Factional Struggle
And Party Leadership

By James P. Cannon

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By Arne Swabeck
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CONTENTS

Factional Struggle and Party
Leadership By James P. Cannon 115
Social Relations in the U.S. Today
By Arne Swabeck 122
Index for Vols. XIII and XIV, 1952-1953 127

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Factional Struggle
And Party Leadership

By JAMES P. CANNON

(Speech by James P. Cannon at the Open Plenum of the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, November 1953, New York, N. Y.)

* * *

We all recognize, comrades, that we have come to the end of the long faction fight in the party. Nothing remains now but to sum up the results.

This has been a long faction fight, and it was not brought to a definitive conclusion until it was fully ripe. The Cochranite minority were given a whole year to carry on underground factional work and organization in the party. A whole year. Then we finally dragged them out into the open, and we had intensified discussion for five months, with more Internal Bulletins published even than in the great fight of 1939-40. Then we had the May Plenum and the truce, which the Cochranites signed but did not keep.

Then five more months of struggle during which the Cochranites developed their positions to their logical conclusion and showed themselves in action as an anti-party, anti-Trotskyist tendency. They organized a campaign of sabotage of party activities and party funds, culminating in the organized boycott of our 25th Anniversary meeting. Then we came to this November Plenum where the Cochranite leaders were indicted for treachery and suspended from the party. And that's the end of the faction fight in the SWP.

In the face of the record nobody can justly say that we were impatient; that anything was done hastily; that there wasn't a free and ample discussion; that there were not abundant proofs of disloyalty before discipline was invoked. And above all, nobody can say that the leadership hesitated to bring down the ax when the time came for it. That was their duty. The rights of a minority in our democratic party have never included, and will never include, the right to be disloyal. The SWP has no place and no room for strike-breakers.

* * *

Unifications and Splits

Trotsky once remarked that unifications and splits are alike methods of building the revolutionary party. That's a profoundly true remark, as experience has shown. The party which led the Russian Revolution to victory was the product of the split with the Mensheviks in 1903, several unifications and splits along the road, and the final unification with Trotsky in 1917. The combination of the splits and the unifications made possible the party of victory in the Russian Revolution.

We have seen, in our own experience, the same principle working out. We began with a split from the Stalinists. Unification with the Musteites in 1934 and later with the left-wing of the Socialist Party were great milestones in the building of our organization. But these unifications were of no more importance, and stand rather on an equal plane, with the split of the leftist sectarians in 1935 and of the revisionist Burnhamites in 1940, and with the split of the new revisionists today. All these actions have been part of the process of building the revolutionary party.

This law enunciated by Trotsky, that both unifications and splits are alike methods of building the party, is true however, only on the condition that both the unification and the split in each case is properly motivated. If they are not properly prepared and properly motivated they can have a disrupting and disorganizing effect. I can give you examples of that.

The unification of the Left Opposition under Nin in Spain with the opportunist Maurin group, out of which was formed the POUM, was one of the decisive factors in the defeat of the Spanish Revolution. The dilution of the program of Trotskyism for the sake of unification with an opportunist group robbed the Spanish proletariat of that clear program and resolute leadership which could have made the difference in the Spanish Revolution in 1936.

Conversely, the splits in the French Trotskyist organization before World War II, several of them, none of which were properly motivated — contributed to the demoralization of the party. It has been our good fortune that we have made no false unifications and no false splits. Never have we had a split in which the party did not bound forward the day after, precisely because the split was properly prepared and properly motivated.
The party was not ready for a split when our Plenum convened last May. The minority at that time had by no means extended their revisionist conceptions into action in such a manner as to convince every single member of the party that they were alien to us. For that reason we made big concessions to avoid a split. By the same reasoning, because everything was clear and everything was ripe in November, we made the split here—without the slightest hesitation. And if, in the reminiscences of the fight, you give the party leadership credit for their patience and forbearance in the long struggle, don’t forget to add that they deserve just as much credit for the decisive, resolute action taken at this Plenum to bring things to a conclusion.

* * *

The Split of 1940

I think it would be useful for us to make a comparison of this split, which we consider to be progressive and a contribution to the development of the revolutionary party in America, with the split of 1940. There are points of similarity and of difference. They are similar insofar as the basic issue in each case was revisionism. But the revisionism of 1940 was by no means as deep and definitive as the revisionism that we have, split with today. Burnham, it is true, had abandoned the program of Marxism but he did it openly only in the last stages of the fight, when he took off the mask. And Shachtman did not go along fully with him. Shachtman, up to the point of the split, did not openly revise our program on the Soviet Union, which was the central issue in dispute.

He left the question open and even stated in one of his last documents that if the imperialists would attack the Soviet Union he would come out for defense. As for the third leader, Abern, he did not yield anything theoretically to revisionism at all. He still considered himself an orthodox Trotskyist, and thought the whole fight was over the organization question. He was greatly mistaken, but the definitive struggle between orthodox Trotskyism and revisionism was by no means as clear-cut and deep in 1940 as it is this time. That was shown by the fact that when Burnham carried his revisionism to its logical conclusion and abandoned the movement altogether a couple of months later, Shachtman and Abern drew back.

The two splits, this one and that of 1940, are similar in that they were both unavoidable. The differences in each case had matured to the point where we could no longer talk the same language or live in the same party. When the Shachtmanites gave us their plain ultimatum and demanded that they be allowed to have their own paper, their own magazine, their own public expression, they were only expressing their deepest conviction that they had to talk a different language from ours; that they could not conscientiously circulate what we wrote in our press along orthodox lines. And since we could not tolerate that, the split was unavoidable.

* * *

The present split is different from 1940 in that it is more definitive. There is not a single member of this Plenum who contemplates any later relations in the same party with the strike-breakers of the Pablo-Cochran gang. Any doubt on this score is excluded. It is an absolute certainty that from yesterday morning at eleven o’clock, when they left the hall—not with a bang but a giggle—that they left for good. The most that can be contemplated is that individual members who have been caught in the under-currents may drift back to the party one by one, and of course they will be received. But as far as the main core of the minority faction is concerned, they have broken forever with us. The day they were suspended from the party, and released from further obligations to it, was probably the happiest day of their lives.

The Shachtmanites, on the other hand, continued to protest for a long time that they would like to have unity. And even six-seven years after the split, in 1946 and 1947, we actually conducted unity negotiations with the Shachtmanites. At one time in early 1947 we had a unification agreement with them, illustrating the point I make that the split of 1940 was by no means as definitive and final as is the split today. We are finished and done with Pablo and Pabloism forever, not only here but on the international field. And nobody is going to take up any of our time with any negotiations about compromise or any nonsense of that sort. We are at war with this new revisionism, which came to full flower in the reaction to the events after the death of Stalin in the Soviet Union, in East Germany, and in the French general strike.

Differences In the Splits

There are differences between the two splits in other respects, very important ones, and more favorable for the party. First, as to the size of the split. In 1940 the Shachtmanites had not less than 40% of the party and a majority of the youth organization. If you count the youth, who were not voting members of the party, it was almost a 50-50 split. This group takes out a baré 20%. That is one difference.

A second difference is that in 1940 the split was a split of the leading cadre right down the middle. Not just a sloughing off of some people that you can easily get along without. For years in the central leadership of the party, the central political nucleus had been Burnham, Shachtman and Cannon. They took-two out of the three. They had a majority of the Political Committee of the party as it was constituted up to the outbreak of the fight in September 1939. We had to reorganize the Political Committee at the Plenum in October 1939 in order to establish the majority rule in the PC.

Shachtman and Burnham were by no means mere ornaments in the Political Committee. They were the editors of the magazine and of the paper, and they did practically all the literary work. There was a division of labor between them and me, whereby I took care of the organizational and trade union direction, administration and finances — and all the rest of the chores that intellectuals don’t like to bother with as a rule — and
they did the writing, most of it. And when they were on the right line they wrote very well, as you know.

So in 1940 there was a real split, not only in the political leadership but in the working cadre as well. At the time of the split there was a lot of apprehension on the part of some of our comrades. What in the devil would we do without these first class intellectual forces, efficient writers, etc.? And there was great jubilation on their part, and a profound conviction that we would never be able to get along because they took all the writers.

Why, practically all the comrades who are now leading the party and doing all the work of the leading cadre — very few of them were even members of the National Committee at that time. Those who were members, were only getting their first experience and had not yet gained recognition as writers, orators and politicians. Comrade Dobbs, for example, coming out of the mass movement, had been only a couple of months in New York. A number of other comrades, who were members or alternates of the National Committee, had not yet considered themselves or been considered as actual members of the leading political cadre of the party. In 1940 the split of the cadre went right down the middle.

* * *

And then there was a third feature of the 1940 split. The petty-bourgeois opposition went out of the party with the majority of the youth who, as Comrade Dobbs said, have more bounce to the ounce. They were confident that with their dynamism, with their ability to jump and run, with their conception of a “campaign party,” and with their writers — they would soon show that they could build a party faster, bigger, better — and in every other California way — than we could. We didn’t agree with them, but that’s what they started with.

And don’t forget, they started almost the next week with a new party. They called it the “Workers Party” and they came out with a new weekly paper and with a magazine which they stole from us. For a considerable period they thought they were serious rivals of ours in the struggle for the allegiance of the workers’ vanguard in this country. That is what we were up against in 1940. We had to take a new cadre of previously inexperienced comrades and push them into places of responsibility in the Political Committee and the press, and begin their training for leadership in the fire of struggle.

The Party Rolls Along

The 1953 split is quite different in various respects. First, I mentioned size. It is much smaller. Second, the cadre is not split down the middle this time, as might appear to some people when they see these names — Cochran, Clarke, Bartell, FrankeIl, and so on. They are talented people; they were part of the cadre; but not an indispensable part. We have had five months of experience of the “cold split” since the May Plenum to test that out. During that entire period the Cochranites have done no constructive party work whatever. Inspired by the Great God Pablo, they have devoted their efforts exclusively to factionalism, obstruction of party work and sabotage of party finances. And what has been the result? We have found in the five months since the May Plenum that these people are in no way indispensable to the literary work of the party, to the political work of the party, to the organizational work of the party, or to the financial support of the party.

The party has been rolling along without them and despite them for five months. The split of the cadre turned out to be a splinter. We tested it out for five months in a cold split before we finally confronted it in a hot split, and we know. There will be absolutely no disruption in the leadership, no scurrying around to find who is going to fill the places vacated by these former Trotskyists turned revisionists. The places are already filled, filled to overflowing, so to speak. Everything is going O.K. That’s the experience of the drawn-out cold split since May.

* * *

Third, nobody can imagine these people even daring to contemplate the idea of launching a new party and an agitational paper. First of all, they don’t believe in their own capacity to build a party. Second, they don’t believe in the capacity of anybody to build a party. And in the third place, they don’t believe in a revolutionary vanguard party. So they are not going to confront us with a rival party, claiming to be the Trotskyist vanguard and the nucleus of the future mass party of the revolution.

They are, in their own maximum optimistic plans, aiming at a small propaganda circle which will publish a little magazine, in which they will observe and analyze and explain things for the benefit of the “sophisticated political elements,” i.e. the Stalinists and “progressive” labor skates. Sideline critics, observers, analysts and abstainers — that is the kind of an opposition they will present to us. No rival party.

They will not be an obstacle to us in our struggle as a party in election campaigns — because they don’t believe in election campaigns. In the first period after we split with the Shachtmanites they used to run their own candidates against us in New York and other places; and in general they tried to compete with us, their party against our party. That will not be the case with the Cochranites. If we want to have any debates with these people, I think we will have to hunt them up wherever they may be hiding. And in some places that is going to be a difficult proposition, especially in Detroit and San Francisco.

* * *

A Test of Leadership

A factional struggle is a test of leadership. Factional struggle is a part of the process of building the revolutionary party of the masses; not the whole of the struggle, but a part of it.

Some comrades, especially mass workers, who want to be all the time busy with their constructive work, who are upset and irritated by arguments, squabbles and fac-
tion fights, have to learn that they can't have peace in the party unless they fight for it. Factional struggle is one way of getting peace.

The party, as you know, enjoyed internal peace and solidarity over that entire period from 1940 to 1951; eleven years, barring that little skirmish with Goldman and Morrow, which did not amount to much - eleven years of peace and normal internal life. This "long peace" carried the party through the war, the trial and the imprisonment of the 18, the post-war boom and the first period of the witch-hunt. That internal peace and solidarity didn't fall from the sky. It was not "given" to us. We fought for it and secured it by the factional battle with the petty-bourgeois opposition in the eight months from September 1939 to April 1940.

Every serious factional struggle, properly directed by a conscious leadership, develops in progressive stages: it has a beginning, a middle, and an end; and at every stage of the struggle the leadership is put to a test. Without a conscious leadership, factionalism can devour and destroy a party. Headless factionalism, sometimes even the smallest squabble, can tear a party to pieces. We have seen this happen more than once. Everything depends on the leaders, on their consciousness. They must know how and when to begin the faction fight; how to conduct it; and how and when to finish it.

* * *

The first two stages of the struggle against the revisionist-liquidators in the SWP - the beginning and the middle - are already behind us. Now comes the end. We will have plenty of time to reflect on the experiences of the first two stages later. I think it would be ill-advised and worse than a waste of time, at this stage of final action in finishing the fight, to begin reminiscing and examining how many mistakes were made, and who made this and that mistake, and so on.

The essential thing is that the leading cadre of the party as a whole saw the problem in time, took hold of the situation and brought it out in the open, for five months of free discussion. Then, at the May Plenum we offered the minority a truce in order to give them a chance to reconsider their course or to establish the issues more clearly in objective discussion. Then, when the Cochraneites broke the truce, we went through five months of the "cold split," and finally brought it to an end at the Plenum.

All that was done successfully, without disrupting or demoralizing the party. That is the essential thing. We can leave for later the reminiscences or examinations or analyses of whether a little mistake was made here and there by this one or that one. That does not count now. The third point is what counts now - how to finish the faction fight. And here again it is a question of leadership.

* * *

**The Question of the Party**

Leadership is the one unsolved problem of the working class of the entire world. The only barrier between the working class of the world and socialism is the unsolved problem of leadership. That is what is meant by "the question of the party." That is what the Transition Program means when it states that the crisis of the labor movement is the crisis of leadership. That means, that until the working class solves the problem of creating the revolutionary party, the conscious expression of the historic process which can lead the masses in struggle, the issue remains undecided. It is the most important of all questions - the question of the party.

And if our break with Pabloism, as we see it now clearly; if it boils down to one point and is concentrated in one point, that is it - it is the question of the party. That seems clear to us now, as we have seen the development of Pabloism in action. The essence of Pabloist revisionism is the overthrow of that part of Trotskyism which is today its most vital part - the conception of the crisis of mankind as the crisis of the leadership of the labor movement summed up in the question of the party.

Pabloism aims not only to overthrow Trotskyism; it aims to overthrow that part of Trotskyism which Trotsky learned from Lenin. Lenin's greatest contribution to his whole epoch was his idea and his determined struggle to build a vanguard party capable of leading the workers in revolution. And he did not confine his theory to the time of his own activity. He went all the way back to 1871, and said that the decisive factor in the defeat of the first proletarian revolution, the Paris Commune, was the absence of a party of the revolutionary Marxist vanguard, capable of giving the mass movement a conscious program and a resolute leadership. It was Trotsky's acceptance of this part of Lenin in 1917, that made Trotsky a Leninist.

That is written into the Transition Program, that Leninist concept of the decisive role of the revolutionary party. And that is what the Pabloites are throwing overboard in favor of the conception that the ideas will somehow filter into the treacherous bureaucracy, the Stalinists or reformists, and in some way or another, "In the Day of the Comet," the socialist revolution will be realized and carried through to conclusion without a revolutionary Marxist, that is, a Leninist-Trotskyist party. That is the essence of Pabloism. Pabloism is the substitution of a cult and a revelation for a party and a program.

* * *

**The Leading Cadre**

The problem of the party has another aspect. The problem of the party is the problem of the leadership of the party. I believe, that just as truly as the problem of the party is the problem the working class has to solve before the struggle against capitalism can be definitively successful - the problem of the party is the problem of the leadership of the party.

You cannot build a revolutionary party without the program. We all know that. In time the program will create the party. But herein is precisely the role of conscious leaders - to save time. Time is "of the essence" in this epoch when years count for centuries. It is certainly dif-
difficult to build a party without leadership, without cadres. As a matter of fact it can't be done.

Look over the world, look over all the experiences of the last quarter of a century, in one country after another, where the writings and teachings of Trotsky were available, where the program was known, and what do you see? Where they lacked the leaders to build the party, where they lacked cadres, the party did not amount to much. On the other hand, those parties which threw up leaders capable of working together as a cadre remained firm and solid and consciously prepared their future.

The leading cadre plays the same decisive role in relation to the party that the party plays in relation to the class. Those who try to break up the historically created cadres of the Trotskyist parties, as the Pabloites are doing in one country after another, are in reality aiming to break up the parties and to liquidate the Trotskyist movement. Take note: I said “trying” and “aiming,” I didn’t say “succeeding.” They will not succeed. The Trotskyist parties will liquidate the liquidators, and the SWP has the high historic privilege of setting the example.

* * *

Given the program, the construction of leading cadres is the key to the construction of revolutionary parties; and the former requires an even higher degree of consciousness and a more deliberate design than the latter. Of course, every party in every generation since the Communist Manifesto has had a leadership of a sort. But there has been very little consciousness about its selection, and for that reason, among others, the real problem remained unsolved. The experiences of the past in this respect are rich in lessons on the theme of what not to do.

The present generation of the revolutionary vanguard, which has the benefit of Lenin and Trotsky, has the supreme duty now to examine the tragic mistakes of the past in this respect in order to avoid them and to replace haphazard methods by a conscious theory and a deliberate design in the construction of leading cadres.

**Kinds of Leadership**

First, and perhaps worst, of the kinds of party leadership which we have seen and known, even in the Fourth International, is the unplanned leadership of talented individual stars, pulling in opposite directions, squandering their energies in personal rivalries, quarrelling over trifles, and incapable of organizing a sensible division of labor. That has been the tragic experience of many sections of the Fourth International, in particular of the French section. I don’t know how things are in France today, but I do know that the French section of the Fourth International will never become a real party until it learns to discipline its individual star performers and make them work together.

A second kind of leadership is the leadership of a clique. In every leadership clique there is a certain coordination, a certain organization and division of labor, and it sometimes looks good—while it lasts. But a clique is bound together by personal associations—what Trotsky, who hated cliques, called “chumminess” — and has in it, by that very fact, a fatal flaw—that it can be broken up by personal quarrels. That is the inevitable fate of every political clique.

There is no such thing, and can be no such thing as a permanent clique, no matter what good friends and chums may be drawn together in a tight, exclusive circle and say to themselves: “Now we have everything in our hands and we are going to run things fine.” The great winds and waves of the class struggle keep beating upon this little clique. Issues arise. Personal difficulties and friction develop. And then come personal quarrels and squabbles, meaningless faction fights and senseless splits, and the clique ends in disaster. The party cannot be led by a clique. Not for very long, anyway.

* * *

There is a third method of leadership which I will confess to you frankly I noticed only after I passed my sixtieth birthday. That is the leadership of a cult. I will admit that I lived sixty years in this world before I stumbled over the fact that there are such things as political cults. I began rubbing my eyes when I saw the Johnsonites operating in our party. I saw a cult bound to a single person, a sort of Messiah. And I thought, “I’ll be damned. You’re never too old to learn something new.”

A cult requires unthinking fools for the rank and file. But that is not all. In order for a cult to exist, it is not enough for a leader to have personal followers—every leader has personal influence more or less—but a cult leader has to be a cultist himself. He has to be a megalomaniac who gets revelations outside the realm of reality. A megalomaniacal cult leader is liable to jump in any direction at any time, and all the cultists automatically follow, as sheep follow the bellwether, even into the slaughterhouse.

That is what happened with the Johnsonites. The cult followed Johnson, not simply for his theory of the Soviet Union—other people have that theory; a lot of people in the world have that theory about “state capitalism.” The Johnsonites were personal cultist followers of Johnson as a Messiah; and when he finally gave the signal for them to jump out of this party for reasons known only to himself, but allegedly because of some personal grievance he imagined, of which they had no knowledge and which they had just heard about, they all left the party at the same hour, Eastern Standard Time. That is a cult. The Pabloite cult, like any other, is capable of jumping in any direction at any time, whenever the leader gets a revelation. You cannot trust the party of the workers’ vanguard to a cult or a cultist leader.

There is a fourth method of leadership which has been very common. I have seen much of it in my time—that is the leadership of a permanent faction. Here is something that we have to be on our guard about, because we have just gone through a very severe faction fight, and in the course of the fight we have become tightly bound together. It is absolutely necessary for the leadership to see clearly what a temporary faction is; what its legitimate purposes are, what its limits are, and the danger of the faction hardening into permanence.

* * *
Hardening of Factions

There is no greater abomination in the workers' political movement than a permanent faction. There is nothing that can demoralize the internal life of a party more efficiently than a permanent faction. You may say, that is contradicted by the experience of Lenin. Didn't he organize a faction in 1903, the Bolshevik faction, and didn't that remain a hard and fast faction all the way up to the revolution? Not entirely. The faction of Lenin, which split with the Mensheviks in 1903, and subsequently had negotiations with them and at various times united with them in a single party, but nevertheless remained a faction, was a faction only in its outward form.

In the essence of the matter, the nucleus of the Bolshevik Party of the October Revolution was the Lenin Bolshevik faction. It was a party. And the proof of the fact that it was a party and not an exclusive faction of Lenin was that within the Bolshevik faction there were different tendencies. There were left-wing and right-wing Bolsheviks. At times some of them openly polemicized with Lenin. The Bolsheviks even had splits and re-unifications among themselves. Lenin did not consider the Bolshevik faction something he was going to keep with him all his life as a closed corporation.

In the decisive days of 1917 when he brought out his April Theses, he showed that his conception was really that of a party by uniting with Trotsky, which made all the difference in the world. It was a party action. And a few months later, when Zinoviev and Kamenev, the very closest collaborators of Lenin, went wrong on the insurrection, he combined with Trotsky to smash them. Lenin's faction was in reality a party.

We have seen factions which grew out of a separate struggle, crystallized and hardened, and held together after the issues which brought them into being no longer existed. That was in the old Communist Party.

Its leading cadre, as a whole, was a fusion of people with different backgrounds. There were the New Yorkers, and some others, who came out of the Socialist Party, whose experience had been in the field of parliamentary socialism, election campaigns, etc. — a purely "political" grouping. Ruthenberg, Lovestone, etc., represented this background. There was another tendency in the party represented by the "Westerners" — those who had a syndicalist background, a background of work in the trade union movement, in strikes, in the "direct action" of the class struggle. Foster, Bill Dunne, Swabec, myself, etc., represented this origin.

We naturally formed different tendencies — each partly right and partly wrong — and from the beginning were always in skirmishes with each other. Eventually these tendencies hardened into factions. Then later, after several years of experience, we learned from each other and the real differences narrowed down. But the faction formations remained. Time after time, the two factions would agree on what was to be done; agree on every resolution for the convention; and still the factions would continue to exist.

Degeneration of Factionalism

In such circumstances the factions degenerated into gangs struggling for power, and the degeneration of the Communist Party was greatly facilitated by that. The Comintern should have helped us to unify the cadre, but instead it fed the flames of factionalism in order to fish in the troubled waters to create its own Stalinist faction. Those were bitter times. I began to rebel against that sterile kind of struggle and I made several attempts — years before we were thrown out of the party for Trotskyism — I made several attempts to break up the politically senseless faction formations. A number of us broke away from the Foster gang and formed a separate grouping and united with a group that Weinstone had split off from the Lovestonites, with the same revolt against this purposeless gang factionalism. We formed a "middle grouping" with the slogan: "Dissolve the factions."

We carried on a fight for a couple of years to dissolve the factions into the party. But by that time both the Lovestonites and the Fosterites had become so hardened in the gang and clique spirit that it was impossible to do it. That contributed to the degeneration of the Communist Party, because permanent factions become cliques and they exclude everybody else. If a permanent faction happens to get control of the leadership of the party and runs the party as a faction, it is bound to exclude others from any real place in the leadership. By that very fact it drives the others into the organization of counter-cliques and counter-factions, and there is no longer a single cadre in the leadership of the party. We saw that happen in the C.P. We have to learn something from that experience.

* * *

In our party, basing ourselves on our experiences and our studies, we have had a conception of the leadership not as a number of uncoordinated individual stars; not as a clique; not — in God's name — as a sect; and not as a permanent faction. Our conception of the leadership is that of a leading cadre.

It is a conscious design, patiently worked at for years and years. A leading cadre, in our conception, has the following basic characteristics: It consists of people who are, first of all, united on the program; not on every single question that arises in daily work but united on the basic program of Trotskyism. That is the beginning.

The second feature is that the leading cadre is an inclusive and not an exclusive selection. It does not have a fixed membership, but deliberately keeps the door open all the time for the inclusion of new people, for the assimilation and development of others, so that the leading cadre is flexibly broadening in numbers and in influence all the time.

Our cadre has another feature. It constructs the National Committee as a widely democratic representation of the party. I do not know how the leadership is constructed in other parties, but our party here is not led exclusively by the central political working group in New York. The leadership, we have always emphasized, is not the Secretariat. It is not the Political Committee. It is not the Editorial Board. It is the Plenum. The Plenum includes
the Secretariat, the Political Committee and the Editorial Board, plus the leading comrades from all the districts of the party.

**Leadership Really Representative**

These district representatives, as you know, are not handpicked in New York and promoted by special maneuvers. We all know how to do that sort of thing and deliberately refrain from doing it. The central leaders never interfere with the deliberations of the nominating commission at party conventions. The district representatives are freely selected by the delegates from their districts and confirmed by the nominating commission. They really represent their branches or locals, and when they sit in the Plenum you have a really democratic representation of the entire party. That is one reason why our Plenums have such a commanding authority in the party.

When the Plenum meets, we can say that we are the leadership because we really are. It is a small convention every time we have a meeting of the Plenum of the National Committee. That is part of our deliberate program of constructing a representative leadership which is democratically controlled.

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A third feature of our conception of the cadre, which we work on consciously and deliberately all the time, is to cultivate among all the leading people the ability to work together; not to be individual stars; not to be wiseacres who make problems of themselves — but people who fit into a machine; work together; respect the opinions of others; recognize that there is no such thing as an unimportant person, that anybody who stands for the program and is sent into the National Committee by his branch or local has something to give. The task of the central leaders of the party is to open the door for him, find out what he can do, and help him to train himself to do better in the future.

The ability to work together is an essential feature of our conception of the leading cadre, and the next feature is that of a division of labor. It is not necessary for one or two wise guys to know everything and do everything. It is much better, much firmer, much surer if you have a broad selection of people, each one of whom contributes something to the decisions and does a specially selective work for which he is qualified, and coordinates his work with others.

I must say, I take great satisfaction in the way the leading cadre of our party has evolved and developed in the period since the open fight with the Pablo-Cochran revisionists began. I think they have given the world movement a model demonstration of a strong group of people, of varied talents and experiences, learning how to coordinate their efforts, divide the labor between them, and work collectively so that the strength of each one becomes the strength of all. We end up with a powerful machine, which combines the merits of all its individual members into a multiplied power.

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And you not only combine the merits and get good out of them. You can sometimes also get good and positive results from a combination of faults. That also takes place in a properly organized and coordinated cadre. That thought was expressed to me in a letter from Trotsky. What I am telling you here is not exclusively what I have seen and experienced and thought up in my own head. It is not only the experience, but also a great deal of personal instruction from Trotsky. He formed the habit of writing to me very often after he found out that I was willing to listen and did not take offense at friendly criticism.

**Trotsky’s Advice**

He kept advising me all the time about the problems of leadership. As far back as 1935 and 1936, in the fight with the Musteites and the Oehlerites, he gave us such advice. He always referred to Lenin, how Lenin had put his cadre together. He said, Lenin would take one man who had an impulse for action, smelled opportunities and had a tendency to run ahead of himself, and balance him off against a man who was a little more cautious — and the compromise between the two got a balanced decision, which redounded to the benefit of the party.

He told me, for example, in one letter where he was advising me to be very careful and not to make an exclusive slate for the Committee, and not to eliminate people who have some faults which I especially don’t like, such as hesitation, conciliation and indecisiveness in general; he said, you know Lenin used to say about Kamenev, that he was a constitutional vacillator; he always tended at the moment of decision to “soften up,” to vacillate and conciliate. Kamenev, as a matter of fact, belonged to the faction of Bolshevik conciliators in the period after 1907 to 1917, with a tendency toward conciliation with the Mensheviks, but he remained in the Bolshevik Party.

And Lenin used to say — as Trotsky explained it to me — we need Kamenev in the Central Committee because his tendency to waver and conciliate is the reflection of a certain tendency of that kind in the party ranks that we want to keep our finger on. When Kamenev speaks we know that there is a certain sentiment within the party of the same kind that we have to take into consideration. And while we do not accept Kamenev’s wavering and conciliation, we go slow and take it into account because when we move we want to take the whole party with us. If he raises too many objections, we stop awhile and devote a little more time to education in the party ranks to make sure that our ranks will be solid.

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Our strength is in our combination, both of our faults and of our virtues. That, taken on the whole, is what I call the cadre concept of leadership. This cadre, for the last year almost, has been constituted as a faction — that is, the great majority of the cadre. We have engaged in a faction struggle. But what was that cadre organized into a faction for? It was not the whole cadre; it was the majority, but not all. It didn’t include the comrades from Buffalo and Youngstown — there were some differences there at first but they have been virtually eliminated in the course of the struggle; the decisions of this Plenum are all unanimous.
But at the start, the majority of the cadre constituted itself into a faction, meeting by itself, making its own decisions, and so on.

However, this faction was not formed for the purpose of having a faction. It was not formed as a permanent combination of good fellows who are going to stick together from now to doomsday and not let anybody else join. It is not a gang, nor a clan, nor a clique. It is just simply a politico-military organization formed for a certain purpose. But what was the purpose? The purpose was to defeat and isolate the revisionist faction of Pablo-Cochran. That aim has been achieved.

**Dissolution of Majority Faction**

That being the case, what is the duty of this faction now? Are we going to hold together for old time’s sake, form a sort of “Grand Army of the Republic” — the only ones allowed to wear ribbons, demand special privileges and honors? No. The duty of this faction now is to say: “The task is finished, the faction is no longer needed, and the faction must be dissolved into the party.” The leadership of the party belongs henceforth to the cadre as a whole, assembled at this Plenum. All problems, all questions for discussion, should be taken directly into the party branches.

I would like to start off this new stage of party life by announcing here, in the name of the majority faction of the National Committee, its unanimous decision: The majority faction that was formed for the purposes of the struggle, having accomplished its task, thereby dissolves itself into the party.

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**Social Relations in U.S. Today**

*By ARNE SWABECK*

From his fundamental social and economic studies Marx drew the conclusion that all human relations are rooted in the material conditions of life, or more specifically, in the prevailing mode of production and distribution of each historical stage of development. This is the basis for the existence of social classes and it gives rise to class antagonism and conflicts as well as to consciousness of class position.

“It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness.”

Economic conditions are not the sole determining factor. They form the basis for the political and legal superstructure with its philosophical, cultural and religious attributes. But between all of these there is reciprocal interaction with a fundamental economic necessity which in the final analysis always asserts itself.

Since the beginning of civilization human society has developed on the basis of dominance of class contradictions and class struggles. Whenever new productive forces were attained the mode of production was altered and social relations changed correspondingly. New classes appeared in place of the old; and the social contradictions and conflicts became the motive power of all historical development.

This holds true for each historical stage, to which capitalism forms no exception. On the contrary, capitalism has intensified these contradictions and enlarged the scale of conflict.

From these contradictions, constantly transformed from one series of connections into another, Marx formulated the objective laws of development of the capitalist system. And he found that the very forces which operate to yield an equilibrium of its elements generate counterforces which disrupt that equilibrium. These contradictions and their reciprocal interactions, expressed in violent conflicts, crises, and wars, account for the instability of the system. Historically, its character is transitory. The ever-expanding productive forces and their ceaseless revolutionization of capitalist society prepares the way for new and higher social forms.

While material conditions of life have thus made necessary a certain order of things during the historical stage of capitalism, they make equally necessary another order into which these must inevitably pass over at the next historical stage.

This we accept as our fundamental concept. It enables us to understand the variations and changes of social relations at each successive stage of development. It enables us also to understand the corresponding changes in the reactions, the moods, and the consciousness of the working class. And the application of this concept provides the key to a correct appraisal of the future course of development.

**American Capitalism**

The analysis made by Marx of the objective laws of motion of capitalist society is most fully confirmed by the evolution of its American sector — its most highly developed expression. The history of the United States is the history of capitalism in its most modern and its most advanced form.

Since its birth the United States has been built on a capitalist foundation from its economic substructure to its philosophical and religious summits. American history reveals an abundance of bold ventures, great spurts, and revolutionary leaps. Its outstanding phenomenon is the remarkably compressed character, and unexampled speed and tempo, of social development. Within this framework American capitalism displayed its special
traits of audacity, aggressive enterprise and ruthless pursuit of its struggle for class supremacy.

As is well known, the secret of its success lies primarily in the unique position enjoyed by American capitalism during the earlier and greater part of its development. It had possibilities aplenty for sustained expansion on a virgin continent rich in natural resources. This provided the essential prerequisites for technological advance. Rapidly growing labor productivity created abundant surplus values to furnish the life blood of an ever greater accumulation of capital, all of which existed alongside of an organically expanding internal market. As it unfolded, this process was interrupted periodically by crises and panics, yet in its dialectic interactions it became a self-sustaining process.

The United States became the land of plenty and of opportunity. Its ever-mounting wealth enabled American capitalism to give greater concessions expressed in a relatively higher standard of living for the population and greater degree of formal democracy than was the case with capitalism elsewhere.

These unique possibilities available to American capitalism set its definite seal upon the corresponding social developments. While the working class movement often challenged the capitalist drive toward complete class domination, its own evolution during this early state followed an irregular pattern. Robust and militant, from its inception, it forged ahead in turbulently explosive struggles, especially during each boom period, to retreat and almost disappear for a time. But it rose again to make further gains. Bold venture and revolutionary leaps became a distinguishing characteristic also of the early American labor movement, reaching its highest point during the upheavals of the eighties of the past century.

The equilibrium of class relations suffered rude shocks, sometimes merely causing a shift of advantage between the opposing forces, at other times, however, having a sufficiently shattering effect to necessitate its reconstitution on a new plane.

Such a reconstitution took place after the explosive period of the eighties. A relative stability of class relations ensued, but it was attained primarily by narrowing the scope and influence of the unions to the skilled sector at the cost of keeping the great mass of the labor population unorganized and helpless. Finally the unions were in actuality divorced from mass production industry. And as American capitalism, still enjoying the fruits of its unique possibilities, advanced toward its most healthy prime in the boom period of the twenties, the labor movement retreated and lost ground.

The Great Depression

With the great depression the unique position which American capitalism had enjoyed came to an end. The long-term factors of organic expansion of its internal market had been exhausted. But exhausted also were its historically progressive qualities. The great depression marked the end of one era and the beginning of a new.

Since the crash of 1929 the social and economic structure of the United States has been subjected to a transformation which is qualitative in its content. Correspondingly, certain important functions of the political superstructure have been altered. As a consequence, social and class relations exist now on a foundation which is also qualitatively different. A new molecular process was set into motion; and the mutual interaction of these basic changes will influence decisively the course of future development.

Several features of this transformation stand out in bold relief and warrant careful examination. Let us consider first among these what an inventory of national wealth reveals.

1: A study of income and wealth published by the National Bureau of Economic Research presents illuminating facts and figures. Estimates of this study are carried through from the year 1896 to 1948. But their real significance lies in the sharp contrast revealed by the two periods, before the depression and after. The figures given in constant dollars based on 1929 prices read as follows:

From 1896 to 1929, both inclusive, national wealth rose from $164 billion to $426.3 billion with a fairly regular upward curve of an increasing ratio, and amounting to an average annual rate of growth of about 3 percent. From 1929 to 1948, however, the figures present an entirely different picture. The rate of growth of national wealth now becomes highly irregular. Starting from a total of $426.3 billion in 1929 the increase over these years is very slight, the actual total of 1948 is only $461.8, or an average annual gain of less that one-half percent (to be exact, 0.45 percent).

Projections made of the above mentioned study by the U.S. News and World Report, carried through 1951, reveal the fact that while we have a plethora of automobiles, radios, televisions and innumerable gadgets, the total value of home buildings, measured in constant dollars on a per capita basis, is today 13 percent below that of 1929. These projections summarize as follows: “Even now, as the U.S. wealth has become, the country is still a little below 1929 in real wealth, population growth considered.”

The basic trend revealed by these estimates is clear and beyond dispute. It does not conceal the fact that the American bourgeoisie has become fabulously enriched by vast profits made in peace-time as well as in war-time. But the twofold effect of ravages of depression, and a vast scale of arms output in the place of production of use values, during this latter period, created a different reality for the American people. Relatively the country as a whole is now poorer than it was in 1929. In terms of population growth this relationship becomes absolute.

What does this basic trend portray if not a system in decline? The powerful internal dynamic once generated by American capitalism, out of its past unique position, to be sure, and not out of any inherent quality, this internal dynamic is now being rapidly dissipated. American capitalism now squanders, recklessly, the wealth
accumulated by past generations. This is the surest indication that it has in actuality entered the state of decline of its world system as a whole.

2: A second feature of the transformation carries implications of more immediate and more basic concern. The great depression revealed the fact that American capitalist economy had lost its capacity to operate as a self-sustaining process. In place of an ever-growing market, keeping abreast of the expanding productive forces, a yawning disproportion appeared. The whole process had been thrown into reverse; it could no longer proceed unaided and on its own momentum. Artificial stimulants had to be injected to keep the economy a going concern.

At first these stimulants took the form of simple "pump-priming" through public works expenditures as an effort to close the gap between production and consumption. But the efforts of the first phase quickly proved insufficient. They were superseded by war and armaments expenditures together with foreign economic and military grants.

Thus, while in 1929 expenditures for the armed forces amounted to less than one percent of the gross national product, in 1944 at the height of World War II expenditures, these were not less than 45 percent. Today the arms program accounts for 20 to 25 percent of the gross national product.

The Arms Program

War and armaments production became, and has since remained, a sector of decisive importance to the whole economy. It was decisive not only in the sense of its central imperialist aim to which all other economic efforts had to be subordinated. It was, and remains, decisive also in the sense of maintaining a balance in a precarious economic equilibrium loaded with explosive elements of crisis.

While the armaments program represents a terrific burden of overhead expense on the nation as a whole, its real paradox lies in the fact that the economy under capitalist relations of production could not be sustained without it. This has already become a demonstrated fact, it is the fact of a qualitative change. The truth is that this economy is no longer expanding organically in the sense of either rapidly enlarging old industries or creating new ones. Those of the latter category which have appeared during the period under consideration, such as radio and television, do not absorb a sufficient part of the immense productive capacity to provide a serious impulsion to the economy. Hence only arms production remains to provide an artificial stimulant. In the absence of an organically growing market these components of the economic structure lay the basis for more devastating crises to come. Thus all the factors which in the past stimulated and strengthened the prodigious growth of the American economy are either disappearing or turning into their opposite.

3: Alongside these changes in the economic foundation and closely integrated with them should be noted the vastly enlarged scale of function of the political superstructure. The paralyzing effect of the great depression made necessary a much more direct state intervention in all aspects of social and economic life. Beginning with the New Deal, this intervention continued through the Fair Deal and it will, all appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, become more complete under Eisenhower.

Greater and more direct intervention in social and economic relations is an outgrowth of, and at the same time a particularly distinguishing characteristic of, the capitalist world system in its stage of decline. Its appearance in the United States serves to underline the fact that basic elements of decline have also reached these shores.

Increasing anarchy of production in general, pushed to its extreme by the greater concentration of monopoly capital, generates ever more malignant elements of economic crisis. Complexities of international relations, expressed in wars and revolutions, and reflected as well in the astronomic costs of the war program, tend to invest every manifestation of economic crisis with a distinct social and political character. They tend to become manifestations of crisis of the bourgeois regime. The combination of these factors has necessitated constantly more direct state intervention in an attempt to preserve the social stability of the regime.

World War II, the Korean War, and the continued war program has brought this intervention to its highest form of development in the United States. The government became the centrally directing force in all social and economic activity. Major risks of capital investments in the war program were assumed by the government with guaranteed lucrative profit returns for the big monopoly concerns. The government took charge of labor relations and set patterns of wages and working conditions. Through heavy taxation, the government controls an increasingly large share of the national income. This constitutes its operating capital — social capital — which is used primarily to promote imperialist aggression in an effort to keep the economy on an even keel and safeguard capitalist profits.

Shifting Class Forces

On the whole, the powers of the political state are strengthened immeasurably; its preponderance, however, renders the political state so much more vulnerable to the tremors and eruptions of social and economic relations with which it is now so thoroughly integrated. The impact on the future political life of the nation will tend in this sphere also to bring forth new and higher forms of development.

4: Yet the most important aspect of the transformation of the American social structure since the depression is the change that has taken place in the relationship of class forces. While the outward stability of its social fabric still remains, this relationship now
rests on an entirely new foundation. The working class has emerged as a distinct social force foreshadowing today its great potentialities of tomorrow.

From the lowest depth of its long period of ebb-tide the labor movement advanced in one mighty leap. A volcanic eruption climaxed the long accumulated pressures of capitalist exploitation which were intensified by the mass unemployment and destitution of the depression days. From virtual atomization the working class went ahead and built the most powerful union movement in the world. In the process of growth, quantity changed to quality. Union consciousness, cohesion and militancy replaced the diffusion, inertia and backwardness of the past.

The hitherto prevailing equilibrium of class forces was shattered and it could be restored only on an entirely new basis: on the basis of recognition of this new power. For the American social structure this change of relationship more than any other development signifies the end of an era and the beginning of a new.

Outwardly this new equilibrium still remains relatively stable. The opposite and antagonistic class forces have maintained a certain balance of power. How was this manifested in actual life? In the first place, the war and the arms economy provided a guaranteed market, relatively free of competition, for the products of capital investments. But it permitted also a vast expansion and a greater utilization of the available productive forces which in turn permitted a more complete realization of surplus value. On the whole this made possible the continuation of a measure of concessions to labor. Through full employment, including overtime, and by means of winning several wage rounds, the working class standard of living maintained a rising trend. Out of these concessions the so-called Welfare State gradually evolved.

Conservative tendencies within the working class grew and became more pronounced as a result of these conditions. And the labor bureaucracy, supported tacitly by the rank and file union members, drew ‘closer to the government, seeking its protection against the power of monopoly capitalism. In effect this new relationship took on the form of a political coalition, not formally recognized of course, but existing in fact. The government needed the collaboration of the labor leaders to assure the indispensable prerequisite of mass acquiescence in its war program; the latter wanted to maintain the benefits of the “Welfare State.” This was the essence of the political coalition which served as an essential prop for the relative social stability that prevailed through the New Deal and the Fair Deal period.

Working class acquiescence in the imperialist war program became an established fact, not to be disturbed seriously even by the unpopularity of the Korean War. Now the Korean war has come to an end. This, of course does not signify a change of the fundamental course of American imperialist policy. Its essence remains global war of undisguised counter-revolution; war for the survival of the capitalist system.

Washington’s Problems

But the war plans elaborated by the Washington strategists are now badly disorganized; their time-table is upset. Defeat in Korea underlines the power and sweep of the colonial revolution. Increased working class resistance to Washington policies in the European metropolis centers unfolds alongside the mounting difficulties, insecurity, and crisis of their bourgeois regimes. The overall effects cause hesitation and muffled resistance also by the latter and introduce paralysis into the NATO structure. Not because these bourgeois regimes, like, for example, that of the British ‘Tories’, are less imperialistic or less counter-revolutionary than their more powerful Washington allies. No, the real reason is the impact of more clearly defined and sharpened class relations on Tory home grounds. Stronger than the pressure from Washington is the more immediate and direct threat to Tory class rule coming from the growing consciousness and political advance of the British working class which, moreover, is displaying its hatred of imperialist war. Tory hesitation and resistance reflect their awareness of that danger.

This is paralleled by significant changes in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin; and the totality of these developments has introduced further modifications in the world relation of class forces which compel a considerably slower tempo of the imperialist war drive. In turn these modifications, together with the change of tempo, tend to aggravate the contradictions of the American social and economic structure. The artificial stimulants which had operated to yield an equilibrium of its elements generated counterforces which threaten to disrupt that equilibrium. Out of their mutual interaction elements of crisis once again become predominant.

A twofold dilemma confronts the American bourgeoisie. In the field of foreign policy the relationship of class forces, on a world scale, is evolving more distinctly to the disadvantage of its projected counter-revolutionary strategy. Internal policy faces the beginning of economic decline which is fraught with serious consequences for the stability of the social structure. Dynamic forces have been set into motion in both fields which easily pass beyond the control of policy makers at imperialist headquarters. Both pose problems of social crisis.

At the imperialist home base the, program of arms production did not mitigate, let alone remove, a single one of the basic causes out of which crises arise. Not only did these persist, but they have grown more malignant. This can be illustrated quite simply.

Commodities produced in a normal peace-time economy for the most part return to further sustain that economy. By and large they return either in the form of capital goods employed as means of production, in the form of raw materials of production, or in the form of means of consumption to sustain the labor force. In this manner they serve to build up and strengthen the economy and increase national wealth. The output of war material, on the other hand, is in its entirety unpro-
ductively consumed. Arms production on the present scale, therefore, constitutes a terrific drain on the economy and on all the resources of the nation. The debt load, both government and private, has reached astronomical proportions; credit inflation extends its dis-integrating influence into every pore of the economy; heavy taxation cuts deeply into the lowest income brackets. And yet, a serious reduction of arms expenditures would spell disaster to the economy.

But the program of arms production promotes also the exact opposite tendency. Military needs, stimulated by the ravenous appetite for imperialist conquest, demand an accelerated and unrestrained expansion of productive capacity which quickly surpasses the absorbing ability of the market. Precisely this is now the case. Elements of a crisis of overproduction appear alongside of, and in spite of, the leverage of vast arms expenditures. It is clear now that the war and the armaments economy tends to push all the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production to the extreme. Tendencies toward crisis, merely held at bay by the injection of artificial stimulants of arms expenditures, are now due to erupt. Their explosive fury tends to become greater because of the consequent unrestrained expansion of the material forces of production.

**Depression or War**

The basic transformation of the economic structure now reveals its real nature: economic decline amidst an enormous armaments production. Indeed, this poses more sharply the terrible alternatives: depression or war. Any other course is definitely excluded. And implicit in both alternatives is the social and political crisis of American capitalism. Its decadence is approaching a deadly climax.

Once again the Marxist analysis of crisis arising inevitably out of the many-sided contradictions between the productive forces and the productive relations of capitalism finds its verification in the actual march of events. But these relations of production, as Marx made equally clear, are capable of final explanation only in terms of the social relation of classes and the position they occupy in the process of production. In other words, all these developments can be interpreted only in the sense of their dynamic interplay with existing class relations, or they cannot be interpreted at all. The reaction to these developments by the contending class forces therefore becomes the decisive question. What the power-drunk bourgeoisie intends to do is already clearly indicated. Its course of action is determined by its economic and political needs as a class owning and controlling the means of production.

Economic decline imposes serious restrictions on the full and complete realization of surplus value. While the magnitude of the latter must inevitably diminish, the magnitude of arms expenditure remains, and it will eventually increase. Yet these terrific "overhead costs" of Wall Street's program of world domination can come from one source, and one only: national income.

Concerned first and foremost with profits and its accumulation of capital, the bourgeoisie, therefore, plans to effect a drastic redistribution of national income. It will not tolerate concessions to labor that approach anywhere near the previous scale. It needs an ever greater part of the purchasing power of the workers to finance the tremendous costs of armaments production. At the same time the bourgeoisie is less and less disposed to tolerate a social relationship in which the labor movement holds a certain balance of power. And in order to strengthen its own class position it is equally determined to change this relationship. Nothing less will satisfy the American bourgeoisie as a minimum prerequisite in preparation for the next stage of aggressive moves in its predatory war plans. As these unfold, the titanic immensity of the contemplated desperate venture would cut the working class standard of living to the very bone and tax the manpower requirements to the point of virtual slave labor.

From these general considerations a two-pronged attack on labor unfolds. Instead of the measure of concessions previously granted, the chiefs of big business and finance are now determined to reduce the workers share of the national income, while they themselves plunder the nation's resources. Austerity will replace prosperity.

But this part of the program cannot be carried out successfully unless it is combined with measures to curtail the power of the trade union movement in order to assure complete command for the capitalist monopoly concerns. The witchhunt, attempts at thought control together with repressive and union-busting legislation is being fitted into the whole pattern of attack. Step by step these measures can be expected to unfold alongside of the production decline and the consequently more abundant supply of labor power. Flank attacks at the initial stage developing to a full-scale offensive for which all of the essential groundwork has been laid down carefully and consciously; this is the real significance of Eisenhower's Millionaire Cabinet.

**Anti-Labor Program**

The political coalition between the government and the trade union bureaucracy has been brought to an end. It was terminated, not on the initiative of the labor leaders, but by the very same chiefs of big business and finance who have taken charge of the execution of the anti-labor program. Now the political coalition has been replaced by open, unabashed and completely unchallenged control of the government by monopoly capitalism. Its first objective is to carry the anti-labor program through to the end. Indeed, state intervention in social and economic relations will become more complete under the Eisenhower regime.

Even in this most highly developed capitalist nation, no clearer proof has ever been provided of the real role and function of the political state as an instrument of class rule. It was to be expected, of course, that this should become more pronounced as fissures of decline and decay begin to crack the capitalist foundation. In-
creasing state intervention in social and class relations arises on the whole, out of the reactionary necessity to prevent the disintegration of the old order, to hold the working class at bay, and to preserve the bourgeois relations of production. State intervention can therefore occur only on behalf of the interests of capitalism, whose class rule it symbolizes and translates into action.

But the relationship of class forces is not at all as favorable to the bourgeoisie as may appear on the surface. By virtue of its economic and social weight the working class is in possession of a far greater power than that of its adversary. It is now a class socially transformed to the highest level of union consciousness and organization. And the trend toward economic crisis together with the two-pronged attack on labor will tend to alter correspondingly the further course of the class struggle.

(To be continued)