view of their hatred for the kind of socialism that had been rammed down their throats for over a decade? Let us recall that the predominant character of the uprising was a national one to drive out the foreign occupation. Virtually the whole population either joined in or was enthusiastically in support of this revolution. But the various sections of the population, workers, old middle classes, peasants, the church, had different social aspirations. If the Russians had not intervened, the revolution would inevitably have gone on to a second stage where the conflicting social aims of the participants would have clashed. Everything we know indicates that the workers were set on keeping the socialist foundations that had been erected, and that they had great support in other sections of the people in this resolve.

Here are a few bits of data (there are many more): On November 1, Népszava reappeared as the official daily of the re-born Social Democratic Party and carried a leader by Anna Kethly which declared: “Freed from one prison, let us not allow the country to become a prison of another color. Let us watch over the factories, the mines and the land which must remain in the hands of the people.” So pervasive must have been this sentiment that even the representatives of the Smallholders and the old National Peasant Party publicly pledged their adherence to the preservation of the socialist achievements. Bela Kovacs, the most important leader of the Smallholders, declared in a public speech: “No one must dream of going back to the world of counts, bankers and capitalists. That world is over once and for all.” Even if we assume that some of these declarations were not sincerely meant, they are still a sure demonstration of the prevailing mood among the people. In the light of this information, isn’t it unduly pessimistic to imagine that an armed working class buoyed up by the support of a revolutionary people and surrounded by Communist states would have been incapable of frustrating the designs of reactionaries who would drag the country back to capitalism?

THE real trend of the Hungarian revolution was not toward fascism, or capitalism, or feudal-landlordism, but to get the Russian troops out, to get Hungary out of the Warsaw bloc and to neutralize the country. That was demanded by Imre Nagy before his downfall and that would have taken place had the Russians not intervened with their tanks. This appears as an intolerable weakening of the socialist forces only to those who remain mesmerized with an over-simplified analysis that the world is divided into two camps, socialist and imperialist, and you have to line up with either Khrushchev or Dulles. Many damned Tito in the past not because they took seriously the hokum about his having turned fascist, but because they thought that if you broke with Stalin, you automatically broke with the “socialist camp” and could only become a tool of the imperialist camp. Great historic events have shattered to bits this over-simplified view of the world lineups.

Let us ask ourselves this: Has the emergence of Titoist Yugoslavia harmed or aided the world struggle for socialism and for peace? In our opinion, it has aided both causes. How about the rise of Nehru and the neutralist grouping in Asia? That has slowed the consolidation of war blocs and has given the peoples everywhere greater breathing space. The ability of the Soviet power to industrialize a peasant country and hurl back the Hitler hordes has undoubtedly been a supreme source of inspiration to peoples in other countries, especially in the colonial world. But don’t let us translate this justifiable appreciation into a strategy that says socialism will prosper elsewhere only by enrolling under the Kremlin leaders’ marching orders. Experience is showing that the Kremlin is nationalist and caste minded, and that such slavishness is retarding rather than advancing the socialist cause.

If the proposition that there are different paths to socialism is to be more than a ceremonial phrase, it must mean that socialism will only triumph in various countries as peoples are permitted to realize their own national genius. And for those who are primarily concerned with the danger of war, we say: A neutral independent Hungary, holding a position similar to Tito’s on the international checker board, would be worth a hundred times more to the Soviet Union’s security and to the preservation of peace, than a hostile and embittered Hungary imprisoned in the Warsaw bloc against its will.
It's not just that Negroes are restricted to inferior job categories. Even within those categories, they get the poorest of jobs and the lowest of pay.

Jobs and the Color Line

by R. R. Childers

ALMOST everybody understands that in America it pays to have a white skin. Few realize how large the dividends are. In recent months, numerous periodicals have publicized some of the facts. Not just radical and liberal journals, but large commercial papers and magazines have been led by the ferment over school integration to tell some of the story of Negro conditions. But so far, the surface has barely been scratched. If we dig more deeply into the facts of Negro employment and wages, we get a picture so startling it is hard to imagine that a structure of discrimination so rigid and deadly can exist in modern America.

Let us start with one of the tables that has received wide publicity recently, that which shows the percentages of Negro and white employment in various occupational groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Occupational Group</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Household</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Laborers</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from ‘Occupational Characteristics,’ one of the Bureau of the Census’ Special Reports supplementing the 1950 census of population.

Although it may be true that symmetry adds to beauty in art, here we get a not so pretty picture. The top six occupational groups, the most desirable, account for 55 percent of white employment, while the bottom four groups, the least desirable, account for 55 percent of Negro employment. We find only 16 percent of Negro employment in the first six groups and 17 percent of white employment in the last four. The whites have the "good" jobs. The menial, servile, and less-skilled work is reserved for those humans with tarnished hides. ("Negro" and "nonwhite" are used interchangeably here, as nearly 96 percent of American nonwhites are Negro; the remainder being "Indians, Japanese, Chinese, and other nonwhite races.")

You can bet your paycheck that the size of income follows suit. You'd win, as these figures for median income in 1949 for the male labor force show. (The income for household workers refers to females, who compose 95 percent of this group.):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Occupational Group</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional, technical</td>
<td>$2668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers, officials</td>
<td>3958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>3006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales workers</td>
<td>3026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, foremen</td>
<td>3121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>1456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operatives</td>
<td>2611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private household workers</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers</td>
<td>2193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers</td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However revealing these figures are, they do little justice to the full consequences of having dark skin. Being based on broad classifications, they gloss over, if not actually conceal, the depth and extent of economic discrimination and suppression. We shall now do what is not usually undertaken: look a little closer at the occupational groups (the bottom four of the above table) which provide the jobs for more than half of America's nonwhite workers.

If somebody asked you which of the following jobs you would prefer: housekeeper, laundress, or household worker, chances are that you would choose housekeeper. Of these three sub-groups under the classification Private Household Workers, housekeeper is the most desirable, both paywise and by status. It is a better position.

The Census Bureau's figures reveal that three out of four housekeepers are white. That is so in a classification where Negro women outnumber white women fifty-eight to forty-two.

The author is a young economist whose work appears in the American Socialist for the first time.
The Negroes are found to predominate, of course, in the other two occupations. Over 60 percent of household workers and just short of 70 percent of household laundresses are nonwhite. While these two groups account for 81 percent of white Private Household Workers, they account for as many as 95 percent of Negroes.

So we are struck with the fact that race prejudice has a certain pervasiveness. The pattern of discrimination throughout the nation’s economy is repeated even within the type of work for which the Negro is considered to be “best suited” by prejudiced whites.

The uniform is the mark of order. It is worn by those that give orders and those who take them. For example, a distinctively cut jacket, and badge, are worn by both policemen and porters. Ninety-eight percent of policemen and detectives are white; 75 percent of porters are Negro.

Besides policemen and porters the classification Service Workers, Except Private Household includes such occupations as attendants of all sorts, practical nurses, barbers, bartenders, firemen, countermen, waiters, ushers, elevator operators and charwomen. All these jobs are characterized by some kind of uniform or distinguishing apparel. With two or three exceptions the uniform, as worn on these jobs, is a sign of condescension. Little wonder that Negroes predominate here.

There are twenty-five such detailed occupations in this classification, but to keep this study manageable, we shall consider only the ten occupations each of which accounts for over 150,000 employees. These ten occupations take in eighty percent of the employed persons in this grouping.

They are policemen and detectives; bartenders; guards; watchmen and doorkkeepers; waiters and waitresses; barbers; beauticians and manicurists; attendants at hospitals and other institutions; cooks, except those working in private household; janitors and sextons; service workers, except private household; and porters.

The last four occupations listed command three-fourths of the nonwhite employees as compared with little better than one-third of the white employees. Leaving out waiters and waitresses, the other five occupations provide jobs for eight out of twenty whites and only three out of twenty nonwhites.

What observations can we make about this distribution? The jobs entailing protection of property and enforcement of law are white folks’ prerogatives. The jobs involving face-to-face contact with people from other walks of life are predominantly white. The jobs which require most catering and physical service surpass themselves with opportunities for Negroes.

A comment about income must be added. In keeping with the over-all picture of remuneration, the nonwhite jobs are the poorer-paying ones. The median income in 1949 for barbers, bartenders, guards and policemen is $2357, $2366, $2551 and $3262. The median income for janitors, service workers and porters is $1950, $1345 and $1781.

The real affront is that in each and every job the Negro takes home less pay than his white counterpart. The Negro cop is short-changed $225. The Negro bartender is robbed of $480 or twenty-three percent of “white” income in this job. The Negro janitor earns poorer by $260. Even the Negro porter comes out $45 worse for carrying the same baggage as his white co-workers. It literally pays to have a bleached complexion.

We turn now to Farm Laborers:

On the farm the Negro is in the same plight. As a self-employed farm service laborer he is under-represented four times; as a farm foreman he is under-represented six times. A significantly smaller percent of Negro male farm laborers worked 50 to 52 weeks in 1949 (less than 45 percent) than the white laborers. Negro farm workers simply don’t have the same opportunity to work full time. The average white male farm wage laborer brings home a little over $1,000 a year. The average nonwhite male has the grand sum of $690.

The figures for women farm wage laborers reveal something further. Fifteen percent of Negroes worked full time as compared with only five percent of whites. However, the median income figure for the Negro is $331 and for the white in the neighborhood of $375!

Such is the case with over half a million Negro workers and their families.

The last major occupational group we are concerned with is Laborers, Except Farm and Mine. It lists six occupations (fishermen, garage laborers, gardeners, longshoremen, lumbermen and teamsters), and a category of “laborers not elsewhere considered.” This last category, to which our attention is limited, takes in 84 percent of those employed in this occupational group.

The laborers are divided according to manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries. In 1949 two-thirds of the white laborers in manufacturing earned over $2000. Less than half of the nonwhites did that well. And only one out of ten Negroes made over $3000 compared with one out of four whites.

In the non-manufacturing industries the situation is similar. Half the whites and only a third of the Negroes are in the $2000 bracket and over. Eighteen percent of the whites and only six percent of the nonwhites earned better than $3000. These figures speak for themselves.

Perhaps the Negro worked less? The fact is that in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries a higher percentage of nonwhites worked 50 to 52 weeks in 1949 than white laborers. The eagle simply follows Jim Crow.
The three books on the Rosenberg Case are expertly sifted and appraised by a legal authority, who concludes that the victims were not proven guilty.

Justice Was Not Done

by Laurent B. Frantz

WHEN I was very small, I lived in a room frequented by strange monsters. I cannot remember what they looked like, since they showed themselves only late at night and in the darkest corners. I can clearly recall, however, how easily they transformed themselves into furniture, clothing and drapery when the lights went on. It was my first glimpse of the ability of the human mind to deceive itself under conditions of fear, suggestion and low visibility.

Fear, suggestion and low visibility in certain areas are characteristics of every period of intolerance and repression and each of them has produced its monsters. In Rome, before Constantine, it was well known that Christians, in their secret underground rites, indulged in licentious orgies. In the middle ages, the heretics, precursors of Protestantism and scientific rationalism, engaged in ghastly parodies of Catholic ritual, in one of which a baby was roasted and its ashes mingled with wine for a mock sacrament. This fact was well documented with convictions. No respectable person, who valued either his soul or his chances of staying out of the hands of the Inquisition, would have ventured to doubt it. In the time of the Spanish Inquisition, it was equally well known that Jews were accustomed to dramatize their disapproval of Christianity by kidnapping Christian boys and crucifying them.

In seventeenth-century England, the Catholics were plotting to betray their country, after which they planned to massacre all Protestants. Titus Oates, a renegade Catholic who had been privy to the plot but betrayed it to become a professional informer, gave testimony on which 37 innocent persons were put to death and countless lives were ruined.

Our own country has experienced its share of similar fantasies. A substantial number of our ancestors once believed that the Jeffersonians were agents of the revolutionary government of France. Later many believed that the Abolitionists were blood-thirsty conspirators, plotting to put themselves in power by a Negro uprising in which whites who opposed the Abolitionists would be put to death. At the height of the anti-Catholic hysteria in this country, nuns were giving birth to illegitimate babies and burying them beneath the convent floor so industriously that the rate was calculated to have reached two and a half babies per year for each nun young enough to conceive. Reformed ex-Catholics exposed these marvels in books, which sold prodigiously. They toured the country lecturing, revealing, among other things, the inside story of how the Jesuits arranged the assassination of Lincoln. Normally sane and sober Americans feared to leave their homes, lest they be burned out by Catholics before they could return.

Plots on the part of the Jews to infiltrate, subvert and take over the world have been expressed repeatedly, as have similar plots on the part of the Masons.

All these things were not only believed in their own day—they were conclusively proved and exhaustively documented. Yet how quickly and completely the monsters faded, once the lights came on.

We know that something like this has been happening in our own day on the other side of the Cold War line. We have seen a political opposition transformed into spies and wreckers in the service of Western Imperialism. We have seen it ultimately admitted, too late to help many of the victims, that this was not true.

Surely one moral of the story must lie in the fact that the case which was not true was nevertheless fully proved. We too easily forget that the process of proof, as it operates:

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Three books have been published scrutinizing critically the evidence and verdict in the Rosenberg case. In our June 1955 issue, we printed a review of Mr. Reuben's book, the first of the three to appear; we have owed our readers reviews of the other two, by John Wexley and Malcolm Sharp. This article surveying all three books, which appeared in the West Coast liberal magazine Frontier for November 1956, fills the bill so well in our opinion that we asked the editors of Frontier for permission, which they kindly granted, to make it available here for our readers.

Mr. Frantz, noted legal authority and an editor in one of the country's major legal publishing houses, has contributed to numerous law reviews as well as national periodicals.
in our courts as well as in theirs, requires no more than a witness willing to say certain things and a tribunal willing to believe him. Doubtless the truth, or something reasonably close to it, is often proved in this way, but the process is inherently capable, even under optimum conditions, of proving many things that are not so. Given an atmosphere of fear and hatred, it is more than likely to do so.

THE big question is whether, during the Cold War years, something like this has also been happening to us. Three recent books, one dealing with atomic espionage generally, and the other two specifically with the Rosenberg-Sobell case, say that it has.

Mr. Reuben, a free-lance, left-wing journalist, has surveyed all the alleged incidents of atomic espionage from the Canadian trials to the Rosenbergs. His conclusion, as his title indicates, is that the whole thing was a hoax, that the atom spy is a manufactured illusion, created to bolster Cold War policies at home and abroad. He has made a better case for this than one would have supposed possible, yet the attempt is too ambitious. Proving the negative proposition that something or other does not exist is a most difficult task. It becomes wholly impractical, if not impossible, when the proof must exhaust the possibilities of an area large parts of which remain shrouded in secrecy.

The attempt to bridge this unbridgeable gap is made through an argument that The Secret never existed. If it never existed, then no one stole it, nor was there ever any danger that anyone would. In support of this, Mr. Reuben proves two propositions to my satisfaction. One is that scientific knowledge cannot be monopolized, since any nation with an advanced technology can duplicate the discoveries made in any other nation, if it wants to badly enough. The second is that the scientific knowledge underlying the bomb was known to the international community of scientists before the war started. Yet, it does not follow from this that there was no atomic espionage. We have never had any monopoly of the basic scientific knowledge underlying guns, ships and airplanes, yet it is still conceivable that countries having that basic knowledge might send spies to steal our latest designs in these fields.

Something of importance, however, does follow from Mr. Reuben's demonstration. This is that a dangerously unreal notion as to how significant atomic espionage might be, if there is any, has been assiduously cultivated in the public mind. Judge Kaufman, in sentencing the Rosenbergs to deaths, did so on the theory that they had given the Russians the atomic bomb and, in so doing, had changed the course of history and caused the Korean war. It seems clear that Kaufman's notion of absolute atomic espionage is a myth. Atomic espionage, if it exists, deals not with one big secret, but with many little ones, and is hardly capable of such cataclysmic effects. It is of interest to note, in this connection, that a good many scientists must have known that the Rosenbergs, even if guilty, were being put to death on a false premise, and these scientists must have concluded that it would be disadvantageous to their careers if they ventured to call attention to the fact.

Mr. Reuben also successfully demonstrates something more important than this. He proves that, in instance after instance, spy scares have been generated in the headlines on a very inadequate foundation of fact. Later these foundations have frequently collapsed, but their collapse has gone unreported, or has been buried in small items on the inside pages whose significance the casual reader would inevitably miss. It is the original impression, based on unsubstantiated charges, that sinks into the public mind and remains there. It is thus clear that myth-making forces (whether conscious, unconscious or both) are at work in this field. This being the case, we must not only shy away from pat generalizations, but must regard even apparently proven facts with considerable suspicion.

Mr. Wexley is a dramatist who attended the Rosenbergs trial with the intention of writing a play. He became so fascinated with it that he wrote a detailed critique and refutation of the prosecution's case. But, if what he has written is not a play, it is in many respects a book which only a playwright could have written. It has a playwright's stress on the personalities and motivation of the principal characters. It has a dramatic high-lighting of incident and a rearrangement of material to bring certain themes into sharp relief. It portrays the Rosenbergs as caught up from the beginning by inexorable forces and the story is the working out of these forces toward an inevitable end. The execution scene itself is employed in a dramatic finale. All this has much in common with good theatrical tragedy and has much the same emotional impact. Due to Mr. Wexley's literary skill and experience, his book, despite its great length and the detail and complexity of the argument, is somewhat more readable than either Reuben's or Sharp's.

Indeed, there was considerable need for this artistic touch, since Wexley's book must be one of the longest and most detailed studies that has ever been published on a single criminal case. He has subjected the record to an almost microscopic analysis. He has also gone beyond the record and independently examined the scenes where various episodes of the story took place, and researched the backgrounds of the characters. He has displayed much ingenuity and imagination in sifting out, weaving together and displaying every clue which might be favorable to his theory of the case. He lays no claim to impartiality. He has written, not an academic study of the case, but a speech for the defense.

This aspect of the book is both its strength and its weakness. It is its strength, because it is important to develop alternative hypotheses as to what might have happened, but such hypotheses may easily be overlooked without a readiness to engage in imaginative reconstruction. It is its weakness, because Mr. Wexley's enthusiasm has led him to push his conclusions further than his evidence will justify. It has also led him to include considerable evidence, consisting of minor inconsistencies in the government's case, which is fairly trivial, even in its cumulative effect. These defects will furnish the hostile reader with a pretext for dismissing the rest of what the author has to say, but they by no means justify such a
course. Mr. Wexley's speculative conclusions and his petty evidence are built on top of the rest of his structure; they are not its foundations. They should have been removed before printing, but they can be discounted in the reading and an imposing edifice will still remain.

Mr. Wexley's basic thesis is that the case against the Rosenbergs was a frameup. He does not quite succeed in proving this, but he presents enough evidence pointing in this direction to justify a very grave suspicion that this may have been the case. It also seems significant, in this connection, that Mr. Wexley flatly accuses named witnesses of perjury and named prosecutors of subornation of perjury. This is a perfect set-up for a criminal libel prosecution against either Mr. Wexley or his publishers. If these statements refer to matters which the government can afford to have explored, it would seem that the failure to take the challenge needs some further explanation.

If Mr. Wexley has not quite proved his own case, he has, it seems to me, successfully discredited that of the prosecution. In view of the near-impossibility of proving innocence, this is really all that should be required of him.

Unfortunately, neither Reuben's book nor Wexleys' is likely to be read by very many persons except those who agree with them and are seeking to bolster the conclusions to which they have already come. Since Sharp is a professor of law at the University of Chicago, and since his tone is moderate and his presentation restrained, there is reason to hope that his book may fare better in this respect. Those who read it will likewise find it more difficult to dismiss. Unlike Reuben and Wexley, Professor Sharp gives considerable prominence to those parts of the evidence least favorable to his hypothesis and takes a long, hard look at them before reaching any conclusions.

It is significant also that Professor Sharp, when he originally became interested in the case, was quite convinced that the Rosenbergs were guilty and that the verdict was just. He was concerned only with the sentence, which he felt to be excessive. Such incidents as the judge's refusal to look at the very substantial newly discovered evidence presented on the motion for a new trial, and the off-hand way in which the subsequent appeals were disposed of without considering their merits, convinced him that the post-trial aspects of the case were not being handled in accordance with any high standard of justice.

Only after long living with the case, and long reflection upon it, did he come rather reluctantly to the conclusion that the verdict itself was not justified by the evidence and that the Rosenbergs may well have been innocent.

He does not make the mistake of attempting to prove that they were innocent. That is a proposition which, irrespective of its truth or falsity, cannot be proved at the present time. Indeed, proof of it may never become possible. There is nothing strange about this. It is only under exceptional circumstances—such as an ironclad alibi or a confession from the real culprit—that anyone can be proved innocent of anything. It is in recognition of this that the law provides—theoretically, at least—that guilt, not innocence, is the proposition which must be proved.

The significance of the Rosenberg case, however, does not turn on a determination as to whether they were guilty. It lies in the fact that, as all three of these books demonstrate, what happened to them can happen to innocent people. The Rosenbergs were pressured to the very end to save their own lives by confessing and naming their accomplices. Whether guilty or innocent, if they had no accomplices to name, they were being placed under pressure as severe or more severe than physical torture to accuse some innocent person. Had they done so, such person would have stood very little chance of escaping the death penalty. It requires no great stretch of the imagination to suppose that persons willing to engage in this attempt to extort testimony from the Rosenbergs would have been equally willing to extort testimony against them in the same way. Surely the minimum lesson to be drawn from the Rosenberg case is that no conviction should be allowed on the unsupported word of persons who are saving their own lives by accusing another.

These books should also inspire even those who disagree with them to reexamine the problem of the death penalty. Tom Mooney, because he was still alive, was able to be vindicated after 20 years. Sacco and Vanzetti, like certain citizens of the Soviet Union, have been posthumously rehabilitated, but, for them, posterity's verdict came too late. The appearance of these books gives ground for hope that a new trial may yet be won for Morton Sobell, serving 30 years in Alcatraz on evidence much like that against the Rosenbergs, but even more unsatisfactory and inconclusive. Even if the death penalty is justified in the case of persons guilty of certain serious crimes—as to which there is much difference of opinion—it can only be applied on the assumption that our trial processes are infallible. That assumption is false and it is doubly and triply false with relation to those cases around which political passions are aroused.

Until we can screw up our courage to abolish the death penalty, surely the minimum requirement should be to extend to the federal courts and all states the rule—already in force in California—that all cases in which the death penalty is applied must be reviewed by the highest court. The performance of the Supreme Court—which three times refused to review the Rosenberg case and then convened a special term (still without looking at the record) to avert a threatened delay in their execution—must always remain one of the most disturbing and distasteful incidents in the whole case.

We need, however, to look beyond particular cases and beyond our own times. Why have the heretics of past ages so frequently been convicted of crimes which seem to symbolize the wickedness of forbidden ideologies? Why have these offenses seemed so factual to their contemporaries and so unbelievable to posterity? Is there something about heresy-hunting which determines the shape of these things and is able to bring them about with little relation to guilt or innocence? It seems to be a characteristic of times of ideological stress that most people who live in them know a lot of things which are not true. This is a far more shameful and more dangerous state than mere ignorance.
A Solution for the Farmer
by An East Coast Reader

It was part of the mythology of the landed aristocracy in England and the Prussian Junker class that only agriculture could provide the sturdy men to man the war machine. The industries of the city worked the strength out of a man and left him a weakening unable to do battle for the greater glory of his country or to shoulder the burden of empire. Actually, of course, this argument was only a rationalization for the position of these aristocrats and Junkers in society. Their privileges rested upon agriculture, and to maintain these privileges they were impelled to promote the cause of agriculture at all costs, inventing for it all sorts of supposed virtues.

It is also popular folklore in the U.S. that the small independent farmer is the backbone of America; that somehow, peculiar virtues and qualities attend the farmer’s calling. When these appeals have been made in recent times by other than politicians from gerrymandered political districts, they have lacked even the foundation of a pious hope. Whether or not the small independent farmer possessed virtues superior to his city brother in the past is not to the point in the present. The small farmer has not for a long time been the backbone of America, today he is a little more than a coccylx. The machine has remade the farmer along with the rest of us. For good or ill we are in an industrial society with production concentrated in factories, and agriculture is only another industry, after all.

The big business farmers would like nothing better than for the American public to go on aiding them under the impression that by doing so they are preserving the sturdy virtues of the family farm. Progressives and liberals are not merely muddled in their approach to agriculture, they are simply wrong. The policies they advocate, such as rigid high price supports, aid chiefly the big operators. The right approach is neither rigid supports nor flexible supports, the right approach must be formulated in accordance with the movement of the whole economy which includes agriculture as an integral part, and in accordance

with the needs of the greatest number of workers and farmers.

In 1950 the Census Bureau counted some 5.4 million farms in the United States. In 1954 there were some 4.8 million farms on which there live today some 22 million people, about 12% of the total U.S. population. A hundred years ago more than 60% of the U.S. population lived on farms. The steady decline in the number of people on farms has been a symptom of the farm problem. The farm problem is the residual of the shift from agriculture to industry. Squeezing people and resources out of agriculture has taken decades of low prices for farm products, prices so low as to give the farmer an income which, even in years of relative general prosperity such as 1953, averages half the income of a city dweller.

Today 85% of all commercial farm products are produced on 2 million farms. This means 2.8 million farms produce the remaining 15 percent. The prices of six basic crops and a few nonbasic crops are supported by the government. These price supports have necessitated the purchase by the government of large amounts of different products at various times. At present, more than a year’s supply of both wheat and cotton have piled up in government warehouses as our exports of these commodities declined in the face of increasing and cheaper supplies abroad.

Price supports are of most benefit to the 2 million farmers who produce the 85% of all farm products. The remaining 2.8 million farmers can hardly be said to benefit from a policy which just keeps them hanging on to the edge of subsistence. Many farmers get no support whatever from present programs. Only 56 percent of agricultural output comes under the government price support program, 44 percent of farm output is unsupported.

These price supports are accompanied by acreage restrictions. If the farmers were not so restricted, artificially high prices would increase our agricultural surplus so drastically as to destroy the whole price support program. Without the acreage restrictions the 2 million farms could easily produce enough to meet our entire present domestic and export demand.

But if only 2 million farms are enough to do the job now and if even less will be needed in coming years as productivity increases (productivity on farms increases at over 3 percent a year while population is increasing at less than 2 percent a year) then we now have 2.8 million farms too many and an underemployed and poorly utilized population of some 14 million in our rural slums. The scandal is even greater if, as under the soil bank plan, we deliberately pay these millions of people to produce nothing.

The present net movement of population out of farms and into cities is at about the rate of 750,000 people per year. At this rate of net out-migration, it would take twenty years for our farm population to be reduced to what is at present required. This means at least twenty years more of a farm problem. Should the economy stagnate or suffer a depression within this period, which it certainly will, all net movement from farm to city would
cease as it did during the thirties and the solution of the farm problem would be postponed indefinitely.

A great deal toward solving the farm problem could be accomplished in just five years by increasing the net out-migration from farm to city by a factor of four. Rather than three-quarters of a million net reduction per year we would require a 3 million net reduction in our farm population per year for a five-year period. This would mean closing out a net of 600,000 farms a year.

There need be nothing drastic in the achievement of such a program. It requires only that the government provide financial aid and job opportunities to relocate those farmers who would gladly leave the farm provided they knew they wouldn’t be trading a farm income half the size of a factory worker’s for a relief check half again the size of their farm income and a fourth of the average factory wage. The present rate of reduction in our farm population suggests how great the pressure toward moving to the city is when it is realized the difficulties a farmer must face coming penniless, unaided, and unskilled to the harsh unfamiliar discipline of the city factories hundreds of miles away from friends and relatives.

First of all, a certain number of the people who would want to move out of agriculture are not potentially employable elsewhere. They constitute a social problem, and would require care and assistance, as for example the aged and infirm, for whom real retirement provision should be made.

But the majority would require aid only until they had productive employment on a permanent basis in the cities. This aid could be supplied in several ways, but a program along the following lines could be worked out towards

The Last Days of the Nagy Regime: An Eyewitness Account

The following letter to the London New Statesman and Nation by a well-known British journalist contains significant information about the last days of the Nagy regime in Hungary. We print it for the information of our readers.

* * *

I WAS in Hungary from October 28 until November 11 and should like to correct and support Jack Mendelsohn’s letter. Some of his facts are wrong. Nagy was not “virtually a prisoner in the Parliament building” on the day before the Soviet army moved into Budapest again; nor was he besieged by a huge crowd demanding his head.” I can say this with confidence because I spent a good deal of that day— in the Parliament building and out of it—with one of Nagy’s closest friends and advisers. The team of broadcasters sent by Radio Free Europe, an odious organization, to the western town of Györ played no part in the events: the Russians sensibly impounded them. “A crowd under the leadership of extreme nationalists” did not storm the foreign ministry: on Friday, November 2, a small group of such people taking orders from a man called Joszef Dudas tried to occupy that building, but were evicted; and Dudas was later arrested by order of the government.

As to Friday’s lynchings in Republic Square, it is worth recalling that the mob was eventually driven off by tanks under the Hungarian flag. . . . On the following morning I happened myself to be talking to General Istvan Kovacs (deputy of the newly appointed General Maleter) at the Ministry of Defence, when he was informed by telephone that another crowd was intent on lynching suspected AVH men (political policemen): I heard him give sharp orders for an army unit to intervene and arrest the suspected men.

Two ministers, not four, visited Mindszenty on Thursday, November 1: they were Tildy and Maleter. I talked to both of them, before and after, in the Cardinal’s antechamber, where, with one other British journalist (Tony Cavendish of the B.U.P.), I was waiting for an interview with the Cardinal. We had that interview directly after Tildy came out; and were told by the Cardinal—who was much too tired, worried, and bemused for diplomatic fencing—that he was trying to find out what the situation really was, and would declare himself two days later. And his broadcast on the following Saturday night was not, in the event, a weakening of the government’s position: he called for national unity and a return to work—precisely what the Nagy government most needed at that time.

Of course there was a danger of things slipping hopelessly to the right. Many disgusting incidents of mob violence, many nasty signs of growing right-wing pressure, much evidence of mischief-making intervention by western cold-war agencies began to occur and appear after five or six days’ fighting against the Soviet army. And one’s estimate of what would have happened without a second Soviet intervention will obviously depend on what one personally saw and experienced during the days before November 4. My own opinion remains that the Nagy government was gaining in control and strength; and that successful negotiation with the Soviet army for withdrawal would have restored Nagy to great national prestige. Others think otherwise. The Chinese, for instance, believe that white terror had won control of Budapest for 48 hours before the second Soviet attack; they, after all, had eight of their Legation staff assaulted (one so badly as to need amputation of a leg), and many of their students insulted.

However that may be, no sensible opinion about Hungary can be based on “the second intervention.” The key questions are: What was the true nature of the Rakosi regime: why did the Russians intervene in the first place? And what do they mean to do now?

Now I am sure—what I did not know before, but ought to have suspected or found out—that the Rakosi regime was a bloodstained tyranny beside which Horthy’s pre-war regime pales to a tolerant and liberal democracy. I ought to have suspected or found out because radical friends of mine, in Hungary, have told me in private they suffered under that terror; and I am one of those who owe them such amends as one can make for not having bestowed myself in their behalf. What is clear and certain now is that the Stalin-Beria system was exported and imposed on Hungary, after the end of 1948, “down to the last chip.” Thereafter Hungary was a Soviet colony, “Socialist and peace-loving” on its propaganda facade, murderous and bankrupt in reality. The British Daily Worker, in Hungary, has long told its people they suffered under a dictatorship; and honesty as silly as it is cynical, it is still talking about the “mistakes” of the Rakosi regime. But murder is not a mistake. Fake trials are not errors. Criminal perversion of everything that Socialism is thought to mean are not malpractice. This, of course, is the language of the morally bankrupt.

Why did the Soviet leaders commit the brutal folly of sending in their tanks to fight for the Rakosi regime? The answer must be complex. But part of it, surely, is that they both welcome and resist the “de-Stalinizing” process: They want it to go on, but only if they can control it. Yet the nature of the process is that ordinary people should control it. So they shrew about in contradictory courses.

Basil Davidson

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real solvin the farm problem and not drawin out the
eyon of it indefiniely.

TO begin with, the farmers are entitled to payment for
whatever equity they have accumulated in their farms
in the form of land, buildings, livestock, seed, equipment,
homes, etc., at fair rates. In addition, the farmer deserves,
for his years of service, a lump-sum payment that could
be designated as severance pay, just as the worker has won
this in his union contract, or the soldier who has completed
his service.

Then, centers would be set up in the cities to which the
former farmers would go, where aid would be provided in
the location of low-rent housing, job training, and of
course in the bringing together of people and jobs. In the
case of any extended difficulties, the centers would be
there to tide the farm families over until they had taken
root as productive workers in the expanding society of the
city. Without such help, a relocation program would be
a bureaucratic monstrosity not much better than Eisen-
hower's "shrink-the-farm-population" approach.

A policy of relocation assistance is the only way to get
at the heart of the farm problem and to end the anachron-
ism of millions of small uneconomic farms tilled by part-
time farmers. Price supports at 90 percent or a 100 percent
of parity are worse than useless, because they perpetuate
the problem, inducing farmers to hang on even if it is only
to just a bare subsistence.

Price supports encourage the large farmers, who have
the capital, to mechanize, reducing their costs even more
below the fixed supported prices and increasing their
large profits. Unsupported prices would fall into line with
the costs of the large operators, for agriculture is, after
all, the only segment of our economy where the com-
petitive laws of capitalism have the most free play.

If the price support program were to be repealed, un-
doubtedly some small- and middle-income farmers would
be wiped out. Not all, for only some get even the slightest
aid from the present program.

WHAT must be realized is that price supports are bad
even as a temporary expedient. The only solution
is for the government of the U.S. to live up to its obliga-
tions under the Employment Act of 1944 and see to it
that every American is provided with the opportunity for
a decent living. The government's obligation is to pro-
vide full employment for all workers and the farmer is
a worker.

The size of the net out-migration required (2.8 million
farm families, 14 million people) is a maximum estimate.
Should American tariff rates be reduced and East-West
trade expanded, the number of people moving out of
agriculture might be reduced slightly. However, expand-
ing East-West trade and reducing tariffs cannot by any
stretch of the figures be made to solve the farm problem.

The crying need of the world, non-communist and
communist, is not for American farm products but for Ameri-
can farm machinery and capital equipment of all sorts
so that those countries now underdeveloped can equip
their farms with machinery so as to release people to the
cities where they can aid in the job of industrialization.

There is no nation in the world so small that it is eco-
nomically necessary for it to specialize exclusively in agri-
culture or in a few special raw materials. Every nation
can profit from a diversified agricultural and industrial
base. Since most of the world's population (over half is
peasant) live in countries that lack industrial capacity,
it is up to this country to provide them with the means
to industrialize.

The program of relocation assistance to farmers can
thus be tied in directly with the demand for expanding
East-West trade and lowering our tariff barriers.

But the need for expanding our exports (which after
all is a means of obtaining goods we need through imports)
is only secondary to the need for increasing the amount
of many goods and services which cannot be imported.
Our underemployed farmers are needed to put up public
housing so as to eliminate the corroding slums in our large
cities, they are needed for a program of school construction
and for the construction of regional systems of dams for
power production and flood control. They are needed in
hospitals and in nurseries. They are needed as scientists,
as engineers.

If it is a shame that we have two to three million unem-
ployed in our cities, it is also a shame that we have seven
million men and women underemployed on our farms.

Religion and Socialism

By A New York Reader

WHEN in the November issue of the American Socialist
Bert Cochran wondered if the "Left can free itself
from the embittered hostility which misses the epic move-
ment of historic progress and can see in the Soviet bloc
only the anti-Christ of our time" he overrated the Chris-
tianity of the Left. One of the common characteristics of
the Left has been a militant atheism that manifests itself
most often in hatred for the One Holy Catholic Church,
the body of Christ.

True, there has been praise of a disembodied social
gospel by the Left. But this has usually been for tactical
reasons. There have been attempts to persuade more
Christian workers to join the socialist movement. But
this has been done with an eye toward brainwashing them
later. Some Protestant ministers were even beguiled by
the fanatically atheistic Stalinists into being apologists for
them.

But the basic attitude of the Left remains one that
reduces socialists who believe in the Trinitarian God to
the level of second-class members of the movement. They
are held in contempt who believe in either the theology
or the liturgy of traditional Christianity.

Far from believing this to be a drawback to the
socialist movement, most find it a very natural and
comfortable state of ideological affairs. They reason that
since Catholicism has many times been interpreted and
used in a reactionary way—as in the Russian and Spanish
civil wars—it is inherently reactionary. Though Cathol-
cism has served as an impetus to progress—from the over-
throw of slavery before the Middle Ages and the spread

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of classic humanism during them; down through the participation of priests in Latin American revolutions of the last century; of Roman and Anglican Catholic priests and laymen in the leftward movement after the turn of the century; up to the recent Catholic strikes in Quebec and the present support of Roman Catholic and Episcopal churches for integration in the South—these activities are considered to be exceptional to its essentially backward nature.

It has too often happened that the Left has attacked the Enemy in such terms that even potential allies had no choice but to accept identification with the Enemy. When Marx performed the shotgun wedding of militant socialism to militant atheism he set the stage for the forced marriage of Catholicism to capitalism. Liberal Catholics will not accept the legitimacy of these nuptials, but most are all too successfully confused, and are often aligned to the Right with the help of the Left.

Aside from the merely tactical consideration that Christians will not join an atheistic social movement, there is the question of the closed state of mind. Ideological questions should be of primary importance to individual socialists, and not on a once-for-all basis. The insistence of an activist on the all-importance of attaining a better social scheme ignores the most important reason for wanting it, and what to do after he's got it.

I believe the two are synonymous. I also believe that modern theology possesses insight that the atheistic viewpoint does not have now and never will have. Those who knock down the straw God of Fundamentalism are wasting as much energy as the religious socialist I knew who attacked the naive, mechanistic materialism of yesterday (the best days of atheism). Every socialist should read Albert Einstein's short piece on "Science and Religion" in the collection "Out of My Later Years" published by the Philosophical Library. The reasoning in favor of religion therein will be seen to be just as cogent as that of another piece in the collection entitled "Why Socialism?"

"Wait a moment!" says the practical socialist. "If we have not yet agreed on the methods of achieving and operating socialism on a simple tactical basis, how can we spend time airing all the various complex and conflicting ideological approaches?" I recognize the difficulty. Perhaps the pages of the American Socialist are not the place to air even a pro-socialist religious viewpoint. But neither should it air blasts against any religious viewpoint. How can a Catholic stay silent when in an article on Spain in your September 1956 issue he sees the phrase "Catholic totalitarian concepts"? It is as false as the phrase "Communist totalitarianism," and for the same reason; it de-denies the true nature of a good thing on the basis of regional abuses.

If that one phrase had been all, this communication might never have been sent. But in "Babbitt Gets Religion," in the April 1956 American Socialist, Reverend Hugh Weston, a Universalist, while attacking opiate religion, alienated just about everybody but Universalistic social gospel followers from his state of grace in one paragraph. While he justifiably condemns venal, reactionary, and state-supported religion, he gives no reasons for identifying "personal religion" with them. When he says that it is the "revival of robes and clerical collars, of chasubles and amices, of antiphonies and incantations," his slur is quite obviously against Catholicism. His statement that it is the "very type of religion which Amos, Jesus, and most great religious leaders gave their lives opposing" is also presented without any concrete evidence. He has the right to present a Reformed Protestant interpretation of the teachings of Jesus, if he wishes. But I question his right to say that it represents "progress" as against the "reaction" in Catholic worship.

True, some have used the Liturgy to deaden rather than enliven the conscience. So have congregational Protestants used non-liturgical worship to the same end. The very secular Stalinists found "dialectical" ways of strangling conscience. Does the misuse of a thing prove it evil? Blaming Catholicism for the rise of Franco is as foolish as blaming Marxism for the rise of Stalin.

As for the quoting of statistics to show that there is as much dishonesty among church-goers as among non-church-goers, it proves nothing except that there are dishonest people in churches as well as out. Weston does not deny the goodness of the social gospel. Though some do not live by it, where do those who do live the social gospel get it from, if not from the churches? Those who do not receive it directly from the Church get it indirectly from the same source.

However many people warm the pews for aesthetic or economic reasons, good Christians are still good on the basis of what they hear in church. Not in spite of it. As a Catholic, I believe that Catholicism embraces all the necessary spiritual elements of a good life. It is humanistic, democratic, pacifistic, communist. It is as well as mystical. The Brotherhood of Man finds heightened poetic expression in the Fellowship of Worship. The highest form of the latter is the partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ, the Blessed Sacrament.

If the Lamb is slain from the beginning of the world it is too much for some readers to stomach, how can they accept such statements as "the Tree of Liberty should be watered regularly with the blood of martyrs" (Jefferson)? And if socialists can find it possible to accept the presence of those who believe in the Humanity of Christ, I see no good reason why they should find the company of those who believe in His Divinity so irritating. Most know very little, if anything, of the profounder meanings of the symbolism of the Trinity and of the Liturgy.

For those who would receive some enlightenment on the subject of liberal Catholicism, I recommend the reading of "Catholicism, Humanist and Democratic," by Robert Woodfield, an active member of the Left in England and a friend of G. D. H. Cole. While there are some interpretations in this vein, his includes some of the thought of the others as well as his own, and is only 96 pages long. It is published by Seabury Press for two dollars.

Not only Russia, but the American Left, has a reputation of anti-Christ. It is about time that something were done to dispel this impression. The best way would be to adopt a policy of not attacking or praising any branch of Christianity in a socialist publication.
IT was a misfortune for American socialists that the system of government ownership and planning should have first been tried out in Russia. It wasn’t an ideal or even a fair test. The philosophy of socialism is based on the proposition of nationalizing and planning an advanced industrial economy. By eliminating economic anarchy and private aggrandizement on this high economic plateau, socialism would be able to provide people with higher living standards, with more leisure, more democracy, more opportunity, with a better life. But Russia in 1917 was an impoverished feudal country with only a thin veneer of capitalism. For the past three decades they have been occupied there in trying to become an industrial nation—something England, Germany and the United States accomplished in the nineteenth century.

In the breakneck race to industrialize a backward peasant country, Russia took Marxism and blended it with oriental despotism. When this unholy brand of socialism came back to the Western world, it repelled, in most cases, the labor movements, especially in the English-speaking world. The people in the most advanced capitalist countries not only enjoyed better living standards, but they had more freedom and democracy. How could they be attracted to the Russian system? The majority of mankind judges social systems by their deeds, not their professions, or promises for the future.

For a quarter of a century, the Moscow trials, the blood purges, the slave labor camps, and the rest of the paraphernalia of Stalinism was the best propaganda argument that American capitalism had to discredit socialism. A comparative handful of fanatics or misguided souls swallowed Stalin and his works. But the majority of American people turned against the Russian system with indignation and horror. It is difficult to judge exactly, but I think it is fair to say that Stalinist atrocities rank very high in inoculating countless American people against socialism. We see the process at work this moment when every reactionary in the country is having a field day pointing the finger at the Russian outrage against Hungary.

I join with all sincere socialists and liberals in protesting and denouncing this crime against humanity. I don’t join with the ones who applauded Dulles’ dirty work against the legally elected democratic government in Guatemala, but are indignant against intervention in Hungary. People who are for democracy in Russia and Hungary have the obligation of battling for democratic practices in the United States. Just as people who demand democracy in the United States have the duty of demanding democracy in the Soviet bloc countries. It’s not only a test of consistency, but also sincerity.

GREAT social transformations are on the way in Poland and Hungary, and, we can be sure, in due course, will come in Russia itself. A vast industrial structure with a modern working class has been built up. And after a
long night of silence and terror, the people are starting to take a hand in shaping their own destinies, in hurling bureaucrats off their backs, and in building a new model of socialism which will be of benefit to themselves, in which they will get more, not less democracy than they possessed in the bleak past. We can only wish them well in their difficult endeavors, which will necessarily take time and move through a number of complicated stages. We can extend to them our solidarity and hope that they will come into their victory with a minimum of sacrifice and hardship.

But I reject the idea that whipping up a war hysteria against Russia is the way to help the Hungarian people, or anybody else. We are living in an inflammable world. A few matches irresponsibly tossed can blow up the whole works. Just a few weeks ago we were poised on the edge of the abyss from which no traveller returns. It doesn't take much to turn a cold war into a hot one. A new war would not solve any of mankind's troubles, either in the East, or the West, but would probably destroy mankind and his civilization. Peace may not solve all social ills, but it's the precondition for any solution of them.

We have got to work for peace. There is no alternative to that. And the most effective proposition would be the creation of a strong peace movement in this country which could throw its mass weight behind a program of world disarmament, or to begin with, at least reduction of armaments, withdrawal of all foreign troops from European soil, and the dissolution of all war blocs on both sides of the iron curtain. When the day is reached when we have a movement like that of England, which is making hash of the Tory war adventure in Egypt, then we can say we have taken a giant step forward out of the morass of present-day American politics.

I WISH I could report to you some stirring progress now taking place for socialism in this country. (Of course, I could report it, but you wouldn't believe me, because you know better.) When the final count is in, we socialists are going to be judged by what we have accomplished toward building a solid socialist movement right here at home. And our accomplishments in the past twenty years have been precious little to brag about. We have been moving chiefly backwards.

In the 1932 Presidential election, the Socialist vote was 885,000. In 1956, all the candidates put together running under the socialist label didn't receive a tiny fraction of this figure. Of course, the New Deal had a lot to do with dissipating socialist strength; the war boom and the witch-hunt pushed the Left still further back. But I believe we're kidding ourselves if we think that's the whole explanation. After all, Eugene V. Debs got almost a million votes in 1912, and the Socialist Party reached a high figure of 150,000 members in that year, when it was up against good times, and Teddy Roosevelt's Progressivism, and Woodrow Wilson's "New Freedom."

We will probably not see a socialist following of millions in this country again until the mood of the labor movement changes drastically and veers leftward. But we would probably have a fair-sized movement today but for the Left's appalling derelicitions and colossal stupidities.

The Communist Party, which dominated radical ranks for the past two and a half decades—with the discredit-ment of Stalinism—dragged itself and the rest of the movement down with it. That's a large part of the reason for our troubles, and some of their people are beginning to realize it themselves.

I have been following to some extent the feverish discussion that is now taking place inside the Communist Party, and the attempt of one group in there to tear itself loose from Stalinism. I don't know whether this group is going to make it, or not. I certainly hope these people do and wish them well. But I am convinced they're not going to be able to do it inside the tainted and hopelessly compromised Communist Party.

WHAT American socialism needs, as I see it, is a new start. The job is to build a new movement, on new foundations, and based on new premises. I have been in this thing too long and have been through too much to whip out for you a three-plank, or seven-plank program, which will unerringly lead us straight to the Promised Land. I am not so cocksure. I do know that a new movement—if it is to have a chance—will have to be absolutely independent of any foreign government or party; it will have to be firmly wedded to democracy and democratic practices; it will have to have its main attention fixed on this country and its problems, and have its feet on the ground, although I hope we don't start getting so pseudo-realistic and practical that we dive into the Democratic Party—I understand that's the proposed cure-all in some quarters—and try to become more respectable than the conservative trade union heads. I can see no need and no room for a pro-Democratic Party socialist movement.

A new socialist movement, if it is to get anywhere, will have to be militant enough and radical enough to inspire a new generation with the great ideal of a more equitable, more honest, more satisfactory society, and to train a host of young people to dedicate themselves again for the realization of that shining goal.

I hope that the churning and soul-searching on the Left today presages that the twenty-year retreat of American socialism is soon due to halt. I hope we are reaching the fork of the road when the intra-mural struggles and the factional passions of the past can be buried with the past, and that a new effort can be envisioned to make socialism a force and a battle cry again in these United States.
Industrialize—But How?


American publications have never been so full of discussions of the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa as they are today, and American policy-makers have never been so pre-occupied with the revolutionary developments in these parts of the globe which are upsetting the old balances and calling into question traditional habits of rule. Books and articles continue to pour forth in which the eagerness to educate the public as to the true significance of these inscrutable events is only exceeded by their anxiety that the government promptly adopt the writer’s schema if it is to avoid sure disaster. Lens’ book has the distinction in this genre of journalism, whose distinguished authors already include an ex-Ambassador, an ex-Secretary of State, and innumerable luminaries in the field of foreign correspondence and belles-lettres, that he attempts to grapple with the fundamentals of the problem, and to impart to his proposals a theoretical premise.

There are a couple of very good opening chapters in which the proposition is illuminated that the huge segment of the underdeveloped world allegedly allied in a blood brotherhood with Western capitalism as part of the “free world” is neither capitalist nor free. Actually, the majority of humanity continues to live under a feudal system of society covered over with a thin veneer of capitalism. And, as feudalism, by its mode of production and habits of life, is unable to accumulate capital, these countries are up against a series of “social inhibitions which preclude the industrialization that could eliminate poverty.”

Western capitalism, as it reached out in its heyday for colonies and spheres of influence throughout the world, allied itself with the decaying feudal classes. It became in fact “the main prop of a crumbling feudal order.” To the perpetuation of ancient social ills and diseases, imperialism added a host of new maladies and misfortunes by disrupting the previous equilibrium, by mercilessly exploiting the subject peoples, and more efficiently shackling them with a reactionary setup. Nehru gave a graphic description of the process in one of his books:

The Indian textile industry collapsed . . . [British expansion] con-

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, industrialization could take place in a relatively harmonious fashion in the Western countries because they
were in possession of considerable capital resources, and the capital aggregates needed were smaller in those days. Their entrepreneurs could begin with consumer industries and then gradually go over to the building of metallurgical and machine industries without withdrawing consumer products from the market. According to the author’s figures, from 1812 to 1924, British production jumped sixteen times, a rate of increase of 2.5 percent per year. From 1812 to 1911, France jumped six times, less than 2 percent per year. America’s production from 1849 to 1929 went up 43 times, a rate of 4.8 percent per year. In all these cases, industrialization proceeded at a relatively measured pace, constantly enlarging the consumer market and permitting a democratic development on the political side.

But consider the contrasting pattern of Japan. The Samurai, confronted with the danger of annihilation from the marauders of the West, put through a revolution from the top in the 1868 Meiji Restoration. They struck down the basic feudal edifice, modernized the state institutions as best they could, and proceeded in breakneck fashion to industrialize the country, as speed was of the essence if the “foreign barbarians” were to be kept out. In the 44 years from 1895 to 1938, Japanese production increased 16 times, or at an annual rate of 6.5 percent, with the main emphasis on heavy industry which far outstripped the consumer industries. But, the author is anxious to establish, “to continue that rapid rate of capital accumulation, it had to use police force, or the threat of it, to keep its populace in harness.”

Before we resume the search with Lens for the precisely correct percentage of capital accumulation which will avoid the Scylla of a suspended revolution and stagnation on the one hand, and the Charybdis of an over-dynamic revolution on the other, it is worth while to pause at this point, and inquire: Why have so many of the revolutions in Asia and South America been unable to push through their “negative tasks”? The best Lens can offer is that as it now takes enormous sums of capital to build modern plants capable of competing with the United States, Britain, or Germany, and as it is difficult to come by the primary capital that is required, there is much less chance for expansion. Consequently, the less a new burgher class can grow, the less it threatens the feudal class.

NOW, this is not a very good explanation. Capital may be hard to come by in the ex-colonial countries, but not impossible. The colonial capitalist class, once it attains state power, doesn’t have to compete with the United States or Germany at all, not for many years. It can, under the protection of tariffs, build industries with the help of state subsidies, and proceed to exploit the potentially huge home market. The labor supply is immense in a country like India, and were the landlords expropriated and capitalist farming introduced, the supply would swell many times over. But the Indian capitalists are firmly allied with the landowners, and the last thing in the world they are contemplating is to lead a struggle against them or their feudal system of land tenure and ancient privilege. Why? Why is there no Hampden, Pym or Cromwell among the Indian middle classes today? Why was there none among the Chinese middle classes from 1911 to 1949?

Despite the persistence of feudal relations in both India and China, both countries had got caught up in the toils of the twentieth century, and could not simply repeat the earlier development of England and France. It is instructive to recall that all capitalist revolutions had their extreme plebeian wings; the Puritan revolution had its Levellers and Diggers, the French revolution had its communist progenitor, Babeuf. But, as there was no modern working class in those days, in both cases the extremists constituted tiny, un-influential wings, which the revolution’s representatives lopped off without any difficulty. Within a half-century after the French revolution, the working class had already grown numerous enough and had become so dangerously infected with socialist ideas as to frighten the wealthy merchant and capitalist groups into an alliance with its old feudal enemies in the 1848 revolution in Germany. Rising capitalism uprooted feudalism in France in the 1789-93 revolution; but rising capitalism had grown conservative and fearful for its property in Germany in 1848, falling back before the feudal assault.

Doesn’t this provide the explanation as to what has gone awry with a lot of the revolutions in the underdeveloped countries? The working classes in these countries may not be very large relative to the whole population, but they constitute a veritable army in absolute terms. Almost invariably being under socialist or communist influence in these countries, they have frightened the upper capitalist echelons into social conservatism. This new class line-up is especially clear in India. The Indian capitalists supported the national revolution against Britain with an elan that surprised many of us. Nevertheless, once independence was achieved, they feared to destroy any of the pillars of social stability lest private property be endangered. They have, as a consequence, clung to their alliance with the landowners.

LET us return at this point to Lens’ book. “Whether we like it or not,” he informs us, “only Communism has carried out the negative phase of the national revolution with any consistency and thoroughness.” But this flings us only out of the frying pan into the fire, as Communism falls down in the “positive phase” due to its over-dynamism. The breakneck race to accumulate capital, Lens says, leads to terrible impoverishment and totalitarianism. Lens is so sure that he has here the key to the whole problem that he states “that the Soviet story can be told almost completely in terms of capital accumulation.”

His statistics are somewhat disjointed and jumbled, but there is no question about the essentials of the proposition: Stalinist Russia has been industrializing at a far more rapid tempo than had the United States—the most dynamic capitalism in the world, and
one which had been favored by huge capital investments from abroad. The Russian pace of capital accumulation was not only a breakneck one, but the lopsided over-concentration in the sphere of heavy industry all the more surely condemned the people to an abysmal standard of living. In other words, there is a lot of validity to the thesis that an over-dynamic industrialization breeds a dictatorship as no people will tolerate Stalinist-type planning under democratic institutions.

Lens' attempt to reduce the main problem of the modern revolution to simple engineering terms, however, again cuts off from his view essential political considerations. In this case, it leads him to ignore the actual dynamics and mainsprings of evolution of Soviet society. A more all-sided historical approach would have established that Russia's aristocratic Stalinist caste took power in 1928 before either the planned industrialization or the forced collectivization of agriculture had started, that the decision to outlaw factions in the Communist Party dated from 1921 (not after 1928, as Lens says), eight years before the inauguration of the first Five Year Plan.

The Stalin dictatorship may very well have grown more bestial as the years went on, driven by its excesses in capital accumulation, but it must have come into being for an entirely different set of reasons, as it preceded the industrialization program. If it is correct that an aristocratic caste arose because of Russia's backwardness; that it exuded a dictatorship because of its isolation, its weakness internally, and fear of war externally, would it not then follow that now that Russia has attained the stature of a great industrial power, and is no longer isolated, the pre-conditions exist for a new effort to eliminate the dictatorship, and to bring planning into greater harmony with the peoples' needs? Lens understands the possibilities for that, too. But he doesn't want to see the process in its continuity because he is seized with the profound compulsion to unqualifiedly pronounce "the Soviet experiment" as "a pathetic failure."

So, where are we? If a revolution is under-dynamic, that's bad. If a revolution is over-dynamic, that's worse. How are people going to get it just right? The solution is finally couched in the form of advice to America's decision-makers. How shall we protect our status, Lens asks? He rejects the attempts to keep revolutions in a state of suspended animation as unrealistic. Even if a long-term agreement were reached with Russia to achieve this purpose, Lens correctly points out, a new Left polarizing force would come into being to provide voice and leadership to the revolutionary peoples. Military interventions and subsidizing of native counter-revolutionary groups may prosper for a while. "But these are temporary and illusory victories." In the end, the revolutionary forces break through, and all the more violently, if they have been artificially and forcefully dammed up. The answer is for us to "join" the revolution.

This solution, as many will recognize, was proposed some years back by Supreme Court Justice William Douglas, and parts of it have been echoed now and then by liberals and laborites. The Judge Douglas proposition sounds best when there is no attempt to work it out in detail and provide it with too refined a series of explanations. Lens makes the mistake of trying to convert an ADA slogan into a thesis. The results are certainly original.

He says in effect to the American powers-that-be that their traditional power is on the wane, that they need a new social weapon, or they are heading for trouble. Rise to the heights of statesmanship of a Bismarck in Germany, and the Samurai in Japan, he exhorts, and start waging your own social revolution on two fronts: against the "counterfeit revolution" of the Communists, and against feudalism. Lens wants the American capitalist-statesmen not only to join the revolution, but to set up their own Comintern to subvert existing governments and structures, subsidize socialists, pacifists, nationalists—all on behalf of an industrialization via a kind of democratic socialist path.

The thesis is too carelessly slapped together and not consistent within its own framework. First the American capitalists' quarrel with Russia and China is not the dictatorship of those countries, or their too rapid accumulation of capital, but their anti-capitalism. Dulles has no difficulty doing business with Franco or Chiang Kai-shek. Next, a socialist revolution from the top would not be very democratic, any more than was Bismarck's Germany, or the Meiji restoration in Japan. By its very nature, a revolution from the top is designed to forestall initiative of the masses from below, and can only be executed through the instrumentality of a vast bureaucracy.

But waving aside the internal inconsistencies and the fancifulness of the project, is it impossible to conceive of American capitalism bowing to the socialist storm even as Bismarck bowed to the capitalist wave eighty-five years ago? It is a theoretical possibility only when anti-capitalist strength becomes overwhelmingly powerful, both at home and abroad. That is by no means the case as yet. For the next decade or longer, American capitalism will struggle implacably for its imperial might. Let us build our socialist forces today and tomorrow, and if the point is reached where American capitalism wants to negotiate a Bismarckian settlement, let's consider it then. B. C.
What Happened to Veblen?


Professor Cauley, who worked for various bureaus of the Department of Agriculture during most of the New Deal period and part of the war, calls himself an "institutional" economist as distinguished from the garden variety. Institutional economics got off to a brilliant and promising start with Thorstein Veblen a half-century ago, but after that it slid quickly downhill. The same thing happens to Mr. Cauley's book.

The idea of institutional economics was that the old classical economics had gone off the track by its insistence on studying mythical exchanges between buyers and sellers, when in fact what took place in society was far different. Hovering over commerce is a ghostly but powerful third party to all transactions; the complex of ideas, institutions, legal codes, social customs, etc. This social heritage is considered far more decisive in the shaping of economic life than the mere commercial transaction, in which, according to the institutionalists, the theoretical economists had lost themselves. Veblen, consequently, left a body of work devoted to description and analysis of the social institutions surrounding the bare bones of the economy. In his hands, the method had two notable features. First, he saw in modern capitalism a basic conflict between the institutions that have grown up on the one side, and the technology on the other; business practices and the profit motive frustrate our ability to produce in great quantities and fine qualities. Second, his descriptive talents were primarily turned in a bitingly satirical vein, and enlivened by a mordant personal viewpoint not easily transmitted to other economists.

Veblen's influence survived for a time, in watered-down form, in such economists as John R. Commons and Wesley Mitchell. But in the end, his emphasis upon the descriptive was turned into a fascination for the purely statistical, and his sarcastic radicalism was washed away in the tide that deposited American economics at its present position of worrier-in-chief for American commerce. Today, Veblen lives on in America through a few vivid phrases and valuable insights to which he gave wide currency, and through a few of our essayists in sociology who like to pry among the oysters of deep seas for some pearls with which to dazzle the reader.

All the more surprising to come upon a practicing institutional economist in Professor Cauley! And he takes his Veblen seriously, as witness the following appetitewhetting start for his book:

There are two aspects to our culture which are particularly significant for purposes of economic analysis. They are technology and institutions.

Technology consists of tools and the use of tools. Thus it includes all of our machines, instruments, skills, knowledge of ways and means, and scientific principles. And since it includes the use of these things, it is, by all means, an aspect of human behavior.

Technology is dynamic in the sense that from time to time we develop new ways of doing things. The process by which this has done is a social process in the sense that many people are involved in it, combining tools and ideas developed by other people in times past. Technological progress accelerates on the basis of its past achievements, which means that the further it goes the faster it goes.

Institutions, as the term is used here, are certain peculiar functional subdivisions of our culture. The essential function of an institution is to distribute power (including purchasing power), rank, status, and prestige among the people. Thus an institution may be said to consist of a "cluster of mores," i.e., a complex of mental and emotional heredity to which all are hardened into statutory law; others have not but are equally effective, if not more so. Typical institutions are the family, the state, and the church. They have obvious structure as well as function. Lacking such obvious structure but possessing typical function are the institutions of property, inheritance, and franchise.

The institutions which we have now are based upon the institutions of the past. They are essentially backward-looking, not to say static. They have strong emotional support from the people and, therefore, stoutly resist change.

The inevitable result of this situation is conflict; e.g., changes in our technology result in an increased output of goods and services; but our institutions, coming down relatively unchanged from the past, are not adapted to the distribution of this comparative abundance among the people.

The point is that the essential object of the study of economics is to identify these conflicts and to derive, as nearly as possible, ways and means of removing them. This same idea can be expressed by saying that the basic objective of economics is institutional adjustment, i.e., the adjustment of our institutions better to fit our changing technology.

An agrarian nation since the Industrial Revolution has succeeded in maintaining production consistently at plant capacity. Only those nations with primitive or backward technologies are able to keep their economies going, one year after another, at their full potential. This does not mean, of course, that their people are better off than we are. Clearly, they are not. But it does mean that we are not as well off as we would be if we maintained production at the highest level of which our technology is capable, year after year and decade after decade.

This takes us well into the first chapter, but the reader who is tautened by the approach and would like to see how it is to be applied to "the agrarian crisis," as the book is subtitled, is advised to put the book down at this point. Things may have gotten so bad that American scholars have taken to writing their books in the famous "Aesopian language," but unless that is what Professor Cauley has done, it is impossible to explain what happened to "institutional economics" after the first chapter.

Not that his book is a bad one. On the contrary, it is among the better of recent discussions of the farm problem. The unfortunate thing, however, is that the boldness promised by his initial premise evaporates completely, leaving behind nothing more than a list of economic and moral New Dealism, laborism, and Brannan Plan-ism.

The farm dilemma has been so often combed that even the city slickers are getting to understand it. Briefly, it is this: As in all industry under capitalism, the tendency is for production to outrun the market. Unlike other industries, farming possesses no governor, however, and in price instead of shrinking the production of farm commodities, tends to enlarge it as each farmer tries to sustain his income by boosting his output. Nor does a farmer "go out of business" in the same way as other entrepreneurs; by the whole nature of his life and occupation he is tied to the farm.

Professor Cauley underlines this last point by making it perfectly clear, with statistics, that low farm prices have not generally driven farmers from the land in the short run. As a matter of fact, one of the few times in recent years when there has actually been a net movement of people back to the farms was in the early thirties, when farm prices were at their lowest. Far more important for bringing about a reduction in the number of farmers has been the opening up of opportunities in the cities, when times are good, even though farm prices may be comparatively high.

The various attempts to solve this problem of a market too small and prices too low to sustain our vigorous farmers and fertile lands have all been made within the framework of our existing institutions, and while temporary alleviations have been scored, the basic problem has been exacerbated. For example, parity price supports have not prevented the erosion of millions of farmers from the land, and have necessitated the piling up of so huge a federal storage holding of a number of commodities that they threaten to burst the dam. The fact that foods and fibers can be hoarded in order to keep prices up while many still go
Go Fight City Hall


Of what interest, in this world of big movements, big events, big history, can a daft old rag-picker be; a rag-picker who wandered dazed and homeless out of the London blitz, stricken dumb by the bursts of high explosive, and known only by the initials on his air-raid defense jacket as "Arp"? Of what interest the Old Cockney, Cockney guardian of the rubbish heap, a veteran of the "Messpot" war, now about to be cast aside by the town council as "redundant"? Of what interest indeed, other than to a novelist like Wolf Mankowitz.

Wolf Mankowitz wrote "A Kid for Two Farthings," the touching tale of the London ghetto which has been filmed and is now being billed in American movie houses as "with Diana Dors." Socialists may be satisfied that he has all the correct opinions about unions, welfare-statism, labor government and the like from the fact that he writes for the lively Bevanite paper Tribune. But he's not one of your namby-pamby social workers or "proletarian novelists" that creates line-splicing workers who never drop a word that isn't politically impeccable. He has a knife-sharp honesty, a completely unsentimental compassion, and a sparkling imagination that can dress up the tired old clichés about the hard lot of the little man in a brilliant overlay of imagery and true-ringing speech. Cockney in his hands is truly the King's English; a commanding language that can wither the stuffed shirt, or sound the uproarious music of ribaldry, or brood over the sorrowful problems of a precarious life with equal Shakespearean effect.

It's a pity that classic novels are usually created only by weaving large social tapestries, replete with many characters and resounding events. There ought to be a way to ensure the survival in our literature of a bit of a thing like this one, which conjures up only one or two insignificant actors who move for a brief moment on a tiny stage. There ought to be a permanent place for the Old Cock, who is—but let him describe himself:

"Here I am, a clean-living, hard-working, skilled man in a profession without which a very fine state of affairs you would be in with the garbage stinking up the entire world, me a public servant of some years standing with a record second to none if I say so myself, with I won't discuss what decorations, we don't give a light for all that, although I might point out a serious buttock wound (non-pensionable after ten years) not to mention a slight residue of gas in the gut which passing through has nevertheless left the lower bowel in an irritated condition likely to breed tape-worms and the like intestinal parasites, but forget all that and look at it as a common or garden man in the street who after giving all for his King and Country is now (you will hardily credit the fact) cast aside like an old hat to graze on pastures new if any should be forthcoming, which they won't due to me being temporary grading and therefore fit only for Potter's Field always taking it for granted they have the spare accommodation.

So the Old Cock is being hounded and threatened by the inspector of the rubbish dump, Bates, "a proper prodnose for correct procedure," "a first-class, number one, grade A diabolical monster, and once he got his knife into the Old Cock he wasn't going to take it out until the poor victim was lumbered good and proper." Because Bates is "just another example of the stinking hypocrisy of the official mind which, while getting up to I wouldn't like to say what under their whitened sheets in their safe suburban nights, puts on a celluloid collar in the morning and with a tight grecy mind goes prowndosm around with a black notebook and a stub of pencil picking up evdence of immorality and inefficiency on the part of war veterans and other true men of the world."

And when Inspector Bates catches the Old Cock doing a bit of innocent courting with the widow Goffin on the premises of the town council, he has him good and proper. And does the Old Cock go to his union? He turns right to "that tribute to the solidarity of the working class, the Sanitary, Sewage and General Workers Union," and defrauds it out of twenty-five quid on the strength of a forged union card on which he hasn't paid dues for twenty-two years!

Is that proper conduct for a proletarian hero? Not likely. And what does the Old Cock think of this? Well, he doesn't talk like any book, unless it's his own book, written by him and by the millions of other wily, scheming, bragging and scared Old Cocks of the world:

"I have always voted Conservative and I always will. Leave government to them. I'm too bloody by this, 'class, education for the filthy job. The working man don't want his own in power because then he's got to spit on himself, but them other lot, the gents, so long as they got the running of things we know where we are and who is to blame, and a man can be free to hate the bastards in power without them turning out to be second cousins from Birmingham. This is the reason which is giving me the nine-ten-out is a Socialist mob, the thieving upstarts. I been a union man for thirty-six years and a lot of good it did me."

But that's not all the un-Marxian, un-scientific stuff spouted by this bumbling Falstaff of the rubbish dump, with his own original worm's-eye view of the world:

"When the unions is masters in our fair land and standing with their boots across our dirty necks I'll think of your advice and what you said. They are all rotten, old chap, take my word for it. Whoever holds the upper hand is evil to the under-dog. We want more brothers like dear old Arp here who get on with cleaning up the rusty nails, not big-heads who interfere with your brains, fill up your caroles, nose and throat with a lot of old cod, de-louse you, marry you, hold your hand while you're on the job, buttonhole your nipper so soon as he peeps out his long bald head, dress him in khaki and send him out with a gun so before he catches his packet he will have generously bestowed upon numerous other poor bastards theirs, and all the time our protectors in the councils and the unions and the government that are giving out with a lot of bullshit to the effect we are attacking no one, we are defending freedom. I'll think of you, old chap, when we march on bleeding feet into Berlin again or Armenteers or Timbuktu or the Kremlin herself with little old father Stalin locked up in a madhouse where him and the rest are blotted out of. Because when they're all mad, old chap. Listen to me, Arp old fellow, as true as we stand here three normal working men who hope to live, the bosses of all sorts, the leaders, the givers, our bloody pince-nez-eyed protectors with their public-loving phizogs and their deep-down private hate-bags, they are the same bloody sort who would they take the jobs, why want to boss lousy old us about in the first place if they weren't a bit cracked? They got all the wrong feelings and all the right thoughts, split like rotten taters they are, off their chumps, my friends, loopy, barmy, gone nuts, plain crackers, and the less they do for us the better off we shall be just doing what we feel like for those of us we fancy with everything for everyone, fill your gut, sleep in a bed, fight back together when you're hit, drop dead if you get any big ideas about being the great O'Reilly himself, and to hell with what the loony bosses tell you is your duty."

There is a lot that is true and touching in this book, plenty that is funny, and more that is uproarious. But has it got political significance? Well, let's not make the author Mankowitz squirm. Of course it hasn't. But you can't help thinking: Here is socialism; it has won millions of solid proletarians and good unionists to its banner; it has won more millions of poor peasants, and a lot of shopkeepers, and plenty of smart intellectuals, and even a few
humane capitalists here and there. But when the Old Cocks are finally won over—and they'll be the last—when they trust us to fight the many City Halls of the world by their side, when they give us a hearty slap on the back and say they believe we're different, socialism will really be here to stay.

Mr. Mankowitz can like that or lump it; that's what this reader got out of his book. But this reader is very political. You may do better to just relax and enjoy it.

L. C.

**Converted Conservative**

**SOCIALISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL**


In 1945, while still in the British army, William Sinclair (a member of the faculty of Edinburgh University up to his recent death) contested East Edinburgh as a Conservative Party candidate. "In the course of that election," he writes, "I found myself increasingly at ease in the Conservative Party." The so-called "Tory Reform group," of which he was a part, had no influence on Tory policy, and Mr. Sinclair became alienated from the Conservatives and declined to run again in a by-election of September 1945. Within a few years he had joined the Labor Party. This book was written to set forth the changed attitude towards socialism and welfare-statism that led to his shift in affiliation.

The book consists of a series of essays on equality, classes, nationalization and planning, etc. Its tone and approach are reasonable in the extreme, to the point of being apologetic and defensive; like many British authors on socialism, Mr. Sinclair appears to feel most distressed when he scores a firm point in defense of his own viewpoint, and completely at his ease only when he is able to admit that he is probably wrong. It is bad manners to be right, and barbaric to know it; this is the kind of tone that is endearing to middle-class intellectuals the world over. Much of the book consists of an apology for the boorishness of the working-class supporters of the Labor Party, explaining their bitterness and their class hatred of factory owners and rich.

This is not to say that the book is all bad; it is merely of that special genre that gives great pleasure to some by its tone, but will be greatly irritating to others. It makes a good, elementary defense of the need for a new role by the state in the modern economy, and will introduce socialism to some American readers on what may be for them a very convincing level.

Two chapters in the book are of special interest for American readers, in that they help convey the flavor of the British economic problem. In a chapter called "Feelings About Class," Mr. Sinclair gives the 1954 figures on the distribution of wealth and income in Britain. Out of 24.6 million income-receiving units, 18.6 million get under 500 pounds a year ($1400); another 4.9 million get between 500 and 749 pounds a year, and only a tiny sliver of the population, 1.8 million income-receiving units, get more than 750 pounds a year. These figures, Mr. Sinclair emphasizes, are after taxes.

In another chapter, "On our Being Hard Up," Mr. Sinclair discusses the impoverishment of Britain. Britain is a nation of more than fifty million; it can grow food for about thirty million at most. The rest comes from trade for Britain's manufactured goods. "This food, brought to us day by day in ships, is mostly eaten up pretty promptly, so that any one time we never have more than a few weeks' or months' supply of certain essential foods actually in the island. We are therefore living chronically on the verge of starvation."

Nevertheless, Britain was a very rich nation. Its wealth was accumulated in the decades from 1840 to 1900 when Britain had a virtual monopoly on industrial production for export. But since that time a number of other nations have become great industrial exporters, and the decline of Britain has been expressed in its forced sale of great holdings abroad, and in its steady loss of colonial possessions and spheres of influence; India, China, Egypt, etc. Moreover, Britain's competitive position is worsening yearly, and the scope of foreign markets narrowing, as more nations reach a level of industrialization comparable to that of Britain in the nineteenth century. Mr. Sinclair's exposition of these hard facts is the most forceful part of his book.

A. S.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Comments on Israel

I was tremendously pleased by my introduction to the American Socialist. The December issue, which I have just purchased, seems to me to be the best American political magazine. I can’t understand how it has been kept under cover for so long.

Especially valuable was Mr. Mandel’s article on Russia and Mr. Braverman’s on debt, though I believe there are more implications to be explored than he suggested. I like the practice of reprinting texts of importance. Why not do more of this, increase subscription to $4, increase length of magazine by 50 percent or so?

I would comment on “A Zionist-Socialist Looks at the Middle East Crisis” as follows: If Israel would survive, she must adopt a large measure of the religious principles which allegedly motivate her people, and practice them as follows:

1. Publicly apologize for her aggression, and repudiate French-British connivance.
2. Announce a vigorous and unconditional support for the normalization of Suez.
3. Put into immediate effect the beginnings of a plan to re-settle such refugees as will agree to return to Israel.
4. Put an end to restrictive laws which make the Arabs in Israel feel discriminated against.

Such a course might not succeed: Additional works of good faith might be required. But to fail to try it will mean the annihilation of the Jews. It does not mean approval of the Arab attitude to recognize its ferocious intent. The circle of violence must be broken, and Israel is in the best position to make the start. It is sad indeed to find the “Zionist-Socialist” compromising his socialist principles by refusing to endorse the Suez normalization.

His assertion that Nasser is responsible if the nationalization fails overlooks the fact that Israeli support at the beginning would have guaranteed, or at least greatly helped, the success of the move.

A. H. Michigan

Sociology, and so Forth

I almost decided against sending in my renewal. In the first place, I have had a growing annoyance at your childish references to sociologists, which occur at least once per issue. (I am a student of sociology—have more to say below.) In the second place, I don’t like your inclusion of communism as a form of socialism, nor your references to the monstrous, imperialistic despotism of the USSR as socialism. But you say the right things about Gomulka and Tito, and I agree that this is potentially a way station “to a new and higher evolution” and a clean break with Stalinism, and so I can’t see reason for too much quibbling.

My insertion of potentially above perhaps indicates a basic difference. Such lack of democracy is also a possible way station on the road to Stalinism. There is no simple faith in Marxist dogma. I come from a pacifist ideology and my prejudices are against the “top down” variety of political order. But I don’t deny that it may become democratic socialism. This is a basic problem, and you could make a contribution by analyzing the conditions under which an imposed socialism becomes democratic, or, alternatively, Stalinistic. Precisely the sort of analysis which Nenni (and others) have called for. I hope you’re not shying away from such a task because you’d step on too many of your older readers’ toes, or perhaps be too harsh with your own prejudices. Of course, such an analysis, to be relevant to present and future situations rather than simply interesting history, would have to look for the general structural features, and general external conditions, and cast specific incidents in Russian history into a general mold. The useful analysis would seek to establish the general, or universal regularities of structural development out of the particularities of history.

In your past references to sociologists I have failed to understand what kind of sociologists you are talking about. In your sophomoric review of Coser’s book you have given some hints that your prejudices were precipitated by Margaret Mead and some Freudians, among others. But you should realize that many sociologists think equally little of Mead, and a little better of Freud, but not of those who use his ideas as you mention. There exists a whole spectrum of sociologists, from market researchers to democratic sociologists. And some not so democratic in their socialism. When you wield your dripping brush, you are smearing plenty of guys who aren’t so bad.

I’m sending my renewal on the assumption that there will be some changes made.

R. H. S. New York

New and Higher Level

The November issue of American Socialist marks a new and higher level of maturity for the people behind it. All the lead articles were good, and it is too bad the issue was published too early for any comments on the recent events in Poland and Hungary in order to give a real socialist view of these events.

The article from a talk by Harry Braverman, “Time to Stop the Trials of Ideas,” was excellent, easily ranking with some of the best speeches by Smith Act defendants themselves and the work by Dalton Trumbo on the Smith Act, “The Devil in the Book.”

I agree with most of the ideas expressed by Bert Cochran in his article “Toward a New Movement of Democratic Socialism,” and, if it were not for the recent developments in Eastern Europe, would agree with his advice that the one-time Soviet-worshiping Communist Party close shop. But with the upheaval in Eastern Europe, the CP is in a unique position to do something constructive about the matter. No other Marxist group in America is in the same position.

The CP is in a position to save the name “Communist” and hence keep the stain of Stalinism off of socialism by denouncing the Stalinist attack on Hungary and calling for the peaceful overthrow of the Kremlin clique that perpetrated this crime against humanity. It should seek the support of an anti-Kremlin position from the Indian, Chinese, and Yugoslav Communists, urging that the French and Italian Reds throw out their Stalinist leaders. In short, it should declare nothing short of full-scale political war against all forms of Stalinism.

If it insults democratic-humanitarian instincts by refusing to do this, then it is doomed, and Mr. Cochran’s advice is most timely.

G. L. Massachusetts

How to Further Fight?

I recently picked up one of your publications on a newsstand here on campus. I was quite interested in your article on integration ["Where do we Stand on Integration?" by Buford Posey, November 1956]. This is the type of thing we need. Keep up the good work. However, as usual, the author stated the facts very explicitly, but said nothing or very little about how to further the fight for Negro equality. I am hoping to see more on this issue.

M. N. Chicago

I value the American Socialist for its clear, objective view, in this confusing world. Even in looks it is a fine magazine, and it deserves a wide circulation. I enclose my subscription for two years.

A. A. New York

Not Far Enough to Left

I’m afraid I can’t renew my subscription right now—I am in debt and also my salary is very low. I believe the American Socialist fills a vital need at present, considering how near we are to downright fascism. However, it still isn’t far enough to the left for me.

T. B. Joplin, Mo.

Very much interested in your efforts to formulate a new approach to American Socialist Left; new in contradistinction to the highly articulate sects now on the scene.

G. A. Bronx

We like the American Socialist very much. It seems to strive for the truth, and that is very badly needed in the trying times we are passing through. Corruption and villany rampant. Your magazine is filling a great need. Like to see you take a whack at religion some time.

C. P. L. Michigan
Where Have You Been?

WITH this issue, the AMERICAN SOCIALIST begins its fourth year of publication. We are repeatedly told that in the past three years we have gained a reputation to be proud of, and we do believe that we have contributed to the reorienting of this country's Left, as many of the ideas which were raised by this magazine early in its existence have now become the common currency of the radical movement.

Yet often—too often—we get where-have-you-been-all-my-life letters, like the first one on our letters page this month, which show that there are a great many interested people who would read the AMERICAN SOCIALIST, only they have never seen it or even heard of it. The letters are heartwarming in their agreement with us, but they are also troubling. The fact of the matter is, we still, after three years, haven't gotten to thousands of potential readers.

Here is where our readers can help us far more effectively than we can help ourselves. You are the ones who have friends who would be interested in this magazine, and it's up to you to spread it around. Send gift subs to a few friends, at only a dollar for a six-month introductory; pass your copy around when you're finished with it; get it into your local library (buy them a subscription if necessary). We have expanded our circulation by advertising and sample-copy mailings, but it's up to you to get it to your friends, so that we can finally stop getting those where-have-you-been letters, gratifying as they are.

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