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LEON TROTSKY: Problems of Civil War

also Ernest Mandel: Peaceful Coexistence and World Revolution
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THE ISR ENTERS A NEW STAGE

In May 1970 the *International Socialist Review* will become a monthly theoretical magazine published by members of the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance in the United States. It will be the first such monthly magazine of revolutionary socialism to be published in the U.S. since 1947, when the narrowing circles of the radical movement were forced to retreat and retrench in the face of a growing reaction. At that time the *Fourth International*, the predecessor of the *International Socialist Review*, was forced to revert to a bimonthly schedule. In 1954, at the very height of the cold-war witchhunt and in the heyday of Senator Joseph McCarthy, we were forced to cut back once again and publish on a quarterly schedule. In those years the hard fact is that there was only a relative handful of people interested in learning about Marxism and even fewer who were willing to make the financial and political commitment necessary for a political magazine to be successful.

But the decade of the cold war and reaction led to its own opposite as the process of radicalization—which had been temporarily derailed—picked up again, this time primarily on the campus and within the Black community. A key part of this radicalization was the rejection of the ruling ideology of the bourgeoisie, both in its liberal and its conservative colors. A search for alternative ideas and an interest in engaging in action against the policies and institutions of capitalism became increasingly popular, especially among the youth.

In this context the ideas of Marxism became of interest to growing numbers of people. The ISR was able to respond to this opportunity by returning to bimonthly publication in the beginning of 1967. At that time we told our readers that this change was but one step towards our goal of reestablishing a monthly theoretical magazine of genuine Marxism in the heartland of world imperialism. We are now ready to take the next step.

We are doing it with the collaboration and participation of the
editors of the Young Socialist. This collaboration in the field of publication will be an example of one of the most important processes that has occurred in the radical movement in the past decade. That is the forging of strong ties between two powerful forces: that section of the new generation of radicals which has, through serious analysis of its experiences in the living struggles, come to the conclusion that Marxism represents the only viable alternative; and the revolutionary party—the conscious storehouse of the experience of the entire history of the revolutionary movement—which has turned towards the youth and won from it fresh forces in the fight for a socialist revolution.

The Young Socialist Alliance, having undergone a rapid growth in the past year, is expanding its publication plan as well. It will stop publishing the monthly Young Socialist. In its place will appear a biweekly newspaper, the Young Socialist Organizer, as well as the expanded jointly-published International Socialist Review. The Young Socialist Organizer will contain the reports, discussions and decisions of the Young Socialist Alliance.

The International Socialist Review will be the magazine of the socialist component of the current radicalization; it will speak for both the youth, just coming to revolutionary politics, and for the veterans of class struggle over the years.

We will not be content with publishing a "little magazine" of the left. We are aiming for a mass circulation monthly to guarantee that the perspectives of authentic Marxism are available to the millions who are now in motion against the capitalist system. This will not be an easy task and it won't be accomplished overnight. The ISR will be appealing to you for assistance in this ambitious and exciting new project. Present subscribers to the ISR will receive the new magazine for the duration of their subscription. We invite new subscribers. Five dollars will get you a full-year-first-year subscription to the expanded International Socialist Review!

The Editors
Leon Trotsky

PROBLEMS OF CIVIL WAR

Introduction

What are the political and what are the military aspects of civil war? What is the relationship between the revolutionary vanguard party and the military front during the struggle for state power? Under what conditions should the armed insurrection be launched? Can a definite timetable be fixed for the seizure of state power?

These questions—of the utmost significance for revolutionaries—are the subject of this speech, which Trotsky delivered to the Military Science Society, July 29, 1924. Again and again following the revolutionary victory in Russia, the organizer of the Red Army and Commissar of War (1918-25) attempted to focus the attention of the world communist movement on the specific military-revolutionary lessons of this victory. The importance Trotsky attached to this study can be gauged on one scale by the fact that he ultimately made it the subject of the monumental History of the Russian Revolution.

In Problems of Civil War, Trotsky's immediate topic is the failure of the 1923 revolution in Germany. Ripe for proletarian revolution, the majority of the working class was behind the German Communist Party; the German bourgeoisie was encountering new difficulties daily. But the Communist Party leadership of Brandler and Thalheimer vacillated. In October, the desperate ruling class attacked in military formation and won a decisive victory without firing a shot. At a crucial moment, the Communist leaders sounded the call for retreat; the disoriented party was thrown into confusion and the masses were thrown back into despair.

But Trotsky in 1924 had even more far-reaching concerns than simply to draw a balance sheet of the German catastrophe. Already by this time, the "triumvirate" of Russian Communist Party leaders, Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin, had opened their attack on "Trotskyism." Lenin, seriously ill since 1922, died March 21, 1924. The co-leader of the Bolshevik Party, Trotsky, was the main obstacle in the march to power of the Stalin-led bureaucracy.

In 1924, Trotsky did not yet see the full consequences of this fateful march. He could not then have imagined that the slightest criticism of Stalin would one day be "treason" against the Soviet state; that Kamenev and Zinoviev themselves—presidents, respectively, of the Moscow and Leningrad Soviets—would be gunned down by Stalin's firing squads; that the entire leadership of Lenin's Bolshevik Party, save only Stalin, would be wiped out in the bureaucratic scourge.

At this time there was still something left of the real Bolshevik tradition that revolutionaries must learn from experience; that discussion, debate and criticism are not only valid but essential tools of revolutionary leader-
ship. In this spirit Trotsky plunged into the discussion of military-revolutionary strategy because he saw in a bureaucratic attitude toward this question serious danger of a repetition of demoralizing defeats.

For Zinoviev, as chairman of the Communist International, in collusion with Stalin, had secretly backed the passive policies of Brandler. They attempted to silence debate on the German situation throughout 1923; and when the collapse came, in what was to become typically Stalinist pattern, they attempted to lay all the blame on Brandler, absolving themselves of responsibility for their disastrous roles.

More significant to Trotsky, however, were the roles of these same top leaders of the Bolshevik Party—in the Russian revolution itself. As Trotsky was to explain more fully in Lessons of October (October 1924), and most completely in the History, there had been vacillations in the Bolshevik leadership at critical points throughout 1917. When it came to the point of acting on what they had been saying, that is, launching the armed insurrection, Kamenev and Zinoviev had opposed it, against Lenin—even down to the final week before the October triumph. Like the leaders of the German CP, they too, argued that the "Russian workers are not ready to fight," on the very eve of successful insurrection. No wonder that not only the history of the German events, but of October itself, was anathema to the Stalin faction. This history was not being studied in 1924; it is not open to study today—more than a half century after October—either to the young people of the Soviet Union or to students in any of the other Stalinized "socialist" countries.

Trotsky attempted to force study of October and of the general theoretical problems of civil war. "In 1924," he wrote in The Third International After Lenin (1928), "a collective work on the elaboration of the directives of civil war, that is, a Marxian guide to the questions of the open clashes of the classes and the armed struggle for the dictatorship, was begun by a large circle of individuals grouped around the Military Science Society. But this work soon encountered opposition on the part of the Comintern—this opposition was a part of the general system of the struggle against so-called Trotskyism; and the work was later liquidated altogether. A more light-minded and criminal step can hardly be imagined. . . . Had such regulations been incorporated in a number of books, the serious study of which is as much the duty of every communist as the knowledge of the basic ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, we might well have avoided such defeats as were suffered during recent years, and which were by no means inevitable . . . ."

* * *

This translation, by A.L. Preston, was first made from the French of Marcel Body, published in 1926. When it was checked against the Russian text in Vol. XII of Trotsky's Collected Works, some omissions were discovered. These have now been restored and this version is in effect a translation from the Russian.

Trotsky and the Russian text refer to it as a speech to the Military Science Society, but it is clearly a series of remarks with intervals between them for group discussion. In the opening lines, Trotsky refers to his spring report to the Academy. This may well be the item in Pravda of May 9, 1924. When it was checked, the text was largely indecipherable because of bad printing. The few paragraphs that could be read touch on the same topics as in the present speech.

Dick Roberts
Problems of civil war

Permit me to make a short introduction to this discussion. Actually, comrades, I have already talked about this in my spring report to the Academy. It is a fact that, as yet, no one has taken the trouble to sum up the experience of civil war, neither ours nor those of other countries. Yet, on practical and ideological counts, there is a very great need for a work of such a kind.

Throughout the history of mankind, civil war has played an exceptionally important role. From 1871 to 1914, it seemed (to the reformists) that this role was played out for western Europe. But the imperialist war once more placed civil war on the order of the day. We know this and we understand this. We have included it in our program.

However, we lack almost completely a scientific approach to civil war, its stages, aspects and methods. Even in regard to the mere description of what has taken place in this sphere over the past decade, we discover monstrous backwardness. I had occasion recently to point out that we devote much time and energy to the study of the Paris Commune of 1871 yet neglect altogether the struggle of the German proletariat, which is already rich in the experience of civil wars, and we hardly concern ourselves at all with the lessons of the Bulgarian insurrection of last September.* But what is most surprising is that it seems to be acceptable that the experience of the October revolution should long since have been relegated to the archives.

Yet, comrades, in the October revolution there is much to be learned by military tacticians since there is no doubt that, to a degree infinitely greater than hitherto, future wars will be combined with different forms of civil war. The preparation and experience of the Bulgarian insurrection of September last year are likewise of considerable military-revolutionary interest. Since many of the Bulgarian comrades who took part in that insurrection now live in Russia, we have at hand the necessary means for devoting ourselves to a serious study of those events. It is easy, moreover, to get a comprehensive view of them. The country which was the theater of that insurrection is no bigger than a Russian province. And the organization of the forces involved, the political groupings, etc., assumed the character of a government. Furthermore, for those countries (and they are many, notably all of the Eastern countries), where the peasant population predominates, the experience of the Bulgarian insurrection is of colossal importance.

* In June 1923 the Bulgarian government of the peasant leader Stambulisky was overthrown by reactionary forces. The Communist Party remained neutral, but the victorious reaction subjected Communists to ferocious prosecution, forcing them underground. The Bulgarian Communists blandly denied they had suffered any defeat and in September attempted to retrieve themselves by a putsch which was doomed to defeat in advance. [D. R.]
Now, what is our task? To draw up a universal handbook, or guidebook, or textbook, or a manual, or a book of statutes on the problems of civil war, and consequently, and especially, on armed uprising as the highest stage of a revolution. It will be necessary to collect and coordinate data from civil wars, analyze the conditions under which they took place, study the mistakes, highlight the most successful operations, and draw the necessary conclusions from them. In doing this, what shall we enrich—science, that is, knowledge of the laws of historical evolution, or art, as the totality of rules of action drawn from experience? Both, it seems to me. In any case, our aim is strictly practical: to enrich the art of military-revolution.

Such a manual will necessarily have a very complex structure. First of all, it will be necessary to characterize the conditions essential for the seizure of power by the proletariat. We remain, therewith, in the sphere of revolutionary politics, for, after all, isn't insurrection the continuation of politics by other means?

Analyses of the conditions essential for insurrection will have to be made for different types of countries. On one hand are those countries where the proletariat is the majority of the population, and, on the other, where the proletariat is a tiny minority among a peasant population. Between these two poles are countries of an intermediate type. That being so, we shall have to base our studies on at least three types of country: industrial, agrarian and intermediate. The introduction (on the preconditions and conditions for revolution) must characterize each of these types from the standpoint of civil war.

We shall consider insurrection in two ways: first, as a definite stage of an historical process, as a definite refraction of the objective laws of the class struggle; then, from an objective and practical standpoint, how to prepare and carry through an insurrection in order to ensure its success effectively. In this matter war offers us a striking analogy because it, too, is the product of specific historic conditions, the result of a clash of interests. At the same time, warfare is an art. The theory of warfare is the study of the forces and means at one's disposal, their concentration and use, to ensure victory. Likewise, insurrection is an art. In a strictly practical way, in making something like a military manual, we can and should elaborate a theory of insurrection.

At the outset, of course, we shall come up against all kinds of bewilderment and objection from people saying that the idea of writing a manual of insurrection, still more, of civil war, is sheer bureaucratic utopianism: that we want to militarize history; that the revolutionary process is not subject to regulation; that in every country, revolution has its own peculiar features, its uniqueness; that in times of revolution the situation is modified every minute; and that it is chimerical to want to manufacture a series of outlines for the conduct of revolutions, or to draw up—after the fashion of the Austrian high command—a mass of unbreakable regulations and impose strict observance of them.

Now, if anyone were claiming to construct something of this kind, he would really be ridiculous. But, basically, the same thing can be said against our military manuals. Every war unfolds in a situation
and under conditions that no one can foresee. However, without the help of manuals which collect the data of military experience, it would be unthinkable to expect to conduct an army in time of peace, let alone of war. The old saying, "don't cling to the manual like a blind man to a wall," in no way lessens its importance, any more than dialectics lessens the importance of formal logic or the laws of arithmetic.

Undoubtedly in civil war the elements necessary for the drawing up of plans, for organization, for dispositions, are infinitely more scarce than they are in wars between "national" armies. In civil war, politics participates more closely and more intimately in military actions than it does in "national" wars. Thus, it would be impermissible to transpose mechanically the same methods from one sphere to the other. But it does not at all follow that it is impermissible to base oneself on acquired experience in order to extract from it methods, procedures, indications, directives and suggestions which show patterns, and to translate them into general rules which might find a place in a manual of civil war.

It is fully agreed that among the rules, mention will be made of the absolute need to subordinate purely military actions to the general political line, to take rigorously into account the overall situation and the mood of the masses.

In any case, before being frightened at the utopianism of such a work, and frightening others with it, it is necessary to decide after profound examination whether there do exist general rules which condition or facilitate victory, and what they are. Only in the course of such an examination will it be possible to define where precise, useful indications, which control the work to be done, stop, and where bureaucratic fantasy begins.

Let us try to deal with a revolution from this point of view: The highest phase of a revolution is the insurrection, which decides the question of power. The insurrection is always preceded by a period of organization and of preparation on the basis of a definite political campaign. As a general rule, the moment of insurrection is brief but decisive in the course of the revolution. If victory is achieved, it is followed by a period which includes the consolidation of the revolution by the method of crushing the last enemy forces, and the organization of the new power and the revolutionary forces responsible for the defense of revolution.

That being so, the manual of civil war—we will for the moment arbitrarily give our work this name—will have to consist of three parts at least: the preparation for insurrection, the insurrection and, finally, the consolidation of the victory. Thus, besides the basic introduction discussed above, characterizing (in the abridged form of general rules or directives) the prerequisites and conditions for revolution, our manual of civil war should include at least three parts covering the three principal stages of civil war in the order in which they occur. That will be the strategic architecture of the whole work.

It is precisely the strategic problem we have to resolve here: how to combine in a logical way all the various forces and resources so as
to achieve the main goal, the seizure and defense of power. Each part of the strategy of civil war raises a series of specific, tactical problems, such as the formation of factory units, the organization of revolutionary command posts on the railways and in the towns, and the preparation in detail of the method of seizing vital points in towns. Similar tactical problems will be dealt with in our manual for the period of the crushing of the defeated enemy and the consolidation of the power of the victor.

If we adopt such a plan for the work, it will be possible to deal with the many aspects at one and the same time. Thus, we can make one group of comrades responsible for certain tactical questions relating to civil war. Other groups will establish the general strategic plan, the basic introduction, and so on. At the same time, it will be necessary to examine from the angle of civil war the historical material available, for it is clear that it is not our intention to fashion a manual simply out of our heads, but a manual inspired by experience, enlightened and enriched on the one hand by Marxist theories and on the other by the facts of military science.

I am saying nothing for the moment about the system of exposition. It would be premature here to lay things down in advance. We know that military manuals contain only "schemes, but no times or occasions," that is, they give only general directives without the support of precise examples or detailed explanations. Can we adopt the same method of exposition to make the manual of civil war clear? I am not sure. Very possibly we shall have to cite, by way of example, in the manual itself or in a supplementary chapter, a certain number of illustrative historical facts or, at least, refer to them. That would perhaps be an excellent way of avoiding an excess of schematism. But, I repeat, to lay down the literary construction now is, to say the least, premature.

The insurrection and the timing

Which is it to be—a manual of civil war or a manual of insurrection? I think if we use the word "manual," it should be a manual of civil war.

It is said that some comrades have raised objections to this and have given the impression that they confuse civil war with the class struggle, and insurrection with civil war. Civil war is a definite stage of the class struggle when, breaking through the framework of legality, it brings the opposing forces onto the plane of confrontation, publicly and, to some extent, physically.

Considered in this way, civil war combines a spontaneous uprising determined by local causes, bloody intervention by counterrevolutionary hordes, a revolutionary general strike, an insurrection for the seizure of power, and a period of liquidating attempts at counterrevolutionary uprising. This all comes within the framework of the notion of civil war, is more than insurrection, and yet is very much less than the notion of the class struggle which runs all through history.
If we speak of an insurrection as a task to be carried out, we have to speak of it knowing what we are talking about, not deforming it, as is currently being done, by confusing it with revolution and thus reducing it to nothing. We have to free others from this confusion and begin by ridding ourselves of it.

Insurrection, everywhere and at all times, poses a precise task to be carried out. To this end, we distribute roles; entrust to each his mission, connected, of course, with the movement of the masses; distribute arms; choose the moment; deliver our blows, and seize power—if we are not crushed beforehand. Insurrection should be made according to a plan conceived in advance. It is a definite stage of revolution. The seizure of power does not end a civil war; it only changes its character. Our manual must include this stage, too. So, it is indeed a manual of civil war that is required and not simply of insurrection, although, of course, it is possible to highlight this task as the central one.

We have already referred to the dangers of schematism. Let us look, in the light of an example, at what it can consist of. I have had occasion to point out frequently one of the most dangerous manifestations of schematism in the way that our young staff officers deal with the military problems of the revolution. If we take the three stages we distinguished in civil war, we see that the military work of the leading revolutionary party has, in each of the three periods, a specific character. In the period of preparing for revolution, we see that the military work of the leading revolutionary party has, in each of the three periods, a specific character. In the period of preparing for revolution, we clearly are still up against the forces (police, army) of the ruling class. Nine-tenths of the military work of the revolutionary party consists at this time of breaking up the enemy army, dislocating it internally, and one-tenth only of gathering and preparing forces for the revolution. It goes without saying that the mathematical proportions I give are arbitrary; but all the same they give some idea of what the clandestine military work of the revolutionary party should really be.

The nearer the time of insurrection approaches, the more must the work of forming combat organizations be intensified. That is when one can fear certain dangers of academic schematism. It is clear that the combat forces with whose help the revolutionary party is preparing to carry through the insurrection cannot have a regular character, even less the character of military units of a higher type, such as brigades, divisions and army corps. Of course, the leading organ of the uprising must strive to introduce as much planning as possible into it. But the plan of insurrection is not built on centralized control of revolutionary troops but on the greatest initiative of each detachment which has been assigned in advance, with the maximum precision, the task it has to carry out.

As a general rule, insurgents fight according to "guerrilla" methods, that is, as detachments of a partisan or semi-partisan type, bound together much more by political discipline and by the clear consciousness of the single goal to be reached than by some kind of regular, centralized hierarchy of control.
After the seizure of power the situation is changed completely. The struggle of the victorious revolution for self-preservation and development changes immediately into a struggle for the organization of a centralized state apparatus. The partisan attitudes which are not only inevitable, but even profoundly progressive in the period of struggle for power can, after the conquest of power, become a cause of great dangers, liable to rock the revolutionary state which is taking shape. It is here that the period of the organization of a regular Red Army begins. All these factors must be reflected appropriately in the manual of civil war.

The timing of a revolution is closely related to these measures. It goes without saying that it is not a matter of naming arbitrarily, outside of events, a fixed and irrevocable date for the insurrection. Nor is it a defiant, open proclamation of some time or other, in the spirit of an old chronicle: on such and such a date "I'll go for you." That would be to have too simplistic an idea of the character of a revolution and its development.

As Marxists, we must know and understand that it is not enough to want an insurrection to carry it out. But when the objective conditions for an insurrection present themselves, it won't just happen—it has to be made. And for that, the revolutionary general staff must first have a plan for the insurrection before unleashing it.

The plan of insurrection will give an orientation of time and place. In the most detailed way, account will be taken of all the factors and the elements of the insurrection. An eye will be kept on them to determine accurately their dynamism, to define the distance the vanguard must keep between itself and the working class so as not to be isolated from it while at the same time making the decisive leap.

The timing of the insurrection is one of the necessary elements in this orientation. It will be fixed in advance, as soon as the symptoms of insurrection show themselves clearly. The date will certainly not be divulged to any and everybody. Quite the reverse: It will be concealed as much as possible from the enemy without, however, leading one's own party and the masses who follow it, into error. The party's work in all spheres will be subordinated to the time set for the insurrection and everything should be ready for the appointed day. If a mistake has been made in the calculations, the date of the insurrection can be altered, although this may be accompanied at the same time by serious inconveniences and many dangers.

It must be recognized that the question of the timing of the insurrection in many cases has the character of litmus paper with which to test the revolutionary consciousness of very many western European communists who have still not rid themselves of their fatalistic and passive manner of dealing with the principal problems of revolution. Rosa Luxemburg remains the most profound and talented example. Psychologically, this is fully understandable. She was formed, so to speak, in the struggle against the bureaucratic apparatus of the German social democracy and trade unions. Untiringly, she showed that this apparatus was stifling the initiative of the masses and she saw no alternative but that a spontaneous uprising of the
masses would sweep away all the barriers and defenses built by the social democratic bureaucracy. The revolutionary general strike, overflowing all the dikes of bourgeois society, became for Rosa Luxemburg synonymous with the proletarian revolution.

However, whatever its power and mass character, the general strike does not settle the problem of power; it only poses it. To seize power, it is necessary to organize the armed insurrection on the basis of the general strike. The whole of Rosa Luxemburg's evolution, of course, was going in that direction. But when she was snatched from the struggle, she had not yet spoken her last word, nor even the penultimate one.

However, there has been till very recently in the German Communist Party still a very strong current of revolutionary fatalism. The revolution is coming, it was said; it will bring the insurrection and power. As for the party, its role at this time is to make revolutionary agitation and await its outcome. Under such conditions, posing squarely the question of the timing of the insurrection means snatching the party from passivity and fatalism and bringing it face to face with the principal problems of revolution, namely, the conscious organization of the insurrection in order to drive the enemy from power.

The question of the timing of the insurrection as outlined above must be dealt with in a manual of civil war. In this way we facilitate the preparation of the party for insurrection or at least the preparation of its cadres.

It must be borne in mind that the most difficult thing for a communist party will be the passage from the work of preparing for revolution — of necessity, long — to the direct struggle for power. This passage will not be made without provoking crises, and serious crises. The only way to reduce their extent and to facilitate the grouping of the most resolute in the leading elements is to lead the party cadres to think about and deepen in advance the questions of the revolutionary insurrection, and this the more concretely the nearer come events.

In this context, a study of the October revolution is of unique importance for all the European Communist parties. Unfortunately, this study is not being made and will not be for as long as the means for it are not made available. We ourselves have neither studied nor coordinated the teachings of the October revolution and especially the military-revolutionary teachings which emerge from it. It is necessary to follow step by step all the stages of the preparation of the revolution, extending from March to October; the way in which the October insurrection unfolded in some of the most critical points; then the struggle for the consolidation of power.

For whom do we propose this manual of civil war? For the workers, answer certain comrades so that each of them knows how to handle himself. Obviously, it would be very good if "every" worker knew what he had to do. But that is to pose the question on too large a scale, and so, utopian. In any case, it is not from this end that we should begin. Our manual should be meant in the first place for the party cadres, for the leaders of the revolution. Naturally, in some
chapters, certain questions meant for larger circles of workers will be given a popular turn of phrase; but primarily, it will be addressed to the leaders.

As a preliminary step, we must collect for ourselves our own experiences and ideas, formulate them as clearly as possible, verify them in detail and, as far as is possible, systematize them. Before the imperialist war, some military writers complained that wars had become too scarce for the good instruction of officers. With no less reason, we can say that the scarcity of revolutions hampers the education of revolutionaries. But in this connection, our own generation has no cause for complaint. We who belonged to it had the good fortune to be mature enough to make the revolution of 1905 and to live long enough to take a leading part in the revolution of 1917.

But, needless to say, day-to-day revolutionary experiences are rapidly dissipated. How many new, practical, continuing, particular and pressing problems we now have in their place! Aren't we compelled today to discuss questions like the manufacture of cloth, the building of the Volkhov electrical factory, the production of aluminum, rather than how to make an insurrection? But this last question is far from being obsolete. More than once, history will demand an answer to it.

When to begin

The German catastrophe of last year has placed before the Communist International the problem of how to organize revolution and in particular, revolutionary insurrection. In this context, the problem of the timing of the revolution is of major importance because it has emerged clearly and beyond evasion that here all questions relating to the organization of revolution become acute. The social democracy has adopted toward revolution the attitude that liberalism had toward the bourgeoisie's struggle for power against feudalism and the monarchy. Bourgeois liberalism speculates on revolution without assuming responsibility for it. At the propitious moment in the struggle of the masses, it throws into the balance its wealth, teachings and other means of class influence in order to lay its hands on the power. In November 1918, the German social democracy played just such a role. Basically, it constituted the apparatus which transmitted to the bourgeoisie the political power that had fallen from the hands of the Hohenzollerns. Such a policy of passive speculation is absolutely incompatible with communism which sets itself the goal of seizing power in the name and interests of the proletariat.

Proletarian revolution is a revolution of formidable masses largely unorganized. The blind upsurge of the masses plays a considerable part in the movement. Victory can be achieved only by a communist party which is centralized, which sets itself as a precise objective the seizure of power; which carefully thinks out this aim, refines it, prepares it and fulfills it, relying on the insurrection of the masses. By its centralization, decisiveness and planned approach to armed insurrection, the communist party brings to the proletariat in the struggle
for power the same advantages the bourgeoisie has from its economic position. In this context, the timing of the insurrection is not just some technical detail; it expresses in the clearest and most precise way the insurrection as an art.

Clearly, when it is a question of the timing of an insurrection, calculations cannot be based on purely military experiences. Having at its disposal adequate armed forces, a state can, generally speaking, unleash war at any moment. Then during the war, the supreme command decides on the offensive—not, of course, arbitrarily, but after having weighed all the facts of the situation. However, it is still easier to analyze a purely military situation than a revolutionary-political one.

The military command has to deal with organized forces, relations which have been carefully studied and prepared, thanks to which the command has its armies, so to speak, in its hands. Clearly it cannot be the same in a revolution. Here the combat units are not separated from the masses of the workers; they can intensify the violence of their blows only when linked with the offensive movement of the masses. That being so, it is up to the revolutionary command to grasp the rhythm of the movement in order to decide with sure judgment on the time when the offensive is to take place. As we see, the timing of an insurrection poses a difficult problem.

It can happen, of course, that the situation is so clear that the party leadership has no further doubts about the timeliness for action: The hour has struck—it is necessary to go into action. But if such an evaluation of the situation is made twenty-four hours before the decisive moment, the call to action may arrive too late. The party, taken unawares, is consequently placed in the impossible position of leading a movement which, in this case, can end up in defeat. Hence the need to foresee as far as possible in advance the coming of the decisive moment or, in other words, to fix in good time the timing of the insurrection on the basis of the general progress of the movement and on the overall situation in the country.

If, for example, the time is fixed for a month or two in advance, the central committee or the leading organ of the party takes advantage of the interval. It gives the party the necessary momentum through decisive agitation which puts all fundamental questions point blank, and through corresponding organizational preparation, the selection and appointment of the most combative elements, etc.

It goes without saying that a date fixed two or three—or still more—four months ahead cannot be irrevocable; but the tactic should be to verify throughout the determined interval whether the chosen date was correct. Let us look at an example.

The political preconditions for the success of an armed insurrection lie in the support which the majority of workers in the principal centers and regions of a country give to the militant vanguard, and the corresponding shattering of the governmental apparatus. Let us suppose that things have not yet reached the critical point but are near it. The forces of the revolutionary party are growing rapidly, but the party finds it still difficult to say whether it has the necessary ma-
ority behind it. Meanwhile, the situation is becoming increasingly serious. The question of insurrection is posed practically. What should the party central committee do? It can, for instance, reason this way:

1) Since, judging by the tempo of the last weeks, the influence of the party is growing rapidly, it is permissible to believe that in such and such main centers of the country the majority of workers are on the point of following us. Under these conditions, let us concentrate the best forces of the party on the decisive points, and let us assume that we shall need about a month to win the majority.

2) Once most of the principal centers are with us, we can call on the workers to set up soviets of workers' deputies, on the condition—it is well understood—that the further shattering of the governmental apparatus will continue. Let us assume that setting up soviets in the main centers and regions of the country requires another two weeks.

3) Once the soviets, organizationally, are under the leadership of the party in the main centers and regions of the country, it follows naturally that the summoning of a national congress of soviets is called for. This requires a further three or four weeks.

Now, it is perfectly evident that in such a situation, the congress of soviets will simply crown the seizure of power, otherwise the congress will be an empty show and will be dispersed—in other words, by the time of the congress, the real apparatus of power will be in the hands of the proletariat. So insurrection is indicated for two to two and a half months ahead: Two and one half months is set as the interval for the preparation of the insurrection.

This time gap, flowing from the general analysis already made of the political situation and its later development, defines the character and tempo that must be given to the military-revolutionary work: Its aim will be the disorganization of the bourgeois army, the seizure of railway networks, the formation and arming of worker detachments, and so on. We allot to the clandestine commander of the city-to-be-conquered well-defined tasks: the taking of such and such measures during the first four weeks, the checking up of all dispositions, and the intensification of preparations during the following two weeks so that in the subsequent fortnight everything will be ready for the action. In this way, by carrying out limited but clearly defined tasks, the military-revolutionary work is completed within the set interval.

We avoid falling into disorder and passivity which can be fatal, and we get on the contrary the necessary fusion of effort flowing from the strengthened resolution of all the leaders of the movement. At the same time, political work will continue undiminished. The revolution follows its own logical course. After a month we will be in a position to check whether the party has really succeeded in winning the majority of workers in the principal centers of the country. This checkup can be made through some kind of referendum, or trade union action, or by street demonstrations; best of all, by a combination of all of them.

If we are convinced that the first stage we outlined to ourselves has been passed as we expected, the date fixed for the insurrection is reinforced in an exceptional way. On the contrary, if it is shown that
whatever may have been the growth of our influence during the past month, we still do not have the majority of workers behind us, it would be prudent to postpone the date of insurrection. During this period we shall have many opportunities for checking up on how far the ruling class has lost its head and to what extent the army has become demoralized and the apparatus of repression weakened. From these observations we shall be able to assess the nature of any weaknesses that may have shown up in our clandestine work of revolutionary preparation.

The organization of soviets will then become a future means of verifying the relation of forces and thereby of establishing whether the conditions are right for the unleashing of the insurrection. Clearly, it will not always be possible at all times and in all places to set up soviets before an insurrection. One must even expect that soviets can be organized only during the action. But, in all cases where, under the leadership of the communist party, it will be possible to organize soviets before the overthrow of the bourgeois regime, they will emerge as the prelude to the coming insurrection. And the date will be only the easier to fix for this.

The party central committee will check up on the work of its military organization. It will assess the results obtained in each branch, and to the extent that the political situation requires it, will give the necessary extra drive to that work. We must expect that the military organization, which bases itself not on the general analysis of the situation and on the relation of existing forces, but on its appreciation of the results it has obtained in its preparatory activity, will always consider itself insufficiently prepared. But it goes without saying that what is decisive at this time is the assessment made of the situation and the relation of the respective forces, the enemy's shock troops and ours. Thus, a date set two, three or four months ahead can have an unequalled effect on the organization of the insurrection, even if we are compelled by later developments to advance or postpone it a few days.

It is clear that the preceding example is purely hypothetical, but it is an excellent illustration of the ideas that should be held on the preparation of an insurrection. It is not a matter of playing blindly with dates but of fixing the date of the insurrection, basing oneself on the progress of events themselves, on the checkup of the correctness of the date during the successive stages of the movement, and then setting the final date to which all other preparatory revolutionary work will be subordinated.

I repeat that in this context a most attentive study should be made of the lessons of the October revolution, the only revolution to date which the proletariat has carried through successfully. From the strategical and tactical standpoints, we should compile a calendar of October. We should demonstrate how events developed, wave after wave, what the repercussions were in the party, in the soviets, inside the central committee, and in the party's military organizations. What was the meaning of the hesitation that showed itself in the party? How heavily did it weigh in the sum total of events? What was the role of
the military organization? This is a work of incalculable value. To
postpone it is to commit an unpardonable crime.

The calm before the storm

There is a further matter of considerable value for the understand­
ing of civil war which, in one way or another, our future "manual" should deal with. Whoever kept in touch with the discussions following the German events of 1923 must certainly have noted the explana­
tion given for the defeat: "The main reason was that the German pro­
letariat was totally lacking in fighting spirit at the decisive moment;
the masses did not want to fight—the best proof of which is that they
did not react at all to the fascist offensive; so, faced with this attitude
of the masses, what could the party do?" and so on, and so on, in
the same strain.

That is what we heard from Comrades Brandler, Thalheimer and
the others. At first glance, the argument seems irrefutable: The masses
did not want to fight; so what could the party do? However, where
did the "decisive moment" come from? It was the result of a whole
preceding period of struggles which kept increasing and growing
sharper.

The year 1923 was marked from beginning to end by battles which
the German proletariat was compelled to fight. So how did it happen
that on the eve of its own October the German working class suddenly
gave up its combative mood? This is incomprehensible. The question
follows naturally: Is there any true indication that the workers did
not want to fight? This question leads us back to our experience in
the events of our October.

If we reread the newspapers (even only the party's) of the time
preceding the October revolution, we see comrades opposing the idea
of an insurrection, arguing specifically the unwillingness of the Rus­
sian workers to fight. Today, it scarcely seems credible, yet that was
the main argument they brought forward. So we find ourselves in an
analogous position: All through 1917 the Russian proletariat had
manned the posts, yet, when the question of the seizure of power was
posed, voices were raised saying that the masses of the workers did
not want to fight. In fact, on the eve of October, the movement did
slow down a little.

Was that the effect of chance? Or rather, should we not see here
some historical "law"? To formulate this law would, perhaps, be pre­
mature. But without a doubt, such a phenomenon must have some
general cause. In nature, the phenomenon is called the calm before
the storm. I am inclined to believe that in a revolutionary period this
phenomenon has no other meaning.

During a given period the combativeness of the proletariat grows;
it takes different forms: strikes, demonstrations, street confrontations.
For the first time the masses begin to grow conscious of their strength.
The growing dimensions of the movement are now sufficient for po­
litical satisfaction. Yesterday hundreds and thousands took part in the
movement, today millions. A whole series of economic and political
positions are adopted through elemental pressure; therefore the masses readily join in every new strike.

But this period inevitably exhausts itself; and, as the experience of the masses becomes greater, their organization develops. In the opposing camp, the enemy shows that it has decided not to yield without a fight. The result is that the revolutionary mood of the masses becomes more critical, more profound, more uneasy. The masses are looking—especially if they have made mistakes and suffered defeats—for a reliable lead; they want to be convinced that we will and can lead them and that in the decisive battle they can count on victory.

Now, it is this passage from quasi-blind optimism to a clearer consciousness of the difficulties that causes this revolutionary pause, corresponding, to some extent, to a crisis in the mood of the masses. If the rest of the situation lends itself to it, this crisis can be dissipated, but only by a political party, and above all by the impression this party gives of being genuinely decided on leading an insurrection.

Meantime, the historic grandeur of the goal to be attained (the seizure of power) raises inevitable hesitation right inside the party, especially in its leading circles on whom will soon be concentrated the responsibility for the movement. So, retreat of the masses before battle and hesitation of leaders are two phenomena which, without being equivalent, are nonetheless simultaneous. That is why we hear warning voices saying, "The masses don't want to fight; on the contrary, their mood is passive; under these conditions it would be adventurism to drive them to insurrection." It goes without saying that when such a mood prevails the revolution can only be defeated. And, after the defeat, provoked by the party itself, there is nothing to stop the party telling all and sundry that the insurrection was an impossibility because the masses did not want it.

This question must be examined in full. Basing oneself on acquired experience, one must learn to recognize the pre-insurrectionary moment when the proletariat says to itself, "Nothing more is to be gained from strikes, demonstrations and other protests. Now we must fight. I am ready because there is no other way out; but it must be a fight to the finish, that is, with all our strength and under a reliable leadership." At such a time the situation is extremely critical. There is the most complete disequilibrium: a ball on the tip of a cone. The slightest shock can make it fall one way or another. In our case, thanks to the firmness and resolution of the party leadership, the ball followed the line which led to victory. In Germany, the party policy sent the ball on the line to defeat.

Politics and military affairs

How shall we characterize our "manual"—as political or military? We begin at the point where politics changes into military action, and therefore look at politics from the point of view of military action. At first glance this might appear contradictory because it is not politics which serves insurrection but insurrection which serves politics. In reality there is no contradiction here. Clearly, insurrection entirely serves the basic aims of proletarian politics. But when the insurrec-
tion is unleashed, the politics of the period must be entirely subordinated to it.

The passage from politics to military action and the conjunction of these two alternatives generally create great difficulties. We all know that the point of junction is always the weakest. Also it is easy to stumble at the point of the junction of politics and its military continuation. We have considered this a little here.

Comrade X has shown by negative example how difficult it is to combine politics and military action correctly. Comrade Y followed and aggravated the previous speaker's error. If we are to believe Comrade X, Lenin, in 1918, denied the importance of the Red Army, on the ground that our security depended on the struggle which had pitted the rival imperialisms against each other. According to Comrade Y we played "the role of the third robber."

Comrade Lenin never did nor could he have used this kind of language. Both comrades have made here an incorrect transition from politics to military affairs. It is absolutely certain that at the time of the October revolution, if we had had to contend with a victorious Germany, with peace concluded in Europe, Germany would not have failed to crush us even if we had had one hundred thousand, five hundred thousand or three million men in the field. Neither in 1918 nor in 1919 would we have been able to find the strength to stand up against the triumphant German armies. Consequently, the struggle between the two imperialist camps was our chief line of defense.

But within the framework of that struggle we would have met death a hundred times if, in 1918, we had not had our small and weak Red Army. Was it because England and France had paralyzed Germany that the Kazan problem was solved? * Had our half-partisan, half-regular, divisions not defended Kazan, making the Whites move on to Nizhny and Moscow, they would have cut our throats like chickens, and they would have been right to do so. At that time it would have been a sorry game to make a show of being "the third robber"—with our throats cut.

Comrade Lenin, when he said, "Dear friends, militant workers, do not exaggerate your importance; you represent one factor in the complex of forces, but you are neither the only nor the main one; in reality, we are maintaining ourselves thanks to the European war which is paralyzing the two rival imperialisms," was taking a political point of view. But it does not follow that he was denying "the importance of the Red Army." Were we to apply this method of argumentation to the internal problems of a revolution, for example, to armed insurrection, we would finish up with some very curious conclusions.

For instance, let us take the question of the organization of combat units. A communist party whose existence is more or less illegal

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*A crucial turning point in the Russian civil war. At Kazan and nearby Svyazhsk in August-September 1918, partisan detachments under Trotsky's direct leadership stood firm against the invading Czechoslovak White Army; in the process they were organized by Trotsky into an arm of the Red Army. [D. R.]
charges its clandestine military organization with the formation of fighting units. What, basically, do a few dozen units set up in this way represent in relation to the problem of the seizure of power? From the social and historical point of view, the question of power is decided by the composition of the society, by the role of the proletariat in production, by its political maturity, by the degree of disorganization in the bourgeois state, and so on. In reality, all these factors play their parts, but only in the long run, whereas the outcome of the struggle can depend directly on the existence of these few dozen units.

The requisite social and political conditions for the seizure of power are the preconditions of success (and the introduction to the manual should deal with them); but they do not automatically guarantee victory. They allow us to go forward to the point where politics gives place to insurrection—where we say, "Now let's do some work with bayonets."

Once more, civil war is only the sharpened continuation of the class struggle. As for insurrection, it is the continuation of politics by other means. That is why it can be understood only from the angle of its special means. It is not possible to measure politics with the scale of war any more than it is possible to measure war with the scale of politics, if only for the matter of time. This is a special problem which merits serious treatment in our future manual of civil war. In the period of revolutionary preparation, we measure time with the political scale, that is, in years, months and weeks. In the period of insurrection we measure time in days and hours.

It is not for nothing that we say that in time of war a month, sometimes even a single day, counts for a whole year. In April 1917, Comrade Lenin said, "Patiently, tirelessly, explain to the workers . . ." At the end of October there was no time to give explanations to those who had not yet understood; it was necessary to go over to the offensive, leading those who had already grasped what was what. In October, the loss of a single day could have brought to nought all the work of several months, even years, of revolutionary preparation.

This reminds me of a theme for maneuvers we set some time ago to our Military Academy. There was some disagreement concerning the decision whether to evacuate immediately the Byelostok region, where the position was untenable, or whether to hold on in the hope that Byelostok, a workers' center, would rise in insurrection. It goes without saying that this kind of problem cannot be settled seriously except on the basis of precise and real data. A military maneuver does not have these data since everything about it is conventional. However, in practice, the controversy turned on two time scales: one purely military, the other revolutionary-political. Now, all things being equal, which scale will give success in war?

The military one. In other words, it was doubtful whether Byelostok could rise in the space of a few days, and even granting that it could, it still remained to be learned what the insurgent proletariat could do, without arms and without any military preparation. And at the same time, it was very possible that in those two or three days, two
or three divisions would be decimated while holding on in an untenable position, hoping for an insurrection which, even if it did take place, could not very well modify radically the military situation.

Brest-Litovsk gives us a classic example of an incorrect application of the political and military time scales.* As is known, the majority of the central committee of the Russian Communist Party, myself among them, decided, against the minority headed by Lenin, not to sign the peace although we ran the risk of seeing the Germans go over to the offensive. What was the meaning of that decision? Some comrades were hoping in a utopian way for a revolutionary war. Others, including myself, thought it necessary to try out the German workers in order to learn whether they would oppose the Kaiser should he attack the revolution.

What was the error we committed? In the excessive risk we ran. To stir up the German workers would have required weeks, even months, whereas at that time the German armies needed only a few days to advance as far as Dvinsk, Minsk and Moscow. The time scale of revolutionary politics is long; the time scale of war is short. And—this must be done with personal experience—whoever does not reach a clear conclusion which has to be thought out and generalized runs the risk of creating a source of new errors where revolutionary politics and military action are conjoined, that is, in a field which gives us superiority over the enemy.

The need for utmost clarity
in posing the problems of civil war

Comrade P has brought us back to the question of what kind of manual we are to write, a manual of insurrection or of civil war. We should not, our comrade tells us, aim too high, otherwise, in a general way, our task will duplicate the tasks of the Communist International. Nothing of the kind! Whoever uses this kind of language shows that he is confusing civil war, using the term correctly, with class struggle.

If we take Germany as the subject for study, for example, we can, with great profit, begin by studying the events of March 1921. Then follows a long period of the regroupment of forces under the slogan of the united front. It is evident that no manual of civil war is suitable for this period. In January 1923, with the occupation of the Ruhr, again there is a revolutionary situation which is sharply aggravated in June 1923, when the policy of passive resistance played by the German bourgeoisie collapses and the apparatus of the bour-

* The Brest-Litovsk treaty (1918) concluded the war between revolutionary Russia and imperialist Germany. Although Lenin's peace proposal was initially resisted by more than half the delegates of the All-Russian Soviet Congress, it was finally accepted. Russia had to concede a huge indemnity and relinquish great territory. Trotsky protracted the negotiations as long as possible to give the strike movement in Germany a chance to develop to revolutionary proportions but the German social democracy stifled this insurgent movement. [D. R.]
geois state cracks at all its seams. This is the period we ought to study in detail, because it gives us on the one hand a classic example of how a revolutionary situation develops and ripens and, on the other hand, a no-less classic example of a revolution that was missed.

Last year, Germany had its civil war, but the armed insurrection that should have crowned and settled it, did not come. The result was a truly exceptional revolutionary situation which was irremediably compromised and led to a new consolidation of the bourgeoisie. Why? Because at the right moment politics was not continued by the other necessary means, that is, by the means of arms.

It is clear that the bourgeois regime which has been restored in Germany, following the abortion of the proletarian revolution, is of dubious stability. We can be sure we shall have again in Germany, in due course, sooner or later, a fresh revolutionary situation. It is clear that August 1924 will be very different from August 1923. But if we close our eyes to the experience of these events, if we do not use this experience to educate ourselves, if we continue passively to make mistakes like those already made, we can expect to see the German catastrophe of 1923 repeated, and the consequent dangers for the revolutionary movement will be immense.

That is why, on this question more than any other, we cannot tolerate any deformation of our fundamental ideas. We have heard here incoherent, skeptical objections on the subject of the timing of the insurrection. They only show the inability to pose in a Marxist way the question of insurrection as an art.

The argument was invoked as something new and instructive that, in the confusion of an extremely complex and variable situation, it is impermissible to tie one's hands in advance by some decision or other. But if we want to carry such commonplaces to their logical conclusion, we shall have to renounce plans and dates in military operations too, because in war it also happens that the situation changes sharply and unexpectedly. No military operation is ever fulfilled 100 per cent; we must even count ourselves lucky if it is fulfilled 25 per cent, in other words, if it only undergoes a 75 per cent change while being executed. But any military leader who relied on this to deny in general the usefulness of a plan of campaign would quite simply deserve to be put in a straitjacket.

In any case, I recommend sticking closely to this method as the most correct and most logical one: First formulate the general rules, general norms, then see what can be omitted or held back. But if we begin by omitting and reserving, deviating, doubting and hesitating, we shall never come to any conclusion.

One comrade participating in this discussion has challenged a remark I made, on the evolution of the party's military organization in the period of revolutionary preparation, during the insurrection and after the seizure of power. According to this comrade, the existence of partisan detachments should not be permitted because only regular military formations are necessary. Partisan detachments, he tells us, are chaotic organizations.

Hearing these words, I was near to despair. What kind of impos-
sible, doctrinaire and academic arrogance is this? If partisan detachments are chaotic, then, from this purely formal point of view, we must recognize that revolution, too, is chaotic.

Now, in the first period of a revolution we are completely compelled to rely on such detachments. Objection is made to us that the detachments should be built along regular lines. If that means that in partisan warfare we must not neglect any element of order and method suited to this kind of warfare, we are in full agreement. But if someone is dreaming of some kind of hierarchical military organization, centralized and constituted before the insurrection has taken place, that would be utopianism which, when you put it in practice, would risk proving fatal.

If, with the help of a clandestine military organization, I have to seize a town (a partial goal in the overall plan for seizing power in a country), I divide my work into separate objectives: occupation of government buildings, railway stations, post offices, telegraph offices, printing works. And I allot the execution of each of these missions to heads of small detachments who are put in the picture beforehand about the goals they have been assigned to. Each detachment must be self-reliant; it must have its own commissary, otherwise it can happen that after seizing the post office, for example, it will be totally lacking in food supplies. Any attempt to centralize and hierarchize these detachments would inevitably lead to bureaucratism which, in time of war, is doubly reprehensible: one, because it would make the heads of detachments falsely believe that someone else will pass them orders whereas, on the contrary, they must be fully convinced that they can exercise the greatest freedom of movement and maximum initiative; two, because bureaucratism, tied to a hierarchical system, would transfer the best elements from the detachments to the needs of all kinds of general staffs. From the first moment of the insurrection, these general staffs for the most part will be suspended between heaven and earth, while the detachments, waiting for orders from above, will find themselves suffering inaction and loss of time. This will ensure that the insurrection will fail. For these reasons, the contempt of professional soldiers for "chaotic" partisan organizations must be condemned as unrealistic, unscientific and non-Marxist.

Similarly, after the seizure of power in the principal centers of a country, the partisan detachments can play an extremely effective role in the periphery of the country. Do we have to remind ourselves of the help the partisan detachments brought to the Red Army and the revolution by operating behind the German troops in the Ukraine and behind Kolchak's troops in Siberia?

Nevertheless, we must formulate the incontrovertible rule: the revolutionary power works to incorporate the best partisan detachments and their most reliable elements into the system of a regular military organization. Otherwise these partisan detachments could undoubtedly become factors of disorder, capable of degenerating into armed bands in the service of petty bourgeois anarchistic elements for use against the proletarian state. We have not a few examples of this.

It is true that among the partisans rebelling against the idea of a
regular military organization there have also been heroes. The names of Sivers and Kikvidze have been cited. I could name many more. Sivers and Kikvidze fought and died as heroes. And today, in the light of their immense merits for the revolution, this and that negative side of their partisan actions fade to nothingness. Yet, at the time, it was absolutely necessary to fight against everything that was negative in them. Only through fighting against partisanism did we succeed in organizing the Red Army and achieve decisive victories.

Once again, I warn against confusion in terminology, because most often it masks confusion in ideas. Similarly, I warn against mistakes that can be made by refusing to pose the question of insurrection in a clear and courageous way on the pretext that situations vary and are constantly being modified.

Superficially, in a strange sort of way, this is called dialectics; in any case, it is willingly accepted as such. But in reality it is nothing of the kind. Dialectical thought is like a spring, and springs are made of tempered steel. Doubt and reservations teach nothing at all. When the essential idea is brought into high relief, reservations and limitations can be arranged around it in a logical way. If we stay only with the reservations, the result will be confusion in theory and chaos in practice. But confusion and chaos have nothing in common with dialectics. In reality, pseudo-dialectics of this kind most often hides social democratic or stupid sentiments about revolution, as though it were something made outside ourselves. Were it so, there would be no question of conceiving of insurrection as an art. And yet it is precisely the theory of this art we wish to study.

All the questions we have raised should be thought out, worked over and formulated. They should be an integral part of our military instruction and education, at least for the high command.

The relation of these questions to the problems of the defense of the Soviet Union are indisputable. Our enemies continue to charge that the Red Army has what they call the task of artificially provoking revolutionary movements in other countries; they do this in order to stop these movements by force of bayonets. Needless to say, this caricature has nothing in common with the policy we pursue. We are above all interested in the maintenance of peace; we have proved this by our attitude, by the concessions we have made in treaties, and by the progressive reduction of our army forces.

But we are sufficiently imbued with revolutionary realism to take clearly into account that our enemies will attempt to test us out with their arms. And, if we are far from the idea of forcing, by artificial military measures, the development of revolution, we are on the other hand convinced that a war by capitalist states against the Soviet Union will be followed by violent social upheavals, the preconditions of civil war, in the lands of our enemies. We must be ready for this.

We must know how to combine the defensive war that will be imposed on our Red Army with civil war in the enemy camp. To this end, the manual of civil war should become one of the necessary elements in a superior type of military-revolutionary instruction.

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With the revolution of October 1917, the problems of socialism were added to the problems of relations between states.

The class struggle on a world scale took a dual form: the struggle between social classes in each country, with its inevitable international repercussions, became intertwined with the relations between the USSR (and after 1945, other countries which had overthrown capitalism) and the bourgeois states.

Marxist theory, which had traditionally started from the general assumption that socialist revolution would triumph first in the most advanced countries of the world, had not prepared a set of guiding rules for revolutionists in these new conditions. It had paid little attention to the implications of the conquest of state power on the international conduct of revolutionary policies. Soviet and non-Soviet communist leaders had to work out ad hoc theories in this respect in the period immediately following the October revolution. Great controversies surrounded these problems, from the early days of Soviet power to the current period. The debates about the relation between the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations and the revolution in Central Europe; the controversies in the 1920s about the theory of permanent revolution and the possibility of building socialism in one country; the discussions at the international conferences of Communist parties in 1957 and 1960, and their explosion into the public Sino-Soviet rift around the problems of "peaceful coexistence"—these can all be traced in the last analysis to the same context.

World revolution and the defense of Soviet Russia in Lenin's time

The Bolshevik leaders had to tackle these problems amidst chaos and civil war, beset by foreign intervention by a dozen capitalist powers, and under the heavy pressure of immediate burning needs. Nevertheless, it can be said that they tried to remain as faithful as
possible to their revolutionary convictions, and that in the process they evolved a certain number of rules to prevent power politics and "raison d'etat" from getting the better of their principles.

Conceptually, they affirmed the unity of the interests of the Soviet state and world revolution in such a way as to subordinate, ultimately, the first to the second; the very conquest of power in Russia was seen and justified primarily as a contribution to the development of socialist revolution in other, more advanced countries. Institutionally, the newly founded Communist International was completely independent from the Soviet state and its diplomatic network or maneuvers. If there was a personal union between the leaders of the state and the Russian representatives in the International, it only underlined that, in the last analysis, the Soviet section of the Communist International considered itself as part of the movement for world revolution.

These elementary principles did not solve the whole complex problem. Very early, even before the foundation of the Communist International, the problem of concluding a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk projected into the debate questions of the dialectics of self-defense and the self-perpetuation of the young workers' republic in relation to the prospects of world revolution. The opponents of the Brest-Litovsk peace in the revolutionary movement outside the Bolshevik Party (the left SRs) as well as inside the Bolshevik Party, accused Lenin of betraying world revolution by strengthening the Central powers through the conclusion of a separate peace. In part nationalist rather than internationalist motives explained this opposition to the Brest-Litovsk treaty. In part mistaken estimates of the immediate maturity of revolutionary conditions in Germany, Austria and Hungary, and erroneous evaluations as to the consequences of the Brest-Litovsk treaty upon the subsequent maturing of these conditions were at the bottom of the arguments of Lenin's opponents.

But what emerges from this whole debate is Lenin's principled conduct and his staunch adherence to the tenet of subordinating the interests of the Soviet state to those of world revolution. Not for one moment does he conceive of putting a brake upon revolutionary propaganda among German soldiers in order to receive less harsh peace conditions from the Central powers. At no time did he propose to the German revolutionists to "help" save the Soviet state by moderating their opposition to the imperialist war machinery and state of their own rulers. On the contrary, he strongly approved of Trotsky's revolutionary agitation at Brest-Litovsk, whose effects in undermining war morale in Central Europe should not be underestimated. The debate over the Brest-Litovsk separate peace treaty did not revolve around the question of whether world revolution should be sacrificed to the self-defense of the Soviet state. It revolved around the problem of whether world revolution would best be served by a desperate "revolutionary war" by the young Soviet republic against the Central powers, which would lead rapidly to the occupation of revolutionary
Petrograd and Moscow, or whether by deliberately trading space for time the Bolsheviks would thereby both save Soviet Russia and hasten the outbreak of a revolution in Central Europe.  

History proved Lenin to be right. One of his chief imperialist opponents at that time, German Imperial Chief of Staff Ludendorff, sadly stated in his memoirs that the balance sheet of Brest-Litovsk had accelerated the disintegration of the Reich. By saving their young republic, Lenin and Trotsky had not made the outbreak of the German, Austrian and Hungarian revolutions more difficult; on the contrary, they had accelerated the revolutionary process in Central Europe that came to a head less than nine months after the conclusion of the separate peace. And there are many indications that this assistance was not only moral and political, but that it also took very concrete material forms. 

The question of the defense of the Soviet state against foreign intervention loomed large among the innumerable political obligations which the Communist International took upon itself during the first years of its existence. This defense was conceived, in the first place, as a specific task for revolutionary action, for example, at the time of the threat of French intervention against Soviet Russia during the Polish campaign in 1920. But the means suggested for that defense were solely the means of revolutionary class struggle: demonstrations, strikes by specific groups of the working class (dockers, railway workers, workers in munition factories), or general strikes. In this way, the problems of the revolutionary defense of Soviet Russia, although implying certain specific tasks, blended harmoniously with those of preparing favorable conditions for an expansion of international revolution. 

Three special aspects of Soviet foreign policy in Lenin's time exemplify this general approach to the problem of interrelating the defense of the Soviet state with the tasks of the developing world revolution. It is well known that Lenin rigidly applied his thesis of the right of all nationalities to self-determination immediately after the October revolution and accepted the independence of Finland headed by the counterrevolutionary Svinhufud government. He justified this action—which was evidently detrimental to the interests of Soviet Russia as a state, for example from the point of view of military self-defense—by the internal needs of the Finnish revolution and the communist movement in that country. 

It is also known that Trotsky was opposed to Tukhachevsky's quick offensive toward Warsaw in 1920, because the Polish revolution was not yet ripe and such a military move would strengthen chauvinism among the Polish workers, and thereby slow down and not hasten the revolutionary process in that country; Lenin recognized that Trotsky was right in that respect. Finally, when preparing the Rapallo and Genoa conferences, and trying to create a rift in the front of imperialist states against Soviet Russia, the Bolshevik govern-
ment did not let this maneuver influence the strategic or tactical tasks of the German Communist Party. The Communist International maintained its course toward a proletarian revolution in Germany; Lenin insisted on the necessity of winning a majority influence among the German workers in order to attain that goal.

Of late, an attempt has been made to present Lenin as the father of the "theory of peaceful coexistence," and a parallel legend has been developed about Trotsky advocating "instantaneous revolution" in all countries through military interventions of the Soviet state. Neither myth has any foundation, either in the theories or in the practices of the founders of the Soviet system and the Communist International.

Genuine misunderstandings (we don't concern ourselves with deliberate falsifications) arise from the dialectical nature of the interrelationship between the Soviet state and the world revolution. Defending the first and furthering the second cannot be conceived simply as a single process with a single logic. Both have a specific logic of their own.

The needs of defending the Soviet state by diplomatic and military means must be recognized as genuine and as a specific part of the general task of world revolution. In the same sense, the needs of furthering revolution implies specific tasks in each specific country, which must be recognized as genuine, and which cannot be confused with any of the needs of defending the USSR. Only if the special requirements of the two tasks are recognized can the unity of the movement be achieved on a higher level.

It is as wrong to advocate subordination of the strategy and tactic of the revolutionary movement in any country to the needs of defending the Soviet state as it is wrong to call upon that state to "hasten" revolution in other countries by untimely military or diplomatic moves which would threaten its own security. World revolution must be seen as a process conditioned in the first place by a maturing of favorable objective and subjective conditions for the conquest of power by the proletariat in a successive series of countries, a maturing which can be strongly influenced but not artificially decided by what happens on the international scale. Both the internal policies of the revolutionary party and the international policies of the Soviet state should be conducted in such a way as to hasten and not to slow down these maturing processes. 13

It is only in this framework that the so-called theory of peaceful coexistence between states of different social natures, attributed to Lenin, 14 can be correctly understood. What it means is simply that the autonomy of tasks for the proletarian state, as long as world revolution has not triumphed in most countries, implies the necessity of accepting prolonged periods of armistice with the bourgeois states, during which all the prerequisites of inter-state relations (diplomacy, trade, etc.) should be used for strengthening its own positions. In that most general and abstract sense, the theory is of course correct.
Its negation would imply the duty of a proletarian state to maintain permanent conditions of military warfare with its hostile environment, without taking into consideration any question of resources, relationship of forces, capacity of resistance, etc.

But such a trivial "theory," expressing the simple need of physical survival and economic growth, cannot be construed to imply any "general line" of the foreign policy of the workers' states, or even worse, of the world revolutionary movement. 15 "Peaceful coexistence" between states of different social natures must be seen as what it is in fact: an armistice—and a temporary one—on one of the fronts of the international class war. This war goes on uninterruptedly on the other front, of internal class struggle in each country (which does not, of course, mean that it always takes the violent form of armed uprisings and clashes). It will periodically involve the workers state in military conflicts.

Both fronts constantly interact upon each other until they blend into an immediate unity (at moments) of exacerbated social and military tension on a world scale. Any other position reflects either the abandonment of the goal of world revolution, or the reformist illusion that this goal can be achieved through the peaceful and gradual elimination of capitalism, nationally and internationally—an illusion which has been cruelly contradicted by reality for more than half a century.

'Socialism in one country' and the 'Soviet bulwark' in Stalin's time

After Lenin's death, a subtle transformation took place in this dialectical interrelationship between the defense of the interests of the Soviet state power and the furthering of world revolution. This transformation was so subtle that it was not recognized by most of the participants in the process, including its main author. As late as 1925, Stalin wrote in a pamphlet entitled "Questions and Answers":

Let us come to the second danger. It is characterized by skepticism towards the proletarian world revolution and the national liberation movement of the colonies and vassal countries; by lack of understanding of the fact that, without the support of the international revolutionary movement, our country could not have resisted world imperialism; by lack of understanding of that other fact that the triumph of socialism in one country cannot be final (this country having no guarantee against an intervention) as long as the revolution has not won in the least several other countries; by a lack of that elementary internationalism which implies that the triumph of socialism in one country should not be considered an end in itself, but a means of developing and supporting the revolution in other countries.

This is the road leading to nationalism, to degeneration, to complete liquidation of the foreign policy of the proletariat, because those who are infected with this disease consider our country not as a part of the world revolutionary movement, but as the beginning and the end of that
movement, as they believe that the interests of all other (revolutionary movements) must be sacrificed to those of our country.\textsuperscript{16}

It would be an oversimplification to state that this process of transformation was actually initiated by Lenin's death. Already before 1924, indications of such a change had appeared.\textsuperscript{17} Confusedly mingled with the debate about the possibility of achieving the construction of "socialism in one country," the change found its first theoretical expression in the "Draft Program of the Communist International" written by the unfortunate Bukharin. From unconscious and piecemeal changes, the transformation became more and more open and deliberate in the early 1930s expressing itself in the decline and fall of the Comintern, and finally its dissolution by Stalin in 1943.

The coincidence between the beginning of this process and the end of the first postwar revolutionary wave in Europe could create the impression of a causal link between these two sets of phenomena: The Bolsheviks subordinated the interests of the Soviet state to those of world revolution as long as world revolution remained a practical proposition; they moved towards a subordination of the interests of the world communist movement to the task of consolidating the Soviet state, economically, diplomatically and militarily, as soon as it appeared to them that an international expansion of the revolution had ceased to be a likely short-term perspective. Or to put it in other terms: The survival of the Soviet state could be based either on revolutionary expansion, or on a division between its enemies. If expansion of the revolution became unlikely, it would be necessary to concentrate on divisions between imperialist enemies, even to the point of sacrificing some revolutionary interests.\textsuperscript{18}

We shall not deny that many communist leaders and militants, both inside and outside the Soviet Union, rationalized the fundamental turn in the Comintern's policies in the 1920s in this way. There seems to be no point in questioning the sincerity of at least part of those who continue to cling to this kind of argument till this very day.\textsuperscript{19} But Marxists cannot limit themselves to examining the motivations which parties and social layers invoke for explaining their own actions. They must check these motivations against the background of objective reality and of social interests; that is, they must try to explain the objective reasons which led social forces to behave in a certain way. From this point of view, it is easy to recognize that the reasons invoked for the new policies followed by the Soviet leaders beginning in the mid-1920s, and their supporters at home and abroad, do not hold water and do not offer a really satisfactory explanation for a change in behavior which ended in a complete somersault.

First of all it must be recognized that if a temporary stabilization of capitalism indeed followed the first postwar revolutionary wave in Europe, this stabilization was only temporary, and the 1920s and 1930s were interlaced with grave social and political crises in several
key countries. These bore testimony to the maturing of pre-revolutionary conditions—to say the least: the German crisis in 1923; the general strike in Britain in 1926; the Chinese revolution of 1925-27; the German crisis of 1930-33; the Spanish revolution of 1931; the Asturias uprising in Spain in 1934; the Spanish civil war particularly in the period 1936-37; the general strike with factory occupations in France in 1936—just to name the most important crises, which put socialist revolution again and again upon the agenda of half a dozen major countries in Europe and Asia.

Secondly, the outcome of these crises, which ended in working class defeats and strengthened the downward trend of world revolution, cannot be separated from the actual policies of the working class parties participating in them, in the first place of the Communist parties, which were the only ones during that period with avowedly revolutionary objectives. The main contradiction in the apologetic positions adopted by those who justify Stalin's policy of subordinating the interests of the international socialist movement to the so-called interests of consolidating the Soviet state's power position in the world lies in the fact that the "impossibility of world revolution," far from being an objective fact, resulted to a large extent first from the political mistakes and afterwards from the deliberate political options taken by the leaders of the Soviet Union themselves.20

Thirdly, by counterposing in a mechanistic way the interests of furthering world revolution to those of consolidating the Soviet state, the Soviet leadership under Stalin objectively demonstrated that it was moved by social motives quite distinct from those of furthering the genuine interests of the Soviet Union. In the light of subsequent history it would be hard to prove, for example, that the conquest of power by Hitler was in the interests of the Soviet Union.21 In fact, a correct policy by revolutionary parties, which would lead to the maturing of favorable internal conditions in various countries, enabling them to conquer power, could be construed in no way whatsoever to lead to a weakening of the position of the USSR on a world scale. Post-second world war history has proved this proposition to the hilt.

But, it may be asked, wouldn't the international extension of the revolution have sharpened the international class struggle and increased international tensions, including tensions on an inter-state level? Indeed it would have—but it would have sharpened these tensions, precisely as a result of a change in the international relationship of forces favorable to the Soviet Union. That under these conditions, such a "sharpening of tension" was not something detrimental to the interests of the Soviet Union seems rather obvious. Wouldn't the imperialists react under these conditions by unleashing war against the Soviet Union? This question cannot be answered in the abstract; it needs concrete examination, as will follow both in respect to the Spanish and Yugoslav civil wars. But what should be stressed at
this point is the extreme oversimplification which is at the bottom of this kind of reasoning. In this kind of argument, the world bourgeoisie is represented as a group of conspirators who anxiously scan the skies for any "pretext" offered them to start intervention against the Soviet Union. The ne plus ultra of revolutionary wisdom consists in not "offering the pretext" for such intervention. History and social conflict are degraded to a vulgar spy game, each side busily engaged in "outwitting" the other.

Is it necessary to stress that this representation of contemporary social conflict and international relations bears only the vaguest resemblance to reality? The historical reality is based upon contending forces, inside each country and internationally. What is decisive is the dynamics of the relationship between forces. In order to start an intervention against the Soviet Union, it is not enough for the bourgeoisie of one of the larger countries to be "provoked" by the extension of the revolution; it is necessary, at the very least, to have reduced its own working class to a position of political and social weakness and/or ideological disarmament, where it has become unable to react in the manner in which the European working class did react, for example, in 1920-21. It is also necessary to have at its disposal the necessary point of intervention from a purely military and geographical point of view. Internal divisions in the imperialist camp are important indeed. But they cannot take precedence over the two factors which have just been stressed. Therefore, any change in the social relationship of forces which increases the militancy and revolutionary spirit of the working class of key imperialist countries makes it more difficult and not easier for imperialism to start a war against the Soviet Union. And any victory of socialist revolution in a new country often has precisely that effect upon the workers inside the key imperialist states.

It is therefore essential to view the change in the official USSR attitude toward world revolution expressed in Stalin's famous interview with the U.S. journalist Roy Howard as reflecting not the genuine global interests of the Soviet state or soviet society, but those of a particular social layer inside that society, characterized by a basically conservative attitude to the world situation, by a desire to maintain the international status quo. Whatever may be the rationalization of this attitude by the Soviet leaders or their apologists, the social roots for this conservatism can only be discovered inside Soviet society itself, in the specific role of that leading stratum and its specific relationship to the basic classes of contemporary Soviet society, the working class and the peasantry.

It is not the purpose of this study to analyze in a detailed way the social nature and function of that upper stratum, the Soviet bureaucracy. This analysis was made before the war by Leon Trotsky, and further developed after the second world war by his followers. In our opinion, it remains fundamentally valid today. From the spe-
cific place of that bureaucracy in Soviet society flows its specific role in world politics. It is not a new class, but a privileged stratum of the proletariat which has usurped exclusive exercise of political power and total control over the social surplus product within the framework of a planned socialized economy. It can appropriate its essential privileges in the means of consumption only on the dual basis of the collective property of the means of production on one hand and political passivity of the Soviet masses on the other.

This role reflects the fundamentally contradictory and dual nature of the Soviet bureaucracy. On the one hand, it is genuinely attached to the new social order which has emerged in the Soviet Union from the October revolution and the violent destruction of private agriculture by Stalin's forced collectivization. It tries to defend this order—the basis for its power and privileges—by means which correspond to its own narrow special interests. By defending Soviet society, it objectively serves the international extension of the revolution, independently of its own desires and motives.24

On the other hand it is instinctively afraid of any upsetting of the international status quo, not only for psychological reasons which reflect its fundamentally conservative nature in Soviet society, but also because it fears the profound transformations which an extension of the international revolution would provoke, both in the political apathy of the Soviet working class and in the internal relationship of forces inside the world Communist movement.25 The transformation of the Communist International into a "frontier guard" of the Soviet Union, elevated to the position of the "main bulwark" of the world proletariat, to whose diplomatic and military defense every single workers' movement in every single country had to be subordinated, faithfully reflects the specific interests of that bureaucratic caste.26

At the end of this process of transformation, the initial relationship of the Soviet state to world revolution, as seen by Lenin, is completely overthrown. The Soviet Union is no longer seen as an instrument of furthering world revolution; on the contrary, the international Communist movement is viewed as an instrument to further the immediate twists and turns of Soviet diplomacy.27 The "unity" of the Soviet Union and international revolution is degraded from the principled height where Lenin and Trotsky had placed it to the lowest level of pragmatic expediency: Communist parties have to ruthlessly sacrifice the militancy, consciousness and self-confidence of the working classes of their respective countries on the altar of the "state power interests" embodied by the Soviet government. The outcome of this process historically was a tremendous weakening of the proletarian forces, which enabled Hitler to concentrate all the resources of the European continent against the Soviet Union with very little initial resistance by the defeated and disoriented masses of Europe, and which brought the Soviet Union within an inch of military collapse.
The Spanish and Yugoslav examples

The real interrelationship between the potential extension of Soviet power and the threat of imperialist intervention against the USSR can be most vividly understood if one analyzes the concrete circumstances under which the problem was posed historically. The two outstanding cases are those of the Spanish revolution in the inter-war period and the Yugoslav revolution during and immediately after the second world war.

The Spanish revolution of 1936 presented the world with one of the maturest examples of revolutionary conditions since those of Russia in 1917. In answer to a fascist military putsch led by generals Sanjurgo, Mola and Franco, and notwithstanding the notorious lack of preparation, understanding and initiative of their official leaderships, the Spanish workers and poor peasants rose with an admirable revolutionary ardor, stormed military barracks and in a few days had crushed the uprising in all the large cities with the exception of Seville, had seized the factories and landed estates and started to build their own armed militia, which drove the fascist armies away from one province after another. With a minimum of revolutionary audacity and organization, the revolution could have crushed the uprising in a few months time, among other things by promising the independence of Spanish Morocco to Franco's Moorish troops, by starting to divide up the land, by calling upon Franco's Spanish troops to desert in order to receive their property in the villages, and generally by consolidating the new socialist order born from the heroism of the July-August-September 1936 days.

The Communist International, assisted by the social democracy and by the significant reformist illusions of the main Spanish anarchist leaders, crushed these prospects within a few months' time. Under the pretext of not "alienating" the sympathy of the British and French bourgeoisie, they prevented the revolution from reaching its climax in the clear establishment of a socialist federation. They used the Soviet arms deliveries to Spain in order to impose their ruthless leadership first on the International Brigades, then on the Spanish government itself. One after another, the revolutionary conquests of the summer of 1936 were torn away from the workers and poor peasants in the name of reestablishing "republican," (that is, bourgeois) "law and order." A regular bourgeois army with a "regular" officer corps, took the place of the militias. Factories and landed estates were restored to their former owners. When the Barcelona workers rose in defense of their conquests, in answer to an open provocation, they were first severely repressed and then abandoned by their own leaders. The Soviet leadership went so far as to attempt to export the infamous
The technique of the Moscow trials to Spain, with results which would appear grotesque were it not that hundreds of honest revolutionaries were killed in the process.30

The outcome was easily foreseen. The comedy of "nonintervention" was not observed by the fascist governments, which generally respect only strength, not diplomatic agreements. But it was scrupulously respected by the social democrat French prime minister, Léon Blum, supported by the CP, and eventually even the International Brigades were dissolved. Having been deprived of an early victory and pushed onto the defensive (which is always fatal in a revolution), the Spanish masses became more and more disoriented and dispirited when they saw that they were called upon to defend, not revolutionary conquests, but the same old "law and order" that they had been rising against since 1934. Final defeat was only a question of time. The admirable spirit of resistance that the workers of the great cities showed for nearly three years under these extremely adverse conditions only underlines the favorable conditions for a rapid victory in 1936. Having completed the revolution they would have won the war. Instead, the CP called upon them to win the war first, and then to complete the revolution. This led to the crushing of the revolution, which could only produce defeat in the war.

The justification offered again and again by the apologists of Moscow's Spanish policies is that any alternative policy would have led to an "imperialist united front" and an immediate threat of victorious intervention against the Soviet Union. But a responsible analysis of the concrete conditions prevailing at that time does not in the least warrant such a conclusion.

In the first place, we know today that Nazi rearmament in 1936 was only in its first infant stage; in the spring of 1936 the Nazis had only one armored division; in fact, they trembled lest the French general staff answer the remilitarization of the Rhine valley with an immediate invasion of Germany, against which they had no force to mobilize.31 Britain's situation was no different; it had no striking force to intervene in Europe.32 The United States had not even started the preliminary stages of rearmament.

The only strong army on the European continent which could be considered a threat to the Red Army—at that time probably the main military power in Europe—was the French army. But France was in the throes of a tremendous rise of workers' militancy. One million workers had just risen to occupy the factories and had voted Blum into power, with the support of a greatly strengthened Communist Party. So scared were the upper classes that they were ready to adopt any measure of social reform in order at least to recover their main property.33 It is completely ludicrous to think that, under such conditions, these workers would have permitted themselves to be mobilized to fall on the backs of their victorious Spanish brothers, not to speak of an attempt to have them travel over thousands of miles in order
to attack the Soviet Union—in alliance with Hitler and Mussolini! It is absolutely certain that the attempt by any French government to push through such a policy would have proved suicidal, and would have been answered by an immediate uprising of the French working class.

On the other hand, it is also unrealistic, to say the least, to compare the internal situation in Nazi Germany or fascist Italy in 1936 with that prevailing in these countries in 1940 or 1941. Internal resistance was still fairly strong. Any foreign defeat would have meant immediate trouble for these governments. Already the small military reverses suffered by the fascist Italian legion at Guadalajara led to increased anti-fascist activities inside Italy. A victorious Spanish and French revolution would have completely changed the relationship of forces inside Germany and Italy, and decisively weakened, if not overthrown, the dictatorship in at least one of these two countries.

It is probable that such a development would have strengthened the sympathies with Hitler and fascism inside the British and American bourgeoisie. But one should not forget that the year 1936 was the year of the great sit-down strikes in the United States and of a strong leftward trend inside Great Britain. The outcome of these tendencies would have been deeply modified in the event of socialist victories in Spain and France, not to speak of a collapse of fascism in Italy. Even if one supposes that eventually the right-wing bourgeois forces would have had the upper hand in these countries, it would have required many years and many changes in the world situation before Washington and London could threaten a war in alliance with Hitler, against the Soviet Union. It is much more probable that such a threat of war, even if it materialized, would not have been directed against the Soviet Union alone, but against a socialist Europe. We would have had a situation similar to the one emerging from the second world war, but with the proletarian forces geographically, socially, politically and morally much stronger than they are today.

As pointed out above, the Spanish revolution was sacrificed to the idea that the attitude of world capitalism toward the Soviet state and world revolution depends in the last analysis upon the ability of the Soviet leadership to avoid "provoking" its united hostility, and to "placate" and "divide" it instead. This conception radically discounts the real class struggle going on in the capitalist countries themselves.

Still clearer was the case of Yugoslavia, although the outcome there was, happily, more favorable than in the case of Spain.

From its inception, the Yugoslav revolution encountered distrust and attempts at strangulation by Stalin and his collaborators. Its attempts to organize proletarian brigades were severely reprimanded by Moscow; it was starved of military aid; and behind its back Stalin divided up the Balkans with Churchill in October 1944, imposing a "fifty-fifty" solution on Yugoslavia. In this way, a coalition government was formed in which bourgeois politicians acquired a certain weight.
The leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, however, did not follow the injunctions of the Moscow leadership. It pushed the revolution through to victory. In a referendum, the decision in favor of the republic and against the monarchy was imposed through huge mass mobilizations and tremendous propaganda. The socialist transformation of the economy was quickly achieved. The remnants of the old bourgeois state apparatus and army, already reduced to a shadow of their former strength during the civil war that was superimposed upon the resistance struggle against Nazi occupation, were completely eliminated. Nothing was left of the coalition government decided at Teheran and Yalta. Socialist revolution triumphed.

During this whole process, Stalin did not cease to express his misgivings and criticisms of the YCP's revolutionary orientation. He feared lest the "great coalition" of the second world war would be broken through this "Yugoslav adventurism." He saw a military showdown looming ahead.

In fact, the development of the Yugoslav revolution was accompanied by strong international tension, especially in the Trieste area, in the same way as the victory of every single revolution since 1945, or even the victory of the October revolution, increased international tension. It is one of the facts of political life, that civil war has the tendency to spill over national frontiers. But in no case did an actual world war arise out of the international tensions provoked by internal revolutionary victories. Tito's achievement of a socialist revolution no more "provoked world war" than the victory of Mao Tse-tung in 1949, Ho Chi Minh in 1954, or Castro in 1959.

In order to understand the reasons for this astonishingly constant factor, it is sufficient to state that world capitalism—and especially the leading layers of the American ruling class—react to the world situation as a whole, and not to each separate country or event, isolating it from the overall context. If it is true that each victorious revolution modifies the world relationship of forces at the expense of capitalism, it is also true that the reactions of world capitalism against such a revolution must then follow in a general context unfavorable for capitalism and for imperialist intervention. The capitalist leadership is therefore torn between conflicting needs—the need to stop currents going against its interests, and the need to take into consideration the deteriorated overall situation which is highly unfavorable for a general counteroffensive.

For this reason, the relationship between victorious revolution and war after 1917, and again after 1945, has been one of limited counterrevolutionary military interventions following upon each new victory of the revolution, rather than general world war. By trying to achieve a few limited victories which neutralize the effects of the previous defeat, imperialism reacts to new extensions of the revolution first by attempting to restore a favorable balance of power, before it considers launching a general counteroffensive, including a possible war of intervention against the USSR.
We shall come back to this point in trying to draw up a general balance sheet of the international developments of the last twenty years. But we can already arrive at a seemingly paradoxical conclusion: It is not revolutionary victories but, up to a certain point, defeats of the revolutionary forces, which hasten the evolution towards world war. This certainly was so in the period 1936-39.

It was not because the Spanish revolution was victorious, but because it was lost, and because the tide therefore turned sharply towards the right and towards the disenchantment and passivity of the masses in France, Britain, Czechoslovakia, etc., that Munich became possible, and as a result of Munich, the occupation of the Sudetenland, the preparation of the liquidation of Poland and the beginning of the world war by Hitler. During the eighteen months between the revolutionary upsurge of the French and Spanish workers in June-July 1936, and the rape of Austria in the beginning of 1938, the relationship of forces in Europe was decisively changed in favor of German imperialism. Surely, the defeat of the Spanish revolution had something to do with this change! Surely, at the end of this phase there occurred precisely what the Stalin leadership had so desperately tried to avoid: the "ganging up" of all great European powers against the USSR (between Munich and the occupation of Prague). If this front of imperialists was broken, it was not because Stalin had made enough sacrifices in order to gain the good graces of the stock exchanges of Paris and London, but because Hitler proved too greedy, and the Western imperialists convinced themselves that he wanted to crush them completely in his proposed embrace.

In the same way, one has to view the immediate postwar developments in Europe in 1944-45. The Atlantic Pact was not concluded to "punish" the Soviet Union for having let Tito make a revolution in Yugoslavia. On the contrary, imperialism was fully aware of the use it had made of the moderating influence which Stalin, through the local Communist party leaderships, had exercised upon the situations in Greece, Italy and France when they came dangerously near to revolution. The North Atlantic Pact was concluded, and imperialism could establish its first worldwide military alliance against the USSR (NATO), after the revolutionary situations in Greece, France and Italy ended in a restoration and consolidation of capitalism, with the help of local CP leaderships and with the full consent of Stalin. In this sense it is correct to say that not the victory of the revolution in Yugoslavia, but its defeats in Greece, Italy and France, brought about a worldwide alliance against the USSR.

There is an apparent element of paradox in this reasoning. After all, one could argue, the Western powers had divided Europe with Stalin at Yalta, and to a large extent, both sides had respected the actual line of division, which reflected a given balance of power. The conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty could be viewed as an imperialist measure to consolidate "its own" sphere of influence, in the same way as the elimination of bourgeois politicians, bourgeois democracy
and private property in Eastern Europe could be viewed as a similar move by Stalin to consolidate the Soviet sphere of influence.

The flaw in this kind of argument is its completely static conception, which forgets that every defensive move always contains the germs of a future offensive. Behind NATO was not only "containment" but also the hope of a future "roll back." "Containment" was facilitated by the fact that in Italy and France the potential socialist revolution was nipped in the bud by the CP leaderships. This again facilitated the possibility of a "roll back." The hope that "containment" would not occur because Stalin deliberately intervened to block the spread of revolution to the West proved to be an illusion. In fact, if one examined the concrete motivation which led to the establishment of NATO, one would have to conclude that the victory of the Yugoslav revolution, or the fear of a victorious revolution in France or Italy, played a much lesser role than the actual military conquests of the Red Army, the events in countries where there was no revolution, like Poland and Eastern Germany, and the strengthening of the strategic positions of the USSR. What "provokes" imperialism is not only the extension of the revolution; it is its very existence, or rather the consolidation of its power base in the USSR itself. In the long run, the only way not to "provoke" the capitalists is to consolidate and restore capitalism everywhere, including the Soviet Union. If one is not ready to pay that price, any other move then becomes simply a matter of calculation as to its effects, not upon the imperialists being "provoked"—which they always are—but upon the overall balance of forces.

We see here the basic reformist fallacy in the strategies of "peaceful coexistence" and "socialism in one country." Underlying both is the hope that somehow, in some way, world imperialism will reconcile itself to the existence of the USSR, and "let it alone," if only the USSR lets world imperialism alone also. Ironically, the same people who base themselves upon this illusion also state that "in the long run" the world relationship of forces will be decisively changed by the economic and military strengthening of the USSR. But surely, imperialists recognize this also, and must therefore strive, in the long run, not only to "contain" revolution but also to destroy the USSR. Therefore, the main question is whether this test of strength is unavoidable in the long run. Once one agrees on this unavoidability, one will then concentrate on achieving the best possible relationship of forces for that moment. Military and economic strengthening of the USSR, attempts to divide the imperialist camp and victorious extensions of the revolution (especially in the main fortresses of imperialism) are then seen not as conflicting, but parallel, developments, tending to create a more favorable relationship of forces for that test of strength. The history of Europe from 1933 to 1941 bears this analysis out to the hilt. And there is every indication that since 1945, imperialism, above all U.S. imperialism, has not ceased for one minute to prepare for World War III.
The Chinese revolution and the nuclear threat to mankind's existence

Two developments of world-shaking importance after the second world war might be thought to modify the general framework of the relationship between the international expansion of revolution and the continuing "armistice" between the great state powers sketched above: the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949, and the beginning of the nuclear arms race in the early fifties. The establishment of the People's Republic of China broke the capitalist encirclement around the Soviet Union and thereby created an entirely new strategic world situation, in which the workers states enjoyed a tremendous superiority in "conventional" armies and weapons on the continents of Europe and Asia. The rapid progress of the USSR's nuclear industry destroyed the American monopoly of nuclear weapons, and Washington's illusion of being able to depend on "nuclear diplomacy," to offset the advantages of the "socialist camp" by threatening nuclear destruction of the Soviet Union. The nuclear stalemate achieved in the late 1950s and maintained ever since implies a potential nuclear destruction of the United States as well as of the USSR in the event of a nuclear war.

The victory of the Chinese revolution gave a tremendous impetus to the colonial revolution, which had started with the July 1942 uprising in India and the substantial weakening of the old imperialist powers—Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Japan, Portugal—Asia and Africa, during and after the second world war. In order to save its essential economic positions, imperialism tried to switch progressively from direct to indirect rule, from outright colonialism to "neo-colonialism."

But the colonial revolution was difficult to canalize in channels controlled by imperialism; it had the tendency to grow over into anti—in Asia and Africa, during and after the second world war. In order Morocco, Kenya, Algeria, Cuba, the Congo, Bolivia and Santo Domingo. In some cases, like South Korea, Malaya and Santo Domingo, strong imperialist intervention in the form of full-scale colonial war succeeded in momentarily defeating the revolution. In other cases, the colonial wars ended with imperialism handing over political power to the bourgeois-nationalist or petty-bourgeois leaderships of the liberation movements, in the hope of saving at least some of its property (Indonesia, Morocco, Kenya, Algeria). In other cases the revolution has gone through a series of vicissitudes but is still in progress, after having suffered partial but not final defeats. In North Vietnam and Cuba, the liberation movement triumphed and the anti-imperialist revolution transformed itself into a socialist revolution and established new workers states. The Arab countries present a complex picture,
but the tendency towards permanent revolution became clear at least in Egypt and Syria, and manifested itself embryonically in Iraq, Yemen and South Arabia.

In the mid-1950s, the illusion was created that a politically powerful "third world" had emerged. Although it was generally recognized that the countries newly liberated from direct colonial rule were economically weak and faced grave inner social contradictions, many people thought that the sheer weight of their hundreds of millions of inhabitants, united around the idea of "nonalignment" and of "positive neutrality," would serve as a buffer between the imperialist and "socialist" camps, and thereby gradually reduce world tensions. The Bandung conference of 1955 epitomized these hopes, embodied in the personalities of Nehru and Sukarno. 46

But these illusions were quickly destroyed. The economic weakness of the colonial bourgeoisie appeared more and more pronounced, and led it to become more and more dependent upon foreign (i.e., essentially imperialist) "aid." 47 The inner social contradictions slowly eroded whatever prestige the Nehrus, Sukarnos and Kenyattas had acquired during the national liberation struggle. Mass agitation and mass uprisings also led them to lean more and more upon imperialist aid and support. Instead of a "buffer zone" between the "two camps," the "third world" became a gigantic arena of social and political polarization, in which violent clashes and civil wars progressively multiplied. On the agenda was not the stabilization of any "state of national democracy" as Moscow indicated, 48 but a struggle between bourgeois states and pauperized masses striving to establish proletarian states.

This was the general framework in which the Sino-Soviet dispute (preceded by the compromises arrived at during the 1957 and 1960 international conferences of Communist parties) exploded. Some of the questions raised by that dispute appear to be of a conjunctural nature. The People's Republic of China's de facto relations with imperialism are of a different nature than those of the Soviet Union. U.S. imperialism has no diplomatic relations with China. It keeps that great country outside the United Nations and deprives it of its rightful seat in the Security Council. It maintains an economic blockade of China. It finances and props up the Chiang Kai-shek puppet regime in Taiwan, symbol of the fact that the Chinese civil war is not yet completely finished and that imperialism continues to intervene in this civil war against the mass of Chinese workers and peasants. It has encircled China with missile, air and naval bases with the acknowledged purpose of military (including nuclear) aggression against China. This situation is obviously different from the relations between Washington and Moscow, which are not only based upon normal diplomatic recognition and exchange, but even upon repeated, and partially successful, attempts at periodic collaboration in many fields.

In that delicate situation the Soviet bureaucracy, guided by its
basically conservative motives in international affairs, committed the unforgivable mistake (nay, crime, from the point of view of the interests of world socialism) of joining the blockade and attempted quarantine of the Chinese revolution. After 1960, Moscow cut off all its economic aid to the Chinese, at a moment when the Chinese economy was going through the severe strains of the failure of the second phase of the 'great leap forward.' It thereby brutally arrested industrial development in China in several key fields. It refused China assistance in the development of nuclear weapons, thereby objectively contributing towards the imperialist nuclear blackmail of China. It went so far as to give military aid to the Indian bourgeoisie, at a moment when it was undeniable that these weapons could be used against the People's Republic of China and even against the Indian masses.

Whatever may be our criticism of the sectarian attitude and polemics which the Maoist leadership has developed in recent years against the USSR and the pro-Moscow Communist parties; and whatever may be our refusal to accept as valid and in conformity with socialist principles a whole series of measures and trends (along with more healthy ones) appearing inside China in the course of the 'great proletarian cultural revolution,' it seems to us undeniable that at the bottom of the Sino-Soviet rift lies the detrimental attitude of the Soviet bureaucracy to the Chinese revolution, which we have sketched in the preceding paragraphs. We therefore say that Moscow bears the main responsibility for the negative results of the Sino-Soviet rift, that is the rift on a state level which weakens the whole of the anticapitalist forces on a world scale. (This should not be confused with the public ideological debate, in itself a welcome departure from the monolithism of Stalin's time.)

We define, nevertheless, as conjunctural all those aspects of the debate on revolutionary global strategy which flow from specific attitudes and actions of the Soviet bureaucracy and its Chinese counterpart. For even if these actions had not occurred, and if the Soviet and Chinese leaders had been glowing representatives of soviet democracy and proletarian internationalism, the new world situation which emerged from the victory of the Chinese revolution and from the nuclear arms race would have posed new problems of revolutionary strategy.

The attempt to deny that the nuclear arms race has introduced a new factor into the discussions on the relationship of war, peace and revolution has been undertaken by Maoist and pro-Maoist forces. It is not very serious and rather irresponsible. We are, of course, no experts on nuclear physics and biophysics. But if scientists warn us that a global nuclear war, with a general utilization of the nuclear weapons which are today stockpiled, could lead to a complete destruction of human civilization or even to a planet on which all life would be destroyed, we have to take these warnings very seriously and examine them on their scientific merit—and not from the viewpoint of
whether they tend to "stimulate" or to "dampen" revolutionary enthusiasm in certain circles. Scientific socialism cannot base itself upon myths, illusions and blind faith in man's destiny. It has to start from an objective and critical appraisal of reality and its evolution. And there seems to be no doubt that the nuclear stockpiles have reached such a terrifying degree of destructive capacity that even if humanity were to survive a nuclear world war, the problem of physical survival would be posed under entirely different circumstances than under present conditions, not to speak of the prospects of socialism.

A classical revolutionary "guide to action" was the rule: Go into the army, learn the use of weapons and turn them against your own ruling class. But nuclear weapons obviously cannot be turned into weapons for civil war, because they destroy workers and capitalists indiscriminately and alike. This example alone is sufficient to prove that the nuclear arms race has indeed changed something in the world. Indeed, if one takes the scientists' warnings seriously, one should conclude that to prevent nuclear world war must become one of the major strategic goals of the world revolutionary movement.

But by posing the problem in this way, one has not at all concluded in favor of the travesty of "peaceful coexistence" which has been the guiding line of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and most of the parties which follow its orientation during the last period. The question remains one of the most effective way to avoid nuclear world war. The question basically boils down to this: whether or not imperialism will reconcile itself to the existence and economic-military strengthening of the "socialist camp" (including China), provided these countries in no way whatsoever "assist" the international extension of revolution. We have already recalled the answers given by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations in the Sputnik period, which clearly recognized in the growing economic and military strength of the "socialist" camp alone, a mortal threat to the survival of world capitalism. This is the basic reason why disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under conditions of surviving capitalism, surviving class struggle on a world scale, is and remains an illusion. Even if international expansion of the revolution were to completely fade away, there would be no "peaceful coexistence" in any meaningful sense, but just an uneasy armistice combined with a constant jockeying for better positions in the inevitable future showdown.

But international revolution cannot "fade away," because it is by no means "provoked," "initiated" or "triggered off" by "foreign aggression," but springs from the deep inner social conflicts and contradictions in capitalist society, in the colonial and semi-colonial countries and in the "advanced" countries themselves. To hope for a disappearance of "violent revolution" from this world is to hope for a reconciliation of the vast majority of mankind with unbearable and inhuman social, economic, political and cultural conditions. Such a hope is illusory, irrational, and not very ethical at that.

Once this is recognized as one of the basic truths of our time, the
next question which arises is this: Will imperialism "reconcile" itself to a gradual spread of world revolution, a gradual shrinking of its own socio-economic domain, or will it try to oppose this process by force, armed interventions and counterrevolutionary aggressions? One should, of course, greatly prefer that imperialism stay passive in the face of world revolution. One could even hope that certain weaker and demoralized sectors of the world bourgeoisie would eventually swing over to such a passive attitude. But to expect such a gradual surrender from the strongest, most aggressive and most vital sectors of world capitalism, the leading circles of U. S. imperialism, at the pinnacle of their economic and military power, is again an utter illusion. Experience has borne out during the last seven years that imperialism has decided to oppose by every means at its disposal, above all armed intervention, any threat of a new victorious revolution.

There remains but one question to be answered: Which attitude on the part of the Soviet Union would in the long run best contribute to avoiding nuclear world war: a gradual retreat before imperialist aggression and blackmail, or a resolute intervention on the side of the various revolutionary peoples and movements attacked by imperialism? If past experience can offer any guidance, the answer would be obvious. Retreat or hesitation in the face of aggression does not "appease" the aggressor. It only makes him bolder and leads him to escalate his aggression, which will eventually provoke a test of strength at a point so near to the vital interests of both contending powers, that world war will be much more unavoidable than if the test of strength had taken place at the periphery, during the first stage of the aggression.

But it is precisely the "nuclear stalemate" which gives this argument much greater force than it had in the past. Nuclear world war is nuclear suicide, for the American bourgeois class as well as for the whole of mankind. Under present conditions, when this class is at the pinnacle of its power, it would be ludicrous to assume that it is ready to commit suicide for the sake of "saving Vietnam from Communism." It will continue its aggression only so long as the risks incurred are relatively small compared with the potential loss. The higher the risks become, the smaller will be the danger of escalation. It therefore follows that the stronger the "socialist" camps' "counterescalation" in face of any imperialist aggression, at any point of the globe, the smaller will be the risk of new aggressions and of new "escalations."

We do not advocate any irresponsible actions on behalf of the Soviet Union. If there existed a democratically united command of all anticapitalist forces on a world scale; and if it moved to coordinate its actions in an efficient way, surely such a "counterescalation" could take a dozen different forms, from those proposed by Ernesto "Che" Guevara of creating "two, three, many Vietnams," to those of prudent military moves forcing the imperialists to send their reserves to various points of the globe. Surely, the logic of such a "counterescalation" is obvious: Instead of allowing the enemy to concentrate his tremen-
dous forces upon each small country and each revolution separately, thereby enabling him to crush these revolutions successively, to force him, rather, to disperse and spread his forces over a wider and wider range of countries and continents, and to tackle half a dozen uprisings, revolutions and military maneuvers simultaneously.

So obvious is this logic and so elementary the political and military truth which it reflects, that one cannot believe the Soviet leaders to be so naive as to be blind to these rules, in their "total devotion to the cause of peace." Peace, after all, is more and more threatened by their constant withdrawal in face of aggression. The only possible conclusion, again, is that their pathetic adherence to the myth of "peaceful coexistence," in the face of blatant imperialist aggression, can only be explained by their specific social interest, by their fundamental conservatism, which clashes not only with the interests of world revolution but also with those of the Soviet peoples and the Soviet Union itself.

The examples of Cuba and Vietnam

The examples of Cuba and Vietnam underline the importance of this analysis. In the Western press, the 1962 Caribbean crisis is often interpreted as a Kennedy "masterstroke." Kennedy "called Khrushchev's bluff." We are far from approving all the tactical moves of the Soviet government on that occasion, especially the somewhat highhanded manner in which the sovereignty of revolutionary Cuba was treated. But one should not forget that after the failure of the "Bay of Pigs" invasion, the pressure on the Kennedy administration to start a new aggression against Cuba was constantly growing. In fact, prior to the shipping of Soviet missiles to Cuba, rumors of a new incipient invasion of Cuba were numerous. The balance sheet of Khrushchev's somewhat erratic dispatching and withdrawing of nuclear weapons to Cuba is, after all, that no such invasion took place. Soviet protection insulated the Cuban revolution from the kind of counterrevolutionary aggression which struck down the revolution in the Dominican Republic three years later.

Ever since the victory and the consolidation of the Cuban revolution, Washington has made clear its resolution to oppose by every means at its disposal any new extension of the revolution. It did so by numerous military coups, in the Congo, Brazil and Indonesia, just to name the most important ones. It did so by open military intervention in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and Thailand. But it did not act in a reckless way. It prudently probed each step. First came the increase of military advisers in South Vietnam, then a large-scale invasion of South Vietnam with the building of huge military bases. Then came a swift but limited air attack against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, allegedly in retaliation for an attack against an American vessel in the Bay of Tonkin. Only when each of
these successive steps was not followed, on behalf of the Soviet Union, by anything else but verbal protests and a certain limited increase of material help to Hanoi, did Washington decide to generalize uninterrupted bombing of North Vietnamese territory, first making exceptions of "sanctuaries" in and around Hanoi and Haiphong, and later not even sparing these any more.

Can there be any doubt that, should these aggressions be marked with success and be answered with further retreats by the Soviet leadership, a mortal danger would loom ahead for all workers states which lie in the immediate shooting distance of imperialist power, that is, China, North Korea, Cuba, and in a certain sense, also the German Democratic Republic? And can there be any doubt that, at some point in this chain of aggression, the Soviet leadership will have to intervene, for reasons of military self-defense, and that the danger of a nuclear world war will be much greater then than today, given the fact that both aggression and Soviet retaliation would be located around "targets" much nearer to the nerve centers of the USSR?

One could argue that the strategy of "counterescalation" to neutralize imperialist aggression involves a certain element of risk, and hinges dangerously on the assumption of rational behavior by the leaders of American imperialism. We do not deny the validity of this objection. The only point we stress is the fact that the myth of "peaceful coexistence" in the face of growing imperialist aggression involves a much greater risk and hinges upon the assumption that the aggressor will become "appeased" by a few peripheral victories—an assumption that flies in the face of all historical experience.

Precisely because nuclear world war is nuclear suicide, it is logical to assume that imperialism will answer the spread of world revolution not by such a war, but by limited local wars. The more it gets away with them, the more it will multiply them. The more it is defeated in them the more it will be deterred from renewing the experience. Only when the international situation has changed so much that the leading circles of American imperialism have become desperate and certain of defeat, like Hitler in 1944, can there be a real threat that they would risk collective suicide by nuclear war rather than accept defeat.

We do not underestimate this threat—as it is underestimated by many of those who justify the hoax of "peaceful coexistence" with the argument of avoiding nuclear war. We believe that as long as capitalism survives, this threat will be there, and will even grow stronger, because it is a function not of the strength but of the weakness of the surviving imperialist fortress. But such an analysis leads to a reappraisal of the decisive historic importance of the revolution inside the imperialist countries—not only for solving the economic problems which victorious revolutions in relatively backward countries have such difficulties in solving, but also for ensuring mankind's survival. For this survival depends in the last analysis upon the possibility of a nuclear disarming of the U.S. monopolists, and this disarming cannot be achieved from without, that is, by any force outside the
United States. It is the task of the progressive and socialist forces inside the United States itself.

We seem far from our starting point: the connections between world revolution and inter-state relations. And yet, in a certain sense, we have arrived back at our point of departure. The alternative to the illusions of "socialism in one country" and "peaceful coexistence" is not "revolutionary war" launched by Moscow, "preventive nuclear war," or "simultaneous revolution" everywhere which is irresponsible adventurism. It is a comprehensive and coordinated strategy of world revolution, which is based upon support for revolutionary uprisings in a successive and growing number of countries, as a function of the maturing of favorable conditions for these uprisings inside the respective countries. It is, in a word, class struggle united in a dialectical way, on a world scale. And in the long run, the class struggle and the socialist revolution in the imperialist countries themselves will play the key role in the final test of strength globally.

For a whole historical period, the center of world revolution has passed to the underdeveloped countries. But it is in Japan, in Western Europe and in the United States, that the fate of mankind will be decided in the last analysis. And the struggle between the opposing class forces inside the United States itself will decide whether there will or won't be nuclear world war, i.e., will decide the life-and-death question facing mankind in our epoch.

Notes

(1) "Empirically, communism is possible only as an act of the leading peoples, 'all at once' or simultaneously, because it presupposes universal development of the productive forces and world trade linked with it." Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die Deutsche Ideologie. (Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 32.

(2) As late as November 6, 1920, Lenin stated in a speech for the third anniversary of the October revolution: "We knew at that time: our victory will only be a victory if our cause triumphs in the whole world, for we had started our work exclusively in the expectation of world revolution." Lenin, Sämtliche Werke, 2nd edition. (Berlin, Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 1930), Vol. XXV, p. 590.

(3) The Soviet delegation to the first congress of the Communist International was composed of Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Stalin, Bukharin and Chicherin, as voting delegates, and Obolenski and Vorovsky as consultative delegates. It is significant that the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs was included in this delegation.

(4) In a speech on foreign policy presented to a common session
of the central committee of the All-Russian Soviet Congress and Moscow Soviet, Lenin stated on May 14, 1918: "We do not fight for power privileges . . . we do not defend national interests, we state that the interests of socialism, the interests of socialism in the whole world, come before the national interests, before the interests of the state." Lénine, Oeuvres Complètes, 5e edition. (Paris, Editions Sociales, 1961), tome 27, p. 396.

In a speech delivered at a trade union congress on June 27, 1918, Lenin proudly cited the fact that the newly nominated ambassador to Britain, Litvinov, as soon as he was freed by the police, designated the Scottish revolutionary socialist MacLean as Soviet consul, and that the Scottish workers greeted that fact with enthusiasm. Lénine, Oeuvres Complètes, tome 27, p. 515.

(5) This was notoriously expressed in the argument used by "left," and even by some Bolshevik opponents, to the signing of the peace treaty, that the Soviet government would "dishonor" itself by "delivering" Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, etc., to Germany.

(6) "I have to speak on the position of Comrade Trotsky. In his activity, two aspects must be distinguished: When he started negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, by using them perfectly for agitation, we were all in agreement with Comrade Trotsky." Lénine, Oeuvres Complètes, tome 27, p. 110. "When it finally came to the Brest-Litovsk treaties, Comrade Trotsky has made revelations before the entire world, and is it not thanks to this attitude that, in a hostile country continuing a terrifying imperialist war with other governments, our policy, far from provoking the anger of the popular masses, on the contrary received their support?" Ibid., p. 511.

(7) Ibid., pp. 67, 68. See also the following statement by Lenin: "The bourgeoisie is more international than small owners. This is what we stumbled on at the moment of the Brest-Litovsk peace, when the Soviet power placed the world dictatorship of the proletariat and world revolution above all national sacrifices, however cruel they may be." Ibid., tome 29, p. 145.

(8) Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918. (Berlin, Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1919), pp. 519, 517, 407, etc.

(9) On the eve of the German November 1918 revolution, the Imperial Government broke off diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, using as a pretext the fact that an accident at a Berlin railway station had revealed that diplomatic boxes sent to the Soviet embassy contained large quantities of communist propaganda in the German language.

(10) See the appeals made to the workers of all countries at the second world congress of the Communist International. Der zweite Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale: Protokoll der Verhandlungen. (Hamburg, Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1921), pp. 46-56.

(11) See Lenin's report on the party program delivered to the


(13) Typical in this respect were the appeals and statements of the first congresses of the Communist International, in which the Red Army was presented as "the army of the international working class," and in which it was stated that "the moment is coming nearer in which the international red army will be created."

(14) We say the "so-called theory" because Lenin nowhere formulated it in these words. The only statements which the defenders of that theory today use to support themselves (for example, E. Kardelj, Le Communisme et la Guerre, pp. 66-71), are statements concerning the need of normal diplomatic or commercial relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist countries. That the Soviet state and the Communist International were right to struggle to break the imperialist blockade against the workers state seems rather a truism. To transform that concrete struggle, at a concrete historical juncture, into a "strategic line of the world communist movement" seems ludicrous.

(15) In the "Open Letter of CPSU Central Committee to All Party Organizations and All Communists of the Soviet Union," of July 14, 1963, the "Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence" is said to have been "proclaimed the general line of the Soviet foreign policy" by that party.


(17) Radek's policy of "national communism," his opportunist maneuvering with the followers of extreme chauvinists like Schlagetter, was a significant departure from genuine internationalism. See Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism: A Study in the Origins of the State Party, (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948); and Ypsilon (pseudonym for Johann Rindl and Julian Gumperz), Pattern for World Revolution, (New York, Ziff-Davis, 1947).

(18) What is involved here is not the question of the legitimacy of maneuvers between enemies, of exploiting interimperialist conflicts, etc. What is involved is the question of whether maneuvers, compromises, etc., have no limits, and whether the crossing of these limits does not endanger the objective fruits of these compromises. In this sense, a comparison between the Brest-Litovsk treaty and the Hitler-Stalin pact is very instructive: In the first case, a maximum propaganda use was made of the negotiations, in order to further international revolution. In the second case, the world Communist movement was degraded to the point of "defending" the Hitler-Stalin pact, and German Communists wrote that "German im-
perialism" (presumably Hitler) was no longer to be considered the main enemy. Die Welt, October 18, 1939.

(19) Some people explain the USSR's survival in the second world war as a result of these maneuvers. This is an obvious mistake in reasoning. If the imperialists didn't unite against the Soviet Union, but continued to fight against each other, one camp allying itself with the USSR, it is because inner-imperialist contradictions were stronger, under the immediate circumstances, than the common hostility against the USSR. This was largely independent of the USSR's propaganda or foreign policy. Lenin made a similar point after 1918 when he said that notwithstanding all their hatred for Bolshevism, the imperialists didn't succeed in uniting against it. And this at a time when the Bolsheviks continued the circulation of revolutionary propaganda!

(20) The wrong policies of the Comintern certainly played a key role in the defeat of the Chinese revolution in 1927, in Hitler's coming to power in 1933 and in the defeat of the Spanish revolution of 1936-37.

(21) Some people who are obsessed by the idea of "all capitalists ganging up against the USSR" go so far as to say that Stalin was right to enable Hitler to come to power, because as a result of this, the Anglo-Saxon imperialists allied themselves to the USSR in the second world war! The absurdity of such reasoning does not need to be elaborated, especially if one knows that Hitler's aggression against the USSR brought the Soviet Union within an inch of military defeat in 1941.


(24) The existence of the Soviet Union has objectively facilitated the victory of the Yugoslav, Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuban revolutions, even if the subjective policies of Stalin, Khrushchev and their followers tried to prevent the victories of these revolutions.

(25) Experience has fully borne out the rationality of these fears: The victory of the Yugoslav as well as the victory of the Chinese and of the Cuban revolutions has created deep rifts, if not de facto splits, in the world Communist movement, on which the Soviet bu-
reaucracy has now a much more limited hold than before or during the second world war.

(26) Extreme examples of such ruthless submission are: the opposition of the Indian Communist Party to the great uprising of the Indian people of July 1942; the opposition of the French Communist Party to the Algerian national movement in the spring and summer of 1945 (going as far as to approve the imperialist repression of the rising people who were condemned as "fascist"); the attempts of French CP cabinet ministers to force their comrade, Ho Chi Minh, to stay within the French colonial empire, rebaptised the "French Union," and the fact that these ministers remained in the imperialist government even after the colonial war of reconquest had been started against the Vietnamese revolution in early 1946!

(27) Walter Duranty cabled from Moscow that the first reaction to the outbreak of revolution in Spain in 1931 was "a melancholic editorial in Pravda . . . in the first place because the USSR is excessively and perhaps unjustly nervous in relation to the war danger, and views with alarm any attempt to upset, anywhere, the European status quo . . . In addition, the policy of the Kremlin is based today more on the success of socialist construction in Russia than on world revolution" (New York Times, April 18, 1931). Already in 1931!


(29) The regular army attempted to take away from the workers militias the Central Telephone Office, which the militias had occupied in July 1936 when they won it from the fascists after great sacrifices.

(30) The sentence pronounced by the "Central Espionage Tribunal" of the Spanish Republic against the executive committee of the POUM, dated October 29, 1938, a verdict which, far from condemning the members of that committee, called for the suspension, "temporarily," of the struggle for their specific goals, that is, the socialization of the economy and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, while participating in the general people's struggle against the fascist military uprising (a participation which the Tribunal does nowhere deny or denigrate!).

(31) William L. Shirer, Aufstieg und Fall des Dritten Reiches. (München, Knaur, 1963), Band I, p. 324. The German generals confirmed this during the Nüremberg Trials. Many other sources can be quoted to the same effect, among them Walter Görllitz, Der deutsche Generalstab. (Frankfurt, Verlag der Frankfurter Hefte), p. 440.


(33) During his testimony before the Riom trial, conducted against him by the Pétain regime, Blum proudly recalled that the employers' organizations came to beg him to become prime minister "because
the workers had confidence in him," and he could become the inter-
mediary between the workers and the employers "to stop this ter-
rrible movement [the occupation of the factories—E.M.]." Here are
some characteristic expressions of Blum's: "As early as Friday morn-
ing, M. Lambert-Ribot, who had been my colleague for long years
in the Council of Ministers, before he, like a great many representa-
tives of high public bodies and the universities, entered the service
of the employers' organizations, M. Lambert-Ribot, with whom I
had always maintained friendly relations, pressed me through two
friends, through two different intermediaries, appealing to me to
endeavor to establish a contract between the top employers' orga-
nizations such as the Comité des Forges and the Confédération Gé-
nérale du Travail on the other." Léon Blum, L'Histoire Jugera.(Paris,
Editions Diderot, 1945), pp. 277-78. "The employers not only did not
ask him to use force but beseeched him not to use it. They told him,
'in the present state of things, that could only lead to a bloody con-
fusion.'" Ibid. p. 279. "But I must tell you that at that moment in the
bourgeoisie, and in particular in the management world, I was con-
sidered a savior, I was awaited and expected as a savior." Ibid. p.
28.

(34) Walter Görlitz relates that even pilots of the "Condor Legion,"
which Hitler sent to Spain, deserted to the side of the Spanish work-
ers. Der Deutsche Generalstab, p. 442. H. B. Gisevius notes that pop-
ular opposition remained strong in the years 1936-37, although these
were the "calmest" years of the Nazi regime. Bis zum bittern Ende,
(Darmstadt, Claassen and Wurth, 1947) p. 266. A strong under-
ground Communist Party organization in Berlin, counting several
thousand active members, had been rebuilt in 1934-36 and was dis-
mantled by the Gestapo only in the beginning of 1937, using the
"spy scare" spread by the Moscow trials and Stalin purges in the
USSR.

231. The decisive historic steps on the road to the Yugoslav revo-
lution, which were the decisions of the second session of the Anti-
fascist People's Liberation Council of Jajce in the autumn of 1943,
were considered "a stab in the back of the Soviet Union" by the Mos-
cow leadership, which continued its efforts to arrive at a compromise
between the Communist-led resistance movement and the Royal Yugo-
slav Government in emigration. Mosa Pijade, La Fable de l'aide
soviétique à l'insurrection nationale yougoslave. (Paris, Le Livre
Yougoslave, 1950), p. 69 etc.

(36) Even today, one can see on the walls of small towns and
villages many remnants of the intense propaganda campaign which
was conducted in Yugoslavia at that time.

(37) Stalin was convinced that his alliance with Britain and the
United States would be put to a terrible test by the victorious social-
ist revolution in Yugoslavia. Only when he saw, to his surprise,
that the Western imperialists weren't gravely shocked by Tito's successes, did he partially change his attitude. Mosa Pijade, op. cit., p. 69.

(38) See Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de Guerre, Vol. 3, Le Salut, (Plon, 1959): "Their (the masses') aversion to the former structures was exasperated by poverty, concentrated by the Résistance, and exalted by the liberation. Here, then, was an extraordinary occasion for the 'party.' By deliberately mixing up the insurrection against the enemy with the class struggle and posing as the champion of both kinds of revolt, the 'party' had every opportunity of taking the leadership of the country by social fraud, even if it could not do it through the Conseil de la Résistance, the committees, and the militias." pp. 112-13. "Taking into account the events which have occurred since, and today's needs, I judge that the return of Maurice Thorez to the leadership of the Communist Party at present offers more advantages than disadvantages. This will be the case as long as I am at the head of the state and nation. To be sure, day after day the Communists will shower us with frauds and invectives. However, they will not attempt any insurrectional movement. Still better, as long as I govern, there will not be a single strike . . . As for Thorez, while trying to advance the interests of Communism, he was, on several occasions, to render service to the public interest. Immediately following his return to France, he helped eliminate the last vestiges of the 'patriotic militias' that some of his people were trying to maintain in a new clandestinity. To the extent that the grim and harsh rigidity of his party permitted, he opposed the encroachments of the Comités de Libération and the acts of violence which some overexcited teams sought to undertake. To many workers, in particular miners, who listened to his harangues he continually gave the order to work to their utmost and to produce no matter what the cost. Was this out of a political tactic? There is no reason for me to try to unravel it. It is enough for me that France was served." pp. 118-19.

(39) Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope. (New York, Doubleday and Co., 1956), Vol. II, pp. 240-43. In fact, in the whole chapter concerning the creation of the Atlantic Pact, Yugoslavia isn't even mentioned; nor is the fear of "subversion" in France and Italy.

(40) This was quite apparent throughout the Kennedy era, when the apprehension of bourgeois public opinion in the United States was not centered less around the "world spread of Communism," than around the "sputnik," the "missile gap," the USSR's advances in space technology, scientific education, etc.

(41) There is an obvious parallel between social democratic reformism inside a capitalist country and Stalinist or Khrushchevist reformism in the world capitalist framework. In both cases we are confronted with the reified dialectic of partial conquests, the defense of which becomes a goal in itself, which takes precedence over the
overall goal. This expresses the particular interests of a bureaucratic stratum which parasitically lives upon these conquests, but can only live on them insofar as they remain partial.

(42) This is the line taken by the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted at the twenty-second congress.

(43) The question could be posed, why didn't U.S. imperialism immediately launch an attack against the Soviet Union in the summer and autumn of 1946, when it enjoyed an overwhelming military and economic superiority and a monopoly of nuclear arms? Three subjective, socio-political obstacles prevented such a course from being realistic. In the first place, the peoples of Western Europe were not ready to accept this turn, which consequently would have most probably led to victorious anticapitalist revolutions in these countries. Secondly, public opinion was not ready for it in the United States, and it would have created a grave internal crisis, much graver even than the crisis created by the present Vietnam war. See The Forrestal Diaries. (New York, The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 100-29. Thirdly, and this was paramount in the minds of the military leaders, the American soldiers were not ready to continue the war, and certainly not against a former ally. They wanted to go home immediately, and even revolted against postwar occupation of Europe and the Far East. See Harry S. Truman, op. cit., pp. 506-510; Mary-Alice Waters, GIs and the Fight Against War. (New York, Merit Publishers (now Pathfinder Press, Inc.), 1967).

(44) A UPI dispatch from Washington, dated October 23, 1951, for the first time mentions the fact that "American specialists on nuclear matters" consider that Soviet nuclear tests could profoundly modify the relationship of forces. Malenkov announced on August 8, 1953, that the Soviet Union had manufactured an H-bomb.

(45) An Agence-France Press release of October 9, 1953, carried a statement by President Eisenhower of the same date that the USSR was able to conduct a nuclear attack against the United States.

(46) Malek Bennabi, an Egyptian ideologue, published a book in 1956 which summarizes all these hopes and illusions. L'Afro-Asiatisme. (Ie Caire, Imprimerie Misr). Many echoes of them can be found in official Soviet and Communist literature of the period.

(47) For the period 1960-66, the average annual "aid" of imperialist countries to underdeveloped countries amounted to $9 billion; during the same period, the average annual aid of "socialist" countries to underdeveloped countries was less than $500 million. These figures are net, that is, after deduction of repayments of underdeveloped nations.

(48) This formulation was used in the program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted at the twenty-second congress to describe those states of the underdeveloped world which are supposed to be "neither capitalist nor socialist."

(49) In The Unfinished Revolution, Isaac Deutscher recalls how
Lenin, in one of his final writings, denouncing the brutal repression which Stalin and his cronies had unleashed in Georgia, expressed his fear that the "great-Russian, chauvinistic scoundrel and oppressor" would cause infinite damage to the communist cause by his arrogant behavior toward Asian peoples. Lenin, in notes written on December 31, 1922, expressed the historic warning that such behavior could cause suspicions as to the sincerity of the Russian Communists' adherence to internationalist principles among the awakening peoples of the East. Oeuvres Complètes, tome 36, pp. 623-24.

(50) One should stress the fact that the Chinese leaders are also responsible for peddling the myth of "peaceful coexistence" for many years; that they opportunistically supported the disastrous right-wing line of the leadership of the Indonesian Communist Party, leading to the catastrophic defeat of October 1965 (Mao Tse-tung sent a public letter to Aidit on the fortieth anniversary of the Communist Party of Indonesia, approving the "correct" line of the party!); that they even today instruct the Pakistan Communists to soft-pedal revolutionary struggles in East Pakistan, because the reactionary Pakistan military dictatorship is the only bourgeois government in Asia which keeps very friendly relations with Peking.

(51) Débat sur la ligne générale du movement communiste international. (Pékin, Editions en Langues étrangères, 1965), pp. 247-261. However, one should add that it is a slanderous accusation to say that the Chinese want to provoke a war between the United States and Russia, or that they desire nuclear war.

(52) In addition, one has to consider the tremendous importance of armament production in the "countercyclical" economic strategy of "mature" monopoly capitalism and the impossibility of that capitalism finding "peaceful" outlets of a similar magnitude without endangering the whole logic of production for private profit.

(53) In the case of Vietnam, it can easily be documented that civil war broke out in the South as a result of Diem's terrorism against left-wing and progressive circles of the population, after the Geneva agreements, years before the North decided to intervene in order to support the Southern guerrillas. See Nguyen Kien, Le Sud-Vietnam depuis Dien-Bien-Phu, (Paris, Maspero, 1963); Hans Henle, Chinas Schatten über Südost-Asien, (Hamburg, 1964); a summary of many sources can be found in Jürgen Harlemann and Peter Gäng, Vietnam Genesis eines Konflikts, (Frankfurt, Edition Suhrkamp, 1966).

(54) For example, The Economist, June 10, 1967.

(55) A few weeks before the October 1962 Caribbean crisis, The Economist published an editorial in its October 6 issue entitled, "Obsessed by Cuba," which started with the following paragraph: "There are plenty of good reasons for being worried about Cuba, and it may seem odd to put the correspondence columns of Time magazine and the New York Herald Tribune at the top of the list. But in fact the most disturbing thing about recent developments in Cuba
is the effect they have had on the American state of mind; these two papers in particular (though not only they) convey the furious impatience—and the reluctance to see Cuba in context—that seem to mark the current mood in the United States. The widespread demand for President Kennedy to 'do something' and damn the consequences, has reached a point where an outsider can fairly say what he thinks." The Russians always insisted on the fact that, before sending missiles to Cuba, they had reliable information that Washington had prepared a new invasion of that island. See "Open Letter of CPSU Central Committee to All Party Organizations and All Communists of the Soviet Union," July 14, 1963.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Kibbutzim children


Among those who settled Palestine in the attempt to make it a Jewish homeland were Jews of various classes and political ideas. One section was composed of people who had become socialists in Eastern and Central Europe and who then abandoned or, as they preferred to think, "adapted" socialism to Zionism. These were the people—mainly the young among them—who set up the kibbutzim (the Hebrew word for groups), which were in fact voluntary collective ("socialistic") farms.

Work in the kibbutz entailed much sacrifice, hardship and danger since the land usually obtained was harsh, the living standard low and the Arabs, from whom the land was taken in one fashion or another, resentful.

The original dreams that these "socialist" Zionists had that Israel would develop on the basis of the kibbutzim into a socialist society
have long since disappeared. For the kibbutzim, with all the "socialist" sweat and tears incorporated in them, have proved to be a useful part of the infrastructure of capitalist Israel. In this respect the history of the kibbutz bears an interesting comparison with the utopian socialist colonies of the nineteenth century which also were founded on the hope of achieving a socialist society on the basis of small communal economic units but which were eventually overcome by the capitalist environment and succumbed to it.

Though nothing positive is to be learned about achieving socialism from the history of the kibbutz, its method of rearing children has provided data which is attracting the attention today of those interested in the questions of child psychology and development, the position of women and the family.

The most significant aspect of the kibbutz system of educating children is that the power over the children's lives is given by their parents to the communal leadership of the kibbutz. Children live, from birth on, in children's houses and only see their parents two or three hours a day at their parents' homes, where the time together is spent in pleasurable activities. Parents also put their children to bed in the children's houses. All the children's food, clothing, housing and education are provided by the kibbutz.

The origins of this form of bringing up children are deeply rooted in the struggle of young Jewish women to break away from the traditional role they played in the all-enveloping Jewish family. At the beginning of the century, the young Jews of Central and Eastern Europe felt a desperate need to break with their authoritarian and constricting family life. For the girls, particularly, the prospect of having to live like their mothers was intolerable.

When these young women went to Israel, they were determined to break up the family as they had known it. The most important thing for them was to live in equality with the men. Thus, at first, they took on the heaviest jobs in the fields to prove their ability.

They did not intend to have any children. They were afraid that caring for children would thrust them back into the hated confining role of motherhood. They were afraid that they would fall into the same patterns with their children that they hated in their own upbringing. Among the patterns they feared was the immense concern of the ghetto family with both religious values and earthly possessions. They determined that neither religion nor personal acquisitiveness would exist in the kibbutz.

A founder of the first kibbutz relates that the original kibbutzniks wanted no children in their community. Most of the settlers did not even want to marry, because "they were afraid that children would detach the family from the group, that . . . comradeship would be less steadfast." It was even proposed that all members should agree not to marry for at least five years because "living as we do . . . how can we have children?"
When the first baby was born nobody knew what to do with it. By the time there were four children, the democratically-run kibbutz council had to make a decision. It was a difficult problem. How were the women both to work and look after their children?

Once a decision was reached, the bonds were so strong between the kibbutz members that no one went against it. They elected caretakers called *metapalets* to be with the children in the nursery from the time the babies were weaned. Even before they were weaned, the babies were returned to the nurseries after nursing.

The *metapalets* were changed every few years so that no strong attachments to them would be formed.

Dr. Bettelheim, a psychiatrist who has had considerable success with acutely disturbed children in his institution in the University of Chicago, is an outspoken reactionary on the subjects of women and youth. Rather than rebelling against the wrong role into which they are forced by society, today's young women students, he says, are rebelling against femininity. He labels the vast protest movement against the war and the efforts of young people to change the intolerable conditions of society as an adolescent revolt against their "permissive" parents. Some students at the University of Chicago call him "Dr. Brutalheim."

Nevertheless, Dr. Bettelheim completely reversed himself on the importance of the nuclear family in the raising of children after his observations in the kibbutzim. He went there because he just didn't believe all the criticisms he read about raising children away from their parents. He felt that Western observers were so prejudiced in favor of family-rearing and close mother-child relationship that they could not view the kibbutz nurseries objectively. So he went to see for himself. Because of his worldwide reputation as a child psychiatrist, he was given every opportunity to visit and interview in Israel.

"First, then, what of the rearing of infants away from their parents?" he asks. "The kibbutz experience clearly demonstrated to me that children raised by educators in group homes can and do fare considerably better than many children raised by their mothers in poverty-stricken homes, and better than quite a few raised at home by their middle-class parents."

Besides being assured good health, clothing, education and work-training from an early age, the kibbutz children feel themselves to be an integral and important part of the community. The children are the most valuable asset of the kibbutz. The most skilled psychiatrists, experts in child rearing, well-trained *metapalets*, look after them. They know their parents, love them, even though their parents have turned the power to protect them over to the community.

In our capitalist society, parents are supposed to protect their children so that they can grow and learn without fear. But how can poor parents protect their children? They can't even protect themselves, especially in the ghettos where the whole power of the police
is arrayed against them. Nor can they be sure of providing for their children.

As for education, kibbutz children have the great advantage over poor children elsewhere. "Most lower class dropouts leave school because the years spent there have made them more and more convinced that education as they know it does not meet their needs. They leave in self-defense. In order to spare themselves recognition of their deficiency, they turn on school as an enemy. The abyss between what they view as today's reality for them and what they aspire to for the future is what makes for their final break with education as a dead-end solution. By contrast, kibbutz education is so much part of a common way of life, so embodies the youngsters' future aspirations that, however much they sometimes tire of learning, what they never feel is a split between them and the educational system."

This book should prove of interest to all those concerned over the perplexing contradictions in women's lives today, the generation gap, and what kind of bring up children need.

Constance Weissman

The U.S. multinational corporations


This book describes the "expansion, merger, internationalization and diversification" of U.S. corporations in the postwar period, particularly since the "conglomerate boom" that erupted in 1967. The book shows that the last three years have seen a rapid acceleration of the concentration of capital and power in the hands of the dominant U.S. trusts. Moreover, it provides useful information about the effects of this process on government, business, the labor force and educational institutions. Barber, who is an expert on corporate law and a former counsel for the Senate Anti-Trust Subcommittee, also
adds an informative chapter on the significant failures of anti-trust legislation in the 1960s.

Barber's central theme is summarized in the chart reproduced on page 60. "In closely examining the industrial terrain of the United States," he writes, "one feature is paramount: the degree to which a very few firms rule most of the principal manufacturing sectors" (emphasis added). There are some cases where a single firm has a total monopoly: "General Electric continues to make most of the light bulbs, Western Electric produces virtually all of our telephone equipment for its parent, American Telephone & Telegraph, and General Motors sells all but a few of the diesel locomotives . . ."

But for most industry "power is shared by a handful of large companies. Result: what the economists call an oligopoly (Greek for a 'few sellers')."

Contrary to popular belief, Barber argues that oligopoly price control is virtually the same as monopoly control. "No formal price-fixing is necessary. Where there are, say, three companies producing most of the industry's output (automobiles for example), . . . each seller knows that it both affects and is affected by the market choices of its rivals. If, therefore, company A establishes a significantly lower price than what has prevailed, its share of the market will increase considerably; its rivals B and C, can thus be expected promptly to match A's newly announced price. Whatever gain A might originally have anticipated by cutting its price is lost. Under these conditions, it does not take long for the parties, independently, to price in a uniform noncompetitive fashion."

The result is that the oligopolies have been able to obtain monopoly profits and to establish a firm grip on the given industrial sector, which becomes relatively immune to penetration by "outside" capital. "Data for the 1960s show that in industries where concentration was already high (where the top four firms accounted for at least half the industry's sales) there was no significant net change at all." Instead, throughout the postwar period the corporations have expanded through the parallel processes of merger and internationalization.

Barber shows that the industries involved in the "merger mania" of the last three years have included the largest. "Once it was common—probably typical—for competing or related enterprises to join together, often for the principal objectives of gaining sufficient size to match the strength of a rival or simply to gain dominance over a market. Such mergers still occur, but we are finding that the acquirer and often both partners are already large firms. Moreover, they are frequently in completely unrelated industries . . .

"From 1948 through 1968, 1,275 firms with assets of $10 million or more were acquired—in more than half the cases by a company with assets of more than $100 million. Of the 500 largest corporations listed by Fortune in 1962, eighty have since disappeared
### Chart 1

**Industries Dominated by a Few Big Firms**

(percentage share of market held by top four firms)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Leading Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum</td>
<td>Alcoa, Reynolds, Kaiser*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>General Motors, Ford, Chrysler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic fibers</td>
<td>Dupont, Union Carbide, Celanese, Monsanto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat glass</td>
<td>Pittsburgh Plate, Owens-Illinois, Corning, Libbey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric bulbs</td>
<td>General Electric, Westinghouse, Sylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone equip.</td>
<td>Western Electric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>Anaconda, Kennecott, Phelps Dodge, American Smelt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereal foods</td>
<td>Kellogg, General Foods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric Tubes</td>
<td>RCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsum</td>
<td>Johns Manville, U.S. Gypsum, National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>Reynolds, American, Philip Morris, L&amp;M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriters</td>
<td>Litton, IBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>International, Morton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber tires</td>
<td>Goodyear, Firestone, Uniroyal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap-detergents</td>
<td>Procter &amp; Gamble, Colgate, Lever Bros.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel ingots &amp; shapes</td>
<td>U.S. Steel, Bethlehem, Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only the names of leading firms in each industry are identified. In some cases there is only a single dominant company, in others there may be two, three, or four.
through mergers. As many as thirty of the companies which appeared on Fortune's top-500 list in 1968 did not appear in 1969 because of merger."

The result is that corporations are now competing with each other for control of the non-monopolized ("non-ologopolized") sectors of industry outside their own sectors. Barber asks, "Remember U. S. Rubber? It's now Uniroyal, and behind that name change stand two features common to much of recent industrial activity: the corporation is no longer a maker of rubber products nor is it a U. S.-based firm. Fewer than half the things it makes have anything to do with rubber. With twenty-eight research and manufacturing centers in twenty-three countries, it has also lost its exclusive or principal ties with the United States. . . ."

"Coca-Cola [it's not on the chart, but could be—D. R.] still sells around the globe 'the pause that refreshes,' but it also makes instant coffee, cattle feed, and Minute Maid concentrated orange juice. . . . Pepsi Cola is another organization that found it expedient to change its name . . . Pepsico, as it is now called, offers a wide assortment of snacks to go with your soft drink; it will also move your goods across the country, or around the world, in its North American vans."

These quotations illustrate the magnitude of the internationalization of U. S. firms. Barber points out that U. S. direct investments abroad "now increase at the rate of about $10 million a day. The result is that the biggest corporations have substantially increased their share of international production by even more than they have within the United States."

A number of the giant corporations derive more than half their income or earnings from foreign sales. These include Standard Oil of New Jersey, Mobil Oil, Woolworth, National Cash Register, Burroughs, Colgate-Palmolive, Standard Oil of California and Singer, Eastman Kodak, Pfizer, Caterpillar Tractor, International Harvester, Corn Products and Minnesota Mining make from 30 to 50 percent of their sales abroad.

Oligopoly conditions are created in foreign markets with U. S. corporations occupying dominant positions: "In England, Ford (which in 1961 paid out $360 million to acquire the remaining interest in its U. K. subsidiary) and GM challenge British Motors, and are not far ahead of Chrysler, which bought its way in by acquiring control of Rootes Motors, once a major independent factor in Britain (and, indeed, in America). In the big German auto market, GM's Opel and Ford's Taunus contend aggressively with Volkswagen. A new $100 million plant built by GM at Antwerp and a vast new Ford plant located in the Saarland will make these companies, along with Chrysler, even larger factors in European car sales. One major consequence of all these moves is that Ford at present makes 40 per cent of its cars outside the U. S., Chrysler over 30 per cent, and GM 25 per cent."
The comparative figures Barber offers show how U.S. corporations tower over their foreign competitors. "Among the world's companies, U.S. businesses are on the average five times larger than the leading British or German corporations, and ten times larger than the French companies. Based on the 1968 experience Belgium's largest concern would not even rank among the top 100 U.S. industrial companies in terms of sales; France's would be number forty-six; Germany's would place only number twenty-three; and Italy's number thirty-four. When grouped by industries the comparison is even more striking.

"In 1968 U.S. Steel's profits were seven times greater than those of August Thyssen-Hutte, Germany's biggest steel producer. Du Pont's profits are nearly twice those of Imperial Chemical Industries and three times greater than those of Farbenfabrikan Bayer. . . . General Motors' sales are almost eight times those of Volkswagen and are bigger than the Gross National Product of the Netherlands and well over a hundred other countries. Indeed, the aggregate sales of VW, Fiat, Daimler-Benz, British Motors and Renault are equal to only three fourths of Ford Motors' sales, which in turn are only about two thirds those of GM."

The American Corporation includes a number of chapters on the ramifications of the power of U.S. trusts in American society. Particularly interesting are the chapters on the "emerging alliance" of industry, universities and government in order to carry out "R&D" — "research" and development—above all in the military, aero-space and electronics fields. (The quotation marks around the word research are unquestionably merited since, as Barber shows, theoretical inquiry receives a tiny fraction in comparison to the funds devoted to applied research and development principally for military purposes.) Accordingly, "The aircraft and missile industry does 35 per cent of all the R&D performed in American industry, yet it accounts for less than 3 per cent of the total value added by the country's manufacturers. Similarly, electrical equipment and communication firms do about another quarter of the country's research, but they provide barely 10 per cent of the amount added by manufacture."

At the same time, "while Federal agencies fund about 60 per cent of U.S. research, they conduct less than 15 per cent of the work. Conversely, industrial firms carry out 70 per cent of all the research that is done, but provide only a third of the financial support. . . . Universities conduct 10 per cent of our R&D, but finance barely 2 per cent." And, what sometimes misses the eye, while universities carry out only 10 per cent of the "research" undertaken by Americans (all this measured in dollars and cents), and this university "research" is largely financed by the government, a large percentage of "university" research is privately contracted to corporations!

A typical center of such learning is the University of Michigan, "bolstered by more than $50 million yearly in Federal research and
grants. ... Its Institute of Science and Technology, operated by the College of Engineering, is aimed specifically at harnessing the talents of the engineering faculty to the needs of industry. A Bureau of Business Research and a Bureau of Industrial Relations provide additional skills, as does the Institute of Social Research ... Through these special centers, and on their own, hundreds of U of M professors regularly engage in extensive consultation with industrial firms around the country. ... "Bethlehem Steel has gone so far as to insist on a 'body for a buck'—rewarding colleges with a grant of $4,000 for each live graduate hired by the company as a management trainee."

But Barber is collosally naive about the implications of his own research. At one point he writes, corporations "have enormous power and will use it, not out of any preconceived imperialistic desires of the sort that worried Karl Marx, but to further their own goals" (emphasis added), to which one is tempted to respond with a shrug of the shoulders.

Barber fails to see that precisely "their own goals," which have driven the multinational conglomerates to their present positions of world economic and political power, will also prove their undoing—namely, their quest for profits. One would think that Barber would foresee difficulties even on empirical grounds. What is most likely to happen now that the world trusts have "oligopolized" all or most of the world markets—a condition of the present economic situation which is becoming increasingly apparent? It is one thing when a number of corporations are eaten up on a national scale; it is quite another when this prospect faces corporations internationally, and Barber seriously underestimates the explosive ramifications of this difference.

Does he think that a Volkswagen or a Toyota will willingly become subsidiaries of Ford and General Motors, even granting the greater size of the latter? Or does he believe that Ford and GM, unable to achieve the first alternative, will willingly give over significant portions of their markets to these foreign competitors?

The answers to these questions are being demonstrated by the impact of the murderous competition between the international automobile trusts right here in this country. It is not one-sidedly advantageous only to U.S. corporations. There has been a massive upsurge of foreign car sales, a spectacular slide of domestic auto production and this is setting the stage for a knock-down battle between the U.S. auto corporations and the United Auto Workers later in the year.

Barber misses completely this "third" arena of the effects of corporate expansion besides internationalization and conglomeration. That is, its impact upon the wages of workers. He nowhere shows understanding of the fact that in the last analysis labor power itself is the source of all corporate profits. He does not see that by driving down the wages of "their own" workers, whether domestically or in-
ternationally, the trusts can individually better their own positions in world competition and that they are doing this on a world scale.

This is the central meaning of Wilson's "austerity" program in Britain, the May-June 1968 general strike in France followed by Pompidou's "austerity," the massive upsurge of Italian workers and the strike wave in Europe generally, and the Nixon administration's recessionary policies in this country. But the connection between the tightening of international corporate competition and the intensification of the class struggle in the advanced capitalist countries finds no explanation in *The American Corporation*.

This is a severe weakness in a book which sets out to extrapolate the present power of U.S. corporations indefinitely into the future. "In [the year] 2000, writes Barber, "the GNP will exceed $2.7 trillion . . . By the end of the century a labor force of 129 million will be working an average thirty-three hours a week. It will be a supersuperaffluent economy, with each civilian employee turning out $21,000 worth of goods and services a year and earning an average family income in excess of $20,000. What all this means to business is an almost incredible growth . . ."

What a splendid prospect this author holds out for the American (and world) working class—tolling for U.S. corporations and the tiny coterie of billionaires who own them for another three decades! It is also an unlikely prospect. The flaw is that it misses the other side of the accumulation of capital: the exploitation of wage labor. The fact is that the intensified concentration and consolidation of capital has intensified the clashes between big business and an increasingly politicalized and radicalized world working class. Predictions about the future of American corporations should take this fact into account.

Dick Roberts
announcing

Leon Trotsky
My Life

Introduction by Joseph Hansen

a new edition

Publication Date
June 15, 1970

Since its original publication in 1930 this has been recognized as one of the world's great autobiographies. Its literary qualities and the author's character would by themselves have made it a fascinating human document. But because Trotsky played such an important role in world-shaking events, it takes on historic dimensions. The reader is given an inside picture of the tempestuous 1905 Revolution, the Bolshevik victory in 1917, and the civil war which followed. There are unforgettable descriptions of the anti-Czarist underground, exile in Siberia, the emigre circles and socialist movements of Western Europe and the United States.

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from Malcolm X's last speeches:

All thinking people today who have been oppressed are revolutionary. Any time you find somebody today who's afraid of the word "revolution," get him on out of your way. He's living in the wrong era. He's behind the times. He hasn't awakened yet. This is the era of revolution. . . .

Anything you can think of that you want to change right now, the only way you can change it is with a ballot or a bullet. And if you're not ready to get involved with either one of those, you are satisfied with the status quo. That means we'll have to change you.

When you tell this black man in America who he is, where he came from, what he had when he was there, he'll look around and ask himself, "Well, what happened to it, who took it away from us and how did they do it?" Why, brothers, you'll have some action just like that. When you let the black man in America know . . . that knowledge in itself will usher in your action program. And it will be by any means necessary.