The American Socialist

OCTOBER 1959  35 CENTS

The NAACP's Golden Jubilee Convention

Mr. Khrushchev Comes to Town

Awakening of Africa

by Fenner Brockway
Letters to the Editor

Coal and Steel Areas

The September issue of your magazine was excellent and I enjoyed it very much. Especially timely and to the point were the articles "Return to the Summit" and "Steel Labor on the Defensive." This summer, I had occasion to spend several months in the coal and steel areas of western Pennsylvania and Ohio, where I saw a tremendous amount of unemployment everywhere.

In the coal fields, where the union membership has shrunk due to the shrinkage of the work force, former United Mine Workers of America organizers and officials have been rescued with county and state jobs by the Democratic Party officials, while the rank and file have no leadership or program to rally around in a fight to meet the new conditions.

Steel workers who were out on strike, though in a militant mood, were very apprehensive of the future. Too much new machinery was being introduced into the mills to make the future look anything but gloomy. In the steel towns and the mining camps there is disgust with the Democratic and Republican parties, but, as we all know, it will take a long time before labor will express itself politically through its own party.

Am sending two dollars for a copy of Bert Cochran's American Labor in Midpassage, and only hope you have some available at that price.

V. P. Mass.

Labor Trial in Japan

The Japanese Supreme Court has handed down its long awaited decision in the Matsukawa Case. It ordered a retrial in the Sendai Higher Court by a seven-to-five vote. The gist of the lengthy decision was that the lower court had failed to properly assess the evidence and that the prosecution had deliberately suppressed information clearing at least one of the convicted defendants. (This piece of evidence was the Suwa Memorandum, written by a company official while negotiating a union contract with labor representatives—including one of the defendants who the prosecution was contending was at that very moment at a secret meeting that was planning the destruction of the train.) The decision is considered a great victory for the trade unions as almost all the criminal cases ordered back for retrial by the Japanese Supreme Court have ended in dismissals for the defendants.

The jubilant Socialist Party issued a formal statement in which it said: "The verdict by Japan's highest tribunal proved that the Matsukawa Case was a frame-up by police and prosecutors as a pretext to apply pressure on labor unions."

The left wing labor federation, Sohyo, issued a lengthy public statement in which it declared: "... the ruling means a step toward victory by the working people." It further referred to the case as a "typical example of suppression of labor unions and a hideous plot to dispose of innocent laborers," declaring unconditionally that "we will fight with the people (defendants) until the day of acquittal in the firm belief that they are innocent."

All along, the defendants and their counsel have charged that the case was cooked up entirely by the police and the public prosecutors, instigated by the anti-Red policy of the then Allied Occupation Authorities.

Tokyo was the scene of high tension on the day of decision, as thousands of marching Matsukawa supporters, mainly trade unionists, converged on the city. A cordon of some 3,000 police surrounded the red brick building housing the Supreme Court, while additional riot police patrolled the arrival points of the marching demonstrations.

Trouble was undoubtedly prevented by the arrest of Bin Akao, president of Dai Nippon Aikoku-to Party (an ultra-rightist organization) along with ten of his party's top activists, for questioning in connection with an attempt to create disorder. They were distributing anti-Communist handbills to the converging marchers from the out-of-town unions. A single incident could have set off city-wide rioting.

All the afternoon papers in Tokyo devoted their entire front pages to the verdict. Without doubt the Matsukawa Case has attracted more publicity than any other court trial in Japan's judicial history.

R. C. Tokyo

Australian Boost

You may know that, as an activity supplementary to our bi-monthly Outlook, we have been producing discussion material, consisting in the main of reprints from overseas journals not available here to many readers. Because of the importance of the subject, we have just duplicated a set of three documents on the Chinese communes—your article "New Thunder out of Communist China" of vol. 6 no. 4, and two articles from Monthly Review.

Our discussion material is circulated to about 150 regular subscribers, and in this case we are sending copies to the Australia-China Societies and various specialists. Of those who have so far seen the material, we have received the opinion that it is by far the most comprehensive and authoritative so far available—more so, for instance, than that produced in England.

We hope you will agree that the reprinting of such material helps the success of your journal; particularly so in Australia, where very few people are in touch with American left-wing journals, and where Outlook has, by frequent mention and quotation, brought the American Socialist to the notice of a good many people. I hope this has brought and will bring some reflection in Australian subscribers.

Helen G. Palmer, Editor
Outlook, Sydney, Australia

Letters to the Editor

October 1959
Vol. 6, No. 10

Published monthly, except July and August, by American Socialist Publications, Room 306, 857 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y. Telephone: WAlkins 9-7739; Subscription rates: $3.00 for one year; $5.50 for two years. By first-class mail: $5.00 for one year. Foreign $3.50 for one year; $6.50 for two years. Single copy: 35 cents. Second class postage paid at New York, N. Y.

MR. KRUSHCHCHEV COMES TO TOWN
INFLUENCE PEDDLERS IN BRASS HATS
AWAKENING OF AFRICA
AN ALTERNATIVE FOREIGN POLICY
THE NAACP'S GOLDEN JUBILEE
MY BATTLE WITH THE WHITE CITIZEN'S COUNCILS
BOOKS

2

AMERICAN SOCIALIST
Mr. Khrushchev

Comes to Town

If Ecclesiastes were alive today, he would reformulate his proposition that there is nothing new under the sun. The Khrushchev road show, for all its corniness, was history in the making with a new twist born of this brash and somewhat wacky age. This unheard-of personalized confrontation of two social systems paled in its high drama anything Jack London was able to conjure up out of his imagination. Deafeningly preceded by the Russians with a missile shot to the moon, and appropriately exorcised on our side by Congressmen who called for a day of national mourning and Catholic archbishops who ordered the recitation of three Hail Marys in their schools, the Prince of Darkness finally landed on our shores. He promptly proceeded, if not to bewitch and subvert the souls of his victims, to at least get the biggest rise out of the American people since Joe Louis dispatched Schmeling.

Why all the nervousness and near-hysteria in high places? We can understand the fury of Cardinal Spellman, Harry Truman, and the directors of Freedom House, because these gentlemen think, as Eugene Lyons blurted out at a McCarthyite-type gathering at Carnegie Hall, that the job is not to stop the cold war but to win the cold war. But what possesses the government hierarchies who concluded that there had to be an exchange of state visits? They face no organized political opposition. Radicalism has been withering on the vine since the post-war boom. Liberalism is at one with Toryism on the cold war. The labor unions are docile, and most of their leaders out-Dulles the State Department. What then accounts for our supposed master politician, Vice-President Nixon, insisting that a "Truth Squad" be latched onto our guest to heckle him up and down the countryside, and for the acquiescence of an administration top-heavy with public relations experts?

Can it be that our decision-makers think that the national unity is woven of such flimsy materials, and are as fearful of opposition as the men in the Kremlin?

As of now, they have done a pretty good brainwashing job on the American people. The word went out and the crowds greeted the visitor in a decidedly chilly manner in Washington and New York. Cheering, waving, tickertape were out: it was tantamount to publicly declaring oneself a Communist. In the newsreel shots of the Washington arrival, Eisenhower looks like a man who has just swallowed a bottle of castor oil but is determined to manfully carry on.

If all this was supposed to impress Khrushchev and the world with our maturity and self-confidence, it demonstrates that the laws that govern the selling of toothpaste and soap are of a different intellectual discipline than those that apply in the relations between nations. At any rate, after the act got loused up in Los Angeles, followed by the clap of Jovian thunder, the high sign went out from a Washington slightly sobered up and our free people in our free country cheered just as efficiently in San Francisco, Coon Rapids, and Pittsburgh as they had silently stared in the East. Khrushchev said at the Washington dinner that he had but to wink and the Russian people knew what was required of them. The American people are at least as well trained.

Now that we have heard Henry Cabot Lodge's panegyric to the welfare state and Spiro Skouras' "rags to riches" success story, now that Eleanor Roosevelt has impressed on the godless Soviet chieftain the deeper currents that course through the American way of life by showing him her late husband's Dutch Bible, now that Khrushchev has regaled us with his folksiness, proverbs, and glitz boasts, now that millions of words have been filed, printed, blared over the air waves, and have found their way to the limbo of the morgues—what remains? Has anything come of it all once the tumult and shouting dies down? In our opinion, yes. In our opinion, a new horizon can open up for American diplomacy even though our previous conclusion is unchanged that the path to concrete agreements remains a long and thorny one.

The fact of the Khrushchev visit is at least as important as anything he said, any impressions he conveyed, any responses he elicited. It came, let us remind ourselves, on the heels of twelve years of cold war punctuated by several shooting wars, and at a time when public opinion in this country is badly disoriented. As a matter of fact, the announcement of the proposed visits stunned a public unprepared for such an abrupt turn and set off protests and grumbling in many influential circles. That an administration whose course had been undeniably set by the Dulles compass should decide that a shift for an international easement must be attempted is prima facie evidence that stubborn facts of life are breaking through the consciousness of leaders not renowned heretofore for either depth or
originality. The pundits and politicians continue to parrot the old arguments by rote and will probably continue to do so for a while. But through a hundred crevices comes flooding the realization that the attitudes and methods of Luce's "American Century" are obsolescent and that Russia has to be treated as an equal if we would have peace.

If Khrushchev set it as his aim to get this thought across to the American people, he has, so far as we can judge, had some success. He has had an enormous impact—that is clear. It is not specially important whether he can win a popularity contest or not, whether the American people think he can dish it out but can't take it, whether they think he was treated churlishly or whether he had it coming. After all, the chances of Khrushchev running for public office in this country are nil, or close to it. What is important is the growing awareness that Russia is a first-rate nuclear-and-missiles power, and that we cannot go to war with Russia unless we want to kiss civilization goodbye. Any informed person didn't need the Khrushchev visit to understand this. But there is nothing like dramatizing and belting out a point in this age of organized confusion and distraction. The most perceptive comment that we have read about the Khrushchev visit was this reprint from the Tokyo newspaper, Asahi: "He is infiltrating every American home, whether Americans like him or not."

If the ground truths of the present world reality are not incontinentely elbowed aside by next week's prize fight or the World's Series—and it stands to reason that they will not be, because one sputnik is now following fast on the heels of another to shock us out of our long sleep of illusion—then the American people will have climbed the first rung toward becoming subjects instead of objects of foreign policy.

**Influence Peddlers In Brass Hats**

The change in attitude towards the armaments industry is an index—and by no means a trifling one—of the spirit of our times.

Immediately following World War I, a series of investigations into wartime frauds, favoritism, and fabulous profiteering rocked the country with their revelations. A special House committee under the chairmanship of William J. Graham of Illinois sat for three years, and published its findings in twenty-one massive volumes. Again in 1934, a Senate inquiry headed by Gerald P. Nye spread the sordid picture of blood-stained enrichment across the nation's press. These investigations did more than merely inspire anger about the many episodes of corruption and conniving. The spirit of revulsion that followed seemed to establish it as a principle of American public life that never again would private dealers in the implements of bloodshed be allowed to coin a profit from their grisly trade.

It is truly amazing how quickly that determination was undermined in World War II and in the postwar years.

There is a profound lesson here for sociologists, in the way economic interests transcend and mold public opinion and the national conscience. Today, welfare-oriented economists point with pride to our greatly expanded federal activities as evidence that we have a better economy, without appearing in the least self-conscious about the glaring fact that the greatest part of the expansion has taken place in the field of arms expenditures. Congressmen dispute openly on the floor of the federal legislature over arms contracts for their districts. It is taken for granted that the war business should be lucrative—the most lucrative in the nation—for contractors and investors. Even unions join the scramble for arms contracts in the hope of staving off unemployment.

Economists, politicians, and journalists tell us that alternatives to this permanent semi-war economy would readily be found if the need arose. But we must all recognize that this is a speculative theory which the event alone can test. Is it too far-fetched to say that there are many powerful persons who might shrink from such a test, and cling rather to the assured solility of the armaments system, no matter how explosive its implications? And might not the rest of us, aircraft workers, research professors, even non-arms workers bothered by the memory of the thirties, assent perhaps a shade too readily in the arguments of our leaders that disarmament is impossible? If we could unearh all that is repressed in the national consciousness, might we not find there, in our acquiescent attitude towards the arms industry and its profits, something to shed light on the mystery of why the German people went along with Hitler?

These are painful questions, but they need to be asked when one looks around at the carnival which our armaments industry has become, and the apathy with which the most shocking disclosures have been received. With only a small part of the picture visible behind the screen of government secrecy and a collaborationist press, enough has become known to hint at the depth and degradation to which arms profiteers and government officials have sunk, as they have turned a vast governmental enterprise which, in the accepted interpretation, is a necessary common effort for the common defense, into a cozy private racket.

A few months ago, the armaments lobby, seizing the occasion that the Defense Contract Renegotiation Act was up for renewal, made a quiet but determined attempt to emasculate that law under which inflated profits are subject to review and part of them may be recaptured. At about the same time, President Eisenhower, alarmed by the extent to which financial considerations instead of purely military necessities were intruding into disputes over different weapons types, referred in a private legislative gathering to the baleful activities of the "munitions lobby," and later reluctantly confirmed his remarks when questioned at a press conference. The House Armed Services investigations subcommittee under F. Edward Hebert (Dem., La.) started hearings on military buying practices, with special emphasis on that perennial concern, the busy traffic in retired high military personnel to the corporate side.
of the negotiating desk within months after retirement. And the federal government’s General Accounting Office, stirred to momentary life by the noise, reported that a random check of only 14 Air Force contracts had uncovered $30 million in excessive costs. None of this received the public attention, the follow-up efforts, or the aroused indignation that it deserved. But a small amount of information has become available hinting at the scandalous goings-on.

A few years ago, Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Services Committee disclosed that 94 percent of the $36.4 billion expended on arms orders to industry from January, 1953 to July, 1955 was awarded by secret, negotiated—in other words non-competitive—bid. This practice, which was carried on under the authority of the Truman Korean emergency proclamation, continues with little modification to the present day, when it is estimated that at least 85 percent of contracts are awarded without open bidding.

Moreover, in arriving at prices for new and complex weapons assemblies, the government has given wide latitude to contractors to operate on the basis of cost estimates rather than firm bids. Where costs prove less, by the companies’ figures, than had been anticipated, the companies are still permitted to retain twenty percent of the overcharge. As Rep. Martha W. Griffiths (Dem., Mich.), herself a former government ordinance negotiator, has pointed out, this is “an incentive to increase the cost of the contract in order to get more profit when you reduce the cost.” When you add to this the fact that some 40 percent of government arms contracts provide profits calculated on a “cost plus” basis, the incentive to pad, boost, inflate all cost figures as much as possible becomes so strong as to break the flimsy barriers of corporation patriotism.

The contracts, especially those let by the Air Force, are usually not for specific items of military hardware, but for huge and complex weapons “systems.” A prime contractor, who assumes basic responsibility, organizes a team of companies to handle the entire system. On the Dyna-Soar Orbital Bomber Project, as one example, two such teams are competing on design studies. One, headed by the Martin Company, includes Bendix Aviation, Goodyear Aircraft, Minneapolis-Honeywell, Bell Aircraft, and American Machine and Foundry. The other, captained by Boeing, includes GE, Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, North American Aviation, Chance Vought, RCA, and Aerojet General. This system has given rise to two important features. First, it has generally removed all the so-called “sub-contractors”—the team members associated with the prime contractor—from direct cost-and-price examination, leaving it all up to the firm which heads the group for that particular venture. And second, it has organized powerful interest groups into ready-made combines prepared to fight other groups for sizable profit plums running into the tens of millions of dollars on each operation. Many of the inter-service rivalries, clashes over the choice of weapons, and antagonistic military philosophies given voice through top-ranking military personnel in recent years have actually reflected the clash of these giant industrial interests.

As a result of the publicity given this system in the past few months, the military, particularly the Air Force, has promised to make changes. First, it proposes to require that contractors “certify” costs as current and accurate. Second, it proposes to regain some measure of control over the “sub-contractors.” There is little hope held out that these promises will result in serious change. An inspection system depends, more than anything else, upon the independence of the inspectors. And the armed services have become so inextricably intertwined, in interests, viewpoint, and personnel, with the corporations to which contracts are let, that it is doubtful that any purely formal procedures will alter the picture in any important way.

Three years ago, the Hebert committee concluded its meek investigation into military buying practices with the comment that “the presence of retired military personnel on payrolls, fresh from the ‘opposite side of the desk,’ creates a doubtful atmosphere.” It has cast little additional light on the matter in its recent return bout. To this day, no comprehensive list of retired senior military officers employed in armaments industry exists, although one has finally been promised by the Pentagon to the House Defense Appropriations subcommittee in time for next year’s budget hearings.

In The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills compiled the following list: “General Lucius D. Clay, who commanded troops in Germany, then entered the political realm as occupation commander, is now the board chairman of the Continental Can Company. General James H. Doolittle, head of the 8th Air Force shortly before Japan’s surrender, is now a vice-president of Shell Oil. General Omar N. Bradley, who commanded the 12th Army group before Berlin, going on to high staff position, then became the board chairman of Bulova Research Laboratories; in February 1955, Chairman Bradley allowed his name to be used—‘General of the Army Omar N. Bradley’—on a full-page advertisement in support, on grounds of military necessity, of the new tariff imposed on Swiss watch movements. General Douglas Mac-
Arthur, political general in Japan and Korea is now chairman of the board at Remington Rand, Inc. General Albert C. Wedemeyer, commander of U.S. forces in the China theater, is now a vice-president of Avco Corporation. Admiral Ben Moreell is now chairman of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. General Jacob Evers is now technical adviser to Fairchild Aircraft Corp. General Ira Eaker is vice-president of Hughes Tool Co. General Brehon Somervell, once in charge of Army procurement, became, after his death in 1955, chairman and president of Koppers Co. Admiral Alan G. Kirk, after serving as Ambassador to Russia, became chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Mercast, Inc., which specializes in high-precision metallurgy. General Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, is now a vice-president of Remington Rand in charge of advanced research; General E. R. Quezada, of the H-Bomb test, is a vice-president of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation; General Walter Bedell Smith is now vice-chairman of American Machine and Foundry Company's board of directors; Army Chief of Staff General Matthew B. Ridgway, having apparently turned down the command of Kaiser's automotive invasion of Argentina, became chairman of the board of the Mellon Institute of Industrial Research.

Senator Paul Douglas recently calculated that 721 military officers, retired from all branches of service, with the rank of army colonel or above, were on the payrolls of 88 of the 100 corporations holding three-quarters of the nation's arms contracts. Lockheed Aircraft has 60 former officers on its payroll, Westinghouse industries, 75; General Dynamics, the second largest arms contractor, 54; RCA, 39.

To the sensible and realistic person, this picture is prima facie evidence of collusion. No private firm, no department store, for example, would dream of standing for so blurred a line of interest between its buyers and supplying firms. Yet the nation's newspapers and magazines have almost unanimously absolved the firms and officers of any trace of wrongdoing; they cannot find any important signs of a conflict of interest. Business Week, which today takes a tone of injured innocence over the whole matter, back in 1952 was rating generals and admirals above five-percenters as valuable in getting contracts, and jubilantly told its executive clientele: "Get yourself a general . . . make him Chairman of the Board." How tough a general will be towards a corporation which he hopes to work for—or even head—within a short time, is obvious to the dullest imagination. How a general who has been hired by a corporation suddenly loses all his inside knowledge, contacts, acquaintances, and influence in military circles also remains a mystery—especially when everyone knows that this knowledge, contact, and influence is precisely what is valuable to his new associates.

** Shall we look then to the civilian heads of military services for a curb on this runaway machinery? It would be rash to do that, with the examples of such men as Charles E. Wilson and George Humphrey so recently before our eyes. Al Toffler, who in May 1958 did a survey of the ninety-five men who filled the thirty top posts in the Defense Department between 1947 and 1958 for The Nation, found them to have come, with few exceptions, from the world of large corporations: "He is oriented, generally, to the higher reaches of business." And we ought not lose sight of the fact that civilian officials can also, like officers, look forward to big jobs with arms firms: Frank Pace, Jr., former Army Secretary, is now chairman of the board of General Dynamics Corporation, Dan Kimball, former Secretary of the Navy, is now head of Aerojet Corporation, which has more than $300 million in military contracts.

How about Congress; can we put our trust there? The Pentagon and the corporations take pleasure in rebutting Congressional oratory by pointing out sarcastically that Congress itself is part of the imbroglio, a charge which Business Week gleefully substantiates:

"Indeed, the lawmakers themselves constitute a lobby of sorts—pushing projects that would benefit plants in their own districts. Congressmen from shipbuilding areas plump for more aircraft carriers for the Navy; those from districts with large Army bases lobby to keep the installations open. For example:

- During the House debate on the defense appropriation, Rep. John R. Foley (Dem., M.)t, a freshman in Congress, tried unsuccessfully to vote money for the Air Force to buy Fairchild F-27 transport planes built in his district—a fund previously knocked out by the House Defense Appropriations subcommittee.
- Los Angeles area congressmen pulled out all stops when the ax came down some years ago on North American Aviation's $650 million Navaho missile project, costing more than 5,000 workers a layoff. Some industry sources grumble that NAA's later award of the Hound Dog missile had the help of Congressional pressure for more jobs in the district.
- At military budget time, the most solid boosters of Boeing's B-52 and KC-135 aircraft have always been the Washington state Congressional delegation. The company recently shifted much of this production to a Kansas plant, thus has another Congressional bloc of friends.

This Congressional involvement makes it very unlikely that an investigation or corrective legislation will be pushed. Says Senate majority leader Lyndon B. Johnson: "I don't know any who deserve that label [munitions lobby]. They have not tried to lobby me."

All this is testimony to a general merging of the corporate and governmental structures. There can be little doubt that such a situation gives rise to numerous instances of actual fraud. One need only recall the trial of Major-General Bennett Myers, former deputy chief of materiel for the Air Force, in 1947, for fraudulent dealings with aircraft contractors, who held out to him the bait of a post-retirement job. Or former Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott, who left his post under a cloud—despite a medal from Eisenhower—because he couldn't seem to forget the interests of his own firm. Drew Pearson charged on August 18 of this year that the General Electric Company's "inside influence" in the Pentagon was a major reason for the United States' failure to beat the Soviet Union in launching an earth satellite. He told a House subcommittee that a decision to switch to a GE rocket engine had "sidetracked" scientists. A
Dr. Richard Porter, who "worked in a sort of dual capacity for General Electric and as an adviser to the Defense Department" wielded the influence in favor of the GE engine. An even more serious case was detailed by Matthew Josephson in the January 21, 1956 Nation:

An instance was reported in October, 1955, of a navy air-corps contract with the McDonnell Aircraft and Westinghouse companies for F3H jet fighter planes. Though eleven of the planes crashed, causing the death of several test pilots, the contract was continued for some time at an eventual loss to the government of most of the $302 million expended. Official investigation showed that the former deputy chief of the navy Bureau of Aeronautics, Rear Admiral Lloyd Harrison (retired), opposed termination of the contracts, despite the plane crashes, because the record of these contractors had formerly been good. But one day after he resigned from the navy in September, 1959, he took the job of vice-president of the McDonnell Aircraft Company. To a congressional committee he admitted that the job had been offered to him as long ago as March, 1955, some five months before retirement.

On August 12, the chairman of the board of the Martin Aircraft Corporation, which holds $400 million in prime contracts, and altogether has some $800 million worth of military work under way, told the Hebert subcommittee that his company had flown a party of high-ranking military officers to the Bahamas for a week-end of parties at a country club. He said the trips, which incidentally were tax deductible, were designed to bring about "a closer relationship" between the company and the military. "All business," he remarked sagely, "is done on close personal contacts. The closer you work together the more effective you are."

When asked if any of the officers taken on the junket had contract dealings with Martin, he answered grandly: "We make no distinction. There is no limitation, we take them all."

The Martin Company is great for parties. Another was planned for Lt. Gen. Bernard Schriever, the Air Force's ballistic missile boss. Co-hosts with W. B. Bergen, head of Martin, were to have been Kimball and Pace, the aforementioned Navy and Army secretaries who are now heads, respectively, of Aerojet-General and General Dynamics. Unfortunately for the effectiveness of "close personal contacts," the press got wind of this party and the fear of too much publicity caused its cancellation.

BITS and pieces of this kind, unfortunately, are all that is available of what is most surely, in its totality, a startling picture. There is no question that the arms program, whatever its merits as a permanent national policy, is being used as a gigantic suction pump for the extraction of wealth from the national economy by several score giant corporations. There is no question that innumerable individuals have made it the royal road to personal enrichment, and in so doing have taken advantage of an increasing flexibility in our national moral code in these matters. There is no question that the growing together of our political, military, and economic structures into a permanent semi-war economy has been helped along and cemented by the eagerness of many high-ranking officers for a position of wealth and high prestige in the corporation world. And finally, there is no question that we all look on with increasingly dulled moral sense and drugged consciences: yesterday's outrage has become today's norm. In part, we may suppose, this can be attributed to long habituation to a businessman's economy and its corrupt practices. In part it measures the changing political atmosphere since the thirties. And finally, we must not forget to credit the politicians, preachers, and publicists, who have become so adept at self-censorship, and so accustomed to marching in serried ranks towards dubious goals, that few of them break the line of march to undertake embarrassing excursions into the side streets where our real business is carried on.

There does not appear to be any assured and practicable way to bring under control a structure that has become more potent than any political force in the nation, or to separate what has become inextricably intertwined. Even if some "abuses" of the system are curtailed (which means cutting down on some of the more flagrant practices until the heat is off), the marriage of the military and corporation worlds will not be broken up by investigations or weak recommendations. It is a system that is part of—really the foundation of—the New Capitalism so many people are busy bragging about, and will probably be with us until there is a basic change in the direction the country is taking. But one thing we may be sure of: no military or economic elite in this country or any other, has ever carried on as this one is doing, without at some time having to pay the price in a popular revulsion and antagonism, and without having to feel the weight of a popular political movement directed against it. There is no reason to think that the present coterie of freebooters will be an exception.

\[\text{IN} \text{spite of the Administration's lip-service to the free enterprise rule of competition, 85 percent of the $23 billion the Pentagon is spending this year for weapons is being spent on "negotiated contracts"—without competitive bidding. What this means in dollars is brought out graphically by a few of the many examples provided by Senator Sparkman, speaking as a member of the Senate Small Business Committee:}

\begin{itemize}
  \item When the Navy ordered a gear assembly from Westinghouse on a non-competitive basis, it paid $277.44. On competitive bidding, Glove Gear, a small company, supplied the same gear for $27.50—a saving of 90 percent.
  \item The Navy paid General Electric $82 per unit for carbon packing. On competitive bidding it got the same item for $15.
  \item Bearing sleeves cost $425 when purchased from Allis-Chalmers on a "negotiated" basis—$189.50 on a competitive bid by the Waukesha Bearing Company.
\end{itemize}

\text{Michigan's Democratic Representative Martha W. Griffiths estimated that "if we cut cost-plus contracts and used competitive bidding, we could save $5 billion. Someone from the Pentagon called me and said 'You're wrong; we could save $7 billion.'"}

\text{The Progressive, August, 1959}
New aspirations, new governments, new movements, new leaders: Such is the scene in the so-called Dark Continent as millions arise from the sleep of ages.

Awakening of Africa

by Fenner Brockway

NINETEEN hundred and sixty will be decisive for the continent of Africa. More peoples and territories will gain their independence in that year than in any previous year. The list will be composed of Nigeria, Somalia, the Cameroons, and Togoland.

Nigeria is the largest of the British colonies. Indeed, when its thirty-five million people become independent, half the non-self-governing population in the British Empire will be freed politically at one stroke.

Somalia, the Cameroons, and Togoland are trusteeship territories under the United Nations: the first administered by Italy, the latter two by France. The United Nations have decided that they become independent next year.

Somalia is bordered by French and British Somaliland. Their peoples will certainly demand freedom and unity in a Greater Somalia when the Italian area is liberated.

Togoland and the Cameroons are also divided at present. The British portion of Togoland has decided by plebiscite to join Ghana. The British portion of the Cameroons will shortly decide whether to remain with Nigeria or to join the French Cameroons. Whatever the decision, they will be part of independent territories next year.

The importance of 1960 for Africa extends, however, far beyond the territories which I have named. The most critical issue to be decided will be in East and Central Africa, where the whole future of race relations on the Continent will be determined. When the Africans of Kenya, Nyasa-

land, and the Rhodesias win democratic equality, European political superiority in all Africa will be doomed. Not even South Africa can maintain apartheid in isolation and against the pressure of events in the rest of the Continent.

During the last decade Kenya has been the chief scene of conflict. First, there was the political agitation, led by Jomo Kenyatta, challenging the appropriation of the best land by the white settlers and demanding political rights. These claims rejected, a section of the African people turned to the violence of Mau Mau. This revolt was crushed three years ago, and in the election which followed a limited number of Africans were permitted to vote for the first time. They were allotted six of the twenty-eight elected members. Later this was increased to fourteen. The table below gives the racial composition of Kenya and the number of elected representatives from each group in the Legislature.

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<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Elected Representation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asians</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the members of the Legislature as a body, including ex-officio and nominated members appointed by the Governor, elect twelve members, four Africans, four Europeans, four Asians.

The Africans have not accepted this undemocratic Constitution. A year ago they proposed that a constitutional expert from Britain should prepare recommendations for a new Constitution and that this should be considered by a

Fenner Brockway, a member of the British Parliament, is chairman of the movement for Colonial Freedom. This article has appeared in the Yugoslav Review of International Affairs, Belgrade.
round-table conference representing all the races and the British Government. This very moderate proposal was rejected by the British and Kenya Governments, whereupon the Africans decided to boycott the Legislature. A little later the Asian representatives, in a splendid gesture of solidarity, also decided to leave the Legislature in support of the African claims.

The Constitution had thus broken down. It could not be pretended that the Legislature was representative when it did not include elected representatives from the two largest races. The pressure for a change was strengthened when an Arab and a European representative agreed to join the Africans and Asians in an inter-racial delegation to London.

A very clever policy was adopted to meet this situation. The most influential European representative, Mr. Michael Blundell, resigned from the Government and formed a new group which endorsed the idea of a round-table conference, although its manifesto was generally vague and indefinite. In these circumstances the British Government accepted the proposal for a report by a constitutional expert to be followed by a round-table conference next year. Thus for Kenya, as well, 1960 will be a decisive year.

The African and Asian elected members have now returned to the Legislature, but the difficulties are by no means over. The Africans are asking that the Government shall state categorically that the aim in Kenya is to establish full democracy with adult suffrage irrespective of race. The British Government has not gone further than to say that it aims at the establishment of democratic Parliamentary institutions. The Africans are also insisting on the termination of the State of Emergency declared at the time of the Mau Mau revolt, the release of all those detained without trial (including Jomo Kenyatta, who is still exiled in a distant village although he has completed his prison sentence), and the legalization of an African political organization for the whole of Kenya. At present only separate district organizations are permitted. The outlook is more hopeful. There is a better atmosphere between the races. But the fundamental decisions have still to be made.

One of the reasons which has led the British Government to a more conciliatory attitude in Kenya is undoubtedly the crisis which is reaching a climax in nearby Central Africa. Here, too, the decisive date will be 1960, when the political structure of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland is to come under review. It is not too much to say that the issues to be decided reflect the biggest crisis in British imperial history since the struggle for the independence of India which ended by the triumph of Gandhi and Nehru and the National Congress in 1947.

The dominant Europeans in the Federation have been carefully preparing both the psychology and the practical conditions for the 1960 review. It will take place at a conference representing five governments: Britain, the Federation, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. By a policy of cooperation between the Conservative Government in London and the Federal Government, representation will be heavily weighted against any satisfaction of African claims.

The population in Central Africa consists of seven million Africans and three hundred thousand Europeans. The maximum representation which this vast majority of Africans can obtain in the Federal Parliament is one-third of the membership. It is therefore clear that the Federal vote at the 1960 Conference will be pro-European. In Southern Rhodesia there are 200,000 Europeans and 2½ million Africans. There is not a single elected African in the Legislature. In Northern Rhodesia the African majority has only one-third representation. In Nyasaland the Europeans are only an insignificant numerical group in the population, but nevertheless have a majority in the Legislature.

Notorious Orlando shanty town, near Johannesburg, is "home" to the urban African, who is not allowed to own land. Here, amid the unpaved streets with unclean puddles, one water-tap may serve a thousand families, and scavenging dogs and cattle pick at the uncollected garbage.

It has been largely because the British Government has delayed so long in establishing a new Constitution, giving the Africans the majority to which they are entitled, that the recent troubles have arisen in Nyasaland. The Africans realize that the vote of their Government will go against them at the 1960 Conference.

The one doubt in the minds of the Europeans in the Federation about the Conference which is to meet next year is the nature of the representation of the British Government. We shall have a General Election before then and it is quite possible that a Labor Government will replace the Tories. The Federal Europeans are alarmed at this prospect. Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Prime Minister, has twice hinted that the whites will stage a “Boston Tea Party” if a Labor Government resists their claim to
throw off the last vestiges of control over them from Britain. It will be remembered that it was the action of the white colonialists in America in throwing overboard a British cargo of tea at Boston which began the War of Independence. Sir Roy Welensky is not alone in creating this panic psychology. Lord Malvern, who was Sir Roy’s predecessor as Federal Prime Minister, recently flew to London to take part in a House of Lords debate, when he threatened that the whites would “go it alone” if Britain resisted their demands.

Why is it that Central Africa should have become the scene of the crisis between the whites and the Africans in this way? Partly it is due to the fact that the 300,000 Europeans have made the Rhodesias their country. The climate is favorable, much of the land is rich, and valuable mineral resources have been found. The Europeans have lived as an isolated community on a social scale far beyond African intrusion. They have lived a life of comparative ease, with many African servants. The Africans have been excluded from their hotels and restaurants. There have been separate entrances and counters at the Post Offices and Africans have had to buy articles through hatches in the walls of shops which can be entered by Europeans alone. Whenever Europeans and Africans have had to

Africans have been able to enter because there is little provision for their secondary education, and even at this college the Europeans and the colored have been accommodated in separate houses. Under the pressure of criticism from liberal circles in Britain, some hotels have been opened to Africans, though very few can afford to meet the charges, and the restaurants in railway trains are now open to the rare African who can meet the cost of a meal. The new Post Offices are to be built without separate entrances and counters. Negotiations are proceeding to allow Africans to rise a little higher in grades of jobs in the mining industry and on the railways.

At the back of this racial segregation, with privilege and comfort on the one hand, and social ostracism and poverty on the other, are the vast European economic interests in the Rhodesias. In December, 1953, the United Nations published a report on Social Conditions in the Non-Self-Governing Territories. It showed that one-third of the total wealth produced in Northern Rhodesia passes annually in interest, dividend, and profit to financiers living in Britain, America and other investing countries. The profits made from the copper mines are fantastic. They are probably the highest made in any part of the British Empire. Recently they have fallen because of the drop in copper prices, but here are the figures for three companies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rhokana Corporation</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leading political figures are directors of these companies. Lord Malvern is the Resident Director of the British South Africa Company. Mr. Julian Amery, M. P. only resigned from the directorship of the British South Africa Company to become the British Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1957. Mr. C. J. Holland-Martin, M. P., a brother-in-law of the British Prime Minister, and Joint Honorary Treasurer of the Conservative Party since 1947, is chairman of Rhodesia-Katanga, Ltd. and a director of Nyasaland Railways. Captain Charles Waterhouse, who was a leader of the imperialist group in the House of Commons which opposed the withdrawal of the British forces from the Suez invasion, is also a director of Rhodesia-Katanga. I could give a long list of Conservatives who are associated with big business in Central Africa. Indeed, when colonial debates take place in the House of Commons it would be difficult to throw a handful of pebbles across the House without hitting a Conservative M. P. who has economic interest in East or Central Africa.

There is little doubt that the present crisis in Nyasaland and the Rhodesias was created by the European leaders in order to anticipate the 1960 Conference. They were deeply disturbed by the success of the African All Peoples Conference held at Accra six months ago. The Europeans dread the example of independent Ghana and are aware that in 1960 Nigeria will become independent.
too. African leaders from the Federation were present at the Accra Conference and returned with an increased determination to gain their political freedom and with much earlier achievement of their aims in mind. Dr. Hastings Banda, the President of the Nyasaland African Congress, delivered a speech at the airport in Southern Rhodesia on his return from Accra which alarmed the white settlers. In fact, the Accra Conference visualized a policy of non-violent resistance to European domination, but on the pressure of the Algerian delegates a sentence was added recognizing that if European Governments prevented political advance and attempted to crush the peoples' movements by force, the people would be justified in retaliating by force. The European leaders in Central Africa pointed to this sentence as justification for their assertion that the African movements in the Federal area intended to resort to force.

The first act of suppression took place in Southern Rhodesia. The Prime Minister, Sir Edgar Whitehead, acknowledged that there had been no violence. Indeed, the only clash that had occurred had been during a strike at the Kariba Dam, where the African workers, paid fourpence a day, asked for one shilling a day as danger money after fourteen Africans and three Europeans had fallen to their deaths from a scaffolding. The Government immediately rushed in troops and the strike was broken. Even then no violence had taken place. The declaration of a State of Emergency was justified as an anticipation of disturbances, not in the Rhodesias, but in Nyasaland.

The governments of Nyasaland and Britain have asserted that Dr. Hastings Banda and the Nyasaland African Congress planned the massacre and murder of Europeans, Asians, and “moderate” Africans in that territory. A Commission is now investigating the truth of this matter, but I am confident that Dr. Banda and the Congress were not committed to any such plan. Undoubtedly they were thinking of civil disobedience on the Indian model. They were frustrated by the delays in constitutional reform, which would mean that they would be unrepresented at the 1960 Conference. The evidence of the massacre plot, it is now known, was provided by paid informers, persons who had been expelled from the Congress and alleged girl-friends of some of the leaders. I think it possible that a desperate group of Africans, outside the Congress, was thinking of adopting Mau Mau methods in Nyasaland, but this was no reason for suppressing Congress and arresting and deporting its leaders. The fact that not a single European or Asian has been killed, although many of them live isolated in large African communities, proves that massacre could not have been seriously contemplated. The only persons killed have been fifty-three Africans, who died as victims of shooting by security forces introduced from Southern Rhodesia.

The Africans of all the three territories, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, and Southern Rhodesia, are determined to end the European-dominated Federation. The people of Nyasaland would prefer to be federated with Tanganyika and perhaps Uganda, which are well on the way to becoming African States. The Africans of Northern Rhodesia wish to become an independent state, freed from European domination. The Africans of Southern Rhodesia are aware that the dissolution of Federation might mean that their European masters would seek to associate the country with the Union of South Africa, but deliberately they have come to the conclusion that their best hope, as well as the hope of the colored peoples in South Africa, lies in the advance of independence in their neighboring countries and throughout the Continent.

The most significant fact in Africa is the growth of a feeling of solidarity among the peoples of the whole continent. The events which are moving towards a crisis in 1960 cannot leave the rest of Africa unaffected. Already we have seen the revolt in the Belgian Congo which has led to concessions by the Belgian Government. France has had to go far in recognizing the rights of the peoples in West and Equatorial Africa, one-third of the whole continent, to internal self-government. The peoples will soon sweep beyond the present concessions which European Governments are making. This movement for liberation has been stimulated not only by the Peoples Conference at Accra but by the call which the independent Governments of Ghana and Guinea have now made for a union of all the African independent states and their united pressure for freedom throughout the Continent.

This African Revolution represents the greatest dynamic change of our time. It is the duty of socialists in Europe and in all parts of the world to identify themselves with it and to support it by all the political means which are within their power.
The latest news from the research centers and "think factories" is that security is unlikely to result from military efforts and the policy of "deterrence." How then can we achieve safety in the missile age?

**An Alternative Foreign Policy**

by Robert H. Sollen

SOME leading military technicians, presumably with great influence in American military and foreign policy planning, have established their contentions so convincingly that they have proven the futility of their own policy proposals.

In an attempt to re-establish the validity of their proposals, they resort to vague nationalistic symbols, and other methods incompatible with the thorough scientific techniques which directed them to answers they perhaps had hoped to avoid. With the facilities of gigantic research and development centers, they have learned how slim and diminishing is the likelihood of achieving security through military means. But their answer to this dilemma is to continue the process they have demonstrated to be virtually hopeless.

Two of these leading military planning experts are Albert Wohlstetter, associate director of projects at RAND Corp., Santa Monica, California, and Dr. Richard C. Raymond, manager of TEMPO, Santa Barbara, California. Both institutions are major "think factories" engaged primarily in military research. RAND works almost exclusively for the Air Force. TEMPO (Technical Military Planning Operation), part of General Electric Company, was set up in 1956 to "examine the fruits of advanced research and the international, economic, political and social factors that might affect tomorrow's weapons systems and incidentally tomorrow's industrial products."

Mr. Wohlstetter has an excellent article, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," in the January, 1959 issue of Foreign Affairs. He told me he is expanding the article into a book.

Illuminating comments by Dr. Raymond were published by Air Force Magazine in its November, 1958 issue. Both articles deal with the problems of defense against current and anticipated weapons. Both agree that the nation that strikes first has a tremendous advantage, and that the advantage increases as weapons are refined and striking power is multiplied.

"Western journalists," writes Mr. Wohlstetter, "have greatly overestimated the difficulties of a surprise attack with thermonuclear weapons and vastly underestimated the complexity of the Western problem of retaliation. . . . The most important conclusion is that we must expect a vast increase in the weight of attack which the Soviets can deliver with little warning. . . . Against our costs of construction, maintenance and operation of an additional base must be set the enemy's much lower costs of delivering one extra weapon. . . ."

As Dr. Raymond sees it: "Just about the time we get our organization for defense against ballistic missiles organized we will find, probably, that somebody has invented an airplane that will fly around the world at 50 feet, or something like that, and we will be back in the old, low-altitude problem. . . . No matter how much work is done on a defense system, you can never be completely sure that the other guy is not going to invent some new wrinkle with which to get at you. He has the choice of weapons; you have to meet him on his own terms when you are working on defense."

"Is there," I asked Dr. Raymond, "any substantial measure of defense in prospect against modern weapons or those of the probable near future?"

In our exchange of correspondence, Dr. Raymond referred me to Harry Paxson, TEMPO's manager of environmental studies:

"Yes," wrote Mr. Paxson (a retired general), and he listed these as defense prospects:
"Early and accurate intelligence of enemy aggressive intentions; the neutralizing effect of our own retaliatory weapons; our ability to intercept and destroy enemy air weapons; our ability to counter enemy land weapons."

As for enemy aggressive intentions, Mr. Wohlstetter points out the difficulty of determining the intent of a missile crew in a blockhouse:

"Not even the most advanced reconnaissance equipment can disclose an intention from 40,000 feet. Who can say what the men in the blockhouse of an ICBM have in mind? Or, for that matter, what is the final destination of training flights or fall-safe flights starting over the Pacific or North Atlantic from staging areas?"

"The neutralizing effect of our own retaliatory weapons," cited by Mr. Paxson, refers to deterrence and retaliation, but the question had to do with defense. Defense is a word less and less used in military terminology. It appears to be increasingly obsolete. Dr. Raymond has stated: "As we look toward future air defense problems and talk about use of nuclear warheads in defense weapons... we find ourselves a little bit in the position of trying to run a police force with no weapon but an electric chair. And it is wired up so that it kills the executioner as well as the victim."

As for U.S. ability to intercept and destroy enemy air weapons, there is an impressive list of admissions by planners from Defense Secretary McElroy on down that there is no missile defense system in sight.

Dr. Adolph K. Thiel, program director for experimental space projects at Space Technology Laboratories, Inc., told me:

"Defense is extremely difficult to achieve. ... There is such a very short time to act... You must track the missile, establish its course, predict its course for the next five or 10 minutes, and then launch something against it. In my opinion, this is an extremely difficult job."

Not only is military aggressive potential making greater gains than defensive measures, as Mr. Wohlstetter points out, but warning systems progress also lags behind weapons development. Vast amounts of money have been spent on radar warning systems. A billion dollars will have to be spent to achieve each additional minute of warning over 15 minutes, writes Dr. Raymond.

Even then, what would we have?
Sir Robert Watson-Watts, described as Britain's "father of radar," was quoted last May as saying that the tremendous speed of ICBM's and the great distances at which they must be detected to give adequate warning time make radar a "weak sister" for missile warning and defense. He said it would be possible to build an effective, world-wide radar warning system, but it would be "astronomically costly."

Not only is missile technology advancing faster than radar improvements, but relatively simple means appear to be available to jam radar or make it useless or unreliable. For these and other reasons deterrence is replacing the term defense in military planning. Deterrence theoretically stems from ability to retaliate effectively if attacked. The U.S. will have substantial retaliatory power soon if it doesn't have it now. The U.S. is developing underground missile launching pads, missile-launching submarines, and solid fuel missiles which have shorter countdown periods.

As deterrence is said to be based on ability to retaliate effectively, these developments are offered as America's "defense." What more perfect a defense than a system, not that stops enemy forces after they have begun to move, but that prevents a potential enemy from even initiating a military move!

Mr. Wohlstetter writes, however, that because the weight of attack which Russia can deliver with little warning will continue to increase, "strategic deterrence, while feasible, will be extremely difficult to achieve, and at critical junctures in the 1960's, we may not have the power to deter attack... Deterrence is a matter of comparative risks. The balance is not automatic. First, since thermonuclear weapons give an enormous advantage to the aggressor, it takes great ingenuity and realism at any given level of nuclear technology to devise a stable equilibrium. And second, this technology itself is changing with fantastic speed."

Moreover, he writes:
"In order to reduce the risk of a national act of aggression, we are being forced to undertake measures (increased alertness, dispersal, mobility) which, to a significant extent, increases the risk of an irrational or unintentional act of war. The accidental problem is serious, and it would be a great mistake to dismiss the recent Soviet charges on this subject as simply part of the war of nerves..."

In our interview in his RAND office, Mr. Wohlstetter elaborated on the danger of accidental war, a peril he feels very keenly. The risk of war by accident, he said, will increase. It is not separable from the deliberate attack problem, he said, and it works in a reverse or contradictory manner. It is easy to minimize the risk of accidental war if one is willing to be irresponsible about the deliberate attack problem. One could achieve total assurance against the chance of war by mishap with a system whereby no retaliatory action would be initiated until complete assurance that an enemy attack has been launched. This would give an aggressor an immensely increased advantage. On the other hand, if one is interested only in retaliating instantly in event of an attack, one can determine in advance to "shoot at any bird that crosses the radar screen." This, he said, is total irresponsibility in coping with the possibility of a deliberate attack.

Dr. Lloyd Berkner, a member of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, points out that a necessarily quick decision must be made as a definite or vague blip flashes momentarily on the radar screen. The time in which a decision must be made will prevent consultation with civilian leaders, right up to the President. The decision may be up to a sergeant watching the radar screen—a Russian or American sergeant.

The sardonic fact about deterrence is that at the moment an attack would be launched against the United States, this nation's retaliatory capability will have failed in its primary objective—to prevent an attack. It could destroy the enemy nation—or a good part of it—but it could save little if any of the United States. Retaliatory potential would have possibly some debatable moral and military
value if it could assure deterrence. As an unreliable deterrent, its validity diminishes. And it is purely diabolic when set in motion. In the present context, it would double the destruction without providing defense.

How, then, does one "prepare" for nuclear warfare? Americans still are being told of the value of civil defense, not because of the scope of the potential catastrophe, but despite it.

Should man be satisfied with the choice between the survival of one fraction or another of the population, when peace should be among the alternatives?

"I don't think any of us would want to recover or survive under any other conditions than freedom," Dr. Raymond has declared.

That would depend much upon who is stating the alternatives and who is defining freedom. The "freedom" of survivors of a nuclear war may be widely held to be less than worth fighting for.

"For those who survive," Dr. Linus Pauling of California Institute of Technology told me in a recent interview, "the air, water, soil and food would be polluted by radioactive contamination."

Add to the immediate havoc the consequences of many years of continuous subsequent fallout and the unknown genetic damage to countless persons for who-knows-how-many generations. Even the decision-makers never weary of reciting the absolute folly of another war. Yet they advise, as the only major solution, frantic war preparations—"deterrence."

Are there no alternatives? I put this question to the technologists who explain in such precise and convincing terms the fruitlessness of military "preparedness."

Mr. Wohlstetter seemed unprepared for such a question. Politics, of course, is not his line. But as scientists and military technologists remind the politicians they must understand science to do their job well, should not the military planners give some serious thought to a possible political settlement to the military dilemma?

MR. Wohlstetter is not politically unsophisticated. He said a political settlement must precede any arms control agreement between the nuclear adversaries. But he saw no political settlement in sight. "I can sympathize with your desire for a settlement," he said. But he left the impression that one is naive for harboring such a desire.

"I have the impression," I wrote to Dr. Raymond, "that TEMPO and other similar researchers have made a perfect case against ever again assuming security through present nationalistic military developments, but they always conclude that we need more of this kind of thing."

In our exchange of correspondence, Dr. Raymond referred the observation to Mr. Paxson, TEMPO's manager of environmental studies.

"If, by this," Mr. Paxson replied to my provocation, "you imply that we should 'throw in the sponge' and attempt to find security by non-military means, I'm afraid I can't go along with that thought. Soviet and Chinese Communism is still potentially militant. While they often achieve short-range goals by subversive and other non-military means, they pose the continuing threat of backing up their demands by military force, if need be.

"I believe that while this state of affairs continues the Western world cannot afford to be second-best militarily—although, of course, we, and the Soviets, must balance our military costs against the costs of keeping ourselves economically solvent."

The trouble is that Soviet decision-makers believe that while this state of affairs continues, they, too, cannot afford to be second-best militarily. Alternatives need not include "throwing in the sponge." In view of the hopelessness the military technicians attribute to their own efforts, it seems worth a more serious effort than has been expended so far on new avenues toward world stability and progress.

New approaches need not immediately replace the present military program or even obstruct military research and development in any way that would be interpreted as increasingly jeopardizing Western security. Alternative policies should be pressed with greater urgency and intelligence to convince the world of America's peaceful and democratic intentions. Not until other approaches to world stability are attempted, with full opportunity to test their effectiveness, will one be found to replace the delicate balance of terror which promises nothing hopeful except possibly a little more—but not much—time.

POSSIBLE alternatives to the balance of terror include a political settlement with the Soviet Union and China. To the question: "Can Russia be trusted to keep any agreement?," C. Wright Mills has this reply:

"Put in this way, the question is rather naive.

All nations... tend to keep those agreements which their leaders believe it to be advantageous to keep; they tend to break those which their leaders believe put them at a disadvantage. If one nation breaks more agreements than another, is it not conceivably because, in the past as a weaker nation, she was forced to enter into disadvantageous agreements? That is as true for one nation as for another.

The pertinent question now is: Do the Russian elite recognize that World War III would not be to Russia's advantage and that an equitable treaty structure presents the only hope for avoiding war? The answer is yes every bit as much for the Russian elite as it is for the American elite.

In this same context, Raymond Swing in the Oct. 4, 1958 issue of Saturday Review suggests that "one way to create confidence between the two blocs is for the West, and for Washington in particular, to accept the Soviet Union as an equal in power and to revise the policy toward the Soviet Union accordingly."

This presumably would apply to instances in which Washington insists Russia back down on her demands while the U.S. announces it will not yield an inch—at least not until after Russia yields. It is also the kind of attitude which withholds American recognition from China until the present "passing phase"—meaning the Peiping government—has become history. If one holds these attitudes at the outset, subsequent settlements are doubly difficult when it is discovered that Russia does not have to
back down any more readily than does the United States, and that China not only survives, but thrives on its self-determined policies.

When finally Russia's strength is publicly acknowledged, it is then cited as the very reason for not seeking political settlement. Russia (and China) seek to communize the world, it is said, and there can be no compromise or accommodation with such a plan. The fact that the U.S. has sought to impose its political and economic system on many areas abroad makes the Russian scheme no less nastily to the Washington decision-makers and symbol-conditioners.

But more important is that Communism probably will not be imposed by military means, if it is imposed at all, outside the current Red bloc. Nor is it likely to be stopped by military means if attempts are made to communize other areas. And if Communism is imposed or accepted by peaceful means, non-Communist resistance by force would only accentuate the appearance of the vitality of Communism and the barbarity of its opposition. The real competition—so well known now it is almost trite to dwell on it—is ideological. But there is little urgency in our official policy about foreign economic aid, technical assistance, a concrete expression of good will for newly independent nations and those still struggling for independence.

Members of the neutralist block often have been regarded publicly in America as diabolically inclined in the struggle of right with wrong, of morality with immorality. The fact has not generally been conceded in America that the neutralists view the great politico-military power struggle as a contest in which they cannot afford to participate and in which the partisan issues are of little or no concern to them. They are concerned only that the struggle exists, for they know well that it could lead to global catastrophe. Why Asia, after centuries of Western arrogance, should be expected to take up arms in defense of the Western world remains difficult to explain.

The West, under American leadership, owes it to Asia, Africa, and Latin America to lead the way for a major UN economic development program. At least it should wish these areas well in their suddenly intensified struggle to emerge from archaic status to independence, equality, democracy, and prosperity.

American aid has been nation-to-nation and has done much good. It would have been far more effective as a United Nations program with broader international cooperation and without the heavy emphasis of arms aid and military pacts. Widespread goodwill probably would have emerged and much anti-American sentiment could have been prevented.

Arms to Pakistan alienate India without providing Western security. Arms to Iraq alienated the Cairo bloc and again served no good cause. Arms to Latin America fed inter-American squabbles and helped neither the people of Latin America nor any legitimate United States purpose. The American demand for a rearmed Japan nullifies much pro-American feeling propagated during at least the first half of the Occupation. Rearming West Germany gives the Soviet Union cause for concern and for counter-measures which intensify East-West tensions at close range and increase the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe.

As Norman Thomas has written: "Obviously Berlin will not be saved by war. . . . What [Khrushchev] wants is a German peace treaty. The West avowedly wants that only on the basis of reunification of an armed Germany as a member of NATO. . . . Russia, even if Boris Pasternak were prime minister, would no more permit a rearmed and reunited Germany to join NATO than the West would permit it to join the Warsaw Pact. There is a kind of madness about the willingness of the West to threaten war in order basically to ally itself with a rearmed Germany."

Disengagement in Europe is regarded officially in America as a risky move which would seriously jeopardize the security of Western Europe. But disengagement need not imply American toleration of Russian aggression in Europe (if such a threat exists), and would not mean American military withdrawal from Europe until such a move were obviously justified.

Meanwhile, the Communists constantly expand their foreign aid, technical assistance, trade and cultural exchange programs, while America conducts its foreign policy toward the uncommitted world with diminishing imagination. The social and political status quo, justifiably rejected by much of the world since World War II as archaic and unviable, has a rear-guard defender in the United States. Hopeless Hashemite kingdoms are upheld by the United States as long as possible, while the moving forces of the Arab world are alienated by American withdrawal of a loan offer for an important dam.

Much effort will be required to overcome the effect of a greater American concern for exploitation of oil and other resources in Latin America than for the Latin American people. No attempt is made to settle the Formosa crisis, pending a new trip to the brink in the Strait. No date is set for return of Okinawa to Japan, a move that even now might erase some anti-American feeling in Okinawa and Japan.

The era of McCarthyism, as the nationalistic excess was called, is not over. The daily rantings are missing, at least from the headlines. But the political thinking of many Americans appears to have been "frozen" at an unproductive level partly as a result of the 1950-55 experience. Controversy has taken on an increasingly negative connotation.
Positive thinking (attempting to adjust differences without facing facts) gains in popularity at the expense of critical (analytical) thinking for which much American education now ill-prepares students. Nationalistic symbol-conditioning becomes more effective because its response is greater in the mind of the positive thinker than in the intellect of the critical thinker. Bi-partisanship therefore becomes the new virtue in Congress, virtually eliminating public debate on foreign policy and diminishing the choices offered by a two-party system. There is higher honor in closing ranks and marching behind the President, even to Lebanon and Quemoy, than in setting off a controversy by asking, Why?

America's nationalistic bi-partisanship and its social and educational retreat from free examination of man's major problems leave too many citizens incompetent to think their way through international issues. The removal of fear of controversy and free examination of issues would help reduce international tensions, and would help to find better ways of solving the arms race dilemma than perpetuating or intensifying it.

In initiating new approaches to world stability, no military safeguards, if such they be, need be dropped. But in the search for a new way, it is likely to be found eventually that the unreliable monster no longer is needed to guard the entrance to the cave.

The power elite of the nuclear nations are not likely to initiate the change. They believe they have too great a stake in the cold war, and they mean to convince the people it is also in their interest to continue it. Cold war provides the outside threat needed to maintain popular unity behind the ruling military-corporate-political elite which alone, the people are told, can save them.

The moving force, therefore, must come from intellectuals who will vocally oppose the nationalistic excesses, and from the sovereign people who have, let us hope only temporarily, abdicated.

The NAACP's Golden Jubilee

by Conrad Lynn

When Oswald Garrison Villard issued his famous "Call" for the founding meeting of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in 1909, he was voicing the shock of liberal Americans over the savage repression of the Afro-American culminating in the horrible pogrom in the home of the Great Emancipator, Springfield, Illinois. English Walling set down the alternatives facing the country in the Independent: "Either the spirit of Lincoln and Lovejoy must be revived and we must come to treat the Negro on a plane of absolute political and social equality, or Vardaman and Tillman will soon have transferred the race war to the north."

Before the formulation of this conclusion most whites and such black Uncle Toms as Booker T. Washington had been diligently propagating the concept of a second-class status for Negroes. He was to remain a hewer of wood and a drawer of water forever. The dynamics of American industrial society, however, made it impossible to fix this role securely on the freedman. The story of the last fifty years is in large part the history of the fight waged by the most militant section of the Negroes, with white allies, to break the shackles continually forged and reforged for the black man.

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With William E. B. Du Bois as its most active voice, the early NAACP definitely found its place among the radical segments of American society. But at the end of the first World War, numbers of capitalists began to assume the leadership of the organization, modifying the importance of its original idealistic founders. Whites have always remained dominant in policy making although they number no more than one-tenth of the membership. Their role has been well-described by Dr. Robert A. Anglin in his doctoral dissertation at the University of Indiana: "Whites established the first policies by which the NAACP was to be guided and they have continued to mold same. . . . Reports sent in by their liaison officers no doubt had significant influence in the thinking of the white leaders as did discussions and consultation with the Negro members of the new body, but when crucial decisions were made, when policies for action were set in motion, it was done at the behest of the whites. . . . The general policy of the NAACP has been and is now to use the Negro as liaison and to use whites as policy makers."

In the recent period, the ranks of the NAACP have shown considerable restiveness. Ordinary Negroes have noticed that the upper-class members of their race can count on direct or indirect subsidy from these whites but that the progress of the black worker is increasingly inhibited. The Supreme Court of the United States declared, in effect,
in its May 17, 1954 decision in *Brown vs. Bd. of Education*, that there could no longer be legal barriers to the full enjoyment of citizenship by Negroes. It thus pointed to the eventual sterility of a program based almost exclusively on lawsuits and legislation to win recognition for the Afro-American. In the last five years the NAACP has been faced again and again with the question: Why has not the Negro been accorded equality and freedom after having obtained their formal recognition in law? The answer, of course, is that no people attains rights unless it seizes and holds them.

The Fiftieth Anniversary Convention of the NAACP in New York City was slated as a jubilee occasion in accordance with the admonition of Leviticus: "And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof; it shall be a jubilee unto you . . ." But a few months before the convention a heresy had broken out. Robert F. Williams, NAACP Branch President in Union County, North Carolina, had called on the Negroes in places of physical repression in the South to take up arms in their own defense. After a succession of atrocious legal travesties upon Negroes in his home town of Monroe, Williams stated for United Press International: "These courts have opened the way to violence. Negroes must learn to convict their attackers on the spot. They must meet violence with violence and lynching with lynching, if necessary." The day after he made his statement Williams was summarily suspended by Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the national body.

THE subsequent "trial" of Williams before the National Board and the fight over his doctrine at the Convention all but eliminated the notion of jubilee from the minds of the delegates. Sensing the significance of this move the press, radio, and television, North and South, freely gave Williams and his counsel, Conrad Lynn, opportunity to express their views. No doubt, the Southern press and radio were in large part motivated by a desire to portray a split in the NAACP. But many staunch Southern white liberals, completely devoted to the Negro cause, like Carl and Anne Braden and Howard W. Carwile, Almond's rival for the Virginia governorship in 1957, backed Williams' stand to the hilt.

Wilkins' control of the convention machinery made it certain that Williams would be defeated in the organization. But the growing fury of the frustrated Afro-American is making itself apparent in the so-called Muslim movement led by Elijah Poole, self-styled Muhammad, which preaches that God will exterminate the whites as devils and give supremacy to the blacks in 1970.

On a more realistic and potent level, groups of Negroes have quietly begun to arm for self-defense in hotbeds of wool-hat reaction in the South. For more than two years Williams has maintained a Rifle Club in Monroe, North Carolina, chartered by the National Rifle Association. Monroe is the southeastern regional headquarters of the Ku Klux Klan and its police chief is honorary chairman of the local Klan. In its first baptism of fire it successfully turned back a motorized Klan attack on the home of Dr. Albert E. Perry, vice-president of the local NAACP in Monroe in July, 1957. Since then an armed truce has existed, with the Negroes publicly warning the Klan that any attempt to cow the Negroes with force will be met by countervailing power. With the doctrine that only physical and moral courage can win full recognition of manhood the Southern Negro, arms in hand, is preparing to lead his people to justice and honor in our land.

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[Editors' Note: We see the recent Williams affair inside the NAACP as well as the mushrooming nationalist movement among Negroes as lightning flashes illuminating the growing frustration of Negro people because of the lack of progress in winning first class citizenship. So far as our observation goes, Williams was subjected to unjustifiable and shabby treatment by the parent organization for expressing his views—views, incidentally, shared by many others.

[We continue to doubt that the Negro will win equality by simply bowing low before the trinity of respectability, court action, and pacifist non-resistance. But we are skeptical that the organization of rifle clubs is the programmatic solution for the present impasse. If we read the temper of the times correctly, what seems to be required is to supplement the legal battles conducted by the NAACP with spirited mass organization and mass demonstrations (which, let us remind the Gandhist epigones, Gandhi practiced in India.) A militant Negro movement would pressure and goad sections of the liberal and labor public, instead of permitting the most timorous and conservative to set the tone and define the strategy of the fight for civil rights.

[The discussion that is opening up in Negro ranks is a heartening sign. We hope that out of the ensuing soul-searching and debate will come a more energetic policy.]
My Battle With the White Citizens Councils . . . by Buford W. Posey

In early 1955, I wrote an article for the American Socialist entitled "Where Do We Stand On Integration?" Sent it off to the editor and quickly forgot all about it. Little did I realize that after a lapse of three years this article would cause my arrest on three different occasions, solitary confinement in jail, loss of my Mississippi citizenship, a fine of $329, and eventually my fleeing the state on a cold, rainy night of February, 1958, in order to avoid a 12-month sentence on a county convict gang.

Let me give a chronological listing of events. Scene 1 was enacted in my presence at Forest, Mississippi, at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon of June 14, 1954. Senator James O. Eastland was midway in the opening speech of his campaign for re-election; suddenly his voice rose and a hush fell over the crowd, as he stated: "Now ladies and gentlemen of our beloved Southland, I have a plan which if carried out will preserve our sacred Southern institutions forevermore. The white citizens of the South must with all deliberate speed launch a vast organization beginning in the South and stretching into every state in the nation, and use its machinery in an unprecedented propaganda campaign to preserve segregation and white supremacy." Within forty-eight hours an application for a state charter for an organization to be known as the "Mississippi White Citizens Council" was submitted to the Secretary of State.

Now to my personal battle with the Neshoba County (Philadelphiaca, Mississippi) Chapter of the White Citizens Councils. It began on March 13, 1959, when its local publicity chairman, Jack Tannehill, and the president, Burdette Richardson, launched a bitter tirade against me in the Neshoba Democrat, which was owned by Tannehill. They charged me with being a Communist, questioned my parentage and my "racial purity." (Conveniently, they ignored the fact that the F.B.I.'s director, J. Edgar Hoover, had stated that there was not a single Communist in the state.) Immediately afterwards a telephoning and whispering campaign began which went something like this: "Buford Posey is a Communist, shouldn't he be run out of the county?" Photostatic copies of my article in the American Socialist were given wide circulation and White Citizen Council members claimed that the American Socialist was a Communist magazine, and therefore I must be a Communist.

On Thursday, April 3, 1958, I got fed up with all this, and since the WCC leaders were claiming that I did not believe in Southern principles, I invited two of them, Richardson and Tannehill, to settle the matter with me in the "noblest" Southern tradition, to wit: dueling with shotguns or pistols. Richardson accepted the invitation and announced that he was moving from the county. Tannehill appeared to the F.B.I. for protection. The F.B.I. refused his request. He then appealed to his friend, Governor J. P. Coleman. The governor sent in the State Highway Patrol on Saturday night April 5th, and I was arrested (for the first time in my life) on two charges: dueling and threatening the peace. I was tried that same night on the latter charge and placed under a peace bond. Incidentally, the judge gave me the following choice: Since the state could not produce any witnesses for the prosecution, I could either plead guilty, or else he'd send me to jail. Because I was the only person staying with my semi-invalid father at the time, plus the fact that we lived in the country and it is almost a mile to the nearest neighbor's home, I was forced to either plead guilty or else let my father die of neglect. (The judge lived in my community and was well aware of my father's predicament.) So, naturally, I accepted a plea of guilty to "threatening the peace." By a strange coincidence the judge himself was a WCC member.

Next, on April 17, 1958, I was scheduled to be tried on the "dueling" charge. However, this time some of my friends congregated around the courthouse and the judge postponed the trial for fear of violence. Once again the WCC appealed to Governor Coleman and he obligingly sent in the State Highway Patrol. So, on May 2, 1958, I was tried before the same Justice of the Peace who had already tried and convicted me on the other charge. Of course, once again I was found guilty, under an 1890 law which had never before been used in the history of the state. This time I was fined $329 and officially deprived of my Mississippi citizenship. This decision was appealed to a higher court.

However, as it turned out, my fight with the WCC was not yet over. In an election held in August, 1958, the man elected circuit judge in the court I had appealed my case to happened to be a fanatical member of the WCC, as was the district attorney, and one of my own attorneys turned out to be an officer in the WCC. The new judge refused all compromise offers even though by this time the complaining witness, Jack L. Tannehill, had agreed to drop the charges. The judge and district attorney, both officers in the WCC, were determined to place me in prison. In this atmosphere I made preparations for my coming trial. Then suddenly less than 24 hours before my trial, I was arrested at 3 a.m. on the morning of February 5, 1959, on "suspicion," and placed in solitary confinement. Once again the Mississippi State Highway Patrol showed up. This time one of their investigators visited me in jail and told me that I must confess or else stay in jail indefinitely regardless of whether my 77-year-old semi-invalid father lived or died. I asked the State Highway Patrolman just exactly what crime I was supposed to confess, since I had never known that the charge "suspicion" constituted a crime. He ignored my question.

Meantime, Mississippi's newspapers, radio, and TV stations were having a field day screaming: "Posey arrested again; on suspicion." Several hours later two local white men who weren't particularly known for their peaceful ways hemmed up the Sheriff and forced him to release me on a $2,000 bond which charged me with the high crime of "suspicion." Later, I found that someone had broken the window out of the office of the local newspaper office which belonged to my original accuser, Jack L. Tannehill. As a result of this unfavorable publicity on the eve of my second trial, my attorneys withdrew my appeal and I became the first person in the history of Mississippi to lose his citizenship without being convicted of a felony or serving a prison sentence.

Meanwhile the WCC was hard at work trying to get me sentenced to a one-year jail term and fined $2,000 on the window-breaking charge (I was secretly charged with the crime without even being placed under bond). Finding out what was in store for me was another trial before the same judge who had previously convicted me on two counts, I fled the state at one in the morning on February 14, 1959. On March 6, 1959, the prosecuting attorney appeared in court and publicly admitted that there was no evidence whatsoever to link me with the alleged crime with which I had been charged. Therefore, the judge had no alternative except to dismiss the charge. However, he announced that it could be brought up again anytime anyone uncovered any evidence against me. At least, although he very badly wanted a conviction, I wish to state that indeed I owe a great debt of gratitude to the investigator from the Mississippi State Highway Patrol for his refusal to manufacture evidence against me, because I am firmly convinced that had it not been for this one man's integrity the local law enforcement officers would have concocted a case out of thin air.

Buford W. Posey is presently working on a book about his home state.
A Review-Article

Last of the Giants

by Bert Cochran


This is the second volume of Deutscher's biography of Leon Trotsky, covering the period from the conclusion of the civil wars in 1921 to Trotsky’s exile to Turkey in 1929. Originally, Deutscher had thought to cover the whole of Trotsky’s life and work from 1921 onward in a single volume, but he found it impossible to compress this extraordinary saga into too economical a mold without doing violence to its historical sweep. He now plans a third volume to cover the twelve years of Trotsky’s last exile. The completed biography is conceived as part of a larger trilogy consisting of his already published work on Stalin, the Trotsky biography, and a planned two-volume Life of Lenin.

Enough has already appeared in print to characterize the project as a monumental achievement. Deutscher brings to his work gifts equalled by few political biographers: a mastery of the documentary materials, a historian’s comprehension of the period, a capacity, untainted by sentimentality or cynicism, to appraise maturely the individuals who trod the stage of the revolution, and an ability to place the individual against the social background. When to this is added his grasp of the ideological sources of Soviet policies and struggles and his lucid exposition, it is easy to see why Deutscher penned a classic.

The Trotsky biography appears at a time when the intellectual climate in the West is utterly unlike the time when Dantonists and Robespierriests in France hotly disputed their claims, or when the Trotsky-Stalin controversy shook the international Left. But this latter controversy has not passed into the limbo of academia, nevertheless; it still claims mankind’s attention because it first grappled with a host of political, sociological, and moral questions which are only now being recognized and which still remain as the agenda of unfinished business of major portions of the globe. Just as a geological

convulsion lays bare the earth’s substructure and enables scientists to reconstruct the laws of geological formation, so the social explosion of the Russian revolution and its aftermath will continue as a prime source for the investigation of the dynamics of society and a point of reference for the solution of age-old problems in modern settings.

The Bolsheviks—and above all, Trotsky—used to boast how supremely conscious was their revolution in contrast to those of their seventeenth

and eighteenth century forebears. They exaggerated. Lenin and Trotsky knew more about history and sociology than Robespierre or Cromwell because humanity’s fund of knowledge had advanced over the centuries, but they were mortals just the same who were caught in the web of entirely novel and in part unresolvable difficulties and could not transcend their times. It was the greatness of Trotsky that though a child of his time he glimpsed the future, and it is a measure of his moral strength that he could challenge the state of which he was one of the prime architects.

By mid-1922, the two main leaders of the Russian Revolution, Lenin and Trotsky, began having qualms about where the revolution was going. This was the first time the element of a moral crisis entered into the thinking of the Communist Party’s ruling circle. The leaders had been self-confident of their historic road throughout all the terrors and vicissitudes of the civil wars. The earlier crisis over the Brest-Litovsk treaty was short-lived and quickly washed out as the revolution surmounted it and faced a new turn of affairs. Even the misgivings and fears accompanying the adoption of the NEP in 1921 were mollified by the forced nature of the retreat. But to the dismal scene of a shattered Russia isolated in a hostile world, with its peoples in the grip of hunger and disease, was now added a new frightening apparition: The two leaders became painfully aware that a bureaucratic apparatus of domination seemed to be emerging which resembled uncomfortably much of the structure of the Czarist state that they had fought to destroy.

Lenin got increasingly alarmed about the menace which threatened to make a mockery of the ideals of the revolution, and in the last weeks of 1922 he proposed to Trotsky that they form a bloc for joint action against bureaucratic abuse. Lenin at this time also decided to support Trotsky on the latter’s proposals for planning, which he had for a long time opposed. He wrote apropos of this to the Politburo on December 27 that “I think one could and should go some way to meet Comrade Trotsky.” In this mood he also dictated on December 23 and 25 the letter which became in effect his last will and testament, and on January 4, 1923
he added the postscript advising the party to “remove Stalin” from the secretariat, which, Deutscher believes, Lenin took for granted “could only establish Trotsky in the leadership.” But the bloc was never to be consummated as Lenin suffered another stroke, and Trotsky embarked on the battle which, in one form or another, he was to continue to his dying day, without Lenin’s aid.

It is Deutscher’s merit that in addition to disintering Trotsky from under the mound of slanders, lies, and misrepresentations which his enemies have heaped upon him, he also critically reviews the struggle from the vantage point of time and experience. The reader is thus enabled to consider basic sociological questions some of which have a universal importance in the study and organization of society.

The crusade that Trotsky undertook in 1923 was fraught with enormous difficulties in all respects, and was a hopeless one in many respects. To begin with some of the less decisive propositions: Trotsky had many drawbacks for the undertaking he now embarked on. For the previous six years, he had distinguished himself, above even Lenin, as the revolutionary disciplinarian, centralizer, and as many thought, authoritarian. He was the prosecutor of the Workers’ Opposition, he had called for the militarization of labor, he had fought for the subordination of the unions to the state. All this had cost him some of his popularity, and deepened anxieties in various quarters that Trotsky aimed to become the Bonaparte of the Russian revolution. For him to come forward after Lenin’s removal from the scene as the apostle of democracy and people’s rights against the pretensions of the bureaucrat and the state appeared to some as demagogic and motivated by a struggle for power.

Despite his name being coupled with Lenin’s as the duumvirate of the Russian revolution, and his overwhelming popularity in the nation at large, Trotsky was never fully accepted by the Communist party “old guard.” He was a latecomer; he had joined only in 1917 after many years of factional bickering with Lenin. Moreover, his superior gifts combined with a certain imperiousness of manner, or as some of his less friendly critics had it, his arrogance, excited resentments, fears, and envy on the part of many of the more plodding machine faithful who believed they had superior claims upon the revolution than this, as they saw him, flamboyant Johnny-come-lately. How anomalous his position was can be gathered when we consider that while he was still viewed by the public as one of the two top leaders, he found himself shorn of all influence in the Politburo the moment Lenin was out of activity. The “Troika”—Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin—were able overnight to convert the Politburo into a conspiracy to isolate him and undermine his reputation.

TROTSKY was not ideally suited in his personal makeup for the kind of struggle that was imposed on him. He had little stomach, and probably a little aptitude, for machine fighting and caucus maneuvering. Where on the grand arena of the revolution, or the civil wars, his whole personality blended naturally and harmoniously with the heroic panorama, and he instinctively found the right tactic and invoked the proper gesture, here, on the plane of the party machine, he felt ill at ease and loathed the degrading mud-slinging and unscrupulous politicking.

From Max Eastman on, innumerable writers, some friendly, more of them hostile, have dwelt at length on the mistakes that Trotsky committed in his fight with Stalin. Upon examination, some of these turn out to be purely personal axes that the authors want to grind. In other cases, the critics ignore the doctrines and purposes of Trotsky and his associates, and devise tactics for an entirely different kind of contest with entirely different aims which strike them as more suitable or worth-while. Naturally, such criticisms are largely irrelevant and belong more to the genre of feuilleton rather than history-writing. Deutscher is able to put the matter into some proper proportion. Not only because he feels a large measure of kinship with Trotsky’s purposes. He has the additional advantage of understanding precisely the atmospheric conditions under which the battle took place, which knowledge shields him from capricious or fanciful criticisms, or arbitrary attempts to juggle with the rules of the game as laid down by history’s imperatives.

Within the admissible historic context, Deutscher singles out two major mistakes:

Trotsky let slip the opportunity to smash the “Troika” at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923 when the three pretenders had not yet consolidated their organizational positions, and when he could have attacked with the backing of the full authority of Lenin, who had urged him to do so and warned against concluding “rotten compromises.” (Years later, Trotsky ruminated that had he launched the attack, he probably would have defeated Stalin at this time, but Stalin might still have won in the long run.)

AGAIN, on the eve of the Fourteenth Congress at the end of 1925, when the “Troika” broke up, and Zinoviev and Kamenev ranged themselves against Stalin and Bukharin: If Trotsky were to make common cause with his two former enemies who were now repeating many of his criticisms and adopting a number of his positions, this was the opportune moment to do it, while their base in Leningrad was still intact. But the animosity that had built up during the previous few years could not be dispelled so rapidly, and Trotsky was mistakenly hopeful that a more massive landslide was still in the offing. Trotsky sat through the stormy sessions of the Congress without uttering a word while the erstwhile
triumvirs revealed the sordid details of their struggle against Trotsky and each side vied for his support. By the time he had decided to join forces with Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin had already ruthlessly employed his power of patronage to cut their organization in Leningrad to ribbons.

Better tactical handling would probably have altered the contours and dimensions of the fight, but not its final result. The only conceivable way that Trotsky might have turned the tables was to ally himself with at least a section of the bureaucracy and pursue his economic program at the expense of his crusade for democracy. Once he decided to buck the bureaucratic state head-on, his defeat was foredoomed. Even E. H. Carr, the noted historian of the Soviet regime, who is brutal in his evaluation of Trotsky as a personality (the revolutionary temperament, in general, seems to be utterly ungenial to him), and who thinks that while Trotsky saw further and more clearly than any of the others, he lacked a sense of tact and timing, or the ability to exercise leadership among equals, concludes that more important than any personal failings, it was "the evolution of events" that led to his downfall. It is in his expert reconstruction and critical evaluation of this evolution that Deutscher makes his original contribution.

By the time Trotsky started his challenge against bureaucratic degeneration, Bolshevik ideology rested on a myth in which the Trotsky Opposition was thoroughly entraped. The Bolshevik dictatorship had been justified by its leaders as the embodiment of the Marxist category of the dictatorship of the proletariat. According to the classical Marxist idea, this was not supposed to be a dictatorship at all in the sense in which the term is generally employed, but a broadgaged representation affording a more generous democracy to the working classes and its allies than they had previously enjoyed but curbing and suppressing the old privileged layers whom the revolution had expropriated. Whether it lived up to its advertisement fully or not, in 1917 the Bolsheviks undoubtedly possessed a popular mandate and were backed by virile and resourceful labor and peasant formations. Even during the civil wars, they probably enjoyed basic support in the struggle against the Whites and foreign invaders. But seven years of ferocious, almost superhuman combat had pulverized the working class as well as the old privileged social groups. The Soviets, in whose name the Bolsheviks continued to rule, were by the end of the civil wars, mere creatures of the Bolshevik party. As the Bolsheviks did not—no more than any previous victorious revolutionary party in history—consider relinquishing power because the class in whose name it spoke was now inarticulate, the proletarian dictatorship inevitably turned into the dictatorship of the Communist party.

But the narrowing process did not and could not stop there. By now the Bolsheviks had suppressed all other parties, as they judged that any organized opposition could turn the chaos and desperation to its own advantage and imperil Communist rule. This had been approved as a necessary defense of the revolution by all the groups and personalities within the Communist party. None of them seemed to realize that they could not ban all controversy outside their ranks while at the same time maintaining the Bolshevik party as an isolated island of democracy within an ocean of authoritarianism. The very pressures which led to the suppression of the other parties would lead to the suppression of free criticism within the one remaining party. As a matter of fact, the process had already gotten under way when Lenin in 1921 proposed the outlawry of all factions, and Trotsky led the attack on the Workers' Opposition.

When therefore Trotsky in 1923 began to thunder against the bureaucratization of government and party and to demand a return to workers' democracy (within the one-party system), his program bristled with contradictions. Could the Bolshevik monopoly be maintained under the existing conditions of social crisis while permitting free play to factions inside the Communist party? The emergent Bolshevik bureaucrats, accustomed to take over all decision-making, viewed the call to let workers control the governmental process as either sheer demagogy or a recrudescence of Trotsky's Menshevism. After the party substituted itself for the working class, the officialdom inevitably next substituted itself for the party ranks. And every attempt of Trotsky and the oppositionists to appeal from the machine to the ranks, either of the party or at large, was broken on the rock of the exhaustion and apathy of the masses, and their docility at the hands of an officialdom on whom their livelihoods depended.

The Opposition program suffered from a further incongruity. Trotsky's economic platform called for planning, industrialization, and as he called it, paraphrasing Marx's terminology, "primitive socialist accumulation." In this, he displayed a greater prescience than any of the others, including Lenin. But he seemed to blot out of his consciousness that neither workers nor peasants would surrender voluntarily a large part of their wages or revenues to the state in order to promote national investment. The state could impose its program of forced savings only after it had insulated itself against the inevitable resistance. So it was Stalin, driven by the lash of circumstances, was finally forced to adopt Trotsky's program (although Trotsky opposed his frenzied pace and brutal execution), the political regime grew more oppressive than more benign.

Whatever blindness Trotsky and his associates displayed about the incompatibilities of the several parts of their program, they were acutely aware of the listlessness of the working class and its indifference to the outcome of the struggle among the Communist hierarchies. How then could the Opposition program win out? Trotsky pinned a lot of hope on the spread of revolution to the West. He remained convinced that the worst predicaments stemmed from Russia's isolation and that once revolution revived elsewhere, both democracy and happier economic perspectives would open up for Russia again. Here Trotsky remained a true son of the heroic period of the Russian revolution as well as of the Leninist tradition. It was on this perspective that the Comintern had been set up, and it was this hope which saw the Bolshevik leaders through the darkest days of the civil wars. But the hope remained unrealized in the twenties as
well as in the following decade of his exile. Trotsky's overestimation of the revolutionary potential in the West, like his underestimation of the resiliency and strength of Western capitalism, was part of the common misjudgment of the Comintern. That is why so many of his tactical prescriptions remained simply irrelevant, as were so many of Lenin's solutions designed to beef up the shrunkenanomies of the Western Communist parties. Moreover, while both of them delivered many lectures against the Western parties uncritically copying "Russian methods," they could never free themselves from viewing Western developments through the false prism of the Russian experience.

HOW is it that the Communist parties outside of Russia, which were up against an entirely different set of social challenges, succumbed to bureaucratism and dictatorship even more easily than the Russian party and permitted their subversion into instruments of Russian national policy? Deutscher gives the traditional Trotskyist explanation. The Communist International was built on the concept that the establishment of the world market had made obsolete customary national boundaries and the consequent supra-national character of revolutionary socialism transcended the old national states. Hence, a new world party of revolution was required. This party, if it was to do its work effectively, had to be led by a centralized world leadership to which all national parties and leaderships would be subordinate. Internationalism implied the subordination of parochial national viewpoints to the overriding needs of the entire world movement. "Had revolution won in any of the important European countries, or had at least the Communist parties there grown in strength and confidence, such international leadership and discipline might have become real. But the ebb of revolution in Europe tended to transform the International into an adjunct to the Russian party."

The explanation has validity up to a point, but in the opinion of this reviewer, it is inadequate. The degeneration of the Comintern has deeper roots. Its very foundation-stone—the idea that an international party could be constructed to which national parties would be subordinate, as are the district and local organizations of a national organization—cut across a vast reality and could not help but give rise either to bureaucratic usurpation or an internal blowup of the structure. The organization of national parties follows the geographical and cultural limits of the modern nation with its path prepared by a long history of economic, political, and social integration. The international party tried to jump over the barriers of language, national cultures, national insularities and prejudices, even national conflicts, not to mention customs barriers and police interference, to attempt to realize an international ideal that neither historical conditions nor political consciousness had yet made realizable. Today's mutual state relations between Russia, China, and Yugoslavia show how utopian was the attempt to regulate national policies by means of a supra-national discipline. The most favorable commentary on the Comintern setup that can now be made from hindsight is that if several more parties had grown in self-confidence and stature, and demanded the rights due them, the constitutional structure might have been modified along federalistic lines. As originally conceived and run, the Comintern attempted the impossible. An international body of the kind dreamed of by Lenin and Trotsky may become operative on the other side of the great divide: after socialist states have flowered for a considerable while—not before.

HOW shall we evaluate Trotsky's struggle, which convulsed Russia for several years, and then in the thirties, stirred the conscience of at least a good part of the Left around the world? Was it just a noble but hopeless fight against the tyranny of history? Deutscher's summation constitutes an epitaph that is eloquent as well as just:

He fought against his time not as the Quixote or the Nietzschean Superman does but as the pioneers do—not in the name of the past but in that of the future. To be sure, as we scrutinize the face of any great pioneer we may detect in it a quixotic trait; but the pioneer is not a Quixote or a Utopian. Very few men in history have been in such triumphant harmony with their time as Trotsky was in 1917 and after; and so it was not because of any inherent estrangement from the realities of his generation that he then came into conflict with his time. The precursor's character and temperament led him into it. He had, in 1905, been the forerunner of 1917 and of the Soviets; he had been second to none as the leader of the Soviets in 1917; he had been the prompter of planned economy and industrialization since the early 1920's; and he was to remain the great, thought not unerring harbinger of some future reawakening of the revolutionary peoples (to that political reawakening the urge to transcend Stalism which took hold of the Soviet Union in the years 1953-6 was an important pointer; still faint yet sure). He fought "against history" in the name of history itself; and against its accomplished facts, which all too often were facts of oppression, he held out the better, the liberating accomplishments of which one day it would be capable.

BOOKS

What Will We Do With Capitalism?


WHEN Clarence Randall, at that time chairman of the board of directors of the Inland Steel Company, took on the job of heading President Eisenhower's Commission on Foreign Economic Policy in 1953, one of the first things he did was to go see the late Senator Millikin, powerful chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Millikin plunged with little ceremony into a discussion of free trade and protection: "I know all the stigmata of the free trader. His logic is unanswerable. But what will you do with Colorado? Will you take my state out of the union? I do not propose to preside over the liquidation of the mining industry of the great state of Colorado."

If Randall had any answer, defiant or
placatory, he doesn't record it. We need not draw any devastating conclusions from the incident. Presumably, some way can be and has been found to keep Colorado in the Union. But Mr. Randall, an earnest modern Republican looking for some way to join "the profit motive to the voluntary assumption of social responsibility" never really confronts his problem squarely.

He begins by assuming that in the domestic arena, business has taken on a sense of "social responsibility." What he means by his phrase is that businessmen now acquiesce, however unwilling they were in the past, in the graduated income tax, workmen's compensation, unemployment compensation, and industrial pension plans, and make voluntary contributions of time and money to charity drives and educational institutions without demanding any immediate quid pro quo. And he hopes that in the future, American businessmen will face up to the international scene with an equal eye to their obligations to America, over and above the cash profit impetus.

These are becoming commonplace questions. Mr. Randall does not bring any extraordinary sagacity or depth to their analysis. His book is interesting chiefly because it shows the state of mind of the most advanced and thoughtful type of businessman, who has been lifted out of his incultration and purely balance-sheet concerns by his activities in the foreign-affairs field that have taken him around the world and given him a glimpse of how the other nineteenth live. He acts like a man awakened to a problem, but not yet having gotten anywhere near the nub of it. Right now, he is very much involved in getting economy-minded politicians and tariff-happy businessmen to get their eyes out of the money trough for long enough to see some of the threats to American business abroad. What he has failed to notice is that in the decade which has gone by since he first started serving on government boards and arguing these matters with his colleagues, the issue has shifted profoundly, and has gone far beyond tariffs and foreign aid.

Only at one point does a hint of the full depth of the crisis which the American economy must sooner or later face appear in the book. In discussing the Soviet economic growth, Mr. Randall summarizes briefly the several basic objectives towards which Russian economic policy is directed, mentioning production, science, education, and trade. He concludes the chapter with a virtual confession that he has no answers but rhetoric: the answers "certainly will be found when American businessmen, throughout the length and breadth of our country, confront their minds with the fuller seriousness of this Communist economic offensive, and set themselves, individually and collectively, to the task of winning a glorious victory on this new battleground."

Assume that Mr. Randall converts his friends to his views. He will still have to admit that an outlook of "social responsibility" would not alter the hard figures of income and expenditure by more than a few percent in any given direction. As the head of a powerful corporation, Mr. Randall must have learned that the economy manages him just as much, if not more, than he manages the economy. In a word, how are America's businessmen, even with the best will in the world, to turn an economy to specific purposes when all of its basic premises and its entire structure presuppose the absence of social purposes?

Mr. Randall writes: "To set up a great government trading corporation, for example, which would have power to buy and sell all commodities either produced or needed within our economy, thus bringing ourselves in parallel with Russia, would be to deny completely our heritage. We would change the fabric of our society." He implies a narrowness of outlook in Mr. Millikan, who did "not propose to preside over the liquidation of the mining industry of the great state of Colorado." But things have far outrun Mr. Millikan, and the issue now is the selfish narrowness of the most "advanced" of our businessmen, who do not propose to preside over the liquidation of private trade for private profit. As will become increasingly clear over the coming years, we will be no staying in the race for the American economy if it retains its present anti-social forms.

Banner with a Strange Device


The front jacket blurb tells us the following: "This unusual book explores the personal lives of people who work for great corporations. It begins where The Organization Man left off, vividly reporting the author's experiences. It says to those who yearn for perfect security: 'I've had it, and I gave it up.' And it tells why."

Promising enough. But upon reading, the tale becomes somewhat less sensational. Mr. Harrington is hardly a Clarence Darrow, throwing over the promise of immense riches in the corporate world. Nor is he in the category of Thomas K. Quinn, who as senior vice-president of General Electric was in line for the top job, but quit to use his immense inside knowledge as raw material for a series of books and articles against the giant monopolies. He is a young novelist and journalist who worked for a few years in the public relations office of a large corporation, and has no more inside knowledge than most of the rest of us. What he gave up was a career, but a temporary job between writing stints.

Sometimes, a tale illustrates more than it sets out to show. Mr. Harrington, with a great beating of drums, tells the world that he has given up "perfect security" for the exciting insecurities of real life. I don't want to take the gloss off this heroic deed, but I feel duty bound by the book reviewer's equivalent of the Hippocratic oath to make the facts clear. Mr. Harrington wrote an article for the Nation early in 1958 called "Life in the Crystal Palace." Although the article caused some commotion around his place of employment, the status quo remained. Enter the Fund for the Republic, with a writing fellowship award enabling Mr. Harrington to expand his article into the present book. That does it. Mr. Harrington resigns from the Crystal Palace.

Rebellion on a Foundation Grant: A banner with a strange device, but it seems to be all we have to set alongside the earlier examples of Thor and Sherwood Anderson. In a recent article, Irving Howe satirically reconstructs the plot of Crime and Punishment to show Raskolnikov saved at the crucial point in his slide into bestiality by a foundation grant that resolves both his tensions and financial problems. Another case where life imitates art.

The theme of Mr. Harrington's book is the enervating blandness of corporate life as it is lived today, including the tranquilizing effects of the "perfect security" which the corporation offers its people. I must confess that I find it hard to approach this topic without splitting some personality some day. It is quite true—and Mr. Harrington adds materially to the case—that custard-smooth conformism and spineless lack of initiative are becoming characteristic of some of the middle reaches of American society. It is equally true that for the largest body of our population, the corporation does not yet offer any such exchange of security for loyalty. For the hourly-rated worker, for the assembly line hands, for the bulk of the office forces, the bane of existence remains the inability to buy security at any price. Although Mr. Harrington's theme is a true, if unoriginal, one, it is still far from a dominant one in our society, although the range of vision of most writers is such that it tends to embrace those portions of our population in which this problem is most acute.

The trouble with Mr. Harrington's book, aside from this, is that he writes from very slight knowledge and fund of experience. Unlike William F. Whyte, who in The Organization Man put a large body of fact and analytic thought at the service of the same theme, Mr. Harrington has tried to parlay a few years as a cog in the machine into a blueprint of the whole plant. As a Nation article, it went over, but there isn't enough here for a book. He does have a number of telling anecdotes, and pathetic portraits of associates in the Crystal Palace, as he calls the lavish structure housing his former employment. But an unfortunate note of disgruntlement creeps in here and there; the tone of the brash young man who doesn't feel his talents were properly appreciated by the business world. Nothing can do more harm to a rebel's case than the slightest hint of sour grapes. All in all, Mr. Harrington is not our strongest candidate for the role of Patrick Henry, and his book will shake few citadels.

H. B.
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC

A COMMUNICATION from a new magazine Movimento Socialista, published in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, informs us that the editor likes this periodical and would like permission to reprint some of our articles from time to time—which we readily granted. Our correspondent makes the telling point that for Latin Americans, a knowledge of United States affairs has become more and more important, and that socialists below the Rio Grande are well advised to find a means of collaboration with socialists here—a point of view which we share completely.

In the same vein, readers will find a communication from Australia on the Letters page of this issue, telling us of reprints of our articles made there. A number of socialist periodicals around the globe have made use of materials from this magazine, as we have made use of articles that have seemed to us particularly important from foreign periodicals.

Our readers will be happy to know that we have enthusiastic subscribers in quite a few foreign countries. Most of them are concentrated in Great Britain, Japan, India, Italy, and, of course, Canada, but there is a scattering all around the globe. Naturally, we are glad to have this kind of circulation, but, just as naturally, our heart still belongs to Uncle Sam, and we are most interested in new subscribers in this country.

Now that the summer is well over, and we are all back at our regular routines, it would be helpful for regular readers to cast about and see if they have some means whereby they can help increase our circulation, and can bring this magazine to others who might also like it. All the methods we have mentioned in this space are in order: lists to which we might mail sample copies; newsstands that might handle the magazine; library subscriptions, and so forth.

BUT of course there is no method better than the old faithful: selling a few subscriptions to friends. From the time we began publication, this has been the single best means of maintaining and expanding circulation. Our introductory offer of six issues for one dollar still holds. You may find it better to start a friend off with a gift subscription. But whatever way you go about it, get one or two of your friends to start reading "American Socialist" right away. We won't bore you with statistics as to how fast our circulation would increase if every reader did that—and we all know it never works out that way. But we will remind you that with your cooperation, socialist ideas can get a vital and much-needed boost. See what you can do, now.

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