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Self-determination for the Palestinian people



INSIDE:

MIDDLE EAST

Editorial

PLUS

report on the
uprisings and
repression in the
occupied territories

POLAND

Solidarnosc leaders
speak about the
situation following the
referendum

SOUTH AFRICA

Inkatha attacks bring
Natal closer to civil war



TURKEY

Ozal profits from
election results and the
weakness of the
opposition

Contents:

EDITORIAL MIDDLE EAST 3

FORTY YEARS on from the partitioning of Palestine by the United Nations, the Palestinian people are still fighting for their right to exist. *Salah Jaber* explains the developments that have led to today's uprisings on the West Bank and the Gaza against Israeli occupation

SOUTH AFRICA 6

NATAL PROVINCE has been brought to the edge of civil war by the armed terrorism of Chief Buthelezi's party, Inkatha.

Nathan Palmer writes on this reactionary Zulu movement and the battles taking place today in KwaZulu

TURKEY 10

AFTER the recent referendum, followed by the legislative elections, the period of military dictatorship is drawing to a close — *Fuat Orçun*

SPECIAL FEATURE ON POLAND 14

JARUZELKI's defeat in the referendum has posed a new and major challenge to the various currents that have developed inside Solidarnosc. *Cyril Smuga* introduces three exclusive interviews conducted for *IV* with leaders of Solidarnosc and of the newly formed Polish Socialist Party:



"If we continue in the framework of the system, the breakdown will be total"

— interview with Jan Litynski

"People no longer have anything to lose"

— interview with Josef Pinior

"Polish society no longer believes in Communist reform" — interview with Andrzej Gwiazda

SOUTH AFRICA 25 Around the world 27

A REPORT from the South African *Weekly Mail* on the ANC's anti-apartheid conference held in Tanzania — a variety of views were put forward by those participating on the next steps for the struggle

● Senegal ● Errata

MIDDLE EAST 28

MICHEL Warschawsky reports from Israel on the continuing uprisings in the occupied territories

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EDITORIAL

Self-determination for the Palestinian people

THE PAST YEAR marked a double anniversary in the Near East, that of the two main stages of the Zionist takeover of Palestinian territory: 1947 and 1967.¹ The Palestinians did not let it pass unmarked. Since December 9, there has been the most extensive popular uprising — both in breadth and duration — on the Palestinian lands since the creation of the state of Israel. (See also article on page 28.) What sparked it off is not important — the explosive material had been there for a long time.

SALAH JABER

FORTY YEARS have gone by since the United Nations adopted its iniquitous partition plan on November 29, 1947 [see map]. That was the signal for the Zionist armed gangs to launch their war of annexation. In 1948 they seized, in total, 80% of the lands of the former British mandated territory of Pales-

tin. (The UN plan granted them 55%). In 1947 the Jews held only 6% of this land and represented only a third of the total population: 630,000 inhabitants out of nearly 2 million.

In December 1949, in the wake of the war for the establishment of the Israeli state, there were no more than 160,000 Pa-

lestinian Arabs on the usurped 80% of this territory, as against a million Jews. Such were the two pillars of the Zionist colonial enterprise: massive expulsion of Arabs and massive immigration of Jews in the name of "biblical rights."


In June 1967, the Zionist usurpation of Palestinian territory was completed by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with the addition of the Syrian Golan plain and the Egyptian Sinai desert. Israel has withdrawn from only one of these territories since then — the Sinai — which it evacuated in 1982. East Jerusalem was officially annexed for "biblical" reasons right away in 1967, and the Golan, for "security" reasons, in 1981.

Status of the occupied territories

The rest of the West Bank, as well as the Gaza Strip, retain to this day the official status of occupied territories, and for good reason! Unlike the Golan, where the great majority of the population (more than 150,000 before June 1967) fled during the six-day war without being able to return, and where Jewish colonists now outnumber the natives, these territories are still populated by Arabs numerous enough to upset the ethnic and political makeup of Israeli society if they became Israeli citizens — a corollary of formal annexation. That would be contrary to the very essence of Zionism.

In the long term, the very nature of the Israeli state as a "Jewish state" would be threatened, given the difference between the growth rate of the Jewish population and the much higher one of the Arab population. This, by the way, is the reason why the Zionist movement attaches so much importance to the emigration of Jews from the USSR, the only source of massive potential immigration into Israel that exists today and therefore the only available means of compensating for the relatively low birth rate of Israeli Jews. It is not labor power that Israel lacks, but cannon fodder.

In the aftermath of the June war, the Zionist state already had almost 1,400,000 Arabs under its control, including more than a million on the West Bank and in Gaza, as against 2,400,000 Jews. The Palestinian exodus this time was not as large proportionally as in 1948, when the vast



1. See the editorial in IV 122, June 15, 1987.

majority of Palestinian Arabs fled the usurped territories. Even though increasingly since 1967 the majority of all Palestinians lived outside the frontiers of the former British Mandat of Palestine — against only a quarter at the beginning of the 1950s, and nearly 35% after the June war — nevertheless less than a third of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza fled these territories in 1967.

The reason for this was not that the 1967 invasion was any “gentler” than the preceding one, although it did not give rise to deliberate collective massacres, such as the one perpetrated by the Zionist terrorists of Irgun at Deir Yassin in 1948.

Second Arab exodus in 1967

The exodus in 1967 was proportionally smaller for several combined reasons. In 1948, for two-thirds of those involved, the exodus was from one part of Palestinian territory to another. This was no longer possible in 1967, since the whole of Palestine was occupied. Secondly, the great majority of the 1948 refugees thought that they were leaving their homes only temporarily. By 1967, the lesson had sunk in.

The fact that the Arabs who remained under Israeli rule in 1948, while persecuted, were not massacred was also an important factor. Finally, the poverty in which the 1948 refugees were living could only encourage the people of the West Bank and Gaza to hang onto their homes and their livelihoods. Thus, the bulk of the 1967 refugees included those who had already fled in 1948, and had nothing of much worth to leave behind. This was their second experience of displacement, their second exodus.

As a result, when the Zionist state took over the remaining 20% of Palestine territory, it brought under its control nearly 40% of the Palestinians, in addition to those already under its jurisdiction. This was the main flaw in the Zionist expansionist project — a veritable time-bomb that successive governments of Israel have not succeeded in defusing, and whose explosive power grows with each day that passes. Today, according to Israeli figures, 2,125,000 Arabs are living under Zionist jurisdiction (two-thirds on the West Bank and in Gaza), against 3,590,000 Jews. The ratio is thus 37 to 63. The Israeli's own projections are that, given the present rates of growth, this ratio will be 45 to 55 in the year 2,000, that is in twelve years!

This explains the worry of the “enlightened” Zionists (an epithet more appropriate than “moderate”). It was enough to hear their leader, the Laborite Shimon Peres, exclaim nervously on December 30 that “in 12 years, there will be a million Arabs in Gaza and the demographic density will be greater there than in Hong Kong.” At the same time, he lamented that today “out of every hundred children born between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, 50 are Ar-

abs and 50 Jews, and nobody is going to stop this phenomena.”

This is Zionism's fundamental dilemma — the contradiction between its expansionist territorial ambitions and its racist project of a “Jewish” state. The latter, of course, is the overriding principle. “To preserve Israel's Jewish character,” as Peres says, is the chief concern of all Zionists. How can this be reconciled, therefore, with the demographic data presented above? This is a debate that goes back 20 years in Israel. Among the Zionists, four different answers to this question can be discerned.

First of all, there is the answer of the biggest fools, or the most outspoken, such as the fascist rabbi Meir Kahane, the leader of the Kach party, who is fighting to make Israel “*Arabenrein*” — free from Arabs — just as the Nazis wanted Germany to be “*Judenrein*.” Unable to expel the Arabs by military force, he is offering visas, airline tickets and financial aid to any Arabs willing to leave. Another example is the general who a few months ago made the term “transfer” notorious in Israel by proposing massive deportation of the Palestinians from “Greater Israel.”

Then there are those who, while proclaiming their unflinching attachment to the same “Greater Israel,” and in particular to Judea and Samaria (the biblical names of the West Bank territories), realize that “transfer” today is impracticable. They know that Israel's extreme dependence on the United States makes a massive expulsion of the Palestinians from their territories quite impossible in the present circumstances.²

“I prefer to keep the Arabs under our control”

They prefer, nonetheless, to hold onto the territories in question, even at the price of maintaining indefinitely the apartheid that was shaped several years ago under Zionist auspices. It is the view of the Zionist right and part of the extreme right that was expressed recently by the outspoken leader of the Tehiya party, Geula Cohen, in the American magazine *Newsweek* of August 31, 1987: “I prefer to keep the million-plus Arabs here, where they are under our control, despite all the problems. At present, the idea of a mass population transfer seems to me impossible, although not immoral. It is the most moral idea in the world.”

However, this “realism” of the Zionist right does not reduce the dilemma described above. It cannot refer to the fact that in the country where apartheid originated 5 million whites control six times their number of Blacks. The power of Israel's Arab environment and the narrowness of the Palestinian territory are major factors making Israel's situation qualitatively different from that of South Africa. This is why, in fact, the Zionist right envies solving the demographic problem by

“creeping” expulsion of a large mass of Palestinians, even if it does not always avow this openly.

Repression and persecution worsen

Already at the Thirtieth Congress of the Zionist Movement in December 1982, Menachem Begin replied to Peres' demographic argument by saying that the statisticians were often wrong in their predictions because they did not take account of the growing emigration of Palestinians! The worsening in recent years of repression, persecution and provocations against the Palestinians in the territories occupied in 1967 have been designed precisely to goad them into leaving “voluntarily.”

Enlightened Zionists consider that this option is as illusory as it is impossible, just as much as “transfer” pure and simple. Illusory because there is nothing to indicate that emigration of Palestinians from their territories is compensating for their birth rate. On the contrary, a number of factors have increased Palestinians' attachment to their homeland: the closing of the traditional outlets for emigration — especially the oil states of the Arab-Persian Gulf, which have suffered an abrupt fall in their buying power; the Palestinians' political determination; and the spectacle of the misfortunes of the refugees in Lebanon, the last country where they could have a certain autonomy.

The Palestinians will only leave en masse if they are forcibly driven out — there is no way that their departure could appear “voluntary.” This is why it is as impossible as “transfer.” When Peres, with his hypocritical air, says that Israel must not lose its “democratic” soul, he means that such a deterioration of its image could be fatal for the Zionist state, in view of its dependence on outside support from its American tutor or from the “diaspora.”

Peres, therefore, proposes simply to maintain control of the territories, while leaving the Jordanians the job of controlling the population! According to the Laborite plan worked out by Yigal Allon in the 1970s, Israel would maintain on the West Bank — where 55,000 Israelis have now settled — a belt of strategic colonies and military bases, especially along the Jordan valley, which is considered the untouchable “safe” border of the Zionist state. The Israeli army would withdraw from those parts of the territories that have a

2. The mere decision to banish nine Palestinian “agitators” has cost Israel strong criticism (as well as a vote against them in the UN) from its American tutor, anxious to calm down the game in the Middle East. A massive deportation of Palestinians would immediately set the whole region ablaze — a real disaster for Washington. It should be pointed out, moreover, that international condemnation of the banishings — although this practice has been well-utilized almost constantly by Israeli governments — shows to what extent rights are only imposed by struggle. The rights of the Palestinian people have never been so evident in the eyes of the whole world as since the present uprising.

dense Arab population, while maintaining the right to oversee their demilitarization. Civilian administration and law and order would be entrusted to King Hussein, in the framework of a settlement coming out of an "international conference," which Peres sees as a sort of second Camp David, only this time with Jordan.

Given the reluctance of Israeli public opinion to accept his party's plan and the Zionist demagoguery of Likud about "Judea-Samaria," Peres has chosen recently to divide the problem by focusing his campaign on the fate of Gaza. It seems to him easier to get a majority on the question of Gaza for several reasons: there is not the same Zionist "biblical" attachment to it as there is to the West Bank; it is a small territory (360 square kilometers), that has a dense population (600,000 inhabitants) with a well-established reputation for rebelliousness; fewer than 2,000 Israelis have settled there; and, finally and mainly, on the other side of Gaza is the immense buffer-zone of the Sinai desert, which was restored to Egypt on condition that it be demilitarized under the supervision of the US.

"Peres proposes the creation of bantustans"

From the beginning of December, even before the spread of the ongoing Palestinian uprising mainly based in Gaza, Peres opened his campaign on this territory's fate. He took the offensive again at the end of December, as soon as the Palestinian struggle seemed to have subsided. His proposals for Gaza are identical to those concerning the West Bank, except that in the first case no role is foreseen for the Jewish settlements, whose numbers are negligible.

"Peres proposes the creation of a bantustan," ingeniously protested Yassar Arafat, leader of the PLO and of its dominant right-wing faction. As if anything else could be expected from an international conference for a negotiated "settlement" of the Palestinian question on the basis of a Jordanian-Palestinian "confederation" — that is, in the framework of the official program held by the PLO since 1983 and reconfirmed last year! As if it were not entirely clear that:

"Leaving aside the totally illusory independence of such a mini-state completely trapped in the Israeli vice, with its back to Jordan on the one side (the West Bank) and to the sea and desert on the other side (Gaza), with Israel stuck in between the two — it would be quite impossible to achieve this through a (negotiated) Israeli agreement to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967. At best, the Zionist state would agree to a very partial withdrawal from the West Bank — where it has already "appropriated" almost half the land — and Gaza, involving draconian conditions which would render these territories little more than bantustans, and this at the price of a total political capitulation, Sadat-

style, by the Arab states."³

In fact, no partial self-determination of the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza can be real without an unconditional Israeli withdrawal from these territories. But in the present relationship of forces this will never come out of an international conference. Achieving it would require a combination of irresistible pressure from the Palestinians on the occupying forces, firm Arab support for their struggle, strong international pressure on the Zionist government and a powerful movement for unconditional withdrawal inside Israel itself.

Today, the supporters of such a withdrawal, both anti-Zionists and "Zionist doves," are in a very small minority among the Israeli Jews — only two thousand demonstrators came out on December 26 in answer to a call issued by the Peace Now movement. But the realization of the other three conditions cited above could only reinforce their arguments.

For this to happen, the determination shown by the Palestinian masses in revolt has to be matched by that of a no less determined leadership rejecting the various schemes for an international conference to decide the fate of the Palestinians, whether these schemes are American, Soviet, Arab or Israeli. A leadership that would unequivocally demand a total and unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist army from the territories occupied in 1967.

For a partial self-determination of the Palestinians to be real, in particular on the West Bank, the Jordanian threat hanging over them would also have to be removed.

This does not only mean that it is necessary to sweep away the proposals that would subject the fate of the Palestinians to the tutelage of King Hussein, including the notorious "confederation" idea. (It should be said in passing that it is a desire not to burn all his bridges to Hussein that explains Arafat's great reticence to proclaim a "Palestinian government in exile," which has been much talked about lately.) It also means that the struggle of the Palestinians in Palestine has to be complemented by a struggle of Palestinians in Jordan, where they are in a large majority; a combined struggle with the Jordanian progressive forces and working masses to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy that has no less Palestinian blood on its hands than its Zionist cronies.

Conditions for emergence of radical leadership

The Palestinian uprising that is underway is creating the objective conditions for the emergence of a radical leadership. This is true in precisely the same measure that, as everyone agrees, the movement is largely a spontaneous one. In fact, given the lasting blind alley into which the successive capitulations of the PLO leadership have led and the general political discrediting of the other factions of the Palestinian resistance out-

side the country, the distinctive feature of the last few years has been the development of spontaneous expressions of the Palestinian struggle. They make up the great majority of the 3,150 "violent incidents" (stone throwing against the army), almost daily occurrences between April 1986 and May 1987, that have been registered by the Israeli sociologist Meron Benvenisti.

A new generation radicalized by uprising

Even if, in the absence of any credible alternative, the majority of the Palestinian masses continue to support the leadership of the PLO, their new generation has already been radicalized by the experience of the uprising that is underway. It is to be hoped that a left leadership can emerge from this radicalization. Short of this happening, there is a great danger that the Islamic fundamentalist current will be the only one to profit from it. This current is already growing rapidly among Palestinians, in particular in Gaza. But such an eventuality would end in a new, still more tragic and disastrous impasse than the one into which the policy of the PLO leadership led.

Finally, it should be noted that, over and above any partial self-determination that may come about, real self-determination of the Palestinian people as a whole inevitably involves the destruction of the Zionist state and the abolition of any discrimination and restrictions on movements and settlement of Palestinians in the territory of their historic homeland. After all, to give only one example, 60% of the inhabitants of Gaza are refugees from 1948! This perspective is inconceivable outside of a proletarian internationalist solution, for which the conditions are still far from having been assembled on the regional and local level. This makes the task of those fighting for such a solution all the more considerable. Hopefully the Palestinian uprising will give a powerful impetus to their activity. ★



3. "The crisis of the PLO", *International Marxist Review*, Vol.2 No. 2, Spring 1987. Report approved by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

Inkatha attacks bring Natal province to the brink of civil war

AT LEAST 200 people have died since the beginning of September in clashes between supporters and opponents of Inkatha, the reactionary Zulu movement led by Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. Such confrontations are nothing new. Buthelezi has never accepted the growth of the more militant forces opposing apartheid, the main ones being the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

In contrast to past conflicts the fighting has been developing on an unprecedented scale. Natal, and especially the Pietermaritzburg region, are today on the brink of a civil war which is threatening the very survival of the progressive opposition in the region.

NATHAN PALMER

THE REASONS for this murderous fury cannot, however, be understood without analyzing Buthelezi himself, his movement and the policy that he has been following toward progressive forces, as well as toward the white parties. The special features of Natal, the province in which these events have been unfolding, also have to be looked at.

Unlike other potentates that Pretoria set up in granting travesties of independence, the "chief minister" of KwaZulu is not a mere puppet. He is a potential trump card for those in South Africa and the Western countries who are worried about the dangers that will arise for capitalist interests when apartheid enters its death agony.

Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi has probably done everything possible to prepare himself for this role, with the help of most of the Western media. Does he not boast of his former membership of the African National Congress (ANC), which maintained semi-public contacts with him until 1980; of his total rejection of apartheid; of his refusal to let his bantustan, KwaZulu, accept the sort of independence that Pretoria planned for the Black homelands? The other side of the coin is the determination with which Buthelezi opposes any policy of sanctions against South Africa and champions the free-enterprise economy.

When the South African government created the "Zulu national state" in 1959, the territory was made up of 150 scattered tracts of land. This number was reduced to 40 in 1980 and subsequently to 26. The whole area comprises 38 per cent of Natal and 50 per cent of the province's population.

KwaZulu — a strange kind of "national state"

Of the 6 million people classed as belonging to the Zulu ethnic group, 3,866,000 lived in the regions assigned to KwaZulu in 1984. With hardly more than half its supposed population actually living there, this fractured territory makes a strange kind of "national state".¹ Pretoria, moreover, had the intention of detaching one of its regions, Ingwavuma, and handing it over to Swaziland, an independent country neighboring South Africa, which was not at all to Buthelezi's taste.

But other parts of South African territory have been forcibly incorporated into KwaZulu against the will of their inhabitants. Such "black spots" that the South African authorities wanted to wipe off the map are KwaMashu (South Africa's second largest township), Umlazi, Lamontville and Cherterville. These were all to become running

sores and one of the causes of the clashes between residents and Inkatha thugs.

Buthelezi has always cultivated an image as a firm opponent of apartheid and of the government's plans for his bantustan. He was expelled in 1950 from the Fort Hare University, when he joined the ANC's youth organization, a training ground for cadres. However, he rapidly abandoned the radical road, succeeding his father in 1953 as head of the 20,000-member Buthelezi clan. The South African authorities took five years to ratify his accession to the chieftainship.

During the 1970s, Gatsha Buthelezi climbed up the rungs of the hierarchy until, in 1976, he became the chief minister of his bantustan. It was also in this period that he reactivated Inkatha ka Zulu, an organization with cultural aims that had not survived the 1930s. Buthelezi renamed it Inkatha ye Nkululeko ye Sizwe (National Cultural Liberation Movement) and transformed it into a political organization. It was to be his party, his mouthpiece, his means of controlling the KwaZulu population and his trump card for establishing his credibility.

Anti-apartheid activists targeted by Inkatha

Inkatha is intended to be the sole party in KwaZulu. Buthelezi "has often spoken of the inappropriateness of an organized opposition in KwaZulu's political system. He considers that the traditional policy was one of consensus, and that in particular the Zulus should remain faithful to their past. The [KwaZulu] Assembly agreed with this proposal in 1974. It adopted a motion demanding that the minister of Bantu administration and development grant KwaZulu the right to oversee or ban parties before independence."²

Inkatha and the KwaZulu police — there is often not much difference — have unremittingly persecuted anti-apartheid activists opposed to Buthelezi or those who simply refused to accept his authority. Protesting students, local populations who resisted the incorporation of their areas in KwaZulu or who refused to join Inkatha en masse have all been targets.

On May 5, 1984, Inkatha thugs attacked a rally held by the UDF to celebrate May Day. On March 29, 1986, the second conference on the National Educational Crisis Committee was held in Durban to debate the question of the high-school boycott, which at the time had very active support. Inkatha supporters attacked it, after burning

1. The Zulus also represent the dominant ethnic group (20%) in Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging and in the Transvaal, where half of South Africa's industrial production is concentrated. See Philip Smit, "Process of black urbanisation" in H Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, *Up against the fence*, David Philip, 1985.
2. Jeffrey Butler, Robert I Rotberg and John Adams, *The Black homelands of South Africa*, University of California Press, 1977. [All quotations re-translated from French.]

down COSATU's headquarters.

In December 1986, 200 of Inkatha's *amabuthos* slipped into the township of Mphophomeni after an "electricity failure." Workers and leaders in the Metal and Allied Workers' Union involved in the long strike at BTR Sarmcol were in the township. Four people were kidnapped and murdered, including two unionists and the daughter of a third. They were burned alive.

Anti-labour union declares war on COSATU

In February-March 1987, more than half a dozen COSATU unionists were killed in Natal. On November 1, COSATU general secretary Jay Naidoo, who had been invited to an conference on investment organized by the business weekly *Financial Mail*, told an audience of businessmen: "A number of our members working in your factories in Natal have been killed or wounded in attacks by itinerant gangs dedicated to destroying any activity outside Inkatha." (*Weekly Mail*, November 6, 1987)

On May Day in 1986, Inkatha, unable to reconcile itself to watching COSATU trespass on what it considered its private preserve, went into open war against it, launching the Union of Workers' of South Africa (UWUSA). This organization has not spread beyond Inkatha's sanctuaries, where it has conducted forcible but not notably successful recruitment. The least that can be said is it demonstrated an anti-labor rather than a trade-union character. The general secretary of UWUSA was (until his recent resignation) Simon Conco, a businessman who combined his union post with that of KwaZulu minister of labor.

Inkatha is based on a network of labor branches that engage in intimidation, relying on lumpen elements and unemployed youth. But it is also a political rallying ground for the Zulu elites that draw their

incomes from sugar cane or other crops and from trade, as well as for the traditional apparatus of the clan chiefs and the bantustan bureaucratic apparatus. Inkatha is where you find in concentrated form what Shula Marks called "the politics of ambiguity."³

Inkatha has all the appearances of the single parties found in neo-colonial Black Africa — regimentation of the population through a bureaucracy and patronage, mobilization of ethnic prejudices, reactionary "nationalism," housing and jobs for members of the movement and so on.

Buthelezi is caught between his national pretensions at a South African-wide level and his exaltation of Zulu "nationalism;" between his adherence to free-enterprise modernism and his attachment to ancestral traditions; between his criticism of the regime and his own dependence on its institutions. On this last point, Buthelezi likes to remind people about his statements opposing apartheid and calling for the release of Nelson Mandela. That did not stop him in 1979 from hailing Botha's scheme for an accord among the southern African states as evidence that the premier was abandoning the doctrine of apartheid. Likewise, while Buthelezi advocated universal suffrage in a single state in the 1970s, in 1985 he declared that he was ready to give that up.

Buthelezi opts for a regional solution

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Zulu chief found himself confronting a two-fold challenge. On the one hand, anti-apartheid mobilizations were growing steadily. The ANC was reappearing more and more in the country. And on the other hand Botha, who succeeded JB Vorster in 1979, had started preparing reforms. There was the Wiehahn commission on the unions, the Riekert commission on influx control (control of Black population movements), the

Zulu "nationalism"

BUTHELEZI will not fail to threaten "Coloured" and above all "Indian" interests. The latter group is particularly concentrated in Natal and represents a real economic and trading power. While this strength is not comparable to that of white interests, it is formidable enough to offer many Indians a privileged situation in comparison to the population classed as "African." There is a well-to-do Indian petty-bourgeoisie in Natal and a small capitalist class. They were the target of the 1985 Durban riots organized by Inkatha.

In 1978, Buthelezi formed the South African Black Alliance (SABA), bringing together Inkatha, the Labour Party of South Africa (Coloureds) and the Indian Reform Party. The conservative Coloured and Indian leaders of these parties succumbed to the lure of the Tricameral parliament introduced in 1983-84, and therefore participated in Botha's fake constitutional reform.

In August 1984, Gatsha Buthelezi revealed his spite and his "African nationalism." In his view, these leaders "are abandoning the Africans and only fostering their own interests at the expense of the Africans." He added that "They are withdrawing from the liberation struggle, and this will have repercussions when the Africans come to power." (*Race Relations Survey 1984*, p.529, SAIRR, 1985.) Thus, Buthelezi is building a reactionary, racist nationalism designed to reinforce his own regional base. ★

Good Hope conference on industrial development and so on.

Buthelezi's response was the choice of a regional option, which was to become the "KwaNatal" option. This explains his repeated rejection of "independence" for KwaZulu. While remaining close to the Zulu chiefs, Gatsha Buthelezi appeared open to constitutional readjustments in the framework of a dialogue with the political and business representatives of white Natal, a sort of integrated regional solution.

The Botha government's perspective is a revamped version of that of Verwoerd, the predecessor of both Vorster and Botha, who in the 1950s was the master architect of apartheid. The Good Hope conference held in the Cape in 1981 maintained the orientation of "ten independent Black states." (This policy has now been half implemented, since Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana are independent, and Pre-

3. Shula Marks, *The ambiguities of dependence in South Africa*, Ravan, 1986.

