By Conrad Lynn:

SECOND ROUND FOR CIVIL RIGHTS

The Rockefeller Report:

Marching Orders From the Power Elite

Socialism and the Mixed Economy

What is Peronism?
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Response to Offer

I am sending you the enclosed list of names in response to your offer of a one-year subscription in return for a list of fifty prospective readers. . . . I would like to know what results you get, if possible.

H. Z. Denver

In accordance with your offer, I enclose a list of fifty prospective subscribers to the American Socialist. You will find here a good many students and teachers. I trust a number will be interested and wish to subscribe.

I enjoyed your December issue, especially the article on Darrow.

D. E. Swarthmore, Pa.

I am enclosing fifty names of persons who may be interested in subscribing to the American Socialist. Please enter my free sub. . . .

I feel you put out an excellent magazine, although occasionally (such as the review of Aptheker’s book on Hungary which took a grossly oversimplified view of the uprising—as did Aptheker) I feel you become less than objective concerning the USSR. . . .

M. M. Portland

The back cover of your December issue was of interest to me in that you indicated a desire for names of possible subscribers. I’m not interested in a free subscription and couldn’t muster as many as fifty names for your use, but I’m enclosing a shorter list. Should you mail sample copies to these people, I’m quite certain that something will develop in the way of new subscriptions.

R. K. Fort Wayne

I have been discussing with a group of young people for some months, and they now desire to set up a socialist study group. They are factory workers—three of them have attended college. Needless to say, they think the American Socialist is tops, and one of them brought in the enclosed eight subscriptions.

G. D. Flint, Mich.

Please send sample copies to the enclosed list of one hundred names. . . .

E. S. Chicago

Forget Names and Labels

I want you to know how much I enjoy reading the interesting articles in the American Socialist.

But it seems to me after the black eye that communism, socialism, and new unionism have been given by the 100 percent monopolists, and considering the ignorance and indifference of the present generation in anything that requires thinking, the best way to waken the masses is to forget names and labels and concentrate on live issues that affect all of us. For instance, the high cost of existence, high taxes, military conscription in peacetime, starvation pensions for oldsters, medical monopoly, waste in government, bureaucracy. These are issues that everybody understands and may unite the dumb herd and save them from an atomic holocaust, eternal slavery, and militarism.

Dr. N. H. Chicago

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Editors’ Note

We have received a number of requests for information about Pal Maleter, who, it has been rumored, has been or will be tried by the Hungarian regime for his part in the rebellion of 1956.

Maj. General Pal Maleter of the Hungarian People’s Army was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense in the short-lived Nagy government on October 31, and on November 3 was raised to Minister of Defense. On that same day, he headed a military mission in negotiations with the Soviet forces. He never returned, as he and the others were seized by the Russians, then preparing their second and decisive attack.

Maleter gave an interview to foreign newsmen on November 2 (reprinted in Columbia University’s book of documents on “National Communism”), in which he described his own involvement in the revolt: “In the early morning hours of last Wednesday, I received an order from the then Minister of Defense to set out with five tanks against insurgents in the eighth and ninth boroughs, and to relieve the Kilian Barracks. When I arrived at the spot I became convinced that the freedom fighters were not bandits but loyal sons of the Hungarian people. So I informed the Minister that I would go over to the insurgents.”

Reports that Maleter had been a volunteer in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War were widely circulated at the height of the revolt, but Francois Petjo, who had himself written such reports for France-Observateur in 1956, writes the following in his recent book “Behind the Rape of Hungary”: “It was said that in 1936 he had distinguished himself in the Spanish Civil War. But in 1936 Maleter was only seventeen, and had the rank of cadet. At the outbreak of World War II, he was a lieutenant in Horthy’s army. In 1942, he was sent to the Russian front, and was wounded and captured by the Russians. There he became a Communist, probably out of resentment against the Hungarian officers’ caste, which had snubbed him because of his humble origins. In 1943, Maleter asked to be dropped by parachute in Hungary, where he joined the anti-German guerrillas. He was awarded a high Soviet distinction and after the liberation was admitted to the Moscow Military Academy, where he specialized in tank warfare.”

On November 23, 1956, the Bevanite British Tribune published an interview with Maleter by Basil Davidson, direct from Budapest. “If we get rid of the Russians,” Davidson quotes Maleter, who was wearing his partisan star of 1944 and another red star awarded for successful coal-digging by his regiment, “don’t think we’re going back to the old days. And if there’s a people who do want to go back, well well we’ll see.” “And,” Davidson adds, “he touched his revolver holster.”

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AMERICAN SOCIALIST
Marching Orders
From the Power Elite

GET your storm clothes on, folks! There’s rough weather ahead! The god of what C. Wright Mills calls “military metaphysics” has for the time being won the day and now all good citizens are called upon to bow down and worship him. The super-super arms race is on. Naturally, it’s going to cost money, plenty of it. But why quibble when “freedom” is at stake?

Those who are a bit slow on the uptake and still have reservations, compunctions and objections will shortly be straightened out by perusing many learned dissertations of eminent philosophers, historians, economists, sociologists, political scientists, which will demonstrate that all of reason, logic, right-thinking, morality, ethics, as well as the Judeo-Christian tradition, point ineluctably and without the peradventure of a doubt, to the necessity that we arm ourselves to our eyeballs so that we can contain the Russians, who are getting similarly accoutered. This is a strategy that is nowadays known as “waging total peace” (although when the Russians do it it’s known as “total cold war”—the difference in definitions undoubtedly to be accounted for by geographical factors). Naturally, no one is better fitted to lead such holy war than our deeply devout Secretary of State.

Of course, the arms race has been proceeding apace for twelve years. But we are now climbing into a new rarefied sphere of spending, and arming and brinkmanship, and we had better all recognize that. Out of the welter of figures and estimates in President Eisenhower’s budget message two stand out: that Congress is being asked to appropriate $10 billion more over the amount actually voted last year; that the Pentagon plans to actually lay out approximately $6 billion more for production orders this year than last year. It is clear to us that this armaments spree does not stem solely from militarist jingoes, or the greedy lobby of aircraft manufacturers who see the chance to make a killing as a result of the national hysteria. These have undoubtedly contributed their share to the undertaking. But

JAMES Reston of the N. Y. Times depicts these reports as shining examples of independent groups of citizens sharing the benefit of their opinions with our legislators—all making for a triumphant demonstration of dynamic democracy at work. We see these reports in a more sinister light. We see them as a case of the power elite moving in directly at this critical juncture of our national history to lay down the line of national strategy and policy.

And what is the line of the Gaither and Rockefeller reports? First, to relentlessly push the arms race, sweeping all other considerations off the boards. The Gaither report proposes to increase the military budget $8 billion by 1961 and to spend an additional $20 billion in the next four years for civilian bomb shelters. The Rockefeller report proposes to increase the military budget $3 billion per year in an arithmetic progression for the next several years, in addition to unspecified amounts for civil defense and equipment of NATO and allied forces.

We spoke in the recent past of the conversion of this country into a Garrison State. The projected military program is another plunge on this road. We are going to be spending as much or more in peacetime than we did at the Korean war peak.

What are we going to do with this bristling array of missiles and bombs and our real estate developments in underground caves and abandoned salt mines? Here we run into a cacophony of uncertain sounds and conflicting counsel. There is a crisis of policy on top. Let us discard the proposition of preventive war which some reporters claim was advocated in the Gaither report, as this has not been authenticated, and in any case, is not presently the policy of authoritative circles. As for the Soviet bloc, the Rockefeller report repeats the general conviction that the possibility of the Russians starting all-out war against this country “is not our most likely threat.” But the authors use this proposition to plunge immediately into the policy labyrinth of “a limited nuclear war” which appears more reckless than any of Dulles’s brinkmanship. Considering the source, it is bloodcurdling.
The report says: “Our security can be imperiled not only by overt aggression but also by transformations which are made to appear, in so far as possible, as not aggression at all. It should be our aim to prevent such situations from developing. When they do become acute we may have a choice only between evils. Our security and that of the rest of the non-Communist world will then hinge importantly on our willingness to support friendly governments. . . . Thus against a nuclear power we must always be prepared to fight a limited nuclear war.”

Let us get a clear view of what this diplomatic verbiage means. We are living, as we know, in revolutionary times, when all sorts of peoples and nations are on the move seeking changes in their personal, social and national status. Many of the underdeveloped countries are trying to bargain with the two super-powers to make the best deals on their own behalf. Where a country like Syria or Indonesia strikes a bargain with Moscow which the State Department feels injures the world balance to its disadvantage, we presumably are called upon to threaten, and if necessary, wage “limited nuclear war,” and leave it up to the Russians to clear out, or reply in kind. But no one knows whether there exists such an animal as “limited nuclear war.” Tactical nuclear warheads are as devastating or more devastating than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Russians have rejected the concept, and the report itself admits: “It seems doubtful that ground rules for the conduct of limited war could be established.” So, if the Russians do not clear out, no one is in a position to say that the “limited nuclear war” will not spread within a matter of days or weeks into an all-out war.

Now, with all due respect to the august personages who drew up the report, that isn’t much of a policy, unless the Rockefellers are reconciled to clashing a third World War, and figure after it is all over we can dig enough people out of the caves and catacombs to start things rolling again. Actually, Dulles tried this kind of a tactic with his Eisenhower Doctrine. We moved our fleet into the Mediterranean. We propped up an anemic puppet on the Jordan throne. We dared anybody to interfere, and the Doctrine seemed to work. The Russians kept out. But then Syria allied itself with Egypt, its government purchased arms from Russia—and Dulles was reduced to sputtering and raving. When the chips are down, everyone realizes that to start shooting where the two super-powers clash means to set off an explosion the consequences of which no one can foretell, and the extent of which no one can control. Are we supposed to start shooting the next time the same thing happens?

If we read the minds of our perplexed and slightly daffy law-givers correctly, the basic emphasis of their strategy is to confront Russia at every turn with an overwhelming display of armed might, to prevent her under threat from extending her influence, to keep her off balance, and hope that sooner or later, she’s going to crack up from within, and either make possible a Tlistit peace, or bring forth a new type of regime with which capitalist America can make book. This was the line of thought of George F. Kennan’s 1947 “containment” paper. This was the foundation of Acheson’s “negotiation from strength” and NATO concept. This is the continuing line, call it policy, hope, or mirage, of Dulles, under his changing slogans of “liberation,” “massive retaliation,” and “waging total peace.”

The thesis may have sounded fairly persuasive when it was first adumbrated, but today it is shopworn for the simple reason that it has been given a workout for almost twelve years, when this country had a military superiority which it no longer possesses today—and it has been found wanting. The fact of the matter is that short of going to war, there is no way we can stop the Russians from selling arms, or hard goods, or giving loans, to underdeveloped countries, and thereby extending their influence and strategic strength. There is no way short of going to war that we can stop the Russians from constructing a herculean industrial empire increasing capable of competing with us and challenging us in what has been our special field of eminence—or, for that matter, in the exchange of threats and bullying.

As for collapse from within, this country’s analysts draw strength from such convulsions as the Hungarian uprising of last year, the Berlin uprising of 1953, the Polish events etc., and Dulles returned to the theme in his press interview of January 17 speaking of the “fatal defect” of the Soviet system which is going “to lead to their undoing” be it in “a decade or generation.” The Soviet bloc is certainly loaded with tensions. Of that there can be no question. But overall, Russia is stronger today vis-a-vis the United States than she was ten years ago. Internal shakeups to the contrary notwithstanding, the Khrushchev government disposes of more power than the Stalin government five years ago. And even more massive changes within the USSR may very well make her a more, not less, formidable opponent than she is today.
As for the United States and the NATO powers—is all harmony, stability and durability here within the fold of the righteous? Is France the model, with its unending colonial wars and financial debilitation? Is England, with its decayed empire, its rising pressures of anti-Americanism and anti-war sentiment? Is NATO, which the newspaper wags say looks more like a sieve than a shield? And is even the United States, which is plagued with an economic recession in the midst of the sputnik crisis, immune from social tremors and dislocations?

Naturally, all existing powers and systems and empires will in due course decline and disappear even as did Babylon and Athens in ancient times. But banking on Russia to crack up as an anti-capitalist power is not a policy—but strictly a hope. And as the Scriptures say, hope deferred maketh the heart sick.

It is the tragedy of the United States that at this moment of history there exists no political opposition in our presumably pluralistic political system to elaborate and battle for an alternative course. Acheson, the Democratic predecessor of Dulles, has just written a book which makes it obvious that he doesn't like Dulles' tone and Dulles' style, and for aught we know, Dulles himself, but he does not have any real quarrel with Dulles' policy. The Democrats in the Senate, under Lyndon Johnson's redoubtable leadership, are set to capture outer space so we can dominate the earth, where they are not simply belolling for more and more arms. The labor leaders, as usual, supply the raucous chorus to the Democrats' jingo pseudo-opposition. And this whole vast martial enterprise, powered by irresponsibility and under the direction of hopped-up gamblers, is now being sold the nation with the enticing wrapping that its attendant outpouring of billions will probably lift us out of any oncoming depression. As the "leak" to the Washington Post on the Gaither report expressed it, the additional expenditures "would come at a fortuitous moment in the American economy," since the Gaither report "started on the premise of a recession, not a further inflation." We can now kill two birds with one stone.

In the whole crowd of pygmies, hysterics, Babbitts, yea-sayers, and lobbyists that infest Washington, one man—Walter Lippman—stands out as a veritable giant, a man who is trying to keep his head, his sense of history, and his eye on where we are heading. Your policy is bankrupt, gentlemen, he is saying in effect to Washington. With it you will head into one humiliating crisis after another. The best we can expect is a military stalemate. The Russians will have as many blue chips as we do. "We are too strong to be bullied or blackmailed. But we shall have to treat them as an equal power that must be restrained but cannot be overawed." Our policy, based on unconditional surrender, is no good because it won't work, neither for Germany, nor for the Near East, nor for China. "It is most probable, it seems to me, that we shall have neither a true peace nor a real war, but that, for an indefinite future, we shall be adversaries and rivals." We have to continue the search for acceptable terms because "no other course is open to us." Lippman believes that the struggle between the two systems will eventually resolve itself into a standoff like that of Islam and Christendom, or Protestant and Catholic Europe.

They fear that any extended modus vivendi will crumble their alliances and spheres of influences and leave them after a spell in a position of marked inferiority. Here is the way Business Week lays it out: "Positive containment [the current policy] would be costly and risky—and would not guarantee peace even at the end of 20 years. On the other hand, negotiated settlements probably would lead ultimately to Soviet control of Europe, Asia, and Africa. If Moscow should ever attain that commanding position, the alternatives open to us would clearly be far worse than those before us today. . . . If [positive containment] offers no absolute assurance of peace, neither does any alternative."

So there we are, our blinders firmly affixed, looking neither to left nor right, galloping down the road that leads no one knows where. We are to continue arming, spending, bluffing, and threatening—until Der Tag, when Russia starts cracking up, we hope, and our diplomats can sit down at another Congress of Vienna to dictate terms. No wonder C. Wright Mills cried out "We are at the curious juncture in the history of human insanity: in the name of realism men are quite mad."

This is the road down which our lords and masters are riding us. Fortunately, even the mighty American plutocracy does not have unlimited power. Even in the days of push-button warfare you need the support, grudging or otherwise, of the people. The war fear sweeping across Europe made itself felt at last month's NATO gathering. The storm is gathering in Britain. And the world-wide sentiment for negotiations and peace has started the current jockeying for position apropos new diplomatic encounters. Dulles and his successors will be forced into many diplomatic sessions, from the cellar to the summit, before it is over. But there is a difference between affecting the tempo and public relations of a policy—and changing a policy. If the American peoples' sentiment for peace is to get translated into alternative policy decisions, and the bipartisan party line is to be breached, it will take organization, leadership and struggle.

Lippman's historical analogy may not be precise, but we are sure that the conflict must be transferred to the political and economic spheres if we are to circumvent Armageddon. But Lippman's proposal for an accommodation is one that the powers-that-be cannot bring themselves to accept.
For Negro History Week: A summary and a perspective on the equal rights fight, telling what has happened and what is due to happen as new fronts are opened by America's own freedom fighters.

**Second Round for Civil Rights**

by Conrad Lynn

LITTLE Rock marked the end of the first round in the Negro struggle for real emancipation throughout the nation. Despite the infuriating vacillation of a weak Republican President, the final descent of the paratroopers destroyed once and for all the elaborate legal facade of interposition that the Southern Democratic leadership had constructed. For a brief period this brittle doctrine had had become a bridge to the "moderate" Democratic forces of the North. The shattering blow of the 101st Airborne Division disposed of a great deal of sterile argument in the Congress. Nor was the helpless rage of the Southern Senators lessened by the news that five divisions of Federal troops stationed in the South had been alerted simultaneously for possible action.

Consternation and surprise were not confined to the South. How could an equivocal executive, who only three months before had said that it was "inconceivable" that force would be used to enforce civil rights for Negroes, have given such an uncompromising order? A brief review of historical origins readily affords the answer. Abraham Lincoln was elected President in 1860 as the representative of the conservative wing of the Republican Party. Over and over again he had made it plain that the freeing of the slaves was not one of his objectives. But the booming of the guns at Fort Sumter presented a different challenge. Was the national authority superior to the "reserved sovereignty" of the states? Lincoln could give only one answer. In the year 1857, as the two world colossi stood locked in the deadly contest of the cold war, the response had to be identical.

The strategists of repression in the South, however, are proving to be resourceful. No longer do they think in terms of a frontal assault on Federal power. The course of events in Macon County, Alabama, gives a clue to their new tactic. There, Negroes outnumber whites seven to one. Moreover, the standard of education of the Negro middle class is higher than that of its white counterpart, for this is the seat of Tuskegee Institute and of a large Veterans' Administration hospital employing hundreds of Negro doctors, nurses and technicians. Potentially, Negroes with the right to vote could easily dominate the county politically. But Sam Engelhardt, its state senator, submitted a bill to abolish Macon County and divide it among adjacent counties in such a fashion as to make Negroes a minority in each of said counties. His bill received practically the unanimous support of the State Legislature. Constitutional lawyers admit that it will be difficult to find in this action any violation of Federal law.

In the wake of this victory the White Citizens Councils have proclaimed a Century of Litigation. Every legal device of village, county and state, not overtly challenging Federal authority, will be used to halt the progress of the Negro and throw him back to a state of semi-peonage. All other methods of combating him are being officially disavowed. For example, in Clarendon County, South Carolina, this fall, a Negro cooperative wished to buy a combine to harvest its crops. The local white dealers at
first refused to consider a sale. Then, the leadership of the Citizens Council intervened. It showed the local members how they were cutting off their noses to spite their faces. An economic boycott cuts both ways. So the local merchants made the sale. The cooperative has its combine and the merchants their profit.

The eschewing of violence and of the boycott has another objective also—the beguiling of the Negro leadership. The attempt to smear the Negro leadership as Red has foiled on the fact that every movement for additional rights begins in the Negroes' church. So far, every concerted effort has been non-violent and buttressed by Christian precept. So the Councils are adopting another approach.

Non-violence anticipates conciliation. The decision of Martin Luther King to pay his fine of $500 for his alleged violation of the Alabama anti-boycott law and to drop his appeal is an instance of the Southern Negro leadership's readiness for compromise. Even though this decision freed $80,000 in funds of the Montgomery Improvement Association, which were being held as security by the state, it was fundamentally unwise. As a matter of principle, it should never have been conceded that the mass march of the Negroes in Montgomery over many months to ensure equal treatment on buses was in any way illegal. Perhaps such lapses must be expected, but this illustrates the necessity for vigilance on the part of the Negro and his friends in correcting his leaders.

At the moment the situation in the South to a degree parallels that of almost a century ago when the Black Codes were first introduced to return the freedman to slavery. These ferocious laws catapulted the Radical Republicans into power and led to the imposition of Reconstruction by federal bayonets. The wily Southern leadership gave way ostensibly but continued insistently to press for a deal with the northern industrialists. Finally, in the Tilden-Hayes election squabble the deal was sealed. The Republicans agreed to remove Federal troops from South Carolina and Louisiana in return for the Democrats conceding the election to Hayes. Thereafter, the central government turned a blind eye to the South where the Bourbon established their control over the blacks by wholesale bloodshed and terror.

Is their any likelihood for a similar outcome in the second half of the twentieth century? May not the ruling class in the South continue to offer to our northern industrialists an open shop paradise based on the irrevocable division of white and black workers? Does not the prospect of recession make their blandishments ever sweeter? To answer these questions in the affirmative requires an expectation of the collapse of the progressive forces of the country.

Unfortunately for the Eastlands and the Talhads the struggle cannot be localized. Regardless of how little the Republicans may stomach a fight for civil rights, they cannot forfeit the struggle for the world with Russia in order to appease these parochial figures. If the more numerous colored peoples on other continents become convinced that the United States is being transformed into a great bastion for "white supremacy" the "American Century" will never be realized.

Nor is it conceivable that organized labor will stand by complacently and watch the forging of chains which will shortly embrace its own ankles. Its leadership's embarrassment over the dilemma of the Democratic Party may have temporarily paralyzed action, but the lesson of Nazi Germany is too recent to permit us to expect supine acceptance of new racial suppression by millions of workers accustomed to mingling on the assembly line with less and less thought of color.

Our final calculation must take into account the action of the Negro masses themselves. In the face of rising pressure the Southern Christian Leadership Conference has issued a call for marches in twenty southern cities on January 20, 1958 on the polling booths for large-scale registration of Negroes. In every one of these cities only an insignificant trickle of Negroes has been allowed to register in the past. The rank-and-file Negro volunteers for this operation have been trained all winter on their course of conduct. It is likely that their action will present the Civil Rights Commission with its first problem.

The Negro will never again permit the issue of civil rights to be swept under the rug. There will be temporary setbacks in the struggle. Possibly there will be betrayals. Sputniks and what not may divert others. The Negro will follow the main course to freedom and full equality of opportunity.

BOOKER T. Washington, who was able to laugh even when the joke was on him, had the habit of making good will tours through the South and discussing his philosophy of race relations before mixed audiences. He told of the time when he was scheduled to speak in a small Florida city. The only place in town large enough to hold the crowd was the courthouse. When this was announced the sentiment of the town was sharply divided. Part of the people thought it was all right for a Negro to make a speech in the courthouse, the others thought he should be there only as a defendant. The meeting was held, however, and he, with his usual diplomacy, won over the crowd. After the meeting a very drunk man came up to him and said "Booker Washington, you are a great man. I was against your speaking in the courthouse, but now I know I was wrong. You are the greatest man in the country." "Well," said Washington, "that covers a lot of territory; how about Theodore Roosevelt [who was then President]?” The drunk said, "I used to think that T.R. was the greatest man in the country until he invited you to lunch."

—Thomas J. Woodruff, "Southern Race Progress"
For those whose illusions about some new kind of "socialism" in Britain have run ahead of the evidences of actual change, the balance sheet tells a sobering story.

Socialism and the Mixed Economy

by Harry Braverman

On one occasion in late 1951, the writer asked a high-ranking civil servant to sum up, if he could, the achievement of the Labor Government. Was it in its essentials, the writer wanted to know, the creation of a mixed economy, Welfare State, Socialism, or something else? "Well," the civil servant began, after a pause, "I don't really know what to say. I think it will be at least ten years before the Attlee Government can be placed in true perspective. But at the present time I put you in mind of nothing so much as the voyage of Columbus in 1492. You will recall that when Columbus set out he didn't know where he was going; when he arrived he didn't know where he was; and when he returned he didn't know where he had been. Perhaps," the civil servant concluded with a wry smile, "that answers your question."

Rogow and Shore, "The Labor Government and British Industry."

Socialism is generally understood as a fundamental change in the power hierarchy of a nation, and in that sense involves a revolution, by whatever means effected. Implicit is a re-casting of class positions, a fresh set of social drives and values, a sharp turning of the road giving a new direction to society.

But what of those cases where some public ownership has come about without such a shakeup? The nationalizations in Britain after the war—as well as state ownership and government investment in a number of countries like India—pose the question of the relation between such forms and socialism. It is common these days for every ounce of fact to be heaped over with a ton of speculation and extrapolation. Our society is so badly in need of over-haul and so clearly in a process of transition that our rulers themselves are not above encouraging us to see "revolutions" in every municipal gas works. But when all the clichés and mumbo-jumbo are discounted, what remains?

Nationalization is hardly brand new. Certain industries and services, chiefly those of bigger scope than early capitalism could handle, or of questionable profitability, have traditionally been public enterprises. The postal service is publicly owned everywhere. Telephone and telegraph services are also nationalized in almost all countries. (Most European nations can give better and cheaper postal service on the basis of telephone-telegraph profits. In the United States, AT&T and its associates have copped the profitable part of the communications industry, and left the federal authorities to struggle under the load of the postal deficit, incidentally thereby furnishing the pundits with a horrible example of the "inefficiency" of state enterprise.)

Radio and television broadcasting are government owned in most countries; gas and electricity very often (in the U.S. they get by with "regulation"). Most of the world's railroads were state operated by 1900, and almost all the remainder have come under government ownership since then. In this country, again, our capitalists showed their astuteness by getting from the government the right-of-way land, huge additional land grants, and much of the financial assistance needed to build the roads—while still retaining ownership.

The trend of the post-World War II nationalizations in Western Europe is hinted at by the Einaudi-Bye-Rossi study, "Nationalization in France and Italy" (1955): "Since all sorts of 'privatistic' slogans are still used in the conduct of what should be a public business, it is not surprising to see the nationalized sector sometimes exploited as a convenient shield behind which to transact business. Nationalized industries may thus be used for experimental purposes in hazardous activities whose more profitable by-products are then taken over by private business, or they may frankly be regarded as a public pound of varying contents into which sick enterprises are cast but out of which, whenever possible, the profitable ones are retrieved."

The nationalization of Britain on a large scale (about 20 percent of industry), overlaid with ideological
ratiocination and the phraseology of social change, have been the most important development of this kind. The Labor Party had, for decades before coming to power in 1945, talked of nationalization, although the early revolutionary zeal and social evangelism had long since departed from the officiodom. The men that led the party were far from breathless idealists by the time they came to office; decades of collaboration, and years of fighting to subdue their own ranks, had indoctrinated them thoroughly in middle-class values and placed them not too far on the ideological scale from their Liberal opponents. Without questioning their sincerity, one may still be assured that any important project they backed would grow far more out of pressing "pragmatic necessities" than any "doctrinaire considerations," as they themselves were at pains to make plain to the world. A glance at the record shows how much the case this was.

The British nationalization program was confined (except for the special case of steel, which was half-heartedly undertaken, queasily trifled with, and soon reversed by the Conservatives) to the fields of transport (inland and civil aviation) and fuel and power (coal, gas, electricity). In electricity, the basic generating grid had already been nationalized for years under the Central Electricity Board, and about half the distribution stations were owned by local authorities. The gas industry, in large part, was already owned by the municipalities. The British railroads had been consolidated into four great systems in 1921, competition among them almost eliminated, and government regulation imposed. The civil aviation industry was as much a creature of the government, through subsidies and military necessities, as is our own in this country. For these industries, and particularly for the utilities, the changes were not very radical, involving a new centralized control, and the transfer of many properties from one form of public ownership to another.

In the coal industry, declining markets and sagging exports had been putting the operators on the rocks; British pits had not been keeping up in output per man-shift with their continental rivals. The large number of operators, slicing the mineral deposits up into small and awkwardly shaped leaseholds, made economical and mechanized operation very difficult. So far as the railroads were concerned, as a result of insufficient traffic they had started a decline in the twenties that nothing but the war seemed to arrest, and wars cannot, unfortunately for capitalism, be continued after the other side has been defeated. In both coal and railroads, therefore, the problem was one of near-bankruptcy.

WITH the demoralized owners of coal and the railroads facing what looked to them like insoluble problems, and with the public utilities up against a patchwork, disorganized setup a number of government commissions were set up by the Conservative government to bring in recommendations. The chairmen of the commissions investigating electricity and gas were also the chairmen of the boards of directors of the two largest corporations in the country, Imperial Chemical Industries and Unilever. The chairman of the coal commission was General Manager of the Fyfe Colliery Company. The reports issued by these commissions took so discouraged a tone and made such sweeping recommendations of government regulation and aid that, although they did not directly recommend nationalization, they invited it by every implication at their command. An American scholar, Robert A. Brady, wrote in his "Crisis in Britain": "All of the nationalization, or semi-nationalization programs were based squarely on the findings, and in large part on recommendations, which had been made by Conservative-dominated fact-finding and special investigating committees." Thus, the "revolution by consent" was even more than that; if it was a revolution at all it was one by invitation.

When Labor was swept into office in 1945, its traditional program of nationalization dovetailed neatly, for the industries under study, with the needs of the owners, who by this time had sufficient assurance that the nationalization measures would not be taken in any onerous form. The defeated Conservatives made a bit of a stop-you're-twisting-my-arm show in the ensuing debate, but the London Economist, an unimpeachable Conservative voice, expressed in August 1945 their real feelings about the Labor program: "There is thus no call for . . . alarm now." Some months earlier the same periodical had pictured the state of opinion about coal nationalization—the most controversial of the bills—by writing: "Support for the principle of public ownership of the mines is now very wide, extending probably to two and a half of the three parties." Here was an attitude so agreeable as to not only prove the claim of a "bloodless revolution," but so far overprove it as to make one doubt the revolution.

THE British capitalists naturally required, in return for their acquiescence, an assurance of a working arrangement which would keep the real changes, as distinct from the nominal, to a minimum. The two main issues were compensation, and the structure of authority. While the nationalizations, even if completely bona fide, were too limited to threaten the commanding power of British capitalism, the form in which they were finally completed changed little in the basic realities even of the industries involved.

Total obligations for compensation in the four major nationalized industries (coal, transport, electricity, gas) amounted to £2,089,800,000 at the end of 1955, well above the stock market valuation of the shares in the case of some of the industries. By that same year, these four industries had already piled up a total of loans for capital renewal and expansion almost equal to the amount paid to buy them, £1,603,100,000, pointing up the inadequate and superannuated character of the purchased assets. The former owners are now drawing a better than 3 percent income from gilt-edged government securities, as against a shaky expectation of better than 4 percent on their previous equity holdings. After taxation is taken into account, not much change in income results. And the nationalized industries are saddled with so huge a debt for so far into the future, as to call into question whether these government-owned concerns are actually
the non-profit outfits they are supposed to be.

So far as control over the nationalized industries is concerned, its form had been set by Labor well before 1945. Direct operation by government had been foreseen, and all ideas of industrial democracy involving labor administration of any kind had also been rejected. What remained was the public corporation, a legal creation charged with running the industry and covering its costs, administered by a small board appointed by a government minister, and generally free from direct Parliamentary control or supervision, or for that matter, control and supervision of any kind. Said Clegg and Chester in their 1953 book called “The Future of Nationalization”:

... this recommended it to those businessmen and administrators who were convinced of the need for rationalization, and who had come to think that the obstacles to voluntary action were so great that public ownership was the only way forward. They thought of workers' control as a dangerous, or more likely a silly and irresponsible, slogan of the lunatic fringe. Many businessmen had experienced departmental control during the first world war, and had disliked what they described as its bureaucracy, delay, and red tape. What they wanted was more power for themselves to do what they thought was required. If Parliament would acquire all the assets of their own industry and appoint them to be members of a board to manage those assets, they would have power. If there had to be nationalization, then, for them, the public corporation was unquestionably the best method.

With the Labor Government committed to the public corporation, the composition of the powerful boards became the next matter of importance. In 1951, the Acton Society Trust did a study of the membership of the twelve boards administering the British nationalized industries, and found that out of 96 full- and part-time members, fully 38 were directors or managing directors of corporations, and another 14 occupied managerial positions on lower levels. As against these 52, only 16 trade unionists had been appointed, and the remainder was made up of a sprinkling of generals, admirals, accountants, lawyers, civil servants, etc.

This was the pattern of control established by the Labor Government itself. It was naturally continued and accentuated when the Tories returned to office. Clive Jenkins, the author of a forthcoming book on the nationalized industries, has presented some of his materials in an article for “The Insiders,” a well-titled pamphlet on the same subject published recently by Universities and Left Review. Mr. Jenkins analyzes the composition of the boards. The result is a crushing demonstration that the public ownership boards are overwhelmingly dominated by private industrialists representing the major corporations of Britain. They have become a veritable happy hunting ground for the power elite of British industry.

Of the 272 members on the national and regional boards examined by Mr. Jenkins as of March 1956, a total of 106 were directors in private corporations; these 106 holding among them a total of 604 outside directorships in the biggest and most powerful firms of the realm. In addition to hundreds of industrial corporations, 18 banks were represented on the public-industry boards through 31 directors, and 38 insurance companies through 49 directors. Further, some 71 managers, who had been recruited almost to a man from the upper echelons of industry, and nine landowners, were members, for a total of at least 186 directors out of 272. Of the remainder, the trade unions, Labor, and the cooperatives all together accounted for only 47.

Mr. Jenkins summarizes admirably the meaning of his factual materials in the following words:

They tend to make the case that the act of nationalization had side-products unforeseen by the rank and file of the Labor movement (and possibly the Labor Cabinet, too). It took certain “liability” industries “off the hands” of the private owners and by so doing (and handsomely compensating) effectively strengthened the 80 percent of industry left in private hands. The nationalized industries have continued this process by the relatively cheap prices charged to industry for their goods and services.

This has now been consolidated-in-depth by the appointment to the Boards of public corporations of persons intimately connected with great firms, financial institutions, and industries associated with the corporations concerned... and can represent a return to practical control, without investment and without risk to the financial groupings who previously had ownership.

The excellent study of the Labor Government of 1945-51 by Rogow and Shore, “The Labor Government and British Industry,” very careful and restrained in tone throughout, drew a remarkably similar conclusion, apply-
ing, it should be noted, entirely to the Labor Party term in office:

It was also true that the essence of the government's program thus far had been reform without essential change. There was, to be sure, incessant grumbling about taxes, controls, bureaucracy, and other subjects that have always constituted the businessman's fundamental critique of Government, but below the level of self-conscious pronouncement was a clear understanding that most of the reforms instituted by Labor had been due and overdue. Full employment, whatever its social significance, had meant higher profits and dividends for the owners of industry. There had been no diminution in the status of managers, and indeed, business personnel were being used in large numbers to staff the controls. The large enterprises, particularly, were benefiting from the general orientation of economic policy which tended to reserve for them the lion's share of licenses, permits, and allocations of raw materials. In short, the Welfare State that had been created by Labor did not appear to threaten the interests of business, and especially the power interests of big business.

There is no question that Labor activities in the welfare-statist field proper, such as the socialization of medical care, improved the conditions of the average person. The nationalized industries, on the other hand, can show no such clear balance sheet, and for that reason are under attack in Britain today for poor performance more from the Left than from the Right. The sick industries were rescued from their purgatory and put on a sound operating footing; their capital equipment is being overhauled, and productivity has been on the upgrade in the mines. But little of these benefits have found their way either to the workers in the industries or to the consuming public. The burdens of compensation to former owners, of large executive salaries to support managers in the style to which they were accustomed, of capital renewal long deferred, are too heavy a drain on the proceeds.

With nationalization confined to a few sick industries and limited to terms dictated by the ex-owners, and with the economy and polity of the nation not otherwise disturbed, the "bloodless revolution" is being nullified as power tends to flow back to its major reservoirs. "In the absence of any socialist ethic evocative of mass support," wrote Rogow and Shore, "the Labor government was bound to operate the capitalist or middle-class hierarchy of values that is characteristic of values of the acquisitive society." And they summarize the basic dilemma of the Labor movement brilliantly in the following remarks:

In the end, however, the socialization of power may require a conscious choice between a stalemate which leaves intact the status quo, and an advance bought at the risk of upsetting both the political and economic stability of British society. Faced with this choice in the case of steel, the Labor government hesitated and temporized at the expense of effective nationalization of the industry, and thereby suffered defeat.

The trifling with steel nationalization towards the end of the last Labor government was by no means due to accidental weakness or temporary confusion. The leaders of Labor's dominant right wing had worked out an accommodation within the limits of ruling-class tolerance. No sooner was there a move to cross the understood line than the bulldog began to growl and show his teeth, whereupon Labor policy seemed to lose all firmness of purpose. The present Labor statements "Industry and Society" and "Public Enterprise" veer sharply away from a policy of further nationalization, and hold out a vague promise of "buying shares" in private corporations. As far back as 1950, Herbert Morrison had arrived at the publicly expressed view that modern economic activity tends to divide itself into a public and private sector, in which the public sector is limited only to "public utilities" and "natural monopolies," which he saw as embracing a total of about 20 percent of the economy. On this outlook, labor's mission of nationalization was completed a decade ago.

We have thus far treated of two major issues: public corporations, which have been used to keep effective control in the old hands, and the scale of compensation, which, under the given circumstances, preserves pretty much the old channels of income flow. A third, and in many respects overriding issue, is that of workers' control. Nothing so much underlines for the worker the nominal nature of many supposed nationalization procedures as when, on the morning the new flag has been hoisted, he goes to the same job, with the same bosses dictating his terms and conditions of work, and with the same mechanisms of control operated by the same people as before. On the factory level the worker finds little change in his position, and on the nationwide level the workers as a class find that the levers of power are as far out of reach as ever. This is not what they had understood by "nationalization" in the past, and many workers grumble in Britain today that "the same old gang" is in power.

In the years before the first World War, as the Labor Party was gaining in strength, the influence of European and American syndicalism started to make itself felt. Where the emphasis of continental Social Democracy was on state ownership and national planning, the syndicalist movement of France and Italy, and the IWW here in America, put major stress on direct workers' control through workshop committees or a pyramid of planning bodies reaching up from the factory level.

The syndicalist influence showed itself first among the railroad workers. The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants urged nationalization of the railroads under workers' control in 1909. In 1914, the National Union of Railwaymen, a successor organization, declared that "no system of state ownership . . . will be acceptable to the organized railwaymen which does not allow them a due measure of control and responsibility in the safe and efficient working of the railway system." In 1915, the Trades Union Congress took up this approach, resolving unanimously that the nationalization of public services was not necessarily advantageous to the workers "unless
accompanied by steadily increasing democratic control” by the employees and by Parliamentary representatives of labor.

The movement known as Guild Socialism, which reached its high point in the years immediately following World War I, reinforced the sentiment with an extensive and widely circulated literature. The Guild Socialists, among whom D. H. Cole played a leading role, tried to rationalize the workers’ control objective and to meet the common objections to syndicalism by a program calling for the following: First, to fit themselves to govern industry, the unions must become national guilds, including in their ranks the clerical, technical, and administrative personnel; second, nationalization must take a decentralized form, in which considerable powers would be retained by the local workshop representation; third, the takeover would be parliamentary, as against the syndicalist program for a revolutionary, direct-action overturn; and fourth, Parliament, giving over the task of administration to the national guilds, would retain rights of state regulation to protect consumer and broad community interests.

Guild Socialism dovetailed with the revolutionary shop stewards’ movement of World War I, and its ideas won influence in a number of unions. The nationalization bills of 1919-21 were drawn up for the Labor Party by Guild Socialists or under their influence; the party resolution of 1920 affirmed:

That the direction and conduct of the coal-mining industry, being of vital importance to the workers in the industry, and the coal-consuming public, should be under the control of the National, District, and Pit Committee, representatives of the National Government, and the various classes of workers, including those engaged in the managing, technical, commercial and manual processes.

When, three years after the defeat of the General Strike, the Labor Party assumed office under the prime ministry of Ramsay MacDonald, the matter seemed to call for an immediate practical solution. But the Labor Party had already changed a great deal in a decade, and the leadership had abandoned workers’ control for the orthodox Conservative-Liberal idea of the public corporation. Herbert Morrison incorporated the latter in a bill reorganizing the London transportation system in 1931, thereby precipitating a debate within the Trades Union Congress and the Labor Party which raged for years. In 1932, the Morrison wing produced a report which, while not accepted by the official bodies for which it was framed, became the basis for the public-corporation policy of 1945. Attacked by the Transport Workers and other unions, the report was recalled for further consideration, debated bitterly for the next four years, and finally, the matter was left in a more or less unresolved state until 1944. By that time the bureaucratic encrustation of the unions had produced an officialdom which cooperated heartily with the party heads, and the 1932 policy was pushed through handily.

Despite this turning of their backs on the matter by the Labor and union officialdom, workers’ control remains a live issue among workers in nationalized industries. Typical of their feelings is this interview by Sterling D. Spero (“Labor Relations in British Nationalized Industry”):

A group of miners in Yorkshire insisted that nationalization would make no real difference to the miners until they themselves ran the mines: “The mine bosses are the same.” “The Coal Board in London is made up of big bosses and ex-admirals.” “Nationalization hasn’t changed anything. The people who oppose nationalization are running the mines.” Asked about trade union leaders on national and divisional boards or in high posts under the boards, they replied, “They change when they go on the board. They become bosses. They forget the workers.”

In coal, the number of strikes and stoppages during the years after nationalization went into effect rose substantially above even the high 1946 level, averaging about 1,600 a year through 1951, and rising to over 2,300 in 1952 and 1953, and to 2,614 in 1954, or just double the 1946 number. The “consultation committees” set up under the nationalization acts have not accomplished much, as they are merely discussion devices which do not increase labor’s power of decision one iota. More to the point is the fact that the Labor government, during its term of office, repeatedly used troops to break strikes, in electric power stations, road haulage, gas works (including, in the last instance, prosecution and prison terms for the strike leaders).

Sentiment for workers’ control in one form or another has increased considerably in the years since the nationalizations took place. A poll by Social Surveys, Ltd. in 1950 showed that 48 percent of workers in industry thought “they and their mates” ought to share in the management of the firms, as against 30 percent who thought not. Interest in the issue has revived among Labor Party militants and socialist intellectuals. D. H. Cole has returned to the attack in a number of current writings. In a 1954 pamphlet, “Is This Socialism?,” he put forward a program for “real workers’ control,” starting with an extension of the area of collective bargaining to cover many managerial functions, going on to the transfer of certain functions of factory discipline and organization directly to the workers, and going on to a system of sub-contracting by groups of workers within factories acting cooperatively. “They would constitute,” he wrote of these ideas, “the reality of workers’ control where the putting of a few trade union nominees on National Boards would give only the appearance of it.”

One thing emerges very clearly from this record: The basic breakthrough for socialism has yet to be made in Britain. Whatever the precise measure of welfarist improvements instituted during the Labor term (and investigation will reveal their modest proportions), and whatever importance the nationalizations may have as a starting point for future structural changes, the locus of power has not yet been seriously shifted.
A Review Article

What is Peronism?

by Bert Cochran


The author is described in the dust-jacket as a professor of Latin American history at the University of Pennsylvania and "one of the most eminent Latin American historians of our era." Possibly this last is a bit of an overstatement, though he is clearly well acquainted with his subject matter; but like so many of his colleagues of the scholarly world, he has enrolled as a technician of the American Empire and discusses, without the tremor of an eyebrow, the most intricate social problems of our time, from the insular assumptions of our State Department politics and the vested interests of our corporate bureaucrats. Indeed, Mr. Whitaker has been so thoroughly conditioned in this sort of outlook, he does not even feel it necessary to elucidate why egotistic American interests should be protected, or to justify U.S. interference into the affairs of a country six thousand miles away. No sir, Mr. Whitaker is no fusspot. He has a job to do, namely, the unraveling of the tangled skein of Argentine politics to enable our decision-makers to more effectively formulate policies, and Mr. Whitaker is doing his job without needless circumlocution, rhetoric, or philosophizing.

He certainly writes of Argentine affairs with an expert's competence. But as his focus is delimited by his specialized commitments, it is quite difficult for the general reader to discern the broad play of social forces underlying the sequence of events that led up to the military revolt of September 16, 1955 which unseated the dictator, Juan Peron, and installed in power a new military junta.

The Peron decade is something that has to be looked into. Argentina, the leading Latin American country both culturally and economically, is destined to renew its challenge to the United States for leadership of the South American continent, as it did under Peron, and his type of dictatorship is endemic to many semi-colonial countries of today and excellently portrays the complex social and political tangle of their affairs. American journalists have glibly described Peron as another fascist fuehrer whose sympathy was with the Axis partners during the war. This gives a totally false picture of the dictator both in his internal and international roles, but it is a first-class illustration of the success of American journalism in utilizing democratic jargon to make our public see the world through the cock-eyed spectacles of the State Department. The Peron-type regime is a new proposition peculiar to the underdeveloped world, and we have to know something of the social makeup of the country to understand it.

ARGENTINA occupied traditionally the position of a semi-colonial country under Britain's suzerainty, although United States investments continued to grow after the first World War until they almost equaled Britain's on the eve of the second. The dominant wheat and meat oligarchy—semi-feudal landowners of fabulous latifundia—ran the country. In recent decades, there grew alongside, a class of native capitalists, which, while lacking capital by Western standards, was nevertheless the strongest of its kind in Latin America and began to play an increasingly aggressive role in the country's affairs. This class decided to push its opportunity for all it was worth when both Britain and the United States had their hands full with the war. Britain had for years spread the propaganda that Argentina lacked resources for the development of basic industry, but no sooner was she unable to supply the country with steel products than the Argentine capitalists drove ahead to exploit the coal and iron ore deposits of Salta and Jujuy. YPF, the government oil corporation, went into an ambitious expansion, and extensive road and rail construction was rushed. A frenzied industrialization boom was on. At the same time, the Argentine government made use of its blocked sterling credits in England to buy back its bonds so that by 1947 the country was free of foreign debt.

Argentina was the only country in South America that felt strong enough not to get into the war on the Allied side, but to maneuver between both war blocs for maximum concessions (and to make sure to wind up on the winning side). This was not because Argentina was more dictatorial-minded than the other Latin-American countries, as it has so often been represented, but because it was in a position to practice an independent policy—neutralism. It is true that the army was German-trained, and both Mussolini and Hitler had many admirers, especially among the higher officers. But naked, calculating, national self-interest, not ideological preferences, determined Argentina's stand. (It had been neutral in the first World War, as well.) In 1943, the army put through a coup d'état, as it had done in 1930, ousted a corrupt and discredited government, and a military junta, which included Colonel Peron, took over.

Thus far, we are dealing with a familiar set of components of a semi-colonial country trying to extricate itself from the grip of foreign imperialism. There is the entrenched landowning aristocracy with strong ties to outside imperialism and united with the latter in keeping the country as an agricultural preserve. There is the growing middle class which aims to lead the nation in its anti-imperialistic aspirations, but which unlike its
counterparts in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is not a social revolutionary, but a conservative class. Coming so late in the historical calendar, it finds itself subject to too many contradictory canceling pressures. It hates the rich and powerful imperialist outsiders, but it fears to lay strong hands on their property lest it upset respect for its own property rights and ambitions. It wants to use the mass nationalist sentiments to blackjack concessions from the imperialist powers, but it fears the growing ambitions of the working classes. It is often in conflict with the landowners over tariffs and other economic questions, but this is over-ridden by the community of interest in maintaining social stability. Consequently, the middle classes are animated by the philosophy of a Mirabeau, not a Marat. Because the nation is thus fragmented, and no class can rise above its parochial interests and command all-national support, the upper class military officer cliques take over time and again as self-appointed arbiters of national conflicts. They have stepped in on more than one occasion to run the government show.

As neither the industrial middle classes nor labor have been strong enough to take charge of the nation's destiny, Bonapartist figures have arisen in a number of the more advanced under-developed countries to fill the vacuum of leadership. Such a figure was Peron. Similar types were Vargas in Brazil, and now Nasser in Egypt.) His political technique consisted in manipulating the contending classes. His social policy was a forced march toward industrialization. His foreign affairs were directed toward a more assertive challenge to imperialism. Here was not simply another Latin American "strong man" pressing down the lid with a bayonet while rifling the treasury. This was the emergence of a social dictator who tried to realize the country's aspirations by modernization and anti-imperialism without an internal social overturn.

HOLDING the twin jobs of Minister of War and Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare in the 1943 junta, Peron introduced something new in Argentina politics. He proceeded to build up the labor unions under government tutelage and eventually as semi-government organizations. From a membership of some 260,000 embracing mainly skilled workers, they swelled under his patronage until they finally numbered practically the whole wage-earning force. When the military clique grew panicly at the new empire he was carving out and tried to dump him in 1945, it was already too late: the descamisados publicly flexed their muscles and triumphantly restored him to power.

For the next ten years, the confederation of labor (CGT), with its derivatives, the Peronista party and Peronista women's party, plus the military, were to be his principal institutional bases of power. Deftly, he sawed between one and the other of these hostile forces utilizing one to keep the other in check. He tried to keep a firm hold on both by staffing the labor organizations with his faithful servitors, and by purging the officers' clique time and again to ensure its loyalty. This Bonapartist technique was made possible by Peron's aggressive program both at home and abroad.

The previous efforts at building native industry appeared pale in comparison to his own. He bought out the British railroads and utilities, the I.T. & T., the ports and grain elevators. He boosted tariffs, instituted monetary controls, altered shippings rates and created an important merchant fleet. He nationalized foreign trade in farm products using profits to promote state and private industries. Such a program called for war on the old feudalistic aristocracy, and Peron waged it, symbolized by his suppression of the Jockey Club and his seizure of La Prensa, owned by the richest landholding clan—although war may be too strong a word for it. While his policies favored the industrialists, he never touched the latifundia, and agrarian reform never got very far during his rule. The social status quo was never upset.

Industrialization and urbanization have been headlong in Argentina. The last national census showed over 60 percent of gainfully employed in manufacturing or services, 10 percent in the government bureaucracy, and only a quarter in farming, forestry and fishing. In the decade 1943-53, industrial production increased 40 percent, with industrial output accounting for roughly half of national production as compared with 40 percent contributed by agriculture and livestock. Although Argentine industry is primarily light, beginnings have been made in steel manufacture, metals, machinery, and vehicles. And as is true of other semi-colonial countries, there is a strong trend toward nationalization of many sectors of the economy, because the native capitalists are too weak and lacking in capital to be able to finance the industrialization projects. In the case of Argentina, the nationalized sector includes the central bank, railways, air services, merchant marine, oil, telephone, port facilities, grain elevators, Buenos Aires transport and gas works. The government also runs military factories and DINIE, a group of expropriated German metallurgical, chemical, and pharmaceutical plants and factories.

In the course of this forced march, Peron gave the labor masses far more than just demagogy, although, to be sure, there was plenty of that. Especially in the first few years, before inflation took its heavy toll, the workers made important strides in higher wages and social security benefits. Furthermore, even under the Peron-dominated CGT, labor won a new sense of strength, dignity, and social influence which will have an important bearing on the future history of the country—and which survived the dictator's fall.

Utilizing the special circumstances of the war and Argentina's extraordinary boom, Peron gave the country's
traditional anti-imperialist policy several additional twists. He asserted Argentine leadership up and down Latin America and challenged United States hegemony both in economic and political matters. It was this pretension to leadership that aroused the righteous indignation of our State Department, not Peron’s affinity to European fascism.

Peronism—essentially a pragmatic maneuvering between social classes at home and between rival powers abroad, concocted into a pseudo-ideology by grandiloquent rhetoric and noisy demagogy—contained a hard kernel of nationalist achievement, material progress and social reform. That is why Peron managed to split every party and political formation from the extreme Catholic Right to the Communist Left and line up the dissidents behind his banner. As Carlton Beals wrote, his leading opponents had nothing to offer except to complain of the lack of civil liberties. Their cry for freedom was somewhat suspect, however, as they had never respected it when in office.

Any half serious study makes clear that it is apocryphal to call the Peron dictatorship fascist unless one decides to promiscuously dump any and all dictatorships into a pot labelled “fascism.” All dictatorships, whether of Czar Nicholas I or Diocletian the Emperor, Pope Julius II or Genghis Khan, Hitler or Stalin, have certain similarities. But it is only in the consideration of the different social backgrounds, class purposes and political aims that is illuminated the makeup of the regime and the history of the period.

The fascist dictatorships of Germany and Italy came to power through the deadlock of labor and capital, by mobilization of the lower middle class elements, and with the benign neutrality or outright support of the propertied classes. Once in power, they smashed, first, all Left and labor organizations; then, all independent political and social formations—to rule society as an omnipotent police regime. Peron, in contrast, took power in a more or less legitimate election in which he won a majority, and his ensuing dictatorship rested on the twin pillars of a government-controlled labor movement, and the army; with the regime oscillating between these two essentially hostile forces. Monopoly capitalism strengthened its grip on the economy under both Mussolini and Hitler while social difficulties continued to be solved by a combination of repression and war preparations.

Under Peron there took place the growth of a variety of nationalized state capitalism, an elimination of foreign investors through staying out of the war and bargaining with both belligerents. Nationalism was used by Mussolini and Hitler as a handmaiden of imperialism. It was used by Peron as a weapon of anti-imperialism. Fascism could be said to represent the rule of modern condottieri who slipped into power with the backing of the big moneyed interests to safeguard the status quo by the rule of the sword. Peronism was the rule of a Bonapartist dictator imposing his will by manipulating the social classes on behalf of industrializing an underdeveloped country and challenging dominant American imperialism. In a word, there is a substantial difference between the two types of dictatorship, and it muddles our comprehension of important lines of social cleavage to identify the two.

**DESPITE** its considerable elan in the first few years, Peronism pretty much exhausted itself by 1953. The country was starved for capital with which to follow through its expansion. Inflation took on runaway proportions, wiped out the gains of the wage earners, and was cutting into living standards. After the war, the United States mounted an implacable offensive which in rapid order swept Argentina out of its economic bases on the South American continent. Pretty well stymied on all fronts, his popularity in heavy decline, Peron, by 1953, was swinging away from the CGT, whose ranks were growing disgruntled, and rested increasingly on the military. His crusade against el imperialismo yanqui had also pretty much ground to a halt and he was by this time trying to fix up a new deal with the United States to get much needed capital and loans. This capitulatory swing was climaxed in his last year with the attempt to sign away oil rights in Patagonia to a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of California, which would have created in effect a quasi-independent state in an area three times the size of Massachusetts. Many believe that this attempted agreement which outraged Argentine public opinion was as important as any other cause in bringing down Peron. When the military cliques moved against him in 1955, Peron tried to overawe them with a repetition of the performance of ten years before. But his deals with the United States had tarnished his reputation as the nationalist Sir Galahad, and the descamisados were no longer the enthusiastic supporters of yore.

The military cliques have always had close ties with the landowning nabobs and the new military junta headed by General Aramburu has tried to swing things back in their favor. The junta has returned La Prensa to its former owners. It has modified some nationalist regulations. It broke several general strikes last year. But it is no simple matter to turn the clock back to the status quo ante. The new industrialized Argentina is a fact. The CGT remains a power that no government can ignore. And the prevailing anti-imperialism can be flaunted by any government only at its own peril.

After much hedging and several postponements, elections are finally scheduled for late February. The country is in for hectic times, as the economy is starved for capital, and the Wall Street crowd hasn’t changed its spots (even though it has jazzed up its public relations). It will not unloosen the old purse strings until it gets its pound of flesh—first of all, the cancelled oil concessions. The prolonged inflation has made Argentine labor restive, the Socialists and Communists are making strong progress again, and Peronismo remains a potent political force two years after the dictator’s exile.

The Peron regime has to be viewed as a stage in the battle of Latin America for economic independence. It did not realize its proclaimed goals, nor could any regime that left the oligarchic social structure of the country undisturbed; but it could boast of some achievements. The next attempt will start from this higher ground.
Competitive Coexistence

by Joseph Starobin

In its interesting editorial, “Balance of Power,” (December 1957) the American Socialist discusses the opinion of “a number of socialist observers” who believe that drastic but progressive changes can be envisaged for American capitalism under the impact of competition with a socialist society. Some of these un-named observers are said to be “going so far” as to view such competition as the specific American way to socialism, or “some reasonable facsimile thereof.”

The editors seem rather uncertain and aloof about this thesis. For many years it has seemed to me not only the key to the dynamics of our time, but perhaps a key to reviving an American Left.

The American Socialist is quite right in asking for deeper study of such views. They ask who makes the changes, and how, and for what? These questions may be asked to negate the value of the idea, or they can be explored as a necessary part of illuminating a valuable thesis.

To my mind, the most fruitful framework for American socialist thought today (and it could embrace more than today’s handful of socialists) is the realization that the very existence and relative success of socialist planning abroad has altered the terms on which the capitalist world will henceforth evolve; reciprocally, the transformations already taking place within capitalism, constantly being forced into new channels by competition with a rival society, are bound to have a profound effect on the countries calling themselves socialist.

It is this change which dominates our age. It forces us to revise earlier doctrines on the transition between capitalism and socialism. It not only outmoded the outworn organizational patterns on the left but opens up new avenues of socialist thought and action—if we can get up more insight and enthusiasm than our editors seem to have.

Consider some earlier dilemmas. In the Debs days, socialists had vague ideas of the dynamic of social change. With the exception of Daniel De Leon, as David Herreshoff points out in his essay in Harvey Goldberg’s “American Radicals,” few leaders spent much time on this crucial matter. Capitalism was considered to bear the seeds of its collapse within itself, probably in crisis and war. The social revolution would ensue, most naturally in the most developed countries of the West, then become universal. This “cataclysmic view” and this “universalism” were the reasons why the Russian revolution both inspired two generations of American socialists, and also misled them.

Accepting or rejecting Lenin’s particular transition, as he deduced it from his study of imperialism and his focus on Czarist Russia, became the dividing line between Western socialists. One group, the Communists, beat their brains out in the effort to repeat the Russian revolution. A great many Communists still cling to this illusory effort. Socialists in the West failed in part because they wanted to re-make the Russian revolution on premises unsuited to Russian conditions, confusing this issue with their own problems in the West. This division—of some socialists trying to do the wrong things for the right reasons, and others the right things for wrong reasons—has dominated and wrecked our time.

But the era is passing. The socialist countries are reaching levels of development which cannot be sustained by the authoritarian political framework of the past. On the other hand, a valid socialist strategy in the West does not depend on imitating those methods which the Russians, the Chinese and others are bound to abandon, and have in fact criticized as frightful in their cost. The evolution of capitalism is bound to be different because socialism is a power: the difference will depend on whether a relatively long peace can be secured in which the competition of the systems can unfold.

What many socialists rejected as “revisionism” fifty years ago may need to be accepted now. Whoever was right and wrong in that argument, today the thesis of a relatively peaceful, inner transformation of capitalism under the impact of a socialist rival is worth looking at afresh. Conversely, the backwardness of the socialist countries on the political and cultural planes may be overcome more quickly in this process of inter-action.

I am much more impressed than the editors of the American Socialist seem to be with the American reaction to the Soviet challenge dramatized by the sputniks: it seems to me that more premises of capitalist thought have been challenged in a few months than forty years of socialist propaganda was able to do.

Many more Americans than there are socialists are doubting whether the present system is eternal. Some say openly the competition is lost. Denis Brogan, in the Yale Review, blames the leadership of business itself, finds it wanting. Archibald MacLeish protests what a business society has done to the intellectual. Every conference of educators, anthropologists, scientists, during the past Christmas holiday indicted the basic values of the society: they find that these basic—and debased—values are the chief reason why young people do not study science, why not enough educators are available.

It is even being suggested that the corporate structure, with the particular profit motive of competing groups, each insulating their science staffs, and each with rival factions in the Pentagon, will have to give way to rational planning, with “public standards of life,” as Walter Lippmann puts it, taking priority over the private interest.

What John Kenneth Galbraith lamented in a recent Atlantic Monthly as the “ideological bans” in American thought have been broken with a sweep and a depth such as has not been felt since 1932.
THE question is not that the "old class struggle" disappears. This struggle exists. It is expressed in the very fever of technological change. It is all around us even if in forms different than before. Those who wish to explore this thesis that competition between systems may be the specific American path toward socialism do not have to deny the class struggle. The issue is not whether it exists, but how it ends, whether it culminates in the way we used to think it would.

Is the capitalist, or the politician expressing his interests, going to make socialist changes? No, not consciously. But in their constant effort to evade the breakdown of their system, to sustain it, to overcome its crisis which is not overcome but only palliated, it is possible to envisage institutional changes within the society that are increasingly beyond the ability of the capitalist to limit, to manage, to control. New forces step in, forces with a socialist potential, which the capitalist suspects or fears, but whose growth in power he cannot avoid.

Classically, the capitalist defends his grip in extremis by fascist methods. It would be illusory to deny this attempt is likely in the United States. But whether it succeeds, and how it is defeated, is something else again. The fact that McCarthyism was a "premature fascism" is not irrelevant; the fact that American capitalists would be attempting fascist methods in the context of a competition with a rival society becoming increasingly democratic is also vitally important.

Our editors ruminate on whether American capitalists can be expected to make "revolutions-from-above" on the model of Bismarck's Germany or Meiji Japan almost a century ago. I doubt whether this is the real question. The distinctive thing in American life has been that in all major crises it is not the capitalist, or even the politician most representative of him, who has been able to create new institutional forms to solve the immediate crisis: it has been a coalition of forces, popular in nature, "impure" in class content, often personified at the helm by men of a non-capitalist tradition. In Lincoln's case, it was an agrarian, in Roosevelt's case an aristocratic tradition of a particular kind.

The new institutional forms appeared to have saved the capitalists despite themselves; but they also, in the New Deal for example, limited the capitalist, forced him to accept public controls, brought about relationships between the capitalist and the government, concepts and techniques of government responsibility for economic and social welfare, whose implications frighten the "power elite."

Granted that the present crisis demands much more than the New Deal gave. Yet, when the editors of the American Socialist ask, most skeptically, whether we can envisage a "labor-liberal government" ranging from Hubert Humphrey to Walter Reuther (I could make better choices of a wider range) introducing measures of nationalization, I would answer: "Certainly."

If one goes back to the Non-Partisan League movement of North Dakota, and then the La Follette days, and the precedents of the New Deal, it is surely possible to envisage a coalition of labor-liberal forces doing many radical things under the impact of necessity.

ON the surface, these radical things will appear to involve how to keep the system going, how to "make democracy work." The essence may be pre-socialist measures, "or a reasonable facsimile thereof." The necessity spurring such changes may not be complete collapse. It may be the process of competition itself, a long, complex, excruciating crisis which transforms the society.

Nobody suggests some automatic unfolding of responses to necessities: History is a product of forces that are personified; it is made by classes, parts of classes, individuals who express what Madison called "interests." But a socialist perspective will go wrong if it is based simply on "free will," on actions which have no basis in the matrix of relationships within which men act.

If these views have any validity, then we should expect many proposals, in the name of competition, which will actually project American life in a leftward direction. It will be in the name of competing with Russia that Americans will be experimenting with new solutions. They will use the frameworks, the labels—if you wish the myths—with which they are familiar, and whatever the subjective form of proposals, their objective content will be most important.

For example, Walter Reuther has just proposed, perhaps only for tactical reasons, a profit-sharing plan similar to the panaceas of the twenties and "reformist" in principle; he does so in the name of the sputnik challenge. Its effect, however, is undeniable very educational. It gets closer to the core of profit relations under capitalism.

It may be that the true function of American socialists is not only to educate and to organize: it is to make those proposals which are realizable in the framework of American competition with the socialist world, in an atmosphere of peace, settlement, disarmament, and which, if realized, would require institutional changes in this country of a progressive character. We may be dealing for a long time with "reasonable facsimiles" of socialism.

Our most immediate problem is to guarantee peace itself. For this is the critical transition period. There are those who believe that if the socialist sector of the world grows stronger, it will take capitalism "by the scruff of the neck" as Lenin once predicted; such views when held by the Left may be wishful thinking; when held by the men who wrote the Gaither and Rockefeller reports, they are dangerous.

I would say both are wrong. The shifting balance of power in favor of socialism is likely to require a long period of coexistence with the remaining capitalist world, for the very purpose of preventing or making less likely a desperate attempt to reverse the terms of power.

It will be in the common interest of humanity for the evolution of capitalism in the West to be prolonged, to find its easiest transitions toward socialism, to make the change as little explosive as possible for everybody concerned for the very reason that hydrogen annihilation is the alternative.

We may therefore be dealing for a long time with a competition whereby the rival societies accommodate one another. Each may come by opposing paths to approximate the better features of the other.
How have societies evolved and cultures changed? Marxist formulas need to be altered, says one student of the problem, to include a century of new researches.

The Ages of Man

by Stanton Tefft

Some current socialist writers have the misconception that the nineteenth century ideas of Lewis Henry Morgan, Edward Tylor, Karl Marx, and Frederick Engels about social evolution are in no need of revision. Modern scholars, who, in the light of new archaeological and cultural data, have tried to modify these ideas, have been accused by them of being anti-evolutionist. In actuality many modern scholars such as Leslie White, V. Gordon Childe, and Julian Steward have merely subjected the earlier evolutionary theories to rigid empirical tests and modified them in light of the new data at hand.

Modern evolutionary theory no longer views the history of all social life as passing through exactly parallel sequences or “stages” of development. It is skeptical of iron laws of single-line or universal development of culture. Today many evolutionists feel that human societies, because of varying technological, historical, and other environmental factors, are traveling along many different lines of development. Nevertheless, it is felt that some societies manifest similar “regularities” of growth. Most neo-evolutionists would admit the importance of technology, the means of production, and the play between biology and environment in the patterning of the “core” or more important institutions of any human group. I shall here trace the gradual modification of older evolutionary schemes under the impact of new scientific discoveries.

The idea of evolution, namely, that the history of all living forms (social or biological) goes through a progression from simplest to most complex, did not start with Morgan or Tylor but dates back to the Ancient Greeks, Romans, and Renaissance humanists. Yet it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that the idea received such impressive empirical documentation as to make it a fundamental assumption of scientific thought and criticism. Such natural philosophers as de Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, de Lamarck, Charles Lyell, and Robert Chambers, preceded Charles Darwin in viewing living forms as going through orderly stages of development. Robert Chambers informed his readers:

In pursuing the progress of development of both plants and animals upon the globe, we have seen an advance in both cases from simpler to higher forms of organization. . . . That there is thus a progress of some kind, the most superficial glance at the geologic history is sufficient to convince us. (“Vestiges of Natural History of Creation,” 1844.)

By the mid-nineteenth century, travelers, explorers, colonists, and missionaries began to document the existence of pre-literate primitive peoples at different “stages”—or so it seemed—of technological and social progress. The social philosophers of this period, such as Thomas Malthus, Georg Hegel, Herbert Spencer, and even Karl Marx himself, saw how useful the earlier natural evolutionary theory was in explaining the gradual development of social forms. Marx, like many of his contemporaries, felt that the phases of history and social life exhibit regularity and order in sequence. Just as the phenomena of nature, human history follows a definite path of evolutionary progress and is governed by ascertainable laws. Unlike his contemporaries, Marx envisaged a succession of stages with each dominated by a particular system for production and exchange of goods, each giving rise to certain human relations, bringing along in turn an appropriate ideology, including law and politics together with such other products as morals, religion, art, and philosophy. Marx stated that:

In broad outline we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as progressive epochs in the economic formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of social process of production; not in the sense of individual antagonism but of the conflict arising from the conditions surrounding the life of individuals in society. At the same time the productive forces developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution of the antagonism. (Preface, “Critique of Political Economy,” 1859.)

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In 1859, Charles Darwin wrote "On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection." To the older natural evolutionary ideas Darwin added the notion of a "constant struggle" going on in nature, with its "natural selection" of the fit and extinction of the unfit species. Social theorists like William Sumner and Walter Bagehot adapted many of Darwin's ideas without modification to their analysis of human societies.

The post-Darwinian cultural evolutionists include E. B. Tylor, Lewis Morgan, J. F. McLennan, E. Westernark, and Frederick Engels. In his book "Ancient Society" (1877) Morgan furnished a scheme of institutional progress with special attention to marriage, kinship, government, and property. He divided all history into three main stages: Savagery, Barbarism, and Civilization. Savagery was a period before pottery; Barbarism the ceramic age; Civilization began with writing. The first two periods were divided into lower, upper, and middle periods each with its own signposts. The upper period of barbarism, for example, starts with the use of iron tools. Morgan felt that societies organized on the basis of tracing descent in the male line (patrilineal) grew out of earlier matrilineal forms. It was Bachofen who first proclaimed the priority of matrilineal descent, and Morgan simply joined Bachofen's bandwagon, along with others.

FREDERICK Engels, impressed by anthropologist Morgan's researches, continued to favor a unilinear concept of human progress. Like Morgan, Engels believed that early human society went through three stages of development. He summarized Morgan's position in his own terms:

Savagery . . . the period in which man's appropriation of the products in their natural state predominates; the products of human art are chiefly instruments which assist this appropriation. Barbarism . . . the period during which man learns to breed domestic animals and to practice agriculture and acquires methods of increasing the supply of natural products by human agency. Civilization . . . the period in which man learns a more advanced application of work to products of nature, the period of industry proper and art. ("The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State," 1884.)

The inadequacy of the unilinear evolutionary approach to historic analysis lies in its attempt to postulate priority of matriarchal, matrilineal kinship patterns over other forms, which fact modern ethnographic data does not support, and in its effort to force all the data of pre-civilized groups of man into a three-stage scheme. But, although the unilinear evolutionary approach has many inadequacies, it has given us insights into the development of civilizations in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, Rome, and Northern Europe. It does not seem as adequate for the analysis of the culture development in the Americas, India, or China.

Universal evolutionists, represented today by V. Gordon Childe and Leslie White, trace their roots back to the nineteenth-century evolutionist tradition. They are aware that twentieth-century research has invalidated the unilinear constructions of the past century. Childe and White have tried to salvage the older ideas by relating the stages of culture development to the culture of mankind as a whole. The distinctive culture traditions and the local variations which have developed as a result of particular historic trends and cultural adaptations in each environment are considered irrelevant.

White conceives culture as a supra-biological, extrasomatic order of events that flows down from one age to the next. Individuals, who inherit culture traditions, have little control over the direction of its flow. Thus, culture has principles and laws of its own. White traces the growth of the culture of mankind through stages of Old Stone age, the Agricultural (neolithic) stage, Bronze and Iron periods, the Fuel and the Atomic stages. Culture has developed and "accumulated" as the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year is increased, or as the efficiency of the instruments of putting the energy to work is increased, or as both factors work simultaneously. The transition from one stage to another is dictated by the ability of the people of each new stage in devising new ways of harnessing additional amounts of energy. The domestication of plants and animals in the Agricultural period increased energy resources for culture building and stimulated the transition from Old Stone age to Neolithic. In Metal, Fuel, and Atomic stages, other technological discoveries have stimulated increased energy resources for culture building.

V. GORDON Childe, while recognizing the inadequacy of Morgan's and Engels' evolutionary formulation, has borrowed Morgan's terms for the designation of stages of development: Savagery, Barbarism, and Civilization. However, Childe uses different criteria to designate the stages. Childe sees culture as an assemblage of associated traits which occur repeatedly." Childe, unlike White, recognizes that various cultures or societies have different adaptations to differing environments and that each society owes specific peculiarities to the geographical terms. But Childe feels that the geographical factors which influence aspects of cultural growth can be averaged all together if one isolates the common features in societies occupying varied regions. Childe visualizes cultural evolution as passing through Savagery, where men lived parasitically on nature by collecting, catching or hunting wild fruits, roots, grubs, game, or fish, through Barbarism, where societies increased their production of food surplus by cultivating plants or breeding edible animals and later acquired bronze
and iron tools, to Civilization, where people lived in cities which accommodated a substantial minority of people who derived their livelihood not directly from hunting and fishing or farming but from secondary industry, trade, and other professions. During the stage of Civilization, social classes began to emerge and the urbanites developed some sort of writing.

The multilinear evolutionists, whose chief prophet and expositor is Julian Steward, unlike the unilineal or universal evolutionists, do not believe that historical data can be classified in universal stages. Their avowed interest is in determining recurrent forms, processes, and functions in societies, rather than world-embracing schemes or universal laws. Their method is empirical rather than deductive. This group is interested not only in the means and modes of production as an influence on cultural development but also the ecological (bio-environmental) historical factors as well. Steward states his case in these terms:

Because the weight of evidence now seems to show divergent cultural development, the proposition that there are significant parallels in culture history is regarded with suspicion. Nonetheless, probably most anthropologists recognize some similarities in form, function, and the developmental processes in certain cultures of different traditions. If interest in these parallels can be divorced of the all-or-none dogma that, because culture is now known not to be wholly unilinear, each tradition must be wholly unique, a basis may be laid for historical reconstruction which takes into account cross-cultural similarities as well as differences. ("Theory of Culture Change," 1955.)

The Steward school has gathered evidence that simple forms of cultural groups, such as the family and bands, do not disappear when a more complex stage of integration is reached but become modified as specialized parts of a new kind of total configuration. A national culture represents the highest level of integration yet achieved. The biological family unit represents the lowest level. Such aboriginal groups as the Western Shoshoni, the Great Basin Shoshoneans, and possibly the Eskimo, had a culture which was integrated and functioned on a family level. The family was the reproductive, economic, educational, political, and religious unit. Family dependence on outsiders was at a minimum and the family could and did exist most of the year without extra-familiar relations. The multifamily group such as the patrilineal band developed in some areas, although not necessarily out of the nuclear family unit. The Bushman of South Africa, some of the Congo Negroes of Central Africa, some Philippine Negritos, the Australians, the Tasmanians, some southern Californian Shoshoneans and the Ona of Tierra del Fuego have achieved this level of integration. These societies developed functions which require a supra-family organization. Productive processes may be patterned around collective hunting, fishing, herding, or farming. Property relations, group ceremonialism, extended kinship and friendship forms, and recreational activity may reinforce the supra-family unity.

Another variant of the supra-family organized society is the composite hunting bands which are integrated to form villages or bands of hunters, fishers, gatherers, and simple farmers on the basis of constant association and co-operation rather than on kinship ties, as is the case with patrilineal or for that matter matrilineal band organizations. Like the patrilineal band, it is politically autonomous and controls the principal resource in its hunting area but it is much larger than the patrilineal band and lacks band exogamy, patriarchal residence and patrilineality. The composite hunting band is found among the Algonkian and the Athabaskan Indians of Canada.

Societies which have a family or supra-family band organization usually have a technology of low productivity and/or a poor environment. These factors prevent a dense population and thus preclude large population aggregates. Patrilineal bands tend to predominate in those areas with a scattered distribution of game, poor transportation, and a sparsity of population, (one person per square mile). Increased food supply or other factors making for a denser population will produce larger social aggregates, or multilinear villages. Some of these groups may become clans if common group names, ceremonies, economic activities, or other factors create solidarity.

The state level of integration may occur when several multi-family aggregates become functionally dependent on one another within still a larger system. Such communities may participate in state projects, such as the construction of public works (irrigation, roads, religious edifices, and so forth). They may produce special commodities for state purposes or uses of other communities. They may join with other communities in offensive or defensive war; they may accept state rules, regulations, and standards concerning property, credit, commerce, and other matters. Mutual economic, military, and religious needs necessitate the creation of a political hierarchy and a social system of classes.

Some societies have never moved beyond the level of family organization; others have always been organized in band units, some societies have gone through a series of developmental stages from family to nation-state units. In any case, modern ethnographic and archeological data has made it clear that the world’s societies have passed through varying levels of sociocultural integration, or possibly in some areas “stages.” Because of similar historical, sociological, or ecological factors, some societies have traveled along similar lines of development. But it now appears quite unlikely that the history of mankind or the history of each world society is one of unilinear and parallel development.

Thus it is not entirely wrong to say that throughout history the world’s culture may have passed or be passing through stages of savagery, barbarism, civilization, feudalism, orientalism, capitalism, and socialism. But because of varying historical, environmental, and sociological factors, feudalism for example in one area of the world may have many characteristics that feudalism in another area of the world doesn’t have, just as Russian “socialism” is somewhat different than Yugoslavia’s “socialism.” These variations in “stages” necessitate revisions in chronological
sequences in the different regions. Thus, certain countries, such as Russia, which have tried to develop socialism out of a society with heavy feudal-colonial characteristics, may move along a different line of evolutionary development than a fully developed capitalist society which tries to introduce socialism.

Thus, the concept of evolution is not dead and buried. It has merely been revised in consequence of modern data. The nineteenth-century evolutionists created a theory which seemed to account for the facts which were available to them. Today new facts have forced the neo-evolutionist to refine and revise the older evolutionary ideas. The interplay of empirical data and theory, with the inevitable revisions of theory, will be the pattern of scientific endeavor only as long as political dogma does not dominate free scientific endeavor. Karl Marx, one of the world's greatest political scientists, would have recognized the importance of this creative task of science.

DESPITE considerable industrialization since World War I, Latin America is still predominantly an agricultural region, with most of the economies dependent on one or several crops, and subject to the vagaries of a world market outside of their control where prices are weighted cheap for raw commodities and dear for manufactured goods. Landholding has been and to a great extent remains feudal, and living conditions of most agricultural workers and tenants are abysmally primitive. With the growth of cities and labor and middle classes, social unrest and revolution has swept up and down Latin America for the past three and a half decades. Mr. Alexander breaks down this social revolutionary movement into four components: nationalism, economic development, change in class relationships, political democracy.

Nationalism has centered in the past few decades on struggle against the United States; its outright military interventions in the twenties, and its more indirect penetrations in the recent past. The aspiration has become widespread for a more diversified and industrialized economy, and not to remain forever the raw-material slaves of the industrial powers. "Virtually all of the countries have provided protection for infant industries, either through old-fashioned tariffs, or through more new-fangled exchange control devices. Many of the countries have established development banks or corporations, which have brought the government into active participation in the process of economic development."

The net result has been to strengthen "the urban against the rural elements" and "has tended the demands for fundamental redistribution of power."

This class realignment is the author's "third fundamental feature of the Latin American social revolution," but unfortunately, his sociology breaks down at this point, as the "urban element" contains two conflicting forces which time and again have clashed in bloody encounters, and one section of the "urban element" has traditionally united with the dominant part of the "rural element" on the overriding issue of maintaining social stability.

That is why, outside of Mexico, there has been no significant agricultural reform in any of these countries. At any rate, it is correct that power has been shifting to the cities, more precisely, to the new industrial middle classes, except in some of the more backward, smaller countries like the Central American Republics which still remain in the ancient grip of landowners and military strong men.

THE social tide has thrust up working classes that are strongly organized into trade unions, although they are often influenced or controlled by governments. Practically every country has labor codes embodying social security provisions, collective bargaining regulations and factory standards. Although from time to time there have been important Socialist and Communist movements in some of the countries, the working masses have nowhere thus far lived up to the old Comintern thesis as the leaders of the new revolutionary reconstruction. The Latin American working classes are highly volatile, very combative, and have on more than one occasion toppled reactionary governments by mass revolutionary action. But they never possessed the cohesion or leadership to assume governmental power. They have often squeezed out concessions, but the main fruits of victory have been invariably appropriated by others. It is hardly to be wondered at that in such a hectic period of political transition and social turmoil the Communists at times have had far-reaching influence. But as the author states, "the surprising thing is not that they occasionally succeeded . . . but rather that, in spite of the very profound feeling of revolt and change which has swept Latin America since World War I, the Communists have made comparatively little progress."

The author devotes the bulk of the book to a country-by-country account of the various Communist Parties, going into lengthy descriptions of their origins, leaders, changing fortunes of influence, numerous zig-zags of policies in line with Moscow's changes of front, and their bewildering series of alliances and flirtations with political groups and personalities up to and including quite a few military dictators among whom at one time were Batista of Cuba and Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. This historical section is the main contribution of the book. The author is obviously trying to be scrupulously accurate in his statement of facts and in the exposition of the interconnecting links.
between policies and social background. On the informational side the compilation is formidable, although written up in unnecessarily pedestrian style, and with an absence of the flavor of the Latin American labor movements and the fiery temper of its struggles. Moreover, his ability to integrate this mass of material into a workable theory of the Communist movement is hampered by his pat cold-war stereotypes which do not encompass the devilishly contradictory political animal under examination.

The Latin American Communist Parties played the Browder line à l'ourtrance during the war years and enjoyed the political favors of many governments. After the war, they went into a headlong decline (outside of one or two places), probably accounted for by the sharp alteration of the political climate, the flimsy nature of their growth, and the widespread discreditation of Stalinism. Furthermore, wherever a native populist-style movement existed, as the Apristas in Peru, the Democratic Action Party in Venezuela, or the Autónicos in Cuba, the Communists have been swept off the boards. None of these movement, however, have succeeded in building stable regimes, and none of them, including the social dictatorships of Vargas and Peron, have even begun a settlement of the number one question of Latin America—agrarian reform. Whether the decline of the Latin American Communists is therefore definitive, or whether they can make a comeback, is too difficult and probably too early to say.

In the final chapter the author concentrates on handing out, New Republic fashion, liberal advice to our State Department how to really and truly fight Communism. We should not arm dictators, but give support to the Democratic Left. We should not rob these countries of their resources, but give them a Marshall Plan, etc., Good advice! Unfortunately, as is invariably the case with the homiletic school of journalism, he has not included any manual of techniques by which we can transform a rapacious agency into an ecleemosynary institution.

B. C.

**The New Mill**


In January 1919, the first continuous seamless pipe mill in the U.S. was opened by the United States Steel Company at the Lorain, Ohio, works of the National Tube Division. The solution of the problems involved in seamless pipe manufacture on a semi-automatic basis—already accomplished in the simpler case of flat strip rolling—was something of a mechanical triumph. It enabled nine men, or 27 men for the three shifts that work the clock around, to produce four times the amount of pipe that had previously been produced by more than double the number of men in older pipe mills.

For the men involved as workers in the new operation, it was soon clear that there was little to call forth joy unrestrained on their part. Thirty-three workers were broken in as the operating crew. They had bid on the new job opportunity for obvious reasons, the possibility of higher earnings in this new and presumably more skilled field; the security of working in the most advanced and efficient pipe mill in the country, which would obviously be the last closed in a business downturn; the chance of easier working conditions.

The new mill soon justified many of the fears of the union and older hands among the men. The working conditions appear in general to have been a bit better, as the new, large building provided more light and cleanliness; but some of the jobs were no easier physically, and for those where the muscular strain was eased, an increase in tensions, mental anxiety and job responsibility combined to make the work anything but a picnic. So far as pay was concerned, the workers found that the job classifications were downgraded because of the reduction in heat and dirt, and the smaller amount of manual dexterity involved. The result was that a team of men with better than eight times the productivity of the crews of the older pipe mills found themselves making less money. The company promised an incentive plan, but refused to install it while the mill was still in the "breaking-in" stage, and turned a deaf ear to all demands for retroactivity for any plan that was installed. Finally, under union pressure, the company came up with an incentive-pay plan that was viewed as unsatisfactory by the men, and on top of that the crews were pared by two men each, from the original eleven per shift down to nine. There was naturally a great deal of resentment.

The story of this breaking-in period for the new mill is told by Mr. Walker in over 200 pages, spun out of factual materials that could have been related in fifty. As this seems to be the accepted technique for current social studies, one has to suppose that this is a successful book, parlaying a number of interviews and a bit of technical detail into a full-blown volume. Whether it will repay the reader's attention is another matter. It is repetitious, anything but acute in its perceptions, and fails to comprehend the place of its little tale in the evolution of the industry and the union conflicts of the period.

During and after World War II, the steel union, aided by the continual shortage of steel and the monopoly price structure which enabled the owners of the industry to resist the possibility of piling up super-profits, advanced from an extremely low-paid position to that of one of the best paid in American industry. A wartime agreement for rationalizing job classifications gave many steelworkers lump-sum retroactive back payments in 1947, when the survey was completed. Wage victories in a series of national strikes, the pension agreement, and particularly the steady work and overtime brought the flush of prosperity to working-class neighborhoods in the steel towns of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, etc.

In the late forties, the steel companies, with evidence of considerable collusion between them to hold down a drive that had been slowed down, and even cancelled out entirely for years at a time, the rate of gain of the labor force in steel. Constant crew-cutting, adding to the duties on various jobs, and such like methods have increased the pressure of work on the men. Programs of technical advance and enlargement, of which the Lorain pipe mill is one example, increased the steel-making capacity of blast furnaces and open hearths, intensified the productivity of rolling mills, and made possible the production of an ever-growing volume of steel with a reduced labor force.

The conflict over incentive-pay plans was not confined to the Lorain mill which Mr. Walker describes, but was nationwide.

What happened was this: The steel companies, knowing that they could not make these great increases in productivity without the cooperation of at least some key sections of the work force, and that they would have to pay out a bit more in higher wages, resolved to install a set of complicated piece-work plans which, by granting special returns to workers in a position to set the pace of operations, would ensure speeded-up production. They appear to have gotten a free hand from the top union officialdom in this project, but as they began putting the new incentives into operation, they were confronted by a considerable revolt among the ranks of unionists. Literally thousand of quixotic strikes and stoppages greeted them in mills across the country.

Many local unionists disliked the spread of piece-work incentives on principle, seeing in them the traditional speed-up mechanism that piece-work has often been. But, as the aristocracy of steelworkers found in these plans a chance to make a slice of dough above their base pay, the plans were not opposed directly. Most of the fighting took place around the unsatisfactory nature of the plans, the picayune incentives granted for great boosts in output, the regressive scales of computation. The company practice of cutting incentives when output was boosted enough to make some real money came in for a lot of fire. But most important of all, local unions revolted against the claim of the companies that they had the right—and the agreement of international union officers—to install incentive pay plans unilateral, without consultation or bargaining on disputed points. The crew-cutting that was going on with all this was also an extremely sore point.

Mr. Walker, confining himself to the 27 men in Lorain, fails to see the meaning of the entire scrap, and writes with the condensation typical of modern sociologists about the "misunderstandings" that can arise in a "period of technical transi-
tion.” Mr. Walker ought to stop trying to treat the workers he interviews as petulant children, and listen a bit more closely when they tell him, as one worker did: “I don’t know whether these new mills benefit the working man. The more production, the more speed. But if there is a recession or things go bad, then is when we will feel it. You take like on Number 4, we put out more pipe in eight hours than Number 1 put out in thirty-two. Figure it out for yourself. If the company runs into slack time, then Number 4 will do in one day what we used to do in four days, and so we lose three days’ work. The fellows are worried about that.” Right now, with a growing unemployment in the steel cities and with one out of five steel workers on less than five days, such anxieties show up as anything but unreasonable.

H. B.

Old Fashioned Liberal


For more than fifty years Professor Guérard has brought to a succession of American universities his own distinctive blend of Gallic iconoclasism and wit. The present volume is a collection of papers gathered from these five decades and published as a “summing up” of his experience. Their subject matter ranges from sympathetic essays on Dante, Alfred de Vigny, and Anatole France to thrusts at the cold war psychosis and pleas for a rational internationalism.

There was a time when the descriptive phrase “liberal intellectual” still possessed a reasonably exact and very honorable meaning. A liberal might be expected to take an impassioned stand for individual dignity, the worth of human reason, and was invariably a sharp critic of the status quo. Today, by some of the ever-present ironies of history, liberalism—at least in our university circles—has pretty much triumphed, but triumphed at the expense of its content. Everyone is a liberal. We have liberal Democrats, and liberal Republicans. There are even “liberal” arguments in behalf of the atom bomb, and “liberal” defenders of segregation.

It is to Professor Guérard’s credit, however, that the two maligned words “liberal” and “intellectual” may still be applied to him with all their pristine meaning. His intellectual heritage is that of the French Revolution and Enlightenment, sharpened by his own experiences in the Dreyfus case and enriched by a lifetime of devoted scholarship. And it is a heritage which he has never betrayed. Even in venerable old age he remains something of a Jacobin. “The intellectual,” he writes in one of his latest essays, “is by definition the man who attempts to practise the gentle (not genteel) art of thinking; and thinking, born of malaise, is a subversive activity. It is hard to conceive of any mental effort that is not subversive.”

And of the alternative which awaits a people who turn their backs on heretical thought he is quite aware: “I take it for granted that there are no intellectuals, no egg-heads, no subversives among ants. But, the well-tried ‘way-of-life’ of the ant community. They are ant-like one hundred per cent, by the most exacting test of a formular McCarthy.”

It is as a libertarian and defender of the critical intelligence that Professor Guérard is at his best. Indeed, it is something of a disappointment to turn from the essay where he dissects the cowardice and complacency of so many of our contemporary thinkers to the papers where he expounds his own positive suggestions. For these latter are the well-meant but diffuse slogans of Wilsonian liberalism—tolerance, gradualism, world government, and the like.

It is true that Professor Guérard makes no pretense as either economist or sociologist, but in his essay on Morocco, for example, one might expect a more penetrating analysis than the one which, in essence, places its hopes in traditional French tolerance and looks back nostalgically to the days of the more “progressive” imperialism of Marshal Lyautey.

But I think it is not unfair to point out that these weaknesses—the tendency to allow good intentions to overrule facts and to seek for panaceas and Utopian solutions at the expense of reality—are the classical failings of intellectual liberalism. “I think, therefore I am,” declared Descartes, and ever since, Cartesian rationalism has somehow supposed that thought is the true motive power of society. Marx knew better—but that is another story.

And in any event we cannot but be thankful for an author who speaks so forcefully in behalf of intelligence as Professor Guérard at the close of his “High Treason Among the Mandarins”:

There is a malaise in our society: at the summit of prosperity and power, a foreboding, an anguish, a dread, which may drive us to drink, or to war, or to the cloister. We are torn between pride in our material success and the warnings of our conscience. For we cannot hush the intellect, and the intellect challenges the five formidable idols which enslave our Free World: racial pride, the leviathan sovereign state, the party system, the profit motive, the sectarian church—all the conformities, the orthodoxies, the vital lies, that we are pledged to maintain, ‘right or wrong.’

GEORGE HITCHCOCK

Reprint of a Classic


Although this notice is belated, it seems to us important that American Socialist readers all know about the reissue of this book in late 1956.

The original publication in 1942 of Paul Sweezy’s book made available for the first time in English an authoritative survey of the “principles of Marxist political economy” (as the book is subtitled). It appeared at a time when scientific Marxist thought, now hopefully beginning to re vive, had been reduced to a mangled remnant, offering the general public a choice between, on the one side, a Stalinist state orthodoxy of sterile dogmatism, and on the other, a timorous and inconsequent western capitalist liberalism. Although Sweezy was then in political tradition and orientation clearly Stalin-minded, in his handling of Marxist methodology the book was a plain break from the dominant pattern and a refreshing return to standards of scientific objectivity.

In the survey of historic Marxist controversies, names and theories (Kautsky, Bukharin, etc.) were handled with a pointed absence of the customary economic and political issues judged without obedience to momentary party lines; considerations weighing against the author’s conclusions as well as those weighing in their favor given due attention. It is sufficient condemnation of the situation in Marxism to say that such features, elementary in a work of science, alone served to mark off Sweezy’s book as unusual in the literature of the accepted Left of the time.

But the merits of the book go far beyond such primitive virtues. Economics is a science in which mechanical and mathematical tools yield but limited results, methods of reasoning are all important, and the human mind must take over many of the functions of the laboratories used in the physical sciences. Economic conclusions cannot be handled by rote, like so many measuring sticks, or they rapidly become useless dogmas. The whole point of any of the economic laws produced by Marxism lies more in the understanding of our society which they imply and condense than in their use as formal prescriptions to his work of exposition and analysis an illuminatingly intelligent understanding of the issues and theories, making it both a text for the student and a body of important and suggestive interpretations for the more advanced.

A concluding chapter presents (and the 1946 introduction reviews) a political analysis which leaves much to quibble with, but these are hardly the significant portions of the book. It is the first fully mature handling of Marxist economic theory by an American socialist, who is at the same time fully at ease in the liberal-capitalist school of economics which flourished in the thirties. That is a most significant combination, and if it could be duplicated in other fields of socialist scholarship, radical thinking might be able to establish a more honored place for itself in this country.

H. B.
Two Reminders

Our appeal for names of prospective readers has again netted some good results, as can be seen from a sampling of our mail on this issue's letters' page. The best response, naturally enough, is coming from newer readers who weren't around to comply when we made previous requests in years gone by. As a result, we are again rolling up a backlog of names to use for sample-copy mailings. This has proved one of our best means for expanding circulation, and we again urge all readers who can muster fifty likely prospects to send us the names and addresses in return for a free one-year subscription (or extension of your present sub).

Another reminder: Our 1957 bound volumes are available, as well as bound volumes back to our first year (1954). The price for each is $5.50. Send in your order now. You will be hard put to find a better set of reference books on events and issues of the past few years.

* * *

San Francisco and Bay Area Readers: The Independent Socialist Forum announces a meeting for Joseph Starobin, author and lecturer, on Friday evening, February 14. The place: 150 Golden Gate. All readers are invited to attend and bring friends.

Chicago Readers

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