Lessons of the Cuban Revolution
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Contents

The Cuban Revolution and Its Lessons
by Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso 1

Radical Intellectuals in the 1930s
by George Novack 21

Postwar Capitalist Development at a Turning Point
by Dick Roberts 35

The Centenary of Marx's 'Capital'
by Ernest Mandel 50

The Day of the People
by Eugene V. Debs 55

Brief Reviews 58

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The Cuban revolution and the workers state it produced, together with the Russian, Chinese and similar revolutions, are positive achievements expressing the aspiration of all the colonial and semi-colonial masses to free themselves from imperialist exploitation and to raise themselves to a better life.

However, the Cuban revolution was not a unique or exceptional occurrence but rather the culmination of a process which, aside from specific national features, started from a level common to all the underdeveloped countries. This means other peoples can also follow the Cuban road, adapting its general features to their own national, regional and local characteristics.

Because Cuba is an example of what the revolutionary masses of a semicolonial country can accomplish with correct leadership, it is necessary and useful to bring out its lessons, experiences and teachings so that they may be assimilated by the revolutionary vanguard of the colonial and semicolonial world.

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This article by a leading Bolivian Trotskyist was written last year when the first reports appeared of a new guerrilla front. This was before it had been disclosed that Che Guevara was in the leadership of the front, before Che's historic letter calling for "... two, three, many Vietnams," before Che's murder at the hands of the Bolivian military authorities, and before the Organization of Latin-American Solidarity conference in Havana. The article was written for an anthology commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution to be published by Merit Publishers later this year. Hugo Gonzalez Moscoso is the general secretary of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, Bolivian section of the Fourth International.
The Road to Civilization for the Underdeveloped Countries

The course of uneven development divided the world into advanced industrialized countries and underdeveloped countries. As the former expanded, they came to dominate the latter, converting them into colonies or semicolonies. But from the beginning, the underdeveloped countries struggled to shake off this domination. The idea of liberating themselves was coupled with that of overcoming their backwardness by emulating the development of the advanced countries.

The two world wars and the victory of the Russian, Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions spread and encouraged uprisings and revolutions of the colonial peoples. Today the tremendous mobilization of the colonial world is continuing in its course, shaking the foundations of the capitalist world and opening the way for an unlimited development of workers states. Huge economically and culturally backward masses are demonstrating their desire to enjoy the benefits of modern civilization. In ceaseless struggles, with their ups and downs, they seek not only equal political rights with the developed nations through formal independence but they also demand equal living standards. National liberation from imperialist domination is bound up with the idea of development, diversification of the economy and improved living conditions for the masses.

The national bourgeois and petty-bourgeois layers, echoing these profound mass currents, have espoused some demands of this type, which would grant a measure of economic development without disturbing the capitalist economic structures. As was inevitable, in undertaking this, these leaderships came into conflict with the world reality of our epoch.

In order to develop an underdeveloped country, capital and an accumulation fund are required to finance the development projects which it lacks precisely because it is a backward, semicolonial country. The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois layers do not advocate expropriating without compensation the surplus value which the imperialists extract, and the land rent, and they do not support economic planning under state control to exploit the natural resources.

Without transforming the structure of an underdeveloped country, the need for capital must be exclusively or in large measure satisfied through foreign credits. Imperialism then moves back in and imprisons the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leaderships which initially rose against it, impelled by the mobilized masses. The imperialists grant credits; however, because of their meagerness, because they are assigned to works of a secondary importance and because of the conditions attached to them and the demands they impose, these credits work against the aspirations of the underdeveloped nations for economic development and industrialization.

This is the history of the Latin-American peoples, who sink deeper
and deeper in debt to Yankee imperialism without emerging from their wretched backwardness!

The national bourgeoisies go around in a political circle. Under the pressure of the mobilized masses, seeking to control them, they lead the struggle for national independence and raise the banners of economic development; however, failing to break out of the confines of capitalism, they fall back under imperialist domination, which signifies national oppression and underdevelopment. Under imperialist rule no underdeveloped country will ever be able to progress and reach the level of the industrialized countries. That is the lesson of history. In the present world situation, the bourgeois leaders cannot accomplish the tasks of national, economic and political independence. They cannot promote industrialization, achieve national unity, plan economic development or carry out a real agrarian reform. That is, they cannot usher in a period of growth in the productive forces which would transform the colonies and semicolonies into advanced capitalist countries and thus repeat the role played by the bourgeoisies of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the present stage of the death agony and putrefaction of imperialism, the bourgeoisies of the underdeveloped countries are incapable of accomplishing the tasks assigned to their class, which the bourgeoisies in the central capitalist countries accomplished during the period of the rise of capitalism.

Against this bourgeois dead end, where instead of liberating themselves and moving forward the underdeveloped countries reinforce their oppressive chains and increase their backwardness, we revolutionary Marxists and Trotskyists have proposed taking the revolutionary road of expropriating imperialism, liquidating the national exploiters, undertaking a radical agrarian reform carrying out the postponed bourgeois-democratic tasks, combining them with tasks that are properly socialist, including establishing a workers state.

The big mobilizations of the colonial masses have followed two paths. Under bourgeois leadership they have ended in exhaustion and defeat, with their aspirations for economic development and a better standard of living for the masses left frustrated. Under revolutionary leadership they have been victorious, showing that the road to modern civilization for the underdeveloped countries leads through the destruction of the capitalist and imperialist order to the construction of socialism.

Cuba and Bolivia: Two Roads
— One Leading to Victory

The Cuban revolution followed the revolutionary road and for this reason succeeded in establishing the first Latin-American workers state. We maintain that this was neither foreordained nor was it a unique and exceptional process—any Latin-American country in the objective conditions prevailing on this continent and in the world
can attain a victory like the one in Cuba. To appreciate this more fully, nothing is more instructive than to compare the Cuban and Bolivian processes and to consider the reasons for their different outcomes.

Let us begin by recognizing that both Bolivia and Cuba, prior to their revolutions, were typically semicolonial countries, formally independent but totally dominated by imperialism. As is typical in semicolonies, they were one-product countries—sugar in Cuba and tin in Bolivia—with both sources of wealth controlled by imperialist concerns. In both countries the land was in the hands of big landowners, and in Bolivia the survival of serfdom of a feudal type was an aggravating factor.

Commerce, the banks, the means of transport and the other principal economic activities were controlled by the imperialists. In neither of these countries had there been any economic diversification or development of manufacturing industry. As a result, the national bourgeoisie was weak and parasitic; it depended on the crumbs left it by the imperialist concerns, in the service of whose interests the entire economic and political life of the nation was oriented. The successive governments were imperialist agents not remotely representing the national interests.

The people—the working class, the peasants, the poor middle class—lived in conditions of poverty, backwardness and humiliation. They were exiles in their own land, discriminated against and without rights in face of the all-powerful oppressor, the gringo imperialist agent.

This identical situation of subservience, poverty and backwardness was the starting point for the development of both the Bolivian and Cuban revolutions.

In Bolivia, on April 9, 1952, the masses defeated the tin magnates' government of General Ballivián. What was initially projected as a coup d'état involving only the military, the police and the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—Revolutionary Nationalist Movement] became a popular insurrection through the intervention of the industrial proletariat of La Paz and impoverished sections of the middle class. The coup d'état was defeated and the uprising was victorious. The POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario—Revolutionary Workers Party, the Trotskyist organization] helped to bring about this victory but because of its organizational weakness the political power did not fall into its hands but into those of the MNR. This meant that while the masses triumphed over the army and the oligarchy they did not themselves take power. A petty-bourgeois party with leftist and anti-imperialist trimmings stole the revolution from them.

From the first moment of the Bolivian revolution, two diametrically opposite political lines were counterposed: the revolutionary Marxist position of the POR and the bourgeois capitalist position of the MNR. The POR called for an all-out struggle against imperialism, active
and organized participation of the masses in the government and in the management of the economy, a real agrarian revolution and replacement of the petty-bourgeois leadership by a proletarian leadership in order to move toward the constitution of a workers and peasants government. The MNR, which was in firm control of the government, maintained that the revolution was to be bourgeois democratic in character and proposed to develop a strong national bourgeoisie in order to build an independent capitalist economy in Bolivia.

In the conflict and confrontation between these two conceptions in the first years of the revolution, the MNR found itself forced to make concessions to the masses. In order to maintain itself in power, it had to enact an agrarian reform, nationalize the mines, establish workers control etc. But at the same time that the MNR yielded to the pressure of the masses, it vitiated these conquests and emasculated them of their revolutionary content. The agrarian reform was reduced to a long-drawn-out bureaucratic process of handing out land titles without any attempt to solve the economic and technical problems involved. The payment of heavy compensation upon the nationalization of the mines decapitalized the mining industry; workers control was narrowly based and was constantly whittled down still further by the bureaucracy.

Commerce, the banks and the other imperialist or national concerns were not touched.

The revolution was halted after having gone only a short distance. Many of the conquests of the masses were gradually wiped out. The doors of the country were opened to imperialism and imperialism became the ally of the MNR and its regime.

The army was reorganized and turned over to Yankee military missions along with the police. When, with the government of Paz Estenssoro, the MNR was no longer capable of containing the masses, this army staged a preventive coup on November 4, 1964, and assumed complete control of the government.

The military regime, first under the Military Junta and later under the Barrientos presidency, carried forward the work left unfinished by the MNR of dismantling all the conquests of the masses, destroying the unions, cutting wages, attacking nationalized property and converting the country into a Yankee colony.

Under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, the revolution was led to disaster. The economy did not develop, mine production fell by fifty per cent, reaching the brink of collapse; the petroleum industry was reopened to the Yankee monopolies which are now strangling the government-run concern, the YPFB [Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos—Bolivian State Petroleum]; manufacturing became semiparalyzed; agricultural production dropped; unemployment rose; the living standards of the people became more wretched. These were the results of twelve years of MNR rule!

The road followed by the Bolivian revolution under MNR leader-
ship did not lead to national independence; it did not develop the economy; it did not improve life for the masses. It ended finally in restoring to power the military and the oligarchs who had been defeated in the 1952 insurrection.

The road followed by the Cuban revolution under the leadership of Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and the July 26 Movement was quite different. If, indeed, the declarations of the revolutionaries in the Sierra Maestra were of a limited character at first, proposing the "humanization" of capitalism and the organization of a national-democratic government, soon, impelled by the needs of the struggle itself and by their contacts with the landless peasants, the revolutionaries found themselves forced to draft an advanced program of agrarian reform. Later, after they came to power, in order to preserve their regime, they responded to the attacks of imperialism and the national exploiters with measures which liquidated the economic, political and military apparatus of the capitalist regime. In order to confront his enemies, Castro inspired the workers, the peasants and the people to mobilize repeatedly, based himself on them and deepened the revolution. The agrarian reform which had been initiated in the Sierra Maestra was followed by nationalization of the imperialist and national capitalist enterprises, and then by the urban reform, monetary and educational reforms, economic planning with diversified industrialization and the raising of the standard of living of the peasant and urban masses. The dissolution of the old army was followed by the armed organization of the people in the militias and the Rebel Army.

This process led irresistibly to the constitution of the Cuban workers state, the first in Latin America. But to reach this level, the revolutionary leadership went through a process of purging itself. As the revolution deepened and the masses won their rights, the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements abandoned its ranks and went over to the imperialist counterrevolutionary front. The Cuban revolution was directed against imperialism and the national bourgeoisie. In order to win, Fidel's government based itself on the Cuban masses, the world colonial masses and the workers states. In Bolivia, on the contrary, the MNR regime allied itself with imperialism against the masses at home; internationally it took the side of the imperialist Western world against the camp of socialist revolution.

With seven years difference in time, the Cuban and Bolivian revolutions started from more or less the same level but followed different roads. The main nuclei in the two leaderships also conducted themselves in opposite ways. The Castroist leadership rooted itself first among the peasants and later the worker masses, mobilizing them against imperialism and national capitalism. The MNR leadership moved away from the masses, betrayed them and allied itself with imperialism and the Bolivian oligarchy.

As a consequence, the Bolivian revolution led to defeat, crisis and prostration before imperialism, while the Cuban revolution led to
victory, economic development, a better life for the Cuban people and national and social liberation.

Thus we see how two revolutions, following two distinct paths, ended with only one victorious, although they both had the same possibilities of succeeding. This outcome was not foreordained, but was the result of the opposing tactical and strategic conceptions of their leaderships.

The Lessons to be Learned from the Cuban Victory

This general conclusion, however, is not enough. The lessons of the Cuban revolution must be more concretely established. We must learn what needs to be done to lead the masses to victory and what errors lead to defeat, as in the Bolivian case, and must be avoided.

In my opinion, the following are the principal lessons that confirm Trotskyist theory:

1. The revolutionary process is permanent and does not go by stages.

The first practical theoretical lesson that the Cuban revolution teaches us is that the revolutionary process in the colonial countries is not divided into stages and does not stop at an intermediate stage.

In an uninterrupted process, the revolution drives out imperialism and liquidates the national capitalist regime. This is the prerequisite for victory, for political liberation and economic development.

The Cuban process did not stop at any intermediate stage but advanced to the point of creating a workers state. Because of this it triumphed. In Bolivia, on the other hand, after first advancing, the revolution was contained and precisely for this reason degenerated and was defeated—and, after twelve years of struggle the military regained power. In Cuba, however, a workers state developed after only two years. This shows that in order for any backward colonial or semicolonial country to progress and transform itself into a free country on the road toward industrialization, it must combine the struggle against imperialism with the struggle against native capitalism, proceeding from the national bourgeois-democratic tasks to tasks of a socialist order in accord with the interests of the working class. The uninterrupted and combined realization of these tasks assures political victory and opens the road for economic development. In this process, the revolutionary leadership must purge itself, disengage itself from the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois elements that go along with the revolution, and become a revolutionary Marxist team at the head of the working class, the peasantry and the poor sectors of the middle class.

This process developed clearly in Cuba. The Batista government fell on January 1, 1959, and a new government arose, presided
over by Manuel Urrutia with Miro Cardona as prime minister. On February 16, Cardona left the government and Fidel Castro came in. On July 18, after a crisis, Urrutia and his ministers left and Raúl Castro and Che Guevara took their places. Finally, on April 16, 1961, Fidel Castro proclaimed the socialist character of the revolution. This winnowing out of the revolutionary leadership was the result of the advance of the process and the radical measures adopted.

The new government's first measures sought to improve the living conditions of the people. The law lowering electric power rates was enacted on March 3, 1959; the law cutting rents on March 6 of the same year. On May 17, the agrarian reform was enacted. The law on recovery of misused property of December 13, 1959, was already an advanced measure because in itself it signified the expropriation of the expropriators. In July and August of the following year, the nationalization of the Yankee imperialist enterprises began. Later foreign trade came under the control of the state, which established a state monopoly of foreign trade. On October 13, 1960, the banks were nationalized along with 383 industrial and commercial enterprises controlled by international finance and native capital. On October 14, the very next day, the urban reform law was enacted. Later internal trade was also nationalized, etc., etc. Thus the economic power of imperialism and the native bourgeoisie was destroyed. Capitalist ownership virtually disappeared in revolutionary Cuba. The persistence of small private ownership represents a secondary factor and makes no difference to the general economic and social situation of the island, although it merits the leadership's attention to promote its gradual disappearance.

These events were inseparably linked. The national-democratic measures went hand in hand with the socialist ones. No matter how one tries, it is difficult to separate the Cuban process into two stages, each with its distinct and specific measures. The schema of a revolution in stages exists only in the reformist and opportunist mentality of the Stalinists and the petty-bourgeoisie who seek to put a brake on all revolutionary processes.

The masses of the underdeveloped countries, as we see, refuse to separate their revolution into stages; they are unwilling to restrict their struggle to fighting against the imperialists for national independence; they also want to settle accounts with their national exploiters. The masses are loath to escape imperialist exploitation only to remain subjected to the exploitation of their national bourgeoisies.

In Bolivia, it did not prove possible to remove the MNR leadership and supersede it with a Marxist working-class leadership. The MNR stopped the process midway at a point where its class interests were satisfied, creating a caste of newly rich persons and disregarding the interests of the nation and the exploited classes. This would have happened in Cuba also if Miro Cardona and Manuel Urrutia
had come out on top in the first crisis and held on to their positions in the government.

The leadership of the Bolivian revolution did not do away with national capitalism; on the contrary, it bolstered it, seeking to develop a strong bourgeoisie. Faced with a mass mobilization outside their control, it appealed for help from yesterday's foe, imperialism. The national capitalists allied themselves with the imperialists against the masses.

Bolivia has been a negative confirmation of the Cuban lesson. Only by permanent, uninterrupted struggle, by driving out imperialism and doing away with native capitalism, is it possible to win and to build a new socialist society.

Both experiences, the positive Cuban one and the negative Bolivian one, in turn confirm the Trotskyist thesis of permanent revolution: that while revolutions in underdeveloped countries begin on the level of a broad united front, in order to be victorious they must consolidate working-class revolutionary Marxist leaderships and not stop at accomplishing the democratic tasks but carry out the socialist tasks, dealing ever more deadly blows to capitalism.

The Cuban revolution is a living example of how the Trotskyist theory works in reality.

The Trotskyists strive to bring the working class to power with the support of its natural allies, the peasantry and the poor middle class, and through the construction of workers and peasants governments. The Stalinist reformists and revisionists, like the bourgeois tendencies, counterpose the theory of revolution by stages to the Trotskyist thesis: A first stage in which the working class must support its bourgeoisie so that it can take power and industrialize the country. A second stage, far in the future, when the workers will aim for power. This theory was applied in Bolivia and proved to be false, because the bourgeoisie once in power did not liberate the country from imperialism or develop it but was satisfied with exploiting the masses as a partner of imperialism. On the other hand, the Trotskyist theory was exemplified in Cuba, leading to a complete victory over imperialism and all the national exploiters and opening up the way for socialist construction.

2. The role of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie.

It must be stressed, from the above it follows that the outcome of a revolutionary process depends on its leadership. If the capitalist bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie cannot be dislodged, as in Bolivia, then the revolution is condemned to defeat or at least to paralysis and stagnation and there is serious danger that the conquests of the masses, including the democratic ones, will be abrogated.

In the present imperialist stage, these classes are incapable of leading a revolutionary process. In Cuba, after the first successes in the Sierra Maestra, many petty-bourgeois sectors joined. After the victory, when power had been won, more bourgeois elements
moved in. But when the agrarian reform was enacted and then came the nationalizations, these elements began to criticize and sabotage the revolution and to fight against it, even taking up arms as in the case of the Escambray events. These elements quickly re-cemented their ties with the foreign concerns and the agents of the Batista tyranny. The leaders of the first hour, beginning with Urrutia and Huber Matos, (etc.), went over to the counterrevolution.

Thus the incapacity of the bourgeoisie or the petty-bourgeoisie as a class to stay with the revolution to its final outcome showed up clearly in practice and not just in theory. If this element is able to maintain itself in power, it blocks the process and diverts it; if it is ousted from the leadership, it goes over to the enemy bag and baggage.

3. Armed struggle and guerrilla warfare.

When the democratic roads are blocked by a capitalist dictatorship, when the normal methods of struggle run up against an unyielding repressive government apparatus, when the exercise of the most basic democratic rights leads to loss of jobs, jail, exile and to concentration camps, the peoples, the masses and their vanguard, have no other alternative than to take up arms and prepare an insurrection.

The revisionist theories of peaceful roads to socialism developed by the Stalinists are not only false and impracticable in underdeveloped countries but become a useful weapon for the oligarchies and their governments, which use them adroitly to lull the masses to sleep and to combat the "extremism" of the revolutionary vanguard.

In the majority of the colonial and semicolonial countries, particularly those in Latin America, political power is held by military camarillas or else oligarchic minorities elevated to power by fraudulent elections and imposed by military and police pressures. In the majority of these countries democratic freedoms for the masses and their vanguard have been abolished. Parliamentary rule flounders in a hopeless crisis. In practice, the parliaments have no significance, not even as a platform for denunciation; completely housebroken as a result of electoral fraud, they are nothing more than docile instruments of the regime.

In these conditions, which are similar in all the countries of Latin America and in the majority of colonial countries, armed struggle is the only correct way to fight the ruling camarillas. Everything else becomes mere charlatanism. Verbal or written protests, which are quite restricted by repression, become a farce. The masses may listen to these remonstrances but they do not find them convincing because they do not see in them an organized and militant will acting against the regime but rather an adaptation to the conditions created by the dictators.

Cuba showed that under these conditions, the appropriate response to liberate the people is to take the road of armed struggle.
Armed action in the form of guerrilla warfare destroyed the best equipped army in Latin America and touched off a gigantic mobilization of the masses.

Broadly speaking, the guerrilla war in Cuba produced the following results:

(a) It brought about disintegration in the government and accentuated its crisis.

(b) It undermined the morale of the army. An army without confidence and without morale falls like a house of cards, notwithstanding its armament, its airplanes, its artillery and its napalm bombs.

(c) It raised the confidence of the masses and the people in their own strength and stirred their combative spirit. The skepticism and lack of confidence inspired by the traditional parties' verbalistic opposition to the dictatorship and the deals made by the traditional parties with Batista were replaced by a new, radical, fighting spirit. The masses saw the determination and firmness of the fighters and felt themselves drawn to the struggle, to revolutionary action—they felt inspired and their confidence mounted. The inner forces of the masses were unleashed in a mighty, irresistible torrent which in its turn also imparted momentum to the leading group in the Sierra Maestra itself.

In the prevailing conditions in Latin America, the results achieved by the guerrillas in Cuba can be realized in any country. Therefore, I say that guerrilla warfare is incontrovertibly the road which revolutionaries must take to liberate their peoples from capitalist and imperialist exploitation.

Armed action and guerrilla struggle have been much criticized. Two criticisms deserve analysis: (a) The exponents of the peaceful road to socialism accuse the guerrillas of being putschist adventurists; (b) they claim that the attempt to create the objective conditions with a few guns and a bold group of men flies in the face of the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Trotsky and that, moreover, this is a substituting for the action of the masses and the revolutionary party.

The first criticism is tendentious and lacks serious foundation. The partisans of the "peaceful road to socialism" would have to show us where the bourgeoisies and oligarchies have ever handed over power to the masses amicably and without a struggle. This argument merits no further attention.

The Cuban revolutionaries have advocated armed struggle for this period of the collapse of bourgeois democracy, of merciless dictatorships, of bureaucratization of the trade union leaderships, and of the existence of small traditional Marxist parties; that is, the period of the crisis of revolutionary leadership. Those of us who assert the validity of guerrilla struggle start from the incontrovertible fact that the objective conditions for revolution are already overripe.
Capitalism and imperialism are rotten and have long been awaiting their gravedigger.

Guerrilla warfare does not create the objective conditions. They already exist. Guerrilla warfare as a political, social and military movement starts from the given situation. And it is all the more justified because, while the objective conditions are ripe, the traditional workers and Marxist parties are unable to mobilize the masses for an insurrectional strike to take power, the classical form of proletarian struggle.

It is not true that guerrilla warfare negates the role of the revolutionary party; on the contrary, it reinforces it. In Yugoslavia, China and Vietnam, the guerrilla struggle was led by Communist parties. In Cuba and Algeria, where the traditional workers parties proved incapable of breaking out of their passivity, errors and conservatism, they were supplanted by new groupings which assumed the role of parties.

Guerrilla warfare cannot be viewed in its armed struggle aspect alone, but must be considered as an inseparable part of the overall political struggle of the peoples for their national and social liberation. The guerrillas are the military arm of the people to be used in breaking up the oppressor armed force on which the capitalist regime is based. Thus guerrilla warfare is not a substitute for mass action nor even for certain other forms of struggle. We might say that guerrilla warfare is a continuation of the class struggle at a special juncture by armed means, which does not exclude other forms of struggle but rather combines with them.

It would be one of the gravest possible errors for the guerrillas to isolate themselves from the urban masses. The armed struggle in the countryside and the mobilization of the cities must be combined to assure victory.

The guerrilla method advocated by the Cubans is applicable to all underdeveloped countries, although its form must vary in accord with the peculiarities of each country. In those countries where there exists a great peasant mass with an unresolved land problem, the guerrillas will draw their strength from the peasantry; the guerrilla struggle will bring this mass into action, solving their agrarian problem arms in hand, as occurred in Cuba, starting from the Sierra Maestra. But in other countries the proletariat and the radicalized petty-bourgeoisie of the cities will provide the guerrilla forces.

In Bolivia, for example, an agrarian reform has already been carried through which, although limited, has solved the basic land problem. However, guerrilla warfare is still the necessary road to defeat the military dictatorship. In our case, the mines, the slums around the cities, as well as certain agricultural zones where the conditions of life are very difficult, will be fertile fields for the development of guerrilla groups. The peasantry of the densely populated regions whose receipt of land and titles has not altered their underdevelopment and poverty will also be won to the struggle under the
influence of the proletariat. In practice, capitalist agrarian reforms like the Bolivian one, and others which are projected, are too limited to convert the peasants into a conservative force. Only the paid, bureaucratized leadership of the peasant organizations is so affected. In Bolivia, the peasants will not be enemies of the guerrillas. In the beginning they will be sympathetic onlookers, later actively revolutionary. The poverty and backwardness in which they live will continue to make them a revolutionary force.

In the last analysis, the Cuban process buried the revisionist Stalinist theories on peaceful roads to socialism and peaceful coexistence.

4. The role of the revolutionary party.

It has been repeatedly and emphatically claimed that the Cuban process disproves some Marxist theses, such as the need for a party. This has gone so far that some say that a party is not needed because the masses can take power without it.

It is true that one of the most notable features of the Cuban revolution is that it was accomplished without the participation of the so-called workers parties and even in opposition to their policy. And from this the simplistic conclusion is drawn that the masses can take power without the leadership of a Marxist revolutionary party.

Revolutionary socialist activity in Cuba dates back to the second half of the last century. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, Marx's ideas were rather well-known on the island. In the first five years of our century, the first workers parties with a clear Marxist orientation developed. With the degeneration of the Third International and its Stalinist bureaucratization the Cuban workers movement was not left unaffected by the struggle waged by the Communist Left Opposition and later by the Fourth International.

After innumerable fusions and maneuvers, the Communist party adopted the name, People's Socialist Party, under which it functioned until the Castroist revolution.

Despite this party's long experience and influence, the revolution led by Castro passed it by. What is more, the PSP opposed the guerrilla struggle in the Sierra Maestra, calling Fidel Castro an adventurer and putschist.

This experience holds a lesson of great value. In our epoch we are witnessing a tumultuous advance of the revolution of the colonial and semicolonial peoples. The force of the masses shakes the foundations of capitalist society. The onrushing revolution blocks off the bourgeoisies of the underdeveloped countries and develops its own instruments of struggle in a political and ideological climate strongly influenced by Marxist ideas and by the objective victories of the socialist countries.

In Cuba, under conditions of intolerable dictatorship, the traditional workers parties were unable to fulfill their function of leading the masses, because of organizational weakness in some cases and in
the case of the Stalinist Communist Party, because of an incorrect political position which led it to collaborate with Batista. In these circumstances, a group of radicalized youth, expressing the historical necessities of the moment, created the July 26 Movement and later in the Sierra Maestra organized the Rebel Army with a broad peasant base. These new political formations, in an exceptional way, performed the role of a revolutionary Marxist party, substituting by their actions for the traditional parties which had proved unable to rise to the height of the political tasks of the moment.

There can be no certainty that the Cuban masses would have taken power and begun the socialist revolution without a party. The Rebel Army and the July 26 Movement filled this role. This experience can be repeated in any country where the workers and Communist parties prove unable to take the leadership of the masses by beginning an armed insurrectionary struggle and fall into conservatism and political passivity. It is elementary that if a Marxist party does not play its historical role, new political forces will move into its place. To think otherwise would be to fall into mechanical determinism or messianism.

In the present conditions of a favorable correlation of forces for the revolution and the extreme weakness of the semicolonial bourgeoisies, such parties can be substituted for, as occurred in Cuba. The revolution and the masses cannot wait; in certain circumstances they will follow those who with audacity and valor strike hardest at their enemies and strive in action to resolve the historical crisis. Moreover, while previously many years were necessary for the formation of a political leadership, in our epoch, convulsed by the tumultuous mobilization of the colonial masses, marked by the progress of the workers states and a high level of social consciousness, such leaderships can be formed in a short time.

It is true that, at the beginning, the July 26 Movement and later the guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra did not have a well-defined theory and fell into confusion and errors. However, their fusion with the landless peasants, and with the agricultural workers of the plantations, coupled with the profound mobilization of these layers, later supported by the proletariat of the cities, enabled the leadership of the July 26 Movement to raise themselves to the level of Marxist-Leninist conceptions, following in practice the line of permanent revolution formulated by Leon Trotsky.

By its own experience the Fidelista leadership confirmed the thesis that to solve the problems of the underdeveloped countries, socialist means must be adopted without stopping at the accomplishment of mere bourgeois-democratic tasks.

This is the indubitable merit of the Fidelista leadership of the July 26 Movement and the Rebel Army, made possible by its fusion with the masses in the context of the present situation in the world and in Latin America.

In the socialist construction which followed victory, the leadership
of the July 26 Movement and the Rebel Army proved insufficient and the necessity reappeared for a mass revolutionary Marxist party. Then the Stalinist party played its hand—from opponent of the revolution it jumped to the opposite position, seeking to seize control of it. The development of the ORI [Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas—Integrated Revolutionary Organizations], the PURS [Partido Unificado de la Revolucion Socialista—United Party of the Socialist Revolution] and finally, of the PCC [Partido Communista de Cuba—Communist Party of Cuba] reflected the need for a party as well as the conflict between the leadership of the revolution and the Stalinist elements which, assisted by Soviet pressure, strove to put their stamp on this process and promoted the emergence of a conciliationist right wing. The outcome of these frictions, which came to a head in the Escalante affair, will have very great import for the future of the Cuban workers state.

5. The role of the peasantry in underdeveloped countries.

The still unresolved agrarian problem in the majority of the underdeveloped countries results in the presence of an enormous peasant mass making up the overwhelming majority of the population and endowed with extraordinary revolutionary potential and explosiveness. Trotsky in his "What is the Permanent Revolution? Basic Postulates" [the concluding chapter of Permanent Revolution], assigned the peasants an important, exceptional position in the revolution, categorically declaring that the proletariat could win only by allying itself with the peasantry.

The Cuban revolution has shown that the peasants in an underdeveloped country can play a revolutionary role and that in fighting to win the land and their liberation from feudal-capitalist exploitation, they can become a mighty stimulus to the working class. The peasantry in underdeveloped countries has close ties with the proletariat. In Cuba the sugar workers had very close connections with the peasantry. In Bolivia the workers in the factories and mines have relatives and families in the countryside, and on their vacations they work the land together with them. But when they return to the countryside they bring their proletarian spirit with them.

Peasant rebellion is a characteristic feature of underdeveloped countries in this epoch of capitalist and imperialist disintegration. But the role of the peasantry has its limitations, and it is impossible to speak of a "peasant revolution" or a "peasants government." In the epoch of the rise of capitalism, the rebellious peasantry did not take power for itself but instead brought the bourgeoisie to power, demonstrating its limited capacity for assuming the leadership of the process. In the present epoch, in which the proletariat is the most dynamic and progressive class, peasant rebellions lead representatives of the working class to power on the basis of a worker-peasant alliance which emerges and is consolidated in the midst of struggle.

The driving force in the victory of the Castro revolution was the
peasantry. The Rebel Army brought the agrarian reform on the points of its bayonets. However, as this force merged with the workers movement in the cities and on the sugar plantations, this basically bourgeois-democratic task combined with others of a socialist character. The involvement of the workers blocked the influence of the liberal bourgeoisie or petty-bourgeoisie in the regime and later gave impetus to the anti-imperialist and anticapitalist tendencies of the revolution.

6. Geographic determinism.
Before the Cuban revolution, every time we revolutionaries raised the question of the struggle for workers power, we were told that the conditions for this did not exist, that since we live in the geographical domain of Yankee imperialism we could not maintain ourselves in power for even twenty-four hours. In Cuba, the cowards, the reformists and the opportunists maintained that their island location was prejudicial to revolution, that it was a disadvantage to be surrounded by the sea since it could serve as a highway for an invasion or a blockade. In the case of Bolivia, it was its landlocked position that constituted the disadvantage, since imperialism could instigate the neighboring countries to intervene or set up a blockade. This deterministic criterion served as the basis of a theory that the underdeveloped countries had to wait for revolution in the imperialist centers as the necessary precondition for making their own revolution. The Latin-American peoples had to wait for a social revolution to triumph in the U.S., then, with the oppressor's grip broken, they could begin their own revolutions.

The triumph of the Cuban revolution upset this geographical determinism. If Cuba, barely 90 miles from the world's greatest imperialist power, could liberate itself and abolish the regime of capitalist exploitation, the other Latin-American countries can do it also. If Cuba, a country of eight million inhabitants, could overcome economic blockade and defeat military intervention, the other peoples of this continent can do it as well. Whatever its geographic location, any people can liberate itself and maintain its revolutionary government.

The Cuban revolution has buried the geographic determinism which the pseudo-revolutionaries used to bolster their arguments.

7. Exporting revolution.
Geographic determinism exists no longer because revolution in any part of the world generates a force both domestically and internationally against which capitalism is impotent.

The Cuban revolution filled the masses of Latin America and the world with enthusiasm. Not only did it sweep away the false and opportunist notions of revolution by stages, peaceful roads and national-democratic fronts with the native bourgeoisies, not only did it isolate those who preached that a socialist revolution could not
win, etc., but also, and this is the most important, it gave a powerful impetus to the mobilization of the Latin-American masses, it speeded up their political maturation. In every country the slogan, "Struggle the Cuban Way," became the order of the day, meaning armed action and guerrilla warfare, implacable struggle against imperialism and native capitalism, radical agrarian reform, nationalization of the foreign and national exploiters—in sum, socialist revolution.

Not only were the colonial masses shaken by the Cuban revolution but so were the workers states. For the first time in history a workers state arose right under the nose of the most powerful imperialist power and without any part having been played by the Soviet Union or the Communist parties.

The Fidelista leadership had the great sagacity as well as the virtue of basing itself on these international forces. And it was precisely the mobilization of these forces which paralyzed imperialism. The U.S. has sufficient military means to crush Cuba but does not do so for fear of the mighty international force represented by the masses mobilized in support of Cuba. The U.S. could easily bomb Cuba but it is stopped short by the effect this would have on the Latin-American masses, who would rise up against it with colossal force. Cuba strikes fear into the U.S. not because of its military or economic strength but because of the tremendous social power of its example for the masses.

This is what the imperialist bourgeoisies call "exporting revolution"; it is nothing other than the dynamics proper to any revolutionary process and might be termed normal for such processes. The revolution extends itself by the attractive power of its example. The world reality is a single whole, and one country's victories are the victories of all the oppressed because they have a common enemy in imperialism. Of necessity, the revolutionary leadership is forced to guide this natural process, as Cuba did with the Second Declaration of Havana and the Tricontinental Congress, supporting revolutionary struggles and initiatives in all countries. It is still more necessary to proceed to build a Latin-American mass united front including all Marxist, workers and popular political tendencies, which would lead a coordinated struggle of our continent for national and social liberation.

The example of the Cuban revolution is valid for all of Latin America and must develop into a Soviet Socialist Federation of Latin America.

Defense of the Cuban Revolution

The Cuban revolution has become the heritage of all the revolutionaries and masses of Latin America and the world. Therefore it is the duty of the masses and leaders to defend it. The Tricontinental
Congress showed its understanding of this in approving a resolution of support for the Cuban revolution. However, the important thing is how to make this support effective so that it does not remain a mere declaration of good intentions.

We pose the defense of the Cuban revolution in two spheres: inside Cuba and outside Cuba.

1. *Inside Cuba.*

The internal dangers to the revolution arise, basically, from the revolution wearing out and dying down, and from the party and the state becoming bureaucratized. These causes affect mass support of the regime, not only at home but also internationally.

Ever since Marx, revolutionaries have understood that once a revolutionary process is set in motion it must advance continually without stopping. The masses constantly require new victories, however small, to maintain their confidence. When the revolution does not advance, it slips backward.

For this reason the masses and their revolutionary leaders must be wary of theories which would check the impetus of the masses from developing, which advocate conciliation and coexistence of the contending forces, which seek to divide the process into stages.

In the initial phase of the Cuban revolution the danger of stabilization and conciliation was rather remote. But today, since the fusion of the Stalinists with the revolutionaries of the Sierra Maestra, this danger has become real. The Stalinists are promoting tendencies toward conciliation with imperialism, seeking to restrain the advance of the revolution, and they may go still further in this. Revolutionaries have a duty to warn against this danger and to combat it energetically, as in the Escalante case.

With regard to bureaucratization of the party and the state, which is a clear danger in any revolution and particularly so in underdeveloped countries, these can be averted by involving the masses in all the functions of the new state. Real socialist democracy is the antidote for bureaucratic deformations, both in the Marxist party which controls the government and in the apparatus of the workers state.

After the victory of the revolution, the revolutionary leadership has the mission of destroying the old capitalist apparatus and creating a new political organization on its ruins—the workers state.

It is in this area, that of political organization, that the Cuban revolution has made the least progress. I do not deny that the Fidelista leadership exercises some kind of check over the danger of bureaucratization, nor that this leadership has instituted a kind of "consultative or plebiscitary assembly" where the masses come to be informed, but where they neither deliberate questions nor decide them. In our opinion, this paternalistic democracy is inadequate. In the view of the Trotskyist movement, the fact that Cuba does not
yet have the proper political-social organization for a workers state represents a weakness of the revolution.

The structure of a workers state was expounded by Lenin in his fundamental work, *State and Revolution*: it is based on bodies democratically created by the masses.

Cuba needs soviets or workers councils. I am not arguing what form they should take, but fundamentally they must be democratically elected and must serve as instruments by which the masses can intervene, deliberate and decide on the administrative, economic and political affairs of the country. It must not be forgotten that the state which replaces the capitalist regime is nothing but the whole of the producer-masses democratically organized.

But without the wide and free play of all the different political tendencies which respect and defend the socialist organization of the country, the political organs of the Cuban workers state will have neither vitality nor the capacity to develop.

After a period of feeling their way, the Cubans organized a new Communist party under the leadership of Fidel Castro. The existence of this single party governs all political relationships in the country and other tendencies are not allowed to operate. This is a very grave error and constitutes a very serious danger, one of the most serious, because it limits the free initiative of the masses, promotes division and inhibits the enthusiasm of the masses.

In defense of revolutionary Cuba, we Trotskyists propose, on the one hand, the organization of the Cuban government along the lines of workers councils and, on the other, recognition of a plurality of organized political tendencies, either inside the present Communist Party and with all the guarantees necessary to their functioning, or within a system admitting a plurality of revolutionary parties.

It is the active masses, through the confrontation of ideas about the best forms and ways of constructing socialist Cuba, who by their initiative, their will and their courage will block the conservativization and exhaustion of the revolution and will root out bureaucratization early enough to preserve the health of the revolution.

2. *Outside Cuba.*

We Trotskyists are convinced that only the development of the revolution breaking through national limits and extending throughout the continent and the world can insure the total and definitive triumph of socialism.

In part, this concept, which is essentially Trotskyist and opposed to the false theory of "socialism in one country," has been adopted by the Fidelista leadership of the Cuban revolution. The appeal in the Second Declaration of Havana and the resolutions of the Tricontinental Congress calling on the Latin-American masses to take political power are examples of this. But in order to impel the world revolution forward, more than resolutions and declarations are needed; it is vital that the Cuban revolution continually advance,
that it deepen and win victory after victory that can serve as an objective spur to the Latin-American masses. Thus there is a dialectical interrelationship in this process. The C \textsuperscript{\textcopyright} revolution spurs the masses on and they in turn give impetus to it. The political leaderships must understand this process, make it a conscious thing and develop it to the maximum, intervening in a resolute manner and planning action on a continental scale.

Thus from the international standpoint, defending Cuba means making the revolution in each and every one of the Latin-American countries and struggling to drive out imperialism and liquidate capitalism starting in one's own country. We Bolivian Trotskyists want to do in Bolivia what the Fidelista leadership did in Cuba—construct our Bolivian workers state, our workers and peasants government. The Trotskyists in other countries have the same attitude. We understand that the defeat of capitalism in any one of the Latin-American countries will be the best assistance to the Cuban revolution. It is not speeches, compromises and cheap adulatory literature which will save Cuba. We Trotskyists oppose the opportunists and charlatans who maintain that the revolution is a good thing for Cuba and support it within the confines of that island but hold that it is not a good thing for Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, etc. The Stalinists seek to set up committees to support Cuba in which even the national exploiters are permitted to enter, instead of organizing revolutionary action by the masses, thereby losing the revolution's socialist perspective.

The defense of Cuba internationally demands an energetic attitude of taking the conquests of socialism to the masses. As the decisive step toward the triumph of the world socialist revolution, the influence of the Cuban revolution must be extended to the workers of the imperialist centers, primarily the U.S., to sap the foundations of imperialism and prepare its rapid collapse.

The best defense of socialist Cuba is audacious, resolute revolutionary struggle.
George Novack

RADICAL INTELLECTUALS

IN THE 1930s

(Text of speech to Socialist Scholars Conference, N. Y., Sept. 1967)

It befits a convocation of socialist scholars in the 1960s to concern itself with the radical intellectuals of thirty years ago. Their behavior through a period of storm and stress is highly instructive to all students of this mercurial segment of American society. But we have closer ties with them. The Left intellectuals had the most widespread antagonism to capitalism and intense attachment to revolutionary socialism during the thirties. Although these attitudes did not endure, that decade forms the most important part of our heritage from the past. If the present resurgent radicalism can learn what its precursors did that was admirable and worth emulating, and where they went astray, it should benefit greatly from the lessons of that experience.

Historical determinism does not nowadays enjoy the vogue it had at the height of the thirties. Yet the record is plain that from the twenties to the forties the majority of anticapitalist intellectuals passed through three phases which were marked out by the mighty national and world events of the time. From the stock market crash to Hitler’s victory and Roosevelt’s assumption of office they were torn loose from their previous moorings and swung sharply to the left. From 1933 to the Spanish civil war and the Moscow trials they deepened their commitments and produced their initial differentiations. From 1937 through the crushing of the Spanish revolution, the Stalin-Hitler pact and the second world war they began the flight from radicalism which was consummated in the wholesale recanting characteristic of the cold war.

Each participant made his free choices at every point along this path of development. Some moved forward or backward faster and
farther than others. Nevertheless, the main line of march proceeded irresistibly from quarrelsome coexistence with the regime of big money before 1930 through a deepgoing opposition that wound up in eventual reconciliation with the status quo. Let us review the decisive steps in this process.

As American capitalism toboganed downhill until it hit bottom with the closing of all banks on March 4, 1933, the nation went into traumatic shock. The illusion of permanent prosperity had mesmerized all classes during the boom era. None of them, from the ruling rich to the working and nonworking poor, had any presentiment of the tornado that broke over their heads and bore down with increasing fury upon the population.

If the crisis caught the intellectuals unawares along with everyone else, the most aroused among them took the lead in asserting that American capitalism was undeserving of support or survival. From 1930 on they began to voice their dissidence, setting out on the quest for a reorientation that carried many of them far from their social, political and philosophical starting points.

In the main the vanguard intellectuals of the golden twenties had been more concerned with cultural and moral values than with social and political issues. Their criticisms and protests flowed largely through literary channels. Under Harding and Coolidge they were disposed to leave the direction of politics and economics to the possessors of power whom they could not hope to influence. Many decried democracy, socialism and politics in the supercilious accents of their popular mentor, H. L. Mencken—or else they munched upon the mild progressivism provided weekly by The Nation and New Republic. Not a few (my friends and I were like that) adopted both these contradictory stances.

The battering of the great depression dispelled that apathy and politicalized the outlook of the most aloof esthetes. The bohemians began a transit from Greenwich Village to Union Square. How could they—or anyone—be indifferent to a system that was creating so much havoc and misery and careening blindly toward the abyss?

Liberalism was the first ideological casualty of the awakening. This tranquillizing philosophy became insolvent along with thousands of businesses because its spokesmen had failed to foresee the catastrophe and were unable to explain its causes or cope effectively with its consequences. Its doctrines appeared more and more out of touch with the critical problems at hand.

In this emergency the leading liberals had to reconsider their attitudes toward American capitalism, bourgeois democracy and gradualism. Their stirrings can be traced in the shifts among the foremost figures around the New Republic. Early in 1931, its editors wrote a series of articles which mirrored the prevailing states of mind among discomfited liberals.

Edmund Wilson appealed to his fellow progressives to give up
their expectations of "salvation by the gradual and natural approximation to socialism" and urged them to become a militant minority actively struggling to attain socialism here and now. This was to be done quixotically, by "taking communism away from the communists." The seriousness of Wilson's determination was shown by his candid self-criticism, his resignation from the weekly's literary editorship when he could no longer agree with its policies, and the tour he took through the country to get firsthand knowledge of the effects of the crisis. His articles collected in *The American Jitters* vividly report the turmoil of the times.

Under the influence of "the Russian experiment" George Soule, an economist of the institutional school who spoke for the official center of the *New Republic*, transferred his hopes for regenerating America to the idea of national planning within a capitalist framework. What the Russians were achieving with their backward technology, he argued, we Americans can do far better with our advanced facilities. The production plant had been built; now it was urgent to "create a brain for our economy." Soule was to see this temporarily incarnated in the professorial brain trust of the New Deal's first phase.

John Dewey came forward to proclaim the bankruptcy of the old parties and call for the formation of a third "middle class" party on the LaFollette model. Thus, while the *New Republic*'s staff economist and its patron philosopher sought to amend traditional liberal positions, its most perceptive literary critic went further and repudiated them in favor of Marxism.

The aversion of the younger minds toward liberalism was given lively expression in John Chamberlain's postmortem of the Progressive movement entitled *Farewell to Reform*. This trend was accelerated by two other influential publications: Lincoln Steffens' *Autobiography* and *The Coming Struggle for Power* by the newly-converted British Communist, John Strachey. I remember going into the *New York Times* cubicle in February 1933 where Chamberlain, its daily reviewer, was annotating Strachey's book for an article that week. "This is remarkably convincing in its logic," he told me. And so it proved for thousands like us.

The strength of the leftward sweep was coupled with the feebleness of right-wing opinion. Except for a spasm of excitement around the academic Tory Humanism of Professors Babbitt and More, the nostalgia for the plantation past on the part of the Southern agrarian writers, and the isolated outright fascism of Lawrence Dennis, reactionary views found few adherents after Hoover's debacle.

While the liberal luminaries were edging a few degrees to the left, the bulk of the radicalized intellectuals was moving much faster and farther in that direction. Along that road they passed by the Socialist Party without stopping. It had nothing to offer them. Since the 1921 split, the American Socialists, dominated by the old guard, had been drained of political and intellectual vitality. Despite the personal ap-
peal of its standardbearer, Norman Thomas, his party had all the defects, without the mass base, of the European Social Democracy.

The Communist movement was the unchallenged center of attraction—and for good reasons. It bore aloft the red banner of the October Revolution; it was the official representative of the Soviet regime; it claimed Lenin, his International and its program for its own. The starry-eyed saw a promised paradise in the land of the five-year plans; the more realistic were impressed by the achievements of a planned economy operated on the foundation of nationalized property which was successfully propelling a backward country forward and eliminating unemployment in contrast with capitalism's creeping paralysis. They regarded the Communist International as the leader of the world revolution and the Soviet government as the most reliable bulwark against fascism, war and reaction. The dedicated energy of the Communist cadres in organizing the unemployed, fighting the Herndon, Scottsboro and other cases, and plunging into the industrial union drive after 1935, seemed to vindicate the party's claim to be the champion of the oppressed and vanguard of the working class.

Few of these intellectual newcomers had been acquainted with the labor movement and Marxist thought or knew anything about the history and controversies of international Communism. They were mostly middleclass individuals with a social conscience that was swiftly being transformed into a socialist consciousness. These political fledglings were at the mercy of the Communist Party in which they reposed unlimited trust.

Paradoxically, after the first shocks, the depression lifted a heavy burden from these intellectuals. Their earlier iconoclasm and cynicism were replaced by the splendid vision of a new world in the making. For the first time since the Civil War, revolution acquired an actuality for the American people and, most of all, for the Left intellectuals who welcomed what others feared or were more hesitant to accept. In addition to acting as a cultural vanguard, they now envisaged a grander role for themselves as revolutionary critics and reconstructors of society. Socialism pointed the way out of the encircling gloom and immensely broadened their sympathies and horizons.

They were convinced that capitalism was on its deathbed. This breeder of injustice, poverty, misery, unemployment, war and fascism could no longer even keep itself going. Its abolition would give birth in this country, as it was doing in Russia, to a new society of human solidarity, peace and abundance. The counter-power delegated to do that job, Marxism taught, was the industrial proletariat; the method was revolutionary mass action. And, as part of the Third International, the CP was predestined to organize and lead the American masses to that overthrow.

Although existentialism had not yet appeared to rationalize their agonies, the intellectuals of the twenties had also been troubled by
the egotism and alienations of bourgeois existence. Now these were being overcome by a gratifying sense of comradeship with the mass of workers who possessed the potential power and needed only the will, knowledge and organization to rise up, dislodge the capitalist masters, and bring a better world to birth. By merging their lives with such a creative social and political force they gained purpose, integration, dignity and rationality in an otherwise anarchic madhouse.

Although such expansive optimism over the prospects of revolution gave way to more somber moods as fascism spread and another world war loomed, it actuated the radical intellectuals throughout those years. The lofty hopes deposited in this outlook likewise accounts for their inconsolable bitterness once they found or felt that they had been manipulated, deceived, betrayed and sold out.

Most of these rebels did not embrace the cause of proletarian revolution primarily through careful weighing of theoretical alternatives. Unlike the emergent radicalism of the sixties their discontent had direct economic sources. Many came to Communism as victims of the world crisis, cast out of jobs or faced with dim career prospects. Capitalism was no longer working for them or fundamentally workable; Soviet Communism seemed the only realistic replacement.

There was nothing wrong in adopting socialism on such empirical grounds provided the movement of their new allegiance could give the relocated intellectuals a sound theoretical education, a correct program and honest leadership which would permanently advance the best of them to higher plateaus of understanding and activity.

At this juncture the contradictory development of world communism set a terrible trap for the unwary radicals. They sincerely believed they were absorbing the ideas of Marxism and the program of Lenin's Bolshevism. Actually they were being indoctrinated with the precepts and practices of the Stalinized bureaucratic caste which had taken over the Soviet Union and the Third International after crushing the Leninist Left Opposition. By the close of the decade elements of this truth were disclosed to many of them. But at its beginning the pro-Communist neophytes had no more premonition of this calamity than they had of the collapse of American capitalism.

They zealously dove into activity, taking responsible posts in labor defense, propaganda and cultural work. They went to Kentucky to help the Harlan miners; sent delegations to Washington protesting the shooting of the bonus marchers; covered strikes and unemployed demonstrations for the radical press.

The first period of their participation was crowned by the manifesto *Culture and the Crisis*, issued by the League of Professional Groups for Foster and Ford in the fall of 1932 and signed by fifty-three prominent writers, artists, and educators, including Theodore Dreiser, Sherwood Anderson, Edmund Wilson, Waldo Frank, Sidney Hook, Malcolm Cowley and Granville Hicks. Every line
flamed with revolutionary passion. The declaration rejected capitalism forever, breathed confidence in the CP and contempt for the reformist SP, and called for the overthrow of the system through "the conquest of political power and the establishment of a workers' and farmers' government which will usher in the Socialist Commonwealth."

Never before or since have American intellectuals displayed more faith in the socialist future or the revolutionary capacities of the working class. Their certitudes stand in sharp contrast with the doubts on these points pervading the New Left today.

Not one of the drafters of that pamphlet remained with the CP three years later. Here is one reason: Stalin's foreign policy veered from one extreme to another during the decade, making twists and turns that greatly befuddled his followers. From 1929 to 1935, in accord with the Comintern's mandate, the CP embarked on an ultra-left course. It branded all other labor tendencies as "social-fascist," applied the united front in a divisive manner only "from below," and, long before the workers were ready, proclaimed that the time had come to storm the barricades. Knowing no better, most radicals mistook this declamatory adventurism for Leninism.

The delirium reached its climax in February 1934 when a Stalinist squad, led by Daily Worker editor Clarence Hathaway, threw chairs and broke up a Madison Square Garden meeting held by the Socialists and garment unions to demonstrate solidarity with the Austrian workers shot down by the Dollfuss reaction. This shameful violence called forth a letter of protest from 25 intellectuals headed by previous supporters of Foster and Ford.

Justifying the action, the New Masses editors replied: "If a leadership obstructs the natural gravity of the masses toward unity, there seems to be only one solution: to attempt to throw the masses together, despite the saboteurs on top . . . This the Communist Party tried to do at Madison Square Garden."

The tactic didn't throw any masses together. But it did tear the first sizeable segment of dissident intellectuals from the CP orbit. Since I was involved in that development from the beginning, some personal reminiscences may cast light on it.

My evolution was in many respects typical of other idealistic college students who entered the socialist movement at the start of the thirties. It paralleled the path of Granville Hicks, for example. After five years at Harvard, I migrated from Boston in 1927 to make a career in New York's publishing business where I worked in the advertising departments of Doubleday and Dutton. The 1929 crash converted me from a Nation-New Republic devotee, who cast his first—and last—vote for a Democratic president in 1928, into a Marxist revolutionary.

I belonged to a group that was acidly satirized at the time by Tess Schlesinger in her recently republished novel, The Unpossessed.
Among its members were such aspiring and talented writers, critics and educators as Clifton Fadiman, Sidney Hook, Lionel and Diana Trilling, Meyer Schapiro, Louis Hacker, Elliot Cohen, Herbert So­low, Felix Morrow and others of lesser repute. Most of them had come out of Columbia and contributed to the Menorah Journal (the predecessor of Commentary) and the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.

This coterie was drawn toward the CP, although few took out party cards. In the early thirties they concentrated on defense work and journalistic assignments and became the builders of an adjunct of the International Labor Defense, the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners, whose literary notables ranged from Dos Passos, Dreiser and Anderson to Lewis Mumford and Waldo Frank. Together with James Rorty, they wrote the manifesto of the supporters of Foster and Ford and canvassed the signatures for it.

We also spearheaded the first contingent of newly hatched radicals to come into conflict with the Communist high command. During 1932 and 1933 we objected to the blind factionalism which refused to aid victimized followers of other working-class groups on the false premise that all political adversaries of the CP were ipso facto "social fascists." I remember one stormy meeting at the Manhattan apartment of Ella Winter, the wife of Lincoln Steffens, where William Patterson, ILD national secretary, told us that IWW organizers, thrown into jail with Communist organizers of the National Miners Union in Harlan, Kentucky, could not be supported because "objectively they were agents of the class enemy." Dos Passos, who had just come back from that embattled area, expostulated: "But, Com­rade Patterson, objectively they are class war prisoners in jail!" Such encounters prepared the transformation of the libertarian nove­list into a conservative Republican.

The major source of disagreement arose from our opposition to the Communist line in Germany which, by rejecting united anti­fascist action with Social Democratic organizations, had helped the brown shirts come to power. We were assailed at meetings as "Trotskyist disrupters" and forced to resign from the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners. If we wished to stay in radical politics, we faced three options: to affiliate with the Lovestone group, the American Workers Party of A. J. Muste, or the Trotskyists. None chose Lovestone; some of us adhered to Trotskyism, while Hook, Rorty and others went with the Musteites. Early in 1934 both branches collaborated in the fusion of these two.

This group made up the hard core of the anti-Stalinist intellectuals for the rest of the decade. They formed the backbone of the American Committee for the Defense of Leon Trotsky, on which I served as national secretary in its campaign against Stalin's frame-ups. They wrote for the Partisan Review after it cut loose from the CP. They collaborated in varying degrees and for different spans of time with
American Trotskyism and then, with the onset of the second world war or soon thereafter, turned away altogether from the socialist revolution. They transmuted their anti-Stalinism into anti-Communism and anti-Marxism, readjusted their ideas and lives to the established order, and contributed their quotas to the ideological virulence of the cold war. I am the sole survivor of that band currently active in revolutionary politics.

The rupture of this group did not diminish Communist predominance since the party kept recruiting fresh adherents in all sectors of radical activity. As Mary McCarthy testified about her attitude in the mid-thirties: "The CP was the only party." That held true for over 90 per cent of her intellectual associates. At the writers' colony of Yaddo in the summer of 1934, where James T. Farrell was finishing the final volume of *Studs Lonigan*, I was a lone oppositionist amidst thirteen Communist members or sympathizers.

Obedient to the Seventh Comintern Congress in July-August 1935, the CP switched to the people's front line which, except for its rhetoric, projected a policy substantially the same as left liberalism while the SP was becoming more militant. Finally, at the close of the decade, after the Soviet-Nazi pact, the CP briefly reverted to its earlier anticapitalist intransigence. This was abruptly terminated as soon as Hitler's armies invaded the Soviet Union.

How the mentality of that generation was warped and confused by the gyrations of the counterfeit Marxism of the CP may be gauged by the opposing appraisals of the Roosevelt regime given by the Stalinist leadership from 1934 to 1944. First, Earl Browder's report to his central committee in April 1934: "Roosevelt's program is the same as that of finance capital the world over. It is a program of hunger, fascization and imperialist war... The New Deal is not developed fascism. But in political essence and direction it is the same as Hitler's program."

By 1938 the General Secretary was acclaiming the alliance with Roosevelt as follows: "With all its weaknesses and inadequacies, its hesitations and confusions, the New Deal wing under the Roosevelt leadership is an essential part of the developing democratic front against monopoly capital."

Browder's 1940 election platform sang a different tune. "The Democratic Party is the party of Roosevelt and Dies, of the Garners and Woodrums, of the du Ponts and Cromwells, of the Boss Hagues and Kelleys, of Tammany and the KKK. It is the party of 'liberal' promises and reactionary deeds... Both parties are war parties, M-Day parties, parties of imperialism, reaction and hunger."

By 1944 Browder announced to the CP national committee: "We know, as we go into it boldly... that the Teheran Declaration which was signed by Churchill, Roosevelt and the great Marxist Stalin represents the only program in the interest of the toiling masses of the whole world in the next period." Irony is virtually
disarmed before such prescient and mutually destroying judgments.

John Chamberlain had bid farewell to reform much too soon for his contemporaries. The vaunted "Roosevelt Revolution" slowed down the leftward momentum and deflected a stream of radicals into the federal apparatus. This was the first time in the century — though not the last — that the White House courted compliant intellectuals. Their faith in the vitality of American capitalism revived with the economic upturn and the President's assurances that his heart throbbed for "the forgotten man." Were they not also among the forgotten?

Such liberals were joined by Stalinists eager to implement the people's front with the chief of the "progressive, peace-loving bourgeoisie." How alluring the New Deal became for those zealous Communists who, as cogs in the Democratic administration, could be anti-fascist fighters, defend the cause of labor, promote the aims of the CP and the Soviet Union, and pursue a government career at a good salary — all in one wondrous package!

At the same time, Communist students and intellectuals inspired by more worthy objectives went to fight and die with the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Spain, manned the picket lines which created the new industrial unionism, and led militant campus actions.

New Deal reformism did not extend much beyond the 1937 recession when it changed over into a war deal as the urgency of domestic rehabilitation was displaced by plans for worldwide combat. Despite Roosevelt's invectives against the economic royalists, princes of privilege and merchants of death, they came back stronger and more arrogant than ever.

The Moscow Trials from 1936 to 1938 convulsed the entire Left. Stalin's frame-ups and executions of the old Bolsheviks posed acute problems of conscience to friends of the Soviet Union as they confronted the puzzling circumstances of the trials and were compelled to take a stand on them. Passions flared to fever pitch because these tragic events were staged amidst the Spanish Civil War. How were anti-fascists to remain loyal to the Republican side if the justice of its sole government ally was questionable or to be condemned?

The torment afflicting such individuals was articulated by Waldo Frank who complained to Trotsky: "It is difficult for me to believe that you entered into an alliance with fascism; but it is equally difficult for me to believe that Stalin carried out such horrible frame-ups."

The furor around the trials split American intellectuals into fiercely opposed camps. Edmund Wilson observed in an article on "The Literary Left" early in 1937 that "one of the worst drawbacks of being a Stalinist at the present time is that you have to defend so many falsehoods." The findings of the Dewey Commission later that year further undermined trust in the Communist cause and detached important figures from it, among them the Partisan Review editors, Rahv and Phillips.

There was no lack of volunteers to uphold the trials against our
efforts to expose them. Under the spell of the popular front and the
demagogic promises of democratization in Stalin's 1936 constitu-
tion, both the Nation and New Republic decried the Dewey Com-
mission investigation. An open letter from 150 intellectuals affirmed
the guilt of the defendants and advised that "the preservation of
progressive democracy" demanded that Stalin's crimes be ratified.
Many signers came to regret their endorsement.

The difficulties of maintaining a periodical of Marxist theory which
included all the Left currents of thought in the mid-thirties was de-
monstrated by the brief career of the Marxist Quarterly. This maga-
zeine, almost wholly subsidized by Corliss Lamont, was organized
during 1936 by a coalition of prominent intellectuals representing
the Lovestonites, the Trotskyists, left-wing Socialists and some inde-
pendent figures who inclined to one or another of these tendencies.

It was ostensibly to be a publication open to all shades of socialist
scholarship and opinion. The Communists were formally offered a
seat on its editorial board but refused to accept. Their declination
was no surprise to those sponsors who were well aware that Stal-
inists would have nothing to do with those they castigated as "agents
of the class enemy."

On the editorial board were Louis Hacker, James Burnham, Ber-
tram D. Wolfe, Sterling Spero, Meyer Schapiro, Herbert Zam, William
Henson and myself. The influential economist Lewis Corey was
managing editor and the historian Louis Hacker its publisher.

The first issue came out early in 1937. No sooner had it appeared
than the second of the Moscow Trials was staged and the furor
around them and the Dewey Commission of Inquiry reached fever
pitch. This split the board down the middle. The Trotskyists (Burn-
ham and I) and Zam resigned. That left the Lovestone grouping
together with Lamont. However, when the idol of the Lovestonites,
Bukharin, was indicted, they finally recognized the frame-up char-
acter of the trials. Meanwhile Corliss Lamont, as chairman of the
Friends of the Soviet Union, was zealously defending them. These
developments gave the coup de grace to the Marxist Quarterly.

Lamont withdrew his financial support in August 1937 on the
ground that events in the Soviet Union and Spain "had had such
serious repercussions everywhere in the radical movement that the
quarterly could not help but be affected." In a letter to Corey, he
stated that, while he did not mind a critical attitude toward the Soviet
Union, the remaining editors manifested an attitude of such complete
hostility that he could no longer continue his subsidy.

Corey blamed the Trotskyists for the breakup of the publishing
venture. However, it was shattered, as Lamont indicated, by the
hammer blows of the great political events abroad. The irrecon-
cilable dissension that brought about the demise of the Marxist
Quarterly proved three things: 1. the practical impossibility of over-
coming the conflicts dividing the radical movement and keeping together under one roof a heterogeneous coalition of Left views; 2. the importance of international events in determining the direction and shaping the development of American radicalism; 3. the extremely narrow margin of operation left open for radical intellectuals unaffiliated with any of the contending major groupings on the Left.

The disillusionment flowing from the blood purges rose to tidal proportions when the Hitler-Stalin pact raised the curtain on the second world war. Granville Hicks and Malcolm Cowley led the legion of fellow travelers who renounced both the CP and Marxism. This retreat swept all sectors of the Left from the sympathizers with the Trotskyists to the Lovestone group which obligingly dissolved itself.

As the vision of proletarian revolution went into eclipse behind the war shadows, the journey back to bourgeois democracy quickened into a stampede. The radicalism of the thirties was finally swamped by the superpatriotic fervor which was abetted by the CP's all-out support for the war.

Protest against the conventions of Babbitry had keynoted vanguard culture in the prosperous twenties. It was ironic that the cultural field during the turbulent thirties should have been overcast by an opposite type of conformism, emanating from advocates of the theory of proletarian culture. Stalin had saddled this misbegotten conception of the relations between the revolutionary movement and artistic creativity upon international Communism after Lenin had rejected it as sectarian and nonmarxist in the early years of the Russian Revolution.

While the proletcult partisans did well to direct attention to the dispossessed and their struggles, they quelled that free experimentation which is the wellspring of originality, freshness and advancement in the arts, by setting up arbitrary models for imitation. Artistic merits and criteria were subordinated to political orthodoxy. Writers were told to fit their works to the prescriptions of an indefinable socialist realism enforced by party pundits. The sterile, inconclusive debates over the meaning of proletarian culture caused considerable confusion in Left literary circles and deformed the development of some promising writers.

Through its sympathizers Stalinist ideas exerted heavy influence in publishing, literary, journalistic, radio, Broadway and Hollywood precincts as well as on Federal Writers' Theater and Art projects. When the popular front was proclaimed, party surveillance over the cultural front did not end. The criteria of official approval were simply brought into accord with the changed political requirements. Whereas previously writers had to portray characters and situations in ultra-revolutionary ways on penalty of being stigmatized as petty-bourgeois or fascist-minded, now they needed only say hurrah for
democracy and refrain from public criticism of the CP to be praised. Thus Archibald MacLeish, Ernest Hemingway and Sinclair Lewis were recast from villains to heroes of the popular front.

Under the Stalinist cultural patrol it would not have been possible to hold a gathering of radical intellectuals as broadly representative as this Socialist Scholars Conference. The nearest facsimiles were the three congresses of the League of American Writers whose first chairman, Waldo Frank, was replaced in that post for questioning Moscow's justice during the purge trials.

Despite the meagerness of Marxist resources on American soil, Communist theoreticians of that period should have made useful pioneering studies in history, sociology, philosophy, economics and other fields of particular interest to socialism. No such contributions survive. The few valuable initiatives in the social sciences were undertaken by scholars outside the Stalinist ranks like Lewis Corey, Louis Hacker and Sidney Hook before they departed from Marxism.

In considering the evolution of the intellectuals Edmund Wilson's case is especially significant. After coming over to Marxism about 1931, he devoted the remainder of the decade to a study of historical materialism. His views on the development of socialist thought finally appeared in 1940. In his review of this estimable work in October of that year Malcolm Cowley pointed out that the title *To the Finland Station* was misleading in the light of Wilson's serious reservations about Leninism and Marxist philosophy.

"*To the Finland Station* is not a book that Wilson would undertake to write in 1940," he remarked. "The question that probably concerns him today, and certainly concerns the rest of us, is not the evolution of communism up to Lenin, but its devolution in the writings and acts of his successors. How was it that the almost selfless revolutionaries of Lenin's day were transformed into (or executed and replaced by) the present Soviet and Comintern officials, the timid and inefficient bureaucrats, the ferocious pedants, the finaglers, the fanatics and the party hacks . . . Where did the original weakness lie—in Lenin, in Marx himself, or in the applications of Marx's and Lenin's theories by people who lacked their singleness of purpose and their genius? The book we should like to read today is one that would try to answer these questions."

The book Cowley asked for had already been written before the Moscow Trials. The author was their principal defendant, Leon Trotsky, and it is called *The Revolution Betrayed*. However, Cowley and his fellows who were galloping "away from the Finland Station" were disinclined to find the Marxist conclusions of Trotsky's work convincing. The imperialist democracy, rearming for a second world slaughter, had again become irresistibly persuasive.

"The Red Decade" is depicted by ultra-rightists as an ugly spectacle of subversion rampant. More benevolent judges liken its errant intellectuals to disappointed prospectors who staked a claim on Utopia,
turned up fool's gold, and then, as Auden phrased it, "the clever hopes expired of a low dishonest decade." Was the ardent revolutionary faith of that time an anomaly which cannot recur, thanks to an increasingly affluent welfare state safeguarded by the controls of the "New Economics?"

If, as many here believe, socialism has a future in these United States and Marxism retains its validity, the vicissitudes of that eventful stage in the development of our middle class radicals have to be differently evaluated.

Ideologically and politically, the American Left intellectuals of the thirties lagged far behind their European counterparts who had assimilated Marxist ideas decades before. The crisis spurred them to catch up in a hurry and they did their best with the equipment at their disposal. However, in this first large-scale exposure to socialist thought and communist influences, they had the misfortune of receiving them through the dogmatic, falsified and malignant forms of the Stalinist school. Most radicals proved unable to decipher the enigmatic nature of the extremely contradictory bureaucratic reaction which had fastened itself upon the first postcapitalist state.

The failure to distinguish between authentic Marxism and its defilers and distorters produced profound theoretical and political disorientation among them. Their relapse, prompted by disillusionment with Stalinism, was reinforced by the most powerful factors in the immediate environment: a restabilized American capitalism which entered upon an unparalleled boom, a bureaucratized and conservatized labor movement, and fearful cold war pressures.

These circumstances thrust the intellectual radicals into an excruciating bind. They were called on to remain true to revolutionary socialist perspectives first during a political reformation of American capitalism and then through its prolonged postwar expansion. A larger saving remnant could have stood fast only with firm moral and political backing from an incorruptible revolutionary organization able to adjust itself to the ebbs and flows of the class struggle.

In recent recollections of the thirties Partisan Review editor William Phillips stated: "If the Communist Party had been a genuinely democratic and revolutionary party . . . I think most intellectuals would still be supporting" it. Instead, their contacts and collisions with Stalinized communism sapped their convictions and hastened their reversion to the democracy of big business.

Many claim that the thirties once for all demonstrated the irrelevance of Marx's and Lenin's teachings to America. That contention would be more plausible if the major political forces on the Left had really propagated and practiced their ideas. But the experience certainly testifies to the bankruptcy of Stalinism as a dependable guide to socialism. If this single lesson is assimilated in its full implications by the oncoming generation of radicals, the ordeals of the thirties will not have been endured in vain.
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On May 23, 1944, John Maynard Keynes rose in the British House of Lords to defend the sweeping changes in international monetary policies just concluded by the allied capitalist powers in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire.

"Was it not I," Keynes asked, "when many of today's iconoclasts were still worshippers of the Calf, who wrote that 'Gold is a barbarous relic'? Am I so faithless, so forgetful, so senile that, at the very moment of the triumph of these ideas, when with gathering momentum, Governments, Parliaments, banks, the Press, the public, and even economists have accepted the new doctrines, I go off to help forge new chains to hold us fast in the old dungeon? I trust, my Lords, that you will not believe it."

Keynes had advocated the adoption of an international currency to take the place of gold in world trade. Although no such currency had been adopted at Bretton Woods, Keynes believed steps had been taken which released international capitalism from the gold standard for all practical purposes. There was no longer a fixed external gold exchange rate to which internal rates were tied. A nation's domestic manipulation of interest rates would not necessarily affect the rate of exchange of its currency in the international market. This would free governments to follow Keynes' advice to prevent depressions through deficit spending: The inflations which this might incur would not be internationalized.

The dollar had taken the place of gold. The United States was obliged to exchange gold for dollars. Dollars were "as good as gold" in international trade. Washington—with its huge gold reserves—had agreed to undertake the role of stabilizing international finance.
Keynes was under no illusion that the United States agreed to these policies solely out of altruism. The dollar would gain a privileged position among currencies; and this would enable a rapid expansion of U.S. investment and trade. "Here," he argued, "we have a voluntary undertaking, genuinely offered in the spirit of a good neighbor and, I should add, of enlightened self-interest, not to allow a repetition of a chain of events which between the wars did more than any other single factor to destroy the world's economic balance and to prepare a seed-bed for foul growths."

Britain must concur with the new policies because "In thus waging the war without counting the ultimate cost we—and we alone of the United Nations—have burdened ourselves with a weight of deferred indebtedness to other countries beneath which we shall stagger."

What has happened in the decades since, and where is international capitalism heading today?

The Modern Viewpoint

Almost a quarter of a century later, the central tenets of most bourgeois economists differ little from those Keynes expressed at the founding of the International Monetary Fund in 1944. A recent statement of these views appeared in an article entitled "Three Reasons for Prosperity" by Edwin L. Dale Jr. in the Nov. 7, 1967, New York Times Sunday magazine. Dale had just returned from the world monetary conference in Rio de Janeiro where steps were taken towards establishing an international currency of the type Keynes desired—SDRs, extending "Special Drawing Rights" to member nations on International Monetary Fund reserves.

The three reasons for a quarter of a century of capitalist prosperity, according to Dale, are the adoption of Keynesian policies to stimulate domestic growth, the expansion of world trade and the development of stable international finance: "Keynes showed that deficits—hitherto regarded as, by definition, inflationary and harmful—would not be inflationary if there were idle men, idle machines and idle savings in the economy, as there are in depression or even recession." Governments would supply the missing purchasing power in periods of economic downturn. "And, of course, the result has been, quite simply, the 'affluent society.'"

"The second direction of thrust of the men of vision of the early nineteen-forties was world trade." Recognizing the importance of expanded world trade, the major powers negotiated a series of agreements to reduce tariff barriers beginning in Geneva in 1947 and 1948. This was GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade) which concluded its sixth major round of negotiations in May, 1967, the "Kennedy Round."

The result of GATT "was an almost unbelievable expansion of world trade. Now running at the rate of $200 billion a year, world
exports have doubled in just the past eight years. This burgeoning of world trade has been an indispensable element in the prosperity of many nations and a major benefit to the prosperity of all of them."

Thirdly, the modern era of prosperity rests on the reforms concluded at Bretton Woods. "Stable exchange rates have been a major factor in the growth of trade, tourism and international investment. The industrial nations have dismantled most of their exchange controls and, when their balance of payments has run into deficit, they have often turned to the Monetary Fund for help to bolster their reserves."

Writers on economics like Dale recognize that three crucial interlocking elements of capitalist prosperity are domestic growth, international trade and international finance. Domestic growth provides a demand for goods which can be purchased at home and abroad. Open and expanded channels of trade stimulate domestic economies by providing foreign markets. And a stable system of international finance facilitates this process. If all is going well, an expanded world trade means that downturns in one nation can be softened by providing that nation with foreign markets.

"Thus," remarks the 1967 GATT report on 1966 world trade, "the slight recession that occurred in the United States in 1960-61 did not substantially affect the level of economic activity in the European countries and Japan. Similarly, despite the vigorous American expansion in 1965 and 1966, there was an appreciable deceleration of economic growth in Europe in these two years while Japan experienced a recession in 1965. . . . Peaks and troughs of economic activity have not coincided in the various industrial countries or areas." [Emphasis added.]

The last sentence is key. Bourgeois economists do not deny the necessity of expansion for the various national economies nor even that expansion leads to overproduction (necessitating "inventory liquidation," "layoffs," "production cutback," etc.) What they believe they have now achieved (at last!) is a "harmonized" world system in which such "recessions" cannot occur simultaneously. This being the case, many of the "New Economists" argue that the gold standard is an old fashioned fetish; protectionist measures are hangovers from the past. "Accompanying and contributing to the Depression," Dale writes, "was a state of chaos in the economic relations among nations. Country after country raised tariffs and obstacles against imports in the false belief that this would save jobs at home. Currencies were devalued in competitive fashion to win more exports, with the result of no gain for anyone. Nations imposed all sorts of controls over the use by their citizens of their money to purchase foreign currencies; exchange controls reinforced trade barriers choking off world trade."

Three weeks after these words were printed, Britain devalued the pound. This provoked an unprecedented speculation in gold which
was followed in less than two months by Johnson's restrictions on U.S. investment, his appeal to cut down tourism, and his recommendation to remove the gold cover on the dollar. At the same time, West Germany erected "border taxes" against imports with special tax privileges for German exporters and Johnson declared he would ask Congress for similar measures to protect U.S. trade. Jan. 8, the same Dale wrote an article for the _New York Times_ in a somewhat different vein entitled "Fight for the Dollar Is On, And the End Is Not in Sight."

Post World War Realities

What these fashionable bourgeois economic theories tend to obscure is that the mainspring of world capitalist development is precisely the "enlightened self-interest" of national capitals. Although this self-interest sometimes harmonizes with international development, the totality of its fundamental direction contradicts it. Only for a limited time can world capitalism as a whole expand in a fashion primarily consistent with the special interests of all capitalist nations. That has been the underlying dynamic of the postwar period.

But this expansion must reach a point where the latent contradictions emerge; and at that time world economics becomes dominated not so much by the temporary convergence of capitalist interests as by their antagonisms. Such a turn has been taking place in the last few years. Britain's devaluation, the attack on the dollar and a marked slowdown in the growth of world trade are among its first signs. It foreshadows the eventuality dreaded by the GATT authors cited above: the occurrence of mutually reinforcing recessions concurrently among capitalist powers.

To the description of postwar capitalist reforms given by Dale, Marxists would add that there were concrete reasons for these reforms and that the subsequent evolution of world capitalism cannot be divorced from these reasons. In a brief analysis of this evolution, these three main factors would have to be taken into consideration: the overwhelming economic and military superiority of the United States, allowing its imperialist interests and aspirations to undergo an unprecedented expansion of investment and control; the correspondingly subordinate position of European and Japanese capitalisms bankrupted and devastated by the war; and the frightening specter world capitalism shared of potential revolutions unlocked by depression and world war now to be confronted by a combination of economic reforms and military repression. It is in the third category that the creation of the International Monetary Fund, GATT, the Marshall Plan and new policies of gradual inflation belong; but so do NATO, CENTO, and SEATO—the military occupation of an unstable Europe and the colonial peripheries of world imperialism.

The economic superiority of the United States following the second
world war needs little recapitulation. In 1945, U.S. gold reserves were over $20 billion and amounted to more than two-thirds of world reserves. The total gold and dollar deficit of European countries owed to the United States was over $8 billion in 1947, the year before Marshall Plan aid began. In the same year, European exports to North America were 14 per cent of their imports from North America. Under the Marshall Plan, Washington extended some $13 billion in direct state to state aid (1948-52) and in 1953, U.S. gross national product was still more than twice as high as the combined GNPs of France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Britain and Japan.

The American colossus towered over the war-wrecked capitalisms of continental Europe, Japan and Britain. These nations were heavily indebted for the costs of the war to Washington. Except for Britain, much of their basic industry had been destroyed; again except for Britain, their working classes had been uprooted and dislocated. In all of the European countries workers were disorganized and misled by the Stalinist and Social Democratic bureaucracies which coupled their wartime policies of support to imperialism and suppression of revolution with postwar policies of reviving capitalism and, in some cases, taking political leadership of the capitalist states. Average hourly wages for these countries in 1950 compared to the United States stood at: United Kingdom, 26 per cent; Germany, 22 per cent; France, 21 per cent; Italy, 20 per cent; and Japan, 7 per cent.

The European arena was consequently most favorable for capitalist expansion: Immense destruction of capital values drastically lowered the organic composition of capital and increased the rate of potential profit. The dislocation of the labor market, high postwar unemployment and the population flux, primarily from East to West Germany, exerted a strong downward pressure on wages, again increasing the potential rate of profit. A European expansion, pruned by U.S. direct aid and investment, could be founded on the destruction caused by world war. And such an expansion coincided with the interests of world capitalism as a whole.

It is necessary to remember that the economic might of the United States in the immediate and later postwar period was not without its contradictory aspects. In comparison with Europe, there was far less change in the structure of capital. A capital spending boom was possible because industries had been run down by the war and the previous depression and the war itself had produced great technological advances, but this was not the same as building on ashes.

Consequently, the American economy swelled rapidly and already in 1949 it entered a recession caused by the classical contradictions of capital accumulation: near to full employment; rising labor costs; shrinking profit rates and overproduction.

Washington's rulers recognized that the expansion of world trade was a necessity to prevent domestic recession. The creation of the International Monetary Fund, GATT, the Marshall Plan, cut both
ways. It stabilized Europe but did so to provide needed outlets for U.S. goods and investment. The European boom cannot be separated from the flooding of European markets with U.S. capital goods and the great expansion of U.S. investment and control.

Enlightened Prosperity

The long postwar prosperity was founded on initially harmonized but fundamentally conflicting international interests. A statistical review of the main components of this prosperity—the expansion of domestic and world trade—elucidates these aspects. And it reveals that the strengths and weaknesses of the objective situations for various capitalist countries at the outset of the expansion were steadily altered as the expansion developed.

The period of 1953 to 1966 saw high domestic growth rates for all the capitalist powers, but for those European powers and Japan building on the destruction of war, they were higher and less interrupted by periodic overproduction cycles. In terms of real GNP, that is, gross national product at constant prices, the capitalist powers marked these average growth rates per year: United States (with decreases in 1954, 1957 and 1958 and no advance in 1956 and 1961), 2 per cent; United Kingdom (with no advance in 1956), 2.5 per cent; Italy, 4.5 per cent; France, 5 per cent; the Benelux nations (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands), 5.5 per cent; Germany, 6 per cent; and Japan, 9 per cent. *

The growth of world exports is even more revealing in showing the disparity between the United States and Britain on one hand and continental Europe and Japan on the other. Total world exports at current prices marked an average annual growth of 7 per cent between 1953 and 1966, reaching $181.4 billion in the latter year. Compared to total world-trade growth, the rates of the major powers were: United States (with decreases in 1954, 1958 and 1959), 5 per cent; United Kingdom (with a decrease in 1958), 5 per cent; France (with a decrease in 1956), 8 per cent; the Benelux nations (with a decrease in 1958), 9 per cent; Germany, 12 per cent; and Japan, 17 per cent.

It should be noted that the share of total world trade of the major capitalist powers listed here increased over the postwar period as a percentage of total trade. That is, the major powers accounted for a greater share of world exports in 1966 (59 per cent) than they did in 1953 (51 per cent). The far reaching implications of this statistic are well-known to the peoples of the underdeveloped world: More and more, world trade is dominated by the imperialist powers to the detriment of the less-developed nations. And export prices of the "Third World" lag behind those of the "First World."

* Unless otherwise noted, the statistics in this article are based on the standard references listed in the bibliography.
In part, the discrepancies in growth rates between continental Europe and Japan, and the United States and Britain, are accounted for by the factors already mentioned. Europe and Japan not only had farther to go in rebuilding basic industry; they could begin at a higher level. Industries reconstructed following the war could take advantage of the technological discoveries in the computerization of world warfare. Bemoaning this fact in its issue following Wilson's devaluation, *The Economist* remarked, "When the pattern of world exchange rates was last fixed in 1949, America and Britain were the only two leading industrial nations whose economies were not still largely war-destroyed. It was obvious that in the next 18 years the war-destroyed countries would be strengthened economically relative to Britain and America; and some people will say that last weekend Britain, at least, recognized at last that the proper market recognition of this was that their relative exchange rates needed to be strengthened too." Statistics support the value of "war-destroyed" economies to capitalist expansion.

Within the world-trade category of manufacturing exports (excluding, in other words, agricultural, raw materials and basic fuel exports), the qualitative advance of Germany and Japan over Britain and the United States is remarkable indeed. Between 1953 and 1964, manufacturing production in constant prices increased at the following averages for these four nations: United States (with a decrease in 1955), 2.75 per cent; United Kingdom (with decreases in 1955, 1956 and no advances in 1961 and 1962), 3.5 per cent; Germany, 9 per cent; and Japan (with a decrease in 1958), 14 per cent.

But increases in exports of manufacturing goods at constant prices were: United States (with decreases in 1954, 1958, 1959 and 1961), 1.6 per cent; United Kingdom (with a decrease in 1958), 3.5 per cent; Germany, 16 per cent; and Japan, 20 per cent.

Nevertheless, the rapid advances in manufacturing production and exports of Germany and Japan cannot be wholly or perhaps even mainly attributed to structural advantages. Equally important, certainly for Germany and the European powers, was the development of the European Economic Community—EEC, or "Common Market," which was founded in 1958 and whose internal tariff reductions became applicable beginning in 1959 and 1960.

The Common Market was the first major break in the harmonization of postwar trade development. It recognized that the productive capacities of the European powers had already expanded to the point where they burst the national boundaries among them. Tariffs in manufacturing goods were reduced between Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, immediately expanding the markets available to each. At the same time, provisions were made for the "importation" of labor from less-developed regions of Europe to the more advanced in order to supply the labor force that could be absorbed by the expanded industrial production. And
to a certain extent these nations pooled technological information to compete with the productive monopolies of the United States.

Some of the important results of the Common Market formation can be indicated after eight years of development. In the first place, it permitted a large advance in trade between the EEC nations themselves coupled with a significant integration of the markets of the ECC powers. The jump in trade between the EEC nations is a major factor in the total growth of postwar trade. In 1953 the EEC share of total world exports was 19 per cent, leaping to 29 per cent in 1966. Corresponding figures for the United States are 21 per cent, falling to 17 per cent; United Kingdom, 10 per cent, falling to 8 per cent; Japan, 2 per cent, rising to 5 per cent.

The integration of Common Market trade is clearly illustrated in the following table from The Economist, May 14, 1966:

**TABLE ONE**

**INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE COMMON MARKET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exports to rest of the common market in 1965</th>
<th>Exports to common market as % of total, 1958</th>
<th>Exports to common market as % of total, 1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958=100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>41.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The establishment of the Common Market did not limit the exportation of member nations' goods solely to EEC nations even though it allowed this to advance greatly. In terms of competition between major powers, the EEC nations have advanced in the penetration of markets outside of the EEC at a faster rate than foreign goods have been able to penetrate the EEC. For example, EEC exports to the United States grew at an average annual rate of 11 per cent between 1958 and 1965 while U.S. exports to the EEC grew at a rate of 9 per cent. In 1956, U.S. exports represented 16 percent of the world exports to the EEC, but fell to 11 percent by the first half of 1966. In the same period, the EEC exports rose from 11 to 16 per cent of the world exports to the U.S.

This changing relationship of world-trade forces affected the United States monopoly on capital goods exports which appeared unchallengeable in the immediate postwar period. Capital goods exports still occupy a central place in U.S. exports and have risen most
rapidly in comparison to other U.S. exports in the past decade. This had been a favorite point made by spokesmen for special-interest groups in this country opposed to liberalizing tariff barriers under the Kennedy Round. Testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Apr. 5, 1967, O. R. Strackbein, chairman of the Nationwide Committee on Import-Export Policy, declared that whereas total U.S. exports increased 30 per cent between 1957 and 1965, exports of capital goods increased 60 per cent. Strackbein's point is that the truth about the competitive weakness of such U.S. industries as finished manufactures and textiles is disguised by the success of capital goods: "If machinery and chemical exports are excluded from our exports," he declared, "these increased only 13.3 per cent from 1957 to 1965 or an average of less than 2 per cent per year."

But even in capital goods, U.S. imports have risen considerably faster than exports. According to Strackbein, imports of capital goods increased 172 per cent in the 1957-65 period. So far as Europe is concerned, GATT figures reveal that EEC exports of capital goods to North America increased 217 per cent between 1962 and 1966 while North American exports of capital goods to EEC nations increased only 86 per cent. Today the European powers internally supply most of their capital-goods needs. The EEC import of capital goods may be largely attributable to the purchase of U.S. capital goods by foreign-based corporations. (Total EEC imports of capital goods in 1966 were $1.5 billion; U.S. firms in the EEC spent $1.3 billion on new plant and equipment.)

The growth of world trade and intra-EEC trade particularly spurred the rapid development of the Common Market powers and Japan. Whereas the total GNP of the United States stood at a ratio of 3.6 to 1 to the GNPs of these seven nations in 1953, the ratio in 1966 had been reduced to 2.2 to 1. In terms of real GNPs the drop would undoubtedly be greater because of the faster inflation rate in the United States than in the Common Market nations and Japan. Furthermore U.S. export figures tend to be distorted in such comparisons because some part of U.S. exports is always taken up by federally financed military aid and subsidized agricultural exports: The Jan. 27 New York Times reported that the U.S. trade surplus for 1967 of $4.1 billion included "some $3.5 billion of exports financed through the foreign aid and 'Food for Peace' programs. On pure commercial account, the surplus was well under $1 billion."

Nevertheless, international competition between capitalist powers does not only take the form of direct trade. The monetary measures adopted in the early forties were equally intended to ease the penetration of U.S. dollars into foreign capital markets. To a certain extent the growth of U.S. direct investment abroad serves to offset its declining competitive position in trade. At the same time—and perhaps more importantly—it serves to integrate the U.S. economy
more closely with the world capitalist economy in the same way as the Common Market agreements integrated the European economies both with each other, and with the world-trade markets.

It is well-known that sales by U.S. foreign-based firms have risen rapidly in comparison to U.S. exports. O. R. Strackbein, in the House testimony cited earlier, declared that whereas U.S. exports to Europe had increased only 52 per cent between 1957 and 1965, sales of U.S. affiliates in Europe increased 197.2 per cent. A statement by the AFL-CIO executive council, Sept. 12, 1967, declared: "In 1965, foreign affiliates of U.S. manufacturing firms increased their sales about 13 per cent to $42.2 billion, while U.S. exports of manufactured products increased less than 5 per cent." Harry Magdoff presented a paper on this question at the 1966 Socialist Scholars Conference (see "Economic Aspects of U.S. Imperialism," Monthly Review, Nov. 1966). Magdoff concluded that in 1964 sales of U.S. controlled corporations abroad were 5.5 times exports; foreign plant and equipment expenditures were 17 per cent of the total U.S. nonfinancial corporate expenditure; and foreign sources for earnings accounted for 22 per cent of domestic profit in nonfinancial corporations.

The dollar penetration of foreign markets brings with it a closer tying of the fate of the U.S. economy to that of the rest of the world. This is above all true in relation to Europe. In 1950, U.S. direct investment in Europe stood at $1.7 billion or 14.5 per cent of total direct investment abroad. According to The Economist, Dec. 17, 1966, this had risen to $13.9 billion or 28 per cent of the total in 1965.

The other side of this, of course, is the extended control of European markets by U.S. corporations. According to the same article in The Economist, for example, U.S. corporations controlled roughly 80 per cent of the German computer industry in 1965 and 40 per cent of German cars and petroleum. New investment of U.S. dominated corporations accounted for about 10 per cent of new investment in the Common Market in 1966.

The 1967 Slowdown of World-Trade Growth

A turning point of postwar capitalist development came in 1967.

International Monetary Fund statistics for Jan. 1968 reveal that the rate of trade expansion slowed markedly in the first three quarters of last year and that this slowdown affected all capitalist trade—for the first time in the last two decades. The following chart shows the average annual export growth rates at current prices for 1953-66 and for the first three quarters of 1967 (extrapolated for the full year):
These figures support the analysis of postwar capitalist relations we have given. So long as the European capitalisms were expanding, they could absorb both goods and investment from the United States. The former relieved the periodic overproduction of U.S. capital goods, the latter offset its falling rate of profit. The long boom in Europe consequently alleviated the cyclical downturns in the U.S. economy.

But the invasion of Europe by U.S. capital of necessity reproduced in Europe the contradictions it stemmed from in the United States. The Marshall Plan, NATO occupational forces and U.S. direct investment all served to stimulate the European economy and to encourage European dependence on the American market. At the same time it revived European national capitalisms as entities with distinct and conflicting interests from those of Washington and New York. The ability of European markets to absorb U.S. goods and investment was associated with steady and significant wage gains by European workers. Indicative figures were released last year by the U.S. Labor department, summarized in Table Two below.

TABLE TWO
INDEX OF HOURLY LABOR COSTS IN MANUFACTURING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>191*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1963

Starting from a terrifically disadvantaged position, European workers have made significantly greater relative wage gains than Amer-
ican workers. In Germany, real wages have doubled since 1958. But in the United States, real wages have risen at a markedly slower rate in the postwar decades than they did in the two decades prior to the war and have in fact been declining in the last two years. But the European wage gains decreased the rates of exploitation.

The development of a new technology—in some cases more advanced than in the United States—absorbed investments, but only to increase the organic composition of capital. Europe, ten or fifteen years later than the United States, inevitably reached the same contradictions of monopoly capitalism that had been besetting the United States since the end of the war. Since 1965, recessions have developed in Britain, Italy, France and Germany. The near concurrence of these recessions and their interconnectedness is significant.

The British recession was induced in 1965 because Britain faced balance of payments deficits resulting from unfavorable trade balances and because these deficits threaten the U.S. dollar. London and New York planned to increase British unemployment in order to create a downward pressure on wages and to enable British industry to shift towards more competitive areas of investment. But this strategy failed to anticipate the subsequent downturns in France and Germany and the stagnation that developed in the United States. Dragged down by the resulting decline in world trade, the British recession has gone deeper than anticipated and its end is nowhere in sight.

Italy went through an economic downturn in 1965-66 and is presently in somewhat of an upswing and the German recession in 1966 may be in the process of being alleviated. But the future of these upturns depends largely on the extent of the world economy's ability or inability to absorb exports. The statistics cited above could prove ominous for both these nations.

However, the specific recessions and the world-trade slowdown are not so important as the fact that they reflect the beginning of a new period dominated by a different conjuncture in world capitalist development. The former period was above all dominated by the relative subordination of European to U.S. monopoly capital; the new period will be dominated by the struggle of European capital to free itself from this subordination. This opens a new stage of intensified inter-imperialist rivalry. At the least, it must result in the long-term slowdown of domestic and world-trade growth consequent on the chain-reaction subordination of international trade to the self-interest of national capitalisms: That is, precisely, the adoption of protectionist measures, "border taxes," devaluations and restriction on investment and tourism.

The U.S. Balance of Payments Deficit

The balance of payments deficits of the United States bring to the forefront of world attention the contradictions which were latent in
the hegemony of U.S. imperialism in 1944. They reflect on one hand the contradiction between the world extension of U.S. military might and the inflationary effect of militarization on the American economy; and on the other hand, the contradiction between the world penetration of the dollar and the struggle of foreign bourgeoisies to free themselves from the consequent dependency of foreign economies on the American dollar. The billions of dollars that have poured out of the U.S. since Lord Keynes assured his British audience that world trade could depend on the dollar have gone essentially to two purposes: the support of U.S. military efforts and the extension of U.S. investments.

The Vietnam war is the central precipitating factor of the dollar crisis. It can hardly be held an accident, after two decades of U.S. military and economic domination in the underdeveloped world, that such a war would arise and that its consequences would be felt on monopoly capitalism. Nevertheless, it is the unflagging resistance of the Vietnamese peasant armies and the inability of the Pentagon to crush them that has stretched the dollar to the breaking point. The war weakens the dollar both internationally and domestically.

Internationally, it necessitates an ever increasing expenditure of dollars in foreign markets both directly on military goods and indirectly in the support of U.S. bases. Estimates that the total dollar outflow due to the war now average about $1 billion annually must surely be on the small side when the Japanese government itself revealed the expenditure of $1 billion on Vietnam war goods alone, last year, aside from the support of the big bases in that country and Okinawa.

But more important than the gold deficit caused by the war is the domestic inflation of the dollar caused by deficit spending to finance the war. And here again, the Vietnam war cannot be separated from the postwar context of U.S. militarization, the enormous expansion of the public and private debt resulting from the Keynesian policies of avoiding crises through deficit spending and the "gradual" inflation this has caused. The brunt of these policies must be carried by the American wage earner. Wall Street Journal economist Alfred Malabre Jr. reported May 31, 1967, that debt services for the average American family had grown from 11.4 per cent of after-tax income in 1949 to 22 per cent in 1966. In addition, Americans have had to pay steadily rising income and "social security" taxes while the dollar has declined 45 per cent in consumer purchasing value since 1945.

The domestic erosion of the value of the dollar also weakens its usefulness to foreign capitalisms and it gives them a lever to use against U.S. investment. Thus the European "attack on the dollar" amounts to something more than speculation on gold. By threatening to turn their dollars in for gold, when the United States "in a showdown" could not meet all short-term foreign claims on U.S.
gold reserves, the foreign capitalisms could force Washington to sell its foreign assets in order to raise gold. Outstanding dollar claims on gold exceed total U.S. reserves by about 200 per cent. The attack on the dollar, in other words, threatens U.S. investment itself.

As the European capitalisms become more and more burdened by overproduction they will look with greater interest towards their internal markets controlled by U.S. corporations as a source for internal expansion. Exerting pressure on the U.S. to raise foreign currencies is a preliminary attack on these internal markets. That such an attack is being made—in the long run risking U.S. countermeasures which could precipitate a disastrous disruption of already shrinking trade relationships—shows how far internal contradictions have already proceeded towards the point of ultimate international collision.

In the concluding sentence of his article referred to at the outset of this article, Edwin Dale wrote: "With all our problems, it is reassuring to know that the world has better defenses than ever against a return to one of the worst plagues of our past: depressions, unemployment and misery." His optimism is based on the unlikely continuation of previous conditions. The "defenses" Dale cited—expanding domestic economies, expanding world trade and stable international currencies, served to shield mankind from these miseries of capitalist economics only so long as the major capitalist economies themselves were expanding, almost in unison. The evidence presented here suggests that that long expansion is over. The long European boom, which largely sustained the expansion of world trade and investment, has slowed down. There has been a sharp drop in the rate of world-trade growth while the postwar U.S. monopoly of trade has deteriorated considerably. The dollar has weakened domestically and internationally under the combined pressures of U.S. military and economic expansion. There has been a sharp increase in inter-imperialist competition for markets and a resurgence of the restrictive measures on world trade supposedly buried at the end of the second world war. A turning point of such world historic importance does not take place overnight or all at once. What is important is to be aware of its implications and to be prepared for sudden shifts and turns that will result from it.

One of the striking "accomplishments" of postwar capitalism has clearly been the close interpenetration of national capitalisms within the world capitaliat system. It means that crises in one sector of the world economy, contrary to Keynes' hopes, must be transmitted more quickly and penetrate more deeply into the others. If that interrelation has had a remedial effect in the past period it can only have a disruptive one in the future.
Works Cited

Unless otherwise noted, statistics in this article have been compiled from the following standard sources:
International Monetary Fund, "Bulletin of Monthly Statistics."
Special mention was made of these two studies:
Ernest Mandel

THE CENTENARY

OF MARX'S 'CAPITAL'

On August 16, 1867, Marx finished correcting the last proofs of the first volume of Capital and sent a brief and moving note to Engels: "This has been possible thanks to you alone. Without your self-sacrifice for me I could never possibly have done the enormous work for the three volumes. I embrace you, full of thanks." In fact, the first volume of Capital was not brought out by the publisher, Meissner of Hamburg, until a month later, on September 14, 1867.

This book, which has had an incalculable influence on modern history, has provoked a permanent controversy over its real nature since the end of the nineteenth century. Louis Althusser and his school have recently rekindled this controversy in France. [Louis Althusser is a prominent professional philosopher belonging to the French Communist Party. He is the author of Pour Marx and Lire le Capital.]

Precisely what is Capital? Is it a work of economics? Is it a work of revolutionary politics? Is it a philosophical text? Is it the beginning of modern sociology? Some people have even declared that it is above all the work of a moralist.

The subtitle of the work is: "A Critique of Political Economy." "Political economy" is for Marx a demi-science, a science which was

Ernest Mandel's latest book, "The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx from 1843 up to the publication of Capital," was published by Maspero in 1967 on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of Marx's major work. His authoritative "Treatise on Marxist Economics" has gone through three editions in French and been translated into numerous languages from German to Arabic. This spring it will appear in an English and American edition.
transformed into an ideology. It was arrested in its development and deviated from the scientific path because it remained captive to the prejudices and concepts of the dominant class of its epoch, the bourgeoisie. It was because their own logic would have obliged them to condemn the capitalist mode of production, expose its contradictions, demonstrate its transitory character and presage its end that the bourgeois economists were incapable of completing the work of Adam Smith and Ricardo and that the classical school of political economy began to decay.

In carrying through the "critique of political economy" Marx therefore had to combine three steps at one time. He had to analyze the functioning of capitalist economy by disclosing its contradictions and showing to what extent the official economic science is incapable of rendering an account of these and explaining them. He had to analyze the theories of the bourgeois economists, set forth the contradictions, inadequacies and errors of their theories and trace these back to their roots in their ideological, that is to say, their apologetic role, in relation to bourgeois society. And he had to analyze the class struggle between the capitalists and workers, which enabled the economic and ideological evolution to be incarnated in living men who made their own history, in the last instance through the class struggle.

The partisans of Louis Althusser are certainly right when they say that the object of Capital is essentially a "socio-economic structure," the specific analysis of the capitalist mode of production. Capital does not pretend to provide an explanation of all human societies, past and to come. It is more modestly content to explain only the society which has been dominant for the past four centuries: bourgeois society.

But the partisans of Althusser are not simply right when they narrowly circumscribe the object of Capital in this manner. They are also wrong, for this definition does not allow us to render an account of the full complexity of Marx's major work.

To be able to explain the operation of the capitalist mode of production, Marx was obliged to trace back the origin of the "economic categories" (commodity, value, money, capital); however, their origin is located in precapitalist society. He is therefore also obliged to undertake the work of an historian as well as to provide basic materials for the understanding of precapitalist societies.

And Marx could not validly analyze the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production without providing a powerful instrument of struggle to the working class, without thereby actively intervening in this class struggle and without trying to orient it toward a precise objective: the overthrow of capitalist society. The Marx of 1867 had not forgotten the imperishable aphorism of the Marx of 1845: "Hitherto, the philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; the point is, to change it."

Capital is therefore a work that is both theoretical and practical,
philosophical and economic, historical and sociological. It could not be otherwise because of the method Marx used to write it.

Marx himself tersely defined this method when he wrote Maurice Lachâtre on March 18, 1872, that he had applied to the study of economic problems a method which had never before been applied to them. He was obviously referring to the dialectical method. This combines the fullest use of empirical data with a critical analysis of them, by disclosing their internal contradictions, contradictions which are most clearly evident when the origins of these same phenomena are studied.

Thanks to the application of this method Marx was able to surmount the weaknesses and inadequacies of the classical school of political economy. He perfected the labor theory of value (which explains the origin of the value of commodities, a social phenomenon, by the quantity of labor socially necessary for their production), by distinguishing "labor" from "labor power," and by explaining that what capitalism buys is not the "labor" of the worker but his "labor power," his capacity for working.

With this refinement, he was able to elaborate the category of "abstract labor," that is to say, of labor, without distinction as to trade, averaging out the totality of labor time at the disposition of society. And by detailing it in this way he was able to formulate his theory of surplus value, which is defined as the difference between the price (the value) of labor power, and the value produced by this same labor power.

All these discoveries, which simultaneously overturned economic science and socialist theory, had already been made by 1859, in Marx's little book Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy, which is especially celebrated for its "Preface" formulating in classical terms the Marxist theory of historical materialism. But it is in Capital that they are found deployed in all their richness.

Capital above all seeks to set forth the "natural laws of capitalist production." These are all derived from the fundamentals of the structure: the theory of labor value and the theory of surplus value.

Capitalist production is production for the market under the conditions of private ownership of the means of production, that is, under the conditions of competition. To win out in this competition, or at least not to go under, the industrial capitalist has to reduce his costs of production. He achieves this by developing technology, the machine system. In so doing, he replaces living labor by a machine and pitilessly subjects the former to the latter. At the same time he kills two birds with one stone: He lowers his costs of production, facilitating the conquest of markets; he reduces employment, generating the unemployment which presses down on the wage workers and thus increases his share of the "net value" produced by his workers. This "net value" is essentially divided between wages
and profits; if the share of the first is reduced, the share of the second is automatically augmented.

To be able to develop technology and the machine system, the capitalist needs a constantly growing quantity of capital since machines become more and more numerous and costly with the development of technology. There is only one fundamental means of increasing capital: augmenting profit. For it is through the investment of these profits (through "the accumulation of capital") that capitals grow.

To augment his profits the capitalist can resort to two means: either by reducing wages (or by prolonging the working day without increasing the daily wage) or by augmenting the productivity of labor without increasing wages (or by raising these less than the productivity of labor rises). The first method was above all applied up to the end of the 19th century in Europe (it continues to be applied in the underdeveloped countries); it culminates in an absolute impoverishment of the working class. The second method has above all been applied in Europe since the end of the 19th century; it culminates in a relative impoverishment of the working class (that is to say, the per capita income of the wage worker increases less quickly than the per capita income of the population). The statistics confirm this.

The accumulation of capital, the instrument for beating out competition, culminates in the concentration of capital. The big fish eat up the little ones. Since the costs of the original installation incessantly increase, only a smaller and smaller number of the big capitalist trusts can spread into the most technically advanced branches of industry. The other day an American economist predicted that by the end of the century three hundred giant corporations would dominate the whole of capitalist world economy.

But this colossal upsurge of productive forces is accomplished in an anarchic and unorganized manner. It is oriented toward the realization of private profit and not toward the satisfaction of human needs. Hence the tendency to overproduction inherent in the capitalist mode of production which is nowadays expressed under the aspect of excess productive capacity. Hence the tendency toward periodic economic crises which are today shamefacedly called "recessions."

Capital, as we have remarked, has not only overturned economic science. It likewise overturned the workers movement. It transformed socialism from a utopia into a science. It forged a weapon for the workers, with which they cannot only detect the weak points in the armor of their adversaries, but also prepare for the advent of a new society, socialist society.

At the moment when the young Marx and Engels drafted the "Communist Manifesto" at Brussels in 1847, there were scarcely several hundred revolutionary socialists organized in three or four countries.
The liberating cry: "Workers of all lands, unite!" did not then correspond to any experienced reality. The scientific diagnosis: "The history of all epochs has been the history of class struggles" could then be grasped by the principal actors in the contemporary drama—the workers in large-scale industry—only in a few countries.

Twenty years later, when Capital appeared, there was already a workers international on the scene and a trade union consciousness had grown up among the workers of half a score of countries. But this was still no more than a very small vanguard. In number, compared with the whole of humanity, it was an insignificant marginal group, although it could already throw a "great fear" into capital during the proclamation of the Paris Commune.

No more than twenty years later, scientific socialism had become a movement embracing millions of workers throughout the world. And a half century after the publication of Capital, the first abundant dividends were collected: The working class conquered power for the first time in a big country, in Russia, in October 1917.

Today, there is not a single country, not even an island, small as it may be, on this planet where a private industrialist does not confront a working class organized into unions or political parties. Today hundreds of millions of workers, intellectuals, poor peasants and students are ranged under Marx's banner. There is not much chance capitalism will survive the twentieth century and that it will be able to contemplate the 150th anniversary of Capital with the same mixture of respect, irritation and complacency with which it is still able, in some industrialized countries, to mark the centenary in its fashion.

Marx rightly predicted: "The bourgeoisie will remember my car­buncles for a long time." Such is the power of thought, when it is scientific, that is to say, when it can comprehend the meaning of evolution and when it takes hold of the consciousness of the masses.

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Eugene V. Debs

THE DAY OF THE PEOPLE

Upon his release from the Kaiser's bastile—the doors of which were torn from their hinges by the proletarian revolution—Karl Liebknecht, heroic leader of the rising hosts, exclaimed: "The Day of the People has arrived!" It was a magnificent challenge to the Junkers and an inspiring battle-cry to the aroused workers.

From that day to this Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and other true leaders of the German proletariat have stood bravely at the front, appealing to the workers to join the revolution and make it complete by destroying what remained of the criminal and corrupt old regime and ushering in the day of the people. Then arose the cry that the people were not yet ready for their day, and Ebert and Scheidemann and their crowd of white-livered reactionaries, with the sanction and support of the fugitive Kaiser, the infamous Junkers and all the allied powers, now in beautiful alliance, proceeded to prove that the people were not yet ready to rule themselves by setting up a bourgeois government under which the working class should remain in substantially the same state of slavish subjection they were in at the beginning of the war.

And now upon that issue—as to whether the terrible war has brought the people their day or whether its appalling sacrifices have all been in vain—the battle is raging in Germany as in Russia, and the near future will determine whether revolution has for once been really triumphant or whether sudden reaction has again won the day.

In the struggle in Russia the revolution has thus far triumphed for the reason that it has not compromised. The career of Kerensky was cut short when he attempted to turn the revolutionary tide into reactionary bourgeois channels.

Lenin and Trotsky were the men of the hour and under their fearless, incorruptible and uncompromising leadership the Russian proletariat has held the fort against the combined assaults of all the ruling class powers of earth. It is a magnificent spectacle. It stirs the blood and warms the heart of every revolutionist, and it challenges the admiration of all the world.

So far as the Russian proletariat is concerned, the day of the people has arrived, and they are fighting and dying as only heroes and martyrs can fight and die to usher in the day of the people not only in Russia but in all the nations on the globe.

In every revolution of the past the false and cowardly plea that the people were "not yet ready" has prevailed. Some intermediate class invariably supplanted the class that was overthrown and "the people" remained at the bottom where they have been since the beginning of history. They have never been "ready" to rid themselves of their despots, robbers and parasites. All they have ever been ready for has been to exchange one brood of vampires for another to drain their veins and fatten in their misery.

That was Kerensky's doctrine in Russia and it is Scheidemann's doctrine in Germany. They are both false prophets of the people and traitors to the working class, and woe be to their deluded followers if their vicious reaction triumphs, for then indeed will the yokes be fastened afresh upon their scarred and bleeding necks for another generation.

When Kerensky attempted to side-track the revolution in Russia by joining forces with the bourgeoisie he was lauded by the capitalist press of the whole world. When Scheidemann patriotically rushed to the support of the Kaiser and the Junkers at the beginning of the war, the same press denounced him as the betrayer of socialism and the enemy of the people. And now this very press lauds him to the heavens as the savior of the German nation! Think of it! Scheidemann the traitor has become Scheidemann the hero of the bourgeoisie. Could it be for any other reason on earth than that Scheidemann is doing the dirty work of the capitalist class?

And all this time the prostitute press of the robber regime of the whole world is shrieking hideously against Bolshevism. "It is worse than Kaiserism" is the burden of their cry. Certainly it is. They would a thousand times rather have the Kaiser restored to his throne than to see the working class rise to power. In the latter event they cease to rule, their graft is gone and their class disappears, and well do they know it. That is what we said from the beginning and for which we have been sentenced as disloyalists and traitors.

Scheidemann and his breed do not believe that the day of the
people has arrived. According to them the war and the revolution have brought the day of the bourgeoisie. Mr. Bourgeois is now to take the place of Mr. Junker—to evolve into another Junker himself by and by—while Mr. Wage-Slave remains where he was before, under the heels of his master, and all he gets out of the carnage, in which his blood dyed the whole earth, is a new set of heels to grind into his exploited bones and a fresh and lusty vampire to drain his life-blood.

Away with all such perfidious doctrines; forever away with such a vicious subterfuge and treacherous betrayal!

The people are ready for their day. THE PEOPLE, I say. Yes, the people!

Who are the people? The people are the working class, the lower class, the robbed, the oppressed, the impoverished, the great majority of the earth. They and those who sympathize with them are THE PEOPLE, and they who exploit the working class, and the mercenaries and menials who aid and abet the exploiters, are the enemies of the people.

That is the attitude of Lenin and Trotsky in Russia and was of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in Germany, and this accounts for the flood of falsehood and calumny which poured upon the heads of the brave leaders and their revolutionary movement from the filthy mouthpieces of the robber regime of criminal capitalism throughout the world.

The rise of the working-class is the red spectre in the bourgeois horizon. The red cock shall never crow. Anything but that! The Kaiser himself will be pitied and forgiven if he will but roll his eyes heavenward, proclaim the menace of Bolshevism, and appeal to humanity to rise in its wrath and stamp out this curse to civilization.

And still the "curse" continues to spread—like a raging conflagration it leaps from shore to shore. The reign of capitalism and militarism has made of all peoples inflammable material. They are ripe and ready for the change, the great change which means the rise and triumph of the workers, the end of exploitation, of war and plunder, and the emancipation of the race. Let it come! Let us all help its coming and pave the way for it by organizing the workers industrially and politically to conquer capitalism and usher in the day of the people.

In Russia and Germany our valiant comrades are leading the proletarian revolution, which knows no race, no color, no sex, and no boundary lines. They are setting the heroic example for worldwide emulation. Let us, like them, scorn and repudiate the cowardly compromisers within our own ranks, challenge and defy the robber-class power, and fight it out on that line to victory or death!

From the crown of my head to the soles of my feet I am Bolshevik, and proud of it.

"The Day of the People has arrived!"
Turning to Radicalization


James P. Cannon has led the kind of life that young radicals in the United States today can look to for inspiration and emulation. Unlike many former radicals who have given up the struggle for a socialist America, Cannon devoted the major part of his 78 years of life to the revolutionary movement—as an IWW organizer and strike leader, as a leader in the left wing of Debs' Socialist Party, as a founding member of the American Communist movement and, from the time he was expelled from the Communist Party in 1928 to the present, as the key builder of the American Trotskyist movement.

In 1944 Cannon and seventeen other Socialist Workers Party members and leaders of Teamsters' Local 544 were jailed under the witch-hunting Smith Act. They were its first victims. The attack on the Trotskyists originated in Minneapolis where they played the foremost role in the labor movement. But jailing these revolutionaries had national significance because of their outspoken opposition to Washington's participation in the second imperialist world war.

Letters from Prison is a collection of the letters Cannon wrote during his eighteen-month internment in Sandstone, Minnesota, federal penitentiary. All but two were addressed to Rose Karsner, Cannon's wife and close collaborator in the Socialist Workers Party. They served as his principal line of communication with the rest of the party. Although written over 20 years ago, they contain capsule discussions of many questions young radicals are asking today,
and particularly the question of how to build a revolutionary party.

Cannon's letters are focused upon how the revolutionary party should deal with the beginnings of a wave of massive radicalization. This was the working-class radicalization that began when the initial flush of patriotic fervor started to wear off—first with the Harlem explosion of 1943 and the union movement against the wartime no-strike pledge, and culminating in the giant strike wave of 1945-46 and the Bring-the-Troops-Home movement at the close of World War II. This promising upsurge ebbed with the Cold War, McCarthyism and two decades of "guns and butter" prosperity.

Now that prolonged passivity is evidently ending. The campus radicalism, opposition to the Vietnam war and the black liberation struggle have spurred a new development of anticapitalist consciousness and combativity among a broad and growing layer of youth, black and white. It is the job of Marxists to find the best means of recruiting these rebellious young people to the ranks of socialism. Cannon's book comes at the right time.

His aim in 1944 and 1945 was to get the leadership and membership of the Socialist Workers Party to think in a new way about their work. To those who counselled patience to Cannon's insistent demands for action, he said, "[patience] is all right for people who are not going anywhere in particular, and it may be good for cows to chew their cud with. But it is no good for executive leaders, traffic managers, etc." It is certainly not a virtue for revolutionaries in this fast-moving phase of forming a new generation of revolutionary cadres in the United States.

Over and over Cannon explained that the party must begin to "think big" about itself and its work. On the question of increasing the circulation of The Militant, the party's newspaper, he pushed for a giant subscription campaign, saying, "...the party must be mobilized and driven into action from the National Office and all party attention and activity centered on the attainment of the quota goal."

He elaborated an extensive plan for the systematic education of new members in the traditions and lessons of working-class struggle, emphasizing that socialist education should keep pace with external activity. He wrote, "...the convention and the year's experience which it summarized and represented was a great triumph for the conception of a party based on great principles, whose cadres have been educated and selected in the struggle for these principles. . ."

Cannon's approach exemplifies the aphorism in one of the letters that, "The art of politics consists in knowing what to do next; that is, how to apply the program of Marxism to the specific situation of the day." For revolutionaries in the 1960s, the Letters from Prison of James P. Cannon show what this guiding generalization means in real life. It is up to them to make good on the challenge.

—Judy White
Two Books Against Bolshevism


In Russia's 1905 revolution Solomon Schwarz was a bolshevik agitator in St. Petersburg, an active participant in the dramatic events that set the stage for the October Revolution 12 years later. In 1917, as a menshevik, Schwarz was a government official in the Ministry of Labor prior to the revolution. On the night that the bolsheviks seized power and transformed world history, Solomon Schwarz, former revolutionary, recalled that his evening was spent editing "an article on the struggle against tuberculosis. Such is the irony of fate!"

Now, fifty years after the Russian Revolution, Schwarz has written a book about 1905, the second volume in a series on the history of menshevism. Hindsight and objectivity might suggest that a reasonable course of historical analysis would be to search for the connecting links between the prelude that 1905 represented and the decisive events of 1917. Surely, we would suspect, the differences between bolsheviks and mensheviks that appeared in 1905 must have given clues to why the bolsheviks would succeed later in 1917 while the mensheviks would flounder helplessly before the great events. But of this, Schwarz has not a word.

Solomon Schwarz has one purpose only in this "scholarly tract"—to prove conclusively that in 1905 the bolsheviks were virtually incompetent, highly inferior tacticians to the mensheviks, and worse, were inherently incapable of relating to the elemental outbursts of the Russian workers, in fact were hostile to them. "Fundamentally," he says, "Bolshevism stressed the initiative of an active minority; Menshevism, the activization of the masses . . . Bolshevism logically developed dictatorial conceptions and practices; Menshevism remained thoroughly democratic." "The Mensheviks were basically concerned with fostering the proletariat's political independence." Of concern to the Bolsheviks "were the ideas of 'firm' leadership from above and iron 'discipline' on the lower levels."

Liberally sprinkled with quotations from representatives of all political tendencies at the time, Schwarz's book has a certain informational value, but only to those willing to make a careful study of other works as well and who, in particular, will not hesitate to dispense with Schwarz's bias. Schwarz does debunk some of the
myths, created later under the tutelage of Stalin, that the bolsheviks were always firm, wise, and successful in their tactics.

Wildman's book is the first volume of the series on the history of menshevism. The author conceives of his work as a "study on the social and structural foundations" of the Russian social democratic movement, a companion work to Leopold Haimson's *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*. As such, it contains much useful information on the workers movement in Russia, primarily prior to 1901. Information on the size, scope of activities, degree of influence, and composition of the social democratic movement is treated thoroughly and with reasonable objectivity.

Wildman's attack on bolshevism is more sophisticated than Schwarz's, but retains the essential ingredient. Lenin's ideas, says Wildman, represented "that minority trend in Russian Social Democracy which valued homogeniety of views and centrally directed action over mass participation and democratic initiative." "Bolshevism was to carry on with Lenin's banner of elitism whereas Menshevism, albeit with considerable vacillation and inconsistency, eventually became the champion of 'worker initiative' and party democracy."

Wildman tries to show that the professional revolutionaries and early political leaders of the movement, largely intellectual in origin, continually clashed with the initiative of workers who were drawn into action through strike struggles and general political agitation. This division, which Lenin explained as that between trade union oriented *militants* and politically oriented *revolutionaries*, was never as definitive as Wildman claims. Furthermore, it was into the bolshevik movement and not the menshevik that the revolutionary minded workers were drawn and were able to assume leadership, as subsequent history showed.

Gus Horowitz

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THE CHINA WHITE PAPER: August 1949. (two volumes) Stanford University Press. 1079pp. $5.95 a set, paper.


ECONOMICS: An Awkward Corner by Joan Robinson. Pantheon Books. 86pp. $3.95.

A STRATEGY FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL POLICY edited by Frank Bonilla and Jose A. Silva Michelena. M.I.T. Press. 384pp. $15.00.


WHY ARE WE IN VIETNAM?: A Novel by Norman Mailer. G.P. Putnam's Sons. 208pp. $4.95.


ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN COMMUNIST RUMANIA by John Michael Montias. M.I.T. Press. 327pp. $15.00.

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PRESIDENTIAL SEIZURE IN LABOR DISPUTES by John L. Blackman, Jr. Harvard University Press. 351pp. $10.00.


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Letters from Prison

by James P. Cannon

The author of this work personifies the continuity of the revolutionary movements of the past half century with today's struggles.

An IWW organizer and strike leader, a leader of the left wing in the old Socialist Party, a founder and leader of American Communism expelled from the Communist Party for Trotskyism, James P. Cannon is today National Chairman of the Socialist Workers Party.

In 1944, along with seventeen other leaders of the SWP and Minneapolis truckdrivers' union who opposed the war, Cannon was imprisoned in the government's first use of the Smith Act.

These are the letters he wrote while serving his sentence in the federal penitentiary at Sandstone, Minnesota. They constitute a combination of a party leader's working correspondence, a guide to national and international politics for professional revolutionists, a manual for organizers, and a prison journal.

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