INTERNATIONAL
SOCIALIST
REVIEW

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The American working class on December 11, 1960, lost one of its best, most experienced and loyal defenders. Carl Skoglund, at the age of 76, died of a sudden heart attack while talking with a few friends. He was a big man, a strong man and a skilled man, a worker experienced in many trades. He knew the life of the lumberjack. He laid railway ties. He worked as a mechanic in a railway shop. He hauled coal. He never exploited anyone. Like all workers, he produced far more wealth than he ever consumed.

But Carl Skoglund was much more. He was a class-conscious worker, a socialist. He lived his entire adult life fully aware of the historic tasks of his class. All his thoughts and all his actions were bent to the education and organization of his class for human progress.

For this reason Carl Skoglund escaped the miseries and frustrations that burden the lives of most workers. He lived his life with the deepest grasp of the historical process.

Most workers escape from the dull, monotonous and hopeless grind of daily toil only in moments of labor upsurge or revolutions. Only then do they feel the liberating solidarity of men and women working and fighting together for the common good. The very fact of struggle against capitalism is an emancipation, a realization of freedom.

Carl Skoglund was one of those few who worked and lived always on the level of the mountain-peak moments of his class. Periods of quiescence or retreat were not occasion for despair, because he understood their transient character. The broader sweep of history was his field of action.

It is for this reason that the story of Carl Skoglund's life is also the history of the revolutionary movement in America. He contributed to that history; and, in return, his personality was an integrated product of that history.

In the first World War Carl Skoglund, as a member of the Socialist party, stood with Eugene V. Debs in opposition to the right-wing leaders. When the workers of one country were ordered to slaughter the workers of another, he raised his voice, still tinged with the accent of his native Sweden, for internationalism. He protested against the lies of the "war for democracy" and the "war to end all wars."

The war ended in the first successful struggle for power by the working class of any nation — the Russian Revolution. Skoglund hailed that great event and helped to found the American Communist party.

By 1928 the Russian Revolution had receded and a bureaucratic caste took over the Soviet government. What later was called euphemistically "the cult of the individual" began the era of the destruction of Bolshevism freedom in Russia and the destruction of Communist parties throughout the world as instruments of revolutionary struggle.

Again Skoglund had the courage and the clarity of vision to pioneer in the construction of an opposition. He joined in defending the truth against this monstrous bureaucracy. His energy was devoted to the preservation of revolutionary principles. He was expelled from the Communist party for his opposition to the Stalin regime in 1928.

The correctness of his views was fully confirmed in the tragic events in Germany in 1933. The second largest Communist party in the world permitted Hitler to come to power without a struggle. As a result Carl Skoglund with his friends and comrades began the arduous task under Trotsky's leadership of assembling a new revolutionary cadre throughout the world. In 1938, once more, he helped to found a revolutionary movement in the United States, the Socialist Workers party.

The thirties also saw a great labor upsurge in the U.S. For the first time the industrial workers successfully challenged the absolute power of the biggest capitalists in the world, forced them to sign union contracts, and brought new hope to the exploited of this land. Skoglund demonstrated his capacity for leadership in the mass movement and helped to make history in Minnesota and throughout the Midwest. He became the much-loved and much-respected president of General Drivers' Local 544, International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

World War II temporarily put a stop to progress for the American working class. War-fed prosperity, repressions, and narrow national chauvinism destroyed the promising movement toward independent political action. And Skoglund, together with 17 of his comrades, was sent to prison in the utterly vain hope of silencing the voice of internationalism.

For the rest of his life, Carl Skoglund was threatened with deportation. The period of the witch-hunt restricted and confined him physically. But it didn't even touch his morale or his convictions. He had a very real contempt for the capitalist class in the United States. A cool contempt. He always seemed amused at the foolish, frantic efforts of the capitalist class to solve their problems and find the means to survive. He knew this outmoded class was doomed; he was sure of the ultimate revolutionary victory. He was supremely confident, as a Marxist and as a human being. But without a trace of vanity or pettiness.

For all these reasons Carl Skoglund was an exceptionally happy man who enjoyed life to the full. Those who knew him were enriched, not only in understanding the world in which they live, but in knowing how to live in that world.

The photograph on the front cover shows a picket line demonstrating in front of the United Nations Nov. 26 against ominous moves of the U.S. fleet in the Caribbean. The picket demonstration was held under the auspices of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, 799 Broadway, New York City.
Theory of the Cuban Revolution

by Joseph Hansen

“No revolution has ever anywhere wholly coincided with the conceptions of it formed by its participants, nor could it do so.” — Leon Trotsky.


In the first stages of the Cuban Revolution, not much appeared about it in the way of searching analysis. Publicity was largely agitational, whether for or against. Consequently the worth of most early writings hinges largely on the accuracy of the reporting and the extent to which documentary material is included. This is especially true of some items, highly laudatory of the Revolution and its leaders, by authors who have since gone over to the counter-revolution.

The situation today is quite different. The character and meaning of the Cuban Revolution, of the government that displaced the Batista dictatorship and of the state now in power are under intense discussion throughout the radical movement on an international scale. The theoretical questions have come to the fore. This reflects the course of the Revolution itself. It began as an ill-reported and ill-understood revolutionary democratic movement in a small island ruled by one of a dozen strong men in Wall Street’s empire. Today it stands as a colossal fact in world politics — the opening stage of the socialist revolution in Latin America, the beginning of the end of American capitalist rule in the Western Hemisphere.

The two books under review are among the best in a new literature appearing about the Cuban Revolution, a literature written by serious thinkers accustomed to probing for the deep-lying forces and trends in modern society. These thinkers are fascinated by what this Revolution has revealed, for they feel that perhaps here may be found clues to titanic revolutionary events now drawing near. As Huberman and Sweezy express it: “In Cuba they are actually doing what young people all over the world are dreaming about and would like to do.” (Emphasis in original.)

Let’s begin with Listen, Yankee. In writing this book C. Wright Mills displayed considerable courage. The author of The Power Elite and White Collar, to mention his best known books, staked a big reputation and high standing in academic circles when he decided to support the Cuban Revolution with such forthrightness. That he weighed the issues is evident from the following statement:

“Like most Cubans, I too believe that this revolution is a moment of truth, and like some Cuban revolutionaries, I too believe that such truth, like all revolutionary truth, is perilous.

“Any moment of such military and economic truth might become an epoch of political and cultural lies. It might harden into any one of several kinds of dictatorial tyranny. But I do not believe that this is at all inevitable in Cuba. And I do believe that should it happen it would be due, in very large part, to the role the Government of the United States has been and is continuing to play in Cuban affairs . . . .

“The policies the United States has pursued and is pursuing against Cuba are based upon a profound ignorance, and are shot through with hysteria. I believe that if they are continued they will result in more disgrace and more disaster for the image of my country before Cuba, before Latin America, and before the world.” (Emphasis in original.)

To help enlighten his fellow Americans and as a service in countering the hysteria, Mills presents the Cuban revolutionary case. As a succinct presentation of the main facts that led to the revolutionary explosion, of the achievements since then, and of the aims, attitude and outlook of the main rebel forces, the book is a remarkable accomplishment. I cannot recommend it.
too highly to anyone seeking a quick briefing, particularly as a knowledgeable Cuban revolutionist, leaving aside diplomatic considerations, might give it to you on a visit to the island.

It's Not Stalinist

The salient feature of *Listen, Yankee* is the clarity with which it presents the anti-Stalinist aspect of the Cuban Revolution. Most readers of the *International Socialist Review* will understand at once, I am sure, that this has nothing to do with the anti-Communism of the House Un-American Activities Committee or similar bodies of witch-hunters and counter-revolutionaries. Even in most Communist parties where the cult of the late dictator was once the first commandment, it is generally accepted today — since Khrushchev's Twentieth Congress revelations about Stalin's crimes and paranoia — that to be anti-Stalinist does not automatically put you in Hitler's camp.

An understanding of the attitude of the Cuban revolutionists toward Stalinism is particularly important. The Cuban Communist party supports the revolution. The government, in turn, has respected its democratic rights, as it has the democratic rights of other radical groupings. It has refused to engage in any witch-hunting and has denounced anti-Communism as a divisive weapon of the counter-revolution. This, plus the aid solicited from the Soviet bloc countries (which undoubtedly saved the Cuban Revolution from going down), has been utilized to falsely picture the Cuban government as having succumbed to Stalinism.

The issue happens to be crucial in the United States for winning support for the Cuban Revolution in sectors of the trade-union movement, among intellectuals and on the campus. It is not just a matter of attempting to overcome hysterical Stalinophobia. In these circles the truth is widely known about Stalin's suppression of proletarian democracy, his frame-ups of working-class political opponents, mass deportations and assassination of socialist leaders. Many rebel-minded people in the United States, who offered their support to the Soviet Union, felt betrayed on learning the facts about Stalinism. Consequently, out of fear of being burned again, they are cautious. On the other hand, the appearance of a genuinely democratic socialist revolution could reanimate them. Besides constituting the only sectors of the population ready at present to give a fair hearing to the Cubans, they are an essential link in rebuilding a mass socialist movement in America. Mills gives the question the importance it warrants, citing many facts to indicate the profoundly anti-
Stalinist nature of the revolution. Among these he notes the stress placed on immediate benefits for the people, the readiness to listen and learn in all fields, the freedom that makes Cuba so exhilarating to radicals, above all those on vacation from the stifling atmosphere of McCarthyland.

On the decisive political fact of leadership, Mills has his Cuban protagonist write an entire letter (No. 5), explaining why the Communist party is not in power in Cuba and why it is highly unlikely even to seek power.

"The plain fact is, our revolution has outdone the Communists on every score. From the beginning up till today, always at every turn of event and policy, the revolution is always faster than the Cuban Communist Party, or individual Communists. In all objective facts, then, we are much more radical, much more revolutionary than they. And that is why we are using them, rather than the reverse; they are not using us. In fact they are being very grateful to us for letting them in on the work of the revolution.

"In fact, this is the case generally with local Communist parties in Latin America. In a real revolution today, in Latin America at least, the local Communists are to the right of the revolution. Here in Cuba, certainly the revolution has outpaced them and does on every front. They always arrive too late and with too little. This has been the case in Cuba and it still is the case: They lag behind our revolution." (Emphasis in original.)

The truth is that Stalinism proved to be an imperable handicap for the Communist party of Cuba, no matter how revolutionary-minded its ranks were; and it was by-passed by Castro's July 26 Movement.

**Capitalist Base Destroyed**

On the theoretical assessment of the Cuban revolution as it stands today, Mills offers some interesting opinions. "The Cuban revolution," he observes, "has swiftly destroyed the economic basis of capitalism — both foreign and Cuban. Most of this power was foreign — in fact, North American. It has now been destroyed with a thoroughness unique in Latin-American history."

In his sociological estimate, Mills says, "The Cuban revolutionary is a new and distinct type of left-wing thinker and actor. He is neither capitalist nor Communist. He is socialistic in a manner, I believe, both practical and humane. And if Cuba is let alone, I believe that Cubans have a good chance to keep the socialist society they are building practical and humane. If Cubans are properly helped — economically, technically and culturally — I believe they would have a very good chance." (Emphasis in original.)

As to political power, in Mills' opinion, "The Government of Cuba is a revolutionary dictatorship of the peasants and workers of Cuba. It is legally arbitrary. It is legitimised by the enthusiastic support of an overwhelming majority of the people of Cuba." In letter No. 6, the Cuban spokesman specifies that it is not a Stalinist-type dictatorship:

"In the most literal sense imaginable, Cuba is a dictatorship of, by, and for the peasants and the workers of Cuba. That phrase, 'dictatorship of workers and peasants,' was turned into a lie by Stalin and under Stalinism. Some of us know that. But none of us is going about our revolution in that way. So, to understand us, you must try to disabuse yourself of certain images and ideas of 'dictatorship.' It is the pre-Stalin meaning of the phrase that is accurate for Cuba."

It is in the political area that Mills expresses the greatest worry for Cuba. "I do not like such dependence upon one man as exists in Cuba today, nor the virtually absolute power that this one man possesses." However, Mills believes that "it is not enough either to approve or to disapprove this fact about Cuba. That is much too easy; it is also politically fruitless. One must understand the conditions that have made it so, and that are continuing to make it so; for only then can one consider the prospects of its development." The conditions include the form of struggle needed to overthrow Batista, the enormous counter-revolutionary pressure of the United States, and the fluidity of the present situation in which democratic forms have not yet been worked out in the living experience of the revolution.

Castro's leadership in the difficult revolutionary struggle brought him this exceptional personal power, but it is Mills' conviction that Castro is opposed to any leadership cult, is aware of the danger and will help the revolution to pass through it. "In my judgment," says Mills, "one must take seriously this man's own attempts to shift roles, even in the middle of his necessary action, and his own astute awareness of the need to develop a more systematic relation between a government of law and the people of Cuba."

**"Anatomy of a Revolution"**

Let us turn now to the book by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, the editors of the *Monthly Review*. They wrote this after a three-week visit to Cuba in March, 1960, publishing it as a special edition of their magazine. Events soon dated parts of it. The authors took another trip to Cuba and have now published a supplement, "Cuba Revisited," (December 1960 issue of the *Monthly Review*) which, I understand, is to be included in a new edition of the book.

The strong side of the book — *Anatomy of a Revolution* is its emphasis on economics. The authors do a good job of summarizing the main facts about Cuba under Batista, available in such books as Lowry Nelson's *Rural Cuba*, then turn to current problems where they offer the results of their own investigations on the scene. The facts they have assembled are encouraging indeed. Instead of collapsing, as the capitalist press has been predicting, the Cuban economy has grown stronger. Consider, for instance, the main crops, which have been the center of a planned expansion drive:

"Their total volume increased by almost one third in the first year of the Revolution, and there is no doubt that a comparable rate of expansion is being maintained this year. China, it seems, is not the only country capable of 'big leaps forward.' But what other country has ever staged such a leap forward in the very first year of a Revolution and in the midst of a far-
reaching agrarian reform? It can be said without exag-
neration: in the Cuban Revolution the world is wit-
tnessing a process of socio-economic transformation and
vitalization that is in many important respects without
any precedent. Let the world look hard and draw the
appropriate conclusions!” (Emphasis in original.)

When the agrarian reform was put through, predic-
tions were freely made in the big press that the Cubans
with their “lack of know-how” would speedily bring
the cattle industry to ruin by slaughtering the breeding
stock, some of it of top quality. The spiteful forecasts
of the dispossessed cattle barons were not borne out.
Huberman and Sweezy cite a representative of the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization who
said that while no figures were available for the island
as a whole, Havana was eating 60 to 70 per cent more
beef in March, 1960, than the previous year while the
supply of beef cattle had also been sharply stepped up
“chiefly owing to better feeding methods.” The authors
conclude: “There could be no better evidence than this
that (1) the Revolution has already transformed the
standard of living of the Cuban masses, and (2) this
new and higher standard of living has come to stay.”

Some Flaws

In political matters, Huberman and Sweezy in gen-
eral leave much to be desired, in my opinion. A few
indications:

They manage to “credit” the “administration of
Franklin D. Roosevelt” with having “abrogated” the
Platt Amendment. They also criticize the same admin-
istration for withholding recognition of the Grau gov-
ernment and granting it to Batista; but the political
necessity of tipping their hats to the FDR myth blocks
them from seeing Roosevelt’s role in establishing the
foul Cuban dictator and maintaining his brutal rule.

In lauding the readiness of the Cuban peasantry to
go directly to agricultural cooperatives, Huberman and
Sweezy refer to the views of bourgeois land reformers
who have aimed at breaking up large landed estates
into small peasant holdings. “More radical thought, at
least from the time of Marx,” they say, “has generally
rejected this aim on the dual ground that small-scale
peasant cultivation of the soil is hopelessly inefficient
and that a small peasantry is inevitably a reactionary,
counter-revolutionary force. However, the Russian Rev-
olution showed the difficulties which confronted any
attempt to go directly from a system of latifundia to
some form of collective agriculture. In spite of them-
elves, the Russian Bolsheviks were forced to distribute
the land to millions of small peasants, and it was only
much later after fierce and bloody social struggles and
frightful agricultural losses that they succeeded in es-
ablishing the system of collective and state farms.”

Thus they amalgamate Lenin’s adherence to the po-
litical position of Engels with its direct opposite, that
of Stalin. Engels held that collectivization in agricul-
ture, despite its obvious economic advantages, could
proceed only in accordance with the will of the peasants
themselves. A revolutionary government could seek to
convince them by argument and examples but in no
case force them. That was how Lenin proceeded. Stalin,
after first pandering to the rich peasants, collectivized
Soviet agriculture by force. The catastrophic conse-
quences still plague the Soviet Union. If a real lesson
is to be drawn from the Cuban experience, it is the
advantages to be gained by following the method
worked out in theory by Engels and put into practice
by Lenin in contrast to the brutal method used by
Stalin. Huberman and Sweezy credit Cuba’s success to
Castro’s knowledge of the peasantry and sensitivity to
their deepest wishes. If Castro is not aware of the
theoretical and historical background, the confirmation
of the Marxist view is all the more notable.

A serious political error which Huberman and Sweezy
themselves admit in their postscript to the book was the
estimate that Washington would not slash the Cuban
sugar quota. We remain uncertain as to why they made
the error. Did they calculate that it was not in the
best interests of capitalism to do this and that the
powers that be would recognize this? Or did they under-
estimate the deeply reactionary character of both the
Democratic and Republican machines? Fortunately, the
politically astute Cuban leaders were not caught by
surprise. As Castro indicated in his speech at the United
Nations, they are well aware of the true relationship
between “the shark and the sardine.”

I mention these items with no thought of disqualify-
ing Cuba — Anatomy of a Revolution. They are minor,
if annoying, flaws in an excellent report and strong
defense of the Cuban Revolution. My intent is to suggest
that if the authors have any predilection it is in the
direction of the Communist party. This gives certain
of the things they say about Cuban politics much great-
er weight than they would otherwise have; for, rep-
resenting a break with their predilection, these views
were undoubtedly pondered many times over before
being expressed.

Made by Non-Communists

From the origin of the July 26 Movement in 1953
until the rebel army was well on the way to victory,
Huberman and Sweezy declare, “the Cuban CP was
cool to and sometimes critical” of Castro’s organization.
The leadership of the revolution “owed absolutely no-
thing to the Communists . . .” Only Castro, if he should
join the Communist party, could persuade any of the
others to follow him. “Since no responsible observer, to
the best of our knowledge, has ever suggested that
Fidel has done any such thing, we conclude that the
hypothesis of Communist infiltration of the leadership
is a pure figment of the anti-Communist imagination.”

Can the Communists get into position to “wrest lead-
ership of the masses, of the revolutionary movement
itself, out of the hands of Fidel and his colleagues in
the army and government?” Huberman and Sweezy
ridicule the possibility, pointing to the smallness of the
Communist party and its lack of standing as against
the size of Castro’s following and their revolutionary
record.

The authors go even further: “In our judgment, for
what it is worth, the Communists could make no bigger
mistake, now or in the foreseeable future, than to challenge Fidel and his close associates for the leadership of the Revolution. They would lose, and in losing they might easily do irreparable damage to the cause of the Revolution, which of course is also their cause. On the other hand, if they continue to pursue their present course, they may play an important, and in some respects perhaps an indispensable, even if subordinate, role in the building of socialism in Cuba.”

To make their meaning still clearer, they compare the Cuban Communists with the American Communists in the New Deal period. “They worked hard and often effectively, trying of course always to push matters somewhat further to the Left than they would otherwise tend to go. While they won control in some unions, they were never in a position to make a bid for political leadership in the country and never caused any serious problems except in the minds of the right-wing lunatic fringe.” In short, although the authors do not say it, since the thirties neither the Cuban nor the American Communists have played the role of revolutionists.

“All the charges and accusations concerning the alleged Communist character of the Cuban government and/or Revolution tend to hide what may turn out to be historically one of the most important facts about the Cuban Revolution: this is the first time — ever, anywhere — that a genuine socialist revolution has been made by non-Communists!” (Emphasis in original.)

Castro and the rebel army, “calling themselves neither socialists nor Communists, in fact without any clearly formulated ideology, seized power in Cuba after two years of bloody civil war and proceeded with élan and dispatch” to do what needed to be done. “No one can now foretell the full implications of this startling fact,” Huberman and Sweezy believe, “but no one need doubt that it will open up new vistas not only in the realm of socialist thought but also in the realm of revolutionary action.”

Although there is considerable difference in the angle of view, in emphasis, in political inclination, and in the way they express what they observed, it is clear that the impressions which the Revolution made on C. Wright Mills on the one hand and Huberman-Sweezy on the other were not greatly different. The similarity extends to other fields.

What kind of social order does Cuba have? “For our part,” declare Huberman-Sweezy, “we have no hesitation in answering: the new Cuba is a socialist Cuba.” (Emphasis in original.)

How did it get that way? After the seizure of power, “the aspect which the Cuban Revolution first presented to the world was that of a quite respectable middle-class regime.” This gave rise to many misunderstandings. However, the real power remained in the hands of Castro. “A sort of dual system of government began to emerge, with Fidel on one side and Urrutia and the cabinet on the other.” The “paradox between the essentially revolutionary character of the regime and the predominantly liberal-to-conservative personnel which represented it before the world” was resolved by March 1960. Two of the landmarks were Castro’s resignation in July 1959 to force the resignation of Urrutia and Che Guevara’s assumption of the presidency of the National Bank in November in place of Felipe Pazos. The Castro regime carried the revolution through to the establishment of a planned economy.

Communist Party Viewpoint

Cuba — Anatomy of a Revolution was saluted with vexed criticism from spokesmen of both the Cuban and American Communist parties. (At this writing they have not yet got around to reviewing Mills’ book.) The CP finds it obnoxious to think that the label “socialist” should be applied to Cuba. It’s a national democratic revolution, you see, in which the national bourgeoisie still plays an important role and in which the need for “unity” is foremost. In addition, Huberman-Sweezy slight the role of the Communist party in the Revolution and the increasingly important role it will play after the proletarian stage opens.

The two derelict authors answer the criticism somewhat disrespectfully with a footnote in their postscript: “Now that the big majority of the means of production are in public ownership, and the regime is rapidly developing a consciously socialist ideology, the Communist argument against classifying Cuba as socialist appears more and more clearly as mere verbal gymnastics. The reason for the Communists’ adopting this position, however, is straightforward enough: they don’t want to admit that it is possible for socialism to be built under non-Communist leadership.”

One wishes that Huberman and Sweezy would venture to analyze this reluctance of the Communists. The question would seem not unimportant and very definitely related to their own belief that the Cuban Revolution has opened up “new vistas not only in the realm of social thought but also in the realm of revolutionary action.” Isn’t the failure of the Cuban Communist party central to this far-reaching conclusion? Wouldn’t a knowledge of the reasons for the failure be of considerable value to other Communist parties — to the revolutionary-minded rank and file if not to leaders who never cause “any serious problems”?

In the dispute between the Communists and the editors of the Monthly Review, it appears to me that Huberman and Sweezy have the stronger case. In fact they hanged the Communist party theoreticians with their own terminology. If each of the countries in the Soviet bloc, including Albania, is “socialist,” then why should this term be denied Cuba, which now has a planned economy — and far greater freedom than any of them?

The fact is that “socialist” was used by Stalin in the years of his psychosis as a mislabel for Soviet society. It was a way of proving that you can build “socialism in one country.” This played into the hands of the worst enemies of the Soviet Union, for they never tired of agreeing and even emphasizing that socialism was what the Soviet Union had all right and therefore Stalinism and socialism were one and the same thing and if America went socialist you’d lose democracy and
get frame-up trials and concentration camps here, too. To confer the badge "socialist" on Cuba may thus — unfortunately — be taken as a somewhat dubious honor. The repugnance the Cubans feel for much that goes by the name of "theory" is not without good political justification.

In the early days the Soviet Union was called a workers' state; "with bureaucratic deformations," Lenin added. It was socialist in tendency; that is, it was a transitional formation on the road to socialism but not there by a long shot. Nor could it reach socialism on its own resources — such a concept, had anyone suggested it in Lenin's time, would have been dismissed as self-contradictory. The Soviet power was a working-class conquest in the international struggle for a world-wide, scientifically planned society built on the foundation of capitalism as a whole, or at least on the combined resources of several industrially advanced countries.

The concern the Bolsheviks felt for terminology was not due to an aesthetic pleasure in splitting hairs. Precision in applying labels reflected their concern over knowing exactly where they stood in relation to the goal still to be achieved. It was a good tradition, well worth emulating, like much else in Leninism.

What Is It?

If Cuba is not "socialist" and is highly unlikely to achieve socialism by itself on one small island, what is it?

The Cubans themselves have been reluctant to say. Professing some disinterest in abstruse questions of theory, they have politely invited those of their supporters and well-wishers who are better informed in such matters to have at it. Meanwhile they propose to move ahead, with or without labels, to work out problems that permit no delay and that have kept their limited personnel going twenty-four hours a day. As their own guide, they find it sufficient to follow the broad generalizations of a humanism concerned with the fate of the humble. If you can tell a guajiro from an imperialist and hold government power, it seems to have all right.

This pragmatic approach has added to the theoretical puzzle. If the Cubans don't know whether Cuba is socialist or not, how is anyone else to know? Jean Paul Sartre, on visiting Cuba, came away with the conviction that the world was witnessing something completely novel — a revolution impelled by blows from an imperialist power to respond with counterblows, each more radical than the previous. Would a revolution driven forward by such a process create its own ideology? That remains to be seen. In any case, Sartre found it a refreshing contrast to what he considers the sectarian approach — applying a preconceived ideology to a revolution.

Others, stimulated like Sartre by the Cuban Revolution, have decided that even Marxist theory breaks down before such phenomena. What provisions are there in Marxism for a revolution, obviously socialist in tendency but powered by the peasantry and led by revolutionists who have never professed socialist aims; indeed, seem to have been limited to the bourgeois democratic horizon? It's not in the books!

If Marxism has no provisions for such phenomena, perhaps it is time provisions were made. It would seem a fair enough exchange for a revolution as good as this one. On the other hand, what books do you read?

Paradox of Russia

The Cuban Revolution is not the first to have given the theoreticians something fresh to consider. The Russian Revolution exceeded it in that respect. In 1917 the entire world socialist movement was caught by surprise, including the Bolshevik party — not excepting even Lenin. Socialists wielding power at the head of the workers and peasants in a backward country like Russia! It wasn't in the book. Well . . . most of the books.

The Russian Revolution was fortunate in having a leadership as great in theory as in action. Four decades ago it was common knowledge in the socialist movement that one at least of the Russian leaders had accounted in theory for the peculiarities of the Russian Revolution in all its main lines — some twelve years before it happened. His name was Leon Trotsky.

Trotsky's theory of the Permanent Revolution greatly facilitated the Bolshevik victory by giving the revolutionary cadre the clearest possible conception of the import of their action. But if Trotsky had not been there, had not made his great theoretical contribution, we may be sure that Lenin, consummate socialist politician and man of action that he was, would have led the Bolsheviks to power just the same and an accurate reflection in theory of the Revolution would have come later.

I mention this not only to defend the right of the Cuban Revolution to have its own peculiarities but to draw from Bolshevik theory to attempt to explain certain of these peculiarities.

The main power in the Cuban Revolution was the peasantry (as in Russia). But this peasantry shaded into the powerful mass of agricultural workers, which, because of the role of the sugar industry, constituted the most dynamic section of the Cuban proletariat. The agricultural workers solidly backed the Revolution. The city workers favored the Revolution but were not in position to head it (unlike Russia) for two reasons. (1) The unions were strapped in the strait jacket of "mu­jalismo"; that is, a bureaucracy tied directly to the Batista dictatorship. (2) The political leadership was held by the Communist party, an organization devoted to "peaceful coexistence," "people's frontism," and the cult of Stalin, an organization which, as Huberman and Sweezy put it diplomatically, "never caused any serious problems." (The CP leaders actually went so far in avoiding causing any serious problems for Batista that they pictured him as a man of the people and took posts in his government.)

The main demands of the peasantry were an end to hunger, an end to Batista's savage killings, and agrarian
reform. (In Russia: Bread! Peace! Land!) These demands became the slogans of the July 26 Movement.

By all the criteria of origin, aims and social following, the July 26 Movement was a petty-bourgeois formation, but an extremely radical one. It had one plank in its program which separated it from all similar groupings and which was to prove decisive. It made a principle of armed struggle without compromise against the Batista dictatorship. To carry out this aim, it organized a peasant guerrilla movement that has been compared to Tito's and Mao's. Parallels can also be found, however, in the rich revolutionary experience of Latin America, including Cuba itself. Its formation was not as novel as its success.

**Character of Government**

On coming to power, the July 26 Movement set up a coalition government that included well-known bourgeois-democratic figures — and not in secondary posts. In retrospect these may have seemed middle-class decorations or mere camouflage hiding the real nature of the government. It is more accurate, I think, to view this government as corresponding to the political aims of the revolution as they were conceived at the time by its leaders.

But such a government stood in contradiction to the demands of the insurgent masses and to the commitment of the July 26 Movement to satisfy those demands. The Revolution urgently required far-reaching inroads on private property, including imperialist holdings. As Castro and his collaborators moved toward fulfillment of the agrarian reform they met with resistance from their partners in the coalition, a resistance that was considerably stifened by support from Wall Street, which viewed them as the “reasonable” elements in a regime packed with bearded “wild men.”

As Huberman and Sweezy correctly observe, “a sort of dual system government began to emerge.” The displacement of Felipe Pazos by Che Guevara in November 1959 marked a decisive shift and the resolution of the governmental crisis, whatever hang-overs from the coalition still remained. The government that now existed was qualitatively different from the coalition regime.

Its chief characteristics were a genuine interest in the welfare of the bottom strata of the population, readiness to entrust the defense of the Revolution to them by giving them arms, clear recognition of the identity of the main enemies of the Revolution and resoluteness in disarming and combating them. It was even free from fetishism of private property. Yet it did not think of itself as socialist. It did not proclaim socialist aims. What should we call such a strange government?

Among the great discussions organized by the Bolsheviks in the first four congresses of the Communist International was one precisely on this question. Deeply buried under landslides of Stalinist propaganda, the minutes and resolutions of that discussion are not readily available. When you unearth them, your feeling is one of shock at their timeliness. Did the Bolsheviks really discuss such a question four years before Castro was born!

The Bolsheviks analyzed several varieties of “workers and peasants government”; that is, radical petty-bourgeois governments, indicating differences that would cause a revolutionary-socialist party to offer support or to refuse support. They also left open the possibility in theory of variants they could not readily foresee at the time. The general label they used for such regimes was “Workers and Farmers Government.” Here we must expostulate a bit with the Bolsheviks; they also called the dictatorship of the proletariat a “Workers and Farmers Government.” A representative from theoretically backward America might have asked for distinctive labels so he could more easily tell them apart. But the Bolsheviks discussed this point, too, and felt that it would not be confusing so long as everyone was clear on the difference in content, since the first kind of government would likely prove to be only a transient form preliminary to the latter type.

Of course, the Communist delegates in 1922 could not visualize such a change without the helpful presence of a genuine revolutionary-socialist party such as the Russian workers had in the Bolsheviks. A key question requiring our attention, therefore, is the absence of this factor in Cuba. To find the answer we must turn to the world situation in which Cuba is locked.

**Death Agony of Capitalism**

The most prominent conditioning force in international politics today is the deep decay of the capitalist system. Leaving aside the effect of such general threats as another major depression or atomic annihilation in a third world war, Cuba has experienced the decay of capitalism in two specific ways: (1) the deformation of national life through imperialist domination — monoculture, super profits, hunger, disease, ignorance, dictatorial rule, etc. (2) the economic and diplomatic strangulation a power like the U.S. applies to a colonial nation seeking independence. The moves emanating from Wall Street and the State Department, as many observers have noted, powerfully accelerated, if they did not make inevitable, the radicalization of the Cuban Revolution. Eisenhower “lost” Cuba much the way Truman “lost” China.

Next in importance to the death agony of capitalism is the existence and the growing power of the orbit where capitalist property relations have been transcended and planned economies constructed. Showing what can be achieved in economic, scientific and cultural progress, not to mention sovereign standing, these countries serve as practical object lessons. Their tendency to magnetize attention, especially in the underdeveloped areas, has become an active political factor that is now powerfully strengthened by the possibility of securing material aid from this source. The Soviet Union, by its mere existence, has always been — even in the terrible years under Stalin — a radicalizing force among oppressed peoples. The attraction was enormously increased by the Chinese Revolution and the fresh example which China has provided of how to break
out of age-old stagnation and imperialist oppression. Cuba has been affected by all this in the most vivid and concrete way.

The third feature of world politics is the long default of the Communist parties in providing revolutionary-socialist leadership to the working class. For decades this signified betrayal and defeat in the most promising of revolutionary situations. Today it has finally begun to signify the emergence of alternative leaderships — the masses in the underdeveloped areas, having lost fatalistic acceptance of hunger, misery, ignorance and ruthless exploitation, have become impatient and are pushing forward whatever leaderships are at hand. Nationalists have filled the vacuum at least temporarily in many areas, but the tendency is toward much more radical currents. Nowhere is this to be seen with greater clarity than in Cuba.

Finally, there is a tendency among the nationalist movements and newly emerging countries in the Far East, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America to seek mutual encouragement and support. The Cuban revolutionists for example, are in close touch with the Algerian freedom fighters. They have diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, India, Ghana, etc. Sekou Touré and Soekarno have been honored guests in Havana. Lumumba is a hero in Cuba. A radical move taken by any of them that proves successful has big impact on all the others. For instance, Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal when Egypt suffered the combined attack of Britain, France and Israel made a lasting impression.

In the light of this international background, the series of countermeasures taken by the Cuban government under pressure from the State Department are seen to have an ideological origin that does no violence to Marxist theory; in fact these countermeasures are explainable only by a theory grounded in the international class struggle.

**Character of the State**

Whatever the consciousness of the Cuban revolutionists may have been, not a single major measure undertaken by them was unique. "Intervention" of the latifundia and domestic and foreign capitalist holdings was undoubtedly as Cuban as the royal palms, but it finds a precedent in the "control" exercised over private enterprises under the Bolsheviks prior to the establishment of workers management of industry. A similar stage appeared in the Chinese Revolution. The expropriations and nationalizations are likewise far from novel. A government monopoly of foreign trade is in the Russian tradition; and the planned economy which Cuba has now begun is, of course, recognized by everyone as in the pattern initiated by the Russian workers and peasants.

In the October, 1960, issue of *Political Affairs*, James S. Allen, a spokesman of the Communist party, labels these as "measures of a state-capitalist type." This effort to avoid the label "socialist," as advanced by Huberman and Sweezy, is not very satisfactory. Are the measures of similar kind in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Albania and China also to be labeled as "of a state-capitalist type"? Evidently not. Aside from this, Allen's position has another flaw. What about the state? Is it capitalist? Can a capitalist state carry out such measures and still remain capitalist? Judging from the shrieks of the counter-revolutionaries and the froth on Wall Street's mouth, it is not possible.

The fact is that the state structure began to undergo alteration upon Castro's coming to power January 1, 1959. For good and valid political reasons, Castro insisted on smashing both the old army and the old police force. The lesson of Guatemala had been well absorbed by the July 26 Movement. A new army and a new police, based on the rebel forces, replaced the old. A nationwide militia was organized.

One could have decided that this was enough to require us at the time to call Cuba a workers state. But the premise for such a conclusion is that the conscious aims of the leadership are revolutionary-socialist, openly proclaimed, so that it remains only a question of time until the entire state structure is altered to conform to the needs of a planned economy. This political premise, of course, did not exist. It remained to be seen what course the pragmatic leadership would take and whether their proclaimed political aims would become altered as they sought to put into effect the reforms they advocated; or whether in sticking to their political positions they modified or gave up their social and economic aims. The outcome could only be determined by the struggle itself.

The results are now in. In the two years since the victory, the holdovers from the old state have been sloughed off in the key positions although they may still hold authority in some sectors. With the completion between August-October, 1960, of the nationalizations in the major areas of Cuban industry, a new state had come into being so deeply committed to a planned economy that Cuba's course in this direction cannot now be changed save by an imperialist invasion and a bloody civil war.

Since the transcending of capitalist property relations and the construction of a planned economy correspond with the economic interests of the working class and are objectively socialist in tendency, we must, if we are interested in exact terminology, call this a "workers state," signifying that it is a state committed to the task of carrying Cuban economy and society forward through the transition from capitalism to socialism.

**Proletarian Democracy**

It is true that this workers state lacks, as yet, the forms of proletarian democracy. This does not mean that democracy is lacking in Cuba. Far more democracy exists today in Cuba than ever existed under any previous regime. It does mean that a government based on workers, peasants and soldiers councils, or some form of councils in democratic control of the government, has not yet been worked out. Mills' observations

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Mills and Marx

How can we defend the values of reason and freedom in this age of the "bureaucracy-ridden mass society"? Marxism and liberalism offer their contrasting answers.

by William F. Warde

In The Sociological Imagination C. Wright Mills examines the state of the social sciences in the United States today. Half of the book is devoted to criticism of the dominant schools of sociology in the universities. The other half sets forth Mills' own views on what social science should be and do in our day. Although this second part has received less attention than his caustic commentaries on his academic colleagues, it is much more important since his method, ideas and example are bound to exert widening influence among the more independent-minded students of sociology.

Bourgeois thought as a rule oscillates between a narrow-minded empiricism disdainful of theory and a pretentious abstractness deprived of concrete content and contact with reality. Both tendencies find their expression in the fashionable schools of sociology dissected by Mills. He concludes that official social science has become pedantic, trifling and bureaucratized, serving mainly the non-democratic sectors of our society and indifferent to the needs of the people.

To this sterility Mills counterposes the fruitful classical tradition of sociology represented by such figures as Comte, Marx, Spencer, Weber and Veblen. For these men "sociology is an encyclopedic endeavor, concerned with the whole of man's social life. It is at once historical and systematic — historical because it deals with and uses the materials of the past; systematic, because it does so in order to discern 'the stages' of the course of history and the regularities of social life."

Mills upholds this tradition as the only scientific and valuable school of sociology which he himself strives to practice and carry forward. This method calls for the exercise of the sociological imagination, he says. What does he mean by this?

Ordinary people are beset by troubles which appear to them purely personal. They either do not understand the momentous historical, social and institutional changes which move and shape their lives or fear them as vague and uncontrollable threats.

The task of social scientists should be to help make men aware of the connections between the course of world history and what is affecting their private lives for better or for worse, to relate the individual biography to history, the self to the world. They can do this by translating individual troubles into public issues and showing how these issues reflect the social contradictions of our time.

When one man is out of work, that is his personal misfortune. When five million are unemployed, that becomes a matter of public policy to be openly discussed, democratically decided, politically resolved. The knowledge conveyed by the sociological imagination introduces more consciousness into social life, enables its members to exercise greater control over its functioning, and thereby increases freedom.

Mills sums up his purposes as follows: "It is the political task of the social scientist — as of any liberal educator — continually to translate personal troubles into public issues, and public issues into the terms of their human meaning for a variety of individuals. It is his task to display in his work — and, as an educator, in his life as well — this kind of sociological imagination. And it is his purpose to cultivate such habits of mind among the men and women who are publicly exposed to him. To secure these ends is to secure reason and individuality, and to make these the predominant values of a democratic society."

Mills has a more progressive method than the ordinary run of academic sociologists. But is the method he uses and advocates thoroughly sound and scientific? Let us subject his theories to the same critical analysis that he has applied to his fellow professors.

Mills acknowledges that "classical
Marxism has been central to the development of modern sociology" and that “so very much of modern social science has been a frequently unacknowledged debate with the work of Marx, and a reflection as well of the challenge of the socialist movements and communist parties.”

He consciously continues this debate along his own lines. His unusual homage to the achievements and influence of Marxism has a special significance. The earliest American sociologists like E. A. Ross, Thorstein Veblen and Albion Small* were not reluctant to admit their admiration for Marx’s ideas and indebtedness to them. Their successors of recent decades in the departments of sociology have as a rule become so imbued with prejudice against Marx’s doctrines that students are deterred from approaching them with any objectivity.

Mills, however, has an ambivalent attitude toward Marxism. On the one hand he avows his debt to the founder of scientific socialism and, reverting to the original tradition of American sociology, urges the necessity of learning from him. On the other hand he relegates Marx to the world of the nineteenth century, saying that, however valuable many of his insights may still be, his conclusions have been invalidated by twentieth-century developments and need to be replaced by more up-to-date theories.

The principal source of Mills’ own general theory about the structure of society is another German thinker, Max Weber, whose writings he has edited and translated with H. H. Gerth (From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 1946) and whom he esteems as the foremost sociologist of this century.

Weber was as inconsistent in his politics as he was an eclectic in his social thinking. He was a monarchist liberal under the Hohenzollerns and wavering between historical materialism and idealism in his sociology. As Mills tells us, “he developed much of his work in a dialogue with Karl Marx.” Although Weber lifted many ideas from Marx, he rejected the materialist method and conclusions of scientific socialism. Certain of Marx’s concepts and contributions were helpful in analyzing social phenomena, he maintained, so long as they were treated as hypotheses and not mistaken for the representation of realities.

Mills draws many of his basic notions on historical change, social structure, sociological analysis and personality development from Weber. This is evident in his conception of the aims of sociology. According to Mills, “what social science is about is the human variety, which consists of all the social worlds in which men have lived, are living and might live” and the broadest aim of the social scientist “is to understand each of the varieties of social structure, in its components and in its totality.”

If we accept Mills’ conception, the diverse social structures need not have any bonds uniting them other than the fact that men have created them and lived in them at various times and places. They lack any essential material unity or historical continuity and simply stand out as different social units. In accord with this theory Mills insists that there are no laws encompassing all the successive social structures known in history. Each is presumably a law unto itself, although they contain certain comparable phenomena.

Mills also invokes the aid of Marx’s “principle of historical specificity” which states that each social formation must be independently analyzed to find out its specific laws of development. As usual, the liberal sociologist takes over one side of a position from historical materialism while throwing out its other and equally important side. In addition to the principle of historical specificity, Marx also formulated some principles of historical generality and taught that the one is crippled and sterile without the other.

MARX based the primary law of evolution in human society on the fact that men must first secure the means for eating, drinking, clothing and protecting themselves through work before they can pursue or develop any of the higher social and cultural activities. Therefore, as Engels explained, “the production of the immediate material means of subsistence and consequently of the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given epoch, form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, the art and even the religious ideas of the people concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which these things must therefore be explained ...” (Speech at the Graveside of Marx.)

Mills denies that any such basic and universal law of social determination as this exists. He likewise denies its corollary that the mode of production and the degree of economic development necessarily determine and can account for the main characteristics of the social structure.

Abstracted Empiricism

Here Mills lapses on the broadest historical scale into the “abstracted empiricism” he so cogently criticizes when exhibited on a smaller scale by his colleagues. His model of the entire social process is as disjoined as their patchwork conception of each social structure. He breaks up human history into a mosaic of separate social units which never add up to a systematic synthesis of the development of society into an integrated whole.

While Mills can carefully consider the problem of homogeneity in a single isolated social formation together with its differences from other social structures, he excludes homogeneity and admits only diversity when it comes to the whole course of human history.

On the scientific level such a procedure resembles the method of pre-Darwinian biologists who admitted the existence of separate species of living creatures and studied their different traits and functions but denied that one evolved into or was descended from another. Just as Darwin demonstrated the common descent of all biological species and explained the mechanism of their evolution, so Marx showed how and why the different social species were derived

* Albion Small, who established the first Department of Sociology in an American university at Chicago and edited its first scholarly journal, stated in 1912 that “Marx will have a place in social science analogous with that of Galileo in physical science.”
from and organically affiliated with one another.

Marx not only emphasized the necessity of discovering the laws regulating the operation of each particular social structure but also the laws which governed their transmutation into one another. Mills simply defaults on this aspect of the historical process, although the revolutionary transition from a lower social structure to a higher one (tribal life to class society or feudalism to capitalism) is the key point in the progress of mankind.

Marx sketched out the mechanism of social revolution in these general terms: “At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or — what is but a legal expression for the same thing — with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution.” (Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy.)

Any such fundamental principle of historical change is missing from Mills’ sociology. It is, indeed, difficult to extract from his writings any consistent or comprehensive theory of the change of one social structure into another and their mutual inter-connections. We shall see how this deficiency handicaps his insight and foresees when he deals with the crucial problems of the changeover from capitalism to socialism.

JUST as Mills breaks up the stream of history into autonomous social structures, so he fragmentizes the social structure into separate institutional orders which do not have any consistent principle of unification. Social structures, he says, are made up or built out of institutions which all together determine the character of the society, the traits of typical individuals and the role they can play. Society is a composite of institutions of various kinds: political, economic, military, legal, kinship, religious, educational. Social structure is “the combination of institutions classified according to the functions each performs.”

Marxism holds that the functions of all other institutions are dependent in the last analysis upon the conditions of production in that society. The unity of any social structure comes from the interrelations and interactions between its economic foundation and its cultural superstructure. The homogeneity of slave society, for example, is derived from its basic relations of production and type of property, the ownership and exploitation of chattels by their masters, and the operation of all other institutions must conform to these facts. Thus the precise functions which education, politics or law performed in the pre-Civil War South can be explained only by setting forth the relations of these social activities to the “peculiar institution” of slavery which determined their chief characteristics and social role.

To Mills, however, this principle of historical materialism cannot be made a universal rule, although it is often applicable and useful. The economy is only one of numerous institutions into which the social aggregation can be differentiated, and it may not be the most decisive one: “Any one of the institutional orders, or spheres, which we have segregated may be (and, in fact, each of them have been) taken as the dominant order from which change springs,” (Character and Social Structure).

Mills agreed with Weber that economics predominates in modern capitalism and therefore the economic order “is the point of departure for any realistic examination of institutional stratifications.” Even in this case, however, he does not categorically affirm that economic activity is decisive but only that it is the most useful and convenient vantage point from which to review the rest of the capitalist system.

On the basis of this pragmatic theory Mills finds it possible to assign the military high command an independent and predominant status in the United States today. The brass hats, he says, are not fundamentally executives for the policies and socioeconomic interests of the ruling rich but are pursuing ends of their own to which even the capitalist economy is subordinate.

Is this so? The armed forces might, as has happened elsewhere, venture to overturn the government by a coup d’etat and set up a military dictatorship in place of democracy. But even the direct rule of armed force which would emerge from such an extreme eventuality would be administered to save the social interests of the strongest section of the exploiting class, and not simply on behalf of the officers’ corps. Under present conditions, however, the military leaders subserve both the economic and political domination of Big Business.

THE principal theoretical task of the sociologist, according to Mills, is to study how the different institutional orders are integrated and operate in a given social structure and to detect the shifts that occur within and between the respective institutions. In contemporary American society, for example, the economic, political and military orders are all superior to the family, church and education. Mills does not give a permanently paramount position to any part of the triangle composing the power elite at this stage; he believes that they play a game of musical chairs. Now the corporate directors, now the political chiefs, and now the high military plays the commanding role.

This eclectic sociology minimizes the historical fact that the relative importance of other social institutions is itself derived from economic conditions and changes. Their functions are, in mathematical language, a function of the economic factors. Why are family (kinship) ties all-important in primitive societies while political institutions bound up with the territorial state are virtually non-existent? The reasons for the centrality of the one and the insignificance of the other are lodged in such material factors as the crude technology, low level of production, collective economy and small, scattered populations of tribal life.

How are the shifts in the social position of the Catholic Church since the thirteenth century to be explained? It helped the highest es’ate
in the Middle Ages; became dispossessed and weakened in the subsequent centuries; and is in a still more precarious status today. The root causes for this steady degradation of that religious institution can only be found in the revolutionary economic and social changes through which capitalism supplanted feudalism and is now itself being displaced by socialist forces.

Mills remarks that “the military order, once a meagre establishment in a context of civilian distrust, has become the largest and most expensive feature of government?” How is this swift ascendency, so contrary to American tradition, to be accounted for? It is obviously an outgrowth of the centralization and concentration of capital in its monopoly forms and the imperialist politics of Big Business.

The leading theories which make up and guide Mills’ own sociological imagination are all brought to a focus when he considers the central problem of social change in our time. He correctly says that “the climax of the social scientist’s concern with history is the idea he comes to hold of the epoch in which he lives.”

Mills’ idea of this epoch is largely shaped by what he learned from Weber. The German sociologist taught that modern society inexorably tended toward the creation, consolidation and domination of large-scale bureaucratic apparatuses, hierarchically organized, rationally administered and centrally directed. Just as the workers were separated from the means of production, so the soldier was separated from the means of violence, the civil servant from the means of administration and the scientist from the means of investigation. These dispossessed atomized individuals were more and more helpless before the mammoth aggregations of power in the depersonalized mass society. Capitalism and socialism were simply two different types of this drive toward bureaucratic despotism. Although intellectuals were no less estranged from society than any other grouping by these developments, they could at least become aware of this universal degradation and uphold liberal values against it.

The influence of Weber is also discernible in Mills’ inconsistent sociological evaluation of the national state. The concept of the national state as the fulcrum of modern history has long been the basis of liberal ideology. As Mills remarks in The Causes Of World War III, it is “the single most absolute and fetishized of our values. In opposition to this fetish, Marxism maintains that the fundamental factor of historical determination since the rise of capitalism has been the world market to which the constituent national states are subordinate.

Mills writes: “The history that now affects everyone is world history.” It would therefore appear that he agrees with the Marxist approach. And yet, in contradiction to the priority he himself assigns to world history, he declares with Weber that the nation-state is the most inclusive unit of social structure that concerns the sociologist. This assertion has a curious provincial ring in the space age where technology, science and culture are cosmopolitan and economic, military and political affairs have an increasingly global scope.

MILLS is aware that world history is at one of its greatest turning points. “We are at the ending of what is called the Modern Age” and entering what he calls the Fourth Epoch. Such institutions and ideologies of the Modern Age as free competition, nationalism, democracy and the Enlightenment are now imperilled. On the political side the competing nation-states are being annexed by centralized bureaucratic superstates ruling vast empires, like the U.S. and the USSR, where irresponsible elites manipulate supine masses and cowed intellectuals. The dominant ideologies of the Modern Age rested upon “the happy assumption of an inherent relation of reason and freedom.” “The ideological mark of the Fourth Epoch — that which sets it off from the Modern Age — is that the ideas of freedom and reason have become moot — that increased rationality may not be assumed to make for increased freedom.” He fears the prospect of Big Bureaucrats tyrannizing over Cheerful Robots made compliant by standardized conditions of life and the hypnosis of mass communications.

Mills counterposes to this terrifying trend toward Orwell’s 1984 the reaffirmation of the need to fight for more reason, freedom and democracy. While he shares these goals and values with liberalism and Marxism, he does not believe that either school of thought can explain the novel developments of the Fourth Epoch or that the movements directed by them know how to defend the ideals of the Enlightenment from bureaucratic barbarism.

The liberal and socialist interpretations of politics and history, he says, “have virtually collapsed as adequate explanations of the world and of ourselves.” “Each of these ways of thought arose as a guideline to reflection about a type of society which does not now exist in the United States or in the Soviet Union,” he writes in The Causes Of World War III. “In these two nations, we now confront new kinds of social structure, which embody tendencies of all modern society but in which these tendencies have assumed a more naked and flamboyant prominence, and perhaps qualitatively new forms.”

ALTHOUGH he arrives at different political conclusions than the cold-war propagandist James Burnham, Mills is apparently impressed with the erstwhile view of this prophet of world-wide “managerial revolution” that the U.S. and the USSR are twin prefigurations of a new social formation. “In the two super-states the history-making means of power are now organized. Their facilities of violence are absolute; their economic systems are increasingly autarchic; politically, each of them is increasingly a closed world; and in all three spheres their bureaucracies are world-wide.”

It is true that the Washington regime and the Soviet state manifest certain kindred traits and tendencies toward centralization which arise from the collectivist character of modern industry. But it is wrong to deduce from these superficial and limited resemblances that both are heading toward a common type of exploitive society where neither workers nor capitalists but bureau-
cratic politicians, administrators and technicians rule. They stand on diametrically different economies, one on capitalist private property, the other on nationalized property. The power centralized in the respective elites serves opposing social systems belonging to different stages of historical development.

Mills does not see the crucial importance of this. He insists that more adequate and accurate explanations for the frightening phenomena of the Fourth Epoch will have to be found than either liberalism or socialism can provide. He candidly confesses that so far he has not discovered them but considers it the duty of "social scientists of the rich societies" to look for them.

While this search is going on, it might be helpful for them and others to take another and closer look at the treasury of Marxism. The literature of twentieth century Marxism from Hilferding and Lenin to Luxemburg and Trotsky is rich in theoreti cal investigations of the phenomena of the imperialist phase of capitalist development, from the monopolist concentration of economic power to its unrestrained militarism. Mills has not submitted these writings to any sustained critical analysis but simply sweeps them aside with the bare assertion that Marxism is out-of-date. To motivate his judgment on the irrelevance of Marxism, he does no more than tell us that "Karl Marx never analyzed the kinds of society now arising in the Communist bloc." As Shakespeare says: "It needs no ghost come from the grave to tell us that, my lord."

However, orthodox followers of Marx have seriously and systematically studied the development of Soviet society. Foremost among them was Leon Trotsky. In The Revolution Betrayed and other writings he demonstrated how and why the first workers state became bureaucratically degenerated and acquired a totalitarian political form while retaining and developing such fundamental conquests of the Russian Revolution as the nationalized means of production and planned economy.

He also explained the peculiar nature and dual functions of the bureaucratic caste which had usurped power from the workers. In his last work, In Defense of Marxism, he even dealt at length with the theory picked up by Mills that the degenerated Soviet regime represented a new social formation apart from capitalism and socialism and its bureaucracy a new exploiting class ruling over helpless slaves — and that the advanced capitalist countries were likewise heading toward this state of bureaucratic collectivism.

TROTSKY rejected this sociological characterization of the USSR on the ground that the Soviet bureaucracy was essentially a temporary excrescence, a tumorous growth, on Soviet society in conflict with its economic base and the demands of socialist development. It would have to be removed, he concluded, by the direct action of the workers who would regenerate Soviet democracy on a far higher economic and cultural level. The recent manifestations of anti-bureaucratic struggle in the Soviet bloc tend to bear out this diagnosis and forecast far more than the one-sided pessimistic interpretations of the spokesmen for the new totalitarian state.

Contrary to Mills' assertion that Marxists have proved incompetent to analyze the evolution of the Soviet system, I venture to say that it would be impossible to arrive at a correct and rounded definition of the extremely contradictory social structures and dynamics of the deformed and degenerated workers states without recourse to the dialectical-materialist method of Marxism. In any event, Mills' attempt to assimilate the Soviet states into a common pattern with their opposite, U.S. monopoly capitalism, is false and misleading.

Stages of History

The explanation of Soviet bureaucracy presented by Marxism is more profound and correct than that of Mills because, among other reasons, its picture of the development of civilization is far more concrete. Mills classifies the course of Western history into Antiquity, the Dark Ages, the Modern Age and the Fourth Epoch. How indiscriminate these designations appear beside the precise definition of social advance analyzed by historical materialism: slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism, which are all historically determined and conceptually explained by their technological level, their economic content, their specific mode of production and forms of property.

The ideas of Marxism on the nature of the great transition of our time are equally superior to the empirical impressions and vague perspectives of Mills. We are living through a world-wide historical process in which the capitalist system is fighting for survival against the advancing hosts of a new socialist order. Humanity is not undergoing a passage from a partially enlightened Modern Age toward a Fourth Epoch of alienated idiocy and omnipotent bureaucracy. Along the road of revolution it is proceeding from the exploitive relations of international capitalism toward the non-exploitive relations of world socialism.

During this prolonged and tortuous transitional period, especially in its first and restricted steps, it is undeniable that the new society must go through aberrations and deformations in this or that time and place. The authentic Marxists have not only pegged these deviations and abominations but have worked to combat them within the framework of the struggle for workers democracy and socialism. And, what is no less important than uncovering the causes for these anti-socialist relapses, they have pointed out the conditions for their disappearance with the further development of the world socialist revolution.

MARXISTS share with Mills his concern for safeguarding the values of reason and freedom inherited from the Enlightenment, that is, the heyday of the bourgeois-democratic revolutions. But, if the plutocratic elite will not abdicate their power, how are these values to be preserved and extended unless the working people are victorious in their efforts to overthrow monopoly capitalism? The forces striving to save this system are the worst enemies of reason and freedom, the spreaders of
irrationality and the enforcers of servitude in its various forms. The Soviet bureaucrats, we agree, are no friends of reason and freedom, either. But the abolition of capitalist rule and its militarism by the workers in the West would be the best encouragement to the Soviet peoples to throw off bureaucratic rule in the East.

Mills contends that his sociological standpoint goes beyond the obsolete positions of both classical liberalism and classical socialism. This is an illusion, a bit of false consciousness about his real role and intellectual position. Actually he stands in line with the finest traditions of American liberalism incarnated in such scholars as E. A. Ross, Veblen, Dewey, Vernon Parrington and Charles Beard. He has brought their kind of criticism of American bourgeois civilization up to date. But he has not transcended their basic ideas, values and perspectives. Like them — and, for that matter, like John Stuart Mill — he trusts to the influence of reason, science, democracy, debate and education to overcome reaction and promote social progress. Like them he rejects the Marxist doctrines that the workers are the key agency and their class struggles the indispensable means for accomplishing these aims.

Mills differs from the leading liberals of the early twentieth century by his greater sophistication and increased doubts about the future. Even as he defies the men in power, he feels depressed at the slim prospects of countering them. All the same, he casts the weight of his influence against the militarist madness of the imperialists. Hoping against hope that democracy, reason and freedom can be rescued from further degradation and ultimate destruction and that “the ideal of the Renaissance Man” can be revived, he ends up on a note of pure idealism: “It is on the level of human awareness that virtually all solutions to the great problems must now lie.”

It is hard to believe that so well-informed a man believes this. Surely he knows that awareness is only one aspect of social action, and not its most conclusive phase!

Great historical problems have not ever been solved by human consciousness, but only by human action, social practice, revolutionary struggle. After such problems have been thought out, and even while they are being thought out, they have to be fought out by contending social forces. It is on the level of class action that grave social issues have been, will be and must be settled. Correct thinking enters as an indispensable element for victory in such struggle but it has to find its source, significance and destination in the arena of social and political practice.

These considerations provide a gauge for evaluating the role and work of C. Wright Mills. His probing studies of the American social structure; his summons to a broader outlook in sociological theory and analysis; his attacks upon the cold warriors and their armor-bearers among the intellectuals; his campaign to lift the academic boycott of Marxism; his breaching of the uniformity and conformity of official sociology are valuable contributions to the enlightenment of the present generation.

But there are vistas beyond this brand of liberal sociology and it will not go well with those who are content to stop there. We have tried to show some of the principal errors and limitations in Mills’ treatment of social problems which are typical of his school: vacillation between historical materialism and idealism; inclination to inconsistency; rejection of Marxism; failure to distinguish between a declining capitalism and a nascent socialism; overestimation of the middle class intellectuals and depreciation of the power of the working class; pessimism and skepticism; lack of a clear outlook on the future and lack of a realistic program.

All these imperfections make Mills’ sociology inferior to scientific socialism as a guide to the most progressive thought and the most effective political action. Despite its critics from Weber to Mills, Marxism remains the most valid and valuable form of “the sociological imagination” in our epoch.

Listen, Yankee
By C. Wright Mills

This is a book about history that will make history. It is the case of the Cuban Revolution as presented by C. Wright Mills, the distinguished American scholar. He tells the dramatic story of the Cuban revolutionaries in the form of a compelling and honest series of letters to Americans as they would be written by the people of Cuba. The author went to Cuba, listened and learned. Then he applied his trained and gifted talents to telling the truth as he saw and heard it, without the doubletalk of either diplomacy or fear. “Like most Cubans,” he explains, “I too believe that this revolution is a moment of truth.”

This is a book that must be read; its message must reach beyond the curtain of indifference and confusion that has been raised in America by the propaganda campaigns of the capitalist press. The monopolists in the U.S. have mobilized White House, State Department and Pentagon to feed this campaign of lies, distortion and hysteria. All this in preparation for their cold-blooded plan to recapture the island they lost when the tyrant Batista fell. Against this vilification, the Cuban revolution by U.S. officials, Mills gives voice to the magnificent courage and hope of the Cuban people. For the first time, the reader will grasp the meaning of the liberation that the people of Cuba are experiencing and will understand their readiness to die, if necessary, in defense of their freedom. Only a visit to Cuba itself could provide more insight into the Western hemisphere’s first victorious socialist revolution.


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INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST REVIEW
Depression Ahead?

Kennedy promises a New Frontier but he inherits a debt-ridden economy whose prospects are tied to the fate of a dollar which is rapidly losing value.

by Lynn Marcus

The 1957 recession was the turning point in America's post-war prosperity. The vast government power constructed during the Roosevelt era to save capitalism from the "Great Depression," the war budgets, the tremendous inflationary deficits — all of these devices now appeared inadequate to prevent another great depression that seemed to loom up for the middle or late sixties. For the 1957 recession was not just another recession; it was not simply the third of three post-war recessions. There was something more: the mechanism of inflationary credit which was the mainspring of the "New Deal" threatened to become the instrument of inflationary bankruptcy. The point was reached in 1957 in which the Roosevelt cure threatened to become as deadly to the patient as the disease it was to treat. The doctors of capitalism had reached a turning point: come up with a new kind of medicine or let the patient die.

This situation, already recognized in varying degrees by leading bankers and economists, is propelling the ruling circles in the U.S. to new political and economic extremes both at home and abroad. We have already seen the politically explosive "tight money" policies, the sharp and intensive anti-labor drive by the corporations and the Congress. We have seen the economic demands made upon Western Europe, the naked arrogance of U.S. policies in Cuba and the Congo. We noted that further anti-labor legislation was postponed during 1960 solely on the grounds that this was an election year. These were only the opening wedge of what is to come.

Kennedy's "New Frontier" and Galbraith's Affluent Society are demands for extreme sacrifices by the U.S. workers at home — a ten to twenty billion dollar increase in government spending, matching higher taxation, price controls, wage controls, credit controls and new labor control bills. U.S. capitalism is in a desperate situation and is plunging toward the political and economic action the situation demands.

What was the "New Deal"?

Thirty years ago, capitalism was dying. Vast political and economic power was consolidated in the offices of the Federal Government. Roosevelt used the ominous power of the working class to regiment the capitalist class into effective combat formations. He then proceeded to hamstring the trade-union movement with regulation and regimentation under the cover of double-edged concessions. The leadership of the trade-union movement was sucked into the position of an appendage of the Democratic party and the capitalist regime in Washington. With this concentration of political and economic power in the hands of an enormous federal bureaucracy, Roosevelt used that power to subsidize the dying system.

During the first eight years of the "New Deal," Roosevelt's administration pumped about nineteen billion dollars of federal deficit spending into the depression-ridden economy. A simple inspection of banking, business activity and employment statistics for the years 1939 and 1940 is sufficient to show that this was not enough; the edge may have been taken off the depression, but prosperity was still a long way off. The second World War saved U.S. capitalism. It permitted Roosevelt to turn an army of unemployed into armed regiments; it converted rusting idle productive capacity into production and war profits; above all, it created the emergency required to drag on the American people and the economy into $240 billion of deficit spending, onto levels of taxation which would have been politically impossible by other means, and established a war budget which could be used to dump the surplus product into the seven seas and outer space.

The economy had recovered from previous depressions by a kind of ex-
pansion into "space." Immigration and the opening of the West were the principal factors of U.S. industrial growth during the second half of the nineteenth century. The U.S. economy formally celebrated its imperialist, finance-capitalist stage of development with the Spanish-American War, and continued this expansion through the first World War and the exceptional conditions of the ten years following that war. When the bust of 1929 hit that economy, the opportunities for recovery through expansion into "space" were exhausted.

AGAINST this background, the "New Deal" economy represented an effort to expand the economy in "time" as contrasted with "space." That is to say, the income used to buy up the surplus product and foster industrial expansion was taken from the "future," in the form of credit. Obviously, the source of this credit could not be the capitalists themselves. When the process of net accumulation has been interrupted by a deep and prolonged depression, the capitalists have neither the ability nor the confidence to engineer such programs. Under such conditions they must turn to the one agency in the economy which has the resources to provide and sustain the needed credit, the state. The state must "prime the pump."

To accomplish this, Roosevelt's regime expanded the power and operations of the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury. The heart of the procedure may be summed up as follows:

The Treasury sells bonds and bills to the banks and corporations, giving them a source of income for their idle reserve cash. In order to generate more lending power in the banking system, the Federal Reserve System buys U.S. Treasury bonds and bills on the so-called "open market" from federal securities dealers. The Federal Reserve uses the national gold reserve entrusted to its corporate care as the basis for printing the money to buy these bonds. The Federal Reserve check is then deposited by the securities dealer with a national bank which is a member of the Federal Reserve System. That bank then uses the check to increase its reserves and its lending power in a five to six-to-one ratio. The money over and above tax revenues pumped into the Treasury is used for deficit spending to create jobs and start business in operation.

In any industrial economy the use of extensive credit procedures in such a manner is, at best, a delicate operation, requiring extensive planning, foresight and control. In a well-managed workers state such procedures can be effected without permanent danger to the economy. However, because of the laws of a capitalist economy — in the very nature of the private-property-for-profit system — the consequences of any such long-term program are deadly, cumulative, permanent, leading to collapse.

We may cite Federal Reserve Board Chairman, W. McMartin, on this point. Speaking of proposals to have the Federal Reserve System hold down 1959 interest rates, he said, "When such a program was adopted during and following the war, it did succeed for a time in actually pegging interest rates on Government obligations. But, at the same time, it promoted and facilitated that dangerous bank credit and monetary expansion that developed under the harness of direct price, wage and material controls. The suppressed inflation that resulted [1947-48, L.M.J, we are now well aware, burst forth eventually in a very rapid depreciation of the dollar and even threatened to destroy our free economy."

THE critical question since the first days of the "New Deal" has been: at what point does deficit spending lead to bankruptcy? A number of misguided calculations have been made to determine how large the federal debt could become before the critical point would be reached. A large amount of wasted effort in calculation may be saved by simply stating that the size of the federal debt, in itself, is not the decisive factor; with sufficient regimentation of the U.S. economy that debt could "safely" expand to a very large sum. The critical point is, as the quotation from McMartin implies, the depreciation of the dollar with respect to the world market. That is of particularly critical importance for an imperialist economy struggling to expand its activity in that same world market. It is of even greater importance when one considers that the collapse of that dollar would result in the immediate collapse of that same world market. The critical point for the economy is the point at which domestic inflation presents the U.S. finance-capitalists with an international monetary crisis.

Definite signs of precisely such a crisis occurred during and following the 1957 recession. That is what made that recession a turning-point in world history.

Evidence of the Crisis

During 1958 the Treasury incurred an increase in deficits of $18 billion. That is the price U.S. finance-capitalism had to pay to buy its way out of that recession. This figure may be roughly compared, allowing for the effects of inflation, with a net deficit of $24 billion during World War I and $19 billion during the eight pre-war years of the "New Deal."

This tremendous ransom to buy off depression produced an immediate, threatening inflationary boom during the recession.

At the same time the U.S. economy experienced a sharply defined balance-of-payments crisis. While the U.S. dollar was rapidly depreciating, the wrecked economies of Western Europe had recovered to the point that their industries were expanding at the expense of U.S. trade balances. As a symptom of that process, we have merely to observe the substantial outflow of U.S. gold reserves toward the treasuries of the West German banks and to compare the prices of West German and American steel products at U.S. ports of entry.
interest rates, greater pump-priming would have disastrously increased the peril to the U.S. monetary position.

Expanding the consumer credit market would have required an extension of the repayment period and prime interest rates in the order of from 1% to 2%, while foreign discount rates were in the 4% to 6% range. To permit such a lowering of interest rates in late 1958 and 1959 would have resulted in a flow of funds out of the United States at a rate that might have wrecked international monetary stability. (It is for such reasons that the past three years have seen a brisk gossip in international financial circles concerning a possible devaluation of the U.S. dollar, exactly such reasons that caused a boom in gold sales and prices on the London market, a boom provoked by capital funds from the New York market.)

The point had been reached at which it was no longer possible to maintain high profits, full employment, high rates of industrial growth and prevent a depression by "New Deal" methods. History had caught up with the "New Deal."

Technical Decay in the Economy

Since 1955, the rate of physical output per production hour has been constantly increasing. At the same time, the absolute number of full-time employed production workers has been constantly decreasing. Since 1955, the main real source of high employment has been capitalist waste; the number of administrative and sales jobs has been increasing. In short, it has cost more administrative and sales effort to account for, supervise and distribute each man-hour of production output. During this same period, the amount of idle capacity has been constantly growing. Despite the increases in gross national product, the U.S. economy has begun to decay. Each production worker now has to carry on his back a constantly growing cost of administration, selling and idle plant capacity; that is the main sink hole of the extra dollars lifted out of workers' purchasing power by inflation. One of the most important symptoms of this decay is the growing proportion of unemployed; the capitalist economy is no longer able with "New Deal" methods to provide jobs for its growing population.

We shall cite an example of this process of decay, automobile distribution. This example is the product of the big post-Korean War boom, an extreme but typical case of the technical decay that has taken over the U.S. economy.

The post-Korea boom was based on two factors. First, the continuation of a high arms budget. Secondly, the exceptional but short-lived conditions created by the expansion of consumer credit. The arms budget held a floor under an otherwise shaky economy; the consumer credit splurge created a fabulous three-year boom in the consumer market. Both of these factors combined to create a headlong capital-investments boom. Industrial and commercial firms, such as automobile, mushroomed their expansion in their eagerness to grab off bigger slices of this new market. This boom lasted three years, and succeeded in achieving for U.S. economy a fantastic rate of growth of the gross national product.

After the great boom in the auto market in 1955, the Detroit manufacturers continued to multiply the number of automobile dealers, despite a decline in new car sales in 1956 and 1957. Also despite the expansion in unit sales in 1955, the market had begun to catch up with the auto industry by squeezing away the high profit rates dealers enjoyed prior to and during the Korean War. Dealers had to double and even triple the number of cars sold to maintain the same rate of profit on annual operations. Detroit continued to hand out new franchises on every block; even gas stations were pressed into taking franchises in many areas. The point has been reached at which there are from two to three times the maximum number of automobile dealers justified to handle the current new car volume.

Despite super profit rates by Detroit manufacturers, auto dealers' margins are at depression levels. On paper, the auto dealer is supposed to own 25% of the retail list price; in fact, he is fortunate if he grosses $200 on a new $3,000 automobile. The giant corporations thus contrive to squeeze both the worker and the small capitalist, maintaining high profits for themselves while they pass to others the cost of the inefficiency and waste they themselves create.

A similar pattern is found in all dealership industries, tires, accessories, refrigerators, etc. The only answer the big manufacturers offer to the rotten mess of waste they have created is "fair trade" price-fixing, to squeeze that much more out of the workers and to keep the retailers from fighting to trim manufacturers' margins.

Who Runs the Government?

The Democratic party and the labor bureaucrats have been selling the myth that the people control or influence the decisions of government.

The reality is quite different.1 The centers of federal monetary and fiscal operations are the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Treasury. The Federal Reserve System is a joint corporation of the Treasury Department and the National Banking System. The U.S. Treasury is, in turn, "advised" by several private committees elected and appointed by the Life Insurance Association, the Investment Bankers Association, etc. The axis of rotation of the billion-dollar-a-day Federal Securities market in New York is the Discount Corporation, whose directors and stockholders are drawn principally from the seven leading New York money-market banks. The roster of the Discount Corporation, the Federal Reserve System, and the Advisory Committees presents us with a list of interlocking directorates representing the controlling interests of U.S. finance-capitalism. Our national economy, federal and "private," is clearly shown to be under the direct supervision and control of Wall Street. Other departments of the executive bureaucracy in Washington are also advised by key "pri-

1. The student of this question is referred to the published report of hearings before the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress on August 5, 6 and 7, 1959, entitled: "The Government's Management of Its Monetary, Fiscal and Debt Operations." While study of this important subject cannot be restricted to this document, this report suffices to point up the most important matters.
The combination of the enormous federal bureaucracy and its finance-capitalist directors and advisors represents the real federal government apparatus, which is substantially independent of the political party in power. The former Secretary of State and the present director of the CIA (the U-2 department), were members of the Dulles family from the firm of Sullivan and Cromwell. But these are only two of many examples.

Against this background we are hardly surprised to discover that many major federal economic policies are first formulated in the quasi-government, the Federal Reserve System. In fact, the Federal Reserve System with its interlocking associations in the New York money market, is the real executive committee of the American ruling class and its government. In many respects, the published documents of the Federal Reserve System and other financial combines are the real political "internal bulletins" of the combat party of finance capitalism in the U.S.A.

It would be incorrect to credit or blame only Eisenhower for the policies and executive actions pursued during his regime. These policies and actions were carried out by the enormous federal bureaucracy created by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a federal bureaucracy liberally "advised" and directed by the leaders of finance-capitalism.

What Can They Do?

During the recent election campaign John F. Kennedy made two apparently contradictory promises. On the one hand, he promised programs that will amount to at least $10 billion a year in added federal spending. On the other hand, he promised a balanced budget. These promises are not as contradictory as they might seem.

The simple answer is a $10 billion increase in annual taxation. Who is to pay it? Kennedy promises business growth, more jobs, and considers possible tax relief to business to encourage investment. This is contradictory, unless we draw the obvious conclusion that income taxes on workers will be increased by more than $10 billion a year.

Does this present a solution to the crisis? Not in itself. It amounts to taking more money out of the presently employed workers to provide payrolls for the unemployed and higher profits for business. On the surface that might seem adequate from the capitalist's viewpoint; it is not. The federal government cannot prevent a continual depreciation of the dollar by this juggling; Kennedy's proposal, so far, is the most temporary kind of solution for the big capitalists, a solution which will wear itself out in probably less than two or three years. The reason for this inadequacy is simple. The federal government can dump ten billions more into the economy; it cannot, at present, control what happens as a result of that added expenditure; in a normal economy that money would tend to flow to the areas of highest turnover, most rapid circulation, greatest anticipated speculative profit, with inflationary consequences. Under present circumstances, it will tend to move out of U.S. economy into foreign investments at an uncontrolled rate. The result is simply a worsening of the predicament the U.S. economy faces at this present moment.

The only and obvious "answer" to this problem is direct government control of the economy, in the form of price controls, wage controls, material controls and selective credit controls. An excellent set of precedents for the legislation and machinery required for this job exists in the experience of World War II and the Korean War. The result will follow along the lines of German economist Hjalmar Schacht's economic reorganization of the Nazi pre-war economy. That is not to suggest that Kennedy is going to introduce fascism; merely to imitate many of the economic control procedures forced upon the pre-war Nazi economy.

The finance-capitalists recognized the meaning of the 1957 recession. In late 1958 they were firmly determined to shift official labor policy from conciliation to outright war. The first test was to be the steel workers. Under the noses of the entire nation, the steel bosses and their big custom-

NIXON, Rockefeller and Kennedy all agreed on the "necessity" of legislation that will give the President added powers to settle strikes. Such anti-labor legislation in the hands of the Kennedy administration fits well with the legislation implied by Kennedy's economic platform and John Kenneth Galbraith's Affluent Society. Americans, Galbraith points out, are spending too much on private luxuries; more money must be diverted from private spending to public spending. That can mean nothing but smaller paychecks and higher taxes for the American worker. Kennedy's promises of bigger public spending, easing tax burdens on business and balanced

(Continued on page 31)
Tremors Under the Fifth Republic

The capitalists breathed a sigh of relief in 1958: De Gaulle had established his "strong" regime. But the solution solved nothing and the General faces the fate of his predecessors

by Tom Kemp

Recent weeks have once again revealed just how deep are the fissures in French society behind the apparent solidity of the façade provided by the Fifth Republic.

While indifference remains widespread — is, indeed itself a symptom of crisis — it is rarely based today on a confident belief that De Gaulle has matters in hand. Even his friends have pierced the myth upon which his successes have been based; one by one, behind the throne, they are getting ready to fix the succession — if they can do so without the decisive intervention of the masses. And slowly, hesitantly, it is being realized by opponents that the regime is not impregnable and is not able to solve the problems of French capitalism. For the present, the heavy incubus of the long record of betrayal of the official working-class organizations still hangs over the opposition, but there are signs of a change, and these signs, restricted as they are, have been sufficient in recent weeks to evoke an almost hysterical response on the part of the government. Papers have been seized, their offices searched, activists have been detained and left-wing university teachers and radio employees, as well as other intellectuals, have had sanctions taken against them. Both the new lines of opposition — directly striking at the essence of state power and the idea of “legality” — though supported only by a small vanguard as yet, and the measures used against them have caused heart-searchings through the ranks of France’s important, and predominantly left-wing intelligentsia. As the most sensitive section of French society it reflects the slight tremors which foreshadow the more intense shocks which the regime will have to face in the near future.

To UNDERSTAND what is happening now, we have to cast our eyes back at the last decade of French history. In May, 1958, the regime had reached an impasse from which it could only escape by a sharp turn to new methods. Its problems were reflected in the low state of morale of the French ruling class and the deep divisions within itself which became an obstacle every time determined action seemed called for. The undermining of the confidence of the ruling class was no new thing. It had been apparent in the thirties; it brought about the capitulation of 1940 and had provided the background to the governmental instability of the period since 1945. It had weakened the capitalists in face of the working-class challenge. Indeed, only the “peoples front” policy of compromise and betrayal (i.e. supporting De Gaulle) by the Socialist and Communist party leaders in 1944-47, as in 1936, had enabled capitalist rule to survive. But it survived under constantly deteriorating conditions.

The French Empire was in process of disintegration. The French voice in the counsels of the great powers had become thin and was ignored with impunity. The shattered post-war economy was put back into action with billions of American dollars and with the exhortations of the Communist party leaders to “produce first.” (The CP only changed its tune when the crucial time for social change had passed away.)

Buoyed up by external aid, the French economy got into gear and embarked on a process of uninterrupted expansion. But this expansion was accompanied by sharp social strains and divisions within the ruling class and proved extremely painful to large sections of the petty bourgeoisie. The reasons for this lay in the antiquated nature of much of the apparatus of production and distribution and the pressures imposed upon it in the course of modernization. Conflicts and clashes of interests appeared between the modernizers in industry and the civil service and the vested interests of the older sections of the economy and their political friends. Hence the emergence of a number of warring but barely distinguishable political parties and groups all representing one or another section of the bourgeoisie or of the threatened peasantry or petty-bourgeoisie.

Thus, although in the fifties industrial production moved up at a brisk rate and important industries were given a face lift, social disintegra-

tion and political incoherence advanced with equal rapidity. With the onset of the nationalist revolt in Algeria in 1954, the situation steadily worsened and new opportunities were opened up for working-class action which the "left" parties failed to take advantage of. The Socialists, when in the government, carried on the war; and the verbal opposition of the Communists did not prevent them voting the special powers needed by the government to deal with the "emergency" nor was it matched by effective support to the Algerian revolution or to the big detachments of the Algerian proletariat forced to work in French industry by the poverty of their own country.

No Way Out

On the other hand the French bourgeoisie was forced to hang onto Algeria at all costs. Not only did it have a big economic stake, but a successful national struggle against colonialism would be a signal for a generalized revolt in the other African colonies. Moreover, without North Africa, the world position of France would once more be downgraded. These were the main reasons for building up in Algeria an army of some half a million men, largely composed of young conscripts. This vast army, officered by men anxious to revenge the defeats suffered in Indochina, was given virtually a free hand to maintain French rule at any price and by all means. In this it was seconded by the million-strong settler group in Algeria itself, profoundly influenced by racialism and right-wing extremism.

The Algerian war, as it dragged on, contributed a further festering stream to the already poisoned social relations of the metropolis. The social crisis became deeper. Repression and even torture became everyday necessities. Parliamentary democracy became quite unworkable. It ceased to guarantee the essential interests of the leading sections of the bourgeoisie; it fostered all kinds of corruption; it fell into open contempt among the people. The settler revolt of May, 1958, gave it the final push and gave the bourgeoisie the opportunity to throw off its fetters altogether. The depth of the crisis was now clearly revealed and the main sections of French capital thus tacitly agreed, if its rule was to continue, some of the old differences would have to be put aside and new, authoritarian content put into superficially democratic forms. This pointed clearly in the direction of General de Gaulle, who had been preparing himself for just such a moment for over a decade.

DE GAULLE's task was twofold. First, he had to work out more favorable conditions for French capital at home both by strengthening the state apparatus and stamping out political intrigue and corruption. Second, but interrelated with this, went the object of defeating the nationalistic movement in Algeria or forcing it to come to terms in a way satisfactory to French investment interests in that country.

The first of these proceeded comparatively smoothly. De Gaulle took over when the business cycle was moving upwards again on a world scale. His regime was thus able to take the credit for continued prosperity. In addition, by putting the exchange value of the franc on a more realistic basis and holding wages in check, a distinct improvement took place in the competitive position of French exports in the world market. The yawning balance of payments gap was thus bridged, though at the expense of a fall in real wages and a check to the home market, which is only showing its full consequences with the signs of slackening of the export boom. While the indices show, superficially, a continued improvement in production, behind the rising curves lies the fact that many sections of the economy, especially agriculture, have continued to resist adaptation. The restricted purchasing power of workers and peasants and the inability of French capitalism to grapple with such problems as housing have revealed that the much-discussed "neocapitalism" has changed nothing fundamentally; especially has it done nothing to reconcile the working class to capitalist relations of production.

De Gaulle has been living in the past two years on a tremendous fund of credit derived from the confidence placed in him by diverse sections of the ruling class, but also from the widely held belief that he had the key to all problems. Even on the home front that has not been so; and the change in the economic climate is beginning to reveal just how little he has been able to achieve in the way of a permanent strengthening of French capitalism. At least here weaknesses and omissions have been concealed. The crucial problems which no one can escape concern Algeria.

In most other African colonies, De Gaulle has found obsequious houseboys temporarily, though he hopes permanently, to stand as guarantors for French interests against the colonial revolution. In Algeria, however, he has been up against an elemental movement, already in armed action, with deep social as well as national roots. Here, although many of the leaders of the National Liberation Front (FLN), may from time to time have been prepared for compromise, the circumstances of the struggle have left little room for a deal. For one thing it would lead to their denunciation by their own more militant supporters as a sell-out. Algeria is no Senegal and no Cyprus. Moreover, the presence in Algeria of the settler movement and an army under the command of a fanatical officer corps considerably narrows down the concessions which even De Gaulle can make in negotiations to bring about a settlement which will conserve the vital interests of French capital. Consequently, the Fifth Republic has been no more successful than its predecessor in bringing to an end a bitter conflict which it stubbornly refuses to recognize as a war. The war itself, with all its consequences, undermines in its course the foundations of confidence upon which De Gaulle's government is based.

The Youth Rebel

As it does so, the war itself becomes more and more a nuisance and an outrage to French citizens; the most acutely affected and the most sensitive to its effects are the youth and the intellectuals. It is
from their ranks, therefore, that has come the first movement which has openly proclaimed the need to fight the war by illegal means if necessary, as part of the struggle against the regime itself. The trial of a number of courageous people who had given assistance to the Algerian struggle resulted in the drawing up of the now famous Manifesto of the 121, which called for solidarity with them.

The clandestine actions of the accused, which resulted in their receiving heavy sentences, have clarified the issues and sparked off a series of reactions in all directions. The panic of the government has been revealed, and, at the same time, a searchlight has been turned on the regime itself. In recent weeks there can be little doubt that the French bourgeoisie has felt more uneasy, has been pressing for a more militant stand. Thus, while still admonishing those calling for acts of resistance — desertions, aid to the nationalists, etc. — the tone is milder, and is now accompanied by the claim that the Communists must organize and carry on work in the army, not engage in individual acts of resistance. From a Leninist point of view, the argumentation appears impeccable, but it is no secret that the army is something which has not been done systematically for a long while. In fact, since the days of the Popular Front, when communists have been marching, with only brief intervals, behind the tricolor and shouting patriotic slogans louder than anyone else it has been quietly abandoned. It is significant, however, that, at least verbally, it should be restored to respectability. Partly through the long-run effects of Communist policy, therefore, the workers are still largely inert.

Rumors are heard that former contenders for power, Pinay and Soustelle, both former ministers in the De Gaulle government, are now ganging up together with their eyes on the future. Socialist chief Guy Mollet, who only last June, at his party’s conference, boasted that De Gaulle was carrying out their policy in Algeria, has now seen fit to make an outspoken criticism of that same policy; he clearly wished to draw a sharper line between himself and a regime which, it daily becomes plain, is not eternal. Right through the old parties similar signs of change can be discerned.

The Manifesto

At the same time, the actions of the 121, headed by Jean Paul Sartre, have outlined more clearly the nature of the policies pursued by the “left” parties on the Algerian question. The most touched is, of course, the Communist party. It began with statements which condemned the “illegal” methods used by the resisters in terms not unlike those current in the bourgeois press. Lately, however, it has been more cautious. For one thing, Khrushchev’s recent references to Algeria, have been less indulgent to De Gaulle than those of the Camp David period. For another, the rank-and-file, obviously uneasy, has been pressing for a more militant stand. Thus, while still admonishing those calling for acts of resistance — desertions, aid to the nationalists, etc. — the tone is milder, and is now accompanied by the claim that the Communists must organize and carry on work in the army, not engage in individual acts of resistance. From a Leninist point of view, the argumentation appears impeccable, but it is no secret that the army is something which has not been done systematically for a long while. In fact, since the days of the Popular Front, when communists have been marching, with only brief intervals, behind the tricolor and shouting patriotic slogans louder than anyone else it has been quietly abandoned. It is significant, however, that, at least verbally, it should be restored to respectability. Partly through the long-run effects of Communist policy, therefore, the workers are still largely inert.

The sensitive intellectual sections, as has been stressed, have been the first to move. But it must not be thought that the majority have acted in a positive way. They were, in fact, put on the spot by the Manifesto of the 121, but in their great majority vigorously rejected its implications, so that while prepared to speak up for freedom of speech, they were not prepared to line up in active struggle against the government. The most widely supported petition, put into circulation by the teachers’ unions, is a quite mild document by comparison. It calls attention to the “moral” problems raised for young conscripts by the Algerian war. It goes on to say “the crisis of conscience and the spirit of revolt among the youth are inevitable, [the signatories] are persuaded that they will only get worse until the cause is removed: the war itself.” This piece of

undoubted logic is followed by a call for a “negotiated peace,” before peace is imposed (by whom is not clear) amidst “convulsions” in France as well as in Algeria. And a warning is included against the “ultras” and the army officers who carry on the war. There is no analysis of the nature of the conflict, just the peace slogan — which could be merely an appeal to General de Gaulle himself to make peace.

In its majority, therefore, the “left” intellectuals themselves are evading the main issues. Clearly, their consciences are tormented by what they hear about tortures and repression carried out in their name (as they sometimes put it) and by the effect of the war on youth — either by making it absorb racial poison or leading it on to illegal paths. The use of the term “convulsions” is particularly revealing. It is difficult to see how anything can be resolved in a progressive direction in France or Algeria without “convulsions” and to act on any other presumption is to play into the hands of reaction. Yet the intellectuals around such journals as France-Observateur and L’Express have not yet woken up to this. Apparently the teachers and others who sign this petition, genuine in their opposition to De Gaulle, and in their desire to see justice done, etc., still wish to be able to return to their studies and cafés with some kind of an assurance that there will be no “convulsions.”

Suppression of the Facts

All this time, moreover, the government counter-attacks at the intellectuals’ main media of independent expression. The weeklies already mentioned have been seized a number of times of late, not so much for their editorial opinions as for factual reporting about the Algerian conflict. The government, which as yet does not dare to curtail press freedom directly, hopes to wear down the intellectuals’ press by striking at it through its finances. The seizures result in heavy financial losses and also means that many readers do not see the papers at all. In fact these “independent” journals are more vulnerable than the Communist party press, which is run at a loss any-

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way and largely distributed through party members and cells. The government wants to destroy the "independent" papers because it is afraid of the facts about Algeria being widely disseminated — and from sources not easily smeared as "Communist" or "Russian." In so doing, it reveals its own fear of the consequences of a widespread popular awakening. It, too, does not desire "convulsions" — which must inevitably follow an intervention of the organized working class.

But the task of the French intellectuals is not to try to find a way around such intervention, but to contribute, so far as they are able, to the construction of a new leadership which can make that intervention, when it at last takes place, a decisive one.

October 17, 1960

The Manifesto of the 121

A very important movement is developing in France, and it is necessary that French and world opinion should be better informed about it at a time when the new turn in the Algerian war must lead us to see, and not to forget, the depth of the crisis which opened six years ago.

In greater and greater numbers French people are being prosecuted, imprisoned and condemned for refusing to take part in this war or for going to the aid of the Algerian fighters. Distorted by their enemies, but also watered down by those whose duty it is to defend them, the reasons for their action remains generally misunderstood. It is insufficient merely to say that this opposition to the authorities is respectable. As the protest of men who feel their honor and their idea of truth attacked, it has a significance which passes beyond the circumstances in which it takes place and, it is important to stress, whatever the outcome of events may be.

FOR the Algerians there is nothing equivocal about the struggle whether carried on by diplomatic or by military means. It is a war for national independence. But what is its nature for French people? Is it not a foreign war. The soil of France has never been threatened. What is more: the war is being carried on against men whom the State pleases to consider as Frenchmen, but who, for their part, are fighting precisely in order not to be. It is not enough to say that it is a war of conquest, an imperialist war, accompanied in addition by racialism. There is this in every war and the confusion continues.

In fact, by a decision which constitutes a basic abuse, the State first of all mobilized entire age groups of young male citizens for the sole purpose of what it described as a "police action" against an oppressed population, which only revolted through concern for its elementary dignity, since it demands to be at last recognized as an independent community.

Neither a war of conquest, nor a war of "national defence," nor a civil war, the Algerian war has little by little become a war specific to the army and to a caste which refuses to give way before a rising which even the civil power, recognizing the general collapse of colonial empires, seems prepared to understand.

Today it is mainly the army's will which keeps this criminal and absurd conflict going. This army, as a result of the political role which a number of its top representatives make it play, acts at times openly and violently outside all legality, betraying the ends with which it is entrusted by the entire nation. It compromises and threatens to pervert the nation itself, by forcing its citizens under orders to make themselves accomplices of a factious and degrading activity. Is it necessary to recall that, fifteen years after the destruction of the Hitler regime, French militarism, as a result of the exigencies which such a war imposes, has been led to resort to torture and to make torture once again an institution in Europe?

It is under these conditions that many Frenchmen are being led to put in the balance the meaning of the traditional values and duties. What is loyalty when, in certain circumstances, it becomes a shameful submission? Are there not cases when refusal to serve becomes a sacred duty, where "treason" means a courageous respect for truth? And when, by the will of those who use the army as an instrument of racial and ideological domination, the army places itself in open or latent revolt against democratic institutions, doesn't revolt against the army take on a new sense?

The question of conscience was posed from the beginning of the conflict. As the latter lengthens out it is normal that the question of conscience should be resolved in more and more cases by acts of insubordination and desertion as well as protection and help to the Algerian fighters. New movements have developed outside all the official parties, without their assistance, and finally, despite their disavowal. Once more outside the established cadres and slogans a resistance movement has been born, by a spontaneous growth of consciousness, seeking and inventing forms of action and means of struggle in relation to the new situation whose true sense and objects the political groupings and journals have agreed, by inertia, doctrinal timidity or national or moral prejudices, not to recognize.

The undersigned, considering that everyone must take a stand on acts which it is no longer possible to present as individual acts of adventure; considering themselves, in their place and according to their means, as having the right to intervene, not to give advice to those who have to take a personal decision in the face of such grave problems, but to ask those who judge them not to allow themselves to be deceived by the ambiguity of words and values declare:

We respect and consider justified the refusal to take up arms against the Algerian people.

We respect and consider justified the conduct of the French people who consider it their duty to bring aid and protection to the oppressed Algerians in the name of the French people.

The cause of the Algerian people, which is contributing in a decisive way to ruin the colonial system, is the cause of all free men.

This manifesto was signed by such leading French intellectuals as Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir. Its publication was suppressed in France by the government.
"American Communism and Soviet Russia"

by James P. Cannon


When Theodore Draper set out in 1952 to write the history of the American Communist party he didn’t know what he was getting into. He had assumed, as he says in the introduction to the present volume, that “the ‘real’ history of American Communism had begun with the economic depression of the early nineteen-thirties,” and that the first ten years could be given short shrift. “Originally I conceived of writing the whole story in one volume, of which the opening chapter would briefly outline the party’s ‘pre-history’ from 1919 to 1929.” It didn’t work out that way.

The writing of this “pre-history” turned out to be a formidable chore because the first ten years stubbornly refused to yield to summary treatment, and information about them was not easily found. The historical reports of others, Stalinist and anti-communists alike, proved to be inadequate and unreliable; superficial jobs, tendentiously slanted and even grossly falsified. Draper explains the problem that upset his original plan with polite restraint, as follows: “I found scholarly exploration almost completely lacking, sources uncollected and often unknown, and most of the available material encrusted with personal bias and political propaganda.”

He had to undertake a basic research of original sources never assembled before. He soon discovered that he had to dig deep for the true story. And, once started, and lured on by its unfolding interest, he kept at it, year after year, until he had piled up a mountain of material and sorted it out into a coherent pattern.

Now, eight years and two thick and richly documented volumes later, he hasn’t been able to get farther than the “opening chapter,” as he at first had conceived it. That simple fact, standing by itself, is testimony to the significance and interest of the first ten years of American communism, and also to the seriousness of the first historian to report it with factual accuracy in scope and detail.

Draper’s first volume, The Roots of American Communism,* published in 1957, could carry the story only up to 1923. His second volume, American Communism and Soviet Russia, recently published, ends in the year 1929. His projected third volume, dealing with the Stalin-Browder era, which he had originally conceived to be the “real” story, has had to wait until the first ten years of the party’s evolution, which eventually prepared the necessary conditions for the Browderian monstrosity, had been thoroughly explored and reported.

Serious students of American communism, and of its first ten years in particular, will be grateful for Draper’s remarkable work of exploration and discovery. His two imposing volumes give the first and only detailed, rounded and connected account of the facts of American communist history, from its inception as a revolutionary movement inspired by the Russian Revolution until it succumbed to Stalinism in 1929. By that time, the American party, gradually yielding to conservative domestic pressures on the one side and to the deep-going reaction in the Soviet Union on the other, had undergone a profound transformation.

How this transformation was eventually brought about is related, step by step, in Draper’s story. It seems simple and clear and easy as you read the flowing narrative from chapter to chapter — until you study the voluminous reference notes and reflect that it took the author eight years of hard labor to assemble them; and reflect further that the research relates to living people in action all the time.

Along the way, the party lost its character as a self-governing organization; its internal democracy was gradually reduced until it was completely strangled in 1929; and the great majority of the strongest and most independent leaders, who had founded the party and led it through the first ten years, were eliminated in one way or another.

All that took time. It took ten years. And they were not quiet, easy years. They were years in which living people — the pioneers of American communism — fought long and hard against insuperable odds to create the first revolutionary workers’ party in this country. They failed, but they didn’t fail easily. Some of

them died, and some fell by the way-side in the exhausting struggle; some changed and deteriorated under the harsh pressures of time and circumstance, and were different people when the showdown came; and some were defeated standing up and had to make a new start.

And even then, the year before Stalin took over the party lock, stock, and barrel in 1929, saw two explosions in the leadership. The Trotskyists had to be expelled in the fall of 1928 and the Lovestoneites in the summer of 1929.

All that had to happen, in drawn-out, unceasing turmoil and conflict, before the party itself could be transformed into an entirely different party, as it is shown to be at the end of its first decade, at the end of Draper’s second volume of party history. The American Communist party met the economic crisis touched off by the stock market crash in October, 1929, with the same name and the same formal program as in the previous decade. But it was not the same party.

* * *

The thesis of Draper’s book is implicitely stated in its title: American Communism and Soviet Russia. He thinks the trouble with the American Communist party began at the beginning when it tied itself to the Russian Revolution and the Russian leaders, and that this initial mistake — the party’s original sin, so to speak — led it inexorably, from one calamity to another, to eventual defeat and disgrace.

His dim view of this original sin is carried over into his extensive report and passing comments on the activities of the sinners and the movement they created or tried to create, and — perhaps unconsciously — it seems to permeate everything he says about them. This deprecatory appraisal is implied, more than explicitly stated, in his style and tone. This style and tone dominate the absorbing narrative from start to finish.

He seems to think, if we take his attitude for his opinion, that the whole thing was a bloody mess, as our English cousins would say, and the people concerned were rather a bad lot, free from any trace of the odor of sanctity. This history is definitely not a work of hagiology. The only actors in the big cast of characters who escape with a few kind words — and this strikes me as an unintended comic touch — are those who dropped out or got themselves expelled.

Draper’s bias is unconcealed. But he manifests it in a manner absolutely unique in anti-communist historical writing. His cocksure interpretations and summary judgments are woven into every page of his writing, from his introduction to his concluding sentence, but he does not twist his evidence to bolster them. He relates the facts as he found them, without prejudicial selection, or deliberate omission, or falsification.

He shows that Russian influence, which began with the influence of the ideas of the Russian Revolution in the Lenin-Trotsky time, culminated at the end of the first ten years in the complete domination of the American party by the Stalin regime in all respects, even to the extent of selecting, removing, and rearranging the party leadership, without regard to any prior decisions or preferences of the party membership.

Draper proves all that from the record, citing chapter and verse every time. Then he assumes and concludes that this Russian influence was strictly no good from start to finish. But he doesn’t prove that.

This question is directly related to the world historical significance of the Russian Revolution of 1917; and to the long and deep reaction, with all its complexities, that followed the vernal period of the revolution but failed to cancel it out, and the effect of this reaction on all the communist parties of the world, including the American, and including the Russian. This is a world problem and the most complicated and difficult problem of modern times. It has to be seen in the light of Soviet Russia’s isolation in the capitalist world. It does not admit of a simple, off-hand interpretation on national grounds, either Russian or American.

* * *

Draper’s account, from a factual standpoint, is unassailable. He tells us what really happened in the American Communist party, and how it happened. The why and the wherefore, and what it signifies for the future, is another matter; the critical reader will have to answer that for himself. By and large, the answer will depend on one’s basic point of view about where the world, and America with it, are heading. The pioneers of American communism and their endeavors, their original aspirations and later disappointments, their achievements and defeats, can only be judged by how they fit into the general perspective.

It’s an either-or proposition, as I see it. If it is assumed that American capitalism has solved, or is on the way to solving, its basic contradictions; and if it is assumed further that our great and blameless country, together with its allies, and with a clean-cut, All-American boy at the helm as president, will soon begin to reverse the trend of history started by the Russian Revolution of 1917 — don’t laugh! — then the doings and misdoings of the pioneer American communists, who hitched their wagon to the Russian star, are irrelevant to the present and the future.

Their history, then, is the history of an off-beat adventure — of interest only to curious scholars and still more curious readers, similar to those who like to write and read about the various utopian colonies and bizarre cults of the past. This is a very limited audience which, moreover, is not likely to excite itself to controversy about the meaning of it all. What difference does it make anyway?

On the other hand, if the historical trend set off by the Russian Revolution is seen as virtually irreversible now, and strong enough to shake off the Stalinist deformations, becoming cleaner, freer and more democratic as it rolls along; and if America, too, is seen as inexorably destined for its own revolution on the Russian model — then the first attempt to organize a revolutionary party in this country was a soundly motivated and heroic undertaking which has a profound meaning and practical interest for the present and the future.

Those who see the future this way, and identify themselves with it by purposeful activity, stand in the direct line of succession to the original American communists who were in-
spired by the same vision forty years ago, and need to know all about them. The times were against the communist pioneers in this country, and their own timing was off, and they committed other mistakes and even some absurdities, and eventually most of them lost their way. But all that is secondary.

Their original vision of the future was true, and that's the main thing. It invests the ten-year story of their endeavors, and their defeat, and the new beginning in 1928, with a continuing interest for the upcoming generation of rebel youth.

* * *

Those who study Draper's history will note that the handful of American communists who revolted against the corruption of Stalinism and made a new beginning did not look for a new revelation. They called for a return to the basic ideas of the Russian Revolution which the Stalinists had betrayed.

Draper devotes a chapter to a report of this revolt and new beginning in the fall of 1928 and concludes — with implied disapproval — that Trotskyism could not give us "the means of finding a new revolutionary road; at best it promised to lead back to an old one." This raises the question of what a revolutionary party is, where it starts, and what it lives on.

A revolutionary party begins with ideas representing social reality, and cannot live without them. And such ideas, like money, do not grow on trees. They have to be taken where they can be found and valued for their own sake, regardless of their point of origin. A would-be revolutionary who doesn't recognize this had better quit before he starts.

The original ideas of the modern socialist movement in all countries of the world, including Russia, had to be taken from Marx and Engels, who happened to be Germans. The continuation and development of these "German" ideas into revolutionary action and victory was the work of Russians, Lenin and Trotsky in the first place, who were internationalists and avowed disciples of the great originators. Revolutionary parties which sprang up in all countries of the world after the first World War were inspired by the original German ideas, which had become Russian ideas and actions, and lived on them in their early years.

The same is true of the entire historical period since the death of Lenin in 1924. The analysis of the new and complicated problems of Stalinism, fascism and the second World War, and the programmatic ideas for a revolutionary opposition, all came again from the Russians, in this case Trotsky and his collaborators in the Soviet Union.

* * *

Of course, it might be flattering to one's personal conceit and sense of national pride — if one is bothered by such anachronistic absurdities at this hour of the clock — to organize a brand new "American" party with homegrown American ideas, new or old. But no such ideas — none that were any good, that is — were to be found in the United States when the first attempt to organize a revolutionary party in this country was made in 1919. They were not to be found when a handful of us made a new beginning in 1928. And they have not been found in the intervening 30-odd years.

To be sure, there have been numerous attempts to improvise a purely American party but they all melted away like last year's snow. That's the way it had to be, for there is no American road separate and apart from the international road. America has produced some great technologists, engineers and professional baseball players, and experts in other fields. But, so far, no creative political thinkers for the age of internationalism.

In this age of internationalism, those who have seriously wanted to build a revolutionary party in this country have had no choice but to look elsewhere for programmatic ideas. Draper says that our espousal of the Trotskyist program in 1928 "helped to perpetuate the dependence of all branches and off-shoots of the American communist movement on the Russian revolution and Russian revolutionaries." That's true. But what of it?

The famous bandit, Willie Sutton, was once asked by a reporter why he specialized exclusively on robbing banks. Willie, a thinking man's thief, answered right off the bat: "Because that's where the money is." In the entire historical period since the collapse of the international socialist movement in the first World War up to the present, revolutionary national parties in every country have had to look to the Russian Revolution and its authentic leaders. That's where the ideas are.

Postscript on India

by Bert Deck

**Recent Trends in Indian Nationalism**


A conscious exponent of the method of Historical Materialism, Dr. Desai has tried, "... to indicate the causal connections underlying economic, political, social, educational, cultural and ideological currents that have been developing in India." He indicates that his is the first attempt to so synthesize all the various aspects of Indian nationalism.

The author, a sociology professor at the University of Bombay, first intended to write a short postscript to his earlier work *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*. However "the postscript lengthened to the size of a small book," he writes in the preface.

Dr. Desai's thesis is that Indian capitalism cannot resolve the crisis in which it finds itself. His prognosis is that the crisis will deepen until India places political power in the hands of the working class.

The Indian bourgeoisie and its Congress party saw the solution to the country's ills in the transfer of political power from the British rulers to itself. However, after over a decade of political rule by the capitalist class, all the old social problems persist and even partial progress is not to be observed.

Its fear of the masses and its material connections with semi-feudal exploitation paralyzes the bourgeoisie in the face of the awesome land question. And without a fundamental overturn of social relations on the land no backward country can make any serious efforts to modernize itself. The industry of the country retains all the characteristics...
of a colonial extension: inadequacy, one-sidedness and an inability to make the substantial leap forward necessary to raise the standard of living above subsistence levels.

A curious aspect of this little book is that the author's conclusions jibe with those of the Trotskyist movement, but he indicates no awareness of either contemporary Trotskyist writings or the monumental work of Leon Trotsky on the subject of colonial revolutions.

IN SHORT

Portrait of the Military?

by Shane Mage


This "social and political portrait" of the upper echelons of the U.S. military hierarchy is a fairly typical product of American academic sociology. "The social backgrounds and life careers of more than 760 generals and admirals appointed since 1910 were studied; opinion data were collected by means of a questionnaire administered to approximately 550 staff officers on duty in the Pentagon; and 113 officers were intensively interviewed as to their career and ideology." In addition to interpretation of this data there is a great deal of theorizing on the nature of the U.S. military and its proper role, all couched in that leaden, humorless style, his rejection of which is in itself sufficient reason for C. Wright Mills' status as a deviant heretic and outcast among American sociologists.

Janowitz starts by presenting five "hypotheses to be investigated, but by the close of the book it has become very clear that these are not hypotheses but conclusions, which have not been put to serious test. They are: 1) the organizational structure of the military has de-emphasized "authoritarian domination" in favor of "manipulation, persuasion, and group consensus," 2) the specific skills required of military leaders have become more like those of civilian administrators, 3) the officer corps is "undergoing a basic social transformation" from a representative of a social elite to become "more representative of the population as a whole," 4) the path to top military status is more likely to be by "unorthodox" rather than "prescribed" military career patterns, and 5) the military has come to regard itself more in terms of political and ideological criteria. Of these only (3) is not either trivial or evident and here, despite a very misleading "social class" arrangement, the best "proof" he can introduce shows eighty-four percent of the sample of high officers studied coming from proprietary and professional classes.

Among the worst features of this book is its apologetics (tossed off in passing) for the Jim Crow nature of the officer corps, which fiercely fought off all attempts at racial integration until the Korean War forced it on the army; and its complete omission of any reference to the military "security" program which the federal courts have ruled involved gross violations of the civil liberties of draftees.

In sum, by criteria both of content and of style, this is a book without serious interest.

Because of the vast scope of the material covered in less than 150 pages, the book often reads more like a manifesto or a declaration of position than a sociological analysis. Nevertheless, those unused to the materialist method will undoubtedly be intrigued by this fresh approach to recent Indian history. Despite its sketchiness, Recent Trends in Indian Nationalism is a useful outline for beginning a study of the Indian "problem."


When, thirty-three years ago, Sacco and Vanzetti were murdered by the state of Massachusetts, the issue of their guilt of the crime for which they were killed was a "controversial" one — controversial not in the sense that a fair-minded person familiar with the facts of the case might believe even in the possibility of their guilt, but that a considerable and vocal group was determined to defend and justify their execution. Even today, judging from the protests against the Metropolitan Opera's commissioning a score on Sacco and Vanzetti, the refusal of the Massachusetts State Legislature to pass a resolution "exonerating" them, and Robert H. Montgomery's recently published book, Sacco-Vanzetti, The Murder and the Myth, the issue is still "controversial" in this sense. Therefore the re-edition of Herbert B. Ehrmann's The Untried Case, first published in 1933 and long out of print, is particularly welcome.

The Untried Case is not a study of the trials of Sacco and Vanzetti nor of their personal history. It is the story of a particular aspect of the case: the discovery of the actual perpetrators of the South Braintree murders. Starting with a scribbled note from a convicted murderer, Celestino Madeiros, "I hereby confess to being in the South Braintree shoe company crime and Sacco and Vanzetti was not in said crime," Ehrmann and senior associate, William G. Thompson, were able to trace the crime to the Morrelli gang, specify the identities of the five participants, and accumulate overwhelming proof of the actual facts. But of course the case against the true murderers was destined to remain "Untried," thanks to the determination of the judicial, executive and legislative branches of the State Government to get rid of those "anarchistic bastards."

The Untried Case is not merely an essential aspect of the historical record — it is in its own right a fascinating and exciting book written with the pace of a good detective story and the reasoned clarity of the great lawyer's argument to the jury. It remains eminently worth reading or even rereading.


In this book Reik seeks to unravel the mysterious and contradictory Biblical account of the creation of the first woman. Like all his books, this is ably and humorously written — nevertheless it is disappointing.

First of all the whole book has a certain "blown up" quality, as if a great deal of it was included only to stretch it out to book length — in particular the first half of the book is largely irrelevant to the main thesis. Secondly, this thesis itself is never presented in a really coherent and rigorous way, and tends to place greatly disproportionate emphasis on what is at best a secondary aspect of the question.

More specifically, Reik is fully conscious of the main point behind the Eve Myth: "that Eve is originally the figure of a goddess . . . of the great mother goddess of the ancient Orient." The violent degrading of the figure of the goddess represents "a spirit of hostility to women," and the myth of Adam's rib is linked to the initiation mysteries in many primitive societies, rituals whose function is to maintain male supremacy by terrorizing the women and enforcing a total separation from their sons. This last point receives the main emphasis (and represents the only thing not already familiar in Reik's thesis). What makes this all so dissatisfying is that Reik leaves off where the real question begins: the degrading of the mother goddess figure in the mythologies of
The concentration of power in one person are accurate.

Marxist theory admits the possibility of situations in which no alternative exists save such concentration of power. However, it regards this as exceptional and dangerous to the revolutionary interests of the workers and peasants. It is a sign of weakness in the organization of the struggle. The norm is the extension of democracy into all phases of the nation’s life. It is not just a question of democratic rights but of organizing the most powerful defense and bringing the maximum power to bear in carrying out the structural changes and constructing the planned economy. Consequently, while defending the present Cuban government from attack from all quarters, Marxists advocate the earliest possible development of proletarian forms of democracy in Cuba. It would seem self-evident that this would add greatly to the political defense of the Revolution, above all as an example to be emulated in other countries.

This is the tendency in Cuba, as Mills notes, and one must join him in ardently hoping that the fierce pressure from American imperialism will not lead to retrogression.

Looking back, they must note with some astonishment, I imagine, that it proved impossible to carry through simple humanistic aims, all of them long proclaimed by the bourgeois society that toppled feudalism, without taking measures that transcended capitalist property relations. Capitalism does not work for the poor. To fulfill their desire to turn the promise of a better life for the humble into reality, these men of power will found they had to put Cuba on the road to socialism. They discovered this through practical experience and not through preconceived notions. It is almost like a laboratory test. What theories did it confirm or disprove, or must we wipe the slate of theory clean and start fresh?

Is this experience not worth evaluation? Wouldn’t the way be smoothed for revolutionists in other Latin-American countries, for example, if they knew the reasons for the course that had to be taken in Cuba? Surely the experience will be similar elsewhere in Latin America and other continents as revolutionists follow the example of the Cuban vanguard and bring their peoples into the mainstream of history.

Up to now the Cuban leaders have appeared as great revolutionists of action. Perhaps some of them may now venture into the field of theory with commensurate contributions. It is time, we think, to attempt to bring the theory of the Cuban Revolution up to the level of its practice. From such a development all the friends and supporters of the Cuban Revolution stand to gain — not least of all in the United States where the success of the July 26 Movement has brought new hope and inspiration to the radical movement.
BOHEMIA NOT SO LIBRE

Counter-revolution like revolution seeks its theoretical justifications, even if these justifications be on the level of Hitler's race theory. However, the counter-revolutionist is not, like the revolutionist, naturally inclined toward theory — he is interested in more “concrete” things: power, money, etc. The counter-revolutionist therefore often recruits his theorists from the ranks of the deserters of the revolution. So it was with the Mensheviks in the Russian Revolution; so it is today with Cuba. It doesn’t seem quite fair of history to require the revolutionary movement to train theorists for its enemies as well as for itself — but that is the way the onion peels.

When Miguel Quevedo turned against the Cuban Revolution and resigned as editor of Bohemia, the leading liberal popular magazine in Cuba, he swiftly departed for Venezuela. Today he is publishing a plush rival to his former publication called Bohemia Libre which is designed to look exactly like the original. Its distributors are attempting to replace the real with the counterfeit on the newstands which carry Spanish publications in New York City and we assume that this is going on throughout the Americas. One might be so naive as to query where M. Quevedo so quickly gathered the financial resources to issue in such large numbers such an obviously expensive publication with so few ads. The more suspicious, we suppose, might feel that the affluent “good neighbor” in the North might have something to do with it.

The main theoretical article in the first issue of this dubious publication is written by Joaquin Maurin, a former leader of the right wing of the POUM.

The POUM was a centrist Marxist party in Spain. This party, while differentiating itself from the traitorous policies of the Popular Front Government in Spain which paved the way for Franco's victory, nevertheless refused to struggle for working class revolution — the only way in which victory could have been secured. Many of Trotsky's polemics in the late thirties were aimed at Maurin - to the downfall of one revolution, this may sound painfully familiar:

“Since Cuba is an economically backward country, the revolution has to be a democratic one and not a socialist one. A socialist revolution is theoretically possible only where there is a large industry and proletariat. Cuba is a preponderantly agrarian country, without any proletariat to speak of. A socialist revolution is not in the cards for Cuba, as it wasn't for Russia during the first years of the revolution. To try to bring about a socialist revolution in a place where historical and economic conditions only favor a democratic-bourgeois revolution is to put the cart before the horse.”

Here we have the method of thought of the Mensheviks put to use, as was the Menshevik theory in its time, by the press of the counter-revolution and used to justify attempts at the military overthrow of the popular revolution. According to the formalist's theory one cannot proceed beyond democratic demands (this is Marxist terminology for capitalist demands) and if one does, we lecture the revolutionary regime: “... either to backtrack toward the democratic revolution, solidarizing itself with democratic America, or to continue its socialist revolution on a narrow path, with a more minimal than effective aid from Russia and the inevitable will ensue.” That is, either you stay within the formal rigid framework we construct in our minds, or we will overthrow you and install, what — Czarism, Franco, Batista?

Trotsky grappled with this problem in 1906 and Lenin and Trotsky carried out in action a solution to it in the October Revolution of 1917. This solution has done down in history as the “Theory of the Permanent Revolution.”

Trotsky held that the struggle for simple democratic demands — land reform, freedom from foreign domination, etc., — would necessitate such a solution to action against the capitalist class in modern times that one would be forced to go beyond democratic demands and raise socialist demands. This has been the experience of the Castro regime. Castro started with a simple bourgeois democratic program of opposition to dictatorship and foreign domination. In the process of carrying out this program he has been forced to take decisive socialist action against the capitalist class which resisted his program at every step. His only other alternative would have been to go the way of Quevedo and Maurin — to give in to American imperialism (Maurin euphemistically calls it “solidarizing itself with democratic America”).

Rather than listen to a ghost from the failure of another revolution who has offered his services to counter-revolution, it might be wiser for those interested in the future of the Cuban Revolution to study the works of Lenin and Trotsky — they won! The future of Cuba and the Latin American revolution lies not with the tired Maurins but with the new and vital working-class forces in these countries.

ERIC FROMM PREVAILS

Normally this department paid little attention to the now defunct Socialist Call for there was little in it worthy of attention. However, the Summer issue of the Call which came out this Fall (it featured Labor Day ads) was devoted entirely to a manifesto by Eric Fromm entitled Let Man Prevail. One may not agree with Fromm on political or psychoanalytical matters but what Fromm writes is usually worth reading.

The bulk of Fromm's manifesto is a well-written restatement of the basic socialist view on the questions of alienation and humanist goals. Basing himself on Marx, Fromm states: “The supreme principle of socialism is that man takes precedence over things, like over property, and hence work over capital; that power follows creation, and not possession; that man must not be governed by circumstances, circumstances must be governed by man.”

It is when Fromm leaves this abstract level and begins to deal with the problem of how we are to proceed from the present capitalist reality to the socialist future that he runs into trouble. Fromm, like many of the New Left and some of the oppositional intellectuals in the Soviet lands, in searching for a “new” approach to this problem, falls back to a pre-marxist point of view. His position runs something like this: under capitalism man is divided and alienated so that things dominate him and his own creation, society, controls him. Since all mankind is so alienated, we must appeal to all men to change “his system of living and adopt a better, more rational system. Such a view was the dominant one in the early part of the nineteenth century in utopian socialist circles before the development of Marxism.

Marx rejected such views as utopian and saw in the class struggle in capitalist society the process which would lead to the final victory of all men. It was Marx's view that the humanist interests of all men were represented in this historical period by the working class — the only class which had nothing to lose from the destruction of capitalism. In other words, the abolition of classes,
Depression Ahead?

(Continued from page 20)

budgets adds up to the same program, a program which means regimentation of the trade-union movement by the Kennedy administration in Washington. Galbraith, in a television interview, indicates that he would be in favor of price, wage and credit controls, if they became necessary; Kennedy's program will make them necessary.

But, even at the best, the inevitable squeeze and betrayal of the trade unions by Kennedy will not be enough to save the system. The object of Kennedy's anti-labor program can only accomplish a certain stabilization of the domestic economy and a limited brake on the continuing depreciation of the U.S. dollar. Only vast foreign investments can save the U.S. capitalist system: not ten or five years from now, but next year; only the opening of a large market for foreign investments will permit the capitalist system to recover from the present recession. It is not remarkable that Washington was driven to such stupendous fury by the expropriation of a billion dollars of U.S. investments in Cuba.

While the U.S. economy is much stronger, has far greater resources and alternatives than Hitler's Germany, Kennedy's economic program is as full of economic contradictions as Schacht's. Schacht's program put the Nazi economy through a series of financial crises that finally forced Germany to plunge into war as the only possible means for solving its internal economic problems. Schacht's "guns for butter" and Kennedy-Galbraith's "public works instead of wages" programs are essentially the same in principle with essentially the same inevitable consequences. On the American scene, Kennedy's "New Frontier" will lead inevitably to either war or a social crisis; it is extremely probable that that decision will be faced within the next ten years. During the next two years Kennedy will put the U.S. economy more and more on a war-economy footing, with corresponding political and economic forms of regimentation. Faced with repeated recession crises the administration will resort to successively more desperate and extreme measures. To the degree that the "New Frontier" postpones the depression it will, to the degree that it builds up the colonial economies, increase the peril to the dollar on the international market.

We think there is no possible doubt that Kennedy will follow the general program we have outlined for him. The "New Deal" is dying; he has only one choice. The great question, the only important practical question, is how and when the working class will react to the betrayals and abuse the Kennedy regime has inevitably in store for it.

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WINTER 1961
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