Stalinism and the 22nd Congress

by Murry Weiss

The Myth of "People's Capitalism"

by Art Preis
Defend the Communist Party!

The latest move to outlaw the Communist Party of the U.S. under the 1950 Internal Security Act, upheld by the Supreme Court 5-4 decisions last June and October 1961, has aroused notable voices of protest from labor, liberal, civil libertarian, religious, journalism, education, art, law and medical circles. Over two hundred outstanding individuals, in a petition to President Kennedy to halt this stepping-up of an “era of fear” said:

“If these decisions are permitted to stand, they will stimulate ever greater repressions, ever bolder invasions of our protected freedoms, roundups of dissenters, book burnings and a permanent corps of informers.”

An official publication of the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation, New America said editorially: “We think this is a first class disaster for American freedom. . . . we clearly reject the McCarran Act and earnestly hope that it will be overturned in the next go around. For us, there is no ‘exception’ to the right to speak, to publish, to agitate.”

Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois, the 91 year-old historian, scholar and founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, declared on the occasion of the savage McCarran Law’s assault on freedom, “On this first day of October, 1961, I am applying for admission to membership in the Communist Party of the United States. I have been long and slow in coming to this conclusion, but at last my mind is settled.”

Farrell Dobbs, National Secretary of the Socialist Workers Party said in a letter to the National Officers of the Communist Party that the SWP “supports unconditionally your defense against the government attack which in force and effect is plainly to outlaw the Communist Party. We feel that agreement or disagreement with your political views has no bearing on the case. At stake in your fight are basic democratic rights precious to the American people.” Dobbs said the SWP “stands ready to aid the Communist Party defense in every way we can. You are welcome to use our meeting halls everywhere in the country. We hereby extend a standing invitation to your speakers to address our meetings and public forums to explain your case.”

Dobbs called for the need to “build the broadest possible movement in defense of the democratic rights of the Communist Party, a defense movement based on the great American labor traditions that an injury to one is an injury to all.”

A Labor-Negro Vanguard Conference, composed of many who were members of the CP and are in disagreement with it on political and organizational questions, nevertheless rallied to the defense of the CP against the McCarran Law attack without hesitation.

The key requirement of the moment in our opinion is united action against the McCarran Law and concrete defense of the CP. The SP-SDF correctly called for an effective campaign, in the name of a new mobilization. “Let all democrats rally to groups like the American Civil Liberties Union; in defending the rights of those we oppose, let us defend the very fundamentals of civil liberties in our land.”

It is unfortunate, however, that the SP-SDF included the point: “We do not want to join with the Communist Party in defense of its freedom, for that would compromise the principled defense of liberty which is so basic to our stand.” To refuse to join with the CP, the immediate victim of McCarthyism, weakens and injures the united defense of democratic rights. To accept the cold-war red-baiting logic of the U.S. State Department, runs counter to a real struggle against the McCarran Act.

All experience warns: Keep the witchhunt out of the civil liberties movement; the enemies of freedom cannot be defeated by accepting their premises.

In this instance this means fighting for the full democratic rights of the CP in the country in general and in the civil liberties movement in particular. The present government attack has made it impossible to separate anti-McCarranism from defense of the rights of the CP in all spheres.

Operating under this principle the New York City University students were able to defeat the Administration attempt to ban CP leader Benjamin Davis from speaking on their campuses. This united action struck a real blow against the McCarran Act. We hope that the coming months will witness many more such victories.

Editor on Tour

Those who missed Joe Hansen in our recent issues can rest assured that he is on the job: Joe, who is one of our editors and the editor of The Militant, has for several months been giving on-the-spot coverage of explosive current events in Latin America. He will return soon and you will be able to hear him tell his story in person.

Hansen is presently filling The Militant’s pages with vivid accounts of strikers battling Colombian troops; the Ecuador general strike and down-fall of the Velasco tyranny; Peruvian police shooting down strikers; bitter street battles in Bolivia.

Joe will give to American audiences a better look at the “Alliance for Progress” and what Latin Americans think of it. He’ll explain why Frondizi and other Yankee puppets are reluctant to openly prepare and sponsor an invasion of Cuba.

His years in Mexico as secretary to Leon Trotsky, a long acquaintance with the Latin American Press and his leading role in the American labor and socialist movement give the Hansen story unusual authority. A trip to Cuba in 1960 produced two excellent pamphlets, The Truth About Cuba and In Defense of the Cuban Revolution.

Individuals or organizations interested in arranging public meetings for Joseph Hansen are invited to write for information about subjects, fees and possible dates: ISR, 116 University Pl., New York 3, N. Y.
No Classes in U.S.?

Myth of “People’s Capitalism”

by Art Preis

TODAY, American employers and trade union leaders alike insist there is no basis in this country for class struggle. They claim, in fact, that “class distinctions” and even classes themselves have disappeared from our society.

The founders of the American Federation of Labor in 1886 did not deny the fact of the class struggle. They said in the Preamble of the AFL Constitution: “A struggle is going on in all nations of the civilized world between the oppressors and the oppressed of all countries, a struggle between the capitalist and the laborer . . .”

It is true that Samuel Gompers, the AFL’s founding president, disavowed class struggle methods. He proclaimed in his 1910 Labor Day statement, for instance, that “Labor Day stands for industrial peace . . . Our labor movement has no system to crush . . . It has nothing to overturn . . .” William Green, Gompers’ successor, announced in 1935, on the eve of the stormy rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) that we were at the dawn of class peace. He assured labor that “the majority of employers sincerely and honestly wish to maintain decent wage standards and humane conditions . . .” He boasted of his “consistent refusal to commit our movement” to “tactics based upon belief that irreconcilable conflict exists between owners of capital and labor . . .”

The modern union leaders have gone Green one better. They have banished economic classes altogether or reduced class differences to the vanishing point. Without classes or class differences, they ask, how can there be class struggle? The late Philip Murray, president of both the CIO and the United Steelworkers of America, thus wrote in July 1948:

“Today, progressive businessmen regard their workers . . . as welcome partners . . . We have no classes in this country; that’s why the Marxist theory of the class struggle has gained so few adherents. We’re all workers here.”

Walter Reuther, United Automobile Workers President and Murray’s successor in the CIO, spoke at the 1954 CIO Convention against a labor party here because he said this country does not have the same type of class structure as in Europe. Over there, he claimed, “society developed along very classical economic lines, there you have rigid class groupings . . . But America is a society in which social groups are in flux, in which we do not have this rigid class structure . . .” Reuther has never made clear whether we are becoming “all workers here,” as Murray said, all capitalists or some new hybrid class. But he is sure of one thing: “We don’t believe in the class struggle. The labor movement in America has never believed in the class struggle.” (New York Times, March 28, 1958).

AFL-CIO President George Meany also abhors class struggle. But Meany, unlike Murray, has liquidated the working class. At the AFL-CIO merger in December 1955, Meany decreed: “We must not think of ourselves as a group apart; there is no such thing as a proletariat in America.”

This echoes a note sounded since the end of World War II by ideologists and propagandists of big business, who spread the myth that in America we have achieved — or soon will — a “classless” society — and without abolishing the private profit system. This unique form of society they call “people’s capitalism.” Thus, the General Electric Corporation in a large advertising spread in the February 22, 1959, New York Times Magazine, explained that its shareowners “come from
all walks of life" and "this trend has made American capitalism more and more a people's capitalism." (Original emphasis.)

Adolph A. Berle Jr., Roosevelt's wartime Assistant Secretary of State and a luminary early in the Kennedy Administration, specializes in this type of myth-making. In the New York Times Magazine, November 1, 1959, Berle states that what Marxists describe as capitalism "perhaps did exist a century ago. But in America it stopped existing somewhere between 1920 and 1930." He informs us: "This American system has not received a distinctive name. It has been called 'people's capitalism.'" This "people's capitalism," according to Berle, is a transformation from the "age of moguls" which existed seventy or eighty years ago. In the last decades of the Nineteenth Century, Berle concedes, "individual owners of private capitalist enterprise were . . . piling up fabulous fortunes from the profits of railroads and mines, steel, copper and oil . . ." But today the corporations have "displaced the tycoons and moguls, substituting professional management." In a subsequent New York Times article, Berle dissolved the working class as easily as he had eliminated the "tycoons and moguls." He wrote on December 18, 1960, that "in America the 'proletariat' is hard to find."

The New York Times editors also claim it is absurd to speak of class distinctions. In a Labor Day editorial, the September 5, 1960, Times instructs us: "What we most need to remember is that such expressions as 'labor' and the 'workingman' have a diminished meaning today. We have no class distinctions to fit such words. Among the crowds on our Appian Ways it is difficult to tell employer and employee apart . . ."

Let the Times editors — and Berle and Meany, too — seek beyond "our Appian Ways" and go to the unemployment compensation offices or welfare relief agencies. Let them survey the vast and rotting slum areas of New York City and our other large population centers. They will find, by some odd chance, that such places and such areas, are frequented almost exclusively by workers.

Here we have one rule-of-thumb measure of class distinctions in America. Unemployment and the need for unemployment relief are almost exclusively conditions affecting wage workers. A study of unemployment, published in June, 1958, by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, disclosed that 11,600,000 workers had suffered some period of unemployment in 1957, a "good" year. If we count as proletarians only those subject to unemployment and their dependents, we must conclude that, contrary to Berle's claim, the proletariat in the United States is not at all "hard to find."

Class divisions in America have been the subject of serious studies in recent years by outstanding sociologists and scholars — all non-Marxists. Their findings are contained in such widely heralded books as The Status Seekers by Vance Packard, The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills and Social Class and Mental Illness by August B. Hollingshead and Frederick C. Redlich. They all confirm, in their own way, that class lines exist and are hardening more than ever. The Status Seekers, a best-seller in 1959 and 1960,marshals an impressive array of facts to answer the directly posed question: has the United States become a classless society or is it even approaching such a condition?

Packard concludes that class lines in this country are becoming more rigid and that even within the upper strata of society the straining for status and privileged position has intensified. Moreover, he dismisses the "widespread assumption" that the rise in available "spending money" in the late fifties is making everyone equal. He stresses that a working-class man does not move into a higher social class even if he should succeed in purchasing a "limousine" or some other material status symbol. And the worker knows
it, says Packard. For, in terms of the worker's productive role, class lines are becoming "more rigid, rather than withering away."

Packard refutes the widely circulated propaganda that the working class is being absorbed into the middle class. In 1940, only about one-third of those gainfully employed were in so-called "white collar" occupations. By 1959, it was claimed, at least half were in the "white collar" group. This, says Packard, has been incorrectly interpreted to signify a great upthrust of working-class people into the middle class. Actually, a large percentage of those recruited into the new "white collar" jobs are women who did not previously work. Besides, many jobs classified as "white collar," Packard points out, are really low-paid manual occupations that require little skill, such as that of office machine operators, gas station attendants, retail store clerks and many government employees.

Today, there are some 23,000,000 women workers, almost a third of the entire labor force. They provide a high percentage of the clerical and other "white collar" workers. The average full-time yearly pay of women workers in 1960 was $3,102, or two-thirds of men's average earnings. Thus, the majority of working women get wages close to or below the poverty level, fixed by government experts at $2,500 a year. This hardly qualifies these new "white collar" workers as middle-class, even if one believes that a poorly paid typist or mimeograph machine operator has a status superior to a union-scale linotypist or pressman in the printing industry.

The Facts cited above confirm Packard's contention that there has been a "revolutionary blurring" between so-called "white collar" and "blue collar" workers in the sense that every basis for the claim of "white collar" clerical workers to superior status over "blue collar" workers has been undermined. Furthermore, Packard divides the "white collar" classification into a "lower" and an "upper" group. The latter includes the managers and executive employees, as well as self-employed professionals like doctors and lawyers. He explains, however, that between the "lower" and "upper" "white collar" groups there is a "sharp and formidable" boundary line.

We are forced to conclude from Packard's findings that the "blue collar" workers are not being uplifted into the middle class. Rather, there has been a massive "proletarianization" of the lower middle class. Our society has become polarized into two primary classes, the wage workers and the owners. The latter's top richest circles are the dominant sector of the American ruling class.

There was a time, however, when the American people might have spoken of "people's capitalism" with a large degree of truth. That was before the American Civil War. Packard has noted this significant historical fact. There has been a tremendous shrinkage in the relative number of small entrepreneurs and self-employed people — farm owners, small tradesmen and shopkeepers, and craftsmen with their own workshops. These independent enterprisers originally constituted a true middle class in this country. They owned their means of production; they did not sell their labor power for wages.

Thus, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, during Thomas Jefferson's presidency, four out of five Americans were self-employed enterprisers, a majority of them being farmers, Packard points out. By 1940, these enterprisers were only about one-fifth of the income earners. In 1959, they were reduced to about 13% of the "gainfully employed." (By April 1960, the farm population, including all "hired hands," had fallen to only 8.7% of the national total.)

In the late fifties, Packard also notes, some 87% of the income-earning populace were employed by others, by a tiny minority of employers, usually in corporate guise. I add the very significant fact that less than 1% of the corporations employ nearly 60% of all paid workers. (U.S. Department of Commerce report, September 22, 1959.) Packard himself, I must further add, fervently disapproves of the hardening of class lines and wishes something might be done about it for the sake of the private profit system itself. But at least he does not shrink from the facts.

The "free enterprise" system in its corporate monopoly phase is not dominated by faceless "professional managers." The Commissioner of Internal Revenue revealed in 1957 that 201 individuals had reported personal incomes of a million dollars or more in 1954 compared to "only" 145 in 1953. A further rise was expected in 1955. Fortune magazine, in its November 1957 issue, noted the significance of this data. Its article, "The Fifty-Million-Dollar Man" by Richard Austin Smith, observed there had been a lot of "poormouthing" about the million-dollar income dying out. It is plain from the statistics, said the Fortune writer, that "America's Very Rich" have not gone the way of the pre-historic dinosaurs and do not seem likely to. The evidence points rather to what Fortune called "the resurgent Very Rich," defined as individuals with personal estates of not less than fifty million dollars. That is the minimum wealth, Fortune contended, to be rich enough never to escape "the aura of money" or to conceive of ever being broke. A Treasury official cited by Fortune estimated there are between 150 and 500 persons in the golden circle of the "fifty-millionaires."

Fortune itself identified 155 "fifty-millionaires" and thought it likely there were another hundred. Under the heading, "America's Biggest Fortunes," the magazine printed the names and chief sources of wealth of the 76 richest people in the country, so far as Fortune was able to uncover them.

The majority of these super-rich "tycoons and moguls" have inherited their fortunes; their family names, such as Rockefeller, Harriman, Mellon, du Pont, Astor, Whitney and Ford, have been associated with fabulous wealth for three or more generations. The minority of "self-made" rich listed by Fortune "made their pile" mainly during World War I and the post-war boom. They include the General Motors quartet, Alfred P. Sloan Jr., Charles F. Kettering, John L. Pratt and Charles S. Mott. Joseph P. Kennedy, stock market
and real estate speculator whose son John was then in the Senate, was listed in Fortune’s $200 million to $400 million bracket.

Of Fortune’s 76 richest Americans, 31 were in the $75 million to $100 million group; 29, in the $100 million to $200 million; eight, in the $200 million to $400 million; and seven, in the $400 million to $700 million sector. J. Paul Getty, a California oil “tycoon” domiciled in Paris, occupied the $700 million to $1 billion niche alone. Getty in 1959 stated that his fortune was probably greater than a billion. (New York Times, October 16, 1959.) Several billionaire families are on the list, including seven Rockefeller’s, four Mellons and four duPonts. Forty one of the 76 inherited their fortunes; of the remaining 35, thirteen got rich from oil. Fortune explained its estimates were “conservative.” I put the combined wealth of the 76 at between $17 billion and $20 billion. Several of the 76 have died since 1957. But the corporations and banks which they or their heirs control or directly influence reflect the spectrum of American industry and finance, with many scores of billions in assets.

The “moguls” dominate more than ever. But the individual or family ownership and operation of a single enterprise, which characterized the economy of the last century, has been transformed into vast industrial and financial complexes owned and controlled largely by single individuals, families or small inner groups who hire and fire professional managers at will.

When confronted with these facts proving that there are more and richer “moguls” than ever, the propagandists of “people’s capitalism” brush the whole matter aside. G. Keith Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange, has erected the final and, presumably, most invulnerable line of defense of the “people’s capitalism” theory. This Maginot Line of “people’s capitalism” is “broadened ownership of corporation stock.” The New York Post, April 21, 1959, published an interview with Funston and explained:

“G. Keith Funston did not invent the phrase ‘people’s capitalism.’ But he’s done such a job popularizing it . . . that people’s capitalism — broadened ownership of corporation stock — has become pretty much of a Funston hallmark.”

Funston is quoted: “I like the term because it’s expressive and because the Russians hate it so. They say, yes, there may be over 8,600,000 Americans owning stock but that only 1 per cent own more than 90 per cent of it — or some such figure. Well, we don’t know exactly how stock ownership is spread, but we estimate that two-thirds of those 8,600,000 shareowning Americans have incomes of $7,500 and under . . . we know there’s been a significant increase of stockownership in recent years — about one-third more buyers than in 1951.”

Funston infers that the question of the vast proportion of all stocks owned by the top one per cent of stockholders is just “Russian” propaganda. This “Russian” propaganda happens to be based on data published by such ardently pro-capitalist institutions as the U.S. Senate and the National Bureau of Economic Research.

A 1946 Report on Monopolies by the Senate Small Business Committee disclosed that the top 1% of shareholders then owned 60% of the outstanding stock of the 200 largest corporations. “The rich are getting richer,” said the February 29, 1960, New York Times, in describing a survey by the National Bureau of Economic Research. This survey, said the Times, “showed that since 1949 there has been a trend toward more wealth in the hands of fewer people . . . .” This trend, the Times reported, “was clearly evident in 1953 . . . when 1.6 per cent of the country’s population held 30 per cent of the nation’s personal wealth” including “at least 80 per cent of the corporate stock held in the personal sector, virtually all of the state and local government bonds and between 10 and 35 per cent of each type of property.”

What is true of the division of all shareholdings is also true for the shareholdings in individual corporations. The classic case is the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. For many years, AT&T has been cited as the outstanding example of “people’s capitalism” because it has more stockholders than any other corporation.

In 1951, AT&T celebrated the attainment of one million shareholders. Widely publicized ceremonies were held in the New York Stock Exchange. The publicity neglected to mention, however, that the vast majority of AT&T stockholders individually and collectively owned very little of AT&T. While just 30 top shareholders in 1950 owned 1,160,000 of AT&T’s 29 million outstanding shares, some 200,000 AT&T wage workers who had been induced to become “capitalists” by buying AT&T shares controlled less stock than the top 30 owners. These AT&T worker-shareowners, representing 20% of all the company’s shareholders, had to strike repeatedly just to win union recognition.

CIO Communications Workers President Joseph A. Beirne called the publicity about the one-millionth shareholder a “shallow and cheap device to fool the public.” He cited AT&T’s own figures to show that “7.5 per cent of stockholders own over one half of the outstanding shares.” He added: “Conversely, the remaining 92.5 per cent of the shareholders combined don’t even have majority control of the company . . . .”

Today, AT&T boasts nearly two million stockholders. More than 90% of them possess insignificant holdings. All of the latter combined have less control over AT&T than a man with a paddle has over an ocean liner.

The head of the New York Stock Exchange, however, has declared that anyone who talks about how few own so much is practically an agent of the Krem­lin. I will limit myself, therefore, to examining simon­pure “people’s capitalism” as defined by G. Keith Funston. In his New York Post interview, he saw this new and better economic order in the fact that about 8,600,000 Americans in the spring of 1959 owned at least one share of stock. That is, only 5% of the population owned stock.

There was more “people’s capitalism” during the great depression in 1938. That year there were 8,039,000 shareholders, or 6.3% of the population. (The Economic Almanac for 1946-47, Page 45.) By 1952,
when Funston began unfolding his propaganda campaign, the number had dropped to 6,490,000, or only 4.2% of the population, according to the New York Stock Exchange's own report. In 1958, the Exchange reported 8,630,000 shareholders, or 5.2% of the American people — still a smaller percentage than in 1936. Finally, in June 1959, Funston was able to come up with a figure on stock ownership representing a higher ratio to population than the 1936 depression figure. The New York Stock Exchange claimed there were 12,493,000 shareholders in June 1958, or about 7% of the population, compared to 6.3% in 1936.

Let us turn from the America of the 1.6% who own 80% of all privately held corporation shares to the proletarian America of the 87% who live primarily by the sale of their labor power for wages. If the “Very Rich” of Fortune's 1957 survey are those who cannot conceive of ever becoming broke, the people of the wage-workers' America never know what it's like not to feel insecure, not to fear that a day will come when they will be broke or nearly so. Most of them at some time in their lives have been broke, or next to it, and many are broke right now.

Under the present private-profit order, the wage workers never escape the fear of pauperization. Insecurity nags the workers even in periods of relative “prosperity.” What if a prolonged illness strikes? What if the job folds up? What if a depression comes? These questions are never far from the surface of the minds of even the best-paid workers.

A U.S. Department of Labor survey indicated that the average family of four needed an annual income of $6,120 in 1959 to maintain a “modest but adequate” standard of living. This did not allow for any prolonged illness or savings. This budget required a full year's income of $118 every week. The average factory wage at the time was $90.78 a week before withholding taxes. I have before me a recent Labor Department report showing that in February 1961 the actual average weekly take-home pay of factory production workers in the metropolitan New York-Northeastern New Jersey area was $80.87 for a worker with three dependents and $73.31 for a single worker.

The U.S. Census Bureau reported on January 5, 1961, that the median family income in 1959 — before the current recession — was $5,400 before taxes. That is, half the families in this country had incomes during the last “boom” year below $5,400, or at least $720 less than the government's own “modest but adequate” family budget.

In the peak “prosperity” year, 1959, a large segment of the population lived close to or in dire poverty. Nearly 25% — one in four — families had to subsist on $3,000 a year or less, the equivalent in buying power of about $1,250 at pre-war 1939 price and tax levels. Fortune magazine, March 1961, cites the fact that today there are 32 million American people living in outright poverty — below the $2,500 a year level per family.

The impoverished in America are equal to nearly 75% of the population of France; about 60% of West Germany or 65% of Italy; nearly double the population of East Germany; and five times the population of Cuba. Many more than half the American people live well below what is officially considered the minimum “decency and comfort” standard for a country as rich and productive as the United States.

Remember, we are not speaking of a land newly emerged from age-long backwardness, like China. Our country, with 6.2% of the world's population, owns 50% of its wealth. (Information Please Almanac — 1961, page 628.) Our governmental units (federal, state and local) together spent $153 billion in the fiscal year 1960. Since the end of World War II, we have spent more than $500 billion for direct military purposes — enough to have built fifty million modern $10,000 homes. In fact, we spend a million dollars a day just for storage of the “surplus” farm commodities bought by the government to prop up agricultural prices.

A MIDST these Himalayas of waste, great sectors of the American people live in permanent misery. Far from benefiting from the “social flux” that Reuther has conjured up, tens of millions of Americans are condemned by race, age and sex alone to suffer permanently in abysmal living conditions while abundance overflows all about them.

Take, for example, the more than 19,000,000 Negro Americans (or Afro-Americans as some of them now prefer to be called). Most of them exist in a permanent depression — economically deprived, physically segregated, socially degraded and politically disfranchised. The Negro workers earn little more than half the average wages of the white workers, although few of the latter attain the blessed estate of a “modest but adequate” family income. As of 1958, half of the nonwhite male workers earned $3,368 or less compared to a median income for whites of $5,186. Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg reported on February 17, 1961, that 13.8% of all Negroes in the labor force were out of work in January 1961, compared to 7% of white workers. At this point, it is well to remind ourselves that there is one vast area of this country, the former Southern slave states with more than twice the population of fascist Spain, that has maintained a one-party dictatorship since the end of Reconstruction and denies civil rights to more Negroes than the entire black population of South Africa.

It is miserable indeed to be a Negro worker in the United States; but, strange as it may seem, it is even worse to be an aged worker, whatever one's color. Life magazine, July 13, 1959, gave a shocking account of the plight of persons 65 years of age or older. There were 15.4 million people over 65 in 1959. Three-fifths of them, some 9.2 million, had personal incomes of less than $1,000 a year. Another fifth, about 3,000,000, received less than a $2,000 annual income.

Our society prides itself on being based on the Ten Commandments, including one that says: "Honor thy father and thy mother . . ." Yet, the United States has well over ten million pauperized aged (mostly white) who are "badgered by economic worries, harassed by failing health . . . for the most part in dire need," write Robert and Leone Train Rienow in the January 28, 1961, Saturday Review. Their article, "The Desper-
ate World of the Senior Citizen," tells how these 10 million impoverished aged Americans hidden away in our dingy back rooms "are, almost without exception, cruelly lonely, suffering from feelings of rejection and neglect." This plight of America's aged, I might add, is a sufficient commentary on the highly touted "social security" system in this richest country of all.

Our dependent and orphaned young also subsist on mere dregs. Payments in many states for dependent children as well as for old-age assistance, "often represent little more than slow starvation," admitted William L. Mitchell, U.S. Commissioner of Social Security, in an address on September 10, 1959. More than three million youngsters are trying to survive on this aid to dependent children under the Social Security Act. Life magazine recently ran pictures of children in parts of the former Belgian Congo starving as a result of civil war and foreign intervention. But just as horrible sights were to be seen down in our own Louisiana. In August 1960, the Louisiana legislature struck 23,500 children off the state-administered aid-to-dependent-children rolls. They were deemed to be living in "unsuitable" homes — the mothers of many of them were unmarried. State Senator Jack Fruge of Ville Platte on November 8, 1960, pleaded unsuccessfully for repeal of the Louisiana law, saying that he knew many instances in his own parish (county) of Evangeline where "children are so hungry they go to garbage cans for food."

But nothing quite equals the vile conditions of the two million hired farm workers. Their average income in 1960 fell below $900. The majority are Negroes, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. They are denied even the meager protection of the minimum wage and collective bargaining laws.

As previously noted, average wages of our 23 million women workers are only two-thirds of men's and provide only half the income necessary for a "modest but adequate" standard of family living. Many women are the sole support of their families.

No proletariat in America? I have just described scores of millions of proletarians — the impoverished aged and the dependent children, the racial and national minorities, the women workers and the farm hands. And I have not yet touched on the main body of proletarians — the white male wage-earners.

Two-thirds of all the gainfully employed are males — 90% of them white. An outright majority — 58.4% — of all employed males are in the manual, service and farm laborer classifications, according to BLS data for July 10-16, 1960. Factory operatives and kindred workers form the largest single group of male employees, 19.2%. Then come craftsmen, 18.7%; non-agricultural laborers, 9%; service workers (a wide category including domestic servants, repairmen, laundry workers, elevator operators, janitors, clothes pressers, garbage collectors, barbers, hotel, restaurant and bar workers, etc.) 6.5%; and hired farm laborers, 4.9%.

All income earners of both sexes totaled 86,689,000 in the above-cited BLS report. Of these, 37,449,000 — or a 54% majority — are in physical labor categories, including operatives, craftsmen, laborers, service workers and hired farm hands. Clerical workers number 9,907,000 and sales workers, 4,405,000. The latter two "white collar" groups total 14,312,000. They formed 20.8% of the employed working force in July 1960. Even if we add to them a mixed category listed as "professional, technical and kindred workers," numbering 7,042,000, or 10.3% of the total, we cannot stretch the "white collar" workers to more than 31.1% of the gainfully employed. However, the "professional, technical and kindred workers" label is deceptive. In January 1960 an AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department seminar on the space-age industries heard a warning that many employers are trying to "bleed" the unions by labeling as "technicians" workers who do about the same tasks as other production employees.

The remaining classifications are "managers, officials and proprietors" and "farm owners and farm managers." Together, they represent 14.4% of the total.

There is extensive manipulation of statistical data to exaggerate the number and social status of the so-called "white collar class." Thus, the Census Bureau's occupational classification system puts file clerks, typists, office boys, grocery wrappers and cashiers, variety-store sales girls and similar low-paid workers in the same general "white collar" occupational division as "managers, officials and proprietors." Recently, the classification of "service workers," who include many in the most menial physical labor jobs, has been shifted from the "Manual and Services" general category to the broad "White Collar Occupations" listing.

The great increase in clerical and "technical" workers in the past 20 years, due mainly to doubling of government civilian employment and expansion of the war industries, is being used to "prove" that "blue collar" workers are in swift decline, that the proletariat is vanishing and that the unions are disintegrating.

Under the headline, "Union Membership Declines," a New York Times editorial on February 7, 1960, takes special note of a 300,000 loss in total union membership from the 18,400,000 peak in 1956. The Times attributes this 1.7% decline in part to the fact that "white collar workers now account for more than half of the labor force but only 12 per cent of American unionists were white collar workers in 1958 . . ." The Times' figure on the predominance of the "white collar" workers, as the Census data I have cited show, is false. There were almost three times as many wage workers employed in physical labor categories as in "white collar" in 1960, although mass unemployment has since cut down paid union memberships by as much as 1½ million.

It is true that union leaders themselves blame the over-all decline of union membership since 1956 in part on the "changing composition" of the nation's work force. Yet some 20 million workers in the physical labor category — many in the South — remain unorganized. Every time there has been a slackening of union growth we have heard the plaint about the "white collar" workers. The fault lies, however, in the
class-collaborationist policies, methods and outlook of the union leaders.

But before anyone hangs a wreath on the American labor movement to mourn the simultaneous demise of the American proletariat and its unions, let us review certain basic facts. Twenty-eight years ago — in 1933 — there were only 2,782,296 union members, or 7.8% of the organizing workers, after 47 years of AFL activity. In 1935, the year the CIO was formed, organized workers numbered 3,616,847, or 10.6% of potential unionists. By 1937, after the CIO went into action, union membership more than doubled, numbering 7,687,087, or 21.9% of organizing workers.

Moreover, during the first two years of the CIO's aggressive drive to organize industrial workers, scores of thousands of "white collar" workers were swept into the CIO's fold — a combined total of 90,000 in the State, County and Municipal Employees, the United Retail Employees and the United Office and Professional Workers unions. Some 15,000 editorial employees joined the new American Newspaper Guild. (Edward Levinson, Labor on the March, 1938, Page 309-315.)

Today, despite recent losses, organized labor represents between 16 million and 17 million members, almost five times as many as in the founding year of the CIO and two and a third times more than in 1937, when the almost-broke CIO unions, amidst a depression, crashed through for their first great victories.

In examining the contention that "there is no proletariat" in the United States, I have touched only in passing on the crucial point of mass unemployment. Despite more than a trillion dollars (1,000,000,000,000) of direct military expenditures in the past twenty years, we have experienced a series of recessions — 1945-46, 1949-50, 1953-54, 1957-58 and 1960-61. The unemployment peak in July 1958 reached 5,294,000. Eight million workers drew unemployment compensation at some time during 1958. In February 1961, a new post-war record of 5,705,000 full-time jobless was reached. Another 3,000,000 were on reduced work-weeks with corresponding loss of pay. Nearly nine million wage earners were suffering directly the consequences of falling production at the low point of the latest recession. About 45% of the unemployed are not covered by unemployment compensation. It is estimated that in 1960 not less than fifteen to sixteen million workers suffered some period of full unemployment.

In February 1961, one in every ten factory workers was unemployed — an outright depression ratio. Most heavily hit were steel, auto and textile workers. Coal miners have lost two-thirds of their jobs since World War II. Detroit unemployment in February 1961 reached a depression level of 11.8% of the city's work force. The Michigan jobless rate was 10.8%. Mass layoffs accompanied sharp drops in production. Auto factories in February 1961 worked at only 44% of the February 1960 rate. The steel industry, from June 1960 through March 1961, operated at between 45% and 55% of capacity.

Because of their relatively high wage rates, coal, steel and automobile workers have frequently been cited as wage-earners who have been lifted above the proletariat. Compared to the $2.30 average hourly wage rates for all manufacturing workers in February 1961, the soft coal miners received $3.27; steel workers, $3.02; and auto workers, $2.87. But frequency of layoffs and short work-weeks in these basic industries have meant deep slashes in annual earnings. Moreover, welfare funds and "fringe" benefits are proving insufficient to meet the need during the current depressed conditions of these industries.

The independent United Mine Workers was forced in December 1960 to cut pensions of 65,000 retired soft-coal miners from $100 down to $75 a month because of "economic conditions that have caused a large decline in the revenues of the trust fund." A supplementary unemployed benefit (SUB), combined with state unemployment compensation, was supposed to provide laid-off AFL-CIO steel workers with 65% of their normal weekly take-home pay for as long as a year. By February 1961, the U.S. Steel Corporation had reduced its individual SUB payments 40% because of the heavy drain on its fund. AFL-CIO United Automobile Workers officials have reported an unspecified number of laid-off UAW members have lost their SUB payments. These are discontinued when state unemployment benefits end. American society is indeed "in flux" — but not in Reuther's sense. It is "in flux" between employment and unemployment; between inadequate unemployment payments and none at all.

I have cited the statistics to prove beyond doubt the class divisions in the United States, the decisive numbers of the proletariat and the tremendous size of organized labor compared to earlier periods. These facts demonstrate that the widely advertised "people's capitalism" is a myth based upon massive falsifications about the conditions of the working people and their struggles for existence in this richest and most favored of capitalist countries. The economy of the United States is neither owned by the people nor operated for their benefit. Our capitalism remains essentially what it has been from birth: a system of exploitation of the many for the enrichment and aggrandizement of the few.

May 1, 1961.
Stalinism and the Twenty-Second Congress

The body of Stalin lies buried in the Kremlin wall but the ghost of the dictator's policies continues to haunt those who served him well while he lived

By Murry Weiss

THE events surrounding the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party last October 1961 constitute a remarkable refutation of imperialist cold-war propaganda. The central prop of the cold-war argument is that socialism and tyranny are inseparable; and that the working masses in the capitalist world should never embark on a socialist revolution since the frightful consequences inevitably will be Stalinism. If the U.S. State Department theory made sense, then the industrial, scientific and cultural growth of the Soviet Union would lead to the strengthening of Stalinism. In actuality, however, the impressive advances of socialism in the USSR, which capitalists don't even try to deny, is resulting in de-Stalinization and tangible gains of democratization rather than the growth of bureaucratic tyranny.

For all its democratic pretensions, imperialism favored Stalinism in the Soviet Union as against the robust and thriving socialist democracy. This is why the trend towards socialist democracy and internationalism within the Soviet orbit is bad news for capitalism and good news for the socialist movement.

A Turkish diplomat, now residing in the U.S., wrote in a letter to the New York Times, Nov. 23, that Khrushchev "had no desire to alter Soviet policies." Nevertheless, his "peasant shrewdness . . . led him to the best and only alternative. By denouncing Stalin's crimes — and the more violent the better — he was disassociating himself and the Soviet Union from such policies and without undertaking any housecleaning, simply by indirection was creating an image of a more liberal and humane Khrushchev and Soviet Union. . . . This I sense to be the underlying theme of de-Stalinization, against which we must watch carefully, for in the long run it would deprive us of the one infallible weapon that we have against communism," (emphasis, M. W.).

This super-clever imperialist diplomat imagines he is matching wits with a super-clever Khrushchev. This reasoning is based on the premise that heads of state can arbitrarily manipulate their respective nations at home in accordance with the needs of diplomatic propaganda.

The diplomat perceives a threat to world capitalism in the dethronement of the Stalin "cult" and the demolition of Stalinism. He correctly senses that a blockbusting power is aiming at the capitalist system. A resurgence of socialist democracy in the Soviet Union will indeed deprive capitalism of its "one infallible weapon" against communism. In the face of this Soviet transformation the whole cloth of the cold-war ideology will be cut to shreds. So, take note all imperialist policy makers, a guided missile of a new type is heading your way. What counter-weapon can you command in your arsenal?

Radicals Ill-Prepared

But the radical movement also has by no means reacted to the 22nd Congress without apprehension. Since the 1956 Khrushchev revelations of Stalin's crimes at the 20th Congress, those in and around the American Communist Party as in all CPs throughout the world have been unable to find their bearings regarding the crucial question of Stalinism. Some radicals cherished the illusion that the nightmarish specter of Stalin and Stalinism would somehow blow over, go away and disappear.

One of the reasons why the radical movement was ill-prepared to cope with Stalinism was the way Khrushchev presented the 1956 revelations. The facts about Stalin's frame-ups and mass murders demanded a serious Marxist explanation of the social cause for the "cult of the individual." But Khrushchev couldn't or wouldn't provide an explanation. Instead he wound up the revelations as follows:

"We consider that Stalin was excessively extolled. However, in the past Stalin doubtlessly performed great services to the party, to the working class and to the international workers' movement . . . . We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot."

This soothing syrup became bitter medicine. The 22nd Congress revealed that Khrushchev could never salvage the cracked image of Stalin. It had to be completely shattered. Stalin had to be exhumed from the Lenin Tomb at Red Square. More and more revelations were required. Instead of Stalin alone bearing the blame for the crimes, mounting to a veritable chamber of horrors, it became imperatively necessary to provide the names of some of those who shared Stalin's criminal deeds. Khrushchev pointed an accusing finger at the "anti-party" group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov.
and Voroshilov as those, and presumably those alone, who were guilty of assisting Stalin's blood purges. But since Khrushchev is naming some, what of the others?

Dorothy Healy, executive secretary of the Communist Party in Southern California, stated to a witchhunting committee, according to the Los Angeles Times, Oct. 7, 1961, that she was “more devastated by Khrushchev’s [1956] revelations of past crimes by the Soviet regime than you.” She said further that she “would like to see the Soviet Union progress democratically to the point where there would be more than one party on the ballot there.”

Without the slightest aid or comfort to the capitalist propaganda, Healy has raised a key subject of the need for socialist democracy. We for our part would certainly favor the right of socialists to create an independent working class party in the Soviet Union because at present the existing CP in the USSR is completely monopolized by the Soviet bureaucracy.

But the prospect of the right to organize an independent party rivaling the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union is posed concretely at this time over the deep debate between the Khrushchev faction in power and the alleged “anti-party” group of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov and Voroshilov. Why does Khrushchev refuse to grant Molotov’s constitutional right to present his views at the 22nd Congress? Why this torrent of denunciations of the “anti-party” group while it is muzzled? The reason is quite apparent. If Molotov were allowed to talk at the party congress this might disclose that everything Khrushchev said about the “anti-party” group as accomplices of Stalin would be just as true about Khrushchev! And once each faction in the bureaucratic regime had listed its record of denunciation and a counter-record of equally damning denunciations the result would be — the disclosure not of one pack of scoundrels or another pack but a sociological phenomenon: a bureaucracy; not bureaucratic errors or bureaucratic crimes but a social and historical development of a parasitic bureaucratic caste. The working masses are exerting enormous pressure on the whole regime to yield concessions of socialist democratic rights. The bureaucracy in power, headed by Khrushchev, are maneuvering for time to find the line of demarcation between imperatively necessary concessions and repressions in a desperate attempt to save the entire rule of the bureaucracy.

Just consider the statements of the Khrushchev group at the congress in the light of the record:

At the congress Khrushchev warned the members of the “anti-party” group to beware “lest their role as accessories to the mass reprisals instigated by Stalin] come to light.” He added, “We are in duty bound to do everything to establish the truth.” Everything?

As the chief of the Ukraine in Stalin’s time Khrushchev declared in 1936, “Stalin is the hope, the beacon which leads all progressive humanity! Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our will! Stalin is our victory!”

During the peak years of Stalin’s blood purge, Khrushchev said, “The Ukrainian people cry out: Long live our beloved Stalin!”

When the Stalin gang murdered the Red Army’s Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky, Khrushchev described this executed victim as “a traitor that the party had unmasked and liquidated, throwing him like dust to the winds so that no trace should be left.” But now at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev refers to Tukhachevsky as “a distinguished military leader.”

When the Ukrainian General I.E. Hakir was executed, Khrushchev referred to him as “that scoundrel who opened the gates to the German fascists, feudalists and capitalists.” Now at the congress Khrushchev describes his victim as “a trusted party man.”

One of Khrushchev’s colleagues at the 22nd Congress, N. D. Podgorny, said, “Kaganovich [in the Ukraine] surrounded himself with a pack of unprincipled bootlickers, beating up the cadres of faithful to the party and hounding and terrorizing the leading workers of the region.” But Khrushchev was Chairman of the Ukrainian CP during this whole period!

Doesn’t this pose point blank the role of Khrushchev as an accessory of Stalin?

If the 20th Congress raised the question of the bureaucracy as the social source of the “Stalin cult,” the 22nd Congress posed the question even more sharply.

Keeping in focus the problem of the nature of Soviet bureaucracy, let us discuss some of the recent reactions in Communist Party and radical circles shortly before the 22nd Congress and following it.

Mandel Requests

In the People’s World October 14, 1961, “Two diverse views of Soviet discussion” were presented by William Mandel, a writer about the Soviet Union, and John Pittman, the PW’s correspondent in Moscow. Mandel said, “Many letters” in the Soviet press, “support the program’s [Khrushchev’s draft] undertaking to fight bureaucracy. Various amendments are offered to the proposed party rules in that respect but only one writer [in Trud] asks that the program include an explanation of why bureaucracy still exists, in view of the disappearance of the reasons for its existence stated in the program of 40 years ago.” Referring to the letter writer in the trade union paper, Trud, “who wants an explanation of bureaucracy,” Mandel concludes, “There is great approval of the condemnation of the ‘cult of the individual,’ but no hint that failure to permit discussion of policy (as illustrated above) instead of techniques may reflect a ‘cult of individual.’”

Pittman takes Mandel to task for adding “a new dimension to presumptuousness” in complaining that there is a “failure to permit discussion of policy instead of technique” in the current discussion in the USSR on the draft program. Pittman is inconsistent. In the first place he argues that there is a policy discussion in the Soviet press and cites some examples which unfortunately do not show such a discussion. In the second place he argues that since there are thousands of daily and factory papers in the Soviet Union how could Mandel assert that there is no discussion. But in the third place he argues that such a discussion is not necessarily required. Here is what Pittman said:

“It is not enough that the Communist Party of the

WINTER 1962
Trotsky's Prognosis

All indications agree that the further course of [Soviet] development must inevitably lead to a clash between the culturally developed forces of the people and the bureaucratic oligarchy. There is no peaceful outcome for this crisis. No devil ever yet voluntarily cut off his own claws. The Soviet bureaucracy will not give up its positions without a fight. The development leads obviously to the road of revolution.

* * *

It is not a question of substituting one ruling clique for another, but of changing the very methods of administering the economy and guiding the culture of the country. Bureaucratic autocracy must give place to Soviet democracy. A restoration of the right of criticism, and a genuine freedom of elections, are necessary conditions for the further development of the country. This assumes a revival of freedom of Soviet parties, beginning with the party of Bolsheviks, and a resurrection of the trade unions. The bringing of democracy into industry means a radical revision of plans in the interests of the toilers. Free discussion of economic problems will decrease the overhead expense of bureaucratic mistakes and zigzags. Expensive playthings — palaces of the Soviets, new theaters, show-off subways — will be crowded out in favor of workers' dwellings. "Bourgeois norms of distribution" [that is, inequality of income] will be confined within the limits of strict necessity, and, in step with the growth of social wealth, will give way to socialist equality. Ranks will be immediately abolished. The tinsel of decorations will go into the melting pot. The youth will receive the opportunity to breathe freely, criticize, make mistakes, and grow up. Science and art will be freed of their chains. And finally, foreign policy will return to the traditions of revolutionary internationalism. —Revolution Betrayed, by Leon Trotsky.

Deutscher's Prognosis

The dynamics of economic and cultural growth determine the prospects of domestic policy. The Soviet Union is an expanding society, emerging from a period of "primitive socialist accumulation," rapidly increasing its wealth, and enabling all classes and groups to enlarge their shares of the national income. This makes for a relaxation of social tensions and antagonisms. On the other hand, the social and cultural advance tends to make the masses aware of the fact that they are deprived of political liberties and are ruled by an uncontrolled bureaucracy. In coming years this will impair them to seek freedom of expression and association, even if this should bring them into conflict with the ruling bureaucracy. No one can foresee with certainty whether the conflict will take violent and explosive forms and lead to the new "political revolution" which Trotsky once advocated, or whether the conflict will be resolved peacefully through bargaining, compromise, and the gradual enlargement of freedom. Much will depend on the behavior of those in power, on their sensitivity and readiness to yield in time to popular pressures. Towards the end of the Stalin era the antagonisms and tensions within Soviet society were acute; and if the ruling group had rigidly clung to the Stalinist method of government, it might have provoked a political explosion. This did not happen, however; and in consequence of the reforms carried out since 1953 the social and political tensions have been greatly reduced. Should the ruling group attempt to cancel these reforms, then it would certainly heighten the tensions once again and exacerbate the antagonisms. But if the government remains flexible and sensitive to popular demands, there will be little likelihood of any explosive internal development. The prospect would then be one of further gradual reform, of increasing well-being and social contentment, and of growing freedom. — The Great Contest, by Isaac Dutscher.

Soviet Union and the Soviet people are undertaking to create a society of abundance for all, to establish the world's highest living standards, to safeguard humanity from thermonuclear extinction, to assist colonial peoples to achieve liberation and to help newly liberated peoples develop their countries, and to pioneer man's conquest of the cosmos. In addition to these undertakings, in order to win Mandel's approval they must discuss and agree with his ideas about Dr. Zhivago, final ballots with more than one name, why a magazine in Yiddish appeared in 1961 instead of 1954, and whether the theoretical resolution by Lenin and Stalin on the issue of "cultural-national versus regional autonomy" half a century ago was really a mistake! Of course, neither Mandel nor I can be sure that these subjects have not been discussed. But I would be surprised if they were . . . I doubt very much if people here would consider them pertinent to the building of a communist society."

This is simply not the way to conduct a discussion. It is begging the question to dismiss the need for an explanation of bureaucracy by referring to "grand" questions. This is getting up on a high hobby horse and looking down at a trouble maker who wants to quibble about trivial questions. But these are not trivial questions, neither the Jewish problem, the national problem, freedom for writers and scientists, the multiple choice of candidates on the ballot — or the problem of bureaucracy. Mandel, moreover, doesn't demand that the CP of the Soviet Union and the people must agree with him to gain his approval. He only raised the question of an explanation of bureaucracy and the source of the "cult of the individual" and regretted the absence of answers and discussion on this point.

The Poles

The Communist Party leader, Wladislaw Gomulka, gave his report on the 22nd Congress to the Polish CP's Central Committee last December 1961. "Broader explanations on the part of our Soviet comrades may be required," he said, and offered his own line of explanation of Stalinism as "one dark page among the glorious pages of the Soviet Union's history." Asking how the "cult of personality" had come about he referred to "The extremely narrow economic base left over by Czarist Russia" and how it "affected the struggle of Russian revolutionists in a multinational country . . . No other socialist country had comparable difficulties."

"Under such conditions," Gomulka continued, "the Soviet state of the dictatorship of the proletariat had to be merciless. . . . It could not tolerate opposition groups, which under pressure of existing difficulties sought ways of solving them through wrong means."

In his further explanation as to why groups had to be suppressed, Gomulka said, "Because collectivization
inevitably provoked resistance, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat had to strike back. But it should not have done this blindly. Organs appointed to combat the enemies [of collectivization] supervised and inspired by Stalin, exceeded the measure. As a result of Stalin's theory of the inevitable aggravation of class warfare parallel to the building of socialism and of his slogan about ‘enemies of the people’ the NKVD [secret political police] could brand as enemies. . . . anyone who dared to utter a word of criticism."

Referring to 1937 in the Soviet Union, Gomulka said, "When heads of marshals, generals, and high-ranking personalities of party and state were falling, people were caught by fear, became suspicious, and the mania of spying spread. . . . Even taking into account all the negative features of his character [Stalin], it cannot be imagined that he would have embarked upon the bloody purge of the high command and the officers corps without the deliberate misinformation planted by the Gestapo."

Gomulka also offered an explanation for the notorious "confessions" at the Moscow trials in the thirties, when old Bolsheviks like Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Bukharin, Rykov, Krestinsky, Preobrazhensky (all members of the Bolshevik Central Committee of the 1917 October Revolution) fell victim to Stalin's executions. These Bolshevik leaders, in Gomulka's phrase, suffered "their silent endurance of Stalin's violence." Gomulka said, this was "not merely caused by fear," although "of course, one's head is dear to everyone." But, he maintained, "Communists are courageous people, men of ideals. . . . Stalin directed the building of socialism in the Soviet Union. A Communist therefore had to face this question: Will he not act to the disadvantage of communism, if he acts against Stalin? This question disarmed Communists and kept them from struggling with Stalin."

It is significant that Gomulka has opened a line of explanation on the cause of Stalin's Moscow Trial frame-ups and the mass murders. To refrain from any explanation is, of course, the first line of defense of the bureaucratic regime in the Soviet Union and the respective bureaucratic formations in the other workers states in Eastern Europe and Asia. One of the reasons why the CP of Poland is among the first to venture into this explosive realm — the social basis for bureaucratic crimes — arises from the events of the last five years.

In Poland the mass of industrial workers had vast experience in a direct collision with the bureaucratic regime in 1956. The June 1956 general-strike uprising in Poznan ignited a wave of mass demonstrations of workers and youth throughout Poland to overthrow the Kremlin-controlled Warsaw bureaucratic tops.

In October 1956 the Warsaw factory proletariat mobilized around a dissident CP wing of the leadership, Gomulka, who was framed by Stalinism in 1949 as a "Titoist fascist" and locked up in prison for four years, and this wing triumphed against the Kremlin-controlled faction. Over the weekend of Oct. 20-21 the traditionally socialist Warsaw working class, alerted at the work bench, dispatched delegation after delegation to the Political Committee to support Gomulka as against the Khrushchev appointed Polish functionaries. The Kremlin's Red Army was poised for an attack. But it was the revolutionary mass organization of the working class, deeply anti-Stalinist, that won the day and hurled back the Kremlin's direct control.

But the Polish CP bureaucratic caste was not shattered, it was reconstituted with a shift in relation of forces between the bureaucracy and the greater voice of the proletariat. Under these conditions, however, in comparison to the Soviet Union itself where the Soviet proletariat has not directly attacked the bureaucracy as yet, Gomulka is compelled to deal with an explanation of Stalinism which has been openly talked about among workers and youth for five years. Gomulka, however, as the new representative of the bureaucracy, continues to refrain from dealing with the nature of bureaucracy as such. He draws a thread of connection between broad objective, historical, economic and social forces — with the personality of Stalin. The missing link is a bureaucratic social formation transmitting objective pressure, pressures that are only personified in a Stalin or a Khrushchev. This is the sensitive, sore point — a bureaucratic caste — and the bureaucracy itself cannot bear to identify the malignant malady or how socialist democracy will conquer it.

A Pat, Tidy Apology

An interpretation of the 22nd Congress was presented in the National Guardian, November 13, 1961 by David Wesley, who offered an explanation of Stalinism as follows:

"China, Vietnam and Korea, like the USSR, have had to industrialize and collectivize virtually from scratch, and are now in a stage roughly comparable to that of the Soviet Union from 1928 to 1934, when Stalin carried through the basic Soviet economic development with ruthless authoritarian control. The Far East states feel the need for similar methods, and it is the Stalin of that period (and of wartime) that they remember and respect. Moreover, they will require those harsh methods for some time to come; for these members of the camp — and for Albania — Khrushchev's call for an end to dictatorship seems decidedly premature."

If Wesley thinks he is arriving at a pat, tidy apology for Stalinism, he had better think again. Stalinism was required, you see, for one period in the Soviet Union; is required for a "roughly comparable" period for China, Vietnam, Korea and Albania thrown in for good measure; and Khrushchev's mistake is a premature call for an end to Stalinist dictatorship for the Far East. QED!

Let's consider only a few of the contradictions arrived at by this sophistry. If this is a search for the sequence of objective economic causes giving rise to the Stalinist political form, why does Wesley designate the years 1928 to 1934 as the economically motivated "ruthlessness" of Stalin and does not allude to years before and after 1928-34 in which Stalinism prevailed?

In the years from 1924 to 1928 Stalin began the de-
struction of workers democracy in the name of unyield-
ing opposition to industrialization, planned economy and
collectivization. Trotsky’s proposal for a five-year plan
was derided by Stalin as “super-industrial”; when
Trotsky proposed collectivization and warned of the
capitalist danger of wealthy peasants, Stalin leaned on
the Kulak and the petty-capitalist forces and refused to
carry out the Left Opposition’s policy.

During 1928-34, Stalin deepened the process of ex-
tripping workers democracy, the strangulation of the
Soviets, the trade unions and the Bolshevik party itself —
time in the name of planned economy, industrial-
ization and collectivization in recoil from the pre-
vious period which brought a capitalist restoration to
within an inch of realization.

In the period following 1934, when Stalin, according
to Wesley had already “carried through the basic Soviet
economic development,” the utter elimination of work-
ers democracy was consumated in earnest under the
sign of frame-ups, witch hunts, and mass murders in-
cluding the repeated execution of Stalin’s own hench-
men, layer after layer.

Wesley’s schema is to box in the “authoritarian”
period of Stalin to these six years since that was
the period the Stalin faction finally came out for in-
dustrialization after demolishing the Trotskyist Left
Opposition for proposing this course. In this way, Wes-
ley can justify a historical cause-effect relation between
the need for industrialization and the Stalinist de-
struction of workers democracy.

Moreover, this schema implies a necessary and re-
quired relationship between carrying through socialist
production and the need for a ruthless despot.

But why not stop to ask: what did the Russian work-
ers, who carried through three revolutions against land-
lordism, Czarism, capitalism and imperialism, through
the historical agency of workers democracy, think
about the need for a Stalinist dictatorship and the eli-
mination of socialist democracy? And ask: did the Soviet
workers submissively accept Stalinism without a strug-
gle? Were they simply a mass of unthinking sheep
just waiting for Stalin to cripple their revolutionary
creative capacities in order to allow the all-wise bu-
reaucrats to carry out objective historical tasks of in-
dustrialization? If Wesley really ponders this question
he might find that he has arrived at the very thesis
on which both Stalinism and imperialism agree: “that
socialist construction in the Soviet Union was synonym-
ous with Stalin and Stalinism, for better or for worse.

This is why it is necessary to go beyond the refer-
ce to Stalin alone and perceive the existence of a
social formation known as “bureaucracy” and its polar
opposite, workers democracy.

The ever widening and more open debate within the
Soviet orbit and the world Communist parties is ac-
companied by the sharper “debate” Khrushchev is
waging against the silenced opponents in the “anti-
party” group. But it is becoming clear that these de-
bates are not restrained from fear that the imperialists
will discover the “secret” of their differences. The
bureaucratic hierarchies fear more than anything else
that the working class and youth will enter the open
arena, take sides, arrive at judgements, enunciate de-
mands, define goals and drive to achieve the restoration
of workers democracy.

Leonid F. Ilyichev, a secretary of the Central Com-
mitee of the CPSU, indicated the tightrope which
the Russian bureaucracy is walking on in its “de-Stal-
inization” campaign.

At a recent national conference on ideological prob-
lems the secretary warned, “We must not allow, com-
rades, a blow to be dealt to the foundation of Marxist-
Leninist theory under the pretext of combating the
personality cult in this theory. We must not allow all
kinds of anti-Leninist views and trends, long ago de-
feated and discarded by our party and by Lenin, to
come to the surface and leak into our press.”

Does this refer to Trotsky, who while Stalin was
alive, became the authoritative spokesman for workers
democracy against the entire bureaucratic caste? Does
Ilyichev’s warning disclose that the demand to examine
the views of Trotsky is reappearing in the Soviet
Union?

Audacious fresh approaches to basic problems are
appearing in all countries of the Soviet orbit, and with-
in the Communist parties throughout the world. The
Italian Communist Party, for example, has plunged
into the stream of this discussion. The party newspaper,
l’Unita, November 28, 1961, hailed the 22nd Congress’
denunciation of “errors and aberrations of the past.”
But even more to the point, the article said: “The
question cannot exhaust itself in a simple denunciation
of Stalin’s negative qualities and his errors. How was
it possible that in the construction of a socialist society
there were so many errors and deformation and what
can be done to guarantee that they will not be re-
peated?” This is indeed a good question.

One of the leading representatives of the Italian CP,
Amandola, a proponent of one of the tendencies in the
Central Committee, according to France Observateur,
said, “It is a matter of returning to Leninism by re-
turning political discussion to the international level.
This naturally implies that debate on the problems
raised take place in realistic terms and not in ritualistic
language. This equally requires a critical study of the
political documents presented by the communist parties
of other countries.”

In keeping with this bold Leninist spirit, it is ap-
propriate that the Young Communist League of Italy
should take the lead in defying the Stalinist practice
borrowed from the Roman Catholic Index Expurgatorius
and publish in its paper a photograph of Trotsky beside
Lenin. The Italian YCL official paper, Nuova Genera-
zione, refers to Trotsky as “one of the most original personalities of the October Revolution, about whose
ideas discussion is now reopened. Among other works,
he is the author of one of the most interesting histories
of the Revolution and some of the finest pages on
Lenin.” The YCL proceeds to discuss critically and
thoughtfully the views of Trotsky.

Thus, the discussion proceeds, irrepressibly, from
stage to stage.
Kennedy
The Candidate and the President
by Myra Tanner Weiss

At the close of the 1960 election campaign, a small item appeared on the front page of the New York Times. An “authoritative source” announced, “The Pentagon is expanding its plans to develop bacteriological and chemical weapons for use in limited war situations.”

“According to an authoritative source, plans call for the use of the weapons in ‘brushfire’ hostilities, short of all-out nuclear warfare, in an effort to achieve conquest without destruction of life and property . . . .

“The Air Force budget for the fiscal year beginning next July 1, now being prepared, will call for the first time for equipping airplanes with nozzles and sprays to deliver ‘nonlethal’ blows against military installations and population centers, the source said.” (Nov. 2, 1960)

At the time this item appeared a battle was raging in the United Nations over Cuban charges that the United States was preparing an invasion of its tiny island neighbor. James J. Wadsworth, representing the U.S., denounced these charges as “monstrous distortions and downright falsehood.” (N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1960)

Subsequent events, of course, demonstrated conclusively that Foreign Minister Roa of Cuba spoke the truth and that Wadsworth was either not informed enough to answer the charges or he was lying.

There is probably no way for the average American to know if the Air Force actually equipped its planes with nozzles for use of chemical and bacteriological weapons or if the release in the N. Y. Times was just designed to frighten Cubans, and any other people interested, with the thought that they could be beaten simply by being put into a mass state of vomiting or sleep.

The idea seems to come straight out of science fiction where some occupants of another planet with a superior technology take over the earth by slipping into the human unconscious mind. But if our real world is taking on the character of science fiction, perhaps we can use our imaginations to see a little more of the reality of American politics,

Let’s imagine that Cuba had an air-force equipped with nozzles and chemical weapons. Let’s imagine that the weapon selected for its big neighbor on the continent was a truth gas that compelled all candidates in election campaigns to tell the whole truth — and furthermore, that this wonderful gas gave its inhaler the knowledge of what he would do when elected to office. About a year has gone by since Kennedy was elected, so it will be easy now to imagine what his campaign speeches would have been like if such a “truth” gas had hit his nostrils.

Election Year Begins

“In the beginning is the word,” quoted Mr. Kennedy, Jan. 1, 1960, in the opening statement of his book, The Strategy Of Peace. And he continued, “Surely, then, the first duty of an officer in a democratic government is to uphold the integrity of words used in public debate; and to do this of himself using them in ways where they will stand as one with the things they are meant to represent.”

From the Bible to the American political scene. That’s a pretty good start. But if Kennedy had been hit with our imaginary “truth” gas, he would have added: “When I am President of the United States, Mr. Roa will again charge us with preparing an invasion of his country. I shall denounce this as a lie. My appointee in the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, will also denounce this charge as a lie and he will back his stand by quoting me as saying, ‘I wish to make it clear also that we would be opposed to the use of our territory for mounting an offensive against any foreign government.’

But in a matter of days the world will know that I and the CIA, using Cuban exiles, equipped, trained and financed by the United States organized the invasion. In doing this, I will of course violate my country’s pledge to respect and defend the ‘right of self-determination of nations’ and I shall violate the laws of my country (my brother, Bobby, will then be the Attorney General, and he will list these violations). Cuban sands will soak up human blood and Castro will shame my country before the world by exposing our role in discussions with captured invaders on national television broadcasts. All this is what I mean when I promise to ‘uphold the integrity of words used in public debate.’”

The Promise of Peace

The dominant theme of Kennedy’s election campaign, however, was not integrity, but peace. He undoubtedly won the support of the largest of the minority groups of American voters by virtue of his speeches on the need for peace. One of his major campaign weapons was his book, The Strategy for Peace. On this issue he voiced some of the yearnings of the American people for an end to the incessant threat of war.

The New York Times, Sept. 15, 1960, reported on Kennedy’s visit to New York City: “Hitting hard at every stop, the Democratic Presidential nominee called for a ‘march toward peace to replace the drift toward war.’” On the same day the N. Y. Times reported that Kennedy told 2,500, mostly women, that “his program would take the United States far on the pathway to peace.”

On Sept. 7, 1960, in Portland, Oregon, Kennedy assailed Eisenhower’s foreign policy. Many peoples, Kennedy said, sincerely wonder “how strongly America desires peace . . . . They are afraid of diplomatic policies that teeter on the brink of war. They are dismayed that our negotiators have no solid plans for disarmament. And they are discouraged by a philosophy that puts its faith in swapping threats with the Russians. For they know it can lead in only one direction — to mankind’s final war.”

Kennedy likened the Administration’s “massive retaliation” defense system to “a fire department that can put out a fire only by blowing up houses.”

Kennedy, the candidate, was astutely aware of the growing concern, in this country as well as elsewhere, for the radioactive contamination that increases with the nuclear weapons race. (At that time there was a “de facto” ban on nuclear tests due to Russia’s unilateral ban on tests — violated only by France.) Kennedy promised his au-
dences that he would provide the leadership that would end the menace of radioactive fallout.

At UCLA, Nov. 2, 1959, he said, “There is no serious scientific barrier to international agreement — despite increasing difficulties in problems of inspection and implementation. The only difficult barriers now are political and diplomatic. If we could mobilize the same talents and energy and resources to meet this challenge that we did to split the atom in the first place, then we should be able to persuade friend and foe alike that continued neglect of this problem will make the world a loser . . .”

It is safe to presume that a few at least in his audience, worried about the Strontium 90 accumulating in their bones, vowed to pull the cord in secret polling places and vote for the “political and diplomatic” leadership that would mobilize the needed “talents and energy and resources” to end radioactive fallout.

But if our imaginary truth gas had hit the candidate, this is what his listeners might have heard: “Within a year, my ‘new frontier’ will begin to take shape. For most of you this will mean, not progress west, nor east, nor up into space where a Russian will be first to travel. Our frontier will be down — under the ground. The big question Americans will discuss will be how deep to dig, what to store, and if Christian morals permit shooting a neighbor or his children if they should come to you for shelter.”

Welfare Promises

As a candidate Kennedy created the image of a man who was deeply sensitive to the sufferings of Americans less fortunate than himself. He promised aid to the aged, who could be utterly ruined by the soaring costs of doctors, medicines and hospitals; to the unemployed, condemned to idleness and poverty in this richest of all lands; to those Americans who, because of race or religion or national origins, were daily robbed of their dignity as human beings, discriminated against, segregated and even submitted to terror in this land of “free” men and women.

To an estimated audience of 4,000 older citizens who had gathered hopefully in New York City, Kennedy appeared and promised (N. Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1960) “that if elected he and a Democratic Congress would put through a medical care program that would be part of the Social Security system.”

In Detroit, on Sept. 5, 1960, Kennedy eloquently ridiculed the Republican slogan, “You never had it so good.” He replied with a show of feeling, “But let them tell that to the four million people who are out of work, to the three million Americans who must work part time. Let them tell that to those who farm our farms in our depressed areas, in our deserted textile and coal towns.

“Let them try to tell it to the five million men and women in the richest country on earth who live on a surplus food diet of $20 a month . . .”

In a television broadcast in Texas on Sept. 12, 1960, Kennedy included in his list of important issues, “. . . the hungry children I saw in West Virginia, the old people who cannot pay their doctors’ bills, the families forced to give up their farms . . . These are the real issues which should decide this campaign.”

And on Sept. 2, 1960, the N. Y. Times reported, “Mr. Kennedy centered his news conference on the civil rights issue and a promise to put the power of the White House, if he is elected, behind a fight to get the broadly liberal Democratic plank passed early in the next Congress . . .”

Kennedy was no novice as a capitalist politician. He was aware that many voters have become cynical about campaign promises over the years. So part of Kennedy’s campaign strategy was to put before the voters the image of a man who not only made promises, but one who had the energy, the youth and the determination to keep his promises.

The N. Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1960, reported Kennedy’s promise in Los Angeles that “he would not content himself with drafting programs and transmitting them to Congress . . . but would actively fight for their enactment, taking his case to the people if Congress was slow in acting.”

He spoke of the crucial period in a new administration — its first 90 days. In this context, on domestic issues, he told an audience in Washington, “. . . the next President of the United States must be prepared in the first three months of his office to send to the Congress messages that will deal with wiping out poverty here in the United States, which will deal with the problem of full employment . . .”

Kennedy, the candidate, appeared to meet all needs. He was sensitive; he cared about the welfare of the American people; he thought something should be done about it; and he was ready to go to extreme measures to see that some thing was done about it. But if Kennedy had taken a whiff of our imaginary truth gas, this is what he would have told his attentive and hopeful audiences:

To the aged and ill: “Many of you may survive my first year in office as President. But you will not get any help from my administration for your monstrous medical bills. What savings you may have toward a pleasant and secure retirement will continue to disappear if you get ill. But do not give up. After my first year in office has passed, I shall solemnly extend my promise to my second year in office. For some of you, this help, if it comes, will come

Socialism and Democracy

by James P. Cannon

In the same easy and highly readable style for which he is well known, Cannon makes clear the basic Marxist view on socialism and democracy. He says: “What is needed is not a propaganda device or trick, but a formulation of the issue as it really stands; and indeed as it has always stood with real socialists ever since the modern movement was first proclaimed 109 years ago.” Cannon tells how the real view has suffered distortion and falsification by Stalinism, Social Democracy and the American ruling class. Send 15 cents for this attractive 21-page pamphlet.

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time. This is most regrettable. But there are more important things for the President to do.

To the unemployed, Kennedy would snuff our truth gas and say, "After my first year in office, most of you will still be without jobs. Unemployment will decrease less than 1% of the civilian labor force. And this despite a successful effort to get a bigger military budget passed in peacetime history. And despite the fact that I shall take off their jobs over 100,000 reservists and put them back in the army to show the Russians that we mean business in the Berlin crisis. I shall attend the AFL-CIO Convention in December of 1961 and express my continued concern. But my Administration will pit its full strength against any attempt to find jobs for the unemployed by introducing a shorter work week or a shorter working day without a cut in pay. That might spread the jobs that still exist, but it would cut into profits. We who get profits wouldn't like that.

"I shall especially express concern for the one million or more youths who can't find jobs. American youth is in a bad way. And they are the ones who must do the fighting in the wars we are preparing. In December of 1961 I shall urge the youth to become 'fit'. I shall point out that 'To get two soldiers, the United States Army must call up seven men. Of the five rejected, three are turned down for physical reasons and two for mental disability ... and the rejection rate is increasing each year.' But I won't give them a chance to work.

Nor will I subsidize athletic activities — that would be socialistic. But I will continue to pass out surplus government food — it's too expensive to store, anyway — and I shall extend unemployment compensation payments, which may not save a worker's house, or the fund for treatment that will keep him off the dole. And I shall pass legislation to make loans available for the development of industry in depressed areas. That's the free enterprise way."

To those who are fighting for freedom in America, Kennedy would snuff our truth gas and say, "Although 'freedom' is a word I use almost every time I open my mouth, when I am President of this country, the filibuster in Congress will continue to tie my hands. That will prevent me from delivering my promises on civil rights, as it prevented those who went before me. Brave youth will continue to risk their lives for freedom in the South. They will continue to be beaten bloody and put in jail. Their fight will continue to make gains, but I will be too busy with important affairs of state to join them in their struggle, for their case 'to the American people.'

"As for those civil liberties that constitute the basis of the freedom that's always on my lips — the right to form political parties and run candidates freely for public office — these liberties will be seriously impaired in the first year of my Administration. It will be my job to enforce laws passed previously to outlaw the Communist Party. If we succeed — and we shall try — it will be the first time any political party has been legislated out of existence. That will be quite a 'first' for any administration.

"As far as the law is concerned, all a political party in power will have to do is to claim that a rival party is controlled by a foreign government. Even if this is denied — even if it can't be proved — that party can be forced to register its members as agents of a foreign government or go to jail. It's not enough that the capitalists own all the means of communication — daily papers, television, radio — it's not enough that we can afford to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in one election campaign to get our candidates elected — we also must persecute one of the small working class parties in opposition.

"Russia may be emptying its prisons of political prisoners, but U.S. prisons will continue to fill up with those who are jailed for opinions, for opposition to those in power. This may be confusing to some when we talk about risking human existence for freedom. But then, that's because they really don't understand what kind of freedom I, and millionaires like me, are talking about — the freedom to invest our capital and take our profits anywhere in the world."

Kennedy — the President

But no truth gas existed in the 1960 election campaign. Kennedy successfully created the image of a man of peace, concerned primarily with human welfare. And he became the President of the United States.

Does this mean that Kennedy was just a cheap liar — deceiving the electorate with the usual empty campaign promises in order to fulfill a personal ambition?

The matter is not that simple. To understand Kennedy both as a candidate and as President, it is necessary to begin with the self-evident fact that he is a capitalist politician. He probably believes that peace, full-employment and broad economic progress can be achieved under capitalism. The deception of the voters was also a self-deception.

Kennedy, like most historically conscious proponents of capitalism, sees an ideal economic system — one that has overcome its recurrent and incessant crises through wise government guidance, thus permitting continuous enrichment of the deserving few without the impoverishment of the majority. In this thinking there are big blind spots born of self-interest.

It is clear that since the great depression, the government has succeeded in maintaining a relatively steady rate of economic growth. To the liberal capitalist the cyclical problems of capitalism have been solved. But there is the equally obvious fact that it took World War II and a continuous war economy ever since to maintain that growth. The capitalist crisis merely changed its form. From a permanent depression America moved to a permanent war economy from which there is no escape except back to the permanent depression.

However, the subsidization of capitalist economy through militarism is not a solution. It requires that the capitalist state borrow on the future labor of society for its holding operation today — at a continuously increasing rate. And even so, the crisis asserts itself through inflation which has quantitative limits beyond which monetary and class stability are both impossible.

The realities of the capitalist crisis are confronted by Kennedy as President. Peace, full-employment and other desirable objectives have to be pursued, not directly but by the assuring of markets and profits to the capitalists, leaving human welfare to appear, if it will, as a by-product.

Basically a capitalist politician, Kennedy also is the son of a millionaire. The profit system has been very good to him. He never knew the poverty, hunger and insecurity that most of the human race knows or has known at some time. He is confident to the point of arrogance. He is rash. He is anxious for quick victories, impatient and accustomed to getting what he wants. He is petulant when frustrated. And as President, he is dangerous for he is fighting for a cause that can't be won.

The real Kennedy pierced through the image known as the 'image' of his Administration. After his criminal and stupid attempt to carry out the plans for an invasion of Cuba, he spoke to American editors gathered in Washington. He spoke quite frankly of the "boring" lessons of the Cuban fiasco. His final words, spoken with evident emotion, were, "Let me then make clear as the President of the United States that I am determined upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril."

In this peroration, he dropped his usual use of the diplomatic, euphemistic term "freedom," and made his meaning amply clear with the brass-knuckle term "system," i.e., capitalism.

Kennedy's Leadership

Kennedy's real occupation in the White House was revealed in his speech to the National Association of Manufacturers on Dec. 6, 1961. Here the President and the millionaire were merged into one. He was at ease. He spoke well, permitting himself impromptu departures from a prepared text. And he was far more frank than older, more ex-
Some Sober Reminders

The task of maintaining full employment will require even greater effort in the future because of two important factors. During the decade of the 1960's, the labor force will be increased by 13½ million workers. In addition, the acceleration of technological progress will displace 28 million workers. These two factors will require in excess of 40 million new jobs over the next 10 years. The approximately 40 million new jobs do not include the additional jobs required to deal with the current unemployment problem... *

In the period from 1953 through 1960, if we had had full employment and full production and a 5 percent rate of economic growth, the American people and the American economy could have created the additional wealth with which they could have built 6 million $12,000 homes to help wipe out the slums and provide better housing in wholesome neighborhoods. In addition, they could have built fully equipped new hospitals with 900,000 beds. In addition, they could have built 600,000 new classrooms to help meet the tragic deficit on the educational front which is denying millions of our children the opportunity for maximum growth and development... *

In the period from 1947 through 1960, the production of motor vehicles increased from 4.8 million in 1947 to 7.9 million in 1960. While the production of motor vehicles increased 64.7 percent, the number of production workers decreased by 37,000. The increase in production will come at a faster rate in the period ahead as the introduction of automation is accelerated... *

Auto workers have accepted automation, but they ask a question and they demand an answer: Why is it, as automation makes an hour of human labor more productive, that this greater economic wealth creates greater insecurity, and workers face lay-offs more frequently and for more extended periods? There is something basically wrong when the creation of greater wealth results in greater economic insecurity... *

Mr. Frederick Donner, Chairman of the Board of the General Motors Corporation, received in salary and bonuses an amount of $2,922,000 for the period from 1956 through 1960. By contrast, the wages of an average GM hourly worker totalled $28,329, assuming that he worked 52 weeks each of these years, which the average GM worker did not. Mr. Donner received in this period more than 100 times the compensation of a GM worker.

From: UAW 1961 Auto Negotiations and the Needs of the U.S. Economy. UAW, August, 1961

experienced men like Franklin D. Roosevelt would ever have permitted themselves to be.

The burden of this speech dealt with the immediate critical problems of the capitalist economy. Kennedy talked about the "payments balance" between the U.S. and the rest of the world, especially Europe. He pointed out that U.S. businessmen now own about $45 billion in capital invested abroad. In 1960 the "long-term outward flow of capital funds was $1,700 million. The return was $2,300 million." So far so good — for U.S. Big Business.

But the American people, with their tax money, spend annually about $3 billion abroad for military bases designed to protect this capital and keep the profits rolling into the pockets of the American rich. As a result of this and other factors, the U.S. has suffered a payments deficit of nearly $4 billion a year, with a net loss in U.S. gold reserves of $5 billion over a 4-year period. (Let no one propose to look for a solution of the U.S. "payments problem" to the underdeveloped sector of world economy. The "take" from there of $1,300 million for an investment of $200 million is already so "balanced" to the U.S. benefit that revolution is now the problem. It is better to deal with a potential than an actual revolution.)

Kennedy proposes to change tax and trade policies in order to stop, or slow the flow of capital to Europe. And he proposes to soften the blow that will be dealt European economy by having the U.S. workers and small businessmen (those who lacked enough capital to get on the European gravy train) share the blow by submitting to direct competition with lower European costs of production. It also "happens" that Kennedy's proposals answer the immediate problems of U.S. capital in Europe. U.S. industrialists moved into Europe after World War II on an unprecedented scale, and asserted their domination by unifying Europe into the European Economic Community. But this expansion and growth within Europe is reaching its apex. There is no longer room for all "to make an honest buck." Competition is growing acute and Europe, under U.S. domination, must once again expand outward. Where? Kennedy's answer: to the United States.

Cars produced in Europe by General Motors, for example, will then compete with cars produced in the U.S. by General Motors. General Motors is the winner, no matter what the outcome. The ultimate effect of this competition will be to lower the wage differential between the two continents.

Having conquered Europe economically, U.S. industrialists hope to conquer the U.S., using its lower labor costs in Europe as the battering ram. Certainly Kennedy's program contains "risks," "sacrifices" and requires "courage." If he succeeds in stopping or even slowing the flow of capital to Europe, the stabilization of capitalism in Europe will be disrupted. And there the working class is powerfully organized as an independent political force. At the same time, class relations in the U.S. will be disrupted.

The immediate peril that Kennedy confronts therefore, is that the axis of the world revolution will shift back from the undeveloped areas of the world to the industrial heart of world capitalism, the U.S. and Europe. He hopes that class-collaborationist control of both labor movements can be maintained. But in any event, the gamble must be made.

Kennedy will have some more "sobering" experiences in the period ahead. He will learn that the American working class will not take kindly to a lowering of its living standards. He will be reminded that the American workers have never been defeated in struggle. He will discover that American labor is not dead — it has been only sleeping. Kennedy will need much more than a monolithic and servile press. He will need more than admonitions "to be calm." And his plea for sacrifice will not be welcomed by those who lack Kennedy's stake in the system.

Not the "Communists" but the capitalist crisis itself is preparing to draw onto the world scene the powerful revolutionary forces of Europe and the United States. The embattled poor in the rest of the world will soon find an ally worthy of their own heroism. Their victory, and all humanity's, will thus be assured.
Soviet Students in Revolt

What is the significance of the conflicting political tendencies reported developing among Soviet youth?

by Martha Curti

"Comrades! Give back to the word Its original meaning!"

—Yevgeny Evtushenko

The developments at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU are evidence of a deepgoing dissatisfaction of the Soviet people with the bureaucracy that rules them. Because of their special position in Soviet society, the university students are the most vocal of all layers of the population in their criticisms of the regime. They give ideological and literary expression to the discontent of broader sections of the people, especially the workers. It seems perhaps paradoxical, at first glance, that such opposition should come from students, who are in large part the sons and daughters of the ruling elite. (Khrushchev himself has admitted that only one third of the students in institutions of higher education are the children of workers and peasants.) Precisely because they are the children of the elite, however — because they are needed by the regime to replenish its personnel — the regime has to a bit more tolerant of them than it is with the rest of the population. It is even more possible in certain periods of limited "liberalization" for students to act in a limited way in opposition to the regime — to hold meetings, organize protests, circulate leaflets — with relative impunity.

It is well known that the removal of Stalin’s mummified corpse from the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum followed upon petitions and demonstrations of students at the University of Moscow. When a group of Peace Walkers recently reached Moscow, students at the university demanded of the authorities that the marchers be given extended time to present their views. Perhaps the most dramatic of such incidents (and we must remember that in all likelihood only a small fraction of these incidents ever filters through into the press) is that involving Yevgeny (Eugene) Evtushenko, which occurred shortly before the Congress.

On September 19, this year, a poem by Yevgeny Evtushenko was published in Literaturnaya Gazeta, organ of the Soviet Writers Union. The poem, "Babi Yar," an impassioned indictment of antisemitism in the Soviet Union, was bitterly denounced for its "negativism." In Moscow, on October 9, an estimate of 5,000 students, were celebrating their annual Poetry Day in front of the statue of Mayakovsky, revolutionary poet of the Twenties. Evtushenko, who has been a very popular figure among Russian youth for several years (collections of his poems are sold out soon after publication) was not included on the program. Students spotted Evtushenko in the crowd and started chanting, "We want Evtushenko! We want Evtushenko!" At last the chairman had to acquiesce to this demand, saying, "Evtushenko is not with us on the platform, but I understand he is in the square. Let him come up!" The young poet recited two poems, one of which was called, "You Can Consider Me a Communist." It accused "the lackeys who pursue not Communist but personal power" and ended, "I will remain firm to the end and never become a licker of nailed boots." This brought protracted applause and bravos from the thousands of listeners. According to Joseph Barry in the New York Post, "When Evtushenko descended the wooden platform, the students pressed around him to continue their praise and there was an impromptu demonstration that completely blocked, for the long moment, traffic, such as it is, on Gorki Street."

Student opposition to the bureaucracy encompasses a variety of views. One of the best sources of information on these currents is David Burg, a Russian student, now living in England, who was at the University of Moscow during the "thaw" of 1956-57. He lists four tendencies: the neo-Bolsheviks, the "liberal socialists," the pro-capitalists, and the nihilists. The latter are not to be regarded as serious people, since they favor the destruction of the existing order but have nothing, and wish to have nothing, to propose in its stead. The pro-capitalists are impatient with the theoretical approach of the neo-Bolsheviks and the "liberal socialists." They think in simple terms: whatever they dislike in their environment they attribute to evils inherent in the system of planned economy; whatever they wish for that they do not have, they believe that capitalism, "private property," a "free economy," will be able to provide. According to Burg this attitude is found more on the fringes of the student population — the engineering and technical schools and the like. There is not a practical political program but an idle daydream.

The neo-Bolsheviks were described in Junge Gemeinschaft, a German socialist youth paper, as follows:

"The oppositional youth consider themselves Marxists, but they feel that the present Soviet social order does not correspond to Marxist ideals. They seek a genuine Marxism and have therefore turned to the pre-Soviet period and to the Twenties. Just as the political and social opposition of the English Puritans against Absolutism in the 17th century was founded on quotations from the Bible, so today the opposition of the Soviet youth against the regime is reinforced by quotations from the classics of Marxism-Leninism. They consider the purges of 1937 as an annihilation of the true leaders of the Revolution by Stalin's bureaucratic clique — as a kind of Thermidor. They see October, whose true history is not particularly well known, as their ideal and demand a return to the original ideals of that revolution which they believe they recognize in several of the works of Lenin of the year 1917 (including State and Revolution). These youth seek of the bureaucratic degeneration of the regime, of the emergence of a ruling and exploiting..."
The neo-Bolsheviks call for: The retention of state-owned industry and agriculture and a centrally planned economy; workers control of industry; political power in the hands of democratically elected, representative soviets; the end of police repression and persecution of dissenters; internal democracy within the Communist party; as the basis of a Leninist program. The poet Evtushenko is apparently one of their spokesmen; his words quoted at the beginning of this article reflect the main slogan of the neo-Bolsheviks: "Back to Lenin."

The "liberal socialists" believe also that the original ideals of the Revolution have been perverted. The basic difference is that the liberal socialists do not think a return to October is either possible or desirable. Neither, of course, do they claim to be for the restoration of capitalism. Like the neo-Bolsheviks, they are for workers control of industry and farmers control of agriculture through cooperatives; however in lieu of state ownership of industry they favor the actual ownership of individual factories by the workers in them. They are for the transfer of political power to soviets "or other representative institutions" and are for a multi-party system. (David Burg, "Soviet University Students," De Gaulus, Summer, 1960, p. 538.)

The liberal socialists are reformists. Individual political freedom is the ultimate goal, means to build an equilitarian communist society. They seek, not the reshaping of society as a whole, but concern themselves solely with improving life for the individual. They generally think that Revolutions (especially if any violence is involved) are merely a source of human suffering, and consequently advocate gradual reform on all occasions except as a last, final, ultimate resort. This reformist outlook is reflected in their writings, which are full of personal soul-searching. They conceive of themselves as analysts of Soviet society, as spectators. They do not think in terms of what needs to be done and what forces are going to be able to do it. (While information concerning the relative numerical strength of oppositional tendencies is not available to us, it is interesting to note that both Burg and Junge Gemeinschaft give the neo-Bolsheviks credit for most of the leaflets that are distributed.) The liberal socialists are prey to illusions about the West, illusions which are concomitant with an apparent inability to see the Soviet working class as the potentially mighty force that can topple the bureaucracy.

Without more precise information on the programs of the neo-Bolsheviks and the liberal socialists, it is not possible to examine them as critically as one would like. Enough information is available, however, to make it clear that the liberal socialists are an expression within Soviet society of social democracy; and that in most important essentials the program of the neo-Bolsheviks is a Trotskyist one, though this group developed with no contact whatever with the Trotskyists (which had been physically exterminated by Stalin and his henchmen, including Khrushchev), in complete isolation from the Trotskyist movement abroad, and despite near-successful attempts to banish the very memory of Trotsky from the consciousness of the Soviet people forever. This is not surprising as it seems. Those who read Lenin's State and Revolution and then look around them at the USSR find that it just doesn't jibe. Unfortunately for the Kremlin bureaucracy, which still must rely on Marx and Lenin for its ideological justification, a serious study of Lenin's works would make apparent the application of Leninism to contemporary Russia logically leads to Trotskyist conclusions, whether or not one has read a single word of Trotsky.

What are the historical origins of the neo-Bolsheviks? They did not spring up out of a vacuum. They have a more or less continuous existence which can be traced at least to 1948.* In that year a dozen Moscow University students drew up a manifesto which aimed: "To wage a struggle against the system of government which rests on the bureaucracy and the army and which can be eliminated only by a political revolution.

"To install full democracy in the shape of a Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Government, the first stage toward the classless society."

The manifesto called for a government of Soviets with all elected officials subject to immediate recall. The students further believed that the transition to communism could be achieved only by the workers of all countries; and they concluded that Stalinist annexations after the war as being contrary to the Leninist principle of national self-determination.

This communist resistance group called itself, appropriately enough, Iskateli Trud Lenina (Lenin's True Works). Within a few months the ITL had gained momentum and extended its organization to the universities of Leningrad, Kiev, and Odessa. It was organized in small circles of three or four, each circle with a specific function: writing leaflets, mimeographing them (a task involving almost unsurmountable obstacles), and distributing them. For two years the ITL functioned in this way, and just as it was having some success establishing contacts with workers in the large city factories, hundreds of members were arrested, all in one night, and condemned to 25 years at hard labor.

In the prison camps the young Leninists made contacts and developed their program through intense debates with succeeding waves of arrivals from the universities. All this is quite reminiscent of the clandestine revolutionary groups which formed the nucleus of the Bolshevik Party. It was these young Leninists who were in the leadership of the great strikes in the Vorkuta prison camps in 1956, the largest open rebellion against bureaucracy which has yet occurred within the USSR.

This tendency emerged once more during the "thaw" of 1956-57. In this period, following the 20th Congress and the Hungarian Revolution, an ideological rehabilitation of Soviet intellectuals, and especially among students, of which we have only glimpses, and whose depth and intensity can only be guessed at. During this time literary works which implied criticism of the regime were allowed to be published — Evtushenko's poetry, the novels of Dulsinskii and Shumenb, etc. Meetings and conversations, however, the criticism became more and more open and sharp, and flowed from the field of art and literature into politics. While previously one expressed dissenting views only to one's closest friends, now people began making small circles of opponents which had been isolated from one another. There was an intense interest in the history of the Revolution, of the party, of the purges in the Thirties, of names and events which were finally beginning to force their way into the open despite attempts to erase them from history. David Burg describes this phenomenon:

"One heard names like Bukharin and Trotsky that had been unmentionable before, I remember going to the apartment of a good friend and seeing a picture of Trotsky on the wall. I thought I was going mad. He said, "Well, I've been hiding this picture long enough. Now I want to flaunt it, at least for a while." ("The Voice of a Dissenter," interview with Burg in Harper's, May, 1961, p. 127.)

In September, 1957, Cedric Belfrage wrote in the National Guardian that Moscow University students had put up on a wall-newspaper board a group manifesto against distortion of Soviet history, including the role of Trotsky. This was removed and put back again, and finally the expulsion of five students connected with it was announced.
A protest against this, which even the university Komsomol leader signed, was successful." University students protested also against the suppression of information on the Hungarian events, and put up on the wall newspaper an account of the events gleaned from a BBC broadcast.

A group of graduate students and research workers in the history department of the University of Moscow were arrested during the summer of 1957 and sentenced to three to eight years in prison - a comparatively light sentence - for distributing leaflets to workers in the neighborhood, attacking the party dictatorship generally and Khrushchev in particular and calling for the establishment of Soviet democracy and a return to the "Leninist line."

During the "thaw" there was a certain amount of over-optimism which must have been dispelled during the crackdown of Khrushchev in 1958-59, in which the publishing policy was tightened again, numerous attacks in the press were launched against the dissident students, and several of their leaders were imprisoned or expelled from the Komsomol (membership in which is an unwritten requirement for all administrative and professional positions. A former inmate of Soviet forced labor camps reported that in 1957-58 the "corrective labor colonies" received a sizable influx of young intellectuals from the large cities.) At a meeting of the Writers Union during the "thaw," Evtushenko said:

"We are not going to let those who would return to old times have their way. We'll rap their knuckle." Evtushenko was one of the most outspoken leaders in the writer's revolt of 1956 and has never recanted. He was expelled from the Komsomol and only his tremendous popularity saved him from a harsher fate.

Thus as we have seen, the neo-Bolsheviks are striving toward what we feel is the correct program to achieve a genuine socialist society in the USSR. But do the neo-Bolsheviks have the capacity to carry out this program? From information available to us, it appears that at least they are moving in the right direction.

They are aware that the political revolution — the removal of every trace of bureaucratic deformation from Soviet society — is not going to happen automatically. Khrushchev and his colleagues are not going to relinquish their power and privileges voluntarily. It will require conscious organization to overthrow the old order. Over decades has exercised totalitarian control over the Soviet people, has deprived them of control over their own affairs, has denied and scorned the very freedom and equality in whose name it rules. Such a task requires that the most powerful, the most cohesive class in Russia, the working class, act under the leadership of a Leninist party. The most encouraging thing about the neo-Bolsheviks is that they are working to create such a party, and that they are consciously attempting to influence and establish roots among the industrial workers. They are trying, in short, to overcome their greatest weakness: for their base now is almost completely among the intellectuals. As such they pose little threat to the bureaucracy. But every time that they have been discovered making attempts to reach out to the workers, that is when the arrests and deportations have occurred; for Khrushchev knows that when the Russian workers feel their strength, he and all that goes with him are done for.

The neo-Bolsheviks are in addition creating, at this moment, the very cadres out of which the new party will be built. Since at least 1948 the neo-Bolsheviks have gone through a more or less continuous process of developing a program, gathering cadres, and developing a seasoned leadership. With all their vitriolic attacks, with all their expulsions, with all the material rewards they have at their disposal, with all their prisons, neither Stalin nor Khrushchev have succeeded in vanquishing the young Leninists. No amount of bureaucratic suppression can prevent them, in the long run, from gaining a foothold in the working class and building the Leninist party which can finally return the Revolution of 1917 to its rightful heirs.

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**You Can Consider Me a Communist**

There were traitors both open and secret,
And indifferent like a stone,
Who signing various resolutions in the name of the revolution,
Were actually trampling on that glorious revolution,
A foul, malicious game,
And helping them in their deeds was a historical figure called
"At your service, sir."

These obedient servants, armed with weighty quotations, slandered
often the most honest, calling them anti-Soviet.

Not being a party member, I declare, I am your revolution,
And I take a legitimate pride in my fate.
I will be firm to the end and will never become a bootlicker.
The only thing I fear is doing harm to the revolution.
And contrary to words of those who are insincere, permit my whole life to shout out: Consider me a Communist.

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**Station Zima**

(An Extract)

Young people were better before
The Komsomol is deadly dull nowadays.
Yes, changes, yes, but behind the speeches
There's some shady game.
We chatter about what yesterday we kept quiet
We keep quiet about what we did yesterday.
So many ancient tricks I've seen
Just staged in a new and expensive way.
We're all guilty
Of empty verses and countless quotations
And standard ending of speeches.

—Yevgeny Alexandrovich Yevtushenko
New Light On an Old Debate

by Shane Mage


The recent 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party continued the demolition of the Stalin cult. However in its basic document, the "Draft Program," it in fact reaffirmed the central myth of Stalinism: that it was the bureaucracy, and specifically the Stalin faction, which conceived the program of Soviet industrialization and carried it out against the opposition of Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and the rest of the "anti-party elements" of the Bolshevik Old Guard who were to be exterminated in the purges of the thirties.

The reality, of course, was vastly different. Throughout the "Great Debate" of the 1920's over the future of the Soviet Union, the clearest and most consistent proposal's for rapid industrialization were put forward by the Trotskyist Left Opposition, while Stalin, for his part, denounced the Opposition as "super-industrializers." But the debate of the 1920's on economic policy has an interest far greater than merely debunking the discredited Stalinist version of history. This debate, in which participants representing all viewpoints made serious and significant contributions, posed problems which even today continue to be crucial for the Soviet Union, and not the Soviet Union alone. Consequenly, as Prof. Erlich rightly states, "ideas which reverberated through the Soviet Union three decades ago and which since then have been blackened, denigrated, and time and time again proclaimed dead, are now p'laying their part in one of the most significant developments of our time."

The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928 is above all a book about those ideas: an exposition and critical analysis of the economic theories and arguments advanced by the major protagonists. As such it is of very great importance — the first adequate treatment to appear in English. It is itself, moreover, a serious and valuable contribution to the discussion.

The ground for the debate was the economic situation of the Soviet Union in the early 1920's, the beginning and middle period of the New Economic Policy. Institutionally, this period was characterized by the combination of a state sector containing all of heavy and most light industry, loosely controlled by the central government, with a largely uncontrolled private sector comprising virtually all agriculture and retail trade. From the standpoint of production this period was that of "restoration": the gradual recovery of industrial and agricultural production to prerevolutionary levels.

The Soviet economy had, of course, been completely debilitated by seven years of imperialist and civil war: at the start of NEP industrial production had fallen to a tiny fraction of its former volume, due to the disappearance of the labor force and of raw materials; the failure to make replacements or even repairs; and even some physical destruction. Agriculture was at a famine level, and the 1921 Kronstadt insurrection showed the refusal of the peasantry to continue feeding the cities while receiving nothing in return.

Starting from this abysmal situation, the NEP achieved speedy and substantial successes. But as early as 1923, long before the old level of production was restored, the basic problem of the Soviet economy became apparent in the "scissors crisis": the tendency of industrial products to increase in price relatively to agricultural products. The startling symptom of this in 1923 was a seeming failure of peasant demand for industrial consumer goods, a "crisis of over-production."

This crisis led to an immediate split within the Bolshevik party over the most fundamental questions of economic policy; a split in which the main spokesmen were, for the Right-Center Majority, Rykov, and above all Bukharin, and for the Left Opposition Preobrazhensky and Trotsky. The majority moved to cut industrial prices sharply in order to stimulate peasant demand. The Opposition, condemning this as a mere palliative and a harmful one, called for the immediate beginning of a panned program of rapid industrialization. The debate quickly developed into a systematic and generalized confrontation between the two basic lines of development open to the Soviet economy.

The essence of Bukharin's position, which remained the dominant conception of the Soviet government until its sudden overturn in 1928, could be summed up in the phrase "harmonious" or "balanced" growth. Because Russia was primarily a peasant country, the primary force for accumulation would have to be provided by the agricultural sector. In step with the growth of peasant production and of the peasant market, industry would be able to expand without causing problems either of oversupply or of inflation. Of course this evolution would involve an orientation of industry to consumer output, and in the countryside would imply considerable enrichment of the wealthier peasants (the "kulaks"). But the technical superiority of state industry and the growth of agricultural cooperatives would guarantee a general socialist development. The peasantry, including the kulaks, would "grow over" into socialism.

This is the economic basis of the
"theory of socialism in one country." In the 1923–25 period the Soviet Union achieved significant economic advances under policies based upon it. But as Erlich points out, this theory was based on a projection into the future of the prevailing trends of the early NEP, and these trends could not possibly be continued. In the "period of restoration" the Soviet Union possessed the economic advantages of returning to a previous level: a large amount of unused or underused industrial capacity, and a vast backlog of peasant demand for the articles of prime necessity. Under these conditions substantial increases in industrial and agricultural output could be and were achieved with very small investments. But once the full capacity was in use, once the backlog of unpostponable peasant demand was used up, the Soviet economy came face to face with other backlogs of a less benign nature: the backlog of technological progress between 1913–26, forcing vast investments in order to acquire modern technology; and the backlog of replacement resulting from the age and obsolescence of the capital stock, and demanding substantial investments even to maintain the given level of production. Thus Bukharin (who, according to the "testament" of Lenin, "never understood the dialectic") suddenly found that a rate of investment at which there would be "balanced growth" had suddenly been transformed into its opposite, a rate at which stagnation or even retrogression might well take place, and that at best "we shall move forward at a snail's pace."

Preobrazhensky, on the other hand, from the very beginning understood the problems that were to trip up Bukharin. He maintained that the industrialization of the Soviet Union would require a period of "primitive socialist accumulation," by which he meant a spurt of intensive and massive industrialization whereby Soviet industry would be modernized. Erlich points out that this theory of industrialization could satisfy the basic needs of the country. A process of this sort, even in the absence of sizable foreign loans (due exclusively to the refusal of Western capitalists to invest in the Soviet economy) would require a sharp increase in foreign trade and a lasting integration into the world economy, the opposite of "socialism in one country."

Preobrazhensky, of course, did not disagree with the concept of "balanced growth" — on the contrary, his entire argument is based on the necessity for balanced growth. The essence of his case was that the Soviet economy itself was totally out of balance. As Erlich puts it, "His analysis brought out the gravity of such an imbalance in the economy with industrial equipment inadequate to absorb the available labor reserves even prior to its depletion, with millions of subsistence farmers hanging on the market by the skin of their teeth, and with foreign borrowing reduced to a trickle." The crux of the argument was the technological and economic inferiority of the Soviet Union in respect to world capitalism, which expressed itself in the higher cost of Soviet as against foreign goods. Only when this imbalance had been essentially corrected through accelerated industrialization would Bukharin-type "balanced growth" be replaced by a gradual equalization of industrial and agricultural growth rates, become both practical and desirable.

That "discontinuous growth" was the absolute prerequisite to the industrialization of the Soviet Union was ultimately admitted by all the opponents of Trotsky and Preobrazhensky: by Bukharin abstractly and reticently, by Stalin in the brutal practice of the 5-year plans. Nevertheless the Stalinist pattern of industrialization through totalitarian oppression of the working class and "military-feudal exploitation" of the peasantry in no way resembled the vision of "primitive socialist accumulation." The key question for all except those who, as Erlich says, "have chosen to assume, in a quasi-Hegelian spirit, that discarded alternatives are by definition inferior to the adopted ones," is whether the Preobrazhensky program in some way was practically feasible from an economic point of view, or whether it was only by Stalinist methods that "Primitive Socialist Accumulation" could be accomplished.

The Preobrazhensky program openly advocated a certain "exploitation" of the peasantry. To provide the exports required to import foreign capital goods, the means of subsistence required for a rapidly increasing working class, and the necessary raw materials, under the given conditions of hostile capitalism, the peasantry would have to turn over to the state greatly enlarged agricultural surpluses without receiving any immediate return through an increase in consumer goods. How were these surpluses to be obtained?

The Trotskyist position was unequivocal: "We can obtain grain," Preobrazhensky wrote, "only by economic means." These economic means were primarily maintenance of a monopolistically high price level for industrial consumer goods, and with thatTpl thus only a fraction of any decrease in production costs, and encouraging the peasants to save.

Could these methods succeed? Erlich does not (and this is certainly a weakness) discuss the situation in a precise and quantitative way, or evaluate the statistical case presented by the 1927 Platform of the "United Opposition." But he does present, what he calls "relaxation possibilities," numerous ways in which rapid industrial growth could be reconciled to the limited investment resources available, and which in fact were emphasized quite strongly by the Right-Center spokesmen Bukharin and Bazarov. His argument is quite categorical: for the Soviet economy of the 1920's "An expansion path which would be bold and realistic as well seemed within the reach of the possible."

But such a path was not to be taken; instead heavy industry was built up rapidly indeed, but only at a frightful cost to the other sectors of economic and social life. Why did Stalin adopt the disastrous policy of forced collectivization? Here a "pure" economic analysis is of little use: the decisive factors were obviously political and social.

On this point Erlich merely indicates the beginning of an answer. Stalin, he contends, could not rely on "economic means" because the rich peasants would be willing to cooperate only if the Communist leaders were willing "to earn the good will of the upper strata of the peasantry by opening up for them avenues of political influence": and this Stalin could not do because it would undermine the monolithic political structure and endanger his own hard-won power by evoking "a bitter resistance on the part of the radical elements in the working class and of the young intelligentsia."

But this, while indubitably correct, merely poses the question in another way: could the anti-Stalin Bolsheviks have succeeded in applying "economic means" or would they have been forced to imitate Stalin?

The crucial point here is that the fundamental issue in dispute between Trotskyists and Stalinists was precisely the question of socialist democracy. Stalin, political spokesman for a rising bureaucracy whose interests required a massive and totalitarian political structure, not only could make no major political concessions to the kulaks, but was even more adamantly opposed to such "concessions" to the rest of the population. For the Trotskyists, on the other hand, the essence of the matter was the democratic rights of the workers. Correspondingly, for the Opposition the struggle against the power of the kulaks had to be based, not on state compulsion, but on the agricultural laborers and poor peasants. Far from fearing to "open up avenues of political influence" to these strata, the Opposition proposed not merely favoring the poor and middle peasants economically, but, politically, called for "the formation of active non-party cadres of the agricultural workers, the poor peasants, and the lower layers of the middle peasants." On a political basis of this sort, why could not the socialist government count on the cooperation of the peasants? It was an economic policy of which they would ultimately be principal beneficiaries?

The industrialization debate of the 1920's, so accurately and interestingly presented in Erlich's book, is thus seen to have a contemporary relevance going
far beyond the solution of technical economic problems. **Workers democracy** was even then the key to an effective and socialist path of industrialization—and today the revolutionary re-estab-

**Marxism and the Soviet Union**

by Carol Lawrence

**Soviet Marxism** by Herbert Marcuse.
Random House, Inc. New York, N.Y.

This is Dr. Marcuse's third contribution to the study of Marxist theory, and like *Reason and Revolution* and *Eros and Civilization* it is provocative reading, and to be recommended for those who will not be discouraged by the author's highly academic style. Like his other books, *Soviet Marxism* is interesting reading, if only because of Marcuse's conscious exposition and use of the dialectic method.

Dr. Marcuse, a Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis University, affirms again in this book his dedication to the principle of a socialist society in which work would become play and man would delight in the truly human use of his abilities to create free aesthetic society. Because the ideal of socialism has not become tarnished for him, Dr. Marcuse is able to offer a thorough critique of Soviet "Marxism" and Soviet "Socialism." However, Marcuse is not a revolutionary. While he by no means accepts the Soviet claim that Russia has achieved socialism, he nevertheless does accept the bureaucracy's justification of its foreign and domestic policies.

Marcuse discusses the Soviet bureaucracy's propagandistic distortions of Marxist theory which have made it into a state ideology which blatantly includes obvious lies; the fact that this bureaucracy holds state power and defends its own privileges while stifling freedom in Russia. He fully develops the implications of the theory of socialism in one country, even noting, as evidence that the bureaucracy is not following a revolutionary foreign policy, the fact that after the second world war the communist parties in Italy and France deliberately disarmed their members despite the fact that they were experiencing their greatest popular strength. He demonstrates that the theory of socialism in one country has implicit in it a loss of confidence in the revolutionary potential of the international working class; and a substitution of class collaboration and the power politics of international diplomacy for revolution. But Marcuse feels that the bureaucracy has represented the best interests of the Russian people. He too lacks confidence.

Marcuse fully accepts Russian foreign policy where it seeks conciliation with the West, because he feels that the East-West confrontation in the cold war has allowed the western nations to stabilize their economies by war spending and has further motivated European nations to accept U.S. domination because of the need for unity against the "communist threat." Because of this the western proletariat lacks class consciousness. Therefore the current situation is temporarily stabilized and the only dynamic for change will come with peaceful competition between the East and West. This will allow the Russian planned economy to outstrip the West and thus increase the attractive power of communism. Marcuse hopes that with the rising standard of living in Russia abuses will be corrected and the distance between the people and the bureaucracy will be lessened economically and politically.

This book was first published in 1958 but a preface written in October 1960 has been added to the current paperback edition. In the preface, Dr. Marcuse mentions that we daily face the threat of nuclear war but that since the alternative of a nuclear war is fundamen-

tally irrational he is not including this possibility in his analysis. Along with excluding the threat of nuclear war from consideration, he seems to also have excluded quite a few recent events. He neglects to mention the Cuban revolution. He dismisses the China-Russia debate as a minor dispute over whether a hard or a soft line is most convincing to the West. He brushes aside the Hungarian revolution as being intolerable to the Soviet bureaucracy because it was a wedge for capitalism and was based on an insufficiently industrialized economy (failing completely to see in the revolution and the uprisings throughout Eastern Europe an indication of the resurgence of the international proletariat).

The book remains two-dimensional because Marcuse discusses capitalist war preparations only as a response to threat of Russian aggressive attitudes. He leaves it tacitly understood that Russia's aggressive poses are basically defensive since Russia has had to defend itself from capitalist encirclement since its inception. He makes a point of the fact that war is not in the interest of either the Russian people or the bureaucracy. However since he sees capitalism as essentially stable in this period he misses, for one, the whole dynamic of the colonial revolutions which are driving the bourgeoisie into one war after another. He fails to comment on the Greek civil war, the Korean war, the Afgan war, the Guatemalan war, the Indo-Chinese war to cite some examples from the period before the main part of this book was written. Because of these serious omissions, Marcuse is unprepared for the revolutionizing impact of the colonial revolutions on the Western proletariat as seen both in the Belgian general strike, where the bourgeoisie tried to compensate for their losses in the Congo by reducing welfare benefits, and in the rising militancy of the American Negroes.

But despite its faults, *Soviet Marxism* has a contribution to make in its clear presentation of the trends in Soviet thought and policy, which the bureaucracy prefers to keep hidden.

**Jose Marti:**
**A Professional Revolutionary**

by Arthur Phelps

**Jose Marti**—**Epic Chronicler of the United States in the Eighties,** by Manuel Pedro Gonzales. Center on Studies of Marti, P.O. Box 6386, Havana. 1961. 79 pp. (Copyright 1953 by the University of North Carolina Press.)

Jose Marti spent a large part of his adult life in the United States. He wrote of its leaders, artists and scoundrels, of its industrialists and its working class. Out of a 70-volume edition of his Complete Works, 17 are given to the articles written about the U.S. "Unfortunately," says the author of the present work, "practically nothing of what Marti wrote is available in English translation. It is hoped that on the occasion of his cen-
tennial commemoration (1953), this deficiency will be remedied."

The deficiency is even more notable now that the continuators of Jose Marti are the leaders of the Cuban Revolution and nation. This little book gives us a hint as to how helpful a knowledge of Marti would be in understanding the evolution of his Fidelist apostles.

Born in 1853 of poor Spanish parents, Marti was sentenced to exile in Spain at the age of 17 and remained in exile virtually thereafter for his persistence in organizing the overthrow of Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico and his implacable intolerance of all oppression. A poet, a journalist, critical observer of the arts and culture in many lands and tongues, Jose Marti was above all a politician: to be more exact, a spokesman for the revolutionary forces of all Latin America and the organizer of the Cuban Revolutionary Party which sparked and led the revolution in Cuba from 1895 to 1898.

From the date of his first exile in 1870 to 1890, he spent four years in Spain, the rest of the time in Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela, with brief interludes in Cuba, England, France and New York. From 1881 to 1895, he resided in the U.S.

The main theme presented in this book shows Marti in the U.S. organizing revolution in Cuba, while the U.S. ruling class was embarking upon the creation of a new system: Imperialism! And the first target was to be Cuba,

Martí gave much to his people in terms of his knowledge of the United States — its leaders, culture and its political development. But most of all he gave Latin America an advance warning. In 1889, he wrote: "What is apparent is that the nature of the North American government is gradually changing in its fundamental reality. Under the traditional labels of Republican and Democrat, with no innovation other than the contingent circumstances of place and character, the republic is becoming plutocratic and imperialistic."

Gonzalez reports two cases when Marti frustrated the immediate ambitions of the U.S. Government: first in 1891, as delegate of Uruguay to the Pan American Monetary Congress he led the Latin American opposition to the U.S.-proposed silver monetary standard; second, in 1895, at the moment when it looked likely that Spain would cede Cuba to the U.S., Marti convinced his Party to launch an all-out struggle for independence, thus presenting the U.S. with a fait-accompli. This small book tempts the reader to go much deeper into the genesis of American imperialism and of the 50-year battle Latin Americans have put up to regain their continent. Jose Marti was among those who initiated that struggle. He more eloquently than any other could say: "I know the monster because I have lived in its lair, and my sling is that of David."

"Hands Off Rosa Luxemburg!"

by Tim Wohlforth


The publication of some of the writings of Rosa Luxemburg in a popularly distributed form is certainly an event to be greeted warmly by students of Marxism. Rosa Luxemburg ranks with Lenin and Trotsky as among the greatest Marxists of the twentieth century. What makes this publishing venture even more important is that far fewer of Rosa Luxemburg's work are generally available than those of Lenin and Trotsky.

We are sorry to say that this otherwise happy occasion is severely marred by the arbitrary and crudely factional choice of her writings that appear in this volume and the historically dishonest introduction by Bertram Wolfe. Bertram Wolfe has selected two of her essays in which she engages in a criticism of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in order to perpetuate the myth of the two contradictory schools of Marxism the "democratic" school of Rosa Luxemburg and the "dictatorial" school of Lenin. The reader should be wary of Mr. Wolfe's motives from the very beginning considering that Mr. Wolfe himself is no friend of revolutionary Marxism in any form — but rather among the legion of former Communists who have become "specialists" in anti-Marxism.

We are afraid that Mr. Wolfe and his anti-Marxist colleagues are not the only ones to perpetuate this myth. Ever since Stalin, in one of his luckily rare excursions into historical writing, published his article, "Certain Problems in the History of Bolshevism" in the early 1930's, this view of Lenin's relations with Rosa Luxemburg has been official doctrine in Stalinist circles — except of course they put a minus where Mr. Wolfe today puts a plus. Even the 22nd Congress has not, as yet, led to the rehabilitation of this great revolutionary whom Stalin called a "centrist."

These articles of Rosa Luxemburg can only be properly evaluated if they are placed in their correct historical context. The period from 1903 to 1919 was a preparatory period for the birth of a new revolutionary international. No one, not even Lenin, entered that period with a fully worked out understanding of the tasks ahead. Within the revolutionary left there was constant discussion, controversy, polemical.

Rosa Luxemburg's article, incorrectly titled in this collection "Leninism or Marxism?" was a part of that polemical process.

It is now far easier than it was then to see who was right and who was wrong. Lenin understood more clearly than either Trotsky or Luxemburg what kind of party it was necessary to build — and he went ahead and built the party that led the Russian Revolution. But Luxemburg and Trotsky were not wrong in all the disputes they had with Lenin. For instance it was Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution, which Lenin had polemicized against earlier, that anticipated the Bolshevik seizure of power. Rosa Luxemburg, for her part, understood better than Lenin the full significance of the degenerative process going on within the Second International and particularly within the great German party of the International. As early as 1910 she was involved in a fundamental theoretical struggle with Karl Kautsky at a time when Lenin still supported Kautsky. Lenin's great gift was not that he was infallible, as the Stalinists claim, but that he was able to learn from revolutionists like Luxemburg and Trotsky, and then act resolutely on what he had learned.

This essay, "Leninism or Marxism?" was originally more modestly called, "Organizational Questions of the Russian Social Democracy." It is a polemic against Lenin's organizational methods and is not too dissimilar to the type of criticism Trotsky made in this period. It should be noted, by the way, that Lenin later stated that at the 1907 London Congress of the Russian party, Rosa Luxemburg supported the Bolsheviks on every important question. Isaac Deutscher in his extremely valuable article "The Trajectory of Polish Communism Between the Wars" (Temps Modernes, Vol. XIII, pp. 1632-1677) had this interesting comment on the controversy:

"It is a curious fact that . . . Dzierzhinsky and Radek [leaders of a minority within the Polish party — TW] should have made almost the same criticisms of Rosa Luxemburg as the latter sometimes made of Lenin. In ef-
fect they accused her of applying a policy of ultra-centralism in the Party, or enforcing too much discipline in it, etc. In fact Rosa Luxemburg's party was led in a manner very similar to that in which Lenin led the Bolshevik party. This was due, especially, to the fact that both parties were operating illegally.

Rosa Luxemburg's essay "The Russian Revolution" was written in 1918 in prison. It was published by Paul Levi, her literary heir, in 1921 as a factional move to justify his right wing break off from the German Communist Party. The essay was written on the basis of largely erroneous information furnished her when she was not in a position to judge the events directly.

Her actions in the brief period of her life after leaving prison certainly made clear her revolutionary convictions. She played a leading role in the Spartacus Rebellion and she was one of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany.

In any event, a serious reading of her life after leaving prison certainly made clear her revolutionary convictions. She played a leading role in the Spartacus Rebellion and she was one of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany.

In the essay, a serious reading of her criticism makes clear that her criticism were raised as a defender and supporter of the October Revolution. What a far cry her criticisms are from those of Kautsky who deserted the revolutionary camp at the first sign of real battle — not to mention those of Wolfe who abandoned the defense of the Soviet Union.

But let Rosa Luxemburg speak for herself:

“What is in order is to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, the kernel from the accidental excrements in the policies of the Bolsheviks. In the present period, when we face decisive final struggles in all the world, the most important problem of socialism was and is the burning question of our time. It is not a matter of this or that secondary question of tactics, but of the capacity for action of the proletariat, the strength to act, the will to power of socialism as such. In this, Lenin and Trotsky and their friends were the first of those who went ahead as an example to the proletariat of the world; they are still the only ones up to now who can cry with Hutton: ‘I have dared!’

We can only repeat the title of Trotsky’s famous article which he wrote in 1932 against Stalin: HANDS OFF ROSA LUXEMBURG. This means you, too, Mr. Wolfe!”

The Biggest Fix?


Was the Russian revolution of October 1917 rigged? Were Lenin and Trotsky, who led the first successful working-class revolution in history, paid off by the Kaiser in a desperate attempt to defeat the allies in World War I? Forty-two years after the event, Alan Moorehead revives the slander that the Russian Revolution was the biggest fix in history.

Life magazine editors commissioned Moorehead, a well-known British author, to write the book because they wanted a popular full-length account of the Russian Revolution based upon the "findings of Dr. Stephan T. Possony, professor of international relations at Georgetown university.

Possony's ten-year study, financed in part by Life purportedly uncovered new evidence in materials released by the West German government. Moorehead says this "evidence" revealed, "I think beyond all reasonable doubt," that Russian revolutionaries had been financed by the German Imperial Government of Kaiser Wilhelm.

But Moorehead, try as he may, adds nothing new to the forgeries that were dug up against the Bolsheviks by the Kerensky government and the Russian bourgeoisie before the October revolution. In 1918, equally damning "evidence" in the form of the Sisson Papers, was produced to justify allied armed intervention on the side of counter-revolution, in the civil war then raging in the young workers' state.

After analysing the Sisson Papers in the book Russia Leaves the War, George F. Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, called them "unquestionable forgeries from beginning to end."

"It is entirely possible," Kennan claims, "that the Bolsheviks received clandestine subsidies from German sources during the summer and early autumn of 1917. There was nothing in the code of Bolshevik ethics to inhibit the acceptance of such subsidies and nothing that would have caused the Bolshevik leaders to feel the slightest sense of moral obligation to the Germans by virtue of having accepted them."

But Kennan is forced to add, "There is no reason to believe . . . that the Bolshevik leaders were in any position of clandestine subservience to the Germans in the winter of 1917-1918. To suggest, as the Sisson documents did, that this was all a bluff of cosmic proportions, that Lenin and Trotsky were in reality beholden to German masters throughout . . . is to move into the realm of historical absurdity."

Harrison Salisbury, New York Times writer on the Soviet Union, agrees with Kennan. In his August 24, 1958 review of Moorehead's Russian Revolution, Salisbury is also compelled to dismiss the Moorehead charge, even if somewhat regretfully. "The nub of the historical question," he said, "has long been not whether the Germans had an investment in the Bolsheviks but whether this investment in any way influenced the course of Russian history."

The famous case of the "sealed train" is rehashed by Moorehead. The "scandal" began when Lenin, stranded in Switzerland after the fall of the Czar in February 1917, felt it imperative to return to Russia as soon as possible. Ludendorff, the Kaiser's foreign minister, offered Lenin use of the train so that he could return to Russia via Germany.

Trotsky testified about this event before the Dewey Commission of Inquiry in 1937, which was investigating Stalin's charges against Trotsky at the Moscow Trials.

"While Lenin did cross Germany utilizing Ludendorff's false hopes that Russia would disintegrate as a result of the internal struggle," Trotsky said, "he [Lenin] neither concealed his program nor the purpose of his trip. He called a small conference in Switzerland of internationalists from various countries, who approved the trip. Upon his arrival in Petrograd he explained to the Soviet and the workers the purpose and nature of his trip."

In a review of Moorehead's book in Saturday Review, August 23, 1958, Isaac Deutcher, the noted historian, at present engaged in writing a biography of Trotsky, said, "The accusation that Lenin was in German pay was first made by his enemies over 40 years ago..."
and given currency in the West during the years of allied intervention in Russia only to be discredited and forgotten for over 30 years.

"The cold war has now given it fresh currency. Morally and historically the accusation is on the same level as the Stalinist charge that Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Tukachevsky were Hitler's spies."

Moorehead does his best to transform a 42-year-old forgery into a fact, but he, along with Possony and editors of Life, are as unsuccessful as their predecessors. Their failure stands as a tribute to the integrity and honesty of the Bolshevik leaders. The Russian workers and peasants, under this leadership, gave birth to the Soviet Union — the precursor of mankind's future that marked historically the beginning of the end of the capitalist system.

Moscow-Peking: The Debate Documented


It has become fashionable in some circles to dismiss the position of the Chinese Communist Party as infantile leftist which will pass away as the power of Revolutionary China increases. (See Monthly Review, Dec. 1961)

Such an opinion ignores the fact that the Stalin-Khrushchev concept of peaceful coexistence took root and developed in an epoch of the isolation of a single backward workers state, numerous defeats of revolutionary struggles around the world, "the cult of the personality," etc. On the other hand, the Chinese position, reviving Lenin's precepts on war and peace, develops against the background of a phenomenal growth of revolutionary forces internationally. A continued expansion of revolutionary power would seem in this case to imply a further undercutting of the Kremlin's ability to maintain the sway of a theory which has its ultimate source in a previous epoch.

Obviously, profound social forces must be at work to drag such reluctant combatants as Moscow and Peking into the arena of public debate. It is only by rigorous research and deduction that one is able to establish the existence of the deep conflict which occurred between Mao Tse-tung and Stalin during the final stages of the struggle to overthrow the bourgeois Kuomintang. That dispute, which was of immediate life and death import to the Chinese CP, was never aired in public.

Yet, today, both Moscow and Peking, while proclaiming the need of unity against their common foe, are inelegantly drawn into an open battle over seemingly abstract, long range theoretical questions.

Still, each side resists the struggle; the protagonists diplomatically protect each other's anonymity and periodically attempt reconciliation; but the attempts fail and the successive terminological compromises merely provide the forms for new conflicts. Their reluctance to pursue the debate discloses that, more than they fear each other, they dread that the ranks of the Communist parties will enter the dispute as an independent force.

All of which indicates that the Chinese-Russian debate and its international reverberations will occupy a key spot in world politics for some time to come. In this regard the publication of the SINO-SOVET DISPUTE is most welcome.

"The object of this book," according to the publisher, "originally prepared as a special issue of The China Quarterly, is to document and analyze the dispute and to assess the current status of Sino-Soviet relations. All the pertinent documents are here: Khrushchev's 'secret speech'; editorials from Pravda and the Chinese People's Daily; the Chinese attack on Soviet Khrushchev at the World Federation of Trade Unions meeting in Peking; Khrushchev's speech, P'eng Ch'in's reply, and the official communique of the Bucharest conference; the 1960 Moscow statement and Soviet and Chinese comments on it."

In addition to assembling in a single volume some of the key documents, the three editors have provided, in their brief commentaries, a number of perceptive observations.

For example, Richard Lowenthal sets the record straight on the Soviet slander of the Chinese position as being one of "inevitability of war." (Incidentally, it should be noted how this purposeful misrepresentation of the Chinese position is gratefully accepted in the West.)

Lowenthal claims, and the included documents confirm him, that the Chinese complaint against Khrushchev is that his application of the slogan of peaceful coexistence tends to sow illusions in the revolutionary camp concerning the peaceful intentions of such men as Eisenhower, DeGaulle and MacMillan, thus disarming the real forces for peace. Peking, not banking on such so-called realistic statesmen of the West, asserts that only the increasing strength and final victory of the socialist camp can guarantee the preservation of peace. Rather than accepting the inevitability of war, the Chinese say that it is now possible to prevent World War III by mobilizing the masses for all-out support to the international class struggle.

While one might consider it unfortunate that the authors have restricted themselves to the 1956-60 period, even this narrow scope will be useful to those readers who have had to depend on third hand comments and rumors about the real positions of the leaders of the two most powerful Communist parties.

Reviews in Brief


Professor Northrop contends that an understanding of political reality requires a grasp of the deeply ingrained philosophical ideas dominating the world outlook of every people. This view, whatever partial truth it may contain, is highly contestable; but in this presentation any content there may be is so thoroughly buried under a mass of high-flown verbiage as to be virtually undiscoverable. For example, this is Northrop's definition of the word "Nation":

"Stated as briefly as possible, a 'na-
tion' is any group of concrete, particular human beings who possess in the hierarchically ordered neural nets of their trapped impulses (which are the psychological, in particular the conscious or unconsciously memorized elementary ideas and postulates) for firing or inhibiting their motor neurons and thereby mechanically causing a similar cognitive behavioristic living law response to any given stimulus."

"As briefly as possible?" Perhaps, but three pages further on he can restate his view thus: "All that is being affirmed when it is said that a nation exists is that a statistically large group of its people hold at least some elementary philosophical beliefs in common."

This is scarcely a book whose content repays the effort required to overcome its style.


This book is apparently a by-product of the Fund for the Republic, and though that institution has helped the creation of several important works, this is scarcely one of them. Mr. Chase tries to indicate the major problems newly posed by the modern world and to put forth some new approaches to them.

He goes over the long list of vital problems of which any educated person is presumably well aware — such things as the exterminating nature of modern war, the "population explosion," the exhaustion of natural resources, the need to overcome the disintegrating effect of nationalism, the importance of maintaining full employment, the disaster of American unplanned urbanism, the differential rate of growth between the "Western" and Soviet economies. But on all these questions his comments are confused and vastly oversimplified, written in a childishly "populist" style whose reference sources are mainly newspaper and magazine articles.

Films

La Dolce Vita

by Trent Hutter

Several outstanding creators of motion pictures have appeared in Italy after World War II, and among these Federico Fellini, who became world-famous with La Strada, is particularly remarkable. He combines the social realism of a keenly critical mind with the poetical feeling of the artistic genius and a deep love for his people, for the less alienated, basically healthy majority as opposed to the decadent minority of the idle rich and various unsavory individuals of other classes. Fellini also is a superb craftsman of the cinema and a discoverer of talents.

La Dolce Vita has been called a "controversial" picture. But it has been enthusiastically received in Europe and America and is controversial only insofar as some Italian right-wing elements and the conservative Roman Catholic clergy have come out against it, while some less reactionary priests, for example, have underlined its moral value, its spirit of truth. On the whole, even the bourgeois critics have admitted that La Dolce Vita is one of the screen's masterworks.

The story consists of twelve episodes. Marcello, a good-looking "third-rate journalist," a kind of gossip columnist — and their reputation is less flattering in Italy than in the U.S. — discreet and unscrupulous, moves in those circles of Roman society where he finds material for his stories. Thus we encounter various layers of a twilight world of so-called aristocrats, pleasure-seeking bourgeois, show-business personalities, prostitutes, perverts .... Marcello, whose character is quite weak, has been corrupted in the process. Yet he is not entirely bad, not entirely without dreams of a more worth-while existence. When he meets Steiner, an intellectual who is the center of a group of artists and friends of the arts and of a happy family life, he feels attracted by this finer and stimulating milieu and encouraged to become a serious writer, a better man.

Unfortunately, Steiner, despite his qualities, cannot be a guide. For he represents the type of bourgeois or petty bourgeois intellectual who adores beauty but has not found an ideology, a concept of the world, a philosophy of life, a goal. Intellectualism and estheticism alone cannot teach us how to live. Steiner does not see a way to make life meaningful, and he becomes desperate to the point of insanity, killing his two children and committing suicide — an exceptionally tragic variant of a not uncommon case, destroying Marcello's hope of ascending to a higher professional and ethical level through Steiner's friendship.

Emma, Marcello's unhappy mistress, has had another disheartening experience at the time of Marcello's early acquaintance with Steiner. More credulous than her unfaithful lover, she wants to believe in an alleged miracle. Two lying children in the village of Terni claim to have seen a vision of the Holy Virgin. A big crowd gathers. Panic rises during a violent storm, and one person is killed in the commotion. Emma's longing for a "miracle" must end in disappointment. Just as mere intellectualism and estheticism will not save Marcello, the quest for an earthly manifestation of the supernatural has not provided relief for Emma.

Marcello's basest self-degradation follows the Steiner catastrophe. The orgy in a seaside villa is the nightmare of a frenzied but doomed attempt to escape from the boredom of empty uselessness, bringing out the stupidity, vices and evil animosity of the participants and leaving a bitter taste. At dawn they shudder at the sight of a monstrous fish that has been swept on the beach, while a young girl of the people Marcello has met before in the country and who obviously likes him, holding out a great hope which he failed to understand, appears in the morning light and wants him to join her. But from where he stands no path leads to her, nor from her to him, for they are separated by an inlet ... Powerful is the twofold symbol of the ugly monster and the lovely, affectionate, innocent girl looking at the depraved and disenchanted revelers, unable to reach Marcello who now is definitely a captive of that "dolce vita," that presumably "sweet" life of perpetual pleasures which is, in fact, a desperate chase after new and ever more joyless excitement.

Fellini's masterwork is Italian in many of its individual figures, its background and local color and in its specific type of sensitiveness. But it would be wrong to call it "an image of contemporary Rome" or "an image of modern Italy." It is the image of certain circles of Roman and Italian society, comparable to the same circles in other countries, including the United States. The degenerates in La Dolce Vita
have their counterparts in Park Avenue, in Hollywood — and in Suburbia. We have no reason, after seeing La Dolce Vita, to piously point a finger at Rome and to say "What a wicked city of sin!" . . . What about "our" puritanical businessmen employing call girls in order to clinch a deal more easily — and deducting the "entertainment expenses" from their income taxes? And did not a columnist indicate recently that wild parties of "our" suburban bourgeoisie frequently can compare to anything in La Dolce Vita? And what about sex crimes — a problem much more alarming in the U.S., than in Italy? The image of decadence in this film is not characteristic of Italy but generally of the big and small profiters of our mid-century boom and those who gravitate around them.

The difference is this however: in the U.S., the most typically capitalist country, the bourgeoisie are more hypocritical. And in our time no fully sincere motion picture on the utter immorality, shallowness and spiritual bankruptcy of America's upper class, its social satellites and lackeys, has been made in Hollywood. There undoubtedly exists more liberty for screenwriters and producers in Italy than in the United States . . .

Fellini does not fail to remind us that outside the sultry atmosphere of the parasites' eternal night there lives and works the immense mass of the "common" people. They are not decadent at all but as sane and vigorous as their ancestors under Julius Caesar, or during the Renaissance, or one hundred years ago when they brought about the unification and independence of their country. Italy's quick and almost miraculous reconstruction after the desolation of World War II is due to the courage, skill and diligence of her workers, farmers, craftsmen, scientists and engineers. The idle and the would-be artists should not let us forget the countless working people, the makers and the doers and the genuine artists.

Even Fanny, the chorus girl who befriends Marcello's father when he visits Rome, has remained in the capital's night life a representative of the people's kindness, good nature and ability to feel pity. Marcello's father is a likeable, decent, provincial petty bourgeois with his set of traditional values but also a zest for life, a love of gaiety, a desire to understand and much humane tolerance. But the clearest contrast is between the idlers' night world and the innocent girl Marcello meets in the country near the sea and who hardly interests him. Reappearing in the final episode, she embodies the countertop to the picture's main theme. Hers is the willingness to lead a useful life, the generosity of the heart and the true sweetness of uncorrupted youth — not the infernally sweet stench of social putrefaction, not the "sweet life."

Federico Fellini, a master of dramatic composition, always captivates our attention, never lacks taste and achieves the most impressive effects springing not from cheap sensationalism but from an artist's vision. La Dolce Vita is an intelligent, adult picture, but it is not shaped by intellectualism. Its symbols are not tortured but simple and straightforward. Great art never aims at the initiated few only. And great motion pictures like Fellini's are great art.

It would be rather foolish to talk about a picture without mentioning the actors, at least briefly. Fellini picked an admirable cast, with Marcello Mastroianni as Marcello, Anita Ekberg in the role of an American movie star, her best performance ever. Anouk Aimée as a nymphomaniac heiress, Yvonne Furneaux as Emma, Alain Cluny as Steiner, Annibale Ninchi as Marcello's father, Magali Noel as Fanny, Lex Barker as the movie star's lover, Nadia Gray whose strip-tease is the culmination of the final orgy. And the aristocrats are played by authentic members of the Roman nobility! (I believe this would be impossible in any other country . . .)

After the downfall of fascism, the partisan struggle, the end of World War II, the Italian masses had become very conscious of their unsolved social problems. They still are, and Italian literature and various films express this consciousness. Despite the paralyzing policies of Stalinism and Reformism, the strength of the political labor movement has been able to prevent the weight of the Vatican and of the bourgeoisie's Christian Democratic Party from stifling Italy's intellectual and artistic life.

Federico Fellini's individual gifts, a magnificent cultural heritage, a tradition of genuine liberal humanism (which even Mussolini found hard to suppress completely) and a continued surge of unprejudiced social critique — these factors have contributed to making La Dolce Vita a new classic of the screen.
Periodicals in Review
by Tim Wohlforth

The Politics of New Politics

New Politics is the latest entry in the already crowded field of socialist theoretical magazines. The tiny radical movement in the United States already supports a greater number of publications than the much larger liberal community — in fact in number of publications, if not in circulation, American radicals can hold their own with the massive movements in Europe.

Considering this fact, it is distressing to note that so many of these publications are seeking to fulfill the same function. The older Dissent, the student publications Studies on the Left, New University Thought, and Root And Branch (scheduled to appear shortly out of Berkeley, California, we are told) and now New Politics all seek to play the same role in the United States that New Left Review plays in England. All disdain ties to existent radical political parties; all claim to be open to all points of view; all seek after some new political program around which to rebuild the socialist movement. Ironically, despite the professed openness of each publication to broadness, despite their proud proclamations of having no political platform, these radical intellectuals do not seem to be able to pool their resources and produce a single publication. The reason for this is obvious. Each publication has a notional center of gravity somewhat different from the other. It would be a service to the radical movement of the editors of these publications would make explicit these implied political differences and defend their political views in a responsible manner before the radical public.

New Politics, if it is able to keep up to the standard its first issue sets, will be the most ambitious of all these efforts. It is typographically excellent, well edited and on the whole an interesting magazine. What gives the publication its life and interest is that it rejects, in large part, the academic jargon which so mars its competitors and it contains, within certain limits, real controversy around important political topics.

What are the politics of New Politics which made its creation necessary to its editors and contributors? Needless to say there is no clear editorial statement of political outlook — but a political point of view it certainly does have. For instance, three out of the four “views” presented in its symposium on Cuba are anti-socialist. The one exception is a non-political piece which was presumably put in by a “totalitarian.” The only contributions which are really divergent from the general tenor of the magazine are Cedic Belfrage’s defense of Revolutionary Cuba and Joseph Clark’s support to Deutscher’s concept of the reformability of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Both these contributions appear as part of symposia rather than as articles by themselves. Absent from the publication, even in the form of a contribution to a symposium, is any presentation of a revolutionary socialist point of view.

The dominant political tone of the publication can be seen in Editor Julius Jacobson’s contribution on the USSR and Sam Bottone’s where he has discovered its capitalism “a liberal dynamic.” He puts it this way: “Because industrial growth impelled the formation of a numerous and homogeneous working class and an intelligentsia, and provided leisure, culture, etc., it multiplied the physical agents and conditions for further democratization within the wide permissive limits of capitalism.” Thus Jacobson takes an essentially classic reformist view of capitalism as a “permissive” society allowing for considerable amount of reform. He neglects to mention its not so “permissive” enslavement of the vast mass of humanity through its colonial policy, its two imperialist world wars, and fascism, the natural outgrowth of precisely this expansionism of the capitalist economy.

When it comes to the Soviet Union, on the other hand, Editor Jacobson is positively a rabid “revo’utionist!” He denies completely the possibility of reformism in the USSR and he is of course correct in this (our difference with Jacobson on this score is primarily his dredging up of Max Shachtman’s discredited theory of a “propertyless” ruling class in the USSR). The pattern here is what is called “Stalinophobia”: these people are ready in an instant to advocate the revolutionary overthrow of the regime in the USSR but when it comes to their own country we hear talk of the “permissive” limits of capitalism, of the seemingly limitless possibilities of reform.

The same theoretical outlook dominates Sam Bottone’s contribution on Cuba. The Cuban Revolution, to him, is a seizure of power by a small group of power-hungry intellectuals seeking totalitarian control. Everything is one big conspiracy. Yesterday Bottone’s counterparts talked of the “sealed train” which carried the “German agent” Lenin to Russia to take over a country of some millions of souls; today is the diabolical Castro. If only Lenin hadn’t dispersed the Constituent Assembly (that is, broken with capitalism); if only Castro hadn’t dissolved the coalition cabinet (that is, broken with capitalism). Anyone who cannot see in the Cuban Revolution a profound revolutionary mass struggle which has led to a social overturn — anyone who only sees a “conspiracy” on top — is blinded by Stalinophobia.

Such people are certainly not serious about bringing socialism to the United States. Even more important, their very softness towards capitalism disqualifies them from playing a progressive role in ridding the USSR of its bureaucratic ruling class. The Russian people seek to overturn bureaucratic rule in order to go forward to real socialism on the basis of the planned economy they already have. They are not interested in those who do not recognize the gains of the October Revolution which they still have and talk instead of “permissive” capitalism, especially when such people miss their historic in the world’s most rapacious imperialist country.

Perhaps a future contributor to New Politics will really come to grips with the Stalinophobia which so poisons so many of its contributors. We will be watching future issues for such a contribution but we are not holding our breath!

Postwar Jewish Intellectuals

Commentary should be warmly recommended for publishing in its April issue a symposium on “Jewishness and the Younger Intellectuals.” The symposium includes a large number of contributions from Jewish intellectuals of the postwar period. Most of these intellectuals are not really young; they are of the generation which grew up in World War II and started on their careers during the prosperity of the postwar period. Thus they are a quite distinct group from the intellectuals whose formative years were during the Great Depression and who by and large went through the radical movement of that period — intellectuals like the present editors of Commentary.

The question that was asked these intellectuals which concerns us most, dealt with socialism: “What are your feelings, if any, about the generation of Jewish intellectuals whose socialism provided the basis for their more or less antagonistic relation to the Jewish community in America and elsewhere? Do you believe there are viable elements in the tradition they represented?”

The attitudes of this predominantly prosperous group of liberal intellectuals towards socialism are quite interesting. One detects a nostalgia for the socialism of the Thirties — especially the emptiness, if this generation has turned from Marxism but has been unable to find
any substitute. True, there are those contributors who rebadit and deprecate their radical predecessors; but other contributors aptly characterize this type of intellectual. Ned Polsky refers to the intellectuals who "try to make up with their parents and become 'good Jews' by writing neo-religious essays for Commentary; or tried for a hole-in-one by writing red-baiting essays for Commentary." Nat Hentoff attacks "such daring empirical intellectuals as Max Lerner, whose flaccid optimism is an all too symptomitis omen of 'liberal cliches."

Andrew Hacker, a professor at Cornell, expresses this nostalgia this way: "What impresses me . . . is that so many of the prominent Jewish social scientists of today received their first exposure to the intellectual world as socialists in the 30's. This is not to say that the Marxist lens gave them an accurate depiction of reality. But the Marxist posture encouraged these young students to ask significant questions and to by-pass conventional approaches. The profit, in other words, was intellectual rather than political. My generation has undergone no such initiation. And our work shows it. In terms of the breadth of the subjects we choose for study and in terms of the power of imagination we bring to bear, our efforts are markedly inferior. Any intellectual who was a Marxist in the 30's never forgets all of his adolescent lessons. No one should apologize for having such a past, and it is important to tell that a substitute for it has yet to be found." Thus this intellectual recognizes that even a little exposure to Marxism raises the stature of an intellectual far above those who have ignored Marxism. Perhaps a system of thought which has such an effect even on those who desert it deserves to be studied in its own right.

Allan Temko, who teaches English at the University of California, perhaps best sums up this liberal attitude: "The socialism of the early 20th century was a crudey's surfaced mirror in which the Jew — like everyone else — saw a distorted image. Today we have new mirrors, but I don't know that they are more clear." What is important to note is that these intellectuals do not understand Marxism and are opposed to Marxism — this we have known for a long time. What is new is that they have been able to find no substitute for Marxism; no alternative "mirror" through which to see reality. Some of the contributors took an even more positive view of socialism, its meaning today, and its potentiality for the future. Particularly interesting were the remarks of Professor Samuel Shapiro who stands out among younger academicians because of his courageous defense of the Cuban Revolution. Professor Shapiro states: "Socialism as a political issue seemed totally defunct during the last campaign. Nevertheless, having spent most of 1959 in half a dozen Latin American countries, where socialism is taken for granted by a majority of intellectuals and is in operation in a number of industries, I don't feel that the socialist cause in America is as dead as it may seem to be. If the armaments race stops, and if Keynesian remedies don't halt the next depression, there will be a revival of socialism; it is waiting to germinate, like a seed beneath the snow."

Philip Green, who is a professor at Princeton University, goes beyond speculation as to whether or not there is a future for socialism. He urges his fellow Jewish intellectuals to become socialists. "... A Jew can best fulfill his moral obligations not by becoming especially involved in 'the Jewish community' (which is not really a community at all); nor by joining up wholeheartedly with the Americanized majority; but by joining the community of radical political action (as well as by exemplary personal behavior). If one feels, as I do, that some of the special values which have been nurtured by Jewish life — humaneness, resistance to mechanized organized society, an emphasis on social justice — can enrich that community, it will be enough of a 'Jewish' contribution to American life and culture to maintain and transmit them. On the other hand, where elements of Judaism conflict with the necessities of radical action and thought, I would drop them instantly, as radical Jews have often done in the past, and call upon others to do the same. For commitment to broaden the contours of human freedom and justice must take precedence over everything else; to me, the Jewish tradition has no meaning except when it is incident to that greater tradition."

Random Notes

The Soviet resumption of nuclear tests has stirred considerable discussion in radical periodicals. Editors Sweezy and Huberman wrote separate editorials on different sides of the issue in the Monthly Review. The National Guardian has printed the Linus Pauling and Khrushchev letters as well as a contribution from A. J. Muste. We can expect to see more discussion in these circles in the months to come on the meaning of the 22nd Congress. . . . Lewis Coser and Irving Howe take note of the growing radicalism among youth in the fall, 1961 issue of Dissent — in a rather demented way. To them the growth of support for the Cuban Revolution and opposition to the U.S. war drive among students is — just another crop of Communist Dupes. . . . The October 28th issues of the Nation was devoted in its entirety to Fred Cook's excellent study of the power of the military in American life, "Juggernaut." We highly recommend it. . . . The New Leader has been completely redesigned with very tasteful drawings on the front cover and new typography throughout. Sad to say its content of undiluted Stalinophobia remains the same. . . . Dwight MacDonald, a well known figure in radical circles for many years until he decided to "choose the West," an act which inspired him so little that he pretty much dropped his political writing, is venting his spleen these days writing vitriolic movie reviews for Esquire. Perhaps this is best all around. . . . While radical journals continue to proliferate in number, if not expand greatly in circulation, the commercial giants are not having it so easy. Coronet has folded. Saturday Evening Post and Life have undergone drastic facelifting operations to counter sagging circulation. McCalls and the Ladies Home Journal continue to merrily slice each other's throat while all and sundry are engaged in a wild circulation war, virtually giving subscription away. Needless to say, no one is considering such a drastic step as putting meaningful content in their publication. So the public yawns, gets a beer out of the ice box, and turns on the TV set.
TWO BASIC WORKS
by Leon Trotsky

The Stalin School of Falsification

DOCUMENTS OF LENINIST STRUGGLE against the rise of Stalinism in the 1920's. The first U. S. edition 1937 with introduction and explanatory notes by Max Shachtman; the translation by John G. Wright. The revealing table of contents: Letter to the Bureau of Party History; Some Documents Relating to the Origin of the Legend of "Trotskyism"; The Lost Document; Two Speeches at the Session of the Central Control Commission; The War Danger — The Defense Policy and the Opposition; A Contribution to the Political Biography of Stalin; How the Insurrection Actually Took place; Appendix: Stalin and the Red Army by N. Markin; The March 1917 Conference. This 384-page book was long out-of-print and is just off the press. Send $3 (paper) for your copy.

The Third International After Lenin

THIS BOOK IS STILL FORBIDDEN READING throughout the Soviet bloc, for it shows in the most convincing way the profound difference between Leninism and Stalinism. This book contains the famous program on which Trotsky stood in his political fight against the regime of Stalin. For an understanding of the issues that shook the Soviet Union after the death of Lenin, this book is essential reading. It is also essential for an understanding of the mass pressure today on the Soviet government to "Go Back to Lenin." The introduction is by George Lavan. 400 pages (paper) $2.50; in combination with The Stalin School of Falsification, $5.

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