LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Protests Rosenberg Review

In his review of "The Rosenbergs: Poems of the United States" in your July issue, George Hitchcock makes a number of declarations and cautions which, if valid, would call into question the common sense, aesthetic capacity, and motivation of those who made this book possible, and the many who have already bought and read it.

From the first to last, Mr. Hitchcock's review is cantankerous, combative, peevish. He seems to have rifled the storehouse of invective to heap upon the book. This is exceeded only by his imputation that good money was thrown away.

As editor of this volume, let me make it clear that the modest sum of money made available for this edition by a few individuals did not take one penny away from Morton Sobell's defense. Certainly Mrs. Helen Sobell, wife of the incarcerated Morton, was well aware of the value of the book by appearing in it herself. The poems themselves are a selection of the best written on the theme, more than 200 having been submitted, and these 25 having been chosen. Between the prefaces to Longfellow and the epilogue, Vanzetti's last speech to the court, is a wide progression of poets' reactions to the Rosenbergs, and a wide variety of artistic conception and shaping. It is for the readers and adherents of justice to continue to judge "The Rosenbergs: Poems of the United States."...

Martha Millet, New York

Local "Right-to-Work" Laws

The "right-to-work" campaign has taken a new tact here in California. Within recent months a city and some counties have passed local "right-to-work" ordinances prohibiting union security agreements. This tactic on a local scale is part of a state-wide campaign to build up for a state "right-to-work" law. Two counties, Tehama and San Benito, and the city of Palm Springs passed "right-to-work" ordinances and four other counties have been considering such action.

Up to now this local campaign has met obstacles in the courts. Local Superior Courts have held all the "right-to-work" ordinances passed so far to be unconstitutional. Further disposition awaits on appeal to the State Supreme Court.

The labor movement has reacted with some vigor. Charging that "right-to-work" agitators are "preparing civil war in California," the Executive Council of the California State Federation of Labor has proposed concerted action. It has appealed for funds to support a state-wide campaign against the open-shop drive. It also laid plans for a centralized legal defense against "right-to-work" ordinances. The State Federation and the California Labor League for Political Education have also urged stepped-up efforts to get union members and their families registered to vote.

What is important to note is a new stage in the thinking of the union leadership. The AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) has put out a booklet entitled: "How to Win: A Handbook for Political Education," the most significant proposal of which is to set up permanent AFL-CIO COPE precinct organizations. In spite of past labor dependence on the Democratic and Republican parties and probable continuance of this policy in the immediate future, an independent precinct organization is one of the ingredients for independent political action.

It would be rash to hail this step of precinct organization as the royal road to a labor party. There certainly is little present demand for action from the ranks. But the prospect is for continued pressure on the labor movement. That pressure in the end will only be relieved by independent political action, a labor party. A labor drive for a labor precinct organization, no matter how feeble, is a step in the right direction, regardless of what candidates are supported initially. We are of the opinion this development should not only be watched, but trade unionists should participate actively in COPE's program.

Two Unionsists, San Francisco

It is exasperating, in reading a discussion of religion ["Science, Truth, and Religion," by Hans Freistadt, American Socialist, August 1957], to see only one phase of theology mentioned. Almost always God is represented as more or less the creator and ruler of the universe and of human events. That is a matter of belief, not of knowledge. But there is another definition of God, explicit in some sacred scripture, implicit in the theses of many nations. God is love, the power within all of us which makes us social animals.

Love is the life force of the race which gave it dominion over the animal creatures. It is also the force that impels people to put common interests above private welfare and even life. Thus God is the cause and incentive of socialism. The law of God is, you must love your neighbor as you love yourself. Mammon is the denial of that law.

German socialists made the great mistake of assuming that religion was hopelessly allied to Mammon. Most churches are, but people can still think for themselves, and our hope for success depends on getting them to know that God and socialism are on the same side, against Mammon, and that those who oppose Mammon are serving God.

A. C. Penna.

I have been reading papers considered progressive for more than 60 years. I still read ten or a dozen of them. The reason I mention this is that I believe your paper comes nearer to persons like Robert Blatchford, editor of the Clarion, published in London years ago. As I now see conditions, we now need someone like you and your friends to try to unite all these groups as much as possible instead of belittling each other.

Similar groups were doing just that in Germany when Hitler saw an opportunity for personal promotion.

J. W. Jacksonville

I would like to add with my subscription renewal a word of praise for your quite worthwhile publication. I am not prepared at this time to say whether or not the material and opinions expressed therein are correct, but I can say they are different, and that is a very important thing. Intelligent and divergent opinion strengthens a democracy.

H. F. Penna.
The Politicians and Civil Rights

The long-awaited Senate showdown on civil rights has come and gone, and while the legislative result may be slight, the skirmish itself is a landmark in American political annals. It is an index to the growing changes in the web of social relations and opens up a new legal chapter in the long battle for Negro equality. The militancy of the Southern Negro, the rising tide of colonial revolution, the international challenge to capitalism, the weight of a mass labor movement, and the consequently increasing American sensitivity to social issues, have added new points to the agenda of national politics. The Knowlands and Nixons can project maneuvers, but they cannot supply the raw stuff of popular moods and demands around which all maneuvers must, in the last analysis, center.

So far as the bill itself is concerned (at this writing the Senate version is awaiting House action after which it goes up for Presidential veto or approval), not too much can be expected of it in the way of supplying effective sanctions against the Southern racists. "Senate Democratic leadership skillfully gutted the first civil rights bill to approach Congressional approval in 82 years," Time magazine noted. "The basic purpose of the bill in its present form," editorialized the N.Y. Times, "is to seem to do something without doing anything." Or, if one doesn't want to accept the strictures of the Eisenhower Republican press which may be twirling its pitchforks to make anti-Democratic political hay, here is the smug chortle of Senator Richard Russell, parliamentary leader of the Dixiecrat forces who all along retained effective veto power over the bill's provisions: "This bill is not going to work any hardship on the people of Georgia."

But beyond the bill itself, the Congressional skirmish was symbolic of the fact that the old political equilibrium is now being disrupted in the South itself by the growing urbanization and resoluteness of the Negro people, and in the nation at large by liberal forces and by politicians anxious to capitalize on the shifts in the old balances and disclosure of new opportunities.

It was in the 1956 elections that the Republicans found themselves the beneficiary of Negro bitterness against the Democrats. The Emmett Till case and other racist outrages in the Democratic South were fresh in memory, and the Supreme Court decision on school integration was widely credited to Eisenhower appointees on the Court (even though it was unanimous). The Democratic share in the Negro vote is computed to have dropped in that election from 79 percent to 61 percent—a pretty steep toboggan for a four-year period. Reports from Harlem, Chicago's South Side, and other Negro population centers in the North indicated a considerable shift. In the Southern areas where Negroes voted the Eisenhower attraction was even greater.

Since that election, the Republican bigwigs have been intoxicated with the prospect that by some adroit gambits, they could smash the already weakened Democratic majorities in the Northern industrial cities and open up a two-party competition in the Solid South. The draught has been especially heady for Republican Presidential hopefuls like Knowland and Nixon. The Republican National Committee has been busily computing the potential Negro votership (9,481,500), and the number of states where the Negro vote is already supposed to be large enough to tip the balance of power (thirteen or fourteen). "Give us an equal-voting-rights bill," James Reston quotes one Republican leader in the N.Y. Times, "and by 1960 we will break the Roosevelt coalition of the large cities and the South, even without Eisenhower." "This," Reston adds, "is what is in the background of the vigorous debate in the Senate."

Eisenhower included a proposal for a civil rights bill in his 1956 message to Congress, but not until this year did the legislative mill begin to turn. On June 18, the House sent to the Senate the Administration bill providing a civil rights commission, another Assistant Attorney General (presumably to specialize in civil rights cases), enforcement by Federal injunction of all civil rights long established in law as well as new ones recently upheld by the Supreme Court such as school integration, and the use of the injunction to back up the right to vote in the South. The real fight occurred in the Senate, traditionally the battleground for this issue, because the basis of representation vastly overstates Southern strength by giving states of comparatively tiny population equal representation with the heavily populated industrial states of the North, and because the filibuster weapon gives the Southern Bourbons near-veto powers.

No sooner did the Southern reactionaries loose their first blast than the bill's floor managers began to wobble all over the lot. Part Three of the bill, shouted Senator Russell, will enable the Federal government to use troops to force "commingling" of the races in the South. Immediately, the Northern newspapers and politicians began to wag their heads sagely and let on that Russell had indeed found a "weakness" in the bill that ought to be remedied, when in fact Part Three committed the government to nothing more than enforcing the existing statutes. It didn't take long for this part to be excised. When, in addition, the Southerners succeeded in getting the fourth part amended to provide jury trials in cases of criminal contempt, an already weak bill was effectively hamstring. Southern juries, which don't convict whites even of murdering Negroes, are not likely to punish them for depriving the Negro of his vote. The first tenet of the
Southern social and juridical system is that a Negro has no rights that a white man is bound to respect.

What Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson was able to accomplish was to rally the Democratic Senatorial contingent, minus only nine members, behind the racists. What he was able to prove was that the Southerners are still the predominant power in the party when the chips are down on issues of direct concern to them. Twenty-one Senators from Northern and Western states, including such liberal lights as Kefauver, Jackson, Kennedy, Fulbright, Church, Kerr, Magnuson, Mansfield, Murray, O'Mahoney, and Pastore joined with 18 Southerners on the vote that added the jury trial provision to the bill, leaving only nine liberal Democrats voting with the bulk of the Republicans at the division of the house. Indeed, it was not far from a straight party vote, a circumstance which many of the commentators have overlooked in scratching their heads at Lyndon Johnson's "odd" coalition. Not only that, but Johnson succeeded in splitting the labor movement on the issue, with the miners, the rail brothers, the postal workers, and some others throwing their lobbying power against the AFL-CIO.

It cannot be denied that in hitting upon the jury trial demand, the Southerners held hold of a clever issue. In the present national atmosphere, the old Neanderthal racism doesn't go over too well, and the jury argument gave them a cover and talking point. The unions particularly don't like to see the injunction power of the federal government augmented. But the Southerners were handed this issue only because the liberal-labor coalition, despite the huge constituency it represents, is no independently organized power in the nation, and least of all in Congress. The ground for the civil rights battle was chosen by Attorney-General Brownell, and that is why the laborites and liberals, who for decades opposed government by injunction, were squeezed into the position of fighting for an extension of court injunctive power. Had the labor-liberal coalition been actually the leader of the civil rights battle, it could have devised a bill providing legislative relief for the Southern Negro and sanctions against violators of civil rights without using Brownell's method.

What would be wrong, for example, with a measure cutting down Southern representation in the House to the extent that any portion of the population is illegally disfranchised? Or refusing to seat Southern Senators where they have been elected by Jim Crow voting?

ANYONE who dreams, however, that it was sheer legal persuasiveness on this point which carried the day doesn't understand the operations of the United States Senate or the cold realities of capitalist politics. Log-rolling and back-scratching arrangements dictated the vote alignment, and while most of these took place off the floor of the Senate, they are not hard to trace.

Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts, it is reported, was undecided as to how to vote on the jury issue. He asked four Harvard professors about the legal angles involved, and got a typical, and in this case convenient, 2-2 decision. But it is no mystery that when Professor Lyndon Johnson helped him make up his mind, it was not by adding more footnotes to the Harvard briefs, but by swinging the club of Southern retaliation anent Kennedy's 1960 ambitions. And so it went, down the line.

"On many practical matters," wrote Reston of the Times, "the South and West tend to collaborate, even though this coalition brings together men of vastly different political philosophies. The South needs Western votes in maintaining supports for cotton, tobacco, and peanuts. The West looks to the South for protection of its wool, silver, lead, zinc, and beet sugar industries. The West helps the South on rivers and harbors legislation, and the South can be of great help to the West on irrigation projects, especially since the South dominates the chairmanships of most of the key Senate committees involved in these matters."

The domination of Senate committees was brought into play in the case of some unions also. Granted that there was much about the extension of injunction powers to alarm labor, it is nevertheless doubtful that this was the prime factor in Johnson's labor gains. As newspaper analysts pointed out, his chief leverage against the railroad and postal workers was in the form of pending legislation affecting these unions, now in the hands of committees of the Senate dominated by Southern Bourbon. While, especially in the case of the mine union which has been injunction-bedeveled in the recent past, a stand on principle is not excluded, in the main it is known to have been a matter of quid pro quo that caused a number of unions to break labor's front against the racists.

Since the Southern bloc will only play ball on its own terms, the unity of the Democratic Party is made the exclusive responsibility of the Northerners, who must give in if the party is to be preserved. Faced by the prospect of a far more definitive rupture in the
Democratic Party than any since the Civil War on the one hand, and a retreat on Civil rights on the other, the non-Southern portion of the party, although by far its majority, bowed in the main to the racists. As this was the general result of the civil rights debate at the Democratic Convention of 1956, the recent result should have surprised nobody, although we seem to be blessed with an irreducible core of starry-eyed liberals whose role it is to be perpetually surprised.

Among the most significant comments on the entire episode was one carried by Time magazine in describing the voting on the Anderson-Aiken amendment striking most of Part Three:

Moreover, he [Senator Lyndon Johnson] rounded up so many votes to carry it that at the last moment he was able to allow some Northern Democrats to vote against the bill to strengthen their civil rights reputations back home.

Senate voting on civil rights is not only a power struggle in which the rights of the Negro people become a political bean-bag, but also a charade in which voting roles can be assigned to help the campaign of this or that Senator.

As for the Republican Party, Lyndon Johnson had a few cards up his sleeve for them, too. He threatened them with a break in the coalition that is used to defeat liberal social legislation, public power projects, and the like. Hell's Canyon and other such issues were brandished to detach enough Republican votes to make up for the handful of liberal Democrats who stuck to their guns. The overall result was that a small minority of Dixiecrats, by means of their stranglehold on the major committees, manipulated a large Senate majority out of doing what it had publicly pledged to do. The fact that most of the Senators involved are far from being firebrands on the issue of Negro rights, conceal beneath hypocritical exteriors a lot of sympathy for the "Southern point of view," and had given their pledge to curb the racists unwillingly and out of greedy political motives, didn't make the job any harder.

About the role of President Eisenhower, the less said the better. If there ever was a General who led his troops from behind, this is the man. A statement was issued over his signature strongly backing the whole bill, and giving special support to Part Three. But immediately thereafter, at a weekly press conference, he flabbergasted reporters by explaining that he did not believe the Attorney General should enter any local civil rights case "without any request from local authorities." (Eisenhower is still reciting last season's refrain; his tutors evidently need a lot more time to get him out of one groove into another.) This chance comment, which takes a ground that even Senator Russell has been forced to abandon in public argumentation, betrayed so profound an ignorance of the essential objects of his own bill and repudiated it so completely that the best an embarrassed press could do was to charitably ignore him. Despite his fit of public-relations "rage" after the Senate voting, the incident reinforced the growing impression that, in the practical workings of the government, Eisenhower is little more than the front man.

The fast-and-loose game upon which much of Democratic Party liberalism rests is plainly coming to the end of its rope. For two can, and are, playing at that game. Modern Republicanism, so-called, is in part the child of the discovery that the liberal role is not so costly as Mr. Herbert Hoover had supposed. The picture of Richard Nixon, Herbert Brownell, and William Knowland vy ing with the Democratic liberals as apostles of civil rights may be ludicrous at first blush, but the politicians who are in the serious business of vote counting haven't found it a laughing matter. The Republicans, with the sure instinct of the politician, have hit at their opponent's Achilles heel. Lyndon Johnson's suave maneuverings may have minimized the damage for the moment, but in the larger measure, the Democrats can preserve their coalition with the Southern Bourbons and lose the Negro vote, or break with the Bourbons and set into motion the forces for a new alignment in American politics. In either case, the structure of the existing Democratic Party is being subjected to a galvanic shock and the tensions will probably become explosive in the years immediately ahead.

Both the Democrats and Republicans are led and staffed by shyster combinationists and opportunist rag-pickers; hence the fight on a great national issue takes on the form of unscrupulous cloak-room intrigues and small-time pork-barrel deals. Our political machinery is clearly an anachronism in comparison to the government's social responsibilities, and a cultural lag in comparison with the people's growing maturity. But though a great national issue be muffled by caucus politics and a great principle besmeared by two-bit haggling, it is breaking through—just as did the old issue of slavery—because it is tied up with the self-interest of the labor and liberal forces of America. And just as a new political instrumentality was necessary to settle the slavery issue, so we believe—once the small-time Henry Clays have had their day—a new political realignment will take place to settle the present issues dividing our American society.

Clifford McAvoy Dies at 52

We report with sorrow the passing of Clifford T. McAvoy, former American Labor Party leader, who died of nephritis on August 9 at the age of 52. Son of a State Supreme Court justice, Mr. McAvoy helped organize the Teachers' Union in the thirties, was appointed Deputy Commissioner of Welfare by Mayor LaGuardia in 1938, and later worked in the United Electrical Union and CIO. Cliff McAvoy was one of the finest persons in the American Left today. Generous, sincere, unassuming, he gave of himself unstintingly. In recent years, beginning with his opposition to the conversion of the ALP into a tail of the Democratic Party, he broke decisively with Stalinism. He was a good friend of the American Socialist, supporting it from the beginning. We will miss him, and send our condolences to his widow, Muriel Gravelle McAvoy.
China started its economic development under more fortunate circumstances than Russia, but lopsided emphasis on some parts of the economy is beginning to tell. Plans are now being revised to ease the strain.

The Chinese Riddle

by Bert Cochran

After the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, many of the Stalinist faithful turned their affections toward China. For them, it was a case of Paradise Regained after the fall of man. They began their new love's idyll while still on the rebound, and Mao Tse-tung's writings were now feverishly scanned to discover and memorize a new round of “Confucius says” oracular aphorisms to replace the Stalin texts that had been dynamited from under them.

But the times are unpropitious for the creation of a new pseudo-Marxist church. Mao Tse-tung's February speech at the Supreme State Conference (released June 18), while of an entirely different order from Khrushchev's speech at the Twentieth Congress, further pierces the veil of Stalinist mythology, and ought to provide another stepping-stone for Western radicals to observe the Soviet countries from higher ground and a more mature viewpoint. There is, of course, nothing original about his central thought that Soviet society is rent with contradictions for anyone who is acquainted with Lenin's polemics during the 1920 trade union debate where he said that the Russian workers need independent unions to protect themselves against their own state, not to mention the elaborate analyses of Leon Trotsky in later years. But Stalinism has so effaced the spirit of earlier Marxism that Mao's simple admission that Soviet society is not of one harmoniously idyllic mold strikes Communists as a profound new revelation to be added to the Marxist treasure-trove.

Mao's mellow philosophizing to the contrary notwithstanding, the Chinese regime has been strikingly similar to the Stalinist, but in a number of ways, it has been milder primarily because the Chinese leaders were more fortunate than the Russians. The Bolshevik state was created in the midst of war with Germany. It was able to save itself from extinction only by concluding a humiliating peace with the Kaiser, whose generals tore huge chunks out of the country. Then, for three years, the Bolshevists had to fight off the interventionist and White Guard armies with the country getting increasingly denuded and ruined. It was only in 1921 that they could turn their attention to reconstruction, but then only in the desperate conditions of a bitter famine, the shooting down of the Kronstadt rebels, and the panic retreat from war communism to the NEP. In contrast, the Chinese Communists fought their civil war before they took power, and could devote their full efforts to reconstruction almost as soon as Chiang Kai-shek was driven from the mainland. The Nationalist blockade proved no more than a harassment, and the Korean war did not halt the swift pace of reconstruction because of its limited scale and occurrence outside Chinese territory.

As a result, after but three years, the Chinese Communists restored the economy beyond the best of pre-war times, stopped the runaway inflation, united the country and were ready to start planned industrialization. In Russia it was a dozen years after the revolution before economic conditions matched those of 1913 and before the first five-year plan was projected. Politically, this meant that the Chinese were able to take the industrialization plunge while they had a fund of good feeling amongst the people whereas the Russians had to start after the years of deprivation had disillusioned the popu-
lace, and when the party itself had emerged brutalized and scarred from the demoralizing Stalin-Trotsky internal battle.

The Chinese were also the beneficiaries of Russian pioneering in the field of planned industrialization. Just as England in an earlier day paid the penalty of being first, so Russia paid the price in the twentieth century. Russian loans to China have been very modest indeed, but her engineers and technicians were able to supply her with know-how and the benefits of Russian experience which enormously speeded up Chinese industrialization possibilities and eased growing pains.

What is striking, though, as one studies Chinese developments during the past several years, is not how many details and techniques vary from the Russian, but how slavishly Mao’s China is imitating Stalin’s Russia in both economic and political policies.

The Chinese plunged into the icy waters of Stalinist industrialization strategy even more thoughtlessly—if that is possible—than did Stalin’s faction in 1929. Starting in 1952 with an aggregate economic structure probably slightly smaller than Russia possessed in 1928, but with only one-quarter per capita product, China projected an ambitious five-year plan which by the end of 1957 was to practically double total output, but with all of the built-in features which produced in Russia—alongside monumental achievements—gaping disproportions, chronic agricultural lag, bureaucratization, waste, and social instability. Industrial production was to be approximately doubled, but agriculture was to rise only 23 percent; annual industrial growth was set at 14.7 percent, but agriculture at only 4.3 percent. This might not be so serious a matter by itself, but to this traditional Stalinist disproportion between industry and agriculture was added the lop-sided emphasis on heavy industry. According to the original plans, heavy industry was to absorb nearly 90 percent of industry investments (which in total eat up about three-fifths of all investment, another fifth for transport, with less than eight percent for agriculture, water conservation and forestry).

The plan was relentlessly driven through so that by 1957 the country could boast of great industrial complexes, a working class of 22 million, and prodigies of growth in many lines that make up the sinews of modern industry. Mao’s pace was scarcely less breakneck than Stalin’s. Russia’s average annual compounded rate of increase of industrial output for 1928-1937 was 20.9 percent by official calculations and 15.7 percent by Professor D. R. Hodgman’s figures. The Chinese plan called for a 14.7 percent annual increase, and according to Po I-po, Chairman of the National Economic Commission, the average for the five-year period will probably come to 17.4 percent. (India’s industrial production rose between five and six percent annually in its first five-year plan, according to the most generous figures.)

These are, of course, stupendous achievements. But the price tag is quite high: a mushrooming bureaucracy, widening of the social and economic gulf between it and the people, Stakhanovism, state trade unionism, aggravated political commandism, exacerbated demand for social conformity and intellectual Fordization. The Chinese had imported Russian social relations and tensions along with their concepts of planning.

The All-China Federation of Trade Unions emerged as a formidable bureaucratic structure regimenting the workers in the numerous emulation campaigns. A Draconian set of labor regulations was promulgated and a harsh labor discipline imposed. The Stakhanovist wage policy called for the widest possible spread of piece work and bonus schemes. The wage scale of the highest grade is over three times that of the lowest, and almost five times among salaried and non-productive workers.

With the deliberate striving for the creation of a labor aristocracy and the wide disparity in workers’ wages, the generalized statistical index numbers may not mean too much nor give too clear an idea of actual living conditions. The plan, for instance, called for a wage increase of one-third from 1953 to 1957 (with a 64 percent increase in productivity). But conflicting figures about wage increases have been issued, so that it is difficult to come to any conclusions as to what has actually transpired in the past few years. Similarly with working hours: While the official figures are from eight to ten, reports repeatedly come in of longer working days imposed in the course of the emulation campaigns. Furthermore, the Chinese papers have carried many items of bad accidents and industrial deaths, and excesses on the part of the local leaders. In August 1953 the Peking daily carried a not untypical piece where it reported that the cadres had beaten and tortured workers. Here is the way the paper proceeded to straighten out the cadres: “It must be made clear that in the work of strengthening labor discipline, we must determinedly prevent the occurrence of this method of punishment, but this does not mean that the adoption of necessary punishment measures is rejected.” With 1953, the press exhortations for labor discipline and more work grew increasingly shrill and feverish, and the workers’ courts, set up in that year, began meting out harsh sentences left and right.

As the plan went into high-gear and began piling up impressive over-all growth figures, it likewise followed the Russian pattern in the spread of a swollen supervisory bureaucracy. The People’s Daily of March 1954 reported that a survey of 195 factories disclosed only seven in which the managerial staff was less than 10 percent of the work force. In 50 factories it was from 10 to 20 percent, and in 138 it ranged from 20 to above 50 percent. Also, as in Russia, constant complaints of huge wastage and the proliferation of low-quality shoddy goods in the pell-mell sacrifice of quality for quantity.

It is true just the same that workers’ conditions are noticeably better today than they were in Kuomintang days, as wages went up rapidly from 1950 to 1952. (Labor conditions under the old regime were notoriously atrocious.) Richard Hughes, the well-known British correspondent, wrote recently that “For the average Chinese worker, it (Shanghai) is a far better, healthier and happier city.... Who can attempt to balance loss of freedom for a minority against loss of fear of starvation for the majority?” Reg Leonard, correspondent of the Melbourne Herald, has written in a similar vein after visiting a number of the main cities.
In their dealings with the capitalists and peasants, the Chinese Communists have had rather more success than the Russians, partly because of happier circumstances, partly by learning from Russian mistakes.

Upon assuming power in 1949, the Communists began to take over the Kuomintang state enterprises, confiscated property owned by Kuomintang leaders, and began squeezing the foreign firms. By the end of 1952, the state owned all railways, almost all the banks, 60 percent of coastal and Yangtze shipping, almost 80 percent of all heavy industry and 50 percent of modern light industry. Its share of gross industrial output was half of the grand total. Private capitalist production had clearly been relegated to a subordinate position, but it still remained a power in the economy, and in the strategic course mapped out by Mao’s “New Democracy” it was contemplated that a mixed economy would have to remain for many years ahead.

But the program of statized industrialization has a logic and momentum of its own. In the next years, step by step, through mass pressure, financial envelopment, and state regulation, the capitalists were finally pressed into converting their enterprises into joint state-private ventures, with the capitalists drawing fixed rates of interest, generally five percent, on their investment. The capitalist owners have thus been converted into state bureaucrats and rentiers, while the government is able to utilize their specialized skills. Lenin, too, contemplated the setting up of joint enterprises under the NEP to ease the transition, but in Russia it never came to anything as the important capitalists had fled or been wiped out under war communism and foreign capitalists understandably showed no interest in investing.

Alongside these vestigial remains of capitalism is the huge network of handicraft cooperatives which accounts for a big part of consumer-goods production, including agricultural implements and machinery. In the cloudy terminology taken over from Stalin, these handicraft cooperatives, as well as the marketing and wholesale cooperatives, are listed as part of the socialist sector, because the state dominates their activities, writes the contracts and fixes the prices. Actually, they are at best semi-socialist, semi-small-capitalist forms, because, as corporate bodies, they own their own property and depend upon profits from sales. The statistics for the end of 1956 showed that with industrial production doubling as against 1952, the joint enterprises still accounted for over 27 percent of production and the cooperative handicrafts for over 17 percent. The state sector remained stable at 54½ percent, but straight capitalist industry and individual handicraft had been virtually eliminated, accounting for little better than 1 percent of total output. As can be seen, even in

**Five Recent Books on China**

**THE United States has for a half-century had immense designs on China and the State Department in the fifties is spearheading the attempt to erect a cordon sanitaire around it. The immense American interest in Chinese affairs is reflected in the considerable literature being published about that country. Unfortunately, the cold war has adversely affected the objectivity of most authors, many of whom write like unashamed propagandists. Some of the books, nonetheless, are rich in factual researches and invaluable as sources of information.**

**CHINA: NEW AGE AND NEW OUTLOOK, by Ping-Chia Kuo, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1956, $3.75.**

Mr. Ping-Chia Kuo was a history professor at Wuhan University and later a Nationalist official. He retired after the Communists took over and is presently living in California. He writes from the viewpoint of a Western liberal, but time and again he cannot conceal his pride as a Chinese in his country’s progress and achievements. He cautions his readers to understand that the Communist government is here to stay and insists that a strong China is a force for peace. A lively and readable book.

**CHINA UNDER COMMUNISM, by Richard L. Walker, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1956, $4.50.**

Richard L. Walker is assistant professor of history at Yale and his book is the result of research work carried on in Hong Kong. It is one of the most informative recent studies of the social and political aspects of Communist rule. Mr. Walker, however, has taken to the cold war like a fish to water. His judgments are venomously biased and he is determined to draw every possible inference against the new regime.

**AN ECONOMIC SURVEY OF COMMUNIST CHINA, by Yuan-li Wu, Bookman Associates, New York, 1956, $12.50.**

Mr. Yuan-li Wu is coordinator of a research project on the Far East at Stanford University. The work at hand is an exhaustive survey of China’s major economic sectors and policies. A mine of statistical information, although of more interest to the professional student than the layman. The author is restrained by professional discipline from going too far afield, but many of his statistical extrapolations as to the potential and results of Chinese planning are colored by his unconcealed hostility to Communism and his skepticism of a planned economy.

**BEHIND THE BAMBOO CURTAIN, by A. M. Dunlap, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D.C., 1956, $3.75.**

A. M. Dunlap is an ear, nose and throat specialist who practiced in China for forty years. The book consists in the main of excerpts of letters that he sent from Shanghai to his son and friends in the United States from the spring of 1949 when the Communists were approaching the city to the winter of 1952 when he returned to this country. The running diary—that’s what it is, in effect—provides some vivid impressions of how the revolution looked in practice as seen through the eyes of an upper-class Westerner. It is also vivid in unconsciously portraying the petty horizons and provincial vapidity of the Western professional set in China.


This is the most recent book on China and is of an entirely different order from the foregoing. Solomon Adler went to China in 1941 for the United States Treasury and later held other official positions. He left China in 1947 and is presently living in Cambridge, England. He is very well versed in his subject matter and profoundly sympathetic to the Chinese revolution, writing with informed understanding of its economic problems and aims.

Everyone who wants to study the main springs of Chinese planning and comprehend the workings of its economy will have to have this book. It is the best and most thorough-going compendium of all the relevant data, coherently organized and cogently explained. It suffers a little from text-book dryness, and what is more serious, a lack of critical judgment with respect to some of the materials. Mr. Adler seems to have accepted a number of the tenets of Stalinist-style planning without sufficient reflection.

B. C.
the urban centers it is still quite a distance to a fully statized economy. China presently combines the Russian stages of the NEP along with the industrialization and collectivization of the 1929-1933 period.

WHILE the Chinese Communists have been successful in bending the native capitalists to their own purposes and paying for it what is probably a not inordinate price, it is in collectivizing agriculture that Mao's achievement shines in contrast to Stalin's. With the latter's man-made famines in mind, the Chinese first approached the problem very gingerly. They thought in terms of a slow agricultural changeover, first into mutual-aid teams, then into producers' cooperatives where the peasant retained land ownership, and only finally into full producers' cooperatives on the Russian model. But after a slow start at the end of 1951, and with setbacks in 1953 and 1955, they hurled themselves into the breach so that by mid-1956, over 90 percent of the 110 million peasant households were organized into some 592,000 collectives, more than three-fifths of the "advanced type." The remarkable thing about the achievement is not its speed; Stalin demonstrated that the state power is capable of herding a scattered peasantry into collectives; but that the changeover has provoked a comparatively feeble resistance, and that throughout, agricultural production was maintained.

The clue to the reasons for the shift in policy is contained in Mao's report in July 1955 where he criticized those who were frightened of the peasantry and laid down the line of moving full steam ahead. He said in effect that China had a huge poverty-stricken peasantry cultivating tiny plots of ground (an average of less than half an acre, and in the southern provinces, less than a sixth). But "everyone has seen how in the course of the last few years the spontaneous forces of capitalism have developed day by day in the countryside, giving rise to the appearance of new kulaks. . . . If this continues, the division of the countryside between polar opposites will deepen inevitably." Mao, in other words, concluded that the longer they delayed, the harder it would be to collectivize. Here he departed sharply from Stalin who, with Bukharin, followed a course from 1924 to 1928 of letting the capitalist forces grow in the countryside, hoping to find through the increased production the necessary capital for eventual industrialization. By the time Stalin got around to collectivization, a strong kulak class had consolidated itself and fought him tooth and nail. The Chinese peasant was too weak to organize a comparable resistance.

That the peasants entered the collectives voluntarily can be dismissed in the light of the repeated official sermons to the "cadres" cautioning against "commandism" and "bureaucratism," and the lurid accounts printed from time to time of the violent doings of these same "cadres" (who had to meet the targets set by higher authorities). But it is to the undifferentiated state of the Chinese countryside after the initial land reforms, and the absence of a well organized capitalist farming class, that must be attributed the comparative ease of Chinese collectivization, thus far, at any rate, as against the recalcitrance of the farmers in Eastern Europe.

Of course, the collectives even of the "advanced type" are, like the handicraft cooperatives, semi-socialist-type institutions at best, and Mao, copying Stalin's 1936 concession, has permitted the individual peasant to retain alongside the cooperative his own private plot of ground. Nevertheless, with farm collectivization, the state has completed its chain of economic control which includes a monopoly of trade exercised through the marketing cooperatives, rationing of food, heavy taxation, and compulsory sales to the state. The collectivization for a period to come will have to remain primarily an administrative reorganization as the government is unable to provide any advanced machinery. The first tractor factory is not scheduled to go into production until 1959.

Trying to lift the country up by its own bootstraps and reverse the thousand-year old stagnation has strained all resources and nerves to the breaking point, produced an extraordinary political tautness, social tension and income polarization, and a hardening of the benevolent despotism. Unlike the Bolshevik party which came to power animated by ideas of revolutionary egalitarianism and dreams of broader horizons for humanity, and which got totalitarianized only in the harsh climate of the civil wars and the struggles with the property-minded peasantry, the Chinese party was Stalinized in the early thirties and upon taking power proceeded without any internal tremors to impose a finished model of political dictatorship. True, a facade of political diversity is maintained by means of a formal coalition with the Democratic League and a number of other non-Communist formations, but these are all pale, ghostly organizations with no power of their own, and are tolerated only so long as they remain Communist satellites.

The Communist Party bureaucracy got its training in the harsh military environment of the twenty-year war with Chiang Kai-shek and came into the cities out of the countryside as a conqueror imposing his will. The government machinery therefore assumed an almost military authoritarian character from the first, and the regional government setups for many years conformed to the vari-
ous army commands. Just as in Russia, where the universal poverty led inevitably to social stratification, and where the Communist functionaries felt it was time now that they were in the saddle to cash in on their many years of sacrifices, so in China the officialdom began to take advantage of their positions to sedentary, enjoy life and live a little better than the mass. In the recent state of public criticism, the People’s Daily quoted Professor Ko Pei-chi as saying that the relation of the party to the masses before and after the revolution was “as two poles apart.” Before, the party cadres “wore worn-out shoes”; “Now they ride in sedan cars and wear woolen uniforms.”

The recent report of General Tan Cheng, political director of the army, also tells volumes on this score. He stressed the tensions that exist between the military and civilian population and between the officers and foot soldiers, and that “some of our cadres are still not accustomed to the use of the method of persuasive education.” He suggested these rules of conduct for the officers in order to remedy some of the evils: “They must not seek wives in schools; they must not use money or other material goods as a means of getting wives; they must not interfere with other peoples’ marriages; married officers must educate their wives to take part in labor and to lead a plain life.” It is to this widespread loss of original idealistic zeal and the striving for creature comforts that Mao referred in his February speech when he said: “A dangerous tendency has shown itself of late among many of our personnel—an unwillingness to share the joys and hardships of the masses, a concern for personal position and gain.”

The political catalyst that shook up this turgid compound, strangely enough, was the Hungarian uprising of October 1956. It hit the overstrained Chinese society with some of the impact that the Kirov assassination had upon Russia in 1934 and produced a lot of troubled soul-searching and conflicting counsel. But Mao, to all appearances, is a less demonic, a less spasmodic, a wiser leader than was Stalin, and the Chinese authority is not as isolated from society as was the Stalinist. He tried to react, not by a wave of violence and terror, but by providing social and institutional escape valves for the supercharged tensions. That was the essential meaning of the February speech.

If we translate his remarks from the obfuscatory terminology derived from a blending of Hegel and Lao Tse into more familiar Western terms and discard the escape clauses and cancelling qualifications, we see Mao trying to reeducate the Communist functionaries along a number of major lines: Don’t get frightened of tensions (and struggles) in our society, he is telling them. They are endemic to a socialist society, but they can be resolved without violent methods. Don’t let us try to overcome difficulties and disobedience by terror but by persuasion and roundabout pressure. We don’t need monolithism in the sphere of thought. Marxism has to win its way by its intrinsic superiority. People have to have outlets for protest and workers have to have a right to strike, provided these manifestations don’t take on opposition to the regime. Such outbursts even have their good side in that they sharply call to our attention defects within our own system and make us find ways to eradicate them.

No Marxist would have been particularly startled at these remarks in 1920, but now they produced a great impression throughout the Communist world and were correctly taken as a sharp departure from Stalinist ideology. Unfortunately, Mao’s speech was not the starting point for any thorough-going democratization of the authoritarian structure of China. The new dispensation will apparently produce only palliatives. Mao and the other leaders are still too bound by Stalinist training and hemmed in by the fearful pressures and difficulties of a poverty-stricken country to chance any fundamental alteration in their political system. Time and again in his speech Mao returns to the proposition that the source of the dissatisfactions is bureaucracy. But he can propose nothing else than various administrative shuffles, not so dissimilar from those made by Stalin over the years, and which never even scratched the surface of the problem.

Of course, there is no rapid-fire and simple solution to the problem of bureaucracy, particularly in a backward primitive country. There is no way of operating the Soviet state in its transition from pre-capitalism to socialism, or for that matter, any other kind of centralized state, without the instrumentality of a considerable bureaucracy. The only amelioration can come from political democracy which permits people some measure of control over the bureaucrats and thereby mitigates their excesses and profligacies. But this is a Rubicon that Mao cannot get himself to cross. He informs us that in the wake of the Hungarian events many voices demanded a two-party system and expressed the view that there was too little freedom in China, but he insists that such a demand must be implacably rejected. He played around with nebulous notions about the non-Communist shadow parties exercising some sort of supervision over the Communist Party, but when a number of the leaders of those parties started voicing full-throated criticisms in response to his invitation, they were promptly terrorized into silence and abject recantations. In these circumstances, without real opposition parties or an opposition press, all talk of democratization inevitably gets reduced to peripheral improvements and ancillary reforms.

The authoritarian state with its enforced discipline
seems for a while more efficient in the attainment of its goals. But in time, the degraded human personality exacts a cruel revenge, especially in education, science, culture, art. The drying up of the wellsprings of thought is not felt so acutely at first, as China today, like Russia in its first years of industrialization, depends in large measure on borrowing from the intellectual capital of the more advanced countries and transplanting their technology and accumulated skills. But no sooner did Russia attain a sufficient height than she began choking in the intellectual prison-house of Stalinism. China is headed for the same frustrating experience.

IN matters of education and culture, the Chinese swallowed the Stalinist dogma raw and the virulence and blind fanaticism displayed during the various ideological remodeling campaigns certainly entitle them to equal honors with Stalin and Zhidanov in this department. After the purge of Hu Feng, a blight stunted further creative effort. Mao worries over the fact that students and intellectuals are turning away in disillusionment from politics. “It seems as if Marxism that was once the rage is not so much in fashion now.” But Mao cannot go beyond holieries because while deploring these negative consequences of the police state and exhorting the cadres to maneuver their manners and polish up their public relations he insists on retaining the authoritarian system.

While no sharp turnabout is to be anticipated in political and social matters, it is in the economic sphere that the lesson of Hungary and last year’s flareup of student and labor strikes and peasant unrest in China has been taken strongly to heart and a pronounced shift is in the offing. Mao talked in February about using their own heads and not copying the Russian pattern slavishly. The second five-year plan is apparently being drastically overhauled to ensure greater harmony between the main divisions of the economy, with more attention being paid to the people’s needs. The original targets for the second five-year plan called for a slight increase in agricultural investment and projected a 35 percent increase in farm output as against 23 percent for the first plan. Mao promised the peasants in February not to raise for a long period of time the quota of 40 or 45 million tons of grain taken from them in taxes and forced sales (roughly calculated as about a quarter to a third of production) and not to interfere with what they do on their own private plots. Industrial growth was also to be slowed down a bit to a 12 percent annual increase and Mao talked of greater emphasis on agriculture and light industry.

These tentative thoughts are now obviously leading to a complete revision of the original targets and a redirection of the second five-year plan goals so as to get away from Stalin’s crazy pattern that dominated Chinese thinking in the first plan and which gave birth to dizzying imbalances and enormous wastage. This year 14 percent less is being spent than last year on capital construction and a little more for welfare and education, and the government is exporting less grain and pork. In his preliminary survey for 1958, (no new set of figures or targets for the revised plan have been issued) Po I-po talked about “equal emphasis” on industry and agriculture and particular concern toward building up small local enterprises, the production of sufficient raw materials and fuels and the perfection of increased transport and communication facilities in order to get the economy back into some coherent balance. Po I-po explained that right now farm production “lags behind that of the whole national economy”; consumer-goods production “lags behind that of the means of production”; raw materials and fuel industries “lags behind that of the manufacturing industries.” Perhaps China will yet blaze the trail of a saner and more balanced industrialization and planned growth.

“A Hellish Ambition for Any Group of Human Beings . . .”

An important straw in the wind in the growing clamor for a ban on H-Bomb tests was the joining of three labor leaders, Walter Reuther, James Carey, and Joseph E. Beine, presidents, respectively, of the United Auto Workers, International Union of Electrical Workers, and Communications Workers, in a petition of 81 prominent people for such a ban. An eloquent testimony to the rising labor sentiment is also to be seen in the editorial in the August 1 issue of the United Mine Worker Journal, excerpts from which follow:

* * *

IN an attempt to take our minds away from fallout, the AEC talks incessantly about a “clean” hydrogen bomb. They mean by “clean” a bomb that would kill only Russians if the bomb is dropped on Russia. We hope it isn’t true, but what the AEC seems to be seeking is a “clean” bomb for the United States, one guaranteed to kill 80 million Russians without endangering our own people, meanwhile hoping that the Russians will be stuck with a “dirty” bomb which will not only kill Americans but will also kill Russians when the winds drop the fallout on the Soviet Union.

This would be a hellish ambition for any group of human beings to hold!

A couple of weeks ago, AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss led three University of California scientists into a White House press conference, where they obediently told President Eisenhower and the nation’s press they could develop a “clean” bomb within five years. So, say they, we can all relax, including the President, and forget about danger from radiation.

However, in spite of all this official soothing syrup we are inclined to go along with Edward P. Morgan, American Broadcasting Co. news commentator, when he says: “Boon or bust, we are going to get clean bombs. But must we like them? We get all excited about a clean hydrogen bomb, as if it were a lovely snowball, suddenly forgetting it has a rock inside capable of knocking civilization off the planet.”

The question of control of “clean” and “dirty” bombs, however, is a political problem, now of sad necessity in the hands of the “statesmen” of all nations.

But control of the behavior of our own AEC is ultimately in the hands of the American voters. And we should remember that the AEC has always tended to minimize the dangers of radioactive fallout and that it was only pressure from eminent, free scientists which forced the AEC to admit that fallout presented even a potential menace.
Man must live in harmony with his given environment, cherish and protect it as a trust for future generations. Conservation can be a faith and a creed for mankind.

The Religion of Conservation

by Reuben W. Borough

FOR many months now I have been verbally exploding at the breakfast table over the steady stream of tragedies headlined in the Los Angeles Times. I have been repeating over and over again an old colloquialism from boyhood days: "We're too big for our pants!" I repeat it here with two recent examples of the current scientific and industrial anarchy of the profit-takers fresh in mind:

1) The aircraft collision a short while back in the San Fernando Valley that took the lives of five airmen and two high school students and injured more than 70 other persons—an impossible occurrence in any socially responsible economy.

2) The spectacular automation triumph at the Holmes Foundry, Sarnia, Ontario, which manufactures engine blocks for the Ford Motor Company. This plant, which before mechanization in 1954 employed 475 men, reduced its working force after mechanization by 100 men, dropped one working day from the week, and still shot its output up so successfully that it met its entire year's production quota in six months! The plant is now closed: What greater proof could you have of the intellectual acumen of modern science and modern industry?

We are indeed "too big for our pants!" We know how to produce but we will not produce without criminal waste and destruction, in contempt of the Psalmist's reminder that not only the Earth but "they that dwell therein" are the Lord’s.

The subject of this article is: The Religion of Conservation. By "religion" I mean an over-all faith and conviction that bind man in reason and logic to a consistent attitude toward the universe and, more directly, toward the Earth Planet, the natural scene of his activities. By "conservation" I mean the preservation of this scene, the safeguarding of nature's resources, their expansion wherever and whenever necessary and possible, and the abstention from action, individual or social, that impairs or destroys them.

What should this consistent attitude of man toward his universe be? My answer is that he should accept it, not rail against it; and that if he is in good health, individually, socially and politically, he will accept it. Moreover, he should accept it, not in any semi-neutral manner but with frank friendliness and love and, even at times, with passionate exultation. This moving scene around him is his home. He is inextricably part of it—body, mind, soul, all of him—and he can never be banished from it. He is cradled in it, sustained by it every hour of day and night, and at the end he will lie down in it and be at rest in it.

SUPPOSING, then, that man does bring himself en rapport with life, what will be the result? Obviously, in this present society, he will act. He will not merely remain an ecstatic poet, commendable as that role may be. He will take the oath of allegiance to the Earth Planet and its universe. He will join the army of the Militant Conservationists—he will go to war against the enemies of Mother Nature.

So now he finds himself committed to causes, ennobling causes that deal with his day and reach beyond his day into the distant future. These causes are varied but they are all concerned with the defense of the natural environment against defilement by profiteering special interests and the wastage of the natural resources by these same forces.

The purity and integrity of air, water, soil, are vital to him. Thus he is engaged in continuous battle with established and familiar forms of industry and transport that spout poisonous fumes and waste from smoke stacks and exhaust pipes. Thus he must expose and excoriate barbarian cities that pollute streams, lakes, sea, with their floods of raw sewage. Thus he must bring every social, political and educational pressure against such earth-husbandry abuses as over-grazing of the range and re-

Reuben Borough was editor of Upton Sinclair's EPIC News in the thirties, and a California leader of the Wallace movement in the forties.
petitive and similar unscientific crop practices. Thus he must fight destruction of the forests and resist over-concentration of population in vast industrial centers.

But these engagements, in the long range of time, are, after all, mere skirmishes. For a new terror now infects the earth, against which he must rally his full faculties—the terror of atomic energy. Little need be said here as to the effects of nuclear explosions. My readers know the meaning of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But they are not sufficiently acquainted, I am sure, with the menace to life of a peacetime nuclear reactor plant in industrial operation at its current stage of development. All of us should have such acquaintance. Certainly our citizen of the Earth Planet, committed to love for and reverence for life should have such acquaintance.

Atomic energy for military and peacetime uses has so far been developed almost entirely by the United States government. Into this business it has poured literally billions of dollars. The basis for peacetime uses has been laid chiefly through development of the nuclear reactor plant which by fission (splitting) of the uranium atom releases the energy which creates the heat which in turn creates the steam which in turn generates the electricity intended for industrial, commercial and residential use. The indispensable fuel for this nuclear reactor plant is the uranium rod or slug which the United States government alone produces from uranium ore. And this uranium ore is produced by a new subsidized mining industry with several thousand employees, which depends entirely upon the government’s guaranteed market with its liberal price per ton and its liberal incentive rewards for initial production.

Yet despite these basic facts, the federal government may not build, own, or operate a single nuclear reactor plant. This right is farmed out, under a system of licenses established by Congressional action, predominantly to private interests by the pro-corporation Atomic Energy Commission. In less than 50 years, if this program of “partnership” with business persists and if atomic power is established as economically feasible, publicly owned power resting by that time largely on vanishing fuel sources, will be wiped off the map. Then watch the rates soar!

But it is not with the high costs of monopoly control that our citizen with the reverence for life is here concerned. It is with the frightening hazards of plant operation under socially irresponsible ownership bent exclusively on profits. For the nuclear reactor can be a deadly weapon—a weapon of annihilation—against the world and all those that dwell therein.

The unsolved problem of radioactivity, says Waldemar Kaempffert in the May-June issue of the Foreign Policy

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**Navajo Indians: Oil and Mining Buzzards Hover Overhead**
by John R. Salter, Jr.

NINETY years have now elapsed since, in 1867, the Navaho Indians ceased their hostilities with the signing of the Treaty of Fort Sumner, at Bosque Redondo, New Mexico Territory. The 8,000 Navaho comprising the loosely federated tribe were given a portion of northeastern Arizona and northwestern New Mexico as a reservation; they were promised schools for their young, medical facilities, and the opportunity to make their living from the raising of stock animals and crops. In return, they surrendered most of their hunting grounds.

Today, in 1957, the Navaho tribe comprises nearly 85,000 individuals. They have been given some schools and some hospitals—not nearly enough, however. Disease is rampant among the Navaho; many adults and children cannot write or speak English and have no real conception of the land beyond the borders of the Navaho reservation. And in some portions of the Navaho homeland there are fully grown adults who have never seen a Caucasian.

The original reservation has been gradually and unwillingly extended by the government to include some 15,000,000 acres on which the Navaho are expected to eke out their seminomadic existence as stock raisers and farmers. But in spite of the tremendous area encompassed by the reservation, it is the poorest land in the Southwest, a land attractive on the post-cards of the tourists, perhaps, but not a land for any sort of real subsistence. It is waterless, grassless, and rocky; fifty acres are required to support one sheep or goat; three hundred acres are needed for a horse or a cow. The result is that Navaho stock is in a deplorable condition, Navaho farming is almost nil, and the Navaho people are a starving people.

Recently, there have been some mineral discoveries—oil and uranium—but it is difficult to determine whether the Navaho will obtain the benefits from these, or whether the large oil and mining concerns will. If past experience is a guide, the Navaho has good reason to worry. It has been a comparatively short time since both the government and the oil concerns combined forces in Oklahoma to seize most of the land and resources of the Five Civilized Tribes. It could quite easily happen to the Navaho, and there are indications that it may. The politicians are now speaking of moving the Navaho one and all from their reservation, ostensibly to “make them better Americans”; the flock of oil and mining operators are hovering over Navaholand like so many buzzards over an animal soon to die.

To the individual Navaho family group, the reservation offers only slow and miserable starvation. No cultural group desires to exchange its way of living for a new and strange alien mode—the Navaho do not—yet most of them realize that they must eventually leave their homeland and seek employment outside. What awaits these Americans-of-longest-standing, once they begin to switch their culture, and attempt to live in the off-reservation communities of Grants and Gallup, in New Mexico, and Holbrook, Winslow, and Flagstaff, in Arizona? They are given at the best some “south side” slum in which to take up residence, and quite often some sort of a skid-row district. Because of linguistic barriers, they are constantly preyed upon by a variety of dishonorable self-seekers; they are discriminated against because of the color of their skin, tolerated if at all simply because of their “local color.” They are given no chance to improve their lot, only the most menial and under-paid positions are allowed them. They are told by missionaries of the Christian faith that their ancient Navaho beliefs are false and detrimental, and that they must surrender these “pagan” beliefs for the faith of the missionary and for the sake of cast-off clothing which is promised them if they comply. And because of all of these things, the Navaho who has left his reservation eventually returns, a thoroughly unhappy individual, to his barren homeland to live out a life of the most miserable sort.

**The author is an Arizonan who writes for the American Socialist for the first time.**

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Association’s Headline Series, is “the bane of the engineer who must design a power reactor.” He continues:

Deadly radioactive rays contaminate everything. They contaminate the water or other liquid which serves as a coolant and which is pumped to the heat exchanger, there to raise steam. They contaminate the walls of the reactor. They contaminate the aluminum cans in which the uranium rods or slugs are contained, the coil of pipe in which the coolant circulates, the coolant itself. Everything is contaminated. The time comes when the reactor must be virtually rebuilt.

Moreover, every reactor must be associated with a chemical plant to purify contaminated spent uranium. Somehow the absorption of too many flying neutrons must be reduced and, if possible, stopped. How this is to be done efficiently is one of the major tasks of the scientists who are trying to improve reactors.

The more general type of devastation that can be wrought by the operation of these nuclear reactor plants in their current stage of development is tersely set forth in an exhibit from the Paris National Museum of Natural History, shown in Cambridge, England:

The uncontrolled utilization of ionic energy and the multiplication of atomic and thermo-nuclear experiments constitute a threat to flora and fauna and to man himself.
Danger may arise from:
Experimental atomic explosions.
Radio-active dust and waste ejected by the chimneys of atomic factories.
Water used in atomic factories and subsequently returned to rivers or poured into the sea.
Immersion at the bottom of the sea of containers holding atomic waste.

With the foregoing disclosures in this possession, what is this loyal citizen of the Earth Planet, this defender of the natural environment, going to say on the matter of the development and ownership of atomic power? I think he is going to say this:

“We certainly do want to explore all the possibilities of atomic energy for peacetime purposes. We want to know as soon as possible whether its costs can be so reduced as to make it economically feasible in industry and science. But, in view of the risks of both its development and industrial use, atomic power must not be surrendered into private hands. Atomic power—all atomic power—must be publicly owned, publicly developed, publicly operated, under management responsible to the whole of society and not to private profit-takers.”

Finally, this citizen of the Earth, with his religion of conservation, must delve into this whole question of power at the base of modern industry. He must exert every conceivable pressure, social, economic, political, to compel a shifting from the depletable to the non-depletable sources. Coal, oil, gas, are on the way out—they will be only minor power sources by the end of the century. Both the life span of nuclear energy derived from the split uranium atom and the extent of uranium sources are uncertain, although there are optimistic predictions. The fact remains, however, that uranium is depletable.

WHERE then will this Earth- and universe-conscious citizen turn? If he has mastery of society, he will turn to the great non-depletables, the sun, the moon, and the winds, and he will command the shift. Proudly he will point to publicly owned hydro as proof of the wisdom of his decision. Here is a power resource, linked to the drifting mists and rains of the ageless hydrologic cycle, which, if its potential were fully realized, could meet the economy’s present needs. It is true that with the rapidly expanding power requirements of the nation it would be inadequate in the not-distant future, but it is a fixed supply—it does not decrease from year to year as does the energy from coal, oil, gas, and the uranium atom. Moreover, it is a clean power, polluting neither sky, earth or sea. And instead of impairing the earth’s resources, it expands them. Its multiple-purpose dams provide not only power and light but flood control, irrigation, stream regulation and navigation, recreation and a new and revolutionary regional frontier.

The inexhaustibility, from the view-point of man, of the power resources of sun, moon, and wind is obviously indisputable.

For more than two billion years the sun has been crashing the earth’s surface with its nuclear energy, delivering enough power to run all the industries of the United States from collector-mirrors on 100-mile square of desert.

The power of the moon—the tide-creating pull on the earth’s oceans—has long fascinated the scientific and engineering mind. In the 1930’s, Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed the harnessing of the massive ebb and flow of the waters of Maine’s Passamaquoddy Bay as a Works Progress Administration project. His board of three eminent engineers contended that the planned dams and high-tide basins could furnish electricity at economical rates. But the reactionaries in Congress entered boisterous denials and buried the scheme under an avalanche of anti-“socialist” and anti-“boondoggling” allegations.

That the uses of the winds, with the exciting historic background of their great mills against the sky, could be considerably extended under scientific direction is conceded by high authority. Present mechanisms convert the wind’s energy into low-load electric power which definitely pays off in areas remote from water power. But whether these mechanisms could ever be made competitive to present-day power supplies is a matter of conjecture.

The problem of the conversion of power from these various non-depletable sources has never been under sustained and organized inquiry in the United States. This is a job beyond the immediate capacities of the isolated laboratories of the private enterprisers—they cannot solve the problem in time. Public enterprise can and must solve it. The loyal citizen of the Earth Planet must marshal the political forces necessary to that end. The long and ruthless raid of Greed upon the basic wealth of Nature must be stopped. Loving care must take the place of the befoulment and destruction of man’s environment. This is the inescapable task and responsibility of the religion of conservation.
A Lawyer Looks at the "Security Risk" Program

by Charles C. Lockwood

PREVIOUS to 1953 the term "security risk" had very little significance to me. In August of that year a very discouraged young man entered my office. He told me he had visited six lawyers that day and none of them would take his case. I asked him what he was charged with and he said the Air Force charged him with being a security risk. The young man's name was Milo Radulovich. His case was widely publicized and had a definite impact upon the security program.

Since that time there have been a considerable number of security risk cases arising in Detroit involving military personnel, industrial engineers, college professors, etc. In all of these cases, the procedure has been the same. A very general statement of charges or allegations is furnished the accused and a hearing date is set. The hearing is private. A hearing board composed of three high-ranking military officers or other government officials presides. The accused and his attorney are not acquainted with the members of the hearing board and are at a decided disadvantage to protect against possible bias or unfairness to sit. At the beginning of the hearing, the president of the hearing board rises and reads the allegations made against the accused. The president then sits down. The government's case has been concluded. The accused is automatically presumed to be guilty and must now proceed to prove his innocence as best he can.

In all of the many cases in which I have appeared, never once has an accused been confronted by the accusers. Never once have I had the opportunity of cross-examination of a complaining witness. Not only do the accusers remain anonymous, but what the accusers say is kept secret. Such information is placed in a sealed envelope which is marked "Confidential." This information is fully available to members of the hearing board, but is completely unavailable to the accused. My experience has been that many of the charges brought in these cases are solely the result of personal jealousy, spite, religious or political differences. But the nature of the procedure makes it difficult or impossible to prove this.

Mr. Lockwood has been practicing law in Detroit for the past 35 years, and is now president of the Greater Detroit Consumers Council, and a director of the Detroit Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union.

THE allegations that are made and which constitute the basis for the "security risk" brand frequently show the ridiculous character of the proceedings (to me) and the efforts made which have the effect of suppressing civil liberties. For instance in this same case, two of the charges in substance were:

1. It is reported that while a student at the medical school you read a radical newspaper.
2. It is reported that in 1952 you attended a meeting in which the Rosenberg case was discussed.

In another case which involved a college professor, we were confronted by two charges in substance:

1. It is reported that you acted as chairman of a meeting of the Federation of Teachers at which academic freedom was discussed.
2. It is reported that while a student in college you attended a class taught by a subversive professor.

There is scarcely a security case that I am familiar with in which similar charges are not made the basis for the proceeding. Furthermore, the rights of the accused are endangered by the frequent practice of the government in giving to rumor and unverified allegations a weight and value unwarranted and unfair. For example, in another security case, the Navy prefaced each charge with these words: "Based on reliable information, it is alleged that you," etc. Now, as a matter of fact, at the hearing the Navy made no claim that it had knowledge that such information was reliable. My objections to this statement as unfair were not challenged. If hearing boards, however, assume that allegations and information in their secret files are necessarily factual and reliable, then the accused is at a most decided disadvantage.

In fact a typical security risk hearing is so disturbing and frustrating and so contrary to our traditional American procedure as to constitute an enormous emotional strain on any lawyer taking part therein. The injustice and one-sidedness of the proceeding is so evident as to make one wonder sometimes if somehow he isn't in some other part of the world or living in another period of history.

In the almost four years that have elapsed since the Radulovich case, but few improvements or changes in regulations and procedures have taken place. Much too little effort has been made by legislative bodies or investigative agencies to meet mounting criticism. It would seem, however, that before an attempt is made to reform and modernize the federal security program, consideration might well be given to the basic question of whether this specific program needs to be continued.

It should be remembered that for more than a century and a half the United States had no security risk program at all. We have many laws and regulations on our books which in the past seemed well able to deal with all cases involving breach of trust or threat to the security of the nation. And the fact that there may be some risk involved in dropping the security program does not necessarily mean that it should be retained. History has shown that there is no such thing as absolute security and that democracy must accept and assume some risks if it is to fulfill its basic function which is the protection of the public welfare and the preservation of the people's liberties.

I appreciate, however, that many well-informed officials and attorneys feel strongly the need of a federal security program and would take sharp issue with those who advocate its repeal or discontinuance. Certainly, no hasty action should be taken. But it is true that unless proper and long overdue safeguards and corrections are adopted that pressure for repeal will continue to mount. In the event, however, that the security program is continued, I would strongly urge the following corrections:

1. The fundamental constitutional right of the accused to face his accusers must be reserved.
2. A careful check of all information and allegations should be made before they become the basis for a security risk proceeding.
3. The accused should have the same right to challenge the members of a hearing board that he has now to challenge the membership of a jury.
4. The accused in a security risk hearing should have the same rights and access to investigative material that he now has in a criminal case.
5. The hearing should be public unless classified or confidential material is involved.
6. There must be definite recognition that the accused is entitled to the same presumption of innocence that now prevails in any criminal proceeding. This is of the utmost importance.
7. Adequate legal representation for defendants who are without funds should be provided. Approximately one-third of all security risk cases in Detroit have involved individuals who were without funds to pay an attorney.
8. No organization shall be listed as subversive except after an opportunity for fair and proper legal hearing. (Perhaps the most frequent charge brought in security risk cases is membership in some listed organization.)

In fact the whole proceeding and practice must be overhauled so as to make it conform to traditional American justice. No lawyer who has ever had any personal experience with a security risk hearing would, I am sure, be willing to settle for less than that, and lawyers and Bar Associations have a very real responsibility to inform themselves on the subject and make their opinions known to responsible government officials and agencies.

SEPTEMBER 1957
Guiana, South American possession of the British, has twice given a majority to a freedom-seeking nationalist party. The first time, in 1953, the British removed the nationalists from office; this August they won a new election.

Guiana Wants Freedom

by Frank Bellamy

British Guiana's election on August 12 has confronted the British with a repeat performance of their 1953 problem. Despite a split in the People's Progressive Party of Cheddi Jagan, he swept the election in a landslide that gained his candidates nine out of the 14 elective seats in the Legislative Council, and rolled up roughly the same percentage of the popular vote (about half) as in the previous election. L. F. S. Burnham's split-away wing, which had attacked Jagan as being too leftist, won three seats. All the British efforts since 1953, involving the removal of a legally elected government from office by military force, the imprisonment of its leaders, attempts to strengthen so-called "moderate" parties, and a new constitution, have failed to weaken nationalist and progressive strivings.

For the first three days after the PPP victory, rumor, seemingly backed up by statements from the British Governor's office, had it that Dr. Jagan would be called on to form a government. On August 16, however, the Governor issued a statement saying that while Dr. Jagan was being invited to join the new cabinet, he would not be given the victory's prerogative of forming it and guiding the government. Dr. Jagan reportedly told the press that the Governor's communiqué had been agreed upon with him. Under the 1956 constitution, the British have the power to dismiss any or all members of both the legislature and the cabinet.

The present article is, to the editors' knowledge, the most complete current exposition of the problems and politics of British Guiana to be published in this country. It was written just prior to the election. Frank Bellamy is the pen name of a New Jersey newspaperman who has made a special study of Guiana.

* * *

FOUR summers ago avowed socialists controlled the government of British Guiana. They won control not through violent revolution but through free elections; nevertheless, it was through the threat of violence that their power was overthrown. On October 9, 1953, the British, back-tracking on democracy, suspended the colony's liberal constitution under which the socialist government had been elected, sent gunboats to British Guiana shores and, subsequently, put some of the socialists in jail. The Foreign Office in London carried the day.

The emergency regulations and restrictions the British imposed continued almost four years, and it was not until August 12, 1957 that British Guianese went again to the polls. This time, however, the Foreign Office, by limiting the scope of the election, tried to make sure in advance that democracy would not get out of hand and another socialist government get into office.

British Guiana, a country of 508,000 population, is Britain's sole possession on the continent of South America.

DR. CHEDDI JAGAN, shown speaking, has swept the elections in British Guiana for the second time. Beside him is L. F. S. Burnham, formerly co-leader in the People's Progressive Party and Minister of Education in Jagan's short-lived 1953 government, who has since split away from Jagan.

The colony's language is English, its favorite sports are cricket and boat racing, and its people are predominantly the descendants of slaves from Africa and indentured Hindu laborers from the slums of Calcutta and the hills of East India. The Guianese have more in common, economically, politically and culturally, with the dark-skinned peoples of Jamaica and Trinidad and other islands of the British West Indies than with their immediate neighbors in South America—the peoples of Venezuela, Brazil and Dutch Guiana. Along the colony's seaboard lies a coastal belt from five to ten feet below sea level, reminiscent, but for the frequent clumps of coconut palms, of the Netherlands coast. Sea walls, dikes, dams, ditches and drainage systems have reclaimed much of the shore from the sea, making it a flat and extremely fertile region, ideal for the growing of rice and a peculiar under-water method of sugar cultivation. The rice is grown by peasant farmers who work a typical plot of two to five acres. The sugar, British Guiana's most important export crop, is produced on huge plantations owned by coupon clippers in England and manned by poorly paid and seasonally employed Guianese.

THE dark-skinned Guianese outnumber the white Britons more than a hundred to one; yet the white Britons rule. They have ruled Guiana for exactly 150 years, and even though they have replaced some of the profit taken from the colony, in general, they have nothing to be proud of.

The people are undernourished. Most cannot afford a plentiful and varied diet but must live on rice, vegetable curries and ground (root) provisions. One result of poor diet and overcrowding is a high rate of tuberculosis. An-
other is that many cannot work at full capacity because their stamina has been sapped by life-long malnutrition. Infant mortality is three times the U. S. rate. Housing is a disgrace.

Floods are frequent along the coast because the ocean waters are inadequately controlled. When floods occur bridges are carried away, fields become awash, and the inflated carcasses of cattle float through the rice paddies. There are 50 miles of paved roads in a country the size of New York and Pennsylvania combined.

The ten-hour day and the six-day week are normal. Unemployment is high, so high that young single women compete for the “honor” of spending two-year hitches as domestic servants in Canada, and men clamor for farm jobs in the United States. Only one in 25 Guianese is a trade unionist. And the average weekly wage is in the neighborhood of $5.

The Guianese have tried to rid themselves of the kind of government which still permits such conditions after 150 years of rule. For at least 10 years the undisputed leader of the independence movement has been 39-year-old Dr. Cheddi Bharat Jagan, a dentist who was able to get his training in the United States at Howard and Northwestern Universities by selling ice cream on summer nights on Harlem’s Lenox Avenue. At Northwestern in Chicago he met and married Janet Rosenberg, a nurse, and took her back to British Guiana in 1943. They now have three children and live in Georgetown, the capital. Mrs. Jagan is probably more popular than even her husband, for she is the only white woman of alien birth ever to slosh through the sugar cane fields on an equal footing with the cane cutters, whom she has helped to organize. In 1950 the Jagans participated in the establishment of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), the first real “poor man’s” party in Guiana history. In 1953, a new liberal constitution came into force. It eliminated voting restrictions that had previously disfranchised all but the property, and substituted universal adult suffrage. Jagan and other PPP leaders entered the election running on a program of a broad New Deal for the colony. Jagan stumped for land reform, for a social security program, low-rent housing, government-controlled and secular schools, encouragement of new industry, enforced recognition of trade unions along the lines of the Wagner Act, and nationalization of the sugar plantations, without which the vicious system of exported sugar profits could not be ended and the social reforms paid for.

In orderly elections held in April 1953, the PPP got 51 per cent of the vote and 18 of the 24 seats in the legislative council. Jagan became the new prime minister. When he and other PPP leaders took their seats in the new government and tried to put their campaign promises into law, the opposition parties, the British landlords, government officials and businessmen intensified their charges that the “Jagans & Co.” were agents of Moscow determined to communize the colony. The attacks mounted, the tension heightened. Charges and countercharges flew. Finally, after the PPP had been in office less than six months, the Foreign Office kicked it out, suspended the constitution, gave emergency powers to the royal governor, and sent gunboats and troops to the colony, not to prevent open revolution as the hypocrites in both London and Washington piously said, but to quell disorder expected to break out among a citizenry enraged at seeing their hard-earned political gains go down the drain.

But no violence occurred. Not even a firecracker went off in the colony. It is not easy to understand why the Guianese have not fought and died for independence as others colonials under the British thumb—those of Cyprus, Kenya and Malaya—have fought and died. One explanation is that in British Guiana there is no farm land to attract English settlers (what Englishman would “lower” himself to plant rice or cut sugar cane?). In Kenya the English settlers gobbled up the rich highlands and left the scrub and jungle for the Africans. In British Guiana this source of potential resentment has been avoided. Competition for jobs between Englishmen and Guianese is at a minimum for there are only 4,000 Englishmen in the colony. A second explanation is that the British have been able to buy off Guianese discontent with snobbery. Snobbish Guianese curry British favor so they can win trophy-like titles to put behind their names, titles like CBE, OBE, MBE, and BEM.

Thus, while the Guianese were sorely distressed at the passing of their constitution and convinced it was a typical act of British perfidy, their protests remained peaceful even when Jagan and later Mrs. Jagan went to jail for six months for violating a curfew that confined their movements to Georgetown.

EARLY in 1955 the PPP was split by factionalism. The followers of the Jagans grouped themselves in one faction and the followers of Forbes Burnham in a second. Burnham, a Negro lawyer and second in command under Jagan during the short PPP reign, rallied those moderates who said, with much justification, that Jagan had unnecessarily goaded the British into suspending the constitution by his uncompromising stands, his excessive zeal, his insistence upon immediately legislating drastic reforms—in a word, by his “infantile leftist.” The most unfortunate aspect of the PPP split was its racial overtones. Most of the East Indians (numbering some 215,000, or nearly half the population) supported Jagan, most of the Negroes (about 165,000 in the colony) supported Burnham.

The factional bitterness has continued unhealed. Last fall in a lengthy polemic, Jagan made the unwarranted charge that the “opportunist Burnham clique” had sold out to the British and caused the split in the PPP at British bidding. Jagan also charged Burnham with being “middle-class,” a “master craftsman in the use of demagoguery and left phraseology,” and of using “tricks and stratagems” to take over the party “illegally.” Closer to the mark was Jagan’s analysis of his own shortcomings, in a manner reminiscent of that employed by American Communists after the Soviet Twentieth Congress. Jagan said he and his supporters had suffered from “mistakes and errors of judgment, certain indiscretions of youthful exuberance,” and “left deviationist tendencies.” “Some comrades of the left,” he said, “behaved in a mechanistic fashion; copying wholesale revolutionary tactics and slo-
gans of left parties in the metropolitan, capitalistically advanced countries, without bothering to study carefully our concrete conditions and historical stage of develop-
mament. . . . In the period of our Party ascendance up to October 1953, we committed deviations to the left. We definitely overrated the revolutionary possibilities of our Party, the leader of the liberation movement. We allowed our zeal to run away with us. We became swollen-headed, pompous, bombastic."

One of Jagan's analyses was incontrovertible: "The split has definitely weakened our national movement for liberation from imperialism." Although taking advantage of that weakness, the British felt compelled to hold elections this summer because of the pressure of public opinion in Britain and the failure of the interim government to solve problems in Guiana. Jagan has called the new constitution under whose terms the elections were held, a "disguised dictatorship." And all the Guianese political parties—there are eight of them—have joined in rejecting it and demanding the restoration of the 1953 constitution. Whereas the 1953 constitution made all 24 legislative council seats elective, the new constitution permits election of only 14 councilmen. His Excellency the Governor Sir Patrick Renison, KCMG, has the power to appoint up to 14 others, thus assuring that if the "wrong" party wins it still cannot run the colony. The governor also retains the power to veto all legislation, and Jagan's former post of prime minister has been abolished.

No matter what the outcome of the August 12 election, it is likely that many more elections will pass before British Guiana can drop the "British" from its name. Both Jagan and Burnham travelled to Africa last spring to witness the evolution of another British colony, the Gold Coast, into the independent nation of Ghana. While Ghana in Africa is on about the same latitude as Guiana in South America, and about the same size, its chief crop—cocoa—has always been owned and controlled by native Africans. But Guiana's chief crop—sugar—has always been owned and controlled from London. London lost less economically by giving up political control over Ghana than it would lose economically by surrendering political control over Guiana.

Sugar is Guiana's chief export crop. Its chief export product is bauxite, the ore from which aluminum is made. Sixty-five miles from the Atlantic coast up the Demerara River sprawls the $40 million Mackenzie bauxite center, producing more bauxite in a given year than all the bauxite mines of North America put together. Mackenzie is owned and operated by a wholly owned subsidiary of Aluminum, Ltd., which has its headquarters in Montreal and is nominally a Canadian corporation, but whose stockholders are 70 percent American and whose president is a resident of Marstons Mills, Mass. Almost one-half of all bauxite mined at Mackenzie eventually finds its way to aluminum-hungry United States. Besides Mackenzie, there is only one other significant bauxite mining center in British Guiana. That is Berbice, owned and operated by the Reynolds Metals Company of Richmond, Virginia. Other American corporations—Harvey Aluminum, Kennecott Copper and Anaconda Copper—have spent millions exploring for bauxite deposits in the colony.

Another mineral vital to the Defense Department's "strategic stockpile" is manganese; this the Union Carbide Corporation is exploiting. Others are columbite and tantalite, essential ingredients in high-temperature steel alloys used in jets, gas turbines, rockets and guided missiles, and taken out of the jungles of Guiana by Harvey Aluminum and Morabisi Mining Company, the last an American-financed corporation.

UNITED States interest in this piece of British real estate goes further than mere desire to keep it as a source of profits to American companies, a source of minerals for the "strategic reserve," and a stopping-off place for Air Force jets at American-built Atkinson Airfield outside Georgetown. It goes as far as a determination to make British Guiana a safe oasis in what the State Department calls the "Caribbean Danger Zone."

There is impressive evidence that the State Department, putting the Monroe Doctrine on the shelf, prodded, if it did not actually incite, the British to use armed force against Guiana four years ago. There is room for only a fraction of that evidence: "Troops were landed in British Guiana with the knowledge and approval of the United States Government" (Reuters dispatch, London Times, October 26, 1953); "British . . . dispatch of troops to Guiana now is being backed to the hilt by the United States . . ." (New York Herald-Tribune, October 11, 1953); and, "The United States stood firmly at the side of Britain today [October 9, 1953] . . . [and] would be gravely concerned [said a State Department spokesman] at the threat to the security of the hemisphere which would arise if British Guiana fell victim to the international Communist conspiracy . . ." (New York Times, October 10, 1953).

Conspiracy between American and British reaction, not any "international Communist conspiracy," is what victimizes British Guiana. The Guianese are learning that colonial peoples get freedom only through struggle, as imperialists refuse to give up power, profits and possessions voluntarily.
Why “Close Out” the Farmer?

by Edward M. Gleason

AFTER reading such articles as “How Deep Is the Farm Crisis” by Harold Ellithorpe, in October 1956 Socialist Call, and “A Solution for the Farmers” by An East Coast Reader, in January 1957 American Socialist, and many others by non-farming “experts” on the farm problem, program, crisis, or whatnot, I wonder if a mere dirt farmer might presume, or even aspire, to a few words on the subject. Believe me, I am truly touched by the great agony of soul our would-be helpers have undergone on our behalf. To tell the truth, I feel much as I imagine the hogs must feel about the controversy now being waged in the packinghouses as to the most humane manner of helping them make the transition from country hog to city pork.

So with deep humility, I now venture to set forth a few pertinent facts, notions and prejudices of my very own concerning the present plight of us farmers, how we got this way and what I, at least, hope we can do about it. Our dear friend from the East Coast spends the first two paragraphs of his fulminations trying to prove that farm folks are no better’n anybody else. That, we farmers freely concede. I do believe however that a farm is a good place to work and live and love and raise a family. For one thing, on a farm, a husband and wife work and plan and scrimp and try to save and really live, together. Children are a blessing, they are loved and welcomed for there is a place for them, they belong. They begin to learn by helping at an early age, they are of the family and it never occurs to them that they are not wanted or don’t belong. They proudly shoulder their responsibilities and carry their share of the load, for farming is a family enterprise. The proof of the pudding is the eating thereof and the statistics show that there are fewer divorces and broken homes among farm folk than among any other class of people. It isn’t because they are intrinsically better, it’s just because farm life is more conducive to a normal, happy life.

The rest of our dear-friend-from-the-East-Coast’s efforts are based on the utterly false premise that “we have 2.8 million farms too many” and that the only solution to the farm problem is the “closing out of 600,000 farms a year” until the number of farms is reduced to the 2 million figure arbitrarily assumes is the magic number we need. I especially like that “closing out,” it is so much nicer than saying starving out, don’t you think? “Closing out” 2.8 million farm families is also the solution favored, and advocated, by the Farm Bureau (the organization dominated by the Wall Street hayseeds and the La Salle Street cowboys); it is also the method being used so successfully by this Administration. Everything Ezra Taft Benson has done since taking over the Department of Agriculture has been done with that sole objective in view. Strange bedfellows for our socialist friend, are they not?

Of course they all have slightly different notions as to just how to go about changing us from country hogs into city pork, but once we are “closed out,” it just won’t make any difference which method they used. What I want to know is, how do they all get so dogmatically sarton-shoor extermination is the only solution to our farm problem? Why doesn’t someone come up with the bright idea that the way to solve the unemployment problem is to re-settle all the unemployed on the land? It would make some sense while their solution for the farm problem makes exactly no sense at all.

THERE are a host of other ways the farm problem can be solved; the only question is, which is the best way? We should choose the one that experience has proven can be operated by the farmers themselves without subsidies and with an absolute minimum of outside interference. It should be streamlined to enable the family-type farmer to compete on even terms with the factory-in-the-field type of farm. The only reason the big corporation-operated factories in the field can survive at all is that almost without exception, they pay sub-standard wages, and they can buy all their supplies, including machinery, at wholesale and sell their farm products at retail. More often than not they have a direct tie-in with the processor and the retailer. That is what we mean by vertical integration. So you can forget that old canard about us family-type farmers being less efficient than the factory-in-the-field type, for the statistics show conclusively the exact opposite to be true. Don’t take my word for it, dig the facts if you really want to know.

Mr. Gleason is an Arkansas farmer who has also been an engineer, printer, and newspaperman; he writes “whatever I dinkety please to whomever I please, whenever the spirit moves me.”

SEPTEMBER 1957
If a farmer wants to, or has to, give up farming and move to the city, he can and usually does, find a place for himself if he has to push a city chap aside to do it. There are no more resourceful or self-reliant people in the world. They have to be to make a go of it on a farm. It's just that we like farm life and we intend to stay on the farm. The sooner you non-farm experts realize we are not a bunch of congenital idiots, morons, and country bumpkins and start learning a few of the facts of farm life, the better it will be for all of us. We are deeply moved by your concern over us but we would prefer for you to stop trying to move us off our land. We can also manage somehow without your patronizing condescension.

The farm plan we had before the Publicans took a meat axe to it was far from perfect but it was a start and it has helped us to know what we can do and what we cannot do, what will work and what will not work. After all, the old trial and error method is the most scientific yet devised by man. Theories have a disgusting habit of overlooking a lot of unforseeable facts that knock them all out of kilter. We always have to make a lot of trial runs, work out the “bugs” we find and then make more trial runs. It is a never ending round of plan, try, test, adjust, and plan again. But it makes progress.

As of now, farmers are an island of free enterprise completely surrounded by a sea of monopoly. The solution I favor is for us farmers to organize, monopolize farming, and set up a system of marketing quotas, build enough well-designed storage space to store an adequate “strategic reserve of food and fiber”—call it a Food and Fiber Bank if you like—and then figure out a new parity based on parity of income.

BRIEFLY, each farm should be given a marketing quota based on the amount a family could produce by operating the farm on an efficient basis. No farm should be allotted a smaller marketing quota than it can efficiently produce, and absolutely no farm should be given more than a family-size quota unless the sum of all the quotas for a commodity falls below the contemplated demand.

The norm to be aimed at in the strategic reserve should be enough to guard against disaster. At present our “burdensome surpluses” fall far short of a safe amount and with our farms producing at full capacity it would take at least ten years to build up a safe reserve. For that reason it will not be necessary to cut any family-type farmer to below his maximum productive capacity but would on the other hand allow those whose productivity is presently below their normal capacity to build it up to normal.

Once we have achieved the norm set as a safe strategic reserve, the total national marketing quota should be set each year to maintain the supply as near the norm as practical. Whenever the amount of any commodity in the strategic reserve rises above the norm, the marketing quota should be set below the contemplated demand. Whenever the amount falls below the norm, the marketing quota should be set above the contemplated demand.

At all times the Farm Program Authority should pay the parity price to all farmers who offer any part of their crop for sale, and sell to anyone who wants to buy any commodity in storage at a price sufficiently above parity to defray storage, handling and administrative expenses, plus a margin of safety. In this way the plan would be self supporting. There would never be more than a small percentage of a crop go into the strategic reserve. Some years a small amount would go into storage. Some years a small amount would be taken out of storage.

The above applies to all storable and semi-storable farm commodities. Surplus non-storables would have to be channeled directly into the school lunch program, to the needy, and to charitable institutions, but otherwise the system would be the same as for storable commodities. Imports and exports would have to be on a strict quota basis.

THIS system would give us total control, with the least possible restrictions on the family-type farmers. It would help the factory-type farm by giving it a stable market at a fair price. The consumer would be protected because the parity price of each commodity would be based on the most efficient type of production, and a farmer would have to produce his full marketing quota to earn a parity income.

If any of you readers are under the illusion that the factory-type farmers are in competition with each other, perish the thought. There is not, and there is no likelihood of any real competition between them. If we are ever naive enough to let the factory farmers take over the farming industry, we will really see some efficiency, in socking the dear peepul for all the market will bear, that is.

It would take three or more much longer articles than this to fully set forth the plan, of which I have given you a sketchy outline of only one facett. There would be credit unions, crop insurance, conservation projects for the conservation of soil, water, timber, recreation areas, wild life, etc. There would be marketing, processing and procurement co-ops, service co-ops, machinery pools, and custom work of all kinds. All this and much, much more would not only help the family-type operator to produce more efficiently, but more efficiency would mean lower prices to the consumer.

After all, America is one country and all segments of its economy must prosper if any of it is to continue to prosper for any length of time. The entire economic body must be healthy and remain healthy, even the coccyx, as our East Coast friend called us.

SOME companies object vigorously to adopting [stock purchase plans for employees] . . . they use such arguments as these:

- The plans are a headache to administer.
- Stockholding might stimulate insubordination among workers (says one executive: “They might start really thinking it’s their company!”).
- If the stock market should dip, ill will would result. When Pfizer’s stock fell below this option price in 1953 and 1954, there was an exodus of many employees from the plan (although many then bought Pfizer shares on the open market with the money they withdrew).
- Employees in the role of stockholders can ask questions that might be embarrassing to management.
- Some employees tend to regard owning stock as a guarantee against getting fired.

—Business Week, May 11
Perhaps I am being unfair to Mr. Howe. I am not acquainted with the details of his personal trauma and the case history given above may not apply to him. But of one thing I am certain: he is a badly wounded man who seeks to justify his injuries.

His book is built upon a proposition which is only fully revealed in its final chapter. Here he says of George Orwell’s “1984,” which is the culminating point of his study: “In (it) the political themes of the novels that have been discussed in the earlier chapters wrest their final and terrible flowering, not perhaps in the way that writers like Dostoevsky or Conrad expected but in ways that establish a continuity of vision and value between the nineteenth and twentieth century political novelists.” And what is this “continuity of vision and value”? It is the tradition of despair in all radical social action, the currently very fashionable feeling of “utter alienation.”

With varying emphasis this theme is traced back through the novels of Orwell, Koestler, Malraux, Silone and Dos Passos in our generation. Here the prevailing mood of despair is attributable directly to disillusionment with the outcome of the Russian Revolution. Of these authors I shall only say that they may be extreme, and justified as their criticism of the Stalin regime may be, they seem blinded to the positive achievements of the Soviet order and often exalt their bitterness and revulsion into a mystique.

But what shall we say when Mr. Howe carries us back, with obvious approval, to the venomously anti-socialist novels of Joseph Conrad—“Under Western Eyes” and “The Secret Agent”? True, he has reservations about Conrad’s politics, but his mere selection of them shows the sort of tradition he is attempting to establish. In case some readers are not familiar with them, let me put to point out that they were Conrad’s bitter counter-attack against the Russian Revolution—not of 1917, but of 1905. The hero of one of these books is a young and unadventured and, apart from their historical interest, as novels they are unquestionably among Conrad’s poorest and have been so treated by all reputable critics until the exigencies of the Cold War called for their exhumation.

Next we are treated to the two novels in which the adopted English Tory, Henry James, dealt with politics—“The Bostonians,” with lampoons on the New England feminist movement, and “The Princess Casamassima,” a very bad novel which purports to describe the workings of anarchism in the London underworld. Beyond James we come to what Mr. Howe considers “the greatest of all political novels”—Dostoevsky’s “The Possessed,” which Dostoevsky himself recommended that their pessimism seems to me extreme and justified as their criticism of Russian radicalism.

Nor is this the end: We are introduced to a novel of Henry Adams which despairs of democracy, a little-known romance of Hawthorne’s which attacks the utopian Brook Farm community and then are given versions of both Stendhal and Turgenev which accent those points of their philosophy most in accord with Mr. Howe’s.

I DO not wish to detract from Mr. Howe’s great abilities. Much of his material he handles with skill and insight and, particularly in the chapters on Turgenev and Stendhal, he makes fascinating reading. Nor is it not coming to mind that the book is ever dull. My complaint is that he is engaged in tailoring an anti-socialist tradition and that by the mere process of his selection he has stacked the cards while keeping up the pretense of impartiality. For in his introduction he makes the broad claim that “my subject is the relation between politics and literature, and . . . the term ‘political novel’ is used here as a convenient shorthand to suggest the kind of novel in which this relationship is interesting enough to warrant investigation.”

This claim is completely meretricious for, in practice, the only kind of political novel which turns out to be “interesting enough to warrant investigation” is the anti-socialist, anti-radical novel of one stripe or another.

How completely he has determined his end result by the process of selection can be easily demonstrated by offering a parallel list of “political” novels which prove, in their totality, just the opposite. At random I suggest Tolstoi’s “War and Peace,” Turgenev’s “On the Eve,” Zola’s “Germinal,” France’s “Penguin Island,” E. M. Forster’s “Passage to India,” the Joseph trilogy of Thomas Mann, and Sholokhov’s “The Silent Don.” The list could be supplemented ad infinitum.

My argument is not over the relative literary merits of one set of novelists as against the other. I yield to no one in my admiration of Dostoevsky and Henry James as literary artists, but the fact remains that politically they were blinded by their conservatism and the novels in which they dealt with radical politics disclose nothing so much as that blindness.

Mr. Howe, then, is playing his game with loaded dice. That he is not unaware of this fact is revealed by his account of an incident at a lecture which the audience pressed him for his definition of a political novel.

“I said,” he writes, “—and this must have struck some of my listeners as outrageous—that I meant by a political novel any novel I wished to treat as if it were a political novel, though clearly one would not wish to treat most novels in that way.” I can close with no better comment on his critical method.

GEORGE HITCHCOCK

No Matter How You Slice It

THE AMERICAN CLASS STRUCTURE
by Joseph A. Kahn, Rinehart & Co.,
New York, 1957, $4.50.

Forty years ago, a book by this name would have been unhesitatingly, and accurately, attributed to a Marxist—or at least some kind of socialist. The fact that it is today a more or less routine product of academic sociology is an index to the impact which the great events of the last
quarter-century—depression, World War, colonial revolution, spread of communism, cold war—have had upon our orthodox schools of thinking. In the twenties, American sociology was an arid statistical plain of highly specialized studies and "correlations" within tightly compartmentalized fields such as the family, crime, education, etc. Much of that straitjacket tradition remains, but recent years have seen a greater impact of European scholarship, both Marxist and academic.

Professor Kahl brings together in admirably clear and concise fashion the results of current investigations and theorizing about class divisions in this country. A reader who applies himself will learn a lot about the subject. The many confusions that will still remain in his mind will be due to the shortcomings of American sociology, not to Mr. Kahl in his capacity as an author.

In the field of social classes, there is one accusation against Marx so standard that if you buy an orthodox book on the subject, you would probably be able to sue the author and collect: to wit, that Marx never wrote a complete and coherent work on his theory of classes. Nevertheless, Marx (and his co-worker Engels) did write many paragraphs which make his view completely and unambiguously clear. No one who is interested in the subject need be in doubt that Marx defines a socio-economic class by its relation to the means of production: capitalists, independent producers, wage workers, slaves, serfs, etc.

A section of academic sociology, by contrast, while accepting the concept of class, is anything but clear and decided as to what is meant, and fails to make itself clear in many large books. Mr. Kahl comes up with six different ways of dividing the population into classes: by prestige in the community; by occupation; by possessions; by friendships and associations; by their own feelings in the matter; and by the values they live by. The book presents a goodly amount of the most important data gathered by systematic researchers in each of these fields, much of it extremely interesting. Genuine class divisions along economic lines emerge clearly from the materials in each of the chapters, but the overall conception and framework remain deliberately hazy.

Mr. Kahl defines his method in the following way: "... in this work we consider all arguments about 'first causes' to be misleading. The true function of a theory is to clarify the variables involved, to show how to measure each one separately, and then to offer tentative hypotheses about their mutual relations. ... When we conceive of the subject matter as made up of a number of mutually dependent variables, we give up the search for original causes and substitute the search for degrees of relationship." "Let us," he adds ruefully, "confess at the outset that we have better questions than answers."

Faithful to this method, Professor Kahl works hard and intelligently at carving the nation six different ways. Naturally, no matter how he slices it he comes up with the same basic class divisions, which, while fuzzy at the edges or overlapping a bit here and there, remain essentially true to the economic structure dictated by our modern capitalist economy. American sociologists may go on puzzling as to whether the differing social habits, styles of life, and power positions of the different classes do or do not stem from their economic placement, but they will be virtually the only Americans in doubt in the matter. This is one of those cases where a plain phenomenon of life can be muddled up in one's mind only at the cost of a lot of specialized effort; but if we are to have a social science in our universities, clearly our scholars must make the effort or get too close to Marxism for comfort.

Among the "variables" that enter the sociologists' picture is the clash between subjective and objective criteria for class. Are there real divisions within the population, or are we to go by what people tell us themselves about the class they think they belong to? Characteristically, the reigning schools of sociology solve the problem by agreeing to accept both guiding lines, and give predominant weight to neither. Much interviewing has been done asking people to classify themselves, and the results have been interesting, both as information, and for the light they cast on many statistical layouts that are presented to us as gospel truth.

A lot depends on the way the question is posed, as Americans are anything but familiar with any precise lingo of class, although they feel its effects keenly enough. When asked: "What social class do you think you are in?", most gave the middle class as their locus, and nearly a fifth denied class or any knowledge of their place in it. Only a small number said "working class." When asked the same question but given a list of choices including upper, middle, and working class to check, the largest category chosen was "working class." There is no doubt that, in this as in other fields, interviewers can get any desired result within broad limits, by varying the form of questioning. All subjective criteria for class analysis suffer from the weakness that they deal not with class but with one stage or another of the consciousness of class, and from the fact that most investigators try to extract such a consciousness into a terminology and mode of expression not natural to the average run among the subjects. Far more weighty than questionnaires is an intimate knowledge and feel for the current of popular feeling gained by years of close association—a qualification notable for its absence in academic circles.

The major class divisions of American life are, as a matter of fact, well established: capitalists of large and medium degree; a middle class composed of petty capitalists, professionals, farmers, managers and technicians; a working class of the skilled, semi-skilled and common labor grades. What has raised more question is the trend: Is a large new middle class coming into being to take the place of our older—and now very much smaller—middle class of farmers and independent enterprisers?

Apparently the answer to this also depends on definitions and viewpoint. Certainly the growth of the professional class from 3 percent of the 1870 labor force to 8.5 percent in 1950 is one word in favor of the notion, as professionals are middle class in anybody's book. Yet, impressive as this gain is in percentage points, it is hardly enough to seriously modify the enormous shift to the working class occupations in the same eighty-year period.

Nor, if we look at the category of proprietors, managers, and officials in the Census Bureau figures, do we find much help there for the thesis of a numerous new middle class. The increase in this category has been slight—from 6 to 8.6 percent between 1870 and 1950. The major shifting has been within the managerial and professional groups and officials working for salaries increasing at the expense of independent proprietors.

Most of the claimants of a new preponderant middle class who search the occupation figures for proof generally cite the big growth of the categories taking in clerks, salespeople and kindred. This growth has been very large: from 4 percent in 1870 to 18.9 percent in 1950. And yet, the middle-class-sounding title covers some very proletarian ground.

Clerical and kindred work embraced about seven million persons in 1950, three-fifths women. Men employed in this kind of work showed a median income (which means that half the group made more and half made less) of about $3,000 a year, quite a bit lower than the median for skilled workers. It includes as its largest categories for men such occupations as shipping and receiving clerks, bookkeepers and mail carriers. A good third of the women employed in this category are listed as stenographers,

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secretaries and typists, showing a median income of $2,138 in 1950. Also included are a third of a million telephone operators, most of them unionized.

Among sales workers, not many of the 2.6 million men were middle-class Willy Lomans. Stock and bond salesmen, wholesaler manufacturers' salesmen, with their higher incomes, pulled the median for the category up to $3,026, but they were the smaller groups. A whopping near-half of the category were retail salesmen with a median income of $2,543. And among women sales workers, the 1950 census showed that fully 90 percent of the one and a third million in this category were retail sales personnel with a median income of $1,243.

In all, the clerical and sales groups emerge as made up of unskilled or semi-skilled employees, with a lower-than-blue-collar income. While white-collar status may conceal the generally proletarian attributes of these classifications from many including themselves, from the point of view of economic classification they are not in the new middle class.

Some have thoughtlessly pushed forward the service-worker grouping as an aspirant for the middle-class title, as they notice that this group is growing proportionately, at the expense of workers engaged directly in production of goods, and conclude that anything non-factory must be middle class. In this case, they are just juggling words. The category of "service workers" was newly introduced into the census in 1950, and it consists of a rearrangement, being composed about one quarter of people formerly classified as "semi-skilled" and three quarters of people formerly classified as "unskilled." It consists of such occupations as hospital and institutional attendants, barbers and beauticians, bartenders, bootblacks, counter and fountain workers, elevator operators, janitors, policemen and detectives, porters, waiters and waitresses, watchmen, etc. The median income of the group in 1950 was, men: $2,193; women: $1,055. Only a few in the service-worker category would qualify as middle class on anybody's scale except perhaps their own.

IN total, it can be said that from the point of view of occupation and real position in the economic machinery of the country, probably one-third of the nation could have been called genuinely middle-class in 1870, and perhaps one-quarter falls in that category today. In view of the sharp decline of independent entrepreneurship both in the farming and industrial-commercial fields, there is nothing surprising about such a result, even when one makes due allowance for the growth in the professional-technical-managerial ranks.

It can be protested that all of this is an extreme attempt to jam new types of workers into a Marxist category that was meant to embrace only industrial workers. Actually, these new workers fit the proletarian status delineated by Marx with complete precision in the economic sense. Even in terms of social status, outlook, values, and mode of life, the demarcating lines between the old and the newer working class groups are growing dimmer with every passing year. H. B.

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Student Protest Hits the Minnesota Capitol

The Minneapolis Tribune called it "the first large-scale march on the capitol since depression days. . . . Nowhere to be seen were the hostile faces of the hungry, dispossessed farmers of the 1930's. Yesterday's was a peaceable assembly of some 200 married students, most of them attractive young mothers carrying infants, pushing older youngsters in strollers."

The students went to see the governor in an effort to halt piecemeal destruction of University Village. University of Minnesota officials plan to build a cold-storage plant and other service buildings on the land now occupied by the Village. They are intent on doing away with the low-cost housing which has been available here for approximately 690 students families since 1946.

Student demands, ratified by about 450 students the night before the march on the capitol, are for maintenance of the Village at its present site for at least five years, construction within the next five years of new low-cost housing for married students, that is, prior to demolition of the present Village, and an end to conspiratorial methods on the part of University officials. What provoked this last demand was that the University received an appropriation from the state legislature for the cold-storage plant in April but did not inform the students that it planned to build it on Village land until the second week in August. One result of this secretiveness is that several families this summer have moved into, painted, and laid linoleum in units which they are now being asked to vacate by January 1.

Students are also angered by the memory of an agreement between the University and Village residents in 1953. Villagers at that time accepted a rent increase in exchange for assurances that the University would maintain the Village for eight years.

It is invigorating to witness and participate in a flare-up of the spirit of militant protest in mid-1957. It is also instructive. The people milling about in the rotunda of the state capitol looked to the Tribune reporter "more like a suburban shopping crowd than like protest marchers." It was nevertheless a demonstration of protest and not a shopping spree.

As a resident of more than five years among the students, I can venture a few observations about them. They were predominantly for Eisenhower in 1956 and they adhere to some of the values and mores of suburbia. Yet they also carry in the back of their minds the American predilection for direct action and they have acquired some useful knowledge of strike tactics developed by the union movement. In the heat of a mass meeting one sees people who were models of conformity on other occasions transfixed. The man who a month ago refused to sign a petition to halt H-bomb tests because "if we do the Russians will have us all in the salt mines," now thinks that an auto barricade is an appropriate defense against the threat of eviction. The student leader with an intense yearning for respectability suddenly proposes a campaign of telephone harassment against certain officials. The pre-med student who believes that Veterans' hospitals should be abolished because they are a form of socialized medicine denounces the opponents of low-cost housing for wanting to convert the state university into a "rich man's school."

The typical young married student is still the veteran getting 160 dollars a month in GI benefits. He has a pre-school child or two. His wife is a full time mother, or perhaps earns pin money baby-sitting or in other part-time work. In University Village barracks and Quonset huts such a student family gets two bedrooms, combined living-room and kitchen, bath, and storage closet for 45 dollars a month with utilities paid by the University. No comparable private housing is obtainable for less than twice this rent. Obviously such a family cannot afford to pay 100 dollars more for rent and utilities, and this is one of the immediate justifications for maintaining low-cost housing for married students. The need for such housing is great and growing. At Minnesota, as elsewhere in the country, about 20 percent of the students are married.

University officials and regents appear dead set against meeting this need. Their sentiments are echoed in the Minneapolis Star-Journal which editorially wonders why taxpayers "should subsidize a married student's family life." The point of view of the opponents of the University Village seems compounded of real estate men's hostility to low-cost public housing of any variety and the nostalgia of aging officials for conditions before World War II when hardly any students were married.

At the moment of writing the outcome of this little struggle between the needs of the present and the prejudices of the past remains in doubt. Nobody has offered to budge.

David Herreshoff

September 1957

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**Coming Attractions**

**ALTHOUGH** the summer season tends to be a slow one, we can't say that the heat has slowed up our contributing writers any. We have piled up so large a backlog of worthwhile copy that we are in a position to give our readers something of a preview of features they will find in coming issues. Unfortunately, we can't set a date on any of these articles, as new copy, some of it of a current type that calls for quick publication, keeps coming in, and often crowds out (for that month, anyway) articles we hoped to print. But here are some of the items:

* A lengthy analysis of the East Coast longshore union, the pressures upon it, the issues within it, and the future prospects.
* From Belgium: a survey of the labor and socialist movement there, with special emphasis upon the new Left that has emerged around "La Gauche."
* Reuben W. Borough, who was editor of Upton Sinclair's "EPIC News" in the thirties (and whose first article for this magazine appears in this issue) has placed in our hands a very interesting manuscript on the "End Poverty in California" movement and on Roosevelt's brief experimentation with EPIC measures during the depression.
* A detailed survey, from Great Britain, of the most important recent developments in that country. This manuscript is quite long, but interesting all the way through, and we are going to try to get as much of it as possible to you.

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