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Manager's Column

Due to various and unforeseen technical difficulties Fourth International has been delayed in appearance. Readers of the magazine will have their subscriptions extended to include all issues covered by their subscriptions. Editors of Fourth International are busy now in the effort to make up for the time lost and the next two issues of the magazine, we hope, will appear at shorter intervals. We would like also to thank the readers for the patience and consideration they have shown.

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Just a few words to catch up on reader's reactions on previous issues:

C. R. H. of Minneapolis wrote in a letter enclosing $5 for the renewal of his subscription: "The article by Harry Frankel, 'Capitalism and Democracy' is worth the price of a year's subscription alone. Of course, all the material in the magazine is good but that article is, in my opinion, exceptional. I read it very carefully and intend to read it very carefully from time to time in the future."

Mrs. R. D. of Detroit found that "the article covering the NYU lecture by Clarke was excellent (in the debate with three professors) was excellent... I was really pleased with it."

"We have been reading Fourth International for several years now," say C. and G. P. of Lloydminster, Alberta, "and have found no other paper that can compare with it as an education in Marxism and Marxist analysis. As far as we are concerned, we like the paper just as it is. However, it must be simplified to some extent to reach a broader mass of readers, the end result being an overwhelming increase in the number of Marxists in this country — so much the better."

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Revolutionary Tide Reaches USSR

An Appraisal of Changes Since Stalin’s Death

The following article is translated from Quatrieme Internationale, a periodical published in Paris.

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Rapidly moving events since Stalin’s death already clearly demonstrate how the dynamism of the contemporary revolutionary period which was initiated by World War II overthrows all previous equilibrium and irresistibly carries world socialist revolution to higher stages.

This basically revolutionary and progressive process is neither simple nor direct. It includes detours, a complicated structure, contradictory elements. Concrete analysis of the world situation is required at each step as well as a great capacity for comprehension and of constant re-adaptation on the part of the revolutionary Marxist leadership of the international workers’ movement.

The sudden death of Stalin occurred in a period characterized by the threat of economic crisis in the capitalist world, the speeding up of the imperialist war plans, and especially those of American imperialism, against Korea, China, Vietnam and the Asian colonial revolution in general. It occurred in a period when there were already some indications of the new revolutionary upsurge in the USSR which we had been able to deduce indirectly from the work and the results of the 19th Congress of the CP of the USSR held last October.

The disappearance of the Bonaparte par excellence of the Soviet bureaucracy in the midst of this kind of external and internal situation made it possible for us to predict that a new stage was now being ushered in for the USSR and Stalinism; that there would be no successor to Stalin who could fulfill his role with the same authority and the same results; that from this point of view, his loss would be an irreparable one for the Soviet bureaucracy and would have deepgoing effects on its position.

Seek to Appease Masses

The cascade of measures taken since that time already go, in importance, far beyond all the predictions made along these lines. They reveal the enormous discontent of the Soviet masses which confronted the new group of leaders, and which was at once catalyzed by the disappearance of the man who was the incarnation of the police and bureaucratic regime foisted on the USSR in place of the proletarian democracy established by October Revolution and Lenin.

The terms “panic” and “disarray” appearing in the first communiqué announcing Stalin’s death to the Soviet masses now assume a more precise meaning. The new Soviet leaders were in the best position to know the real aspirations and feelings of the Soviet masses. They knew that there was widespread discontent in the USSR, that there was a profound desire on the part of the broadest masses, arising from the tremendous economic and cultural progress, for a liberalization of the regime, for a lessening of intolerable police pressure, for the rebirth of Soviet democracy from its ashes.

These leaders were aware of the real state of affairs in the USSR as far back as the 19th Congress of the CP of the USSR and wanted somehow to get a better grip on the situation. But when Stalin passed away, his successors were suddenly overcome with the feeling that unless they speedily undertook drastic reforms and concessions they faced the danger of being rapidly overwhelmed by discontented masses, who had been encouraged and stimulated by the passing of the man who was the personal embodiment of the oppressive regime.

Hence the series of measures which are undeniably of major significance for the future of the Soviet Union, the Soviet bureaucracy and Stalinism: the amnesty decree which covers a large number of concentration camp prisoners; the promise to revamp the penal code now in force in the USSR; the new and significant reduction in prices, from five to 50%, the sixth such reduction since 1947; the sensational reversal of the proceedings against the doctors who were exonerated and, for the first time in the history of Stalinism, the fraudulent, criminal and “inadmissible” methods employed by the police and the judiciary were denounced, as was racial discrimination; the arrest of high police officials; the disgrace of S. Ignatiev, one of the five recently selected secretaries of the Central Committee of the CP of the USSR who was relieved of his functions in the state and the party; the new attitude regarding foreign policy; and lastly the tendency to soft-pedal the leader-cult.

This is a conspicuous attempt of the new leaders to provide their regime with a far broader popular base and to indirectly create the impression that a new era, breaking with the ways and methods of the Stalinist era, is now
unfolding in the USSR. That they find themselves obliged to act this way at peril of raising more than doubts on all previous trials, on all the “confessions,” on all of Stalin’s crimes in the USSR and in the “Peoples’ Democracies” and of lending a powerful impulse to the democratic strivings of the Soviet masses—all this demonstrates the existence of a pressure from the Soviet masses of unsuspected force.

**Big Repercussions Forseen**

This tremendous pressure is the combined result of the steady cultural and economic progress of the USSR and of the international upsurge of the revolution which is now erupting in the USSR itself and merging with the revolutionary forces of the country. The concessions the new leaders of the USSR are now obliged to give fit into the framework of the rising world revolution. They are only a beginning, and they cannot but be only a beginning. The leading bureaucrats will attempt to restrict them, to annul them and even to go backward. But the entire international and internal situation of the USSR, to which has been added the important factor of Stalin’s demise, works in the opposite direction.

The repercussions of the events in the USSR on the satellite countries, on China and on the Communist Parties will be incontestably great and revolutionary. Everywhere they will strengthen the tendencies to independence from the Kremlin as compared with the rigid control to which they were previously subjected, and it will strengthen the differentiations and the possibilities of criticism at the expense of monolithism. Greater attention than ever should be paid to what will happen in the coming months to the countries, parties and movements now under Stalinist influence.

The new attitude adopted by the Soviet as well as by the Chinese leaders in foreign policy is in part at least determined by the developments now transpiring in the USSR. The concessions made to the UN on Korea and the conciliatory attitude guarding against, giving imperialism further formal pretexts for imperialist aggression are not without connection with the delicate situation in which the Soviet leaders have been placed in relation to their own masses. They will attempt to attenuate the pressure of imperialism simultaneously with making important concessions to the Soviet masses.

**Concessions No Sign of Weakness**

But it would be no less erroneous to conclude that the USSR is making concessions to imperialism out of weakness or that we are on the eve of a general and lasting compromise between the two. In the first place, the concessions which the Soviet and Chinese diplomats have made up to now have more of a formal than essential character, and their overall effect on their adversary is more offensive than defensive in character. For the present they act to disorganize imperialist plans for attack, and particularly those of American imperialism, widen inter-imperialist differences and hasten the outbreak of the gathering economic crisis. It suffices to note the embarrassment of the imperialists, especially of American imperialism, after the concession the Chinese and Soviet diplomats made on the prisoner-of-war issue as well as the cave-in on the stock exchanges of the imperialist capitals in New York, London, Tokyo, to get a real appreciation of the impact of this diplomatic offensive.

The offensive got under way at the very moment that American imperialism was again on the point of going into action in Korea, of intervening in Vietnam and of acting directly or indirectly in China itself. The last obstacles to the ratification of the Paris Treaty and re-militarization of Germany were on the point of being overcome in Europe. All this is once again now partly called into question and the imperialist powers are being obliged to re-adjust their immediate plans to cope both with the “peace offensive” and the danger of being thrust into economic crisis.

**Limited Scope of Agreement**

While they attempt to save face before their peoples by not rejecting the Kremlin’s conciliatory offers out of hand, they remain determined not to “unfreeze” the cold war climate, to maintain the level of armaments and to speed the ratification of the Paris agreements. This tendency of imperialist policy is determined by the basic needs of the capitalist system which has been shorn of a large part of its former markets, its economy already essentially pivoted to war and being threatened with a new economic crisis.

A general and lasting compromise between imperialism and the USSR allied to the other anti-capitalist countries would require the Kremlin to be in a position to make substantial and not just formal concessions which would re-open the markets that have been wrested from imperialism since the last war. In addition, it would require a re-adjustment by imperialism to as “peaceful” a policy of economic expansion as possible without precipitating the major economic crisis with which it is now threatened in the event there is a serious curtailment in armaments expenditures.

Despite all its desires, the Kremlin cannot offer either of these.

Even relatively minor concessions like the surrender of the Vietnam or Malayan revolution do not depend on a mere gesture from the Kremlin. The masses in these countries, as in all the colonial and semi-colonial countries are deeply involved on their own account in the anti-imperialist struggle, and no power is capable of stopping the revolution now in progress. Hence the intrinsic fragility of any compromise with the Kremlin and the almost inevitable trend of imperialism to war barring the possibility that the evolution of the relationship of international forces becomes so unfavorable to imperialism as to paralyze it completely and to force it to surrender without giving major combat.

**Prospects for War**

This eventuality is improbable in practice and cannot be responsibly accepted by revolutionary Marxists as the basis for a political orientation for the revolutionary Marxist vanguard. On the contrary, it must be understood,
Stalin’s Role -- Stalinism’s Future

By GEORGE CLARKE

No man ever more accurately expressed the utter bewilderment of bourgeois thought on the Soviet Union than Winston Churchill when he said that “it (Russia) is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Never was it more apparent that this mystery would remain forever unravelled than at the time of Stalin’s death. On the contrary, his death seemed to shroud the thinking of our most eminent — and “practical” — statesmen in a new cloud of illusions. With an amazing alacrity, John Foster Dulles leaped straight into the occult. The age of Stalin has ended, he proclaimed, the era of Eisenhower begun.

There was no enigma, however, in Dulles’ statement. It came straight from the Propaganda Ministry (Time-Life-Fortune) of the House of Morgan. If the “American Century” had fared badly since the end of the war, its advent was now assured with the passing of “that man.” For Dulles, obviously, the Soviet Union and socialism had no separate existence apart from Stalin and the bureaucratic dictatorship. Logically, the end of the one was the end of the other. To him, the great economic achievements arising from the planned economy and making the Soviet Union the second industrial power in the world were realized solely by sheer force directed against an unwilling people. Similarly, the bonds that link the Soviet Union to China, to Eastern Europe, to colonial revolt in Southeast Asia, to the mass Communist parties of France and Italy are also maintained by sheer coercion. So now with the passing of the “great tyrannical unifier,” the new world of 800,000,000 peoples would fall apart: Mao Tse-tung would take the road to a “Titoite” purgatory; the countries of Eastern Europe would snap the chains; and the Soviet peoples would probably revolt.

Let no one think that the above was merely an outburst of spontaneous rhetoric on the part of the Secretary of State. That is really how they think in Washington. It took only a few weeks for Dulles’ rhetoric to become official state policy. Eisenhower opened his hapless “peace offensive” by instructing the new Soviet rulers that they were now in a position to do what Stalin had been unwilling or unable to do: to get out of Eastern Europe and Asia; to stop the flow of colonial revolt as though it were controlled by a faucet from Moscow, to permit the unification of Germany as part of the anti-Soviet military alliance. That’s all. After that there would be peace.

Nevertheless there appears to have been a sneaking suspicion in the imperialist headquarters that what they call “the Soviet Empire” might not crumble to ruins very quickly. There was a thinly concealed frustration that they were in no position to hasten the process by an immediate military assault and so exploit any weakness or confusion occasioned by the change of rule in the Soviet Union. Eisenhower’s “peace offensive” is obviously intended to do in part by diplomacy what cannot yet be attempted by more persuasive methods. It is easy to predict that this diplomatic stroke, which has no precise objectives, asks everything and gives nothing, will soon come to grief. Fundamentally, it is based on a historically and socially false premise. It is based on the totally false conception that Stalin like other dictators in the past was the keystone of the Soviet regime, which thus could not long survive his death.

Cromwell, Napoleon and Stalin

The Cromwellian regime, for example, lasted some six months after his death in September 1658, and the following year the Stuart Charles II returned to power. Napoleon’s empire fell apart and turned against him after his defeat at Waterloo following a 14-year reign. The Bourbons returned to power in France. Reaction under the Holy Alliance triumphed in Europe. It takes no daring to predict that neither development will occur now after Stalin’s death. The regime will not crack up in six months, or in many times six months. If an attempt is made to crush the regime in war, it will spell the doom of the capitalist not the socialist world.

This is not because Stalin was a greater figure than Cromwell or Napoleon, or even comparable for his conscious efforts and works on a historical scale. Precisely herein is demonstrated the superiority of Marxist thought...
over all other. Great men may influence the course of history, but its main direction is determined by material (and class) forces beyond and more powerful than any individual, no matter how great. The social system which Stalin ruled will outlast him because it is far more powerful socially and economically than those dominated by Cromwell or Napoleon, and that is decisive regardless of the striking fact of genius on the one side and mediocrity on the other. Its enemies are far weaker materially and in a historical sense than those which beset the erstwhile rulers of England and France. The new bourgeois property forms were still in the infancy of development under Cromwell's anti-feudal regime, and were not too much further advanced under Napoleon, and particularly in the Europe conquered by him. In contrast, the socialist-type economic system of the Soviet Union now overshadows in strength and scope those of all other capitalist nations save the United States.

But the greatest reason for the durability of the Soviet regime is a political one, and it is this that extends its life span far beyond the mortality of any ruler. Regardless of political oppression, the rigors of an iron dictatorship, of poverty and burdensome toil, the Soviet regime rests upon new socialist property forms which have entered the consciousness of the masses not as a repetition of old exploitation in new forms, not as a change from feudal lords to capitalist profit-seekers, but as the road to the future, to the end of all exploitation of man by man. Not all the privileges and plundering of the bureaucracy has been able to undermine this historically justified idea. On the contrary, it is this idea which, with the growing cultural and material strength of the Soviet Union, is more and more undermining the basis for the existence of the bureaucracy.

The death of Stalin presages not the twilight and doom of socialism, but the beginning of the end of Stalinism. This forecast will occasion little joy in capitalist circles. For if the system that is evolving toward socialism is now strong enough to begin to correct its internal distortions, then it derives its strength for reform and change not merely internally but primarily from the irresistible power of the revolutionary proletarian and colonial movements in the capitalist world itself. It is in this sense — which we shall develop later — that the death of Stalin is an evil omen for world capitalism.

Three Decades — and Not a Tear

For those who understand the Marxist method and are able to grasp the real essence of the relationship between the Soviet system and the usurping bureaucracy and of the transitory character of this ruling caste, Stalin's role is no enigma. It was explained by Trotsky many years ago. Now in the few short weeks after his death, this analysis has been receiving an amazingly rapid confirmation.

Stalin's rule lasted longer than that of any other single figure in our time — an entire epoch. No other figure remained so long, so constantly in the public eye as he. It was said of Franklin Roosevelt that a generation had grown up not knowing there had ever been another President. But of Stalin, it could perhaps be said that two generations had never known another ruler, another leader of Russia. Lenin's regime lasted but seven years; Stalin's almost three decades. Yet the events following closely upon his death already indicate that never is so prominent an individual being more quickly forgotten. It is as though his memory were an evil thing to be conjured up in anger and hatred of monstrous, untold crimes, for cynically, wantonly inflicting endless suffering and death.

The funeral orations of the triumvirs who fell heir to the bureaucratic rule already spoke volumes on this score. They were far, far from that deeply felt eulogy that is so naturally accorded those who have rendered great services to humanity, who have illuminated the path of progress to be travelled. Malenkov, Beria, Molotov droned on in the same ritualistic way at Stalin's bier, making the same — and perhaps the last — obeisance to him they had made so often during his lifetime. Their dull, grey style, forcibly stamped on Soviet thought and speech by Stalin himself to maintain his pre-eminence, gave the nightmarish feeling that the deceased ruler was making his last pronouncement through the tongues of three living shadows. There was not a tear in their remarks, not an inspired word, not a cry of pain or anguish, not even a tone of regret — discernible only was fear of their own uncertain future. Nobody swore to Stalin as Stalin had sworn to Lenin when at his grave in 1924 he chanted in an almost medieval litany that he would be true, he would carry on . . . Everybody expected, demanded that Lenin's heirs continue his work. Nobody, to a certain extent not even the bureaucracy itself, wanted that of Stalin's successors. Their speeches seemed an apology for their long association with the deceased. Beria's reference to Malenkov's close links to Stalin had almost the sound of a slur.

On the other side of the world, Mao Tse-tung, in paying his last respects to the deparred dictator, bowed in somewhat mock deference to the men who had assumed the title but seemed to be taunting them with Stalin. He seemed to be saying: I had to pay a certain price to him, to make a certain obeisance because he wielded so much power, held the reins so firmly. But which of you is his heir? I rendered to Caesar, that which was Caesar's. But now Caesar has no successor. Malenkov is official but he is not Stalin.

The Achievements and the Man

Closer to home, the Monthly Review, which has difficulty in distinguishing between criticism of the bureaucratic regime and attacks on the Soviet system, found itself obliged to memorialize Stalin with an apology. "One can argue," says an editorial (April 1953), "that Stalin's methods were unnecessarily harsh and ruthless . . . But "it is extremely difficult to believe that any of the other candidates for Lenin's position (Trotsky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin) could have succeeded as Stalin did." Stalin himself also found this "difficult to believe" and that explains perhaps why he resolved the question by slander and frame-up, by murdering all "the other candidates" and many others. Nevertheless, says Monthly Review, "whatever one may think of his methods, one cannot deny him his achievements." This of course is the heart of the apology; the nub of the question.

Stalin's name is associated with the greatest social
achievements of our age: with the lifting of Russia, by the methods of socialist planning, from ancient backwardness to a foremost modern, industrial society; with the extension of the foundations of the socialist society to one-third of the world. Were these really his achievements, Stalin, despite all his ruthlessness and brutality, would enter history as one of the world's great immortals, as great or greater than Marx, Engels or Lenin, for what they projected in theory, or took merely the first step in practice, he would have carried out on a vast arena, solving hitherto unforeseen problems, overcoming titanic difficulties. In fact, were it the case, the four names would be indissociable, the fame of Marx, Engels, Lenin proved and vindicated by the works of Stalin.

This, to be sure, is one of the most complicated questions in modern history — perhaps in all history. How can the achievements of a regime be divorced from the man who held its reins? Or contrariwise, can these achievements be attributed to the very man whose entire life-work was carried on by "harsh and ruthless" methods in mortal antagonism to the very forces who consciously strove for these achievements and in the end made them possible?

A riot of conflicting answers arises from the quest to compress an unmanageable reality into convenient, simple formulas: 1. Stalin was the architect of industrialization, of the victory and spread of the revolution. 2. Stalin had nothing whatever to do with them. 3. The methods were bad, therefore the achievements are bad — they do not exist. 4. The methods were necessary, the results are good, therefore they are justified. The answers are like those given by the blind men about the elephant when they each touched it in a different part. The role of Stalin is only to be discovered by discarding the methods of the blind men of formal logic and empiric thought for the application of the Marxist dialectic of historical materialism to the concreteness of Russian conditions which gave rise to the phenomenon of Stalinism.

Strength and Weakness of Russia's Workers

The Russian working class, small numerically amidst a vast agricultural population living under conditions of semi-feudalism, but strong because of the concentrated organization of Russian industry and because of its socialist consciousness, proved powerful enough to overthrow a weak capitalism whose fate was tied to a rotting Czarist Empire. But the great revolutionary action of October 1917 did not immediately or automatically overcome the backwardness and poverty of Russia. Powerful enough to eliminate the fundamental social causes which produced this backwardness, the proletariat was still too weak to overcome the consequences of this backwardness which were bound to remain until a new economic structure could be created on a Russian and world scale. It could overthrow Kerensky, defeat Wrangel and Kolchak, hurl back the intervention of the imperialists, but by itself, without the aid of the more advanced working class of western Europe, it was too weak to prevent the rise of the most characteristic phenomenon of backwardness — the rule of bureaucratic overlords, headed by Stalin, on the back of the revolution. If Lenin reflected the strength and greatness of the Russian proletariat, then Stalin was the product of its weakness and of a society weighed down with the inheritance of an almost medieval past.

But the question does not end there. If it did, the Mensheviks who had predicted dire consequences if Russia dared to skip over the stage of capitalism, would today be an important current in the workers' movement instead of dopessters and scribblers whose knowledge of Russian permits them to furnish useful bits of information to the press and State Department. Stalin throttled the revolutionary wing of the Russian working class when he smashed the Left Opposition in the Twenties. With that defeat the proletariat as a whole was removed by a bureaucracy as the conscious, guiding force of the revolution and from all direct participation in the state and the economy. But the peculiarity of this development lies in the fact that the victory of reaction was not accompanied by a restoration of capitalism, that the revolution survived this terrible defeat. It not only survived but it even succeeded in making its agent in a distorted and unexpected way the very engine of the triumphant reaction, Stalin himself. And precisely therein is the key to the enigma of Stalin and Stalinism illuminated and demonstrated again and again by the main chapters of the post-Lenin period of the Russian Revolution.

The Bureaucrats' Alliance With the Peasantry

The bureaucracy could not simply usurp the state power after Lenin's death, nor could it find sufficient support for this coup d'état among the Russian workers, most of whom stood aghast at its path in revolutionary hostility. It had to turn for aid to that class which had been the chief beneficiary of the democratic phase of the Russian Revolution, and which, as a capitalist formation, ran the risk of being the chief loser in its socialist phase. Lenin and Trotsky were deeply conscious that the Russian peasantry, like the peasantry in all previous revolutions, could very likely turn against their own revolution and become the tool of the new reaction. For that reason they constantly reiterated that the fate of the Russian Revolution depended on the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry — and upon a struggle of the poor elements within the peasantry against its more capitalist sections. But they did not envisage the alliance of anti-revolutionary bureaucracy with the peasants, and particularly with its richer members. Stalin's alliance with Bukharin and Rykov was in its own indirect way the political consummation of that alliance. Within a few years the social force of this alliance proved powerful enough not only to overwhelm the revolutionary sections of the proletariat but to bring the peasantry to the very threshold of power. In 1928-29, the Soviet Union stood on the brink of capitalist restoration.

It was then that the revolution re-asserted itself, forcing Stalin to turn on his former allies, to make war on the very class that had brought him to power, to appeal to the proletariat for its aid in saving the revolution and to borrow bag and baggage from the program of the revolutionary representatives of the proletariat, the Left Opposition, whom he had just liquidated in the factional civil war in the party. The revolution turned to the left again. True
there was a coincidence of interest between a section of the bureaucracy (which stood to lose all by a defeat of the revolution) and of the Russian working class. But more important was what the events indicated of the power of the revolution: it was not the peasantry which triumphed over the bureaucracy but the proletariat which imposed its historic interests on this bureaucracy, even after its most legitimate representatives had been crushed and defeated.

Superiority Over French Revolution

In this decisive crisis was revealed the immense superiority, historically and socially, of the Russian proletarian revolution over the French bourgeois revolution of the 18th century. After the destruction of the plebeian base of Jacobin power by Robespierre, which opened the gates to the Thermidorean reaction, the French revolution never again moved left. The Thermidor was followed by the Napoleonic Empire which in turn was supplanted by a new rule of the Bourbons, ruling this time to be sure for the bourgeoisie and not for the shattered feudal nobility. The bourgeoisie, through the Thermidor, had definitively triumphed over all the plebeian forces — it no longer needed the revolution.

But the Thermidorean forces of the Russian Revolution, the Stalinist bureaucracy, were compelled in the interests of self-preservation to again arouse the plebeians of the 20th century, i.e., the disciplined, cohesive and socialist-conscious proletariat. It was the working class which was summoned to carry the major brunt of toil and sacrifice in the execution of the Five Year Plans; it was the most hardy and courageous elements of this class which poured into the countryside to implement the vast project of collectivization of agriculture.

The Bureaucracy's Stolen Privileges

Now having destroyed the peasant base, on which the Bonapartist regime in the Kremlin balanced itself against the working class, the bureaucracy sought once again to achieve its independence from the class it could neither live with nor without. Once again it struck at the proletariat in the monster purges of the Thirties. In the process, there was created a kind of aristocracy of labor and a managerial and governmental caste enjoying exceptional privileges and a living standard incomparably higher than that of the masses. The caste had gained a certain stability, but it was a transient, crisis-ridden stability.

The new privileges, considerable as they were, could not be converted into property in land or the means of production; they could not be converted into capital, the prime source of wealth and power for a ruling class in the modern world. On the contrary, these privileges derived from a system of property relations, nationalized in form, socialist in essence and inexorably striving toward a greater egalitarianism, from a system, in short, that was the antithesis of the stolen privileges of the ruling caste. In fact, the bureaucracy, except for a few brazen indiscretions from time to time, has sought to conceal its favored position. To this day there are no statistics in the Soviet Union on comparative incomes. Unlike the nouveaux riches of the capitalist world, it dare not indulge in conspicuous waste; it must ever lie about its real situation, it must constantly explain that the inequalities are merely a phase of the transitional epoch, with the inevitable citations from Marx and Lenin.

The Balance Sheet: Promise and Fulfillment

We can now better assess Stalin's role and place in the post-revolution era. We are led unerringly to one conclusion: despite his physical association with the great works of the revolution, he must go down in history as a usurper, a hangman, hated and despised:

1. Stalin came to power promising an end to the rigors of civil war that marked the Lenin-Trotsky era, promising a slowing down of the revolution, the most gradual transition to socialism (which would be built "at a snail's pace") and the harmonious collaboration of all classes with exceptional favors to the peasantry (this was the meaning of the endless refrain in the early days that Trotsky was "underestimating the peasantry").

Within four-five years, Stalin turned into the direct opposite, converting the Soviet Union into a vast battlefield of civil war for the collectivization of agriculture. More lives were lost in its panic than bureaucratic execution (of a correct program) through violence, economic dislocation, famine than in all the earlier years of revolution, counter-revolution, civil war against the White Guards and against foreign intervention. Thus Stalin's role in the monumental transformation of Russia, agriculturally and industrially, is characterized first by the betrayal of the promise on which he rose to power and second, for its barbarousness and total callousness for human life.

2. To create the socialist economic foundations that would save the regime from capitalist restoration, Stalin turned to the proletariat demanding tremendous sacrifices from it for industrial construction which were made with the greatest heroism, devotion and self-abnegation. Again Stalin had borrowed from Trotsky's program of "permanent revolution" but again it was applied in panic entailing the most frightful waste, incompetence and the consequent unnecessary suffering on the part of the people.

In the end, however, the proletariat discovered that the sacrifices had not been equally made by all sections of Soviet society, that a bureaucracy was battenning off the new wealth created by economic growth, and finally that it had been shorn of all means of self-defense against the arbitrary power, the arrogance of this uncontrolled bureaucracy.

3. Stalin rose to power promising peace to a war-weary, revolution-weary Russian people. There would be "socialism" for them in "one country," there would be an end to Trotsky's "world revolution adventurism." This was all to be achieved by avoiding any revolutionary clashes with capitalism by making a state policy of international collaboration or "cohabitation" with world capitalism.

In the interim between the two wars, he succeeded in averting, damming up and even contributing to the suppression of the revolutionary clashes with capitalism on a national scale (in Germany, France, Spain). But he could not avoid the most fatal of all the clashes, that which involved the Soviet Union itself on an international scale in...
World War II, and which was made possible in part by Stalin's "peace" policy itself. Far from the bringing of an era of durable "peace" and indefinite cohabitation of the two systems, as Stalin again promised, the war gave new and unprecedented impetus to the revolutionary encounters of proletarians and colonial peoples on two continents, and then once again came the ever impending danger of a far bigger conflict with world imperialism on a global scale.

In brief:

The "peasants' friend" became its most hated foe.
The "builder of socialism" became the defender of the new privilege.
The "man of peace" without revolutions became the man of war surrounded by revolutions he didn't want and tried to prevent. The last years of his life were marked not by "cohabitation" but by Cold War.

The Most Consummate Opportunist

Stalin cannot receive credit for being forced to do the very opposite of what he intended and promised. He can only earn eternal ignominy for using barbaric methods directly at variance with the aims to be achieved, and used for privilege-seeking, power-seeking purposes. He goes down in history as the most consummate, ruthless opportunist of all times. All suffered from this opportunism — the left and the right, the peasantry and the proletariat, various sections of the bureaucracy itself at different times, important battalions of the world proletariat. Stalin's role was fundamentally a barrier to the progress of the Russian Revolution in the post-Lenin era. Its achievements are consequently a victory over his opportunism — it was not he who led the revolution, but the revolution which impressed him unwillingly into its service, at tremendous cost to itself. The honor for the achievements will one day be accorded to the men Stalin liquidated because it was their program, their prescence which made these achievements possible.

Stalinism — Doctrine of Reactionary Epoch

The death of Stalin prefigures the end of Stalinism. This applies uniquely to the Georgian tyrant and not at all to the great revolutionary figures to whose succession he forcibly, falsely laid claim and which he forced an entire state and people to recognize. Marxism did not die with Marx; nor Leninism with Lenin, nor Trotskyism with Trotsky. In their cases, the mortal man was only the physical frame for immortal doctrine and works. But if the ideas of these towering figures became more powerful, more acceptable after their death it is because their genius consisted in being able to divine the future through analysing the past and understanding the present. They were, so to speak, ahead of their times, which means they were in tune with human progress.

Stalinism, on the other hand, was already dying before the demise of its foremost spokesman. That was because it was not a doctrine, not a system of ideas, not a universal world-outlook, above all, not a science. If the world philosophy can be sufficiently distorted, Stalinism might be called a philosophy of conservatism and defeatism. Like Stalin himself, it was the product of a specific epoch, the rationalization of a temporary phenomenon, the making of a virtue out of necessity. Far from foreseeing the future, it tried to enclose the past into the present, and to perpetuate the present into the future. It was out of tune with human progress, standpat, regressive, reactionary.

Defeats, the backwardness of Russia, its isolation and encirclement by a still powerful capitalist world brought Stalinism into being. It gradually came to the conclusion, then made it a state doctrine, that the victory of the socialist revolution was impossible anywhere else in the world. Any attempt at revolution, they believed and decreed, would lead only to defeat and then to war against the Soviet Union. The duty of the Communist parties was therefore restricted to placating or pressuring their bourgeoisie, and to wait — to wait until after socialism was completely built in the USSR, to wait until the end of that historic period when socialism would prove so attractive, so superior a system that capitalism would fall of its own weight. But since the USSR was encircled by mortal enemies, endangered all the time, there had to be an iron discipline in the country, there had to be a bureaucracy for this function, to protect and supervise the masses and thus to shepherd them into socialism (and naturally, it expected to be properly rewarded).

That was the epoch of crushing defeats from China to Spain. It was crowned with the triumph of Hitler and the Nazi conquest of Europe. It was the epoch when the Soviet Union was stained with the blood of revolutionists as the night of Stalinist terror descended over the bureaucrats' Socialism in One Country. That epoch lasting almost twenty years came to an end with World War II.

The War Changes Everything

Surprised by the war, and particularly by the attack of his erstwhile ally, Adolf Hitler, Stalin wanted no more than the defeat of Germany and Japan — these were his total war-aims, all McCarthyite raving to the contrary notwithstanding — and the resumption of the pre-war collaboration with "peace-loving," "democratic" capitalism. The goal was attained, but it proved more than Stalin had bargained for.

The defeat of the two main bastions of reaction in Europe and Asia, the exhaustion of British and French capitalism, the disruption of their colonial systems opened the floodgates to the greatest revolutionary torrent in history. It passed through the very channels the Kremlin had so laboriously, so villainously constructed to divert the tide — that is, through Communist parties themselves. The Kremlin denounced, exhorited, pleaded, sabotaged, made secret deals with the enemies of the revolution, but there was no damming the tide; it came on irresistibly. The contrast with the pre-war epoch is overwhelming.

In 1924, shortly after Stalin's ascent to power, there was a revolutionary crisis in Germany induced by the effects of the Kaiser's defeat in World War I, the depredations of the victorious Versailles powers, by raging inflation, by economic stagnation. At this juncture, Stalin sent a discouraging communication to the young, inexperienced German Communist Party seeking to dissuade it from
bold, revolutionary action. Such, he admonished, could only lead to defeat, and, in any case, the Russians were too weak to come to their aid if their successful action should be subject to military intervention from the imperialist states. The effects of the letter were to create confusion, uneasiness and restraint in a situation where clarity and audacity were prerequisites. The opportunity was missed— and eventually became one of the causes that paved the way for Hitler.

Twenty years later, in an interview in Moscow, Stalin gave the same type of advice to Tito whose partisan forces were fighting a civil war in Yugoslavia. A year or two later, and then again in 1948 he gave the Chinese Commu-nists the benefit of the same wisdom. (The pertinent facts of these incidents have now been made public by Tito. They are quoted elsewhere in this issue in a review of Vladimir Dedijer’s biography of the Yugoslav leader.)

The Yugoslavs listened intently to Stalin’s advice, and the Chinese even agreed. Then they went back home and... did the opposite — led their armed forces in victorious struggle against reactionary enemies and conquered state power.

In the interim there developed another unexpected turn of events, particularly for Stalin, in Eastern Europe. He began, at the termination of the Second World War, by attempting to maintain the entire area as a military buffer zone of friendly states, occupied or protected by Soviet troops; and also as an area that could be utilized for political bargaining and commercial transactions with western capitalism. He was obliged, only a few years later, to reverse this policy completely and thus to uproot capitalism root and branch in one-third of Europe. Next to the Chinese Revolution, the creation of these new, deformed workers’ states became a chief cause of imperialist preparations for World War III, which Stalin’s entire anti-revolutionary policy had sought to avert.

China Shakes the World and. . . Stalinism

Sic transit gloria mundi! Thus ended two myths — as unquestionable for two decades as Papal Bulls!

1. Stalin’s infallibility: If communists fought for power, they couldn’t win, among other reasons because he wouldn’t help them, and certainly because he’d help them lose. He tried to help them lose in Yugoslavia and China but they fought anyway, and won.

2. Socialism in One Country: This was the theory that there could not and should not be revolutions anywhere else in the world until the USSR had entered the realm of communism; and that therefore the working class and colonial peoples of the world were merely accessories to the Kremlin.

Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe called the theory into question.

China! China shook the world, and put an end to the theory forever. Without Stalin’s help, agains this advice, despite his sabotage and secret deals with Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Tse-tung overthrew capitalist rule over one-fifth of the world’s population, undermining imperialism beyond repair.

When Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty in 1950 binding him to the defense of the Chinese Revolution against any attack — the first time he had ever agreed to defend anything but the Soviet Union and the bureaucracy — he officially signed the death warrant of his most precious theory. Not only was another revolution given equal footing with that in the Soviet Union, but added to the theory either as a secret clause or a separate understanding was the agreement that henceforth Mao Tse-tung would be empowered with the right of CODIRECTION OF THE WORLD STALINIST MOVEMENT.

Stalin’s speech at the 19th Congress of the Russian Communist Party last October, which received little attention in the capitalist press, was in effect a last testament and a public admission of the bankruptcy of his theory and practice of Socialism in One Country. He went to consid-erable pains to prove that the Soviet Union (meaning his Bonapartist clique) had aided the struggle for socialism by defeating Germany and Japan in the war. He admitted that the Soviet Union was dependent on the workers of the world. His plea for their help in the event of war was motivated on the grounds that by so doing they would in reality be aiding their own struggle for socialism.

So universally recognized was the demise of Stalin’s theory that the new Soviet rulers cast it into the grave as much a cadaver as their dead leader. Not one of the three funeral orators even made passing reference to the theory that had once been called an earthshaking contribution to Marxism. But all three gave Stalin credit for “proletarian internationalism,” which he had fought like an enraged beast during his lifetime.

Changes in the Soviet Union

Since the end of the war, the world has changed as much inside the Soviet Union as outside. Stalin had seized power over the Soviet state in a backward country with an illiterate people, only a small minority of whom were industrial workers. Today the Soviet Union properly boasts of one of the largest working classes in the world, of a comparatively cultured people, an educated youth, technicians, scientists, (despite all the artists still in uniform). The foundations and raison d’etre of the bureaucratic regime are being steadily undermined by the constant creation of an abundance of the very qualities which the bureaucracy had once enjoyed as a tiny minority and for which it commanded such a high price for its services. Thus, if for the sake of argument, we were to grant that Stalin had made this world, then it was unmaking him and Stalinism before his death.

Already at the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in Malenkov’s report and in Stalin’s booklet on the problems of the Soviet economy there was a sharp reflection of these changes in the Soviet Union which took the form of a subdued clash between the new proletarian and intellectual critics and their bureaucratic overlords. Basically, despite the utmost care to disguise this criticism in language that would pass the censors in a police regime, the criticism revolved around three primary questions: the standard of living; the privileges of the bureaucracy and inequalities in income; the iron dic-
tatorship — a theme obviously discussed as is apparent from the constant attacks against those expounding Marx's conception of "the withering away of the state." (For more extended treatment of these questions, the reader is referred to studies by Ernest Germain and Michel Pablo on the Congress in the last issue of Fourth International.)

At the Congress, the Kremlin seemed prepared to make some concessions to the masses and its critics by the fiercest verbal assaults against bureaucracy heard in many a year, by an attempt to renovate the Communist Party as an instrument of control against certain sections of the bureaucracy, and by granting certain rights to the rank and file — within very strict limits, naturally — against some of their more arbitrary, arrogant masters. Although the cause and intent were clear, the proposals were more than somewhat vague. But before the new program could even begin to go into operation, the Kremlin seemed suddenly to change its mind, and the stage was being set for a new vast purge initiated by the arrest of the nine doctors, followed by the typical screaming denunciations of "bourgeois nationalists," "swindlers," "deviationists," "the scum of old oppositions," and with the Jews beginning to figure as major scapegoats. It appeared that a policy of concessions was an untracked wilderness for the bureaucracy while the purge was a well-trodden path.

Into the midst of this impending purge, there broke Stalin's death. At once all bets were off, all signals changed or changed. The problems remained the same as before his death: the conflict between the parasitism of the bureaucracy with the needs of the nationalized economy; the conflict of the masses and the new intellectual strata with the bureaucracy; the pressure from all strata of Soviet society for greater democracy and freedom. But the relationships had now altered within the bureaucracy, and thereby, to a certain extent, between the bureaucracy and the people.

Position and Problems of the New Regime

The new rulers, none of whom inheriting Stalin's position of unquestioned power, none viewed by each other and the bureaucracy as a whole as a court of last resort, each "fearing the other and all fearing the masses" — they drew back from the purge as from a plague. Obviously none would entrust the execution of the purge to the other, as it might very well mean his own execution; and none was strong enough to force it without the agreement of the others. The more compelling motive that decided the course of the Stalin succession was its relationship to the Soviet masses. The new regime had first to consolidate its position, to win a measure of support for itself among the people. Above all, it had to pacify discontent, ease all the oppositional forces gathering before Stalin's death but then restrained by the apparent strength of the regime might now break loose because of its apparent weakness.

Malenkov had apparently been bestowed with the high title, but it was also apparent that he could not play the role of Stalin. For if the conditions, internally and internationally, that made it possible for Stalin to continue as the supreme arbiter were being undermined before his death, then the circumstances were even more unfavorable to attempt to build up a successor for that position. Consequently, the new regime was obliged to recognize that the monolith no longer gives the same appearance of omnipotent power, that it can no longer act in the same way as in the past. The "iron unity" of the bureaucracy under a single head, has now been supplanted by a coalition of representatives of the various sections of the bureaucracy: party, state, army, secret police, economy. The new talk in the Soviet press about "collective leadership," the diatribes against the evils of "one-man leadership" are a reflection of the existence and needs of this coalition.

Its first need was to gain support for the coalition as a whole, while each section of the bureaucracy secretly is seeking to gain support for itself as against the others, and for this purpose it was essential that the new regime present an appearance of benevolence to the masses. In this, the new rulers have not been averse to casting off the "Stalin tradition" as if it were an old rag. This began immediately at the funeral. All three pretenders for power promised an improvement of living conditions — there was not even the vaguest hint of such a promise at the 19th Congress. Beria went one step further and promised the safeguarding of the rights of Soviet citizens — the keynote at the 19th Congress was vigilance and more vigilance (i.e. coercion and repression). No sooner was the corpse disposed of than began the series of measures which some journalists compared to "the 10 days that shook the world." This is undoubtedly a tremendous exaggeration, but they were correct in an intuitive feeling that the new measures were pregnant with the most significant change.

Four Steps That Startled the World

Stalin had enlarged, extended and diffused the dominant organisms of the regime apparently to permit his heir-apparent, Malenkov, better possibilities of single-handed control. The first act of the new regime was to combine and reduce the size of these leading committees so as to dwarf Malenkov and divide the power among several. This was followed by Malenkov's resignation from the powerful party secretariat, and then by the return of Marshal Zhukov, "the hero of Berlin," whom Stalin had sent into obscurity — thus further diffusing the power by bringing the army into a more prominent position.

The second act of the regime was to fulfill its promise for an amelioration of living conditions by a drastic reduction in prices. The burden of Stalin's economic "masterpiece," which only a few weeks before had been advertised as the greatest contribution to socialist thought since Marx, was that any real improvement in the standard of living had to wait until the advent of communism.

The third act was to reverse the direction toward a new purge, taken after the 19th Congress under Stalin's guidance, by the proclamation of a general amnesty. True, the amnesty measure stopped short of those sentenced for "counter-revolutionary" crimes (which naturally includes the genuine revolutionary opponents and critics of the regime), and the newspapers immediately issued the usual warnings against "Trotskyists and Bukharinists." But it must be remembered that the new regime was seeking support to protect itself, not committing suicide.

The fourth act and most startling of all the measures
was the release of the imprisoned doctors who had been given a one-way ticket to "liquidation." More important even than their exoneration was the accompanying official admission that a frame-up had been perpetrated, that confessions had been extorted by coercion, that anti-semitism had been used as an-official method. It was an unprecedented action, a direct blow at the very foundations of Stalinist rule — at the infallibility of the regime, at its barbaric method of settling differences with political opponents and of maintaining power. It raised doubts about the Moscow Trials and about the Košťák, Rajk and Slansky trials in Eastern European countries; it raised doubts about Stalin’s methods of dealing with the national question which Malenkov, Beria and Molotov had sworn to uphold and continue in their speeches at Stalin’s funeral.

Finally, the indictment of high police officials for persecuting the doctors, regardless of the maneuvers it served in the clique struggle at the top, reversed the process begun after the 19th Congress which took the form of a police hunt of “dissolve intellectuals.”

**Masses Observe Cracks in the Monolith**

Undoubtedly the masses — who have developed that acute sensitivity of change of all peoples living in a dictatorship — saw in these measures the first crack in the monolith, its essential weakness, the differences, antagonisms and clique struggle for power. They probably speculated that the amnesty decree was a blow against Beria who had been responsible for the imprisonments over the last five years covered by the decree. They probably reckoned that the vindication of the doctors was a blow against Malenkov (and Stalin) who had charged Beria and the security organs with “lack of vigilance” at the time of the doctors’ arrest. These signs prefigure the end of the Stalinist dictatorship. They announce the coming entry of the Soviet masses onto the political arena. When the top bureaucrats, to settle the conflicts in their own ranks, are compelled to appeal to the masses for support, then its inevitable counterpart must be an attempt by these masses to utilize the conflict among the bureaucrats to put an end to all bureaucratic rule.

Trotsky wrote in 1929, when it appeared that the wealthy peasantry was gaining the upper hand in the Thermidoran coalition, that the film of history was unwinding backwards toward a capitalist restoration in the USSR. Today, it can be said that its direction is reversed and is now unwinding toward socialist democracy in the USSR. Not at once, to be sure, and not rapidly. There will probably still be many ups and downs, many conflicts between the masses and the bureaucracy, new outbreaks of violence, coercion and probably even purges, and the entire process in all likelihood will pass through a Third World War. But its direction is indisputable, its outcome is inevitable — not the restoration of capitalism, but the return of socialist democracy on a far higher level.

“Es schwindelt” (it makes one dizzy) Lenin said to Trotsky soon after October, in remarking about the enormous transformation that had brought them out of the obscurity of exile to the helm of the first workers’ state. “Es schwindelt” to contemplate the vast changes opening now which the generation of Marxists today shall still see in their lifetime.

**New Relations in Anti-Imperialist Camp**

What the Russian workers are beginning to see about the new regime, although they are not yet able to act upon their conclusions, can also be seen in other parts of the anti-imperialist camp, and this is beginning to determine a new attitude to the Kremlin. It was of considerable symbolic significance that Mao Tse-tung was the only leader of the bloc of workers’ states who did not go to Moscow to pay homage to the dead leader and directly, establish his relationships with the new ones. He seemed to be saying that his debts were not so large that they could not be discharged by a subordinate; that there was no single leader powerful enough with whom to negotiate, that he would deal with all of them together and with each of them against the other.

But on the contrary, the new Kremlin rulers seemed to feel far more constrained to make public display of their friendship for revolutionary China and Mao than he to them. They were openly recognizing China’s position of co-direction that Stalin had already acknowledged in fact. All of the funeral orators singled out China for special, laudatory mention. Malenkov forged the photograph of the signing of the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty to eliminate all other participants but he, Mao and Stalin.

Even more substantial in concessions to Mao was the new trade agreement with the Soviet Union which is extremely favorable to China. And finally — it was China that took the lead in the new peace offensive. Previously it was Malik who had made the peace offering on Korea; then it was Vishinsky who rejected the Indian proposal before the Chinese could speak. This time Chou En-lai made the proposals which were then seconded and supported by Molotov.

These are no isolated, episodic events. They are signs of a new relationship of forces in which the Kremlin no longer holds single, undisputed leadership; they are part of a process which must eventually and inevitably pass through the rest of the new anti-capitalist world, into Eastern Europe and that must “liberate,” as Pablo wrote (Militant, April 6) “the centrifugal tendencies . . . in the leadership of the Communist parties in vassalage or tied to the Kremlin.”

**The Coming Vindication of Trotskyism**

Trotsky predicted that the victories of the revolution in other parts of the world would bring about the downfall of Stalinism. But because these victories have thus far occurred in backward countries and under the leadership of Stalinist-type parties, the process is taking different forms than Trotsky envisaged but the content is the same. The rise of new workers’ states, the spread of the colonial revolutions — joined to the modernization of the Soviet Union — is having the effect of loosening the bonds of the Stalinist monolith internally. And this must eventually react to loosen the bonds of the monolith on a world scale.
Will the process take the form of a violent upheaval against bureaucratic rule in the USSR? Or will concessions to the masses and sharing of power — as was the long course in the English bourgeois revolution in the political relationship between the rising bourgeoisie and the declining nobility — gradually undermine the base of the bureaucracy? Or will the evolution be a combination of both forms? That we cannot now foresee. But that this process means not the end of socialism, but its great renaissance — that is certain.

The Coming Showdown in Latin America

One Year of the Bolivian Revolution

Exactly one year ago this month there occurred the revolutionary ascent to power of the government headed by Paz Estenssoro. The action of the armed masses swept out the former military government and brought to power the party which was known for its national-democratic revolutionary tradition and program: the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR).

Since then there has unfolded a veritably revolutionary era in the country which has been characterized by ever more widespread and deepgoing activity of the worker and peasant masses.

This situation can only be defined as the national-democratic phase of the Bolivian Revolution.

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Bolivia is a semi-colonial country whose particular economic and social structure explains the unfolding revolution and determines its character.

Situated in the center of South America, with an area of 412,772 square miles, it is inhabited by a population of less than 3,500,000 persons. 65% of this population is concentrated on the upper plateau (Altiplano), 12,000 feet above sea level and whose area does not exceed 16% of that of the entire country. 20% of the population is concentrated in the Yunga some 4,000 feet above sea level and covering some 14% of the total area. The remaining 15% of the population is scattered in the Llanos and the Gran Chaco region, some 200 feet above sea level and encompassing some 70% of the total territory of the country.

The concentration of the largest part of the population in the Altiplano is explained by the proximity of the mines whose production still accounts for the most important wealth of the country. This concentration already existed at the time of the Incas who, by means of a colossal system of irrigation works and soil conservation, had succeeded in maintaining the principal sector of agriculture of the country on the Altiplano and thus of resolving the problem of food supply for the workers in the mines.

From this geographic distribution of the population, in flagrant contradiction with the natural distribution of the arable land of the country, there arises one of the causes of its economic disequilibrium, and especially of its very low standard of living.

Poverty and Land-Hunger

Agricultural production is among the lowest in all Latin America, and this despite the existence of some 65 million hectares [one hectare is over two acres] of arable and wooded land which can be put into production at relatively little expense.

The cultural and material level of the population is one of the lowest in the world. According to a UN commission, consumption of food per inhabitant comes to some 1,600 calories a day as against 2,730 in Argentina, 2,350 in Brazil, 2,280 in Colombia. The Commission's report adds that this consumption is naturally clearly inadequate for a normal adult weighing an average of 140 pounds, but, fortunately, it comments, the average weight of Bolivians is under this figure. It omits to add that this is the result of chronic malnutrition.

From 1937 to 1952 the retail price index rose from 100 to 1,040. Wages for the same period, however, only went up from 100 to 650.

In Argentina there is an average of two pairs of shoes annually per inhabitant, in Chile a pair and a half, in Peru one pair for four inhabitants, in Bolivia one pair for 17 inhabitants.

The large majority of the population, composed of Indios (autochtons) and métis, is illiterate, which accounts for the electorate being a small minority of the people. In 1950 there were 142,000 children registered in primary schools out of a total of 445,000 children of school age; they attended schools in the rural districts 60 days of the year, and 90-100 days in urban districts. Higher education is exclusively reserved for a small minority coming from the middle and upper layers of the petty bourgeoisie.

The social geography of the country is typical of all semi-colonial countries. The peasants are in the majority; there is a quite numerous urban petty bourgeoisie; a proletarian minority strongly concentrated however in the
mines and in some other industries (transport, textile, cement, glass, chemical products, beer and alcohol, tobacco, tanning).

The propertied groups of the country are mainly composed of layers of large landed proprietors and of a numerically weak compradore-type bourgeoisie deriving its main income from mine holdings and a few other industries, the most important of which were owned by the imperialists (principally Americans and English).

**Distribution of National Income**

The peasant population accounts for some 900,000 tillers, the great majority of whom are completely landless or own a bit of ground from 1/4 to 3 hectares. For the most part they work as agricultural workers or serfs in the fields of the big landowners, whose property varies in size from a few thousand to 20 thousand and more hectares. They live and work on these lands in the most miserable conditions of housing, sanitation and food. These conditions, taken together with the extremely primitive methods and means of cultivating the soil, explain the very poor output of agriculture. For all of these reasons the agrarian question is extremely acute in Bolivia as are its effects there on the political developments of the country and the future of the revolution.

The urban petty bourgeoisie is divided between a very poor majority, highly radicalized because of its unstable conditions and always available as an ally of the revolutionary proletariat, and on the other side certain upper layers corrupted by their relatively privileged position in the state apparatus and in the staffs of the large mining, industrial and commercial establishments.

The proletariat is some 200,000 strong, 60,000 of whom are miners, 30,000 industrial workers, 20,000 building workers, 25,000 in transportation, 40,000 in commerce. The miners are by far the most centralized group of the Bolivian proletariat, employed in three big and some 60 other small and medium mineholdings. The mineral wealth of the country, mainly tin, lead, zinc, antimony, copper, make up the essential exports of the country whose value between 1940 and 1950 amounted to roughly $90 million on an annual average. But whereas in 1948 the 60,000 miners received in earnings some 1,100 million bolivars, the roughly 15,000 officeholders and retainers of the government received 1,300 million bolivars the same year.

The distribution of the national income illustrates the extreme exploitation of the large majority of the population by the imperialists, the native propertied groups and the upper strata of the petty bourgeoisie tied into this system. Even if the national income of the country is estimated at from $250-350 million,* the share of 90% of the population is only $120 million. The remainder, more than half of the total, is divided between the mineowners, the big landowners and the narrow strata of the native bourgeoisie and upper petty bourgeoisie.

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*Without revealing their means of measurement, the Bolivian government and the UN estimate the national income at $460 million, while holding that the daily income per family at La Paz is not in excess of 80 cents.

The domination of the country by imperialism and the successive governments in the pay-off native reaction (the famous rosca) has brought the country to extreme distress, to extreme impoverishment, despite its exceptional natural wealth, In truth, although the agricultural output and even the mine production of Bolivia** is among the lowest in all Latin America and the world, it nevertheless possesses very extensive, very productive arable and wooded lands as well as mineral wealth which has barely been touched up to now.

In addition to varied and very precious metal deposits in the Altiplano, the very rich oil deposits of the country have hardly been exploited or even explored. Waterways and waterfalls are plentiful, and were they rationally utilized they would not only raise the productivity of agriculture, but in themselves would be able to solve the power question for the entire country as well as for neighboring countries.

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*It is estimated that even with the present very primitive, very defective mine equipment, production could rise from $90 million a year as an average to some $150 million in export value.

The highly explosive character which the mass movement has assumed particularly in the last fifteen years is explained by this extraordinary combination of contrasts and contradictions which is Bolivia. The contradiction that dominates all others is the one between the living conditions and aspirations of the great majority of the population consisting of landless peasants, workers (particularly the miners, the hungry slaves of a few big mining concerns working under indescribable conditions in the highest and most terrible mines on the face of the earth), the pauperized sections of the petty bourgeoisie of the cities, and, on the other hand, a tiny minority of compradore feudal capitalists governing by force and corruption for the benefit of the imperialists.

**The Nature and Future of MNR**

The latest revolutionary outbreak of the Bolivian masses began, as we pointed out, last April. The party which has governed the country since then, the MNR, is representative of the political development of the masses in semi-colonial countries like Bolivia. It reflects the attempt of the petty bourgeoisie to assume a leading role in the mass movement after the utter discredit of the compradore bourgeoisie, and before the proletariat has been able to assert itself as the national, revolutionary leadership of all the oppressed masses of the country.

The MNR is a mass party, the majority of its leadership petty-bourgeois but fringed with a few conscious representatives of the nascent national industrial bourgeoisie, one of whom, for example, is very probably Paz Estenssoro himself. Its ideology, its confused program, a mixture of revolutionary aspirations and phrases with opportunist and, in the last analysis, capitulatory practices toward imperialism and the rosca, is the expression of this class character of its leadership.

It is inevitable in all colonial and semi-colonial coun-
tries, in the absence of a revolutionary proletarian party strongly rooted in the masses, that the first phase of the revolution is marked by the rise of the radical political formations of the petty bourgeoisie (or of the liberal national bourgeoisie in more socially developed countries like India, China, Argentina, Brazil, Chile).

But once in power, the petty bourgeoisie proves itself utterly incapable of solving any of the specifically democratic-national tasks of the revolution (independence, agrarian question). Its upper strata quickly capitulate to the pressure of imperialism and reaction; its lower reaches are more and more attracted by the dynamism of the ideas and especially of the action of the revolutionary party of the proletariat. By the very logic of things, in order to maintain itself in power such a government is obliged to transform itself into a Bonapartist government, like Kerensky, like Mossadegh, like Paz Estenssoro. In a more advanced stage of the revolution it will fall under the drive of the right seeking to impose a military dictatorship, or of the left to establish the genuine workers’ and peasants’ government, the dictatorship of the proletariat allied to the peasant poor and the urban petty bourgeoisie.

Divided Power, Peasant Revolt

The direction of the Bolivian Revolution up to now confirms step by step the general line of this type of classic development of the proletarian revolution in our epoch. It bears more resemblance to the course of the Russian Revolution, although in miniature, than it does to the Chinese Revolution, for example. It began by lifting the radical party of the petty bourgeoisie to power (as was the case with the Russian Revolution in a particular stage before October) with the support of the revolutionary masses, in opposition to the defeated formations of native compradore circles, and of the still weak revolutionary party of the proletariat, the POR (Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Bolivian Section of the Fourth International).

But the masses did not completely confound their actions with those of the government. They set up from the beginning their own organs, parallel and independent of the government, the embryo of dual power: the Bolivian Workers’ Center (COB) on the one side, and their armed militias on the other. Far from their revolutionary activity ceasing with the installation of the new government they took it as a pretext to go even further. It was the unceasing pressure of still armed and still active masses which decided the government to nationalize the three principal mining establishments and to make imperialism accept this concession.

But it was from the time that the revolutionary fever spread to the peasant masses that the revolution received a new spurt and began to move toward its decisive climax.

Important as it was, the nationalization of the mines was circumscribed by two facts: first, that the state apparatus which carried out the nationalization is not in the hands of the masses; second, that even without genuine workers’ control, nationalization carried with it a considerable compensation further loading a budget which is already unbearable for the country’s decrepit economy. The bourgeois, pro-capitalist and pro-imperialist elements of the government reckoned on making nationalization of the mines a weapon of subsequent corruption and dislocation of the workers’ movement of the country by absorbing a number of the leading workers’ representatives into the administrative apparatus of the mines.

Quite different are the prospects now being opened by the revolutionary movement of the peasant masses. A half-million peasant-serfs in the Cochabamba region have gone into action to occupy the lands at once and to cultivate them for the sole benefit of those who till them. The example is becoming contagious and will soon embrace all of the land-hungry masses. Conscious of the acuteness of the agrarian question, the government tried to bypass it by first “studying” the problem, but finally adopted an innocuous agrarian reform law. The peasants are demanding that it be supplanted by a genuine agrarian revolution which expropriates the landed proprietors without compensation, grants the usufruct of the land to those who till it, and that this be done at once.

Conflict Moves to Decision

There is an absolute incompatibility between the interests and aspirations of the great masses of the population and the petty-bourgeois character of the government which is fringed with conscious agents of the native feudal-capitalists and of imperialism. Only revolutionary struggle can now decide the fate of the agrarian revolution as well as that of the Bolivian Revolution as a whole.

Workers and peasants are now in the process of joining forces in common revolutionary struggle. This most characteristic and promising development is not only the result of the spontaneous movement of the masses. The conscious role of the revolutionary leadership of the proletariat and of its party is becoming an ever more determining factor in it.

As in the Russian Revolution, we are witnessing in the Bolivian Revolution a rapid decline in the influence of the petty-bourgeois leadership over the masses to the growing benefit of the proletarian leadership which is trying to consciously express the interests and aspirations of all the poor of the country, to advance the revolutionary struggle equally in all decisive sections by coordinating it on a national scale and moving toward the final aim of the struggle: the formation of a genuine workers’ and peasants’ government. This government will not arise mechanically but dialectically, basing itself on the organisms of dual power created by the mass movement itself, and corresponding to the level of consciousness of these masses resulting from their own struggles and experiences.

Among these embryos of dual power is the COB and the Workers Militias which need to be maintained and strengthened to the maximum. There are also the peasant unions and committees which have been constituted to effect the immediate occupation of the land. The workers’ and peasants’ government will appear tomorrow as the natural emanation of all these organisms on which it will base itself.

The tactic of the POR toward the MNR and the present government is determined by a series of factors and
changes in the development of the situation in the country: by the character of the MNR as the radical party of the petty bourgeoisie of a semi-colonial country, by the initial attitude of the masses toward this party, by the relative initial weakness of the revolutionary party; by the concrete actions of this party and of the government, both subject to the pressure of opposing social forces.

The POR began by justifiably granting critical support to the MNR government. That is, it desisted from issuing the slogan "down with the government"; it gave the government critical support against attacks of imperialism and reaction, and it supported all progressive measures. But at the same time it avoided any expression whatever of confidence in this government. On the contrary, it propelled the revolutionary activity and independent organization of the masses as much as it could.

The POR limits its support and sharpens its criticism insofar as the government proves itself incapable of fulfilling the national-democratic-program of the revolution. Insofar as it hesitates, capitulates, indirectly plays the game of imperialism and reaction, prepares to betray and for this reason tries to harry and deride the revolutionists.

The POR has been applying this flexible attitude which requires a carefully considered emphasis at each moment, one that is not confused but neither is it sectarian, and in applying this attitude the POR is demonstrating a remarkable political maturity. The POR has adopted an attitude of constructive criticism toward the proletarian and plebeian base of the MNR with the aim of facilitating a progressive differentiation within it.

The collaboration of a revolutionary wing emerging from the MNR in a future workers' and peasants' government, basing itself on the revolutionary organisms of the masses, cannot be excluded. On the contrary, it is necessary to constantly keep before these most advanced elements the concrete prospects of what the program and the achievements of such a government could be in contrast with the practices and prospects of the present government. The outlook for the formation of a genuine workers' and peasants' government in Bolivia and of its remaining in power is quite favorable. The joining of the revolutionary movement of the workers with that of the peasants, for which the POR is consciously working, will raise the revolution to a higher level and will then broadly unfold this prospect within a relatively brief time.

Can a Revolutionary Government Hold Out?

Such a government would not have to fear either the catastrophic effects of an economic blockade laid down by imperialism and the reactionary governments of certain neighboring countries, or military intervention. The level of imports needed for the life of the country is actually so low (scarcely $2 million a month, and less than half of that for foodstuffs) that the situation could be coped with by the export of a minimum part of the present mineral wealth of the country, or by slightly raising the present very low level of agricultural production, or by both these factors together.

On the other hand, the least rational organization of the resources of the country, freed of the enormous unproductive tribute now extended by the imperialists, the landowners and the state bureaucracy, will raise the living standards of the masses perceptibly. Their support to the regime will grow constantly with each action of such a government. Besides, this regime would attempt to exploit the relatively favorable situation which now prevails in South America, proposing realistic and reciprocally advantageous trade agreements to all neighboring countries, and even a pool of all Latin American raw materials.

Bolivia's geographical position provides it with relative protection from any military adventure which neighboring reactionary governments might eventually decide to undertake. The Bolivian Revolution has already aroused a lively interest and a deep sympathy among the worker and peasant masses of surrounding countries and it can count upon them to oppose such adventures. The longer-range prospects for a workers' and peasants' government will naturally depend on the evolution of Latin America as a whole and of the international situation in general.

The Bolivian revolutionists are conscious of all these factors, of all these advantages, chances, and also of the responsibilities they bear. They are conscious that they now constitute the vanguard of the revolutionary Marxist movement of the Fourth International which has to provide practical proof of working for a proletarian revolution in a country where the taking of power will not come by some kind of accident. It will not result from exceptionally favorable conditions following a war, for example, as in Yugoslavia or China, but from normal, classical conditions. The conscious, responsible role of the vanguard guided by a genuinely revolutionary Marxist and not an opportunist line will prove to be the determinant in the final analysis.

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Benedetto Croce: 1866-1952

Bourgeois Philosopher -- Educator of Marxists

By LIVIO MAITAN

We are happy to bring our readers the following article penned by a well-known Italian Marxist in tribute to the great bourgeois philosopher, Benedetto Croce, who died last November. Croce was born in 1866, and his influence on Italian thought, and to a certain extent on its politics, spread over many decades, two world wars and the era of Mussolini's fascism. He became a Senator in 1919, and was Minister of Education in 1920 and 1921. Croce's chief work, which embodies his philosophic system, "The Philosophy of the Spirit" appeared in four parts from 1902 to 1917. Livio Maitan's brief article gives a Marxist critique of Croce's work and highlights the significance of his long career. — Ed.

The philosophy of Benedetto Croce made its appearance at the beginning of our century, and came to full flower in the first decade of the century. It arose at a time when the Italian bourgeoisie, having achieved the unification of the country, had reached the stage of maturity. It was the philosophy of this bourgeois class, the expression of the post-Risorgimento Italian world. Due to Croce's genius, there was repeated for our bourgeoisie what had already occurred for the German bourgeoisie in the preceding century: it developed a superiority in the ideological sphere in contrast with its political and economic inferiority. In truth, with the exception of Hegel's philosophy, no bourgeoisie in the 19th and 20th centuries has enjoyed a more systematic and lucid philosophical expression than the one achieved by the Italian bourgeoisie, thanks to Benedetto Croce.

Croce's philosophy, to use an image already employed for Hegel's philosophy, is characterized by its conservative solemnity. It adequately expresses the conception of a world where the bourgeoisie has conquered power without a really revolutionary struggle, by means of a series of compromises at a time when the bourgeoisie on a world scale had already lost its revolutionary elan. Anyone who comes in contact with this philosophy cannot avoid the sensation of a critique that conserves, not of a critique that destroys. It consists not of the genius which penetrates to the bottom of things and dissects them, but of a comprehensive intelligence which embraces, and rearranges things without neglecting them, contenting itself with curbing usurpations and exaggerations in the distribution of the parts.

As the natural interpreter of the laity of a class which had to fight the Vatican and the clericals to fulfill its historic function, Croce was particularly Italy's ideologue of the Giolitti epoch.* As Gramsci** wrote in his authoritative essay Croce fulfilled an indispensable conservative role by joining the intellectuals of southern Italy to the Agrarian Bloc and thus, on a different plane, accomplishing the same function fulfilled by reformist transformation.

After the inevitable foibles of youth, Croce adopted a "tolerant" attitude to the workers' movement in its reformist form, because, despite his hostility to socialism, he could assign a function to it within the framework of his general conceptions. But he hardened, became bitter and blind to the workers' movement after 1917 when it no longer appeared to him as an element of ferment but as an element of destruction of the system.

More able than any in interpreting the general interests of his class, and of interpreting them from the standpoint of a certain perspective, Croce was the "clerical" type who does not betray. The genuine intellectual has the function, not of placing himself above the battle or of being a righteous acolyte, but of keeping intact the vision of universal interests — from the point of view of a given society — and of never yielding to opportunist or expedient temptations which can come into conflict with or endanger permanent values. In this sense, in the best sense of the word, Croce fully deserves the designation of having been a genuine intellectual.

Croce and Fascism

Official eulogies to the contrary notwithstanding, the victory of fascism marked the definitive crisis in Croce's ideology which had already been impaired by the shattering blows of the First World War and of the immediate postwar period.

Despite his wavering, Croce's attitude in practice toward fascism was not incoherent. So long as fascism appeared to him as an anti-Bolshevik force, as the most effective one against the revolutionary spirit of the workers, he granted it his support. Afterward, his opposition to fascism was determined by the fascist critique of the liberal state. For long years, however, this did not involve militant opposition, but merely the re-evocation of a world suppressed by fascism. It was only when fascism approached disaster, and when the more responsible groupings of the bourgeoisie decided to change horses that Croce assumed a more important position in the anti-fascist resistance movement.

If he could witness the fall of fascism with the honors of a victor, the fascist phenomenon marked the inevitable disintegration of that political and social equilibrium on which he had built his philosophic system. Fascism represents the epoch of the most regressive attitude of the bourgeoisie which has come to the twilight of its system, condemned to negate the very values of which it had once been the passionate prophet. As the expression of a mature society, Croce could not become the ideologue of new

*Risorgimento: resurrection, a term that designates the movement for Italian unification in the 19th Century.

*Outstanding Italian bourgeois politician between 1900 and 1920; a liberal who united the anti-clerical petty bourgeoisie of southern Italy with the bourgeoisie of the north.

**Together with Bordiga, Gramsci was the most outstanding personality of the Italian Socialist Left, later one of the founders of the Italian CP. He died after years of imprisonment in fascist jails.
American policies degenerated forms. He was incapable of this as much because of the universality through which he understood and expressed the interests of his class, because of his genuine intellectual integrity, as well as because of his antipathy to the plebeian character of fascism which he hated with the hatred a big bourgeoisie has for petty-bourgeois demagogy.

**The Philosopher in His Twilight**

By an irony of history, which Hegel calls the "cunning of reason" (*List der Vernunft*), Croce, precisely in the twilight of his philosophy, involuntarily performed a function whose import he did not understand. In the crisis opened by the First World War the major talent of the Italian workers' movement was being shaped in philosophic thought through Croce's works, and should rightfully have accorded him the greatest recognition, when Croce turned upon this movement as its most implacable critic. Twenty years later, at the close of Gramsci's life, it was once again Croce's philosophy which penetrated like a ray of light through the wall of fascism, exercising an irresistible attraction on a new generation of intellectuals who, with Croce's ideology as a starting point, were to follow the same philosophical and political road Gramsci had traveled before them. Just as the founders of dialectical materialism had been molded in Hegel's philosophy, so Marxist thought in Italy — with hardly an exception — was redefined in Croce's ideology. And that was all the more plausible, as Gramsci remarked, since Croce was an idealist who had learned something from Marxism.

Croce, who played no political role at the high point of his life, became a politician proper in a period when his philosophy was already exhausted. In truth, Croce's role was more than ever finished. Croce had no longer any role to play in a society where an equilibrium could not be reestablished, in which Giolittism had no longer any room for development, in which the laity itself had been stifled by the return of clerical reaction, in which all the regressive forces have been revived for a last effort on behalf of the bourgeois order. It was impossible to reknit the Agrarian Bloc. His serene ideological function was at an end. He could not even make a valuable contribution for his class in an occasional polemic against communism, so painfully myopic was the character of his last writings.

Priests, liberals and Marxists met at Croce's funeral: a symbol of the multiplicity of viewpoints from which Croce can be judged! The priests, without abandoning their livid sectarianism, intended by their gesture to give recognition to the clearly conservative function of this "spiritualist" whom they hope to have liquidated in order to become his cultural successor. The liberals wept the most sincerely and sadly. Sons of the same world and nourished on the same ideology, they wept over the passing of the last vestige of glory of their class, because the void created by his departure enhances the sinking feeling of a society which is crumbling to ruin.

As for the Marxists, they wanted to render homage to their unwitting teacher. They wanted to recognize an objective historic value which devolves equally on the representatives of antagonistic historic interests. And it will be the anti-Crocean disciples of Croce who will build the new house which will produce a new, more universal culture than that of Croce because it is the expression of more universal interests.

**The Case of Owen Lattimore**

*By V. Grey*

As part of a series of connected events, including the Eisenhower election victory, the coming perjury trial of Owen Lattimore will prove once again that there is a serious, and in fact, irreversible shift in the politics of the American bourgeoisie. So much so that former New Dealers and liberals must change their political character, or be branded as communists and the supporters of communists.

The policy of collaboration is being changed for the policy of the club. But the shift to the right is a shift in American politics abroad even more than at home. The policies of the American ruling class abroad, organically imperialistic, are now being implemented more and more with the weapons of desperation. And the human instruments of these policies tend more and more to be the most extreme jingoists rather than the calculating "experts" of diplomacy.

Only yesterday, the bourgeoisie hailed the victory of Eisenhower over Taft in the Republican convention as a victory of rationalism over blind reaction in international politics. But this victory was extremely provisional as Eisenhower's endorsement of McCarthy soon revealed. Eisenhower, whom McCarthy treats like an appeaser, was compelled in some degree to appease McCarthy. The recent peace terms that Eisenhower offered the Soviet Union were not the terms of the middle-of-the-road policy Eisenhower was supposed to represent. They were the terms of the Tafts, the Jenners, the MacArthurs. When the most powerful American capitalists supported Eisenhower against Taft, their purpose was to continue the foreign policy of Truman with a somewhat firmer hand. Their purpose was to keep the extreme reactionaries on ice for some time to come. But their need has a constant element of desperation nowadays. In spite of everything they slowly gravitate in the direction of Taft, McCarthy and MacArthur. The bourgeoisie may never consciously, willingly or completely adopt these extremists. But the latter remain the political, moral, and military alter egos of the capitalist class.

The inner politics of the bourgeoisie, however, are not
written down or worked out in advance. (That is, nowhere but in the most generalized predictions of Marxism.) The above process is taking place by means of a split, and by a struggle. It is a historical process, but it does not seem impersonal or objective. Quite the contrary. This struggle within the bourgeoisie, which for some time has centered on the question of who is responsible for "losing China," is being fought out with calumnies, lies, character assassination. In morality it is a return to the piratical youth of the bourgeoisie, in politics, an imitation of the most savage fascists. One of the most educational by-products of their struggle is the phase, "how we lost China," which they now toss around as unconcernedly as a farmer talking about his lost sheep. To describe the revolution of a people three times the population of their own country as "our losing China" reveals a degree of arrogance difficult to measure.

A Debate With Murderous Intent

With the imperialists, these hysterical accusations and debates are not merely a blind product of enraged frustration at their "loss." Nor do they hold these debates and investigations because they are really interested in finding out who killed Cock Robin. The debating is ot carried on so as to learn from their mistakes in slave-owning statecraft, so as to do better next time. It is rather a matter of dumping the old leadership in order more unrestrainedly to follow the new course. When McCarthy and his friends publish "exposes" which supposedly explain why "we" lost China, they are doing so, not in order to educate the American workers in the slick tricks of diplomacy, but in order to compromise, to defeat, and utterly to ruin their opponents within their own class. They are now and have been for some time so destroying and ruining Owen Lattimore, one-time consultant to the State Department, and expert on the Far East.

It goes without saying that the campaign against the State Department Lefts is also a part of the more fundamental class campaign against the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. But it would be a mistake to regard that as the main point here. True, the government is imprisoning radicals and hounding all opponents of capitalism. This persecution creates a hysteria which spills over into the formerly pink-tinted, but now re-painted parlors of the liberal part of Washington. Hence the very atmosphere lends a murderous effectiveness to the wild charges of the extreme Rights. But the real fight over foreign policy within the bourgeoisie is not a fight of the pro-capitalists against pro-communists, or even pro-Stalinists.

The struggle over "who lost China" is first and foremost a struggle for leadership in the coming titanic war. The iron fist is throwing off its velvet glove. But such a transformation cannot take place as quickly as the figure of speech implies. The capitalist class is not a monolithic body with but a single arm. Its interests are often divided. Its political servants do not all reflect the needs of its system at all times. And today the system as a whole is being challenged from the outside, while stability seems to reign inside. So the most hard-boiled and ruthless servants of capitalism are successfully fighting the experimenters and the compromisers. The instinctive reflex-action of the slave-owner to slaughter every rebellious slave is proving stronger than the rational policies of the experts in soothing syrup cures for rebellion. The reactionary defenders of a dying system are kicking its liberal defenders aside. And since they are in a hurry, they slander their opponents with the allegation that the whole velvet glove policy was made in Moscow.

But while the capitalists are not a monolithic mass it would be incorrect to regard the present struggle as between two specific economic "wings" of the bourgeoisie, such as between light industry and heavy industry.

A Policy Bypassed by History

There is not now a substantial left wing of the American bourgeoisie at all. There is only a Leftist bureaucracy, which is in turn, only a residue of the bourgeois Leftism created by the pressure of the proletariat (and the bourgeoisie "pump-priming" theories) in the Thirties. A certain body of thinking and policy-making was necessary to the bourgeoisie in that period. And a selection of personnel was made on this basis. This personnel has outlived its usefulness to the bourgeoisie. But they cannot simply retire to the shadows. So they have to be destroyed.

The helpless vulnerability of these Leftist servants of capitalism is more clear when viewed in the above light. After all, the only defense of the Leftists would be to reveal the real process of deception they practiced against the proletariat and the subject countries. Thus, they might prove their true loyalty to capitalism, but at the same time they would have to give the whole show away. There is also the matter of their own personal integrity — leaving aside the belly-crawlers and capitulators to McCarthy.

The personal orientation, the viewpoints, the ethics shaped over a period of decades cannot easily be reversed in serious self-respecting people. Besides, they would have to turn their own souls inside out in a way which would be quite impossible for them. They would have to understand the whole process which created them. True, the "socialist" Leon Blum could have the necessary proportions of historical objectivity and girlish naivete to plead in the Vichy trial that his "Popular Front" government had saved capitalism in France. But Blum was a false servant of the workers with a bourgeois soul; Lattimore is an honest servant of the bourgeoisie with a logical mind.

The foreign policy of the bourgeois Leftist bureaucracy was an extension of their domestic policy. It is impossible to understand the Lattimore case without understanding the Leftist bureaucracy's program for giving crumbs to the colonial bourgeoisie in exchange for tying their fortunes to the wheels of Wall Street. In the opinion of the extreme Rightists, such as McCarthy, the giving of crumbs only encourages the revolution. The actual revolution seems to prove this thesis. And since it actually deprives the bourgeoisie of material things in China, it enrages them, and pushes the great bulk of them into closer proximity with McCarthy.

Lattimoreism was only a rational and liberal superstructure erected on the foundations of the uniquely American "dollar imperialism." This imperialism in turn could
grow up without any political colonies other than a few military outposts. But at the very time this dollar hegemony was creating the most beautiful and rational theories in the heads of the Lattimores, it exploded dialectically into the objective need for a lead-and-iron hegemony. America emerged from World War II as a super-global power at the very time when the slaves of the dollar were breaking away. The bourgeoisie has not yet solved the question of the exact form of the new rule they hope to establish. But they have little doubt that its first premise is a war of pacification, no matter how intense, how destructive, or dangerous to themselves. Thus McCarthy's frenzy, and thus the bourgeois shift in McCarthy's direction.

McCARTHY'S MAN HUNT

McCarthy is not becoming more effective because he has backed up his charges with more facts. On the contrary, he has backed down on many of his charges including some of those against Lattimore himself. But he becomes more authoritative as the bourgeois right swing becomes more definite. Three years ago, when he began his duel with Lattimore, he was considered even by most Republican leaders as a shameless sensationalist.

Early in 1950, long after the witch-hunt had been well under way, and some time after McCarthy had begun his own crusade against the "pro-communists," the senator started the liberals in Washington, not to mention the *New York Times* and the rest of the world, by the accusation that Owen Lattimore was "the top espionage agent in the United States." In the ensuing inevitable senatorial investigation, Lattimore put up a courageous and eloquent defense, which is summarized in his book, *Ordeal by Slander*. He was finally declared not guilty by Senator Tydings, speaking for the committee (majority).

But the Tydings Committee's verdict of "not guilty" did not end the Lattimore Case, any more than the Loyalty Board's favorable decisions at that time really freed Vincent, Davies, Service and the others. Lattimore was again called to testify early in 1952, this time before the McCarran Committee, where he again answered a similar line of questioning. The "top Soviet spy" issue was quietly dropped, but this time the verdict was that Lattimore was a "conscious, articulate instrument of Soviet policy" in China. He is furthermore now indicted on a criminal charge of perjury...*i.e.* lying to the committee on seven counts, but principally denying that he had ever been a "sympathizer and promoter of communism and communist interests." [The latter count, including three others, were recently struck from the indictment by Federal Judge Luther Youngdahl. — Ed.]

The forthcoming trial will re-hash the "communist question, but with a vengeance. Not only Lattimore will be on trial, but a whole generation of liberals will be on trial. Not only Lattimore, not only members of the State Department, but a great host of middle and ruling class individuals had the same background in the Thirties, and are now subject to the same persecution if they do not get in line. They are not only vulnerable in the negative sense that they represent no solid wing of capitalism. They are doubly vulnerable because their policies dove-tailed with Stalin's in so many respects that they now can be smeared as "enemy agents."

LATTIMORE AND STALIN

Stalinist foreign policy was for a long period largely congruent with American capitalist foreign policy. It is only secondary that many American foreign policy-makers also enjoyed the name of being radicals or pro-Soviet in a radical period, while they were furthering the best interests of American imperialism. Lattimore did not have this secondary enjoyment. He never claimed to be any kind of radical, and never thought of himself as one. But since his foreign politics were so close to the Stalinist, and since there is a case for claiming he was "architect of the U.S. Far Eastern policy," the proof of his "guilt" will all the more certainly convict the whole leftist bureaucracy.

To understand the Lattimore Case more fully, let us pass from the consideration of the Leftist bourgeois bureaucracy to the consideration of foreign policy itself, and more especially the historical currents which condition the policy. We shall see that the Right are not altogether wrong in their howls about the "collapse of American foreign policy in the East."

Certainly the aims of Stalin in China had been only those calculated to advance the interests of the Stalinist bureaucracy. These aims coincided almost entirely with the aims and interests of the capitalist United States at that time, and they coincided only in part (point no. 1.) with the interests of the Soviet Union itself. These aims were mainly: (1) To drive Japan out of China. (2) To create some kind of democratic China under Chiang, where the Chinese CP might have to be strong enough to keep Chiang in line, but not strong enough to frighten the Western capitalist nations with whom Stalin wanted peace.

The only trouble with the Lefts in the State Department was that they understood Stalin's conservative aims to well, besides understanding China and a few other things too little. They did not see Stalin as the empiric he is, but as a programmatic leader, who leads in accordance with a program—a program whose anti-revolutionary content they well understood. They thought that Stalin was against the revolution in China, in principle, not understanding that Stalin never had a principle in his head, good or bad. Although they know Stalin could not control all the events, the Lefts, even more than the Rights, are now baffled by the Chinese Revolution. When the Rights accuse the Lefts of being duped by Stalin, and contend that the war and pre-war policies of Stalin were an elaborate and devious preparation for the Chinese Revolution and the "Cold War," the poor Lefts think it just might be true, and they naturally have a feeling of secret guilt, of having, perhaps after all, done a great disservice to their class.

Lattimore does not share this feeling. The temporary congruency of American and Soviet policy in the Far East never confused him in the least. He was far too keen a student of history to misunderstand this. He thoroughly understood the three-way power politics (aside from the class analysis) of the United States, Soviet Union and Japan. He also understood the altered world power condi-
tions that a free Asia would bring about. He naturally failed to understand Stalinist politics, because he failed to understand the dialectical interaction between the needs of the bureaucracy and the dynamics of the workers' state which conditioned these needs. He was an honest, pragmatic, "realistic" servant of the bourgeoisie, with not even the slightest degree of sentimentalism. He could never have been idealistic enough to be a Communist nor cynical enough to be a Stalinist.

The Pragmatic Approach to the Revolution

He understood Mao much better than the State Department understood Stalin. But only to the extent that he understood China better than they understood the Soviet Union. Lattimore did see Mao as an empiric. But he saw him, and still sees him, as an empiric who is shaped entirely by the historical events, and since Lattimore understood the events as well (or as badly) as Mao from the theoretical side, he thought he could predict Mao's politics. On the positive side, for example, he could see that if Chiang Kai-shek "refused" to lead the democratic revolution, Mao would have to take the leadership. But on the other hand the pragmatic Lattimore thinks Mao can yet be an ally of Wall Street, because the U.S. is more powerful than the Soviet Union!

And yet Lattimore understands more clearly than his friends or enemies within his class what a revolution really is. There are some important gaps in his understanding as we shall attempt to show. But his wide experience and observation in China have taught him first of all that there is a tremendous upheaval that originates in the very bowels and vitals of the country, that includes everyone in its scope. And nobody can sell him on the proposition that the Communist Party hatched it out as a dark plot, or even consistently planned the actual taking of power.

Lattimore's greatest crime in the eyes of the right wing of his class, is not his political actions, but his theories, his ideas, his very thoughts. True, he advocated the coalition government between Chiang and Mao at a time when Mao wanted it and Chiang refused it (just as General Marshall, President Truman, and a few others also advocated it). But in addition to this "crime" — a real crime for a genuine communist — he has a theory about modern China which, if it is valid, can provide the logical foundation for a compromise between China and capitalist America — for a co-existence as it were.

This of course is not specifically mentioned in the list of Lattimore's "crimes." But because it is a basic compromise, it is this theory which the bourgeois Right is determined to crush, in crushing the Left bourgeois Lattimore.

Lattimore's Theory on China

Lattimore's theory is that China has been going through a tremendous democratic revolution ever since 1911; that this classical democratic revolution has some odd and strange aspects only because this is 1952 instead of 1776, and China is Oriental instead of American. He believes the right wing of his class is hopelessly out of date, that they are Colonel Blimps in an age when the old colonialism is dead. Asia is "out of control" he says, and American poli-
hardened the new Chinese regime, forced them into the al-
liance with the Soviet Union sooner rather than later, com-
pelled them to divide land faster to create a greater mili-
tary base among the peasantry. But the McCarthys can
hardly be blamed for the division of the land itself. A
democratic capitalist regime in China, if there could be
any such animal, would find it utterly impossible to do
such a thing under any circumstances. Moreover, it is equal-
ly correct to say that the events in China forced an earlier
rearmament of Japan. Thus the new Chinese regime har-
dened the will of capitalism to fight, just as the capitalist
reactionaries compelled the Chinese to fight back.

On the other hand, it is not true that the Chinese CP
is, or was in the Thirties, a genuine communist party. The
Chinese CP, in spite of all their long struggles, in spite
of the undisputed heroism of their membership, still re-
main Stalinists, who, even with a Menshevik theory, have
been forced to take the power. The Chinese Communist
Party combined the democratic capitalism theory of the
Mensheviks, with Stalinist world politics — and their own
armed power. In 1946, nineteen years and millions of tor-
tured deaths after the defeat of the Stalin-Menshevik poli-
cies of 1925-27, they agreed to a coalition government with
Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang told them they would have to
give up their armed power. But this armed power was the
only guarantee that the democratic reforms and the al-
lignance with the Soviet Union would be carried out. Some-
what important also — it was the only guarantee of their
own heads.

The coalition thus failed to materialize. The interna-
tional situation converged with the forces of the Chinese
Revolution to push them inexorably onto the road to
power. The problems of state power now turn everything
upside down, including their own theory. State power has a
relentless logic of its own, as Stalin found out long ago. It
has already compelled the new “Mensheviks” to do strange,
un-Menshevik things. But regardless of the character of
the new state, all its pressures and needs cannot transmute
themselves into a revolutionary theory in the heads of the
new ruling group, nor make this group fully capable of
solving the tasks history is about to impose upon them.

The Dream of Democratic Capitalism in China

Lattimore, the bourgeois with a Menshevik brain, saw
the possibility of developing democratic capitalism in Chi-

na. But the Kerensky period of 1917 proved that this could
not be done in a backward country. And if Lattimore un-
derstood Marxism one-tenth as well as he understood the
specific problems of the Chinese people, he would have
seen that Chiang Kai-shek’s main accomplishment for twen-
ty years was to prove again that capitalist democracy was
as impossible in the colonies as the democratic revolution
was imperative. A contradiction? Yes, but if it could not
be understood by Lattimore, McCarthy, or the Stalinists,
it was hammered into the bones, and finally the brains, of
countless illiterate peasants by the blows of the Chiang
Kai-shek reaction.

If there can be a capitalist development for China; if
this development can complement the growth of American
capitalism; if, in a word, capitalism still retains its basic
progressive function; then Lattimore is not merely a mis-
treated public servant of the capitalists. He is a great so-
cial prophet with the historical right on his side. The capi-
talist class would in the long run follow out his line. And
we ourselves would be compelled to alter our program.

A sensible, rational man like Lattimore can well ask
the capitalists the following question: instead of allocating
millions of tons of steel for war production to destroy Chi-
nese villages at great cost to yourselves, why not send these
millions of tons peacefully and profitably to build great
cities? Why indeed? This question is answered by another
question more to the point. Why did the capitalists not do
this during the great American depression when their furn-
aces were idle and their friend Chiang Kai-shek was in
power in China?

Even more to the point: Why did the American bour-
geoisie at the very time they were fighting the feudal slave
power in their own country, help the British crush the
Taiping Rebellion in China? Lattimore, who knows China’s
history so well, has never asked himself the fundamental
reasons for this. The long-haired Taipings, as they were
called, attempted to unify China on a nationalist, demo-
cratic revolutionary basis. They divided the land, abolished
the queue, instituted equality of sexes, opposed binding of
the feet, etc. They took over a large part of China. They
would surely have crushed the outlived Manchus com-
pletely, but for the English and American material sup-
port of that reactionary dynasty.

For those interested in the hypocritical curiousity of the
history of the American bourgeoisie, it is interesting that
the Taipings were for Protestant Christianity, i.e. Ameri-
can Christianity. But, the upright church-going American
capitalists of those days preferred to support the “heathen
Manchus. And they have ever since taught American school
children how backward the Oriental pagans are, how they
bind the feet of little girls, etc.

Who Can Develop China?

But all bitter jokes aside, does this incident not prove
to the hilt that the bourgeoisie could not possibly accept
Lattimore’s program for China? The American bourgeoisie
in their most progressive (even radical!) period could only
ally themselves with the most reactionary forces in China.
Even at that time the China trade had its exploitative ba-
sis. Even the progressive cross-continental American rail-
road building was taking place largely in response to the
drive for a quicker route to the despoliation of the Orient!

Today American capital can only “develop” China (and
then only one-sidedly) by making profits for Wall Street
on top of the “squeeze” for the Chinese capitalists and other
reactionary rulers. This would make still further slaves
out of the Chinese people. And as Lattimore patiently ex-
plains to his persecutors, this last is no longer possible.

On the other hand, China is demanding in every way
to be developed. And the Chinese themselves can develop
China in only one way — that is, cooperatively, socialist-
ically.

Take the question of railroads alone. Railroads in Chi-

na are so important that most of the older lines were each
a factor in world politics for many years. Any government
that wishes to resist foreign domination must not only operate, but own these roads. Furthermore, these roads, with the exception of the Manchurian network, are in the east, connected to the seaports, in order to facilitate the domination of the western, maritime nations. Independence, economic progress and the unity of China demand a system of railroads and feeder lines in the interior and that in the shortest possible time.

Nobody but the government will take on such a giant undertaking. Surely no little group of landlords is going to change their little rice granaries into the tremendous tonnage of steel rails and locomotives necessary to tame the Chinese deserts. No. There would either first have to be a reasonable development of capitalism (such as the first two or three centuries in England, or the first seventy years or so in the virgin soil of the United States) in order to produce enough liquid private capital for stocks and bonds — or else it must be undertaken as a colossal project by the whole Chinese people. And that is exactly what they are planning and have even begun to do.

To repeat: this railroad system must be built. It must be built not only to satisfy the demands of the people for a better life. It is necessary to prevent the living standards from being further depressed by the exploitation of imperialism which has now been transmuted into a form of attempted annihilation. Not only to have their labor count in the world market, but to have their labor resist the cheap bullets as well as the cheap products of imperialism, the Chinese must transport the products in the socially necessary amount of labor time. This means socialist construction — a drive to a socialist system.

As Lattimore himself has eloquently shown, irrigation is needed on a tremendous scale in China. There are great rivers whose destructive floods, once harnessed, would provide fertility and abundance instead of destruction. Even large parts of the Chinese desert are potentially as fertile as California. A sort of dry muck called "loess" pervades the desert, in some places twenty feet deep. With this right amount of water it becomes very productive soil. And flowing over these "wastes" there are torrential rivers in the spring, which trickle dry in the torrid summer. They only await damming and sluicing to provide good farms for millions.

Such an irrigation program plus internal railroad building would provide the greatest leap in productivity that the Chinese have made for two thousand years. In the smaller spaces of Japan the building of a few hundred miles of railroad eliminated food famines by the simple expedient of making it possible for the first time, to transport food from crop surplus areas to crop deficiency areas. In China, where there are simply not enough surplus areas, it may be said categorically that modern irrigation plus modern railroads would stop forever the eternal famines of that country and put it among the great crop producing countries of the world.

But huge armies of workers are needed to construct these things. No amount of private capital would be able or willing to assemble such armies. Only the totality of the peasants feeding and clothing these workers through the instrumentality of the government can bring them together. Moreover, this is a project that cannot wait for the end of the (Korean) war. The war (as well as Stalinist policy) will demand compromise with the peasant on revolutionary issues, only to command even more imperiously, at a later stage, the communizing of the countryside.

Korean War Draws True Picture

"But the war is not my fault," Lattimore might well plead. "I, too agree, and even contend, that the war is pushing China further from capitalism. Truman and MacArthur should never have started the Korean War in the first place." But the Korean War was not the qualitative change which really began the governmental expropriations and constructions. The qualitative change here was the Chinese Revolution and the conquest of state power in December 1949. This was the turning-point for class relations in China. By 1950, it was impossible for American imperialism to listen to Lattimore's advice, even if a few honest capitalists might continue to say it was well-meant. Looking backward, it seems inevitable that the war had to break out in a few months. The war is only the same old imperialist politics in greatly exacerbated form in the epoch of the downfall of imperialism. It expresses the true relationship between the United States and China far, far better than the words and wishes of Lattimore. To say for the thousandth time what will certainly have to be said a thousand times again: Imperialism is a function of declining capitalism, not a policy to be taken up or dropped at will.

We should add that the advanced countries gave China somewhat more than suffering and death. They gave China also the irreplaceable need to develop itself on the same level as its tormentors. To apply Marx's term to the Leninist epoch, they held up to China the mirror of its own future. But in preventing the rational realization of this picture-image by their imperialist subjugation, they compelled China to fight for it arms in hand, not only tearing away all the encrusted social institutions within China but unfixing the very root of world capitalism in the process.

It is not that the McCarrhites understand this dialectic better than Lattimore. Not at all. Lattimore is infinitely more scholarly than his attackers. But his class instinct is weaker. He sees the democratic revolution liberating the energies of the free farmer, thus creating an economic backbone for capitalism as did the French Revolution, or the American Homestead Act — creating a great internal market. True, the land is being divided with a revolutionary knife even sharper than the French Revolution's with many more private owners than the Homestead Act ever made. But how is a Chinese peasant going to use a McCormick Harvester on a two-acre farm? Thus the revolution poses the question of socialism rather than that of American salesmanship. The errant, ignorant McCarthy instinctively scents the truth, while the scholarly Lattimore is the victim of his own formalistic scholarship.

In this connection, who can fail to recall the happy title phrase of the book, Four Hundred Million Customers? The ideological servants of capitalism correctly.
see the expansion of capitalism as the exportation of an immense amount of commodities throughout the world. But every little grocer who sees a crowd pass his store can imagine them all as potential customers. It does not occur to him that a sale is an exchange of equal values with the customer, since his income is derived from a commission on the sale. The little bourgeoisie has his eye hypnotically fixed on the process of circulation. The big bourgeoisie, the producer, to whom sales are no less important, looks upon sales as above all, the realization of his surplus value. He must coin the sweat of the American worker not only into pure gold, but ultimately into an exchange of Chinese commodities. But this is just what the Chinese do not have.

China can produce surplus value for the U.S. only as a subject nation. That is why McCarthy and Co. correctly conclude for their class that in the present period the only trade can be with bullets. Surplus value can only be bomed and blasted out of China now, then reason. Capital is a relation between people, Marx tells us. In the age of imperialism, it is a relation between whole countries. Is that relation to stand, or is it to be destroyed? In all his preoccupation with world power politics, this class formulation of the question does not occur to Lattimore. It is the objective reality, however. And its iron logic inexorably dictates the shooting politics of the big bourgeoisie.

There is a great deal for Marxists to learn from Lattimore's books on China. The facts, the background, the world power politics are well presented. He even half-understands the revolution itself. The trouble is that such events must be comprehended wholly. He saw the democratic revolution, but being bourgeois himself, failed to see the decline of world capitalism which gave this revolution its special, "permanent," character.

China's Fate — and Lattimore's

The driving forces of the democratic revolution, so long repressed in China, finally proved too powerful, even for the false program which was Lattimore's as well as the Stalinists'. These driving forces broke through the restrictions of a narrow theory, and crashed into a new field of history, carrying the Stalinist party with them, like a bull crashes through a stable wall, and paws the open ground, with the old boards still clinging to his horns, before taking off for fresher fields.

The final word has not yet been said in China. Far from it. China will never be socialist without the Trotskyist program. But in the meantime, there is the new regime; and there is American imperialism. There is Eisenhower; and there is McCarthy. And there is the inevitable war against China. Lattimore's middle way is finished. He sees that China is not yet socialist. He sees that there is a transition period. But he fails to see that it is a special kind of transition period with its own laws. He confuses a transition with a never-never land. Not so McCarthy, and not so, most of the bourgeoisie. They have no clear idea of the nature of the Chinese state. But they do not need one. They are sure, however, that it must be destroyed.

The present author believes this transition period in China to be the dictatorship of the proletariat in a distorted, Stalinized form, but a workers' state nonetheless, with very real concrete laws governing its existence. It cannot be maneuvered or "dealt" out of existence. On the other hand, the leadership cannot, and will not, lay out a socialist program. But the question of socialism has been squarely posed in China regardless of the subjective position of the leadership. This posing of the question has opened the floodgates of world counter-revolution, bringing closer, among other things, the inevitable war against the Soviet Union as well as against China. On this point, McCarthy is much more clear than Lattimore. Lattimore and his friends still think there may be some trick formula to ally Mao's government with Wall Street against the Soviet Union. All that is needed is the proper approach. (Which according to him does not include bombing China!)

But the American bourgeoisie does not want or need this kind of thinking today. McCarthy, who only yesterday was considered on the lunatic fringe of capitalism, is now aided by the majesty of the U.S. Federal Courts in his drive to burn out, to expunge, to destroy root and branch, the left bourgeoisie philosophy of Owen Lattimore. This is unfortunate for all liberalism as well as for Lattimore. It is the end of the relative bourgeois freedom that could still exist here and there as long as there was a spark of economic vitality left in capitalism. But let us conclude with the remark that the whole process described above is only the blunter side of a two-edged historical sword. The bourgeoisie's reckless drive to the Right is only pushing the working class ever more sharply to the Left. This process within the working class must have its qualitative changes also. Only the remaining stability of capitalism in the West during its pre-war, pre-crisis period, is supporting the facade of fakers in the workers' movement East and West. This stability, preventing the American working class from recognizing the Chinese masses as its great ally, also prevents the reckoning of the world working class with its leadership. But the crisis will grow. The same historical forces which compel the bourgeoisie to dismiss its honest pragmatists will compel the proletariat to reject its dishonest, and inadequate empirics, in favor of revolutionary Trotskyism.

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Democracy and Workers’ Rule

By JEAN-PAUL MARTIN

The classics of Marxism, from Marx to Lenin, definitely conceived the “dictatorship of the proletariat” not as the dictatorship of a “Jacobin” minority over the class but on the contrary as the flowering of democracy for the whole proletarian class and for the strata of poor allied with it. On this score there can be no doubt whatever.

In order to obtain a clear understanding of the real meaning which they gave to the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” after its establishment, all that is necessary is to reread the texts attentively, those of Marx and Engels, as well as those by Lenin himself (especially his writings prior to the seizure of power in October 1917).

So far as the ideas of Marx and Engels on this question are concerned, no one can honestly challenge them. The foremost leaders of the Russian Mensheviks: Martov and Dan, delighted in emphasizing the evolution of Marx’s thought from a conception of the revolution and the regime it subsequently establishes that was slightly “Jacobin” in the beginning to that expressed more completely by Engels in 1895 in his introduction to Marx’s Class Struggles in France.

“The epoch of bold forays, of revolutions made by small conscious minorities leading unconscious masses, is over. When a complete transformation of the social organization is involved, the masses themselves must participate and understand what is involved, why they must intervene. That is what the history of the past fifty years has taught us.”

The theoreticians of Russian and international Menshevism concentrated their fire mainly against the Russian Revolution, against the character and evolution of the regime established by Lenin. Basing themselves on the theory of the party as elaborated by Lenin in What Is to Be Done and also on certain formulations contained in the pamphlet One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward they expounded the idea that Bolshevism was an anti-Marxist doctrine, predicated on a political organization of the proletariat and on a conception of the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat which were essentially Jacobin, that is to say, upon a conscious active minority within the class, without widespread and effective democratic participation in political life of the this class, as well as of the other strata of poor allied with the proletariat.

In addition they established an organic link between the conception held by the Bolsheviks and Lenin, of the party, of the revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which led to their conclusion that “under the cover of Lenin’s ideas on organization were really concealed his ‘Jacobin’ conceptions on revolutionary development and on the dictatorship.”*

According to them the Russian Revolution was carried out in a Jacobin manner and installed a Jacobin regime.

The Menshevik View

Th. Dan, it is true, is willing to concede that this character assumed by the Russian revolution and its political regime is not due exclusively to the organization and ideas of Bolshevism but also to the objective conditions in Russia, “the social, political and cultural conduct of the forces on which the Bolsheviks based themselves, forces which determined not only the ‘Jacobism’ of the Bolshevik dictatorship, but also its subsequent tribulations . . . From the birth of the dictatorship, the petty-bourgeois peasantry appears as the decisive force in the Russian Revolution (on which the active proletarian minority bases itself and to which it adapts itself) and it puts its imprint on the course of events.”

Hence the birth of Stalinism, an organic product of Leninism, according to Dan.

Rosa Luxemburg who had, as we know, already criticized the organization of the Bolsheviks in the past and the ideas of What Is to Be Done, also formulated certain criticisms of the Russian Revolution but from an essentially different point of view from that of the theoreticians of Menshevism.†

Far from criticizing the activity of the Bolshevik Party in the period preceding the seizure of power and its firm orientation toward this objective, or from denying the proletarian and socialist character of the Russian Revolution, she considered, on the contrary, that:

“Lenin’s party was the only one which had grasped the mandate and duty of a truly revolutionary party and which, by the slogan — ‘All power in the hands of the proletariat and the peasantry,’ — insured the continued development of the revolution.” (p. 14)

“Moreover the Bolsheviks immediately set as the aim of this seizure of power a complete far-reaching revolutionary program: not the safeguarding of bourgeois democracy, but a dictatorship of the proletariat for the purpose of realizing socialism. Thereby they won for themselves the imperishable historic distinction of having for the first time proclaimed the final aim of socialism as the direct program of practical politics.” (p. 15)

Her criticisms regarding the Russian Revolution were aimed on the one hand against Lenin’s two slogans of division of the land and the rights of peoples to self-determination, which she wrongly considered as petty bourgeois, and on the other hand with regard to the democratic content of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is the latter aspect of her criticisms with which we are most concerned now.

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† 2. Ibid.

Anyone who now strives to recapture the physiognomy of the Russian Revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat as it existed in Lenin's time has difficulty in grasping its characteristic features and their modifications under very specific conditions, because of the monstrous disfigurement produced by almost three decades of bureaucratic degeneration.

The October Revolution had installed a political regime whose character, in the beginning at any rate, was that of a government not exclusively Bolshevik, based on democratic Soviets in which there were several political tendencies representing several legal Soviet parties. On the other hand, the majority Soviet party, the Bolshevik Party, far from representing a monolithic bureaucratically governed bloc, was in reality the most virile proletarian party, the richest in discussions and in tendencies which had ever existed. Let us recall several important facts and dates in the evolution of the political regime installed by the October Revolution.

The Revolutionary Regime After October
The Left Social Revolutionaries withdrew from the coalition government, formed with the Bolsheviks in March 1918, as a result of their disagreement over the Brest-Litovsk treaty. (They wanted to continue the war, and as petty bourgeois nationalists they denounced the Bolsheviks. They wanted to continue the war, and as petty bourgeois nationalists they denounced the Bolsheviks.)

But they remained a legal party outside the government, as did the Mensheviks and Right Social Revolutionaries.

The last two were temporarily outlawed during the same year, 1918, because of the connections of certain of their members with the White Guards, while the civil war was in full swing.

But the Mensheviks were authorized to become legal again in November 1918 when they promised to act as a loyal opposition within the framework of the Soviet regime.

The Social Revolutionaries were definitely outlawed following the action undertaken by this party in opposition to the Brest-Litovsk peace, in which they provoked the assassination of Count Mirbach, German ambassador, as well as a series of insurrections in various parts of the country, including Moscow. Finally, on August 30, they wounded Lenin himself and assassinated two Soviet leaders: Uritsky and Volodarsky.

Nevertheless, a kind of libertarian spirit continued to exist both in the Soviets and in the party (especially in the latter) despite the civil war and until its conclusion in the middle of 1920.

It is from this time on, as the result of a new danger for the revolution arising out of the critical economic situation of the country, exhausted by civil war and isolated from the international revolution, that new measures restricting democracy were taken, this time affecting the life of the party itself.

The Tenth Congress of the Russian CP, which forbade the formation of any opposition groups or factions within the party, coincides with the suppressed insurrection at Kronstadt in March 1921.

The famous discussion on the role of the trade unions, where Lenin defended their relative independence from the "workers state," which already was suffering from "bureaucratic deformation," dates back to this Congress.

Neither government by a single party, nor a regime of a single party in the country, nor the monolithic leading party, nor trade unions incorporated into the state apparatus, were in the program or initial intentions of the Bolshevik Party. That is the strict historical truth.

Concrete conditions, linked fundamentally to events set off by the civil war, in a USSR which remained deprived of the support of the advanced proletariat in the West, compelled the Bolshevik leadership and Lenin personally to take this or that measure at a given moment, but this was done provisionally and not in any final sense.

How Lenin Saw the Dictatorship
Lenin, in fact, never theorized that any of the measures to which he was compelled to resort were part of the real meaning of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Trotsky mentions as an example in this connection that the decision of the Tenth Congress of the party forbidding factions had only an essentially provisional character in Lenin's mind and it was understood and approved by the party exclusively in this sense. (L. Trotsky, The New Course)

Any discussion on the manner in which proletarian democracy was or was not applied in the USSR by the Bolshevik Party and by Lenin runs the risk of being without practical value if it is not placed in the context of the concrete historical conditions surrounding the first proletarian regime. The question is: could any other revolutionary regime placed in the same conditions have reacted differently without at the same time losing the revolution?

Unquestionably from the standpoint of a pure application of proletarian democracy many errors were committed, and up to his death, Lenin personally never ceased to admit, affirm, and even to insist on the specifically Russian character of certain forms used by the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR. These forms, he conceded, were not necessarily valid for the revolution in other economically and culturally more advanced countries than Russia, and that not all the Russian experience of revolution was good for export.

But to what extent can the errors and "stupidities" — to use Lenin's own term — committed by the Bolsheviks in power be attributed solely to the fact that they were compelled to deal in some way with the most pressing needs, in the given historical conditions, or risk seeing the revolution completely ruined, and not to a false interpretation, really tainted with "Jacobinism" in deeds, of the party, of the leadership of the revolution, and of the dictatorship of the proletariat?

The question of more than of academic interest at the present time.

The extraordinary degeneration of the proletarian power which has characterized the development of the Soviet regime established by the October Revolution in the USSR;
the more recent experience acquired by the Yugoslav and Chinese Revolutions, as well as the fact that we are now witnessing an objectively higher phase of the proletarian revolution developing internationally, give an enormous, primary importance to this question of the real meaning of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and of the effective application of proletarian democracy.

These factors compel us to a critical reconsideration of the entire experience of the proletarian revolution since the Russian Revolution, to think these problems out anew and to draw certain conclusions from them. These are not artificial problems but are imperatively posed by the present situation; they are sufficiently matured, they are, in a word, necessary, that is to say, they have been prepared by all the previous development and experience.

The Criticisms of Rosa Luxemburg

If we return to the criticisms which Rosa Luxemburg made of the Bolsheviks, of Lenin and Trotsky in particular, it is because, unlike the Mensheviks, she took her stand regarding the Russian Revolution on the solid ground of the revolutionary proletariat, adopting this revolution as her own; because, also, some of her criticisms, at least, have never really been refuted either in writing or by events; because now, after so many years of experience, they seem to us singularly fresh and full of insight; because L. Trotsky himself reviewed some of these conceptions held in the revolutionary period.

For all these reasons, Rosa's criticisms deserve to be recalled and warrant the effort of further consideration and study.

Rosa Luxemburg did not criticize the Bolsheviks from the standpoint of "formal democracy" but from that of the real meaning of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" regarded as a "dictatorship of the class, not that of a party or a clique — dictatorship of the class, that means in the broadest public form on the basis of the most active, unlimited participation of the mass of the people, of unlimited democracy." (The Russian Revolution, p. 53)

She started with the idea that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is not opposed to democracy in general, but to bourgeois democracy, a democracy which is limited and deformed insofar as the masses are concerned. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" does not reject the democratic element but completes it and develops it to the ultimate in the interests of the masses.

She repeated time and again that the essence of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a class dictatorship is to be found in "the active, free, energetic political life of the broadest popular masses," in the "social activity of the masses" enjoying "unlimited political freedom."

"Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, without a free struggle of opinion," she thought, "life dies out in every public institution (including the Soviets, she added) becomes a mere semblance of life in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active element." (My emphasis — J.P.M. Ibid, p. 47)

For the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to remain a class dictatorship it must be "the work of the class and not of a small minority leading in the name of the class — that is, it must proceed step by step out of the active participation of the masses; it must be under their direct influence, subjected to the control of complete public activity; it must arise out of the growing political training of the popular masses." (Ibid. p. 54 — my emphasis, J—P.M.)

The Mechanism of Workers' Democracy

What should the concrete mechanism be, according to Rosa Luxemburg, of such a manner of applying proletarian democracy under the regime of the "dictatorship of the proletariat"?

Although Rosa Luxemburg nowhere clearly indicates the whole of this mechanism it is not difficult to make a critical formulation of this as follows: The system of Soviets should be combined with a National Assembly elected by universal suffrage; authorization of parties; autonomy of the trade unions and all mass organizations in their relationship to the state.

Rosa Luxemburg criticized Lenin and especially Trotsky for having concluded from the necessary dissolution of the Constituent Assembly elected under Kerensky that "Constituent Assemblies in general were absolutely useless" even up to denying the value "of any popular representation whatsoever which might come from universal popular elections during the revolution." (Ibid., p. 35.)

She found, on the other hand, that to proclaim the right of universal suffrage and at the same time grant it "only to those who live by their own labor," while society is still not yet economically in a position "to make possible for all who want to work an adequate civilized life on the basis of one's own labor," was "a non-viable improvisation," a measure not consonant with the concrete social reality, a right which was not measured by the concrete economic and social conditions of the moment in accordance with "abstract schemas of justice." It ran the risk of remaining an anachronism, and according to Rosa Luxemburg, that is what it was in effect. There was no effective exercise of universal suffrage.

Rosa Luxemburg conceded that the measures taken against "the entire middle class, the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois intelligentsia [who] boycotted the Soviet government, for months, after the October Revolution, crippled communications, etc., opposed the workers' government"; deprivation of political rights, of the economic means of existence, etc., were required "in order to break their resistance with an iron fist." (Ibid., p. 41)

But she appeared to be against such conjunctural measures becoming the "general rule of long-standing effect" of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The right of suffrage granted "to those who work" must at the same time imply, according to her, the effective possibility of the regime's furnishing work to all those who want it.

Rosa Luxemburg, we must repeat, was completely conscious when making these criticisms of the unfavorable historical conditions which in some way had imposed these "deviations" on the Bolsheviks. She was sincerely convinced that they would have proceeded quite differently
"were it not that they suffered under the frightful compulsion of the world war, the German occupation and all the abnormal difficulties connected therewith, things which were inevitably bound to distort any socialist policy, however imbued it might be with the best intentions and the finest principles." She found, however, that "the danger begins only when they make a virtue of necessity and want to freeze into a complete theoretical system all the tactics forced upon them by these fateful circumstances" and want "to recommend them to the international proletariat as a model of socialist tactics." (Ibid. p. 54, 55)

What Must We Say Today?

What criticisms of Rosa Luxemburg remain valid today? In the light of our acquired experience, what must the function of the real "dictatorship of the proletariat" be, conceived as a class dictatorship of the proletarian class allied, with the other poor layers of the population?

Let us first take note that it was L. Trotsky himself, who, on the basis of the experience of the Russian Revolution which after the death of Lenin entered a phase of accelerated bureaucratic degeneration, was first to review certain of these initial ideas and to draw conclusions along the lines of Rosa's criticisms.

As soon as he saw the use which the epigones sought to make of the decision of the Tenth Congress of the Russian CP on the banning of factions, L. Trotsky began a vigorous struggle for the defense of the democratic essence of the Leninist Party of the proletariat against the theory of "monolithism" outlined by Zinoviev and practiced by Stalin.

This brilliant defense of the proletarian party, considered in its concrete relationships to the class on the one hand, and in the relationship between its ranks and leadership on the other, is among the best contributions of Leon Trotsky to the dialectical spirit of revolutionary Marxism. (See New Course, L. Trotsky)

It completes and strengthens Lenin's theory of the party, which is fundamentally alien to the monstrous caricatures which are to be seen in the Stalinist parties today, beginning with that of the USSR.

Trotsky's Review of the Problems of the State

Later, after L. Trotsky had given up hope of an internal reform of the Communist International and the Communist Parties, including the Russian CP, and had come to the opinion that Thermidor — that is to say, a stage of political reaction on the social foundations of the Revolution — had already been accomplished in the USSR, he formulated certain new opinions on how proletarian democracy would be reborn in the USSR.

In Revolution Betrayed, reconsidering the problems of the concrete experience of the USSR, he had already thought it necessary to combat the idea of the single party which was in no way inherent in the Bolshevik program, and to reaffirm that the banning of other parties, "obviously in conflict with the spirit of Soviet democracy, the leaders of Bolshevism regarded not as a principle but as an episodic act of self-defense." (Revolution Betrayed, p. 96)

In the same work, L. Trotsky, developing the program of the new political revolution required for the overthrow of the Soviet bureaucracy, believed that "a restoration of the right of criticism, and a genuine freedom of elections, are necessary conditions for the further development of the country. This assumes a revival of freedom of Soviet parties, beginning with the party of Bolsheviks, and a resurrection of the trade unions." (p. 289)

Finally, in the Transition Program, in the chapter dealing with the situation in the USSR, this very important passage is included: "Democratization of the Soviets is impossible without legalization of Soviet parties. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognize as Soviet parties. (Transition Program, p. 51. my emphasis — J—P.M.)

When L. Trotsky mentions the "resurrection" or "freedom" of the trade unions, he is obviously reviewing the positions he defended in his discussion with Lenin in 1921 and means to speak of their independence in relation to the State and governing party, that is to say, of their right to defend the interests of the workers on occasion against the "Workers State" itself. (Which does not exist as such — "Workers State" — but more or less "bureaucratically deformed," and this until its complete withering away, when there will no longer be any "State").

Like Rosa Luxemburg, L. Trotsky, too, describes in somewhat summary fashion the mechanism for the effective application of proletarian democracy, insofar as it is the essence of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" considered as a class dictatorship; presenting a few guiding ideas, but without a more complete analysis. This is due in our opinion to two fundamental reasons operating simultaneously: to the lack of concrete experience on the course of socialist development once the proletariat has taken power, and to the fact that the application of proletarian democracy in one manner or another, on one scale or another, is not established once and for all times in accordance with certain abstract schemas, as a matter of principle, but is dialectically dependent on the given historical conditions in which the class struggle unfolds in each country.

National Assembly and Universal Suffrage

Let us take for example the case of the National Assembly and universal suffrage which Rosa Luxemburg discussed.

Should Soviets and National Assembly be combined or opposed to one another, or should Soviets and National Assembly be elected in different ways in order to attain a more authentic and direct representation by the masses? Who then will have the right to vote and in what degree?

These questions cannot be resolved a priori for all countries and all circumstances in accordance with an abstract code of principles of proletarian democracy.

For example, particularly as regards the right to vote, it is obvious that the answer to this question may depend on the social character of the country, on the precise proportions of peasants, city petty-bourgeois, and workers,
and on economic conditions which do or do not permit a guarantee of work to all those who want to work. Shall the petty-bourgeoisie of country and city, under an NEP regime where they continue to be small proprietors, trading more or less freely, have the same voting weight as the workers, agricultural laborers and landless peasants? Shall the bureaucracy and labor aristocracy have the same rights as the mass of workers?

In this connection, Trotsky had considered, for example, that "it is necessary to drive the bureaucracy and new aristocracy out of the Soviets." (Ibid., p. 51) "In the Soviets," he added, "there is room only for representatives of the workers, rank-and-file collective farmers, peasants, and Red Army men." The right to vote should be restricted to these layers of the population.

It can be seen from all this how complicated the question is.

Nevertheless, it seems to us that the manner of effectively applying proletarian democracy, as the essence of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," considered as the dictatorship of the working class in alliance with the other layers of poor in the population, will not be determined in an arbitrary way but that it falls within a generally applicable guiding framework.

This framework is as follows: Organisms representative of the masses able to exercise their direct control right up to the top of the State apparatus. Legalization of all soviet parties; genuine regime of democratic centralism in the revolutionary party; independence of the trade unions in relation to the State apparatus and the parties.

Let us analyze the more precise meaning of these elements.

**The Aim Is Popular Control**

Whether based on a system exclusively of soviet or on one combining them with a National Assembly, the important thing is to avoid establishment of a practice in which the lower, local, or even regional ranks have only some crumbs in the real control and leadership of the State and of the economy, but that they shall have as direct an influence as possible on the government itself.

Such a government must be subject to the constant control of a body which is as democratic and representative as possible and which designates it and recalls it. In an exclusively Soviet system, this should be the supreme Soviet replacing the bourgeois parliament or the national assembly elected by direct suffrage.

The legalization of all soviet parties means the right and possibility for all tendencies within the working class and its allies to constitute themselves as distinct parties so long as these tendencies do not challenge the social foundations of the revolution. This measure is theoretically justified by the following reasons: heterogeneity of the working class which will disappear only in the general process of the disappearance of classes and of the State in the evolution of socialist society; the fact that "practical realization of socialism," as Rosa Luxemburg wrote so correctly, "as an economic, social and juridical system is something which lies completely hidden in the mists of the future. What we possess in our program is nothing but a few main signposts which indicate the general direction in which to look for the necessary measures, and the indications are mainly negative in character at that. Thus we know more or less what we must eliminate at the outset in order to free the road for a socialist economy. But when it comes to the nature of the thousand concrete, practical measures, large and small, necessary to introduce socialist principles into economy, law and all social relationships, there is no key in any Socialist party program or textbook: (Russian Revolution, p. 45, 46)

A regime of democratic centralism within the revolutionary party means the possibility of forming tendencies, temporary currents of opinion which are occasionally in disagreement with the line of the party leadership. In case these currents, crystallizing, become factions and prove themselves incompatible with existence in the same party which, while democratic, does not cease to be centralist, they shall have the possibility of constituting themselves a distinct political party.

Finally, trade union independence from the State and political parties does not mean that fractions of these parties within the trade unions should not struggle for political influence, but only that neither the workers' state nor any workers' party must identify itself with the unions and incorporate their apparatus into its own apparatus. Without that there can be no guarantee that the trade unions can remain the widest organizations of the proletariat defending its interests even as against the "workers' state" itself.

**Importance of Multiple Party System**

Of all the elements entering into the effective application of proletarian democracy, essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the most important for the effective functioning of the whole mechanism appears to us to be the legalization of all soviet parties.

In fact, if we take the trouble to reflect on the theoretical aspect of the problem, as well as on the experience which the proletarian revolution has gone through up to now, only the possibility of eventually constituting several soviet parties gives the whole of proletarian democracy its real meaning and all its effectiveness. Without the possibility for the different currents of opinions which can eventually appear within the working class which takes power to constitute themselves as distinct parties and thereby influence the whole of political life in the country, there is the danger, despite the best intentions, of the theory and practice of a paternalistic regime for the class, which will favor only one of its sections.

Pursuing such a practice, which is that of the single party, there no longer exists any guarantees that this party will effectively represent its class (even if such were the case at a given moment) and will enjoy its confidence. For this to be true, the class must at every moment have the possibility of expressing itself in a different political way, to promote and organize other parties, to choose other parties, to vote for other parties.

The political party remains the highest formation in class consciousness and its best instrument for effective action. No other form of organization, neither the soviets,
the trade unions, nor the various *Fronts* of Stalinist practice, which were repeated by both the Yugoslavs and the Chinese, can replace the political party.

If only a section of the class has the possibility of constituting itself as a political party and in that guise setting itself up against the remainder of the class, it can easily dominate all these other organizations, thanks to the superiority of national organization acting uniformly on the basis of a program and a line embracing all of the problems of the class.

Confronted by such a political formation of a section of the class, the rest of it appears atomized, restricted in its views, local in its interests, hesitant, unable to express and defend its interests and views, which may be in opposition to those of the single party, in a coherent, that is to say political way on a national scale. The dictatorship of the class inevitably degenerates under such a regime into a "Jacobin" dictatorship and the whole fabric of proletarian democracy becomes warped.

In order that the soviets should remain genuinely alive and democratic, that a national representative body, supreme Soviet or National Assembly, should determine the government, that the internal regime of the revolutionary party should not degenerate into "monolithism," that the trade unions should remain really free, there must be the possibility of several legal soviet parties.

It is through them that the free play of opposing opinions can be exercised which will yield the genuine freedom which is "always and exclusively freedom for the one who thinks differently" (R. Luxemburg).

We mean that it is necessary that such a possibility should exist, for we do not believe that the various soviet parties should be promoted and organized artificially.

The revolutionary party representing the consciousness of the vanguard of the class can remain the only party,* or the party of the overwhelming majority of the class, but this must be ratified by the class itself, by the continued confidence which the class places in the party under conditions allowing the former to decide differently if it so wishes. The revolutionary party must prove itself by submitting itself to the constant judgment of the class.

**The Distortion of Monolithism**

Every attempt to substitute the party for the class, to flee its free verdict, to place it somehow under tutelage, and to limit its constant control over all the party’s political manifestations, is a practice contrary to a Marxist-revolutionary, healthy understanding of the concrete relations between the class and the party, and of the essence of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as a class dictatorship.

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* It has the greater chance of playing this role the more it maintains a healthy internal regime capable of containing tendencies occasionally opposed to the line of the leadership. On the other hand, since there can be no question of transforming the party into an arena of permanent discussion paralyzing its activity, every faction which asserts the impossibility of coexistence in the same party, will have the possibility to constitute itself as a separate party. The verdict of the class will decide its viability.

Stalinism has naturally erected into a principle the system of the single party as well as that of the monolithic party. It thereby expresses the incompatibility of the rule of the Soviet bureaucracy, a privileged social caste raised above the broad Soviet masses, with the very minimum of democracy for the latter.

But now the Yugoslavs, who nevertheless make such a lot of noise about the accelerated "withering away" of their state, of the de-bureaucratization of its apparatus, of the decentralization of its political and economic functions, remain among the fiercest defenders of the system of the single party and set it up as a specific characteristic of genuine proletarian democracy in the socialist regime.

"The first task of the revolution," Tito asserts in *Tito*, by V. Dedijer, "will consist of liquidating the multi-party system." It will be replaced, according to the Yugoslav leaders, by the single party on the one hand, and a broad organization of the masses, a front embracing communists and non-communists at the same time, but all struggling for one goal: socialism.

Several parties, Tito argues, "mean several programs, and in our country there is but one program: to create a socialist society. This program unites the vast majority of the citizens of our country."

The arguments which Kardelj uses elsewhere are the same: one goal, one party. (*The State and Democracy*)

**Legitimate Differences and Their Resolution**

However, we have already presented the theoretical reasons relating to the heterogenous nature of the working class, and the uncertainty concerning the means for attaining socialism, which refute these arguments of the Yugoslavs. Though the goal may be a single one for all of the proletariat and its allied poor layers, *there can be several different orientations within the class concerning the means for reaching it*. On the other hand, in undertaking one or another road for reaching the goal, one or another particular layer of the class will be favored to the necessary detriment of certain others, and this will also not fail to provoke various differences.

For example, the question of industrialization as well as that of collectivization of agricultural economy, the sectors to be favored in industry, the tempo of development of each sector, the methods to be used in order to pass from individual agricultural property to cooperation or collectivism, finally, the foreign policy of the worker’s state — are so many matters on which the various layers of the class can have different opinions and orientations during a whole period.

How can these questions be brought out and successfully resolved under the system of a single party which moreover excludes tendencies which are occasionally opposed to the line of the leadership, or under some sort of Front, which is not a unified front of distinct parties, but a single organization (also excluding tendencies organized on a national scale and which are occasionally opposed to the line of the leadership)?

The theory of the Yugoslavs is all the more indefensible and in reality hypocritical because it is combined not only
with a declaration of the “withering away” of the state, which according to them is taking place almost “at a gallop,” but also with an entirely different practice.

The “withering away” of the state is a political process which cannot pass over the stages determined by the effective withering away of the objective causes which give birth to the division of society into classes. In the final analysis it is a question of the effective suppression of economic inequalities by a superior development of the productive forces and finding the high road to abundance.

Can they really make anyone believe that Yugoslavia is in the remotest degree nearing such a stage and thereby justify in this only possible way the “withering away,” however rapid they want to make us believe, of the state?

On the other hand, to the degree that the state begins to “wither away” in reality, this should be reflected in the political sphere by the expansion of political democracy and not by its contraction.

The evolution of the dictatorship of the proletariat takes place through the expansion of political democracy up to the complete withering away even of this form.

Let us remain, however, at the stage of the expansion of democracy, wherein the withering away of the state is politically manifested. This can only mean increased freedom in all organs of the masses and the revolutionary party. The possibility for the class to promote and organize other parties if it so wishes, as well as for tendencies within the party to appear which are occasionally opposed to the line of the leadership, far from disappearing must become all the more complete.

Are we even remotely witnessing such a process in Yugoslavia? One must possess an unusual amount of ignorance, mental simplicity, or hypocrisy in order to assert this. The Yugoslav Party has become more “monolithic” than ever, more “bureaucratic” than ever to the degree that it only follows the policy of the leading group which controls and directs both it and all the other organizations of the country from the top. “Free” expression of opinion is allowed on local, practical questions concerning application of the line, but the expression and organization of national political tendencies is as strictly forbidden as in the USSR and its satellites.

The New Scope of the Problem Today

The “Jacobin” and subsequently bureaucratic deformation of the workers’ power which marked the first proletarian revolution was in a sense inevitable in the precise historical conditions of the time.

At present, after the Second World War, the liberation of a third of humanity from the capitalist system, the sharpened crisis of the later, and the tremendous rise of the international revolution, the question appears in an entirely different light.

We must now start from the conviction that the objective course toward the world revolution has become practically irreversible and irresistible, and no temporary defeat here or there, even a temporary loss of power here or there, can be decisive internationally, and consequently, finally locally; that the force of the revolution is immense, and that the proletarian power does not have to submit to any limitation in the expression of its real nature: that of being the widest democracy for the class. On the contrary, it is by giving full scope to this precise content that the dynamic of the revolution will be accelerated and its final and total triumph will be facilitated.

No justification therefore can be given to a bureaucratic regime which theorizes the political expropriation of the class.

The mechanism of proletarian democracy as we have described it is valid for the USSR today as well as for all the countries which have thrown off the yoke of capitalism. Let this constitute our program for all these countries, and let us declare this very loudly and with greater assurance than ever. Let the Trotskyists inscribe it in their program for the political revolution which they are urging in the USSR and in its satellites, as well as in Yugoslavia. Let this be the orientation of the Chinese Revolution and the proletarian revolution in all countries.

March 2, 1953

BOOKS

Tito Speaks

Vladimir Dedijer’s large volume* of over 400 pages is not without interest. Despite the sometimes carefully embel­lished story which conveniently reshapes a posteriori events, the role of men, of Tito and of other Yugoslav leaders par­ticularly, the struggle of the Yugoslav masses as well as that of the Communist Party against the Nazi occupation and

-TITO by Vladimir Dedijer, Simon and Schuster; $6.

for social liberation is often drawn with feeling in keeping with the heroic proportions of this struggle.

The outstanding interest in the book is contained in some previously unpublished facts and information on the relations between the Yugoslav CP and the Kremlin during the war and up to the time of the break between the two; on the relations of other Communist parties with the Kremlin; on the formation of the Cominform (1947); on the project of a Balkan Federation; on the attitude of Stalin and the Kremlin toward the Yugoslav, Greek and Chinese revolutions. In the final chapter of the book there are noteworthy indications from Tito on how the Yugoslav leadership now conceives of and justifies the political regime in Yugoslavia and its prospects of development. (See article by Jean­Paul Martin elsewhere in this issue.)

The information provided by Dedijer’s book on all the above-mentioned subjects confirm especially the evaluations made by our own movement on the relations between the Soviet bureaucracy, the Communist parties and the revolutionary mass movement, as well as on the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions.

Let us examine this concretely.

Dedijer believes that the scope taken by the revolutionary movement of the masses in Yugoslavia during the war, and its relatively independent character, greatly displeased Stalin and the Krem­lin from the beginning (1941).

The Kremlin was very parsimonious
in the aid it doled out to the Yugoslav partisans, enough to hold out against the German troops and to immobilize a certain number of them in Yugoslavia, but not enough to permit the creation of an independent force capable of achieving victory by itself.

On Yugoslavia, as well as on Greece, the Kremlin had come to an agreement with the Americans and the English during the war which would have permitted the inclusion of both of these countries in the British sphere of influence. To buttress this point of view Dedijer cites not only a series of significant facts which were disclosed in the relations between the Yugoslav CP and the Kremlin but also the pertinent references contained in Cordell Hull's and Stettinius' memoirs.

The description of the first interview between Stalin and Tito in 1944 in Moscow leaves no room for doubt on Stalin's intentions toward Yugoslavia at the time. He brought pressure on Tito to accept the return of the king, not to oppose an eventual landing of British troops in Yugoslavia, and to placate the Serbian bourgeoisie which he, contrary to Tito, believed to be "very strong."

We know that he had a like attitude toward the Greek revolution which began with the liberation of the country in 1944, and that the Greek Communist party, loyal to the Kremlin's orders, did not attempt to take power either before or during the month of December 1944. We know that it engaged in merely defensive battle despite the overwhelming superiority of its forces for a number of days during the British intervention in December 1944.

Stalin and Mao Tse-tung

From a number of other sources and from our own deductions we know that Mao Tse-tung's struggle for power beginning with 1946 started under the pressure of the revolutionary movement of the peasant masses and against the Kremlin's line which was designed to maintain the compromise with Chiang Kai-shek.

Dedijer provides new proof of the correctness of this point of view on the Chinese Revolution in his citation of the proposal Stalin made to Kardelj in Moscow in February 1948. According to Dedijer, Stalin then said the following, verbatim:

"For instance, we do not agree with the Yugoslav comrades that they should help further the Greek partisans. In this matter, we think we are right and not the Yugoslavs. It is true, we have also made mistakes. For instance, after the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow and we discussed the situation in China. We told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprisings in China had no prospect, and that the Chinese comrades should seek a modus vivendi with Chiang Kai-shek, then support the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army. The Chinese comrades agreed here with the views of the Soviet comrades, but went back to China and acted quite otherwise. They mustered their forces, organized their army and now, as we see, they are beating the Chiang Kai-shek army. Now, in the case of China, we admit we were wrong. It proved that the Chinese comrades and not the Soviet comrades were right. But that is not the case with the Greek partisans, and Yugoslav comrades should stop helping them. That struggle has no prospect whatsoever." (pp. 321, 322).

The admission is in character, and despite Stalin's recognition of "error" — he obviously could not have done differently — it is not exaggeration to say that this fact (Mao's victory achieved, the Kremlin's line to the contrary notwithstanding) constitutes the decisive act of independence of the Chinese CP in relation to the Kremlin whose happy consequences, and historic significance for China as for the entire world will perhaps never be forgotten by the Chinese.*

*In this connection it is interesting to cite in extenso what Isaac Deutcher wrote on the same subject in the introduction to the French edition of his biography of Stalin (pages 13-14):

"... Stalinists as well as anti-Stalinists have recently begun to acclaim the legend that Stalin was the real inspirer of the Chinese Revolution. How far does this recognition of his role in the Chinese events of 1925 to 1927 as we have described them in Chapter X7 How reconcile this opinion moreover with the declaration of Stalin himself at Potsdam that 'the Komintang is the only social political force to govern China'? (Cf. J. P. Byrnes, "Speaking Frankly")

One may contend that he ostensibly disregarded the Chinese communists at Potsdam solely to deceive his Western allies. It appears more correct to me to believe that Stalin, until a very late date, had a very conservative point of view on the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to control all of China and that even in 1948 he went to the lengths of trying to dissuade Mao Tse-tung from launching the series of offensives which were to bring victory to Chinese Communism. It seems that a letter from Stalin to Mao was read at the confrontation of the Chinese Communist Party which was held shortly before the beginning of these offensives; but the conference rejected Stalin's advice."

Forth International

To be noted also in Stalin's declaration are his remarks relating to the Greek civil war (1947-49), once again cynically betrayed by the Kremlin since "it has no prospect whatsoever."

Inside the Cominform

The dissolution of the Cominform in 1943 did not cause any concern among the Yugoslavs, according to Dedijer. They found Stalin's motives at the time to be perfectly justified. On the other hand, in 1948 Dedijer believes that the Yugoslavs were the first to feel the need for the revival of an international body for consultation and the exchange of experiences between the various Communist parties. They proposed this idea to Stalin who endorsed it immediately for other reasons.

Not lacking in interest are all the facts given in Dedijer's book on the meeting that founded the Cominform, the criticisms directed by the Yugoslav and Zhdanov at the French and Italian Communist parties for their opportunist line, as well as all the details on the functioning of the Cominform, the editing of its paper, etc. They depict the constant efforts of the Kremlin to keep the Cominform under its strict control in face of discontent and even of latent opposition by several leading elements of different Communist parties.

Of great interest are the pages on Dirich's attitude, his pressure for a Balkan Federation, as well as for a broader confederation embracing "Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and Greece—yes, mind you, Greece" (p. 314), his declaration published in Pravda and then refuted in the same paper, his frictions with Stalin personally on this question, as well as the reactions of other Communist leaders to this project. They give a clear illustration of how far the aspirations of the Communist parties in the satellite countries — the deformed expression of the aspirations and interests of the masses — ran counter to the Kremlin's line.

They clarify in part the deeper reasons for the unrest, the chronic crisis which afflicts their relations with the Kremlin, as well as the past and future purges to which the Soviet bureaucracy is driven to keep direct agents totally loyal to it at the head of the Communist parties and governments.

— M. P.

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