The American Socialist

From
Liberalism
to Laborism

By G. D. H. Cole:

NOVEMBER 1957
35 CENTS

The Space Age Opens

Inside the Teamsters Union

Our Fantastic Chariots Look Back at Hungary
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Ethics and Theology

I read with great interest the carefully stated article by Dr. Hans Freistadt ["Science, Truth, and Religion," August 1957] and the letter of criticism by Rev. William Baird [October 1957]. Rev. Baird seems to object to what he regards as an unwarranted trespass by Dr. Freistadt upon theological areas, yet it is precisely here where the author made his greatest contribution. Theologians never seriously question the existence of God; they start with God as an a priori conclusion, an incontestable fact to be accepted on faith. It is for this reason that the theologians never do wrestle with the real issues of life.

I submit that the first problem of religion is: "Does the God of orthodox religion exist?" If so, then ethics is woven inextricably with theology. If not, then a new foundation for ethics must be created or discovered. In religion, this is our central problem which the theologians never quite comprehend; if they did, they would no longer be theologians, at least not professionally. Men of science and even a few ministers of religion gradually are learning that orthodox religion is doomed by the advancing tide of knowledge of our universe. The disaster is not that belief in God is going. The disaster is that ethics were ever bound up with theology. Ministers believe that when God disappears from religion, religion will become unethical, but this is an unwarranted fear.

Secondly, I believe that Rev. Baird shows a lack of respect for science and a tragic lack of faith in the possibility of a scientific ethic. It is all very well to note the plight of man today, and our involvement in the responsibility for that plight; it is quite another thing to note that science is a very new resource for man. In time, science may be able to help man solve his emotional and navigational problems. Meanwhile, we must help men transfer their expectation of help from religion to science, or redirect religion to scientific goals and methods.

Finally, no socialist should argue with Baird if he insists upon rooting his socialism in a theistic Christian framework, but this is no reason for him to suppose that all of us must do so. He may make himself more comfortable in this setting; he may require the assurances it seems to provide him, but there are others of us engaged in a humanist ministry who stand alone, who do not require a Heavenly Father or a universe with a bias in favor of man, who have no theology—or at most a deper- sonalized one—and who have an ethic with no supernatural or theological guarantees that it will ever be realized.

Rev. Baird says: "It’s all very well to espouse Jesus’ ethic, but the evidence seems to indicate that one doesn’t get very far with his ethic until one appreciates (and it may be even espousers) the faith which He engendered." If this were true, the Christian church would be a great ethical dynamo; instead we find it to be a chief obstacle to the defeat of capitalism and in certain areas a bulwark of racial segregation. The evidence, unfortunately for Mr. Baird, is that theology has been a substitute for ethical action, or worse, a strong defense of unethical situations. Religion has been man’s spiritual organism with God; let us make it into a humanitarian movement for a world of peace and plenty. If Rev. Baird argues that the church has misrepresented Jesus to the world, one can only reply that the reason for this is to be found in the church’s obsession with theology, an obsession which Mr. Baird still seems to share.

Let us be defending God. If He did exist, He wouldn’t require guardians or salesmen. Since His existence has never been adequately demonstrated, and since His devotees are not in agreement as to His supposed attributes, it seems the point of wisdom to forget about theology and discharge our human duty to our fellow men, freeing them from economic, social, or theological enslavement. Dr. Freistadt’s presentation of the theory of scientific knowledge is a step in the direction of this "salvation."

Rev. Eugene Wm. Kerves Illinois

Who started the nationwide campaign now in progress to keep what some people call "comix and other comic literature" off the newsstands? I have heard that the Catholic clergy started it, but here in Kansas City the Protestant sects are more fanatically agitating the matter than the Catholics. They have succeeded in getting the city government to put a ban on that type of magazine, and even the newspapers don’t seem to realize the danger to freedom of the press in listening to this crowd of sappy, sentimental, wild-eyed, fanatic religious idiots.

Can’t something be said or written or done by somebody who can reach the large numbers of sensible Americans, to expose the fat-headed ignorance of this campaign to them?

H. E. F. Kansas City

If I may, I’d like to suggest some possible subjects and problems you might care to explore in future issues. I could certainly gain from them, and probably so could others. Here are my suggestions:

The benefits or failures of limited nationalization as against complete nationalization, or vice versa; the methods by which U.S. socialists could implement their program in a federal system and a division-of-powers government; the experience (good and bad) of individual nationalized industries; decentralization under socialism; the practicality of “socialist industrial union” government; the experience of farmer-labor parties in the U.S.; the accomplishments and problems of Social Democracy in Scandinavia; the fascist potential in this country (consider the government-structure, the hero cult, violence, etc.); and, most important, the prospects for war or peace.

M. S. St. Paul

With its Carnegie Hall meeting in New York on September 20, the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee kicked off its campaign for the abolition of that national disgrace, the House Un-American Activities Committee. Clark Foreman, ECLC director, is at present on a national tour to work up support behind such a movement.

The abolition idea is winning adherents in many liberal circles. For example, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., former chairman of Americans For Democratic Action, called for the abolition of both the Senate Internal Security Committee and the House Un-American Activities Committee in a debate before the Federal Bar Association. The campaign is worthy of the broadest support.

EDITORIAL BOARD
Bert Cohren
Harry Braverman
J. Geller

BUSINESS MANAGER
Eline Roseland

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
Arthur K. Davis
Kermit Eby
David Herreshoff
George Hitchcock
Conrad Lynn
Ernest Mazy
Harvey O'Connor
George Olshausen
George H. Shaw
William A. Williams

The American Socialist
November 1957
Vol. 4, No. 11

Published monthly by American Socialist Publications, Room 306, 857 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y. Telephone: WAthins 9-7739. Subscription rates: $3.00 for one year; $5.50 for two years. First-class mail: $5.00 for one year. Foreign $3.50 for one year; $6.50 for two years. Single copy; 35 cents. Second-class mail privileges authorized at New York, N. Y.

THE SPACE AGE OPENS
CONTRIBUTING EDITORS BOARD
FROM LIBERALISM TO LABORISM by G. D. H. Cole
WHAT THEY SAY ABOUT "LIMITED NUCLEAR WARFARE"
OUR FANTASTIC CHARIOTS by Frank Ballamy
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS by Harry Braverman
LOOK BACK AT HUNGARY by Shane Mage
BOOK REVIEW

AMERICAN SOCIALIST
The Space Age Opens

WHERE is it all leading? In 1945 we entered the atomic age. Seven years later, the hydrogen bomb was exploded. Several months ago, the Soviets launched the first intercontinental rocket. Now, a man-made moon, Russia's “Sputnik,” is circling the globe beeping-radio signals to the earth's inhabitants below (or is it above?). Isaac Asimov, professor of biochemistry and science-fiction writer extraordinaire, predicts that in a century the whole solar system will be open to us, and we have grown so accustomed to the merging of the fantastic and the real that no one has the temerity to declare the vision extravagant. Who knows? Equally unbelievable feats have already been compassed.

That we are in the midst of a shattering scientific revolution has become a truism. That this revolution is destined to transform our mode of existence, economically, politically, socially, will also be gainsaid by few.

But a veritable paralysis seizes the human brain when it tries to move from the Olympian generality to specifics in the daily round of existence. Homo sapiens, who came down out of the trees more ape than man, has become the lord of the earth and is now reaching out into the other planets and outer spaces. But he has still not mastered himself and has not become the architect of his own social organization. We are talking of space ships to the moon while two-thirds of the earth's people are still condemned to little better than an animal existence, and the favored third are slaves to insecurity and fear.

If the “Sputnik” had been shot into the firmament in the optimistic days before the first World War, the pean of joy going around the world would have been unalloyed. Everyone would have been convinced that the rolling back of the frontiers of science was a sure precursor of the improvement of the human lot. Now, our excitement and pride is overlaid with foreboding. Will this knowledge of the gods take us one step nearer to a war of annihilation? What is the use of reaching the moon if we devastate the earth?

We understand the fears and share them. Yet, trying to grasp the larger meaning in the chaotic welter of movements and events, we believe that we can discern social and scientific forces at work that are of greater power than the designs of diplomats and the gesticulations of war captains. These forces are furnishing the framework within which all diplomatic policies must necessarily be drawn, and will probably prove more compelling in outlining the destinies of mankind than the furies and frustrations of rulers.

LOOK at the course of this country's foreign policy: For over a decade, it has hinged on trying to create an overwhelmingly superior military machine to overawe the Soviets and to dictate terms. And each time, when our officials thought they were grasping the prize, it slipped from their hands, and their quarry was as distant as before. For a few years after the start of the cold war, our leaders were living in the fool's paradise of imagined monopoly of the atom bomb and were applying the squeeze to exploit their advantage to the full. By 1949, the Soviets broke the monopoly (science is not nationalistic, it cannot be refused passports) and confronted the State Department with the awful predicament that a new war would destroy sizable portions of the human race and turn whole continents into deserts; that it was doubtful there could be any victor in a third World War.

This unchallengable arithmetic should have dictated some basic re-formulation of our foreign policy. But the human brain, so audacious in science, moves like a crawling worm in political affairs. For eight years now the world has been plunged into an arms race that not only devours untold wealth and resources, but has turned the earth into a haunted house of terror. Peoples' nerves are growing more taut and human existence has taken on a quality of eeriness and unreality. Neither the State Department nor the Russians seem able to extricate themselves from the embrace of the voracious god that is ever hungry and ever demanding more feeding. Arms races are nothing new in the history of the human race, of course. Up to now, though, there has always been this element of rationality about it: Both sides had hopes of victory and of enjoying the spoils of the conquest. It was the supreme gamble. But what is the purpose of an arms race for a war in which there can be no victor?

Some of our high-powered security thinkers started worrying in the past year that this piling up of armaments, bases and war alliances wasn't breaking the deadlock and forcing a decision, that it left this country with no perspective. Men in high places gathered in the Council on Foreign Relations—labored and labored and came forth with the mouse of "limited nuclear warfare." As explained by Dr. Kissinger in his book, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," the proposition is that since global war is now impractical as an instrument of national policy, and since the threat of "massive retaliation" is not a workable strategy, we should strive for an agreement with the Soviets to fight only small nuclear wars with limited objectives in mind, a thought that is echoed, or more precisely, given a couple of more cold war twists, in an article by John Foster Dulles in the October issue of Foreign Affairs. The scheme is rigged with rules and regulations to ensure American victory in any contest, and under Dulles' exegesis, it becomes another vehicle for America to distribute wholesale to its war allies so-called tactical atomic weapons, and another propaganda weapon to ward off the Russian campaign for cessation of nuclear tests. It
is understandably therefore not being taken too seriously either at home or abroad.

A SIDE from the jokers attached to the proposal, the basic thought is without merit. There have been a number of small wars since 1945 in Korea, Indo-China, Egypt, Algeria.

LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR
See Page 9

The fear of a nuclear war of annihilation has undoubtedly controlled the actions of the major powers and has to some extent been operative in preventing their spread. This is the deterrent power inherent in the present possession of the obliteration weapons by both the world’s super-powers. It is a good thing that there is this much deterrent which has thus far kept the big guns from booming. But world public opinion correctly believes that it must have some better assurances for peace than that provided by the “balance of terror.” In an inflammable world, it may take only one match to set the works ablaze. It is a gruesome and irresponsible idea that the answer to the present impasse can be found in the legalization of limited nuclear wars. Every half-literate person understands that the tendency for limited wars to become unlimited wars, especially where both super-powers would be involved, is frighteningly large; that limited wars would aggravate, not mitigate, our peril.

Anyhow, this puny product of puny minds has already been washed out by the Soviet intercontinental missile, because Kissinger’s brainchild derived from our present series of bases and alliances. After the Russians got the atom bomb, the State Department sought to maintain its position of superiority by forging a far-flung system of war alliances, and setting up a network of bases ringing the Soviet Union. In any war, it believed that it could pulverize a good part of Russia with its long-range bombers based upon close-by bases and aircraft carriers, and while much of Europe, North Africa and Asia might get wiped out in the holocaust, the United States itself would remain a privileged sanctuary. There were many big “ifs” and questionable components in this military strategy from the first, but with our entrance into the rocket age, the strategy is obsolete. Once the intermediate and intercontinental rockets go into production (and considering the speed with which atomic and hydrogen bombs were developed, that should not be too long) our bases will become as vulnerable as the great battleships, Iowa and Wisconsin, which are now going into mothballs (they cost only $110 million apiece) and the Russians can hit us every bit as easily as we can hit them. (As a matter of fact, for the moment, they are ahead on missiles.) The “balance of terror” is being reinvigorated with a vengeance.

TURN as one may, science and technology have said their word on the matter, and politics can find no substitute to peaceful co-existence. We realize that its attainment is fraught with difficulties because the two world super-powers clash as conflicting social systems as well as antagonistic national states. But where a new global war may leave little beyond smoldering ruins, a practical settlement is dictated, and the social contest must get channelized along economic and political lines. It would seem elementary that the revolution in armaments and military arts has blocked off any other rational choice. But though the nuclear revolution has spoken imperiously on this score for almost a decade, it has not yet produced any like revolution inside people’s heads, and the preparations for

Is This the Answer?

THE Long Island Conference of Machinists, representing about 12,000 employees in aircraft and guided-missiles industries on Long Island which have been hit hard by layoffs in recent months, is campaigning for more arms spending. An emergency meeting on Oct. 9 declared that "the best interests of the country would be served if Congress seriously considered raising the debt ceiling with a view toward further appropriations for defense needs." The machinists' unit urged President Eisenhower to call a special session of Congress to "repair the damage already done to the national preparedness program and the well-being of the American people."

In Detroit, the International Executive Board of the United Automobile Workers echoed the demand on Oct. 12, expressing concern at the increasing layoffs resulting from arms-spending cutbacks, finding such cutbacks had been handled in a "socially irresponsible and economically questionable" way. "Now," the Board said, "is not the time to retrench."

The picture shows Democratic Governor Meyers of New Jersey (center) celebrating with a group of Camden shipyard workers, the contract awarded a Camden shipyard to build a super-carrier. The sign carried by man in trim's clothing reads: "I would have looked like this without the carrier; so would my friends."

With the nation's economy on a definite downside, the question before the labor movement is: Shall the unions meet any economic trouble with a demand for more arms budgets? Will the risk of an arms race culminating in nuclear war and perhaps the end of civilization prove worth it? Is war spending a worthwhile—or even workable—way to keep prosperity?
Armageddon proceed apace.

The question is: Will the obtuse pupils in our State Department and the other world chancelleries finally catch up with their history lessons? We often hear the argument that the trouble stems from the Kremlin not being subject to any public opinion at home, while Washington has to reckon with its own people. "We" are therefore at a disadvantage as against "them." The proposition is less than accurate on both counts. Russia is a dictatorship, of course, and manipulates its people, but it has no more won total freedom from the opinions of its people than have other dictatorships of the past, especially on such an explosive issue as war and peace. As for us, are the American people less manipulated because we are operating under a parliamentary system? Has public opinion a chance to get crystallized here when the two parties that effectively dominate the scene never permit genuine alternative policies to be widely debated, and when all the media of public information inculcate the people with what are so many variations of one and the same party line?

Furthermore, in the light of the recent convulsions in the Soviet bloc, who dares say that if the United States diplomats stopped executing cold war maneuvers and provocations and laid on the table an authentic program calling for a compromise settlement of the most troublesome differences and a halt to the arms race, such a program would not have stormy repercussions among the Soviet peoples—even if we assume that the government heads were disposed to ignore or reject them?

The issue is not clean bombs vs. dirty bombs, or tactical atomic weapons vs. strategic atomic weapons, or limited wars vs. unlimited wars, or "open skies" inspection vs. conventional inspection. These are debater's points designed to gain momentary advantage in the propaganda battle for men's minds, or, at best, technical problems subsidiary to policy questions. Of course, when facing disaster, there is invariably a school of thought present that can only propose to do the same thing that has been done all along, except to do it harder and to do more of it. So, our Lilliputian Congressmen are calling for more investigations and a professional anti-Communist writes Eisenhower to start a hunt for spies in our missile program. Things wouldn't be normal if we did not have our over-supply of demagogues, adventurers and fools. But the genuine alternative policy to Dullesism is an offer for a settlement of the cold war, a halt to the arms race, and a recognition that the contest between social systems cannot be left to the arbitrament of the sword.

The logic of the whole situation calls for the rise of a peace party or movement pledged to this type of policy, and we must believe that this logic will finally impress itself on people's minds. If the "sputnik" in the skies hastens this realization along, it will have conveyed to us a more important piece of knowledge than any our scientists are liable subsequently to learn.

**Contributing Editors Board**

With this issue, the American Socialist all but completes four years of existence. We had the conviction from the start that many of the old Left shibboleths were no longer adequate for the America of the fifties and that the old Left formations were without a viable function. We believed that a new socialist voice was needed that broke with dogma and began probing the realities of our country and the world. We further thought that such an effort could gain recognition and support. We would be less than frank in pretending that it was easy to carve out the support we presently enjoy, or that the circulation of the American Socialist is as large as we would like it to be. But accuracy dictates that we admit that the successes of the magazine have by and large exceeded the expectations of its founders.

As we saw it, the primary need for the present was the creation of new intellectual centers that could again make socialism a purposeful and exciting adventure and could revive interest in the message and cause among new groups of students, intellectuals, and workers. We have sought throughout to widen our circle of collaborators and supporters and make the publication a broadly cooperative enterprise. Accordingly, we are happy to be able to announce the formation of a board of contributing editors which is included in our editorial box, consisting of a number of well known Left and liberal writers, and a number of new younger writers who have already made their mark in the pages of this magazine. We hope our readers will accept the new setup as symbolic of the kind of movement the American Socialist seeks to inspire.

It would be vain to pretend that an authoritative intellectual center has already been created in the American Left. That is still ahead of us. The indescribable confusion and even demoralization that has attended the disintegration of the older movements, particularly the Communist, has inevitably given passing vogue to a medley of nostrums, quackeries, get-rich-quick gimmicks and just plain muddling. We are the last to deprecate the need for organization and action, or hold to the belief that the world will be saved by talk alone, be it in written or spoken form. But, so far as we can see, before there can be any purposeful socialist action (we are not discussing important necessary activities in the fields of civil liberties, civil rights, trade unionism, etc.) there has to be rough agreement on what to do, and there has to be a sizable body of supporters who are willing and able to act. Neither of these prerequisites obtain, as yet.

Intelligent radicals are consequently going to concentrate on doing what has to be done now. The building of an effective and influential socialist press that is experimental in its attitudes, but holds true to socialist perspectives; that re-establishes the original bond between socialism and freedom, but refuses to tolerate any cold war propaganda, at home or abroad; that furnishes an outspoken, militant lead for basic social change—this, to our mind, stands at the top of the priorities list of American radicals today.
He offered a bridge between Liberalism and Socialism in the years when British labor was making that transition. What can we, in a nation where labor is still firmly tied to the Democrats, learn from the career of James Keir Hardie?

From Liberalism to Laborism

by G. D. H. Cole

JAMES Keir Hardie, the principal founder of the British Labor Party, was born on August 15, 1856, in a one-room, thatched cottage at Leebrannock, Lanarkshire, Scotland. His father was a doctor, and his mother a servant-girl, Mary Keir, who speedily married a ship’s carpenter, named Hardie—a descendant of the Andrew Hardie who had been involved in the Bonnymuir working-class rising of 1820 and had been executed for his part in the affair. Keir Hardie was thus, like Ramsay MacDonald, an illegitimate child; but this was not widely known, and he was commonly regarded as the eldest of the Hardie family. He was brought up in deep poverty and went to work very young at a sequence of odd jobs. In 1867, at the age of ten, he got a job in the mining industry as a pit-boy and rose to the grade of a skilled coal-heaver before he was twenty years old. In the evenings he set to work to educate himself at night-school, and became an omnivorous reader.

The Hardies were strong Radicals and Republicans, and followers of Charles Bradlaugh in religious matters; but young Keir first became active in the Morisonian Evangelical Union and in the temperance movement, through which he came into contact with Dr. G. B. Clark, the champion of the Highland crofters, who had been an active member of Karl Marx’s International Working Men’s Association.

Keir Hardie, by the time he was twenty, had begun to campaign actively for a revival of the Miners’ Trade Union, which had fallen to pieces in the depression of the 1870’s; and in 1879 he was chosen as unpaid secretary of the Hamilton Miners, and later the same year as national secretary of the Scottish Miners—a post which forced him to seek a living outside the mining industry, for the colliery owners still refused to recognise the right of the miners to organize. During this year of deep depression, the Lanarkshire miners newly re-formed union was broken up by defeat; and in 1881 Hardie moved to Old Cumnock, in Ayrshire, in order to undertake the task of reorganizing the union in that county. There, he earned his living mainly by journalism for local newspapers. He had married in 1880, and his first child was born the following year. In 1882 he resigned his post as secretary of the Ayrshire Union, but continued his work for it as unpaid president. He also continued his Evangelical preaching and his work for the temperance movement.

At this time no organized socialist movement existed in Scotland; and even in England Hyndman had only just founded the Democratic Federation (1881), which became the Social Democratic Federation early in 1884. Up to that year Hardie seems barely to have heard of socialism: he regarded himself as a Radical attached to the advanced wing of the Liberal Party. But in 1884 Henry George came to lecture in Ayrshire, and Hardie accompanied him on his tour. Hardie gradually realized that his own program, including an eight-hour day for mine workers and other protective industrial legislation, went well beyond what either Henry George or the Liberal Party would be prepared to support. By the end of 1886 he had again taken office as secretary of the Ayrshire Miners; and soon afterwards he accepted their invitation to become their parliamentary candidate for North Ayrshire, and also became again secretary of a barely organized Scottish Miners’ Federation.

These changes ended his career as a Liberal journalist; and in 1887 he started his own monthly paper, The Miner, in which he set out to develop a distinctive labor program and strongly attacked the established Liberal-Labor leadership, appealing to the workers to set up an independent party of their own, with an immediate program, not yet of socialism, but of far-reaching industrial reforms. During 1887 he paid his first visit to London, where he met Engels and Eleanor Marx. He also attended for the first time the Trades Union Congress,

Socialist and labor historian, long-time leader in British left-wing thought, G. D. H. Cole writes for the American Socialist for the first time.
and made his presence felt by a forthright attack on its Lib-Lab secretary, Henry Broadhurst, whom he accused of supporting in parliamentary contests “sweating” employers belonging to the Liberal Party.

The following year Hardie fought his first election in Mid-Lanark as an independent labor candidate. He was heavily defeated in a three-cornered contest; but out of the campaign arose the Scottish Labor Party, with Hardie as secretary and R. B. Cunninghame Graham as President. At the 1888 Trades Union Congress he continued his attack on Broadhurst and the Lib-Labs, and at the International Labor Congress of that year he unsuccessfully moved a resolution calling for an international organization of the trade union movement, based on national and international organization of each trade or industry. The following year he was a delegate at the Paris Socialist Congress which set up the Second International—a body with which he continued his close connection right up to 1914, and in which he became by far the most prominent representative of the British workers. By that time—at the beginning of 1889—he had replaced The Miner by The Labour Leader, which he made the mouthpiece of the movement for the creation of an independent British Labor Party with an evolutionary socialist program in which the main emphasis was placed on immediate social and industrial reform.

HARDIE was by this time definitely a socialist, but not a Marxist. His approach to socialism was fundamentally ethical rather than materialistic, and broadly, though undogmatically, Christian. He firmly believed that the road to socialism in Great Britain lay through the adoption of such reforms as the eight-hour day, the minimum wage, etc.

These were the years during which the British Labor movement, after its period of arrest during the depression of the 1870’s and 1880’s, rapidly took on a new shape and achieved a rapid advance in both the industrial and political fields. The Miners’ Federation of Great Britain was founded in 1888; and the following year came the great strikes of gas workers and dockers in London which set on foot the extension of the trade union movement to the less skilled workers and established what is known as the “New Unionism,” with its militant policy of struggle for collective bargaining rights. All over the country, there set in a wave of labor activities which challenged the subordination of the trade unions to the Liberal Party and sought both to extend their influence to groups hitherto unorganized and to proclaim the need for an independent workers’ party with socialism as its ultimate objective. New working-class journals, including besides Hardie’s Labour Leader Joseph Burgess’s Workman’s Times (1890) and—most influential of all—Robert Blatchford’s Clarion (1891), appeared; and in one place after another local Labor Parties or Leagues for Independent Labor Representation were set up.

Hardie, meanwhile, was searching for a constituency that might elect him to Parliament as an independent labor member; and he found this in South-West Ham, on the outskirts of London, for which he was elected at the General Election of 1892. John Burns, already beginning to withdraw from the Social Democratic Federation, was elected at Battersea in the same General Election.

In the House of Commons Hardie soon earned for himself the name of “Member for the Unemployed,” on whose behalf he put up a struggle in which he repeatedly violated precedents of parliamentary conduct. Meanwhile, outside Parliament, he was doing his best to gather the emergent local forces of independent labor into a comprehensive national organization. At the Bradford Conference of 1893, delegates from a number of these bodies set up the Independent Labor Party on a basis of individual membership with the aim of working for the establishment of a wider labor party based on an alliance of the socialists with the trade unions. It took several more years of steady propaganda to bring this object to practical realization in the setting up in 1900 of the Labor Representation Committee, which adopted the name “Labor Party” in the momentous General Election of 1906.

Hardie had lost his West Ham seat in 1895; and thereafter he was out of Parliament for five years, during which he carried on his campaign under the auspices of the I.L.P. At the General Election of 1900 he was returned to the House of Commons as M.P. for Merthyr Tydfil, in South Wales, having endeared himself to the South Wales miners by his ardent support of their struggle with the colliery owners. Thereafter he led the labor forces in Parliament; but these were but scanty till at the Election of 1906 the newly named Labor Party was returned 30 strong to a Parliament in which the revived and reorganized Liberal Party commanded an immense majority.

Through these years of intense propagandist effort he continued to edit The Labour Leader and to carry the fiery cross throughout the country as a speaker. He was also very active in the Second International, which was becoming more and more concerned at the growing danger of war arising out of the imperialist rivalries of the great powers. At repeated International Socialist congresses he was prominent as a leading advocate of the general strike against war—to which the International refused to commit itself in face of strong opposition from the German Social Democrats. Hardie pleaded especially for a working-class embargo on the transport of troops and munitions and for an attempt to stop munition manufacture in face of the war danger. He was throughout one of the International’s most determined anti-militarists, and most bitterly denounced the maneuverings and bickerings of the great powers over colonies and spheres of influence. In this, however, he could not command the united support of the British delegates, any more than of the German or the French—the French being sharply divided and the German solidly hostile to trade union action for such purposes.

The International did indeed adopt at the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 the famous resolution pledging its affiliated parties to drastic action for the prevention of war and to the use of the opportunity, should war actually occur, for overthrowing the capitalist system. But in this resolution the methods to be adopted were left undefined; and, as all the world knows, when war did break out in
1914 the International ignominiously collapsed—to Har
die's deep dismay; for in very truth the outbreak of the
first World War broke his heart and unquestionably
hastened his death.

The later years of Hardie's political life were a period
of increasing unhappiness, as well as of failing health.
The Labor Party in 1906 and again in the two General
Elections of 1910 owed most of its seats in the House of
Commons to the support of Liberal votes against the
Tories; and in Parliament the party gave almost constant
support to the Liberal Government. Hardie disliked this
attitude, and wanted a more independent policy, even at
the cost of turning the Government out; but he felt a
very strong sentiment of loyalty to the party he had done
so much to create, and consequently felt himself bound to
support it even when he felt it was going wrong. This
caused him to lose some of his support from the Labor
left wing; but he continued to be held in deep respect by
the vast majority of British socialists on account of his
immense services in building up the movement and of his
unshakeable fidelity to the cause of internationalism and
peace.

As the war danger increased, he became more and more
despondent about the future, and also less and less able
to play his old, energetic part in contesting it. As Chair-
man of the British Section of the Socialist International
he signed its anti-war manifesto of July 1914 and spoke
at the Trafalgar Square demonstration held the day before
Sir Edward Grey's statement in Parliament that brought
Great Britain into the war. He took his stand with the
ILP against the war, and continued to speak against it
after it had started. But he was by then already a dying
man. He expired on September 26, 1915, worn out in
mind as well as body.

Keir Hardie remains unquestionably the greatest name
in British socialist history. He never professed to be a
profound theorist. As he said to the ILP Conference in
1914, "I think I have shown that I can be a pioneer,
but I am not guided so much by a consideration of policy,
or by thinking out a long sequence of events, as by in-
tuition and inspiration. I know what I believe to be the
right thing, and I go and do it." In this spirit, he fought
all his life as the champion of the "bottom dog." Though
this attitude made him often militant and uncompromising,
there was in it nothing of the revolutionary. He looked
forward to the coming of socialism, not by a sudden mili-
tary coup, but by a gradual advance of socialist opinion,
leading to the development of a socialist Labor Party
that would in course of time win political power and be
in a position to carry its socialist principles into effect by
stages corresponding to the development of socialist opin-
ions and attitudes among its followers. He was, in fact,
especially an adherent of parliamentary democracy, ani-
mated by a radical passion for social equality and justice,
but utterly opposed to any attempt by a minority to
impose its will on a reluctant people.

In practice, his socialism found expression in two ways—
first, in a strongly ethical defense of the rights of com-
mon men and women and a deep belief in human brother-
hood transcending all racial and national barriers. And
second, in the advocacy of a series of immediately prac-
tical measures designed to remove outstanding injustices
and sufferings. Among these latter the eight-hour day, the
minimum living wage, and the right to a job (or to public
maintenance when it could not be assured) took pride
of place. These objectives he successfully impressed first
on the ILP and subsequently, to a great extent, on the
Labor Party for which it prepared the way. He was im-
patient of revolutionaries who failed to convert their
aspirations, in part at least, into positive programs that
could be worked for by democratic means. This attitude
marked him off sharply from the British Marxists of his
day, who were mostly contemptuous of trade unions and
of reform movements not based on a forthright notion
of class struggle à l'outrance. Not that Hardie denied the
reality of the class struggle: On the contrary, he strongly
affirmed it and played an active part in its conduct
whenever the occasion arose.

Hardie was, in effect, one of the principal founders of
that distinctively non-Marxist revolutionary socialism in
which the main stress is laid on the promotion of welfare
and social equality rather than on socialization, except
as a means. He was of course an ardent advocate of
social ownership of the means of production; but in his
day this seemed a less immediately realizable objective
than the improvement of wages, working conditions, and
social services, and he saw the road to social ownership as
opening itself up only later, when the socialists had at-
tained a much larger measure of political power than
seemed within early reach. He therefore gave priority to
support of trade union action and to political pressure
for improved conditions under capitalism, which could be
placed only at a later stage and could in his view in the
meantime easily afford to grant improved standards of
living to the bottom dogs. His entire outlook was hu-
manistic: it was no mere accident that one of his more
successful pamphlets had the title, "Can a Man be a
Christian on a Pound a Week?"

In his policy, he was at the same time eminently prac-
tical and idealistic; and in his private life he was always
frugal, unassuming, and devoted to the cause in which he
believed. He was, indeed, so much of a Puritan as to
antagonize some socialists, who declared him a "kill-joy"
and scorned as "bourgeois morality" his teetotalism
and the simple asceticism of his private life. This very sim-
plicity, however, endeared him to the majority of his fellow-socialists, who, in the formative days of the ILP and the Labor Party, were strongly moved by sentiments of social cooperation and disposed to look on socialism less as an economic doctrine than as a brotherly and equalitarian way of life.

Keenly hostile though he was to what he regarded as the hypocrisy of the Lib-Labs and determined though he was to build up an independent labor movement on a foundation of socialist belief, Hardie and his followers in fact took over and made their own a great deal that was derived from "Liberalism" in a broader sense. The ILP, even if it took much of its detailed program from the Fabians—above all from Sidney Webb—derived its essential attitude much more from the Radical Nonconformity from which it broke away than from any theory of historical evolution, such as Marx's, or from any scientific approach. Hardie, in following this line, gave a rapidly growing section of the British people just what it wanted at the time; he made it easy for men and women to transfer their allegiance from liberalism to socialism without too sharp a break in their ways of thought and action. But, whereas many who followed his lead for a time relapsed subsequently into mere reformism and accepted meekly the new Liberal-Labor alliance of the years after 1906, there was in Hardie himself a fighting spirit which made him unable to undergo this relapse and keep him faithful to the idealism of his youth. His name is therefore revered by the Left as well as by the moderates in the working-class movement; and his utter honesty went unquestioned, even by those who, in the years from 1906 to 1914, were most critical of the party's compromising policies during the period of Liberal ascendancy that was ended by the first World War.

What they Say about "Limited Nuclear Warfare"

THREE years ago a group of influential Americans sat down to work out a foreign and military policy for the nuclear age. Brought together by the Council on Foreign Relations, they included retired Cabinet ministers and ambassadors from the universities, four generals, and, in their own delicious phrasing, "persons who had been hardened by the realities of the business world."

Nor was this all. Their "invited guests," though no names have been disclosed, included "persons in responsible positions in Government."

After talking for eighteen months, they asked Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, a brilliant young man from Harvard, to write a book, which he did with literary skill and clarity.

He bears the formal responsibility for what it says, but since it is the culmination of the whole project we may treat it as the voice of the American Establishment.

It is called "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" . . . you should at once get the book out of the public library and buy a bottle of whisky to drink after reading it. For it is as menacing a portent as the intercontinental rocket.—London Tribune, September 20.

* * *

NEVERTHELESS, Dr. Kissinger's proposals, according to reliable reports, are being seriously weighed by the Pentagon. One of the most interesting features of the limited nuclear war business is that it would demand more, not less, expenditure of money for new types of arms—ultimately about $65 billion a year. Besides, the thing might go on forever, as Kissinger admits, since the winnings would be small, or perhaps nothing. This is a point of great significance to our expansion-minded military bureaucratic and to the technical-war industries which contribute so much to our prosperity.

It takes two to play at limited war, and there is always the risk, admittedly, that the thing might turn into unlimited thermonuclear war. Our experience in the narrowly confined Korean War tells us how reluctant either party is to leave the game when he holds the winning hand.

Napoleon said there was really no such thing as military strategy. There is probably no such thing as a strategy of limited war, no insurance that it will turn out to be brief and chivalrous. The German army's general staff in 1914 laid brilliant plans for a quick war, aimed at knocking out the French in six weeks (as in 1871). Indeed no one can say how these things can be managed conveniently. . . . The only scientific estimate that can be made about the results to be anticipated from limited wars is that you simply cannot estimate them.—Matthew Josephson, The Nation, August 31.

IN the Foreign Affairs article . . . Mr. Dulles said that in the future it may be "feasible to place less reliance upon deterrent of vast retaliatory power." This is what the headlines interpreted as the abandonment of the massive retaliation policy, though the sharp-eyed reader will notice that he speaks only of "less reliance upon it."

Mr. Dulles says that as an alternative, "It may be possible to defend countries by nuclear weapons so mobile, or so placed, as to make military invasion with conventional weapons a hazardous attempt. For example," he goes on, "terrain is often such that invasion routes can be decisively dominated by nuclear artillery." Mr. Dulles goes on to paint the new policy. "Thus," he says, "in contrast to the 1950 decade, it may be that by the 1960 decade the nations which are around the Sino-Soviet perimeter can possess an effective defense against full-scale conventional attack and confront any aggressor with the choice between falling or himself initiating nuclear war against the defending country."

But nuclear arms can be used for attack as well as defense. If the Sino-Soviet perimeter is to be armed with nuclear weapons, the countries on the other side must also arm themselves the same way, since they fear attack just as we do. A round-the-world border would bristle with nuclear arms.

Mr. Dulles speaks of the "Sino-Soviet perimeter," of the Chinese as well as the Russian borders. Consider some of the countries along that border. The first is South Korea. If South Korea is to be armed with nuclear weapons, the Russians are going to have to arm the North Koreans the same way. The next "country" on the perimeter is Formosa. If Chiang Kai-shek is to have nuclear arms, Communist China will have to have nuclear arms. Do we want to trust Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek with nuclear weapons? Do they not fit Mr. Dulles's definition of "irresponsible persons" who would be given by atomic arms "a power for evil that is appalling even to contemplate"?

The U.S. has rationed the supply of gasoline to Syngman Rhee because it does not trust him, because our military authorities fear that if he had enough in the way of supplies to risk it, he might start up the Korean war again. Are we to trust with nuclear weapons a man we do not even trust with gasoline? Are we to allow Chiang Kai-shek nuclear weapons? Those U.S.-supplied planes with which he drops leaflets on the Continent could as easily drop atomic bombs one night and unleash a world conflict. Is this new policy not a global recklessness worse than massive retaliation? Why has there been no outcry against it? Why is it accepted without debate?—I. F. Stone's Weekly, October 7.
Gasoline thirsty, over-powered, unwieldy, today's autos are the logical outcome of a competition in conspicuous consumption.

Our Fantastic Chariots

by Frank Bellamy

The 1958 automobiles—more murderous in speed, vulgar in ostentation and useless in size than ever before—are making their official debut, for the most part, this month. The real production battle will begin in December. The Big Three, GM, Ford and Chrysler, have spent over one billion dollars, the largest investment ever, to design, style and engineer the new models.

Why? Weren't the '57 cars good enough? Will more horsepower and ginracks improve them? The answers are no secrets. Harlow H. Curtice, GM president, calls the policy “dynamic obsolescence,” and says the auto industry is “dedicated” to it. In a speech last year, he remarked: “The automobile industry, as no other industry, makes a practice of investing regularly and heavily in planned change. Another top spokesman, equally candid, is Victor G. Raviolo, head of Ford engineering research. He puts it this way: “The automobile industry is predicated on change and intelligent obsolescence. . . . We deal in a product subject to change of fashion. In effect our tools and dies get stale before they wear out.”

Back in the days when cars were young, an auto manufacturer felt no compulsion to come out with a new car each year. Henry Ford kept his Model T in production, virtually unchanged, from 1908 to 1927—19 years—before GM’s competition crumbled public acceptance of that once-revered institution and forced Ford to remodel. Reminisces Frederick Lewis Allen in “Only Yesterday”: “Model T had been losing to Chevrolet its leadership in the enormous low-price car market, for the time had come when people were: no longer content with ugliness and a maximum speed of forty or forty-five miles an hour; no longer content either, to roar slowly uphill with a weary left foot jammed against the low-speed pedal while robin’s-egg blue Chevrolets swept past in second.”

So Ford shut down his plant for six months to prepare his answer to the jaunty Chevrolets. His answer was the Model A. The Model A lasted five years, supplanted in 1932 by the V-8. The skirted fender came in 1933, the inside running board and headlights in the fenders in '35, V-type windshields in '36, two-tone finish in 1940.

The last pre-war car was the '42. When Detroit resumed auto production in '46, it was on a make-do basis. The pre-war dies, tools and jigs were dug out of the closet, put back on the assembly lines, and made to do for three years. Cars were at a premium. Anything on rubber would sell. The lucky customer passed extra money under the table; over the table he passed more money for an unwanted load of expensive “options”—anything to get a car. In 1949, things changed. New models began appearing. Motor car design entered a new decade. Since 1949 car design has been mostly a matter of power, looks and gee-gaws. Each year the auto makers have boosted horsepower ratings. The '57 cars, already regarded by one critic as “soupied-up rocket ships on wheels,” are still less hot-blooded than the '58’s, whose under-the-hood strength has been increased by five to fifty horses, with the top engine at 385 horsepower. Each year the cars have grown longer, lower, wider and less sensible in shape. “Those fantastic and insolent chariots with which American motor car manufacturers now burden our streets and parking lots,” is what Lewis Mumford calls them.

The '58s are laden with a smorgasbord of accessories, with vent ports that don’t vent, with three-tone needlepoint-plastic upholstery, triple-tone finishes, gadget-crammed dashboards, pounds of chromium. “About the only thing there will be more of,” says the N. Y. Times (August 5), “is comfort, especially when the new six-passenger car has a full load.”

Changes, be they good or bad, are not come by haphazardly. It usually takes three years, less frequently two, to put a new model through the stylist’s wringer. Work on the Edsel began in June 1954 and it was not until August 1957 that it appeared in dealer showrooms. Before a single Edsel rolled off the production lines, Ford studied some 4,000 separate decisions, from the pros and cons of hubcap styling to the basic question—why build an Edsel at all?

Because styling, engineering and retooling a new model is such an expensive proposition (the Edsel cost $250 million), an auto maker seldom risks his multi-million-dollar investment by daring anything too radical. The new designs go just far enough, but not too far. Even when substantial, changes are more evolutionary than revolutionary. Nevertheless, great secrecy obscures a car in the design mill. But like most trade secrets, competitors have a way of peeking in. A few years ago GM got wind that Ford’s grille looked disastrously like the grille blue-printed for Pontiac. There was only one thing to do. General Motors, grappled with the itch to make its cars “easy to recognize” and “distinctive” from all others, scrapped Pontiac’s grille and designed a substitute.

Scraping tools and dies before they wear out is so

Frank Bellamy is the pen name of a New Jersey newspaperman whose last article for the American Socialist, on British Guiana, appeared in our September issue.
expensive that only Ford, GM and Chrysler can spend money freely on model changes. Neither American Motors (Nash-Hudson) nor Studebaker-Packard has the kind of money it takes. This money squeeze is one reason their share of the market (an estimated 3 percent this year) has dwindled so pitifully and their very existence is threatened. The death of these independents would be nothing unusual. Of a total of 2,500 companies that started in the car business during the last half-century, only five remain on the scene today.

Who will pick up the billion-dollar remodeling tab on the '58 cars? The consumers of course. This summer the auto magnates not only rejected Walter Reuther's suggestion that they cut prices $100 per car as an anti-inflation measure, in exchange for his promise to go easier on them at contract-negotiating time, but actually boosted car prices. The lowest-priced '58 cars cost from $60 to $100 more than their '57 counterparts. The medium-priced cars are up $200 to $300. The luxury models are being jacked up even more.

In addition to being noticeably costlier to buy, cars for some years have become noticeably costlier to run, what with their over-size, gas-thirsty engines. They are also costlier to repair. They crumble like paper in collisions partly because the manufacturers don't build them to last, partly because they are of impractical design. On some cars the upswept tail-fins (the fin is still the thing) stick out behind the rear bumper, thus affording a wonderful target for a bump and a bill for replacement of the entire rear fender.

The annual model change has not only resulted in more garish cars, and cars costlier to buy, operate and repair; it has also aggravated unemployment during retooling in the late summer and fall. The UAW's hard-won supplementary unemployment benefit program, which was intended to give the manufacturers a dollar-and-cents incentive to even-out production during the retooling months, has fallen short of its goal.

If the annual model change has mostly undesirable effects, it has at least one good one. Because new models render all old models obsolete, they reduce the desirability of owning an old car—and hence its price. Many cars would be driven by their original purchasers until the vehicles wore out, were it not for the prestige motive of owning the very latest model. The car-a-year fetish, made possible by the new model-a-year fetish, tends to depress used car prices by channeling more cars into the used car market.

To convince the motorist that he needs a new car, the auto makers must convince him there's something in the new car he hasn't got in his old car. That something is "newness." The cult of "newness," of being "up to date," reached the pinnacle of absurdity in an advertisement Buick ran in Fortune and other magazines last December. In the ad the word "new" appears no less than 31 times, "newest" twice, "brand-new" once, "newness" once, and "newer" once. The ad then ends on this note: "Discover all that's new in the newest new Buick ever built."

Detroit's huge investment in the "new" models forces it to pour money recklessly into advertising to make sure the '58's do not arrive unnoticed. Ten million dollars alone has been and will be spent, to advertise the Edsel. Last winter, to promote the '57 cars, the manufacturers sank $10 million into the national auto show. Out of the four corporations that spend most on advertising, three make cars (the fourth makes soap).

Much of this fuss and expenditure is calculated to indoctrinate the public in tastelessness and Veblenesque snobbery. The manufacturers delight in the car buyer's fixation in choosing a car for the sense of importance it gives him. Social Research, Inc. of Chicago made a study of car buying. According to that study, as reported in the November 13, 1954 issue of Saturday Review, "autos no longer represent just a means of transportation... They constitute definite symbols of social status, and each car has its own reputation... A Cadillac may be purchased to tell the world that its owner can afford the best". The car buyer does not usually pick one car over another because it is mechanically more efficient, but because it looks better to him. "In auto sales, appearance is everything, or almost everything. It is certainly the most important single factor in a customer's decision to buy this or that make." (Life, January 18, 1954.)

The customer, vaguely conscious of guilt for wasting his money in the emulative chase, says he wishes there was less junk on the cars, yet he continues to buy the "de luxe" model in preference to the "standard," the fancy hard-top in preference to the staid four-door sedan. Thus the customer must share with the manufacturer the blame for the yearly model change. Although this is true, it is also true that the customer has no say-so in the styling process. The billion-dollar investment in '58 style changes was necessitated in part by signs of customer revolt. Instead of buying 6.5 million cars this year (the pre-year prediction) the public will buy only 5.7 million (the scaled-down estimate). Originally, 1958 promised to be an "off year" in the auto industry's model cycle. All Chrysler lines, the Ford and Mercury, along with Buick, Oldsmobile, and Cadillac had been completely restyled and reengineered for 1957. GM had originally planned no major overhaul for '58. However, stung by slumping sales (its market slice has dropped from about 51 percent last year to 46 percent so far in 1957), GM felt forced to throw more than 500 million dollars into the sales battle. What was to have been an "off year" turned out the biggest "on year" in auto remodeling history.

Auto magnates love to say competition fosters efficiency. But the annual model change, fruit of the bitterest kind of competition, is not efficiency. It is, for the most part, a waste. The magnates also love to say competition lowers prices. But the '58's are costing more. They say competition makes for a better product. But the '58's are less comfortable, less tasteful, less safe.

The auto makers have been shoving cars down the public's gullet for several years now. More than $15 billion installment credit is outstanding on autos. The market has approached the saturation mark. Eventually something must give. Only so long can a goose be stuffed before it will bust.

Man rose above other animals, the anthropologists tell us, because of his ability to accumulate his learning and behavior patterns in the form of culture, and transmit them to succeeding generations. Modern civilization, in like measure, grew out of primitive societies by virtue of the developing human ability to produce far more than required for the direct sustenance of the producer. The accumulation and use of an economic surplus is thus the central fact of economics.

Professor Baran's book investigates the economic surplus—which he defines with a care and detail that cannot be reproduced here—in its modern setting, when it has become a problem of critical magnitude for humanity. The analysis falls naturally into two major parts. For the larger portion of mankind, living in countries where colonialism prevented the industrialization that occurred in the West, the problem is how to command a surplus for the renovation of their economies. The advanced capitalist countries, on the other side, have the capacity to produce huge social surpluses, but, because they are geared to the motive of profitable investment as the sole permissible driver of most economic activity, they are forced to juggle these surpluses like hot coals. Where the crisis of the East is primitivism, the crisis of the West is an overflowing productivity embarrassing to the capitalist scheme of things.

Around the time the Asian-African-Latin American nations were enslaved by colonialism, Baran believes, they were themselves on the eve of a break-up of their stagnant feudal structures, a process that had already occurred in Western Europe. Imperialist penetration prevented the consummation; it broke up old modes of economic life such as handicraft production, but did not substitute any new developmental scheme. Social life was frozen in its ancient miseries in order to keep it helpless for exploitation. India is contrasted with the example of Japan, the one nation of this category which did achieve a belated leap into modern capitalism, and the conclusion is drawn:

It is obviously impossible even to conjecture on the speed with which the now backward countries would have gone the way of Japan and would have autonomously generated a process of capitalist development and economic growth, in the absence of Western invasion and exploitation. Indeed, the rapidity of Japan's transformation into a capitalist, industrialized country was due to a large extent to the military and economic threat from the West. Yet whatever might have been the tempo and the specific circumstances of the forward movement, there is ample evidence in the history of all the countries in question to indicate the nature of its general trend. Regardless of their national peculiarities, the pre-capitalist orders in Western Europe and in Japan, in Russia and in Asia were reaching at different times and in different ways their common historical destiny. By the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they were universally in a state of disintegration and decay. Peasants' revolts and the rise of the bourgeoisie shattered everywhere their very foundations.

A number of the colonial countries have won political independence in the recent decade. What is it that today prevents the undeveloped lands from starting their own dynamic capital-accumulation cycle or industrialization process? Baran's intensive argument cannot be duplicated in this space, but its outline is as follows: It is not the lack of economic surplus that is chiefly responsible for choking the colonial lands; "the consumption of the productive population has been depressed to the lowest possible level... The economic surplus therefore while by comparison with the advanced countries small in absolute terms has accounted for a large share of total output—as large as, if not larger than, in advanced capitalist countries."

The chief trouble Baran finds in the enforced "mode of utilization" of the economic surplus. A landowning class, lacking the specific accumulative drive of capitalists, consumes much of the surplus in extravagant living. Small-scale merchant capitalism, centuries old and very little changed, plays its traditional role of mediating between petty producers in order to exploit them, and is unable to transform itself into industrial capital, a transformation which in the Western countries was by no means automatic but required energetic state intervention. And the cream of the surplus is skimmed off by foreign exploitation. Imperialism has inflicted a social and political pattern of rule and subservience which has stunted the growth of the capitalist class, preserved the landowning and feudal classes, and has so atrophied the normal capitalist growth pattern as to choke off capitalist development even where the imperialist power has been forced to withdraw from direct overlordship.

Thus Baran's conclusion: "The establishment of a socialist planned economy is an essential, indeed indispensable, condition for the attainment of economic and social progress in underdeveloped countries." It is worth not-
ing that this idea, ever more widely accepted among socialists today, is at variance with the prevailing notions of not so long ago, when many looked forward to a prolonged stage of capitalist industrialization in the colonial countries after a series of capitalist-nationalist revolutions, in accordance with Marx’s generalization: “The country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its own future.”

In the advanced capitalist countries, to which Baran devotes the first half of his book, the problem is quite different. The greater part of the actual economic surplus (just about all of it with the exception of that portion going to government) takes the form of privately owned capital which requires re-investment to produce the going rate of profit. While the system possessed the vigor of rapid and broad-scale expansion into areas of the economy and lands previously dominated by other modes of production, or into a host of new industries demanded by the complex of industrialization and urbanization, investment opportunities rarely presented a problem, and then only for relatively short periods of time. In recent decades, however, it is clear that the earlier thirst of the economy for new aggregates of capital has been somewhat slaked. Whether one attributes this to “causes inherent in the working of the economic engine” as does Baran, to factors external to it, as does most of contemporary official economics, or to a combination and interaction between the two, the fact itself is hardly in doubt. The balance between investment capital and investment opportunity has become precarious; it fell through entirely for the decade of the thirties, and the possibility that it may be destroyed again hangs as a constant threat over the economy even in boom times.

But there has been prosperity in most capitalist countries since the end of World War II, a prosperity which, like all others under capitalism, includes as an essential a great boom in investment opportunities. This has raised the question whether some new framework has indeed been devised and is already in operation which redresses the imbalance of capitalism either by reducing the economic surplus in private hands, or by maintaining investment, or both. Some claim that monopoly capitalism is inherently more stable than the earlier competitive form; others, that government activities in the economic sphere can, will, or do now provide the regulator and corrective. A portion of the first half of Baran’s book sets forth basic theoretical considerations, plus a small amount of factual illustration, bearing on this problem. Again, we have space only for his conclusion:

Thus the stability of monopoly capitalism is highly precarious. Incapable of pursuing a policy of genuine full employment and of genuine economic progress, having to abstain from productive investment as well as from a systematic expansion of consumption, it has to rely in the main on military spending for the preservation of the prosperity and high employment on which it depends both for profits and for popular support.

But military spending, even on the huge scale of today, is not reliable as a lasting answer:

. . . in whichever way the government spending that had ignited the original expansion may have been financed, its result is not merely an increase of total output but also a rise of both the absolute size of the economic surplus and also of its share in national income. Thus if growth of unemployment in the next period is to be avoided, the utilization of the economic surplus (on the part of business and/or government) must not remain merely on the given level but must increase. But nothing resembling the required increase can be expected from private investment. On the contrary, as we have seen, once the new plateau of income and demand has been reached, private investment tends to come to a standstill. What is worse, the increased volume of excess capacity renders the system less sensitive to the stimulus of further government spending. Once a large arms industry has been erected, once a major wave of increasing demand and “confidence” have led to large investment, the possibilities of further “induced” investment become very much smaller. At the same time, the possibility of increased government spending is predicated upon increased taxation. This in turn means further cuts in consumption, further expansion of the economic surplus, further dependence for economic stability on government outlays.

Although this is very much a minority view today, there is little doubt in my mind that this theoretical framework will, in the main, prove more accurate than others commanding large followings and official backing. Keynesians, or laborites like John Strachey, have presented ambitious alternative schemes and prognostications, but these achieve their plausibility mainly by the setting of the super-prosperity in which they appear. Most of them show a highly unscientific selectivity in dwelling on only those recent and often ancillary developments in capitalism which happen to fit their thesis best. Keynesians ignore for the most part crucial trends such as the permanent armaments economy, and the increasing monopolistic concentration of capital. None of them have yet found a way to get around the fact that the reform elements of current capitalism at its best, which do shift some income in the direction of the consumer, represent a 2-3 percent fringe item, in contrast with military expenditures which represent 15 percent or better of the national income.
While Baran has much the best of it in sticking pretty close to orthodox Marxist economics, it is hard to avoid a feeling as one reads him that he is too grudging in granting recognition to some of the recent changes in the scaffolding of the system. Capitalism has after all been subjected to massive shocks and pressures, some of them from the working class and other discontented groups in the population and some simply from the inability to go on in the old way. It has made a variety of adjustments to these pressures. Some of these adjustments, such as the permanent arms economy, Fascism in Central Europe during the thirties, limitations of production (our present farm program) and the encouragement of waste and non-productive employment, are clearly irrational, retrogressive, or barbaric. Others, including social legislation long demanded by the radical and labor movements, are true premonitory symptoms of socialism; incursions of the new society within the body of the old. While there is no warrant for singling out the few progressive developments and inflating them out of all realistic proportions in order to prove a self-reform-of-capitalism thesis, neither is a stand-pat playing down of the so-called welfare state developments tenable or necessary.

What is missing in Baran's approach is some sort of recognition of how important the change in the American mind has been, from older ideas of market automaticity to the current well-diffused view of government responsibility, and how this new level of expectation will affect future economic and social crises. Baran very cogently brings home the fact that monopoly capitalism has little to fear from present-type government intervention, all the more so as the interveners are themselves under the firm control of big business. But, important as that thought is, it cannot gainsay the fact that the breakdown of the threadbare shibboleths of "individualism" and "the invisible hand" and the growth of a new climate of opinion of public and social responsibility, will be recorded by history as America's first great step out of the crudities of nineteenth century capitalism in the direction of a socialist future. It has marked off the bounds of tomorrow's social battlefield, and can give to the next major American Left—if it is realistic enough—an audience of unprecedented dimensions. While it may be revolting for socialists to look upon the uses to which this new ideology is currently put by liberals, labor leaders, politicians, and academicians, it does no good to punish such adversaries for their unquestionable misconduct by ourselves closing our eyes to an important new reality in this country.

The experience of socialist planning, considered in a final chapter called "The Steep Ascent," is not tackled as directly or critically as I, for one, would desire in a book on this subject at this time. It is not my intention to blame the author for not writing about something outside his topical guideposts. Yet it would seem that a book on this particular subject, which reaches the kind of conclusions that have been indicated above (and with which this reviewer is in general and hearty agreement) would have to say something more about the current problems of socialist planning, if only as a defensive gambit to guard the good name of the socialist solution which the book proposes to the people of the world.

To raise the matter briefly: We are, by this time, long past the silly season when the term "socialist planning" meant for many only that particular (gruesome) variety of it practised by Stalin. It has become more generally understood, as increasing numbers broke from the old hypnosis, that the decision to plan and industrialize still leaves open a host of questions of pace and proportion, structure and control, which allow for a great variety of combinations. To say that agriculture must be collectivized does not settle the many knotty questions of speed, methods, incentives, etc. To say that heavy industry must be favored and popular consumption restrained in order to maximize the surplus leaves undecided the precise mix between the two, a matter that can be settled only by wisdom, human needs and experimentation, not by dogma, preconceived formula, or police power.

No socialist at all serious about his ideas can quarrel with the general decision to industrialize taken first by Russia and later on by China and Eastern Europe, nor is there any profit in toying with the notion that this decision could be carried out without considerable sacrifices. But what has been proven beyond any possible doubt to one of critical mind, in the past few years, is that the solutions to the riddles of pace, proportion, and politics worked out by Stalin, while they bludgeoned their way through the worst period in Russia, were far from the wisest solutions available, were unnecessarily wasteful, and piled up enormous costs in human misery, degradation and discontent which will haunt the Soviet Union for many years. In Eastern Europe, by the testimony of Gomulka, Lange, Nagy, and others in a position to know—and also by the testimony of the sweeping events in Poland and Hungary—Stalinist-type planning broke down completely. In China, Stalinist planning has already had to undergo modification to eliminate some of its most unsatisfactory features, and it will probably have to be modified some more before very long.

In the light of all this, it would have been important for Baran to make an economic analysis of what went wrong, not with the idea of socialist planning which has on the whole vindicated itself brilliantly, but with the many features of the brutal Stalinist variety of planning which have run into such serious trouble. His few brief remarks in the preface deal solely with the political system of Stalinism. What is of more immediate relevancy here is the economic assessment which the above considerations call for. Lacking that, the chapter has the ring of a sweeping endorsement of Stalinist economic policy at the very moment when it is beginning to undergo a critical reassessment even among some Communist economists.

None of this is intended as deprecation of the great value of Baran's important book. As a serious piece of work, it deserves serious and critical consideration. Nothing as ambitious and as erudite as this book has been written in the field of Marxist economics in America for many years, and no serious socialist, or for that matter student of economics and current world affairs, should neglect to give it the careful study it requires.
Was it an imperialist coup? Or was it, despite confusions, the voice of a new socialism, democratic and labor-governed, sounding its first full-throated cry?

One Year Later:

Look Back at Hungary

by Shane Mage

THE Hungarian revolution of 1956 was one of the crucial events of our time. The picture of this affair provided by the Russian government is essentially the same as that given by the "free world": an attempt to restore capitalism. But where the spokesmen of the West slyly imply that it would have led to democratic capitalism, the official Communist line asserts that Russian military intervention was necessary to avert the imposition of a fascist form of capitalism. There is a third analysis which holds that what we witnessed was in the main a socialist revolution which rejected Stalinism, and aimed at, not a return to capitalism, but the establishment of socialist democracy. What do the facts tell us?

Herbert Aptheker, an American Communist intellectual, has published a book on the Hungarian uprising which attempts a full-scale defense of the Kremlin description of the event as a "counter-revolution."* The bulk of the book deals not with the uprising itself, but with background material, with the old, pre-war, Horthy Hungary, with the post-war evolution of Hungary as a "People's Democracy," and with the counter-revolutionary aims and actions of U.S. officials. The purpose of this section is to lend weight and plausibility to the book's main thesis, but even if everything Aptheker says in this part were true, his interpretation of the Hungarian events would still remain to be proven.

Aptheker's description of Horthy Hungary presents considerable authentic information. His portrayal of U.S. policy towards Eastern Europe is accurate. In discussing Project X, the Kerstein Amendment, the CIA, the Gehlen organization, U.S. support to emigré fascists, he can and does let the makers of U.S. policy speak for themselves. But the presentation is studded with foul punches in the worst tradition of old-style Stalinism. Thus he presents

---


The author, a young socialist writer, appears for the first time in the American Socialist.

ON October 23, 1956, small groups of counter-revolutionaries organized by the "U.S. intelligence services" took advantage of a peaceful mass demonstration to launch an armed attack on the Hungarian government. Because the government was unprepared for this attack, it was compelled to call on Russian army forces stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw treaty. However, the Russian forces were active only in Budapest; in the rest of the country the counter-revolutionaries got the upper hand, and they were quickly reinforced by a great number of emigré fascists who crossed the Austrian border. A full-scale White Terror broke out throughout Hungary, including the systematic murder of Communists and the organization of pogroms. Capitulating to this pressure, the Nagy government swung steadily to the right until by November 4 it had become a pro-Western, pro-capitalist regime powerless before the counter-revolution which was sweeping Hungary. Faced with this situation, a small group of true Communists led by Kadar, sincerely interested in the democratization of Hungary and with a record of opposition to the crimes of Rakosi, had no alternative but to make a "supreme effort" and call on the Russian army to aid it in crushing the counter-revolution.

Aptheker's basic method is not that of a historian attempting to arrive at the truth, but of a lawyer attempting to convince us of his client's case. As a rule, he takes his "facts" from two sources: the extreme right-wing capitalist press, which is anxious to boast of a pro-capitalist uprising, and the official Communist press, which is equally anxious to complain of one. His sole criterion for using a quotation is its usefulness for his case; if it is factually false, or dubious, or from an untrustworthy source, Aptheker disregards these considerations, and, what is worse, hides them from the reader. The following are representative examples of this method:

On page 212, Aptheker presents the discredited story of an impending government headed by Cardinal Mindszenty by means of a quotation from what he calls "a leading Paris newspaper, Aurore." The unsuspecting reader is not informed that this "leading Paris newspaper" is in fact an ultra-reactionary paper whose fondest wish is to see a Horthy-type government in Hungary, and in France as well. Similarly, to "prove" the sizable influx of Horthyite agents during the uprising, Aptheker on page

November 1957
228 quotes the Austrian newspaper Oesterreichische Volkstimme affirming “the existence of ‘regular headquarters’ at border areas where reactionary and Horthy agents ‘have recently crossed the border together with Hungarian refugees in order, as they say, to join the insurgents.’” Aptheker hides from the reader the following facts, which expose this story as a fabrication:

a) The Volkstimme is the paper of the Austrian Communist Party.

b) This story was not confirmed by any independent source in Austria.

c) The facts alleged are completely incompatible with Austria’s status as a neutral country, as guaranteed by the Soviet Union among other powers. Yet the Russian government never made a formal protest against the supposed violation of Austrian neutrality.

d) The Austrian government made a formal repudiation of these charges, in a memorandum dated November 3, 1956, which stated: “The Austrian government has ordered the establishment of a forbidden zone the length of the Austro-Hungarian frontier. . . . The Minister of Defense inspected this zone in the company of the military attachés of the four Great Powers, including that of the USSR. The military attachés have thus been able to assure themselves of the measures which have been taken in the frontier zone to protect the neutrality and the frontiers of Austria. All necessary measures have also been taken at the western border of Austria to prevent emigrés from infiltrating. . . .” The Russian government never officially denied these facts.

APTHEKER begins his description of the start of the uprising with an account of Gero’s speech to the October 23 mass demonstration. He omits, however, the most provocative aspect of the speech—Gero’s refusal to accept the demand that the Central Committee meet immediately and install Nagy as Prime Minister, and his declaration that the Committee would not meet before October 31. He then describes the events in this passage:

By now—nearing 9 p.m.—uglier sentiments began to appear from knots among the demonstrators: sentiments justifying Gero’s characterization for a small minority certainly present from the beginning. Evidences of disciplined, preconceived schemes of provocation and disorder began to appear—anti-Semitic remarks, false rumors of shooting, the bursting of fire-crackers. Soon contingents broke away from the main body and, very sure and very clear as to what they were doing and where they were going and who was to do what, one group headed for the broadcasting station; another for the building housing Szabad Nep; a third for the telephone center; a fourth for a motor park containing 60 trucks; a fifth for an electrical factory recently converted into a small arms plant. A sixth went to a munitions dump.

At the radio station were some police and guards, but they had firm orders not to shoot except in self-defense. They were attacked; the group killed several and wounded more. The firing then was returned and after a skirmish and some damage, the attack on the station broke off. At the newspaper office, after killing a woman, the group gained control, smashed a bookstore in the building and burned the books, tore down and burned a red flag that topped the building and held the presses for about 16 hours. Meanwhile the trucks had been driven off—drivers clearly prepared and selected beforehand—and arms and munitions were loaded into them from the factory and the dump.

Involved in all these more or less simultaneous and swift actions were perhaps something under a thousand people. Meanwhile, many demonstrators had returned home, suspecting nothing, and even the Government seems to have been informed tardily and not very urgently of the apparently disconnected, sporadic assaults by a mere handful of people.
Two things stand out in this description: the vividness with which events are detailed, and the stark contradiction between this and every previously published non-Stalinist account of the beginning of the uprising. If this is the way it began, the Hungarian revolution was most certainly initiated by plotters.

On finishing this sensational account, our eyes naturally turned to the bottom of the page, to discover from what source the author gleaned these remarkable facts; the bottom of the page presents an astounding sight—a blank space. Aptheker, so liberal with references and quotes elsewhere in the book is unable to cite a single source for this key passage. Why the incredible lack of documentation, which a trained historian like Aptheker must realize would make his narrative unacceptable to even a slightly critical reader? The only possible answers are that this account is an imaginative re-creation of the way Aptheker wants to assume things happened—in other words an invention—or he is getting his description from a source whose mere mention would be more compromising than the omission of any source. In either case, this passage is pure fantasy, as can best be shown by comparison with an eyewitness account by an observer who cannot possibly be accused of anti-Communist bias, Luigi Fossati, Budapest correspondent for Azanti, newspaper of the Socialist Party of Italy led by Pietro Nenni, which has cooperated closely with the Communist Party since the end of World War II. Here is Fossati’s account of the events at the broadcasting station, where, according to Aptheker, a small group of disciplined counter-revolutionists attacked “police and guards” who “had firm orders not to shoot except in self-defense”:

A large column of demonstrators leaves the square and goes toward the Radio Broadcasting building on Chamor Brodj Street. They wish to send a group into the building in order to have the radio station employees broadcast the slogans of the demonstration in answer to the speech of Gero. The security police then intervene and open fire. It is here that the first victims fall: two dead and ten wounded.12

And here Fossati describes the events he saw at the Szabad Nep building, where, Aptheker has told us in his anonymous account, “fascist reactionary elements” had just, “after killing a woman,” captured the presses:

About 11:00 I go back to the center of town, fighting is going on at several points. I hear the sound of machine-gun fire from Tolkin St. I pass before the Szabad Nep building. No police are there to protect it: a few workers stand in front of the main door, discussing. From a window, leaflets are thrown down which state the following: “The editors of Szabad Nep greet the powerful demonstration of the people of Budapest to speed up the development of socialist democracy and the renovation of our public life. In our conscience as communists we profoundly deplore the violent reaction of the security forces. We believe that those responsible for this will have to render an account for their actions.

The editors of Szabad Nep assure the party and the people that they will never support those who wish to answer the voice and demands of the people with shooting and terrorism. People of Budapest, we announce to you that the Central Committee of the United Workers Party is meeting in special session this very night.” The few groups standing around the building show their joy at reading the leaflet and cry “Hurrah.”

A decisive point at which Aptheker’s thesis breaks down is this: If the fighting was carried on by “something under a thousand people,” why was it necessary to call in the Soviet army? The security police alone should have been more than enough to crush a few fascist bands. In actual fact, rarely has a populace been so unanimous in any revolutionary action of history, rarely has a government been so rapidly and so completely left without support. Not just students, workers, and peasants, but even the Hungarian army became involved in an uprising which was led predominantly by Communists themselves breaking from the old Stalinism and seeking to give a new shape to socialism. Peter Fryer, London Daily Worker special correspondent, who was on the spot, relates:

The troops in Budapest, as later in the provinces, were of two minds: there were those who were neutral and there were those who were prepared to join the people and fight alongside them. The neutral ones (probably the minority) were prepared to hand over their arms to the workers and students so they could do battle against the AVH [security police] with them. The others brought their arms with them when they joined the revolution. Furthermore, many sporting rifles were taken by the workers from the factory armories of the Hungarian Voluntary Defense Organization. The “mystery” of how the people were armed is no mystery at all. No one has yet been able to produce a single weapon manufactured in the West.3

Where we come to Aptheker’s claims of a White Terror, his account is one-sided, exaggerated, and misinterprets the facts. It is true that some reactionary and fascist-like forces operated in the Hungarian uprising. It is also true that enraged people committed Lynchings and brutal beatings. Some of Aptheker’s material is here useful in documenting this side of the revolution. But far outweighing them in scope and significance were the progressive socialist forces seeking a new path for Hungary. Aptheker has, however, written a lawyer’s brief which sees only one side, and exaggerates this out of all proportion to reality.

The fury of the people was mainly turned against the security police, the AVH. The ferocity with which the AVH fought the people, the massacres in Magyaro and in Parliament Square, added to the hatred. For Aptheker, however, the security police did not exist. Anyone killed as a secret policeman and torturer with a thousand crimes on his conscience invariably turns up in Aptheker’s pages as a “Jew,” a “Communist,” or a “Hungarian army recruit.” Without condemning the lynch
methods used against the AVH men—they would better have been brought to fair public trial and their records published to the world; that is what the organization of Hungarian writers, many of whom had been tortured by the AVH, wanted done—it should be made clear who the victims in most cases were. Aptheker cites “the prolonged and systematic attack upon the headquarters of the Party in Budapest,” quoting an outrageously tendentious account by a reactionary British correspondent for the Beaverbrook press. The facts, according to the Polish Communist Wiktor Woroszylski, editor of the magazine Nova Kultura, are these:

Marian [Marian Bielicki, correspondent for the Polish Radio, also a Communist] has already been here for several days. Now he gives the impression of having been particularly shaken. It was hard for me to get him to tell what he had seen today.

He was . . . a witness to the assault upon the Party headquarters building, where somewhat more than two hundred members of the AVH were defending themselves.

The AVH are the uniformed divisions of the political police. An elite corps, richly paid (the salary of an AVH man was ten times the average monthly wage of a worker), tied life and death to the bloody regime of Rakosi, the janissary detachments of the AVH held the country to the very end in the iron grip of a terror of which we had no idea in Poland. After the liquidation of Beria, after the resignation of Rakosi and the arrest of Farkas, no change had taken place in the AVH. When, on October 23, the AVH opened fire on the unarmed demonstration of the people, the cup was filled to overflowing. The insurrection broke out and was joined immediately by the army and the police. The AVH—officially dissolved by the Nagy government—refused to submit to dissolution and continued to sow death and provocation. Then the wrath of the people, in a great wave, submerged Budapest.

Marian tells how the crowd, supported by a few Hungarian tanks, attacked the fortress of the AVH. They defended themselves furiously, their volleys laid low more than one attacker. But finally they were dragged out of the building, and then . . .

Marian’s lips tremble; he is very pale.

“. . . I never saw a lynching like that. They were hung by the feet and some were literally torn to pieces. Finally, the organized insurgents—the National Guard—arrived and protected the remaining prisoners against the crowd. But those they didn’t get there in time to defend. . . .”

Far from being a White Terror against Communists, many Communists participated in the killing of AVH men, so hated were the latter. Here is Woroszylski’s account of a conversation with a group of leading Hungarian Communists, in the government offices:

Marian again tells what he had seen that morning. It is smothering him, and he looks for an answer among his Hungarian comrades, among the Communists. After a moment’s silence, one of them speaks up:

“Believe us, we are not sadists. But we cannot bring ourselves to feel sorry for those people.”

Of a different category than these revolutionary excesses of popular revenge were the crimes of murder, vandalism, anti-Semitism on the part of a reactionary and fascistic fringe that was able to raise its head during the turmoil. There was, for instance, an anti-Semitic current. But was the revolution marked by an organized “effort at mass extermination of the Jews,” as Aptheker claims? Nothing of the sort is true, as proven not only by an enormous mass of eye-witness accounts, but also by an unimpeachable source, the Budapest Corps of Rabbis, which, together with other Jewish organizations, issued the following statement on November 2: “Hungarian Jewry, having regained religious freedom, enthusiastically salutes the achievements of the revolution, pays reverent homage to the heroes and identifies itself with the independent and free homeland. Hungarian Jewry appeals to Jewish organizations abroad to give quick and effective help to the long-suffering Hungarian people.”

Most important to consider in all this is that the fascist groups remained isolated, that reactionary actions did not catch on, and that the strongest forces in the revolution showed themselves fully conscious of the problem and ready to deal with it. Although the Hungarian newspapers of those days contain overabundant proof of this, Aptheker manages to quote none of it. For instance, on November 1, Magyar Honved, the Hungarian Army paper, wrote: “At Gyor, certain extreme right-wing elements wanted to hold a big meeting Tuesday afternoon. According to their program, they desired a new government headed by Ferenc Nagy who is at present in a foreign country. But the workers of Gyor prevented them from doing it. We want no fascism, we have had enough of tyranny, whether it be the tyranny of Rakosi or of Szalasi.” On November 2, Igazag (Truth), revolutionary youth paper, wrote: “We hate the fascists who are lurking in the shadows and want to exploit the revolution.” And on November 3, the whole press carried an interview with Pal Maleter, long-time Communist, veteran of the International Brigades in Spain, fighter in the Resistance during World War II, now Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council and soon to be Minister of Defense in the last Nagy government. Maleter said: “The National Guard, the revolutionary committees and the workers councils are solidly in the hands of freedom fighters who are fighting on two fronts: against the Stalinists and against the reactionaries.” This is likewise the testimony of the reputable Western and Polish correspondents.

As to the Nagy government, Aptheker claims that it evolved to the right to the point where it was “predominantly bourgeois” and had a “perspective of a return to capitalism.” As a major item of proof of this, Aptheker asserts: “It is significant that by October 30, Nagy was omitting ‘Socialist’ from his descriptions of Hungary. It is a fact that thereafter in his speeches and pronouncements and in those of other Government figures until November
During the Russian withdrawal from Budapest, armed guards searched the streets for hated Hungarian security police, to whom they generally showed no quarter when found. This picture, like many others taken during the revolution, stresses the youth of the rebels.

4, the Socialist fundment of Hungary is omitted.” (P. 204, Aptheker’s emphasis.) This “fact” is on a par with so many of Aptheker’s others. On November 3, for example, Nagy’s closest political associate and a minister in his cabinet, Geza Losonczy, declared:

The government has unanimously declared that it will not make any concessions so far as the positive achievements of the past twelve years are concerned, for example, in agrarian reform, the nationalization of factories, and social achievements. It also demands that the achievements of the present revolution remain intact, notably national independence, equality of rights, and the building of Socialism not on the basis of a dictatorship but on the basis of democracy. The government is determined not to tolerate the restoration of capitalism in Hungary.

All of the groups in the government, including the Peasants, Smallholders, and Social Democratic parties, made numerous similar statements during those last days of October and first days of November before Russian troops initiated the final battle on November 4. One may question the sincerity or dependability of some or all of these spokesmen, but having done that one would have to inquire into the kind of popular pressures that evoked such statements, and the conclusion can only be that the capitalist-restorationist elements were isolated, and the flood-tide of the revolution was overwhelmingly socialist in sentiment. But Aptheker sidesteps the whole problem by blandly asserting that the government speeches and pronouncements “omitted the Socialist fundment.” That is surely falsification with a vengeance.

By this time, the careful reader may have become disturbed at the absence of a key factor in “The Truth About Hungary.” The Hungarian working class was the central actor in the Hungarian drama—and the working class is totally omitted from Aptheker’s version. More exactly, Aptheker mentions the workers only to deny that they played any role: “The workers of Budapest by and large adopted an apathetic or passive or neutral attitude.”

It is surely not necessary to recapitulate here the great number of eyewitness accounts proving that the main fighting forces were made up of young workers, that the heaviest fighting took place in the working-class districts like Kobanya, Ujpest, and “Red Csepel,” the proletarian stronghold of Hungarian Communism and the last center of resistance to fall to the second Russian intervention. It should be enough to cite the curious manner the Hungarian workers chose to show their neutrality: a complete general strike that went on for more than five weeks after the Russian troops had crushed the uprising, and the formation of Workers Councils throughout Hungary antagonistic to the Kadar regime imposed by the Russians.

Many of the most important and clarifying events of the revolution took place after November 4, which may be why Aptheker chose to close his narrative on that date. The contending social forces stand out clearly. The fascistic groups vanished into thin air (or into Austria and thence other countries of the “free world,” to prepare new adventures). Mindszenty hid in the U.S. embassy. Bela Kovacs was invited to join the Kadar government but refused and announced his “retirement” from politics. But the Workers Councils remained and carried on a fierce struggle. As late as December 12, all Hungary was gripped by a general strike of labor. In the end, as we know, the Kadar government was able to break the strike by the threat of starvation. It proceeded to arrest the workers’ leaders and destroy the Councils, charging that the Councils “have preoccupied themselves with exclusively political questions with the objective of organizing a sort of second power, opposed to the state power.”

If a network of Workers Councils had been created with the leadership authority to lead a five- or six-week general strike throughout Hungary, and which as the Kadar regime claims, tried to organize a state power, how can Aptheker say that the workers were “apathetic or passive or neutral”? The exigencies of Stalinist politics are evidently such that what Kadar is forced to admit in Hungary, Aptheker is afraid to reveal to his Communist readers here. But clearly, the outlawing of the only representative bodies of the Hungarian working class by a self-styled “Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government” shows more about the character of the Hungarian Revolution and the choice it posed before Hungary than most of Aptheker’s quotations and “facts.” The working class councils did not pose the threat of “restoration of capitalism.” The workers of Gyor showed this when they suppressed the meeting of supporters of Ferenc Nagy. The workers’ council of the 11th district of Budapest showed this when it demanded “free elections in which only those parties may participate that recognize and have always recognized the socialist order, based on the principle that means of production belong to society.” This last, by the way, shows up the hypocrisy of the capitalist “friends” of the Hungarian revolution in the West: What
is the attitude of Dulles and Macmillan towards workers in their own countries who speak up for a "socialist order, based on the principle that means of production belong to society"?

Aptheker's attempt to sidetrack the reader with a fictitious White Terror prevents him from coming to grips with the real dangers threatening a possible capitalist restoration. The Western statesmen falsely pretended that the Hungarian insurgents were fighting for capitalist-style democracy because they hoped to pull the revolution into that channel. They had certain solid facts of Hungarian society to rest their hopes on: a majority of the population is agricultural and attached to private property, the majority is moreover enrolled in the Catholic church, there exists an important old middle class, and ten years of Rakosi Stalinism had discredited the Communists. There was room for speculation that the establishment of a parliamentary system might become the opening gambit in the return of the Catholic hierarchy and émigré politicians to political leadership positions, and from there, a step-by-step restoration of capitalist power and orientation toward the West. However, this pre-capitalist design could get translated into reality, the Workers Councils would have had to be bamboozled out of their socialist aspirations and their armed formations dissolved. Where is the evidence to justify the pessimistic conclusion that such would have been the end result of the Hungarian revolution? The Polish experience lends weight to the proposition that the chances for the dreams of the Dulleses coming true were not too impressive. In any case, people cannot be led to socialism with the tyrant's whip, the torturer's rack and the hangman's rope. And if help were to be sent to the beleaguered Hungarians, it should have gone to the Workers Councils and their armed formations, not to uphold the discredited rule of the Stalinist secret police.

Aptheker's book will take its place on the bookshelves alongside such Stalinist classics as "The Great Conspiracy," "From Trotsky to Tito," and "History of the CPSU—Short Course."

2 France-Observateur, Nov. 1, p. 8.
3 Peter Fryer, "Hungarian Tragedy," London, Dennis Dobson, 1956, p. 44.
5 "Revolt in Hungary," p. 69.
6 Quoted in France-Observateur, Jan. 3, p. 20.
7 "Revolt in Hungary," p. 82.
9 "Revolt in Hungary," p. 2.

Inside the Teamsters Union


Dr. Leiter's book comes out at a strategic moment when the Teamsters union is being splashed across the nation's headlines. The subject matter might have made it a best seller. But it's not that kind of a book. The author, who is Associate Professor of Economics at New York's City College, has worked up a lackluster, pedantic paper, long on figures and data, and short on insights, color, or integrated analysis. Dr. Leiter has studied all manner of technical materials connected with the union and lays out all sorts of factual information which probably even the well-informed Teamster official is not aware of. But as in the case of other educated labor specialists from the academic world, the feel, the dynamics of the union, what makes the wheels go 'round, seems to elude his grasp.

The book suffers from a further distortion: The internal evidence shows that most of it was written before the McClellan hearings when Dr. Leiter had no conception of the extent of corruption in the organization, and when he thought its officials were doing a pretty good job. His decision after the McClellan hearings to superimpose on the original text additional paragraphs and sections written from a different point of view leaves the reader squinting at a somewhat blurred film that is inadequately lighted up and a bit out of focus. However, as a reference work supplying background material on the union's structure and operation, on wages and the economics of the trucking industry, the book is valuable and to be recommended.

Dr. Leiter is of little help in guiding his audience out of the maze of unrelated facts because he is not too clear about it all himself. What is one to make of this pronouncement: "Those men running the International Brotherhood of Teamsters have apparently been fully aware of their responsibilities and have publicly opposed racketeering in all its forms." It is also doubtful that he will win a medal for this one: "The union has not and does not ordinarily invade jurisdictions of other trade unions." As for the proposition that "There are abundant evidences of democracy operating within the union in the structural inability of the international leadership to dominate the convention completely and in the internecine internal disputes which are occasionally publicly aired," he confuses a federalistic structure with the different categories of rank-and-file democracy and shows an inadequate comprehension of the evolution which the union is currently undergoing. It is to be doubted that the matter is straightened out when at the end of the chapter, the author slaps on a paragraph that "the union needs some guidance from responsible leaders of the AFL-CIO and from some of those of its own officials who are impeccable. It also requires temporary, but firm, legislative pressures by the federal government to compel the abandonment of corruption." Dumping into the pot anything that happens to be lying around the kitchen does not necessarily make a tasty stew.

The big thing to keep in mind about the Teamsters union is that up to the middle of the thirties it was primarily an organization of men engaged in local cartage, and that its structure, typical of so many of the leading AFL internationals of the time, ran along the lines of a feudal kingdom. Daniel Tobin (his tenure as president started in 1907), once he suppressed various dissident and secessionist factions during the early years of his career, ran the international board and office out of his vest pocket. But his power stemmed exclusively from the backing of the regional barons and dukes who could not be interfered with in their own fiefs. On contract negotiations, regional policies, and the operation of the local unions and joint councils, the local nobility laid down the law and brooked no interference. The N. Y. Times correspondent summed up the nature of the regime during Tobin's long reign:

... it was not an international union at all, for all its size, wealth and strategic position. It was a combination of hundreds of locals, each a law to itself.

American Socialist
Daniel J. Tobin, Beck's predecessor, was the most powerful single individual in the AFL. He headed the federation's executive council with shambling arrogance, but he walked softly in the presence of his own local leaders. In New York, Chicago, and other big cities, Teamster officials threw their weight around with no regard for the parent organization. On the rare occasions when Tobin sought to blow the whistle, no one listened.

But already in the thirties, new currents began to flow which in time transformed the union's topography. Tobin in 1934 was in the front ranks of the AFL officialdom who tried to keep out the "rubbish"—as he designated the new members who soon went to make up the emergent CIO unions. But Teamster and other AFL business agents did not scruple shortly afterwards to take advantage of the CIO's crusade to fatten their own organizations and treasuries. The Teamsters union which had less than 100,000 members in 1929 and 112,000 in 1934, stood at 361,000 in 1938 and 418,000 in 1940. Most of the new agents went in for plenty of back-door negotiations, but Dave Beck in Seattle came up as the virtuoso of the "sweetheart contract," selling employers 100 percent respectable American unionism (at cut rates) to ward off the bugaboo of the Red trade unionism of the CIO (with its then more militant attitudes and generally higher demands).

Concomitant with the growing membership and power of the union went the transformation of the trucking industry. Over-the-road haulage, which took on importance in the late twenties, was growing at accelerated speed in the thirties, and with this, came the rise of nationally important trucking corporations. The Minneapolis Teamster leaders first analyzed the significance of the new business structure and devised an ingenious organization strategy around the concept of requiring all drivers coming into Minneapolis terminals to be union members. Minneapolis was an anomaly in the conservative Teamster organization. Local 574, under a leadership of revolutionary socialists of Trotskyist persuasion, had led in the organization of the whole city with a series of fearlessly fought and brilliantly executed strikes during the NRA period. Pursuing now the over-the-road strategy with militant purposefulness, they signed the first uniform over-the-road contract in 1938, thereby securing for themselves a position of strength in the entire area. From his own end, Dave Beck quickly grasped the significance of the new strategy and proceeded to copy it in his region. By 1937, despite Tobin's opposition, who feared the growing power of institutions outside his own control, Beck set up the Western Conference of Teamsters, and gradually area-wide bargaining became the new pattern. Ten years later, the International was officially divided into four conference areas with each conference administered by a chairman and executive board, and further sub-divided into as many as sixteen trade divisions.

The Teamsters union was thus being pushed powerfully toward centralization and integration by the same pressures which operated in CIO unions pitted against the manufacturing giants. It was commonly assumed that when Beck took over the presidency in 1953, he would reorganize the Teamsters along the line of the Miners union. But he had to move slowly as some of the regional baronies were too strong to be taken in a head-on assault, and both Brewster, the new chairman of the Western Conference (representing a quarter of the membership), and Hoffa, the power of the Central States Conference (37½ percent of the membership), headed independent machines. The victory of the Hoffa machine at the recent Miami convention meant that centralization will henceforth be pursued relentlessly, that a nationally integrated organization is in the making, and that the local princedoms are going to have to knock under to the monarch, or be brushed aside. It remains to be seen whether Hoffa, or a successor, is destined to be that monarch, and whether the Teamster Louis XIV finallysteadies the throne peacefully or only after a long series of sanguinary contests.

Even when local autonomy was in full flower, the Teamster organization was never noted for democracy accorded its membership. The local district exarchs ran things just as autocratically as any national dictator could, but there always was a certain amount of democracy for the bureaucrats, generally utilized by them on behalf of power intrigues and to ward off encroachments on their domains. This phase is passing. Once the national machine is consolidated it will demand unswerving homage to itself alone. The new direction was indicated at Miami: Everybody that bucked Hoffa was unceremoniously dumped. If Hoffa does not run afoul of the law and can function in the presidency, all the old barriers are going to have to abandon their crumbling castles and operate out of Versailles.

Despite the widespread corruption amongst its officials, the Teamsters union has grown faster since the passage of the Taft-Hartley law than most other unions. In 1948, its membership figures stood at 917,000 and in 1956 at 1,368,000. A number of its leaders are aggressive and energetic and make good use of the union's unique economic position that enables it to control the flow of goods and services in industry. Besides, they are opportunistic in the extreme, and don't give a damn what effects their activities have on the rest of the labor movement. In the case of Montgomery Ward, Hoffa even jumped into the middle of a stock-burnished stock contract with a national contract covering 15,000 workers. On wages, the Teamsters union lagged behind the manufacturing unions throughout the war period. Teamster and warehouse annual earnings were higher than in manufacturing from 1932 to 1940, and lower from 1941 to 1945. But after the war, they shot up again and continued outdistancing wage rates in manufacturing. For instance, in 1955, average earnings in manufacturing were $4351 and in transportation and warehousing, $5130.

The Teamsters union is that anomaly that has bobbed up time and again in this country, particularly in the skilled unions: a labor organization headed by a crooked leadership; a dues-payingship that is for practical purposes disenfranchised, but which stays largely indifferent. Fear is an element, but in larger part, the membership goes along because the officials manage to negotiate relatively favored conditions of work. The crack used to be that it's easier to reform capitalism than it is to reform the unions. This was probably an exaggeration, but it's certainly no harder.

B. C.

As Others See Us

AMERICA AND THE BRITISH LEFT

The aim of Pelling's book is to show "how the fund of Radical goodwill for America and its institutions, which made such a contrast with the prejudices of the 'educational' classes in the middle of the nineteenth century, was gradually dissipated in the succeeding decades, until by the middle of the twentieth century the bulk of so-called 'anti-American' feeling was to be found among the adherents of the Left in British politics."

Until well into the nineteenth century, most varieties of British radicals found their ideals realized in the United States. The Chartists believed that American workers were a good deal better off than British workers. Followers of Bentham liked the liberal constitutions of the member States of the Union. Dissenters and freethinkers hailed the American separation of church and state. And land reformers gloried in the abundance of cheap, or even free, virgin land in America.

Thus, from the time of the American Revolution through our Civil War, America was the apple of British radical eyes. But when labor radicalism began to replace bourgeois radicalism as the main current of the British Left, the American way in society and politics began to have less appeal to British rebels. And as profound social changes began in America after the Civil War, our country, with its growing oligarchy of wealth, suddenly took on a new attractiveness for British Tories, who had previously equated "Americanization" with "democratization," a word they feared and despised.

During the Civil War, liberal, radical, and conservative class unions hardened in favor of the North when it became clear that the destruction of slavery would come if the Union won. The Northern victory

November 1957
gave an impetus to the rising Liberal Party, and to the Parliamentary reform movement for a truly representative House of Commons. In the fight for universal suffrage, it was natural that the British radicals should come forward as the defenders of the American democracy; the success of the American Union was for them a telling rebuttal of the argument that an unrestricted franchise would reduce Britain to ruin. But the controversy over universal suffrage was the last political battle in Britain in which the Left was unambiguously pro-American and the Right was anti-American.

BEGINNING about 1877, the British Left began to feel misgivings about America being the model of the good society. Strong whiffs of the corruption of the American urban political machines were wafted across the Atlantic. And the suppression of the railroad strikes of 1877 had a jolting impact on British radicals. The class war in America, it began to appear, was a social struggle of incomparable ferocity.

Meanwhile, Pelling notes, "the American system of government was becoming an object of friendly comment among British Conservatives, who regarded it as providing valuable safeguards against what they considered would be the evil effects of democracy."

The three British lecture tours which American radical reformer Henry George conducted in the 1880s apparently reinforced the movement of opinion already under way. "What impressed British audiences of Henry George was his insistence that there was economic distress in America which paralleled that in Britain." The execution of the Chicago anarchists after the Haymarket affair in 1886 "seemed particularly shocking to British Socialists" and cleared off some illusions among them about American courts.

For a short while in the 1880's, labor political activity in the United States seemed to portend the rapid rise of a national labor party, and this appearance of things stimulated British socialists. "The make-shift rule of thumb economics of Trades Unionism," wrote the labor paper Reynolds' in 1887, "are simply a disgrace to British workmen, and the sooner they take a leaf out of the book of their American brethren the better." In the same year Engels expressed the hope that "the example of the American working man will be followed before long on the European side of the Atlantic. An English, or, if you will, a British Labor Party will be formed..."

This, says Pelling, was "one of the few periods when the state of political organization of the working class as such in America could be regarded as more complete than that of the British workers."

But after 1900, the growth of huge open shop industrial empires on this side of the Atlantic and the relative weakness of the American labor movement began to worry British unionists. British employers developed the habit of arguing that it was the freedom of American industry from the restrictions of trade unionism that accounted for its competitive advantage. The image of American capitalism as ruthless and hard-driving was important in spurring British labor to political action because it was widely felt among British workers that American conditions foreboded things to come in Britain if capitalist development were not interfered with. "The Labor Party was born," writes Pelling, "and on its very birthday its denunciation of 'the American experience' was at least as sharp and bitter as its criticism of the state of things inside Britain."

The retardation of the political movement of U.S. labor came in for a lot of notice. J. R. Clynes, a Labor Member of Parliament, wrote in 1909:

American trade unions, in point of political activities, stand now where ours did fifteen years ago. American industrial legislation compared with ours is twenty years behind, and the American Socialist bodies suggest no comparison with ours at any time.

At the same time, it is true that the writings which were the expression of American labor radicalism did make a lasting impression in Britain. They provided the image of America held by the generation which now leads the British labor movement. Aneurin Bevan records this American literary impact in his "In Place of Fear":

As I was reaching adolescence, towards the end of the first World War, I became acquainted with the works of Eugene V. Debs and Daniel De Leon. When I found that the political polemics of De Leon and Debs were shared by so loved an author as Jack London, the effect on my mind was profound. Nor was I alone in this. My experience has been shared by thousands of young men and women of the working class of Britain... From Jack London's "Iron Heel" to the whole world of Marxist literature was an easy and fascinating step.

While young British workers like Bevan were being inspired during the war by the writings of American radicals, British union and socialist leaders were being repelled by Samuel Gompers, whom President Wilson had sent to England to rekindle the burned-out war spirit. The impact of an AFL delegation led by Gompers on the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference in 1918 was noted by Beatrice Webb:

They asserted and re-asserted that the war—at any rate since they entered it—has been a war between Democracy and Disinterestedness, on the one hand, and Autocracy and Lust of Power on the other. Whenever this thesis was controverted the Americans repeated their credo—more slowly, more loudly, and alas at greater length. "Are you stupid, criminal, or merely deaf?" was implied in their intonation... .

The performance of the Gompers team foreshadowed the heavy-footed mission to Europe of the cold war by the present leaders of American labor. As Pelling analyzes the Gompers mission to Britain, "Gompers in his war policy was carrying on his long struggle with Socialism—a struggle in which he had been engaged for a quarter of a century. The attitude of the British Labor Party, and the control which the Socialist had won over it, seemed to threaten Gompers once again with an enemy which he thought he had vanquished." In his memoirs Gompers later distilled his attitude into a maxim: "Socialists the world over are of the same mental caliber—there is only one way to deal with them—don't argue, just tell them." Gompers' foray strengthened the anti-American sentiment in the British labor movement. On this as on other occasions, the most persuasive propagandist of hostility to the U.S. turned out to be an American.

In 1931, the British Labor Government was told that it would be denied an American loan unless it promised to reduce unemployment relief drastically. The U.S. conditions created a political crisis which brought down the Government. The Daily Herald, Labor Party organ, naturally took the American conditions to be "an attempt... to dictate the internal policy of Great Britain."

In Britain it was old Lloyd George and the Liberal Party of British capitalism, not the Laborists, who were cheered by the coming of Roosevelt and the New Deal. "This was the period," Pelling reminds us, "when almost all Socialists were warm in their praise of the Soviet Union, which seemed to have insulated itself from the world depression by means of the Five Year Plan. The more Marxist the British Socialists were, the more they found to blame and the less to praise in Roosevelt's policy; and it was unusual to find supporters of the President even among the less Marxist." The prevailing view was that Roosevelt was a tinkerer who would try to mend but who would never get rid of the structural faults of capitalism. When they looked to America with hope they looked not to the New Deal but because the turbulent rise of the CIO led them to expect the early formation of a labor party in America. Mark Starr, a Labor Party man who had emigrated to America and become educational director of the International Ladies' Garment Workers, expressed a characteristic British laborite view right after the Roosevelt landslide of 1936: "The unionism of the '30's became the basis for independent political action in Britain, so the workers in the CIO unions of garment workers, coal miners, radio, rubber, and glass workers will be the real support for the 'new alignment' of 1940."

Since World War II, McCarthyism, the open control of government by big business,
and the build-up of America's military power have tended to strengthen traditional British laissez-faire mistrust of the U.S. But at the same time the bureaucratic conservatism of the British union officialdom is supplying a new, if narrow, base for pro-Americanism. Pelling looks at the world from the point of view of Socialist Commentary and the Socialist Union, which are the rallying centers for a brain trust of the British union bureaucracy, and interprets its view. These officials feel close political and social kinship with their American counterparts. They support such American policies as the re-arming of Germany. They see America, Pelling maintains, without the ideological blinkers of the British socialist intellectuals and they will in time, he hopes, win over the British working class.

They want to put an end to ideology "as a major factor in British politics"—in other words, they would like to ward-heelize the British on the American model.

It is disquieting to see our country's defects recommended in Britain by people in or around the British labor movement. But for all that, Pelling has written a book which instructs us ably on a fascinating subject.

DAVID HERRESHOFF

Bracing Gaelic Breeze


WHATSOEVER else can be said about Irish literature of the past half-century it is rarely lacking in a sense of generosity and human warmth which all too often puts its Anglo-American counterpart to shame by comparison. Mr. O'Faolain's collection of essays is a case in point. The author is a distinguished novelist and short story writer who may, I suppose, fairly be ranked with Sean O'Casey, O'Connor and Elizabeth Bowen as among the chief luminaries of contemporary Irish writing.

Here he discusses the work of a number of his well-known contemporaries—Aldous Huxley, Evelyn Waugh, Virginia Woolf, James Joyce, Graham Greene, Elizabeth Bowen, Ernest Hemingway and William Faulkner. A certain unity is given the various essays by Mr. O'Faolain's thesis that the Hero, as the unifying figure of literature, has disintegrated in contemporary society and has given place to various anti-Heroes.

There is, of course, nothing extremely novel in this theory. Over twenty years ago I heard Aldous Huxley lecture on much the same topic and a number of Marxist critics have since carried the analysis even farther, locating the roots of this transition in the sense of alienation which the artist feels from the capitalist world. However, Mr. O'Faolain's theoretical structure is not his long point; it is in his specific literary insights that his real excellence lies.

His point of view is one which is rarely encountered in criticism today—that of an urbane and essentially optimistic Catholic humanism strongly overlaid with an admiration for the clarity and simplicity of much of French letters. Politically he would appear to be accounted a conservative but not anti-democratic.

Despite these many points of difference, the radical humanist is likely to find great areas of agreement with his literary judgments. His critiques of his fellow-Catholics—Greene, Waugh—are in particular first-rate and, for one, could only applaud after reading his thorough-going deflation of our own windy poet of doom, William Faulkner.

THE study of Graham Greene is particularly rewarding, because Mr. O'Faolain is peculiarly well-equipped to trace the religious background of Greene's fascination with evil. In discussing Greene's indebtedness to Pascal and the Jansenists, he throws light on a whole contemporary tradition which includes Faulkner, Alberto Moravia and George Orwell among others—"all of them," he says, "anti-humanist, anti-heroic, highly skeptical about man's inherent dignity, which the great humanist tradition took as the cornerstone of all its beliefs."

In detail he traces the obsessive nature of Greene's novel, his essential contempt for humanity and his underlying anti-intellectualism which succeeds in converting all of his characters into will-less creatures who can only be saved by a deus ex machina.

"We are forced again and again to the conclusion," he writes, "that Greene is not primarily interested in human beings; human problems... life in general as it is generally lived; that what he is writing is not so much novels as modern miracle plays... In fact, I go so far as to doubt if he is in the least interested in human nature except in so far as he can put it into some weird-looking cabinet, saw it up in bits, stick swords in it, fire shots at it, draw a curtain, and show us that it has suddenly been transmogrified magically, or miraculously, if one prefers, into an angel."

Strong language, but long overdue. Here in America we have suffered through a decade and a half in which the anti-humanist tradition has ridden triumphantly through lecture halls and literary magazines. We have been half-submerged by a literature of despair, anguish, corruption and sadism; we have been told that moral actions are meaningless, brotherhood is a cynical jest, and our aspirations foredoomed to betrayal and failure.

In such an atmosphere Mr. O'Faolain's warmth and love of human values in literature comes as a bracing Gaelic breeze. Irrespective of ideologies, it exudes acumen, wit and a healthy concern for the future.

GEORGE HITCHCOCK


1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher and editor, Bert Cochran; Managing editor, Harry Braverman; Business manager, Elaine Roseland; all of 857 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y.

2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.) American Socialist Publications, Bert Cochran, Harry Braverman, all of 857 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y.

3. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 percent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) None.

4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statement in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

5. The average number of copies of each issue of this publication sold or distributed, through the mails or otherwise, to paid subscribers during the 12 months preceding the date shown above was: (This information is required from daily, weekly, semi-weekly, and tri-weekly newspapers only.)

/s/ Elaine Roseland

Business Manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 24th day of September, 1957.

(Seal) /s/ Ethel Supnick

November Meetings

Hear
E. D. NIXON
of Alabama
Organizer, Montgomery Improvement Association
President, Montgomery Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters

"How Can We Achieve Integration—North and South?"

CHICAGO: Wednesday, November 20, 8 pm, at Shiloh Baptist Church, 4821 South Wabash. Dr. T. R. Howard, formerly of Bayou, Mississippi, will appear on the program with Mr. Nixon in Chicago. Admission, 50 cents. Auspices Eugene V. Debs Forum, write for tickets to Room 504, 208 North Wells.

DETROIT: Friday, November 22, 8 pm, at Central YWCA, 2230 Witherell at Montcalm. August Scholle, President of the Michigan CIO Council, will appear on the program with Mr. Nixon in Detroit. Auspices Detroit Labor Forum, admission 90 cents, students 50 cents.


———

DETROIT DEBATE

Kenneth Boulding, Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan versus Harry Braverman, "American Socialist" editor, on "Must the Boom Bust?" Thursday, November 7, 8 pm, at the Central Methodist Church, 23 E. Adams at Woodward, admission 90 cents, students 50 cents. Auspices Detroit Labor Forum. Questions, discussion, audience participation invited.

The American Socialist
Room 306 • 857 Broadway • New York 3, N. Y.

FOR NEW READERS ONLY:

☐ SPECIAL INTRODUCTORY SUBSCRIPTION SIX MONTHS $1.00

☐ ONE-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION $3.00
☐ TWO-YEAR SUBSCRIPTION 5.50
☐ ONE-YEAR by first-class mail 5.00

Date

Name

Street

City Zone State

CHICAGO

Republican ex-governor

vs.

"American Socialist" editor

J. Bracken Lee, two-term governor of Utah now national chairman of For America, debates Harry Braverman, on "Which Way America: Free Enterprise or Socialism?" Moderator, Professor Cortelyou, Roosevelt University. Tuesday, November 12, 8 pm, at Masonic Hall, 32 West Randolph Street. General admission, 90 cents, student admission, 60 cents. Auspices, Eugene V. Debs Forum of Chicago, for tickets write E. V. Debs Forum, Room 504, 208 N. Wells.

———

TORONTO

Harry Braverman will speak on "Why the Boom Must Bust" at the United Steelworkers Hall, second floor, 33 Cecil Street. Friday, November 15, at 8 pm. Questions and discussion, admission free.

MILWAUKEE readers note: Harry Braverman will speak in Milwaukee on the evening of Sunday, November 10. The hall for this meeting had not been arranged by our copy deadline. For details write to the "American Socialist."

———

HARVEY O'CONNOR IN NEW YORK

"War Tensions in the Middle East" will be the timely and important topic discussed by Harvey O'Connor, noted authority on the oil industry and author of the monumental "Empire of Oil," in a lecture on Sunday, November 3, at 8 pm. Fraternal Clubhouse, 110 West 48 Street, admission $1. Questions and discussion. Auspices, American Socialist Club of New York.

———

CHICAGO SYMPOSIUM ON "THE NEW CLASS"

At the University of Chicago: Professor Irving Howe of Brandeis University, an editor of "Dissent," David Herreshoff, Carnegie Fellow at the University of Minnesota and a contributing editor of the "American Socialist," Morton Kaplan, assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, will speak on the new book by Milovan Djilas, "The New Class." Sunday, November 17 at 8 pm. The Social Science Building, Room 122, 1126 East 59 Street. Auspices, the Politics Club of the University of Chicago.