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EDITORIAL

Self-determination for the Palestinian people

THE PAST YEAR marked a double anniversary in the Near East, that of the two main stages of the Zionist takeover of Palestinian territory: 1947 and 1967.¹ The Palestinians did not let it pass unmarked. Since December 9, there has been the most extensive popular uprising — both in breadth and duration — on the Palestinian lands since the creation of the state of Israel. (See also article on page 28.) What sparked it off is not important — the explosive material had been there for a long time.

SALAH JABER

FORTY YEARS have gone by since the United Nations adopted its iniquitous partition plan on November 29, 1947 [see map]. That was the signal for the Zionist armed gangs to launch their war of annexation. In 1948 they seized, in total, 80% of the lands of the former British mandated territory of Pales-

tin. (The UN plan granted them 55%). In 1947 the Jews held only 6% of this land and represented only a third of the total population: 630,000 inhabitants out of nearly 2 million.

In December 1949, in the wake of the war for the establishment of the Israeli state, there were no more than 160,000 Pa-

lestinian Arabs on the usurped 80% of this territory, as against a million Jews. Such were the two pillars of the Zionist colonial enterprise: massive expulsion of Arabs and massive immigration of Jews in the name of "biblical rights."


In June 1967, the Zionist usurpation of Palestinian territory was completed by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with the addition of the Syrian Golan plain and the Egyptian Sinai desert. Israel has withdrawn from only one of these territories since then — the Sinai — which it evacuated in 1982. East Jerusalem was officially annexed for "biblical" reasons right away in 1967, and the Golan, for "security" reasons, in 1981.

Status of the occupied territories

The rest of the West Bank, as well as the Gaza Strip, retain to this day the official status of occupied territories, and for good reason! Unlike the Golan, where the great majority of the population (more than 150,000 before June 1967) fled during the six-day war without being able to return, and where Jewish colonists now outnumber the natives, these territories are still populated by Arabs numerous enough to upset the ethnic and political makeup of Israeli society if they became Israeli citizens — a corollary of formal annexation. That would be contrary to the very essence of Zionism.

In the long term, the very nature of the Israeli state as a "Jewish state" would be threatened, given the difference between the growth rate of the Jewish population and the much higher one of the Arab population. This, by the way, is the reason why the Zionist movement attaches so much importance to the emigration of Jews from the USSR, the only source of massive potential immigration into Israel that exists today and therefore the only available means of compensating for the relatively low birth rate of Israeli Jews. It is not labor power that Israel lacks, but cannon fodder.

In the aftermath of the June war, the Zionist state already had almost 1,400,000 Arabs under its control, including more than a million on the West Bank and in Gaza, as against 2,400,000 Jews. The Palestinian exodus this time was not as large proportionally as in 1948, when the vast



1. See the editorial in IV 122, June 15, 1987.

majority of Palestinian Arabs fled the usurped territories. Even though increasingly since 1967 the majority of all Palestinians lived outside the frontiers of the former British Mandat of Palestine — against only a quarter at the beginning of the 1950s, and nearly 35% after the June war — nevertheless less than a third of the residents of the West Bank and Gaza fled these territories in 1967.

The reason for this was not that the 1967 invasion was any “gentler” than the preceding one, although it did not give rise to deliberate collective massacres, such as the one perpetrated by the Zionist terrorists of Irgun at Deir Yassin in 1948.

Second Arab exodus in 1967

The exodus in 1967 was proportionally smaller for several combined reasons. In 1948, for two-thirds of those involved, the exodus was from one part of Palestinian territory to another. This was no longer possible in 1967, since the whole of Palestine was occupied. Secondly, the great majority of the 1948 refugees thought that they were leaving their homes only temporarily. By 1967, the lesson had sunk in.

The fact that the Arabs who remained under Israeli rule in 1948, while persecuted, were not massacred was also an important factor. Finally, the poverty in which the 1948 refugees were living could only encourage the people of the West Bank and Gaza to hang onto their homes and their livelihoods. Thus, the bulk of the 1967 refugees included those who had already fled in 1948, and had nothing of much worth to leave behind. This was their second experience of displacement, their second exodus.

As a result, when the Zionist state took over the remaining 20% of Palestine territory, it brought under its control nearly 40% of the Palestinians, in addition to those already under its jurisdiction. This was the main flaw in the Zionist expansionist project — a veritable time-bomb that successive governments of Israel have not succeeded in defusing, and whose explosive power grows with each day that passes. Today, according to Israeli figures, 2,125,000 Arabs are living under Zionist jurisdiction (two-thirds on the West Bank and in Gaza), against 3,590,000 Jews. The ratio is thus 37 to 63. The Israeli's own projections are that, given the present rates of growth, this ratio will be 45 to 55 in the year 2,000, that is in twelve years!

This explains the worry of the “enlightened” Zionists (an epithet more appropriate than “moderate”). It was enough to hear their leader, the Laborite Shimon Peres, exclaim nervously on December 30 that “in 12 years, there will be a million Arabs in Gaza and the demographic density will be greater there than in Hong Kong.” At the same time, he lamented that today “out of every hundred children born between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, 50 are Ar-

abs and 50 Jews, and nobody is going to stop this phenomena.”

This is Zionism's fundamental dilemma — the contradiction between its expansionist territorial ambitions and its racist project of a “Jewish” state. The latter, of course, is the overriding principle. “To preserve Israel's Jewish character,” as Peres says, is the chief concern of all Zionists. How can this be reconciled, therefore, with the demographic data presented above? This is a debate that goes back 20 years in Israel. Among the Zionists, four different answers to this question can be discerned.

First of all, there is the answer of the biggest fools, or the most outspoken, such as the fascist rabbi Meir Kahane, the leader of the Kach party, who is fighting to make Israel “*Arabenrein*” — free from Arabs — just as the Nazis wanted Germany to be “*Judenrein*.” Unable to expel the Arabs by military force, he is offering visas, airline tickets and financial aid to any Arabs willing to leave. Another example is the general who a few months ago made the term “transfer” notorious in Israel by proposing massive deportation of the Palestinians from “Greater Israel.”

Then there are those who, while proclaiming their unflinching attachment to the same “Greater Israel,” and in particular to Judea and Samaria (the biblical names of the West Bank territories), realize that “transfer” today is impracticable. They know that Israel's extreme dependence on the United States makes a massive expulsion of the Palestinians from their territories quite impossible in the present circumstances.²

“I prefer to keep the Arabs under our control”

They prefer, nonetheless, to hold onto the territories in question, even at the price of maintaining indefinitely the apartheid that was shaped several years ago under Zionist auspices. It is the view of the Zionist right and part of the extreme right that was expressed recently by the outspoken leader of the Tehiya party, Geula Cohen, in the American magazine *Newsweek* of August 31, 1987: “I prefer to keep the million-plus Arabs here, where they are under our control, despite all the problems. At present, the idea of a mass population transfer seems to me impossible, although not immoral. It is the most moral idea in the world.”

However, this “realism” of the Zionist right does not reduce the dilemma described above. It cannot refer to the fact that in the country where apartheid originated 5 million whites control six times their number of Blacks. The power of Israel's Arab environment and the narrowness of the Palestinian territory are major factors making Israel's situation qualitatively different from that of South Africa. This is why, in fact, the Zionist right envies solving the demographic problem by

“creeping” expulsion of a large mass of Palestinians, even if it does not always avow this openly.

Repression and persecution worsen

Already at the Thirtieth Congress of the Zionist Movement in December 1982, Menachem Begin replied to Peres' demographic argument by saying that the statisticians were often wrong in their predictions because they did not take account of the growing emigration of Palestinians! The worsening in recent years of repression, persecution and provocations against the Palestinians in the territories occupied in 1967 have been designed precisely to goad them into leaving “voluntarily.”

Enlightened Zionists consider that this option is as illusory as it is impossible, just as much as “transfer” pure and simple. Illusory because there is nothing to indicate that emigration of Palestinians from their territories is compensating for their birth rate. On the contrary, a number of factors have increased Palestinians' attachment to their homeland: the closing of the traditional outlets for emigration — especially the oil states of the Arab-Persian Gulf, which have suffered an abrupt fall in their buying power; the Palestinians' political determination; and the spectacle of the misfortunes of the refugees in Lebanon, the last country where they could have a certain autonomy.

The Palestinians will only leave en masse if they are forcibly driven out — there is no way that their departure could appear “voluntary.” This is why it is as impossible as “transfer.” When Peres, with his hypocritical air, says that Israel must not lose its “democratic” soul, he means that such a deterioration of its image could be fatal for the Zionist state, in view of its dependence on outside support from its American tutor or from the “diaspora.”

Peres, therefore, proposes simply to maintain control of the territories, while leaving the Jordanians the job of controlling the population! According to the Laborite plan worked out by Yigal Allon in the 1970s, Israel would maintain on the West Bank — where 55,000 Israelis have now settled — a belt of strategic colonies and military bases, especially along the Jordan valley, which is considered the untouchable “safe” border of the Zionist state. The Israeli army would withdraw from those parts of the territories that have a

2. The mere decision to banish nine Palestinian “agitators” has cost Israel strong criticism (as well as a vote against them in the UN) from its American tutor, anxious to calm down the game in the Middle East. A massive deportation of Palestinians would immediately set the whole region ablaze — a real disaster for Washington. It should be pointed out, moreover, that international condemnation of the banishings — although this practice has been well-utilized almost constantly by Israeli governments — shows to what extent rights are only imposed by struggle. The rights of the Palestinian people have never been so evident in the eyes of the whole world as since the present uprising.

dense Arab population, while maintaining the right to oversee their demilitarization. Civilian administration and law and order would be entrusted to King Hussein, in the framework of a settlement coming out of an "international conference," which Peres sees as a sort of second Camp David, only this time with Jordan.

Given the reluctance of Israeli public opinion to accept his party's plan and the Zionist demagoguery of Likud about "Judea-Samaria," Peres has chosen recently to divide the problem by focusing his campaign on the fate of Gaza. It seems to him easier to get a majority on the question of Gaza for several reasons: there is not the same Zionist "biblical" attachment to it as there is to the West Bank; it is a small territory (360 square kilometers), that has a dense population (600,000 inhabitants) with a well-established reputation for rebelliousness; fewer than 2,000 Israelis have settled there; and, finally and mainly, on the other side of Gaza is the immense buffer-zone of the Sinai desert, which was restored to Egypt on condition that it be de-militarized under the supervision of the US.

"Peres proposes the creation of bantustans"

From the beginning of December, even before the spread of the ongoing Palestinian uprising mainly based in Gaza, Peres opened his campaign on this territory's fate. He took the offensive again at the end of December, as soon as the Palestinian struggle seemed to have subsided. His proposals for Gaza are identical to those concerning the West Bank, except that in the first case no role is foreseen for the Jewish settlements, whose numbers are negligible.

"Peres proposes the creation of a bantustan," ingenuously protested Yassar Arafat, leader of the PLO and of its dominant right-wing faction. As if anything else could be expected from an international conference for a negotiated "settlement" of the Palestinian question on the basis of a Jordanian-Palestinian "confederation" — that is, in the framework of the official program held by the PLO since 1983 and reconfirmed last year! As if it were not entirely clear that:

"Leaving aside the totally illusory independence of such a mini-state completely trapped in the Israeli vice, with its back to Jordan on the one side (the West Bank) and to the sea and desert on the other side (Gaza), with Israel stuck in between the two — it would be quite impossible to achieve this through a (negotiated) Israeli agreement to withdraw from the territories occupied in 1967. At best, the Zionist state would agree to a very partial withdrawal from the West Bank — where it has already "appropriated" almost half the land — and Gaza, involving draconian conditions which would render these territories little more than bantustans, and this at the price of a total political capitulation, Sadat-

style, by the Arab states."³

In fact, no partial self-determination of the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza can be real without an unconditional Israeli withdrawal from these territories. But in the present relationship of forces this will never come out of an international conference. Achieving it would require a combination of irresistible pressure from the Palestinians on the occupying forces, firm Arab support for their struggle, strong international pressure on the Zionist government and a powerful movement for unconditional withdrawal inside Israel itself.

Today, the supporters of such a withdrawal, both anti-Zionists and "Zionist doves," are in a very small minority among the Israeli Jews — only two thousand demonstrators came out on December 26 in answer to a call issued by the Peace Now movement. But the realization of the other three conditions cited above could only reinforce their arguments.

For this to happen, the determination shown by the Palestinian masses in revolt has to be matched by that of a no less determined leadership rejecting the various schemes for an international conference to decide the fate of the Palestinians, whether these schemes are American, Soviet, Arab or Israeli. A leadership that would unequivocally demand a total and unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist army from the territories occupied in 1967.

For a partial self-determination of the Palestinians to be real, in particular on the West Bank, the Jordanian threat hanging over them would also have to be removed.

This does not only mean that it is necessary to sweep away the proposals that would subject the fate of the Palestinians to the tutelage of King Hussein, including the notorious "confederation" idea. (It should be said in passing that it is a desire not to burn all his bridges to Hussein that explains Arafat's great reticence to proclaim a "Palestinian government in exile," which has been much talked about lately.) It also means that the struggle of the Palestinians in Palestine has to be complemented by a struggle of Palestinians in Jordan, where they are in a large majority; a combined struggle with the Jordanian progressive forces and working masses to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy that has no less Palestinian blood on its hands than its Zionist cronies.

Conditions for emergence of radical leadership

The Palestinian uprising that is underway is creating the objective conditions for the emergence of a radical leadership. This is true in precisely the same measure that, as everyone agrees, the movement is largely a spontaneous one. In fact, given the lasting blind alley into which the successive capitulations of the PLO leadership have led and the general political discrediting of the other factions of the Palestinian resistance out-

side the country, the distinctive feature of the last few years has been the development of spontaneous expressions of the Palestinian struggle. They make up the great majority of the 3,150 "violent incidents" (stone throwing against the army), almost daily occurrences between April 1986 and May 1987, that have been registered by the Israeli sociologist Meron Benvenisti.

A new generation radicalized by uprising

Even if, in the absence of any credible alternative, the majority of the Palestinian masses continue to support the leadership of the PLO, their new generation has already been radicalized by the experience of the uprising that is underway. It is to be hoped that a left leadership can emerge from this radicalization. Short of this happening, there is a great danger that the Islamic fundamentalist current will be the only one to profit from it. This current is already growing rapidly among Palestinians, in particular in Gaza. But such an eventuality would end in a new, still more tragic and disastrous impasse than the one into which the policy of the PLO leadership led.

Finally, it should be noted that, over and above any partial self-determination that may come about, real self-determination of the Palestinian people as a whole inevitably involves the destruction of the Zionist state and the abolition of any discrimination and restrictions on movements and settlement of Palestinians in the territory of their historic homeland. After all, to give only one example, 60% of the inhabitants of Gaza are refugees from 1948! This perspective is inconceivable outside of a proletarian internationalist solution, for which the conditions are still far from having been assembled on the regional and local level. This makes the task of those fighting for such a solution all the more considerable. Hopefully the Palestinian uprising will give a powerful impetus to their activity. ★



3. "The crisis of the PLO", *International Marxist Review*, Vol.2 No. 2, Spring 1987. Report approved by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

Inkatha attacks bring Natal province to the brink of civil war

AT LEAST 200 people have died since the beginning of September in clashes between supporters and opponents of Inkatha, the reactionary Zulu movement led by Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi. Such confrontations are nothing new. Buthelezi has never accepted the growth of the more militant forces opposing apartheid, the main ones being the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU).

In contrast to past conflicts the fighting has been developing on an unprecedented scale. Natal, and especially the Pietermaritzburg region, are today on the brink of a civil war which is threatening the very survival of the progressive opposition in the region.

NATHAN PALMER

THE REASONS for this murderous fury cannot, however, be understood without analyzing Buthelezi himself, his movement and the policy that he has been following toward progressive forces, as well as toward the white parties. The special features of Natal, the province in which these events have been unfolding, also have to be looked at.

Unlike other potentates that Pretoria set up in granting travesties of independence, the "chief minister" of KwaZulu is not a mere puppet. He is a potential trump card for those in South Africa and the Western countries who are worried about the dangers that will arise for capitalist interests when apartheid enters its death agony.

Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi has probably done everything possible to prepare himself for this role, with the help of most of the Western media. Does he not boast of his former membership of the African National Congress (ANC), which maintained semi-public contacts with him until 1980; of his total rejection of apartheid; of his refusal to let his bantustan, KwaZulu, accept the sort of independence that Pretoria planned for the Black homelands? The other side of the coin is the determination with which Buthelezi opposes any policy of sanctions against South Africa and champions the free-enterprise economy.

When the South African government created the "Zulu national state" in 1959, the territory was made up of 150 scattered tracts of land. This number was reduced to 40 in 1980 and subsequently to 26. The whole area comprises 38 per cent of Natal and 50 per cent of the province's population.

KwaZulu — a strange kind of "national state"

Of the 6 million people classed as belonging to the Zulu ethnic group, 3,866,000 lived in the regions assigned to KwaZulu in 1984. With hardly more than half its supposed population actually living there, this fractured territory makes a strange kind of "national state".¹ Pretoria, moreover, had the intention of detaching one of its regions, Ingwavuma, and handing it over to Swaziland, an independent country neighboring South Africa, which was not at all to Buthelezi's taste.

But other parts of South African territory have been forcibly incorporated into KwaZulu against the will of their inhabitants. Such "black spots" that the South African authorities wanted to wipe off the map are KwaMashu (South Africa's second largest township), Umlazi, Lamontville and Cherterville. These were all to become running

sores and one of the causes of the clashes between residents and Inkatha thugs.

Buthelezi has always cultivated an image as a firm opponent of apartheid and of the government's plans for his bantustan. He was expelled in 1950 from the Fort Hare University, when he joined the ANC's youth organization, a training ground for cadres. However, he rapidly abandoned the radical road, succeeding his father in 1953 as head of the 20,000-member Buthelezi clan. The South African authorities took five years to ratify his accession to the chieftainship.

During the 1970s, Gatsha Buthelezi climbed up the rungs of the hierarchy until, in 1976, he became the chief minister of his bantustan. It was also in this period that he reactivated Inkatha ka Zulu, an organization with cultural aims that had not survived the 1930s. Buthelezi renamed it Inkatha ye Nkululeko ye Sizwe (National Cultural Liberation Movement) and transformed it into a political organization. It was to be his party, his mouthpiece, his means of controlling the KwaZulu population and his trump card for establishing his credibility.

Anti-apartheid activists targeted by Inkatha

Inkatha is intended to be the sole party in KwaZulu. Buthelezi "has often spoken of the inappropriateness of an organized opposition in KwaZulu's political system. He considers that the traditional policy was one of consensus, and that in particular the Zulus should remain faithful to their past. The [KwaZulu] Assembly agreed with this proposal in 1974. It adopted a motion demanding that the minister of Bantu administration and development grant KwaZulu the right to oversee or ban parties before independence."²

Inkatha and the KwaZulu police — there is often not much difference — have unremittingly persecuted anti-apartheid activists opposed to Buthelezi or those who simply refused to accept his authority. Protesting students, local populations who resisted the incorporation of their areas in KwaZulu or who refused to join Inkatha en masse have all been targets.

On May 5, 1984, Inkatha thugs attacked a rally held by the UDF to celebrate May Day. On March 29, 1986, the second conference on the National Educational Crisis Committee was held in Durban to debate the question of the high-school boycott, which at the time had very active support. Inkatha supporters attacked it, after burning

1. The Zulus also represent the dominant ethnic group (20%) in Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging and in the Transvaal, where half of South Africa's industrial production is concentrated. See Philip Smit, "Process of black urbanisation" in H Giliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, *Up against the fence*, David Philip, 1985.
2. Jeffrey Butler, Robert I Rotberg and John Adams, *The Black homelands of South Africa*, University of California Press, 1977. [All quotations re-translated from French.]

down COSATU's headquarters.

In December 1986, 200 of Inkatha's *amabuthos* slipped into the township of Mphophomeni after an "electricity failure." Workers and leaders in the Metal and Allied Workers' Union involved in the long strike at BTR Sarmcol were in the township. Four people were kidnapped and murdered, including two unionists and the daughter of a third. They were burned alive.

Anti-labour union declares war on COSATU

In February-March 1987, more than half a dozen COSATU unionists were killed in Natal. On November 1, COSATU general secretary Jay Naidoo, who had been invited to an conference on investment organized by the business weekly *Financial Mail*, told an audience of businessmen: "A number of our members working in your factories in Natal have been killed or wounded in attacks by itinerant gangs dedicated to destroying any activity outside Inkatha." (*Weekly Mail*, November 6, 1987)

On May Day in 1986, Inkatha, unable to reconcile itself to watching COSATU trespass on what it considered its private preserve, went into open war against it, launching the Union of Workers' of South Africa (UWUSA). This organization has not spread beyond Inkatha's sanctuaries, where it has conducted forcible but not notably successful recruitment. The least that can be said is it demonstrated an anti-labor rather than a trade-union character. The general secretary of UWUSA was (until his recent resignation) Simon Conco, a businessman who combined his union post with that of KwaZulu minister of labor.

Inkatha is based on a network of labor branches that engage in intimidation, relying on lumpen elements and unemployed youth. But it is also a political rallying ground for the Zulu elites that draw their

incomes from sugar cane or other crops and from trade, as well as for the traditional apparatus of the clan chiefs and the bantustan bureaucratic apparatus. Inkatha is where you find in concentrated form what Shula Marks called "the politics of ambiguity."³

Inkatha has all the appearances of the single parties found in neo-colonial Black Africa — regimentation of the population through a bureaucracy and patronage, mobilization of ethnic prejudices, reactionary "nationalism," housing and jobs for members of the movement and so on.

Buthelezi is caught between his national pretensions at a South African-wide level and his exaltation of Zulu "nationalism;" between his adherence to free-enterprise modernism and his attachment to ancestral traditions; between his criticism of the regime and his own dependence on its institutions. On this last point, Buthelezi likes to remind people about his statements opposing apartheid and calling for the release of Nelson Mandela. That did not stop him in 1979 from hailing Botha's scheme for an accord among the southern African states as evidence that the premier was abandoning the doctrine of apartheid. Likewise, while Buthelezi advocated universal suffrage in a single state in the 1970s, in 1985 he declared that he was ready to give that up.

Buthelezi opts for a regional solution

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Zulu chief found himself confronting a two-fold challenge. On the one hand, anti-apartheid mobilizations were growing steadily. The ANC was reappearing more and more in the country. And on the other hand Botha, who succeeded JB Vorster in 1979, had started preparing reforms. There was the Wiehahn commission on the unions, the Riekert commission on influx control (control of Black population movements), the

Zulu "nationalism"

BUTHELEZI will not fail to threaten "Coloured" and above all "Indian" interests. The latter group is particularly concentrated in Natal and represents a real economic and trading power. While this strength is not comparable to that of white interests, it is formidable enough to offer many Indians a privileged situation in comparison to the population classed as "African." There is a well-to-do Indian petty-bourgeoisie in Natal and a small capitalist class. They were the target of the 1985 Durban riots organized by Inkatha.

In 1978, Buthelezi formed the South African Black Alliance (SABA), bringing together Inkatha, the Labour Party of South Africa (Coloureds) and the Indian Reform Party. The conservative Coloured and Indian leaders of these parties succumbed to the lure of the Tricameral parliament introduced in 1983-84, and therefore participated in Botha's fake constitutional reform.

In August 1984, Gatsha Buthelezi revealed his spite and his "African nationalism." In his view, these leaders "are abandoning the Africans and only fostering their own interests at the expense of the Africans." He added that "They are withdrawing from the liberation struggle, and this will have repercussions when the Africans come to power." (*Race Relations Survey 1984*, p.529, SAIRR, 1985.) Thus, Buthelezi is building a reactionary, racist nationalism designed to reinforce his own regional base. ★

Good Hope conference on industrial development and so on.

Buthelezi's response was the choice of a regional option, which was to become the "KwaNatal" option. This explains his repeated rejection of "independence" for KwaZulu. While remaining close to the Zulu chiefs, Gatsha Buthelezi appeared open to constitutional readjustments in the framework of a dialogue with the political and business representatives of white Natal, a sort of integrated regional solution.

The Botha government's perspective is a revamped version of that of Verwoerd, the predecessor of both Vorster and Botha, who in the 1950s was the master architect of apartheid. The Good Hope conference held in the Cape in 1981 maintained the orientation of "ten independent Black states." (This policy has now been half implemented, since Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana are independent, and Pre-

3. Shula Marks, *The ambiguities of dependence in South Africa*, Ravan, 1986.



KwaZulu, product of apartheid

UNLIKE other regions such as the Reef, where the population does not live in the bantustan to which it is assigned and may never even have seen it, almost all the Black population of Natal lives on the various fragments of the bantustan. KwaZulu is the most populous of the bantustans, and, along with Ciskei, has the largest urban population.

This reflects the growing urbanization of the population classified as "African" (which today totals 26 million). The government's planning experts estimate that from now until the end of the century, 10 to 15 million "Africans" will be urbanized.¹ KwaZulu's main urban centers border the white areas and the industrial complexes — Durban-Pinetown-Hammarsdale, and, in the north, Empangeni and Richards Bay.

When Verwoerd was minister of native affairs, the doctrine was not to authorize direct investment — white, of course — in the bantustans. Preference was given to developing the industrial concentrations in the white areas close to the "frontiers" of the homelands. It was only after 1969 that the government authorized direct investment in the Black areas. But programs for moving plants remained tightly controlled by the authorities in Pretoria, who kept the keys to industrial development of the bantustans in their hands.

Some enterprises began to establish themselves in KwaZulu. Bata Shoes moved one of its plants from the Pinetown industrial zone to Loskop. The benefits of such an operation were obvious. Wages were two to three times lower than those in the white areas. B&S Furniture moved its Krugersdorp factory to Ezakheni for the same reasons.

In 1984, the KwaZulu Development Council accepted 34 projects for setting up plants in the bantustan, involving a total of 12.9 million rands. Twelve of these came from Israel, five from the United States, nine from the Far East and two from Europe. The policy of the bantustan authorities has always been to attract foreign investment, while supporting the development of small "African" enterprises.

Unlike most of the other bantustans, KwaZulu has real agricultural potential. Like the others, it has primarily a subsistence and not a profit-making agriculture. This is related both to the arable land available and the productivity of the soils. Since 1913 and the first Land Act, "Africans" have been unable to acquire ownership of land, and the most fertile lands have, of course, been assigned to the "white areas."

The structure of land ownership in South Africa has been shaped politically in accordance with the specific features of the country, bound up with the peculiar aspects of its capitalist development under the conditions of apartheid. The white authorities also manipulated the traditional structures as a supplementary means of control over access to the land. In KwaZulu and the other bantustans, the land is held in accordance with the ancestral system.

Thus, the rules of the market do not govern acquisition of land. It is acquired through inheritance or by grant from the chiefs, on the "prudent" advice of the white authorities. There is no free market in land. "Africans" are not free to sell or to buy land, even in the bantustans, and of course there is no capital market in the form of loans or credit available to the Black population.

"There is no environmental reason for KwaZulu's agriculture to remain as unproductive as it is, but considerable investment, adaptive ingenuity to bring in new crops and technologies and good public and private resource management will be needed before agriculture can advance."² This agriculture remains largely a female occupation. "For most, return to full-time labour in agriculture is not commensurate with earnings outside....As long as influx laws keep women from moving to their husbands' place of work, much of the minor agriculture will remain in their hands."³

The needs of agriculture can, however, lead to the development of certain crops in the bantustans. This is true for sugar. Along the Indian Ocean, "The Natal coast is a prime area for sugar cane, and parts of KwaZulu — the only remaining lands suitable for sugar cane expansion — could become very productive....A quota system is in effect in the [South African] Republic, and KwaZulu has been granted an allotment. This is divided and allocated to farmers by the KwaZulu government on the advice of white extension agents."⁴ ★

1. Herman Gillioes, "The changing political function of the homelands," in *Up against the fences*, David Philip, 1985.

2. Butler, Rotberg and Adams, op. cit.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

toria hopes soon to declare the "independence" of Lebowa and KwaNdebele, despite the rejection of this in August 1986 by the KwaNdebele Assembly.) The innovation offered by the Good Hope conference and the 1982 plan that bears its name lay in the recognition of eight (later nine) industrial development "regions," of which only one, the Western Cape, does not include a bantustan.

As an underpinning for these regions, the plan offered the functional ties existing between the white areas and the neighboring bantustans, and proposed the setting up of "Regional Development Advisory Committees." An EEC-type model was not far from the minds of the inventors of this plan!

One of these regions includes Natal (the white areas) and KwaZulu, as well as a strip of territory in northern Transkei. Leaving aside this part of Transkei, the idea reappeared of an entity embracing the white areas of Natal and the territory returned to the Black population of KwaZulu. Does this mean that Botha is a supporter of the KwaNatal opinion? In fact, there are two aspects to the answer. One goes with the question "is such an entity an unavoidable reality?" The second has to do with Botha's intentions. As regards the latter, it has to be pointed out that in the projects that PW Botha has pursued since his accession to the post of premier and then of president of the republic, the dominant feature has been "authoritarian reformism."

Cooptation of Black elites into state apparatus

The regional industrial development and local government projects subsequently introduced along with the Regional Services Councils reinforce the links between the white areas and the bantustans for a certain number of tasks at the regional level. But, at the same time, they concentrate still more tasks at the central level, in particular in the hands of the Executive.

Botha has not departed from his policy of coopting the Black elites into the management and administrative apparatus, allowing them to rise as far as the intermediate levels, even at the cost of irritating the Afrikaner far right. In this, his objective is to reinforce his control over the top levels of the state.

The question remains of KwaNatal and the special social and economic features of its two components. The *Indaba* (debate) over KwaNatal has become the hobby horse of Buthelezi and of the white parliamentary opposition, which has a majority in Natal.

The province has been a laboratory for perfecting and testing a system of representation, administration and economic planning at an intermediate governmental level, in the framework of a future constitutional readjustment (we have even seen an attempt at an *Indaba* for the Cape).

In 1980, Jan Lombard turned over to the bosses of the sugar industry the report that they had asked him to make on the future of the province and proposals for adjustments to preserve established interests. It got an unfavorable or mixed reaction from all sides.

In the same period as the Good Hope conference did its work, the "Buthelezi Commission" met. Besides Inkatha's "Coloured" and "Indian" partners in the South African Black Alliance (SABA), it included white liberal groups, representatives of the Natal sugar industry, national chambers of commerce and industry, magnates like Harry Oppenheimer and various experts.


The commission's report was published in 1982. It declared for an association of KwaZulu and Natal, for a mixed economy and economic redistribution measures between the two partners in the association, as well as moving toward free access to KwaZulu land.⁴

The ruling National Party (NP) showed hostility, while the New Republic Party (NRP), which at the time was still the dominant white party in Natal, began to take its distance from Inkatha and move closer to the government's options. On the other hand, the Progressive Federal Party (PFP) — which was nibbling away at the positions of the NRP — and Inkatha moved toward each other. This was reflected in 1984 by the Ulundi agreement between the KwaZulu government and the Natal province executive. This set up working groups to formulate concrete administrative and constitutional proposals for the whole of Natal-KwaZulu.

In 1985, the Private Sector Liaison Committee was set up. It brought together the Durban Metropolitan Authority Chamber of Commerce, the Natal Chamber of Industry and the Sugar Producers' Association of South Africa. These organizations were strong supporters of the KwaNatal option, and were to develop a policy of pressurizing the government on its behalf.

Chris Saunders, one of the big sugar barons and a member of the sugar producers' association, sees the regional model as the only alternative to a single state which "would create the most powerful Black state in the world and lead to Marxism, a dictatorial one-party state, almost continuous revolutions and so on."⁵

Why do the local employers support the



KwaNatal option? Above all, they are looking for political stability — the fundamental precondition for the security of their investments. And Pretoria is proving incapable of assuring that either through reform or armed force. The local employers want a labor market in the region freed from the fetters that impede free circulation. More generally, they want to rationalize the infrastructures by extending the reach of the region's industrial centers to KwaZulu.

Sugar magnates support KwaNatal option

For these reasons, the sugar magnates have every interest in opposing the stabilization of KwaZulu as an entity distinct from the rest of Natal, since such a consolidation would involve the state buying up lands with a view to incorporating them into the bantustan, subject to redivisions and recombinations.

The profitability threshold of the sugar refineries turns around 70 to 75 per cent of capacity utilization, and is very dependent on intensive supply, and therefore on cultivating large tracts of land. That makes all arable land precious.

However, while the sugar industry employers have been in the front rank of the supporters of the KwaNatal option, they

have also managed to pull other sections of employers behind them. "Unable to achieve sufficiently quick results by way of lobbying the NP [National Party] by signals that Pretoria would respond favorably to, private and regional initiatives, big capital — including the national representatives of the Federal Chamber of Industry, the Institute of Bankers and Anglo-American — went for the political gap opened up by KwaNatal"⁶

This policy has paid off, since after 1985 the government was to demonstrate a more favorable attitude to the experiment underway in Natal. Botha, on the other hand, does not necessarily support the KwaNatal option one hundred per cent. His party remains divided on it, and the wing most favorable to the regional option, to a large extent, only jumped onto the KwaNatal band wagon when it was already rolling. Botha's game, therefore, is to move toward this scheme, while

keeping prerogatives in the hands of the central executive in the interests of the National Party.

In July 1987, the Regional Service Councils were set up. On August 11, the Joint Executive Authority of KwaZulu-Natal was formed and it began functioning officially in November 1987. It includes ten representatives (three whites, two Indians and five for KwaZulu). The government has let it be known, moreover, that it envisages a similar structure for the Transvaal.

A solution of this type in any case requires political stability in order for the various participants to enjoy a sufficient base and authority. This is precisely what has posed problems for Inkatha and for Buthelezi.

How can he play this role if he is being challenged in the zones that he is supposed to administer, if he does not prevent the growth of the radical anti-apartheid forces? In order to achieve this, Buthelezi is ready to unleash a blood-bath in the attempt to crush his opponents. He is demonstrating this today in Natal. ★

4. The Buthelezi Commission, "The requirements for stability and development in KwaZulu and Natal," H & H Publications, Durban, 1982.

5. Daryl Glaser, "Behind the Indaba: the making of the KwaNatal option," *Transformation* 2, 1986.

6. Daryl Glaser, op. cit.

Özal profits from election results and the opposition's weaknesses

WITH THE legislative elections on November 29 in Turkey, the process of transition following the 1980 military coup came to its end. All the bourgeois parties and politicians who were banned by the generals were able to participate in these elections.

Only one thorny problem remains to be resolved before the new regime put into office by the military will be consolidated: the question of the president of the republic, who has to take over from the putchists' leader, General Kenan Evren. The final transition from the military dictatorship will be made at the time of the presidential elections proposed for 1989.

FUAT ORÇUN

MORE THAN seven years after the coup d'état, the military's political operation has largely succeeded. The mass movement and the social opposition has been beaten. Revolutionary groups, left trade unions, professional associations and democratic organizations have been dismantled. They have been stripped of all legal political rights by a whole series of restrictions, written into the lawbook as well as the constitution.

The masses have been dispossessed of any means of extra-parliamentary pressure. All political activity has been forced into the sole framework of the bourgeois parliament. Stability has probably been assured thanks to strong and lasting governments of the "centre-right". Depoliticization in society continues and deepens. In terms of the process of "normalization", all the bourgeois parties have integrated themselves into an authoritarian and strong-arm parliamentary system.

It has, therefore, been a smooth transition, without marked schisms between the army and the political parties, with neither an explosion of the social opposition nor major contradictions inside the regime that carried it out. Compared to what has happened in a number of so-called third world countries, the Turkish bourgeoisie has been able to obtain the stability it wanted at little cost.

The social opposition has proved ex-

tremely weak, and the left is having an identity crisis — now its goal is purely and simply to survive. It is the first time since the 1950s that the Turkish bourgeoisie has had such a long period of calm in which to realize its plans. It is clear that such a prolonged period of bourgeois order and stability is going to leave profound marks and bring considerable changes in all the structures of Turkish society.

Referendum boosts political activity

Premier Turgut Özal's decision to hold a referendum on the question of the ban on political activity by pre-coup bourgeois politicians boosted political activity.¹ Özal and his government spent their time during this campaign blackening the record of the "ex-leaders", drawing heavily on the arguments used by the military to justify their coup d'état. Sulyeman Demirel, the rival to the right of Özal, defended himself in recalling the "merits" of his government, which was overturned by the military.

As for the social democrats, they were unable to profit from the referendum by raising the legitimacy of the whole system established by the military, or by highlighting consistent demands for general democratic freedoms. For the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP) led by Erdal İnönü, the referendum was purely a transitory step

toward "real parliamentary democracy".

Participation in the referendum was obligatory. However, nearly a million votes out of the 24 million registered were abstentions or no votes. Some socialist currents launched an appeal for abstentions or no votes to underline the absurdity of the referendum, but all the void ballots certainly cannot be counted as protest votes.

The "yes" vote was finally 50.16%, against 49.84% voting "no", the difference between the two being only 75,000 votes. Thanks to this "Pyrrhic victory", the pre-coup bourgeois leaders had their political rights re-established and were able to take their place at the head of their parties. The very high number of "no" votes included — outside of the voters supporting Özal — those of a large fringe of the social-democratic electorate. Many supporters of the SHP voted against the lifting of sanctions against their previous leader Bulent Ecevit, who was accused of "dividing the left". Splitting from his old collaborators, Ecevit formed a rival formation, the Party of the Democratic Left (DSP), and led a campaign against the SHP. Looking at the vote, it should also be added that many electors did not understand the stakes involved in the referendum.

Özal calls legislative elections one year early


Even before the announcement of the voting results Özal announced his decision to hold early legislative elections. This decision — at a time when Özal and his Motherland Party (ANAP) held a comfortable majority in parliament, and in the absence of any serious opposition either inside or, more importantly, outside parliament — can be explained by two factors:

- First, they wanted to take the opposition by surprise, and to force the opposition parties into an electoral contest before they had time to reorganize with the politicians who had just been "amnestied".

- Secondly, they wanted to respond to the need to for a "reorganization" of the economy with new austerity measures that would have been unpopular before an electoral test.

Indeed, 1988 is going to be a very difficult year from the point of view of repaying the external debt. To satisfy the demands of international financial institutions in order to obtain new credit, and this on the eve of an election, would have been suicidal for a parliamentarist party. Moreover, immediately following the elections the government announced new price rises of up to 40% on nearly all consumer products,

1. See "Reconciliation between the generals and the politicians", *IV* 124, July 13, 1987, for a full account of the political developments leading up to the referendum and the banning of the pre-coup bourgeois politicians. This article also looked at the different political parties and predicted the possibility of early elections and a right-wing victory. So as not to be repetitive, the article above is restricted to analyzing post-election results and probable developments.



while the official price index spoke of a 40% inflation rate (50% in reality).

In bringing forward the elections by a year, Özal also brought in a new electoral law giving unheard-of advantages to the party winning the elections. To the existing 10% barrier (minimum votes to get MPs elected), the new law added a higher regional one and gave an additional MP to the winning party in each constituency. In spite of some timid threats of a "boycott" by Demirel and Ecevit's parties, the elections took place according to Özal's wishes. The main opposition party, İnönü's SHP, was lined up with the governmental argument on the one hand so that it would not create a crisis threatening the parliamentary game, and on the other to eliminate its rival, Ecevit, who had little hope of getting to the 10% mark.

So it is no surprise that the ANAP won the elections with 36.3% of the vote, in spite of a loss of 9% since 1983. With a third of the votes, Özal swiped two-thirds of parliamentary seats thanks to his electoral law. (In the 1977 elections, Demirel only had 189 MPs out of 450 with the same percentage of votes, while Özal got 292 MPs!)

The SHP kept its 99 MPs with 24.9% of votes, and Demirel has been able to return to parliament with 59 MPs for his Party of the Just Road (DYP), who got 19.5%. No other parties were able to pass the 10% barrier. Ecevit, although he won his constituency, was thus excluded. His party, the DSP, only having won 8.5%. Erbakan's Islamic Party and Colonel Türkeş' fascist party, the MÇP, were also kept out of parliament with 7.1% and 2.9% of the vote respectively. All the results taken together pleased both the Turkish bourgeoisie and international centres, including Moscow.

The election campaign was lifeless enough. No party fundamentally challenged the general's system and the legitimacy of the coup d'état. No party was able to present a global alternative to the government's policies. Neither the opposition

nor the electors really believed that they could change the ruling power.

The SHP certainly took up some democratic slogans, but in a very cautious and timid way, and without going beyond the framework fixed by the military's constitution. The party was resigned in advance to a meek oppositional role. Its competitor, Ecevit's DSP, led a campaign in conflict with most of the left. First of all, Ecevit claimed that he wanted to create a "real social-democratic party" of the base against the "intellectual elite". But he began by harnessing the most reactionary MPs in the general's parliament and centering his campaign against the SHP, which, according to him, was an obstacle to the social-democrats taking power. In order to do this he didn't hesitate to flirt with the ruling ANAP. Resting completely on the personal charisma of Ecevit, the DSP nevertheless won 8.5% of the poll, more than the polls had predicted. But outside parliament the future of this party remains questionable. This fratricidal battle in the centre-left pushed floating voters to the right.

Islamic Party a force to be reckoned with

Demirel's party won a section of the disgruntled voters, mainly in rural areas. It could be said that 19.5% was a satisfactory score for the DYP, who had been caught unprepared by the early election. It was the first time in the history of the country that a right-wing party was in the running to take over from a government of the right. The conjuncture was not favorable for Demirel, who had only just come out of political banishment. His goal was to make a sufficiently significant return that would allow him to hold on until the next elections, and he got what he wanted.

The 7.1% won by the Islamic Party means that it is a force to be reckoned with. The Islamic current has been able to stabi-

lize and get through the period of the military dictatorship without suffering losses. Indeed, the Islamics won 8% of the vote in the 1977 elections. In the recent elections, a section of its electorate preferred to register a useful vote for the ANAP, which has a large Islamic current. The 10% barrier also worked in favour of the Islamic Party, as did the fact that it has greater organic links with the voters and has a strong extra-parliamentary tradition.

Fascist vote is still a threat

The Islamic Party, moreover, won nearly 15% of the vote in Kurdistan, where they clearly act as a brake on the national struggle of the Kurdish people. Even if the Islamics could not play the role of spoilsport as did its minor partner in the coalition governments, they still have a certain influence thanks to the positions they have acquired in society.

In percentage terms the fascists of the MÇP lost half of their voters compared to 1977. The moderate wing of this current is in the ANAP now. Internal divisions inside the fascist party, the losses they have suffered since the coup and general depoliticization explain their relative decline. That said, it still got the same percentage of votes as in 1973 when it first began to advance. In addition, in absolute figures, the MÇP has doubled its electorate since 1973, and still remains a serious threat to workers. Their vote of 2.9% could be a jumping off point for the fascist current in a future mass radicalization. The fascists are particularly strong in hot spots like central Anatolia and the borders of Kurdistan, where there are ethnic-religious clashes.

These elections have confirmed a constant trend in Turkey: that two-thirds of the electorate vote for the right. Social democracy has lost the influence it had in 1973, and is far from reaching the historic heights of 41% — its result in 1977. Its present division cannot let it hope for a turnaround in the short term, despite support from part of the socialist left. Even a large section of the working class electorate in the urban conurbations preferred to vote for the ANAP.

Lacking a credible alternative, the ruling ANAP's demagoguery paid off. Its promises of "jumping a century ahead", economic expansion and deluxe consumerism were preferred by the voters. Lastly, the efforts made by the military in terms of "ideological construction" have made their impact felt: order and stability has come out of the ballot boxes.

The process of recomposition and reorganization in the socialist left is only just starting. The elections have therefore been an important test for judging the capacity of the left to elaborate a national political line.

At the time of the referendum, most Marxist journals called for a campaign in favour of a "yes" vote. They estimated that

the referendum was an occasion — although limited and insufficient — to oppose the restrictions imposed by the military. Against this, five currents from various origins, but dominated by revolutionary socialists, joined together around a common platform and published a joint declaration to denounce the electoral farce. Four of these journals called for an abstention or no-vote, the fifth for a “yes” protest vote.

At the elections, these groups, who had decided in their platform to prioritize the question of working-class independence against the bourgeois parties, presented jointly some independent working class and socialist candidates. Remembering the extremely sectarian traditions of the Turkish and Kurdish left, the very fact of such a united initiative is a big step forward in itself.

The content of the joint platform was also a marked progress: above all, it is a programme of action focussed on immediate democratic and economic demands, going from political restrictions on the unions to the national question and the oppression of women. The manifesto, entitled “Long live socialism!”, was seized during the campaign and the editors hounded for “subversive propaganda”. The socialist candidates received thousands of votes in Istanbul. The joint platform of these five currents could be a modest, but nonetheless important, lever for ongoing united action. It could also play a positive role in the process of recomposition of the socialist left.

Against this, nearly all the currents who called for a “yes” vote in the referendum gave total support to the SHP, “in the name of the struggle for democracy”.

On the eve of the elections, the Turkish Communist Party and the Turkish Workers’ Party (TIIP) announced their fusion in exile, and the general secretaries of the new United Turkish Communist Party (TBKP) also announced their decision to return from exile so as to legally form their party in Turkey. This showy return, accompanied by some European Communist MPs and journalists, was a fiasco, and the two CP leaders were arrested immediately they stepped from the plane. At the time of the fusion, the CP spectacularly abandoned its previous line and programme. From one day to the next, the ultra pro-Soviet CP decided to drop the “dictatorship of the proletariat”, withdraw its demand that Turkey should get out of NATO, make some post-

humorous gestures towards Eurocommunism and so on.

Another grouping that has evolved and radically changed its programmatic identity is the traditional Maoist current in what was the Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (TIKP). Having followed through the logic of their third worldist and Soviet social-imperialist lines, the party’s cadres ended up supporting formulations of the type “Strong state/national state”. Today, after some unsuccessful attempts to form a legal, mass socialist party regrouping left currents, the leaders of this party have drastically trimmed down their radical talk. The orientation of founding a legal party has as its goal the creation of a socialist party with a national character, which would be the



ÖZAL: SELF-CRITICISM

left wing of parliamentary democracy.

The revolutionary groups like Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Road), Kurtulus (Liberation), Halkin Kurtulusu (Liberation of the People) and so on by and large collapsed after the coup d'état. Today, the groups that claim the revolutionary heritage appear to want to turn towards a larger and more unitary recomposition. But we are still a long way from constructing a revolutionary pole with any credibility.

Political and trade-union freedoms

Özal is in power for another five years. It is clear that he is going to follow the same austerity policies, and that we cannot expect any let-up on the socio-economic front. On the other hand, the years to come may hold some unexpected surprises in store from the “progressive-conservative” government (as Özal himself calls it) in the area of juridical restructuring.

For example, without openly abolishing the death penalty, ANAP hopes to put forward a law that will transform all death sentences that have not been ratified by

parliament within the six months following condemnation into life imprisonment. Thus, without fundamentally changing the repressive laws, a solution could be found for pending executions, which have now become politically unacceptable.

All this has to be seen in the light of Turkey's request to join the European Community. If the Turkish bourgeoisie wants to integrate itself into the EC it must, at least formally, adapt its legislation to European “norms”. So it is not excluded that Özal's government will proceed with some juridical modifications in the sense of a kind of “liberalization”, but at the same time without changing the authoritarian and repressive nature of existing laws. The stumbling block in all this is the question of political and trade-union freedoms.

The government has to find a formula that will enable it to continue surveillance and repression of “communist” and “separatist” groups who are judged dangerous, while maintaining the legal existence of some “moderate” organizations. Moreover, General Evren himself has declared that it will be possible in the future to legitimize, for example, a party that accepts Eurocommunism, that renounces the dic-

tatorship of the proletariat and that does not “receive orders from outside”.

A socialist party that was happy just to contest elections without having any chance of passing the 10% barrier would be very useful for giving the regime a liberal and democratic facade.

Within the general stabilization of society, some breaches have opened nonetheless. After the shock of the first years of repression under the military dictatorship, students and workers with a strong tradition of struggle have begun to discuss with each other. In the universities, students have succeeded in forcing the government to retreat on its project for a law that seeks to standardize student societies. In spite of very tough conditions and police repression, this victory — even if modest — was the first in many years.

With new trade-union laws on the right to strike, everybody drew the conclusion that because of the number and scope of restrictions it would be impossible to strike in the future. In addition, the government skillfully pushed this idea in order to discourage possible strikers. Despite this, some highly combative strikes have been led in the telecommunications, metallurgy, leather and

service sectors.

The number of strike hours was higher in 1987 than 1979, before the coup! These strikes have also mobilized big solidarity campaigns. But the workers lack a combative union federation, like the DISK in the past. This puts on the workers' movement agenda the question of reorganizing a strong, independent trade-union federation. Wide discussions are under way on different solutions: whether to continue to lead a struggle inside Türk-İs, or to orient rather toward a new restructuring via the independent unions.²

Kurdish national question now discussed openly

Another paradoxical development has been around the Kurdish national question. This question, yesterday still a taboo subject, is today openly discussed, even in the big bourgeois press, and has the support of a much larger fringe of public opinion than previously. Of course, only the socialist journals speak in veiled terms of the right to Kurdish self-determination. But the fact that, even in bourgeois newspapers, the questions of human rights are stressed (for example, the right to speak their own language) is a very remarkable step forward in Turkey. It was not so long ago that even to admit to being Kurdish or that Kurds existed was a crime in Turkey. (Under the dictatorship, an ex-minister was thrown in prison for having dared to mention the word Kurdish.)

In its recent election campaign the SHP demanded the right of Kurds to speak Kurdish. Demirel has recognized that Kurds are citizens like any other. The ruling ANAP party included and got elected on its slate an ex-social democratic MP, a Kurd, who is renowned for his "separatist" views and who was imprisoned by the dictatorship. The SHP also had a Kurdish ex-MP elected, who had also been imprisoned for "separatism".

Even the most chauvinist representatives of the bourgeois press have recognized that the Kurdish question cannot be solved by military means. And even the Chief of Staff has said that the Kurdish question is in the same category as that of Ireland, the Basque country or Corsica, and that Turks must learn to live with it.

All this was happening at a time when the guerrilla struggle in Kurdistan was at its height. The Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) launched the guerrilla actions in August, 1984; a struggle has already resulted in a total of 1,000 deaths. In fact, before the coup, the PKK was only one of a number of Kurdish organizations and was far from being hegemonic. Today, it is the only one in the field.

The PKK has profited skilfully from the conjuncture and the empty border created by the Iran-Iraq war. Based sometimes in Iraq and at others in Syria, it began by launching small expeditions — or rather

suicide commandos — into the "Turkish part" of Kurdistan. Today, these actions have been stepped up and they have a certain implantation in Turkey.

That said, the methods of the PKK (an ultra-sectarian organization) are very controversial. It does not hesitate to resort to violence and even assassination against rival Turkish and Kurdish organizations. The same methods are used to sort out conflicts and internal differences inside the PKK. Such a bloody settling of scores has happened even among exiled members or those who have emigrated to Europe.

Furthermore, under the pretext that in wars women and children also die, the PKK has not hesitated to organize and call for entire villages hostile to them to be massacred, killing defenceless children in cold blood.

Another new factor in Turkey is the emergence of an autonomous women's movement, which did not exist before 1980. Appearing first at the level of feminist publications, this movement began to build and act most notably around a campaign and demonstration against marital violence and rape.

Campaign for liberation of political prisoners

A very large democratic campaign for the liberation of political prisoners is also under way. Limited primarily to detainees' families, this movement succeeded in collecting 130,000 signatures for a petition demanding a general amnesty at the time of founding a Human Rights League.

None of these struggles have yet found a clear political focus, but they are portents for future dynamics. The socialist movement must therefore organize in order to integrate these new dynamics and propose a socialist alternative where all parts of the social opposition can meet and find a place.

A real will to organize in a different way exists in the revolutionary socialist milieu. But in spite of their relative strength before the coup, revolutionaries' impact is today limited to the readers of various Marxist journals. Restructuring the revolutionary socialist movement is indispensable. This movement has been going for 20 years in Turkey, through two coups and a pre-revolutionary situation. Nearly all the socialist currents in the world have a group expressing their views there. Today, new discussion on socialist de-

mocracy, internationalism, feminism, the national questions, independent mass organizations and so on are on the agenda.

A period of relative calm can perhaps be used for serious preparation before a new rise in struggles.

Revolutionary movement must start afresh

The social opposition in Turkey is certainly still very weak, but it has been through important experiences, starting from zero, during the past 20 years: in the trade-unions; in the localities; of thousands of militants hardened by stretches in prison, who have seen many thousands of their comrades fall and who have continued the struggle in spite of terror and repression.

All these lessons and this experience must now be remodelled.

Of course, not only are we not on the eve of the revolution, but even partial victories will be very difficult to win. However, a healthy restructuring would allow the Turkish revolutionary movement to start afresh from a much more solid base than before. ★

2. DISK: a trade-union federation that was banned by the junta, at the time with 300,000 members. Smaller but further left than Türk-İs, and including all the left and far-left currents.

TÜRK-İS: the first trade-union federation to exist in Turkey, created with the help of US unions. With 1 million supporters, mainly in the public sector, today it is the only authorized federation. Its general secretary was social security minister during the military government established by the 1980 coup d'état.

In some sectors, such as auto, leather (tanning), banking and so on some independent unions exist, which members of DISK joined after it was banned, and which have become very strong. One example is the metallurgy union (including auto), which today has around 60,000 members.



Jaruzelski's referendum deal raises new challenges for opposition

"NORMALIZATION" suffered a major setback in Poland at the end of November with the unexpected defeat of the plebiscite that the generals engineered to gain a façade of popular approval for their projected market-type economic reform.

The government's defeat in the referendum was also a shock for the leadership of Solidarnosc, which itself proposes market-type reforms. (See IV 132, December 21, 1987.) It posed a new and major challenge to the different currents that have been forming in Solidarnosc.

AFTER THE release of almost all the political prisoners in September 1986 and the decision of a section of the leaders of Solidarnosc to set up a public leadership of the union, divisions came out into the open in the various leading teams of the movement. First of all, in autumn 1986 the differences crystallized around the tactical question of whether or not it was opportune to set up a leadership body functioning openly.

However, since the spring of 1987, it appeared that the main political line of cleavage was political. Should Solidarnosc concentrate on trade-union work in the plants? Or should it rather give priority to developing the structures of the "independent society" (press, book publishing, cultural activities), with trade-union activity becoming one of its main concerns, among others?

It was in such terms that the debate was posed, notably by the Warsaw Solidarnosc leaders. For their part, they came out in favor of the second orientation, which they had been following for some years in their region. In contraposition to them, a current giving priority to trade-union activity in the plants and opting for a greater centralization of the work of Solidarnosc appeared in particular within the Wrocław and Szczecin regional leaderships. (See IV 125, September 14, 1987.)

In the context of this debate, another major political difference has appeared. Could the reforms that General Jaruzelski's regime undertook assist the independent social movement? Could it base itself on certain aspects of them and radicalize their content?


Or should it reject them as a new attempt to increase the exploitation of the workers? And, in the latter case, should it build the working-class mobilizations that the introduction of these reforms would necessarily generate?

Convinced that only the establishment of a free market could make it possible to combat the economic crisis effectively, the majority of Solidarnosc leaders—and in particular the better known Warsaw leaders—opted for the first solution. Jacek Kuron wrote the following, for example, about the reforms announced by the regime:

"The struggle does not end in publications, in parliament or in the apparatus. They all want to save their power, but some are coming out for repression, and others for rationalization. The latter are the strongest, because Gorbachev's conception is to save communism through rationalization. The development of enclaves of efficiency impels into confrontation the managers of the productive enterprises, the secretaries of departmental committees and those apparatchniks who have the souls of organizers. If it becomes possible to wrest the economy from the control of the nomenklatura, then whatever the regime's intentions, we will be living in another system." (*Tygodnik Mazowsze* 219, September 2, 1987.)

Such an approach, which led to neglecting the immediate struggles in the plants, as well as to abandoning the values of equality and self-management that were the cornerstones of Solidarnosc's identity during the Polish revolutionary upsurge of 1980-81, was challenged by many union activists. On September 22, in an

open letter to Lech Walesa, 22 historic leaders of Solidarnosc demanded a meeting of the union's statutory leadership. They criticized the multiplicity of ad-hoc structures set up over the preceding year. At the same time, they pointed out that the manifest lack of attention paid to social questions was leading to a loss of the union's identity. Other activists considered that it was becoming urgent to offer working people their own political representation, and undertook to form the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). In the meantime, in October the multiplicity of leading centers in Solidarnosc was reduced. In place of the Temporary Coordinating Committee (the clandestine TKK) and the Temporary Council of Solidarnosc (the public TRS, formed in October 1986), a united structure was established. It was the National Executive Committee (KKW), presided over by Lech Walesa. This was



Defeat the

done without calling a session of the statutory National Commission, and none of the 22 leaders who called for it was included in the KKW.


The debates that continue to run through the Polish independent social movement are far from closed today, and the differences that are sketched above are the main lines of the currents that are crystallizing within it.

In the aftermath of the referendum vote, Cyril Smuga conducted telephone interviews with three Solidarnosc leaders, who had distinctive points of view on the meaning of the referendum results for the political and social situation in Poland, as well as for Solidarnosc's strategy and perspectives. Jan Litynski's opinions reflect those of the present leading circles of the union. Andrzej Gwiazda is one of the signatories of the letter of the 22. Jozef Pinior is vice-chair of the new Polish Socialist Party (PPS).

It should be noted that the Polish opposition has, to a certain extent, a language of its own. For example, it habitually counterposes "the society," meaning the masses, to the state, or regime, meaning the ruling bureaucratic caste. ★

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"If we continue in the framework of the system, the breakdown will be total"



Interview with Jan Litynski

JAN LITYNSKI took part in organizing help for Ursus and Radom strikers who fell victim to repression in 1976. He worked with the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR), joining in 1977. He then founded the journal *Robotnik*, the first opposition bulletin intended for workers. In 1980, he became a Solidarnosc expert.

Arrested on December 13, 1981, he escaped and went underground. A member of the Warsaw Regional Executive Commission, he is a close collaborator of Jacek Kuron and Zbigniew Bujak.

WHAT can you say about the results of the referendum?

Obviously, they were a surprise for everyone, because even if you take as good coin the official explanation given by the authorities, you don't hold such a referendum in order to lose it. But the results were unambiguous. The government lost. You might wonder why they didn't fake the results in order to be able to announce that they had an absolute majority of positive responses. I think that they were so certain of winning that

they were not prepared for falsifying the returns. Maybe, and that is giving them the benefit of the doubt, they didn't want to falsify the results — but that doesn't seem to me to be very likely.

The outcome seems clear as regards the general assessment of the situation. Whatever the government does, whatever kind of propaganda it engages in, it does not have the confidence of the society. This is all the more so because the campaign conducted before the referendum testified to a lack of respect for the society. The questions were not clear. And even though they announced that they would clarify the meaning of the questions, they did not do so.

Today, it has become evident that the authorities engaged in a form of blackmail. "You'll get reforms, maybe you'll get a better life, there may even be some political changes. But to get that, you'll have to accept a big price rise." What seems to me to have been the big success in the referendum was that the society refused to grant such confidence. And in my opinion a lot of those who voted "yes" in the referendum did so only because they are convinced any reforms will have to come from this government.

On the other hand, a lot of those who voted "no," or who abstained, and in that case those who did so in response to Solidarnosc's appeal, were also convinced of the need for reforms, but thought that this government was incapable of carrying out the

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reforms that it proposed. In my opinion, this was a signal for the government. Without real reforms today, the situation cannot improve. As regards Solidarnosc, the result shows first of all that its decision to ignore this referendum was proved to be correct.

Secondly, the result shows that there is a possibility for overcoming the social apathy that has prevailed for rather a long time in our country if Solidarnosc shows that it is able to stimulate the potential for social activity indicated by the referendum results, that we can expect quite significant changes, over which the society will have an influence.

■ But in calling for ignoring the referendum, in its first appeal at least the National Executive Commission of Solidarnosc (KKW) did not mention the question of the price rise. You say that today there is a possibility for remobilizing society. Around what axes can this be done, and what place should be reserved in this for the workers' material demands?

I think that that is not the only axis, although material demands are indispensable. What is more, since 1982, it has become apparent that the spontaneous resistance to the price rises and the struggles that developed spontaneously for wage increases have been useful, because they have prevented the government from getting a surplus at the expense of the society alone. All this resistance, this wage fight, has been a struggle for reforms, because it has forced the regime to undertake structural reforms. I think that that was something very valuable. On the other hand, today, while such resistance is necessary, it is not sufficient.

Today, we need social activity in a lot of different areas at once. First of all, there is the problem of self-management at the enterprise level. The councils are functioning in one way or another but they should increase their activity. There is the fundamental problem for Solidarnosc of finding ways to rebuild the union — a process that is beginning through the creation of Solidarnosc organizing committees in the enterprises. There is the question of democratic self-management at the local government level.

If reform gets off the ground, its fate will be decided on the local level. The present structures, the various cliques, or even mafias, have to be dismantled. They serve as a straitjacket because of the ties that exist between the administration, the nomenklatura and even a section of the private entrepreneurs. If all this can be destroyed, to the benefit of local self-management, normally functioning industries and cooperatives, as well as private economic activity, then the reform will be successful. The success of the reform, therefore, will be determined on two levels. The first is the dismantling of the nomenklatura and the cliques in the stronger industries. The second, perhaps more important, is the local level.

■ Don't you think that the essential question is that of the central government?

It is obvious that it is the system that is in question. But this system is evolving under social pressure. What is at stake is getting the central power to give up control of economic and social life. In order for it to do that, appropriate pressure will be necessary, because it functions in such a way that its natural tendency is to fill up all the gaps in social life. On the contrary, the society must penetrate into all the breaches that open up. I do not see today any possibility of solving this problem centrally, in the sense of the system being transformed overnight into something else. This can only be a process advancing as the system evolves.

■ When you talk about economic reform, are you thinking about a market reform?

Yes, of course.

■ But don't you think that the society's response to the referendum has been a rejection, if not of the market reform project, at least of the social cost involved in introducing such a reform, no matter in what form and regardless of who carries it out?

I think that it is incorrect reasoning to say that the reform involves social costs. Maybe that is so, I don't know. Social costs do not flow from the reform but from the debits piled up by the totalitarian economic, social and political system that has dominated our country. We have to accept these costs. We are in a situation where the standard of living is going to continue to decline.

The question is whether, with this declining standard of living, we can carry out reform. The question is therefore not whether we want a market reform or non-market reform, but only — and that is much more essential — who should make the sacrifices. If there is no activity and organization by the society, then it will be the weaker social groups that will bear the weight of the sacrifices. If we manage to force the acceptance of independent unions and local self-management, then there is a chance that the costs will be borne by those who have caused them, that is the apparatus and its clientele.

The fundamental problem, which no one has yet raised, is that of the military complex, of the administration, the army and the police. In the present situation, if Gorbachev's policy is really aimed at reducing the arms race, then that should have a real effect in Poland by leading to a reduction in production for the army, in the costs of administration and in the military and repressive apparatus. That is where the reserves have to be found that can make it possible to distribute the costs more equitably.

■ In 1980, at the time of the struggles that culminated in the founding of Sol-

darnosc, one of the demands put forward was rationing around the argument that everyone has the same kind of stomach. But the market method, on the other hand, leads to distribution on the basis of money, and so in this context the less well-placed groups naturally pay the costs of this option.

Yes. That is why mechanisms must be introduced that will guarantee a certain minimum for the more disadvantaged groups. But such mechanisms can only be introduced on condition that Solidarnosc and other real unions can exist legally.

I do not see any other way to develop the country than the one that involves the market, or in other words the one that leads to capitalizing actually existing socialism. This does not mean that social forces that will take up the defence of the weak groups should not exist in this process. On the other hand, the road of rationing leads to strengthening the central apparatus and creating a group of people with an interest in perpetuating the system.

■ In 1981, Solidarnosc demanded social monitoring of rationing. Don't you think that that could be an alternative solution?

I don't think so. The rationing system involves the existence of a developed bureaucratic apparatus, and it is no solution to set up an apparatus for social inspection standing above the society, one that will naturally tend to degenerate. In that way we would have apparatuses that in monitoring each other would paralyze social life. I am, of course, in favor of social inspection, but this must be done through democratic mechanisms, whether of a parliamentary or market type, and through various social groups. This applies, for example, to the question of the environment, where pressure and social monitoring are necessary.

■ In what way can Solidarnosc exert its influence today with a view to getting such changes?

First of all, Solidarnosc organizing committees must be formed in the factories. If we don't achieve this, we will get nowhere. Even if it was not inevitable, today one can see clearly that the regime on its own will not authorize trade-union pluralism. Rather strong pressure will be necessary.

There are today in our ranks two conceptions of these Solidarnosc factory committees. One is that it is enough to form these committees and expect that when they are numerous enough they will force acceptance of Solidarnosc. The other, toward which I incline much more, is that the committees should be established, go through a stage of organization and begin immediately to act. This would be an indirect way of continuing the work that Solidarnosc did in 1980-81.

However, today this is no longer enough. For years we have called for giving Solidarnosc a chance to exist at plant level in the framework of reform. But this is no longer

adequate. We have to take up organizational activity at a higher level than that of the plants. And I don't think we can afford to be slow about undertaking this. For some time, we have been seeing a tendency to abandon clandestine activity, which at present seems quite pointless, in favor of open activity.

■ **In 1981 you wrote an article arguing that the time had come to begin to divide. In Solidarnosc today, differences are appearing more and more clearly, including at the central level. I am referring here to the letter of the 22 Solidarnosc leaders to Lech Walesa.**

I am for expressing differences, if they are around real tendencies, different programs, and not differences over the question of who is or is not in the leadership. It seems to me that the letter of the 22 was an error. Today, calling a National Commission would serve no purpose. Solidarnosc is what it is. That is, it is weaker but continues to exist in the framework of certain structures. It is in this framework that it has to start to act, and that has to be done with the support of other people who also want to act in Solidarnosc. This is not the time to question whether what is needed is National Commission or the KKW. The KKW was set up. I think that it was an organizational step forward, because it eliminated the quite artificial and harmful division that existed between a clandestine and a public part of the leadership.

The KKW is the only possible leadership today. It emerged in a natural way, although its composition is partially the result of chance, since it is made up of people who headed clandestine structures in their regions, or who had a great authority there. In such a situation, to raise the question of convoking the National Commission instead of acting in collaboration with the KKW seems to me to be an error. I say this even though I know that a number of the signatories of the letter of the 22 are active leaders in their regions and that they do good work.

■ **But the signatories of the letter of the 22 are not just demanding the convoking of the National Commission of Solidarnosc. They are criticizing the weakening of Solidarnosc's trade-union character, its lack of concern for defending the standing of living and other material interests of the workers.**

I agree with the criticism that Solidarnosc is not paying enough attention to material questions. That is correct. But you have to take into consideration the fact that until now, most of Solidarnosc's documents have gone unnoticed because such documents have to be coupled with a certain level of activity. What purpose would a Solidarnosc report on working conditions in the plants have, if there were no possibility for struggles to improve these conditions? In fact, people prefer to work in bad conditions and earn more money.

I think that for a union the problem of working conditions is fundamental but should be put in a more general context, that of a movement. And today we do not have any chance to create that. While it is true that various leading bodies in Solidarnosc are neglecting a number of social questions and this is a mistake, this error stems from the general situation and not any bad will. There is no point in issuing yet another appeal. We might have acted, not through appeals, but as Zbigniew Rosazewski proposes, for example, by organizing massive leaflet distributions on working conditions in the Silesian mines or in the Lodz textile plants. We probably did not have the means to do it, and this was an error.

■ **With respect to the Solidarnosc leadership itself, you mentioned differences that emerged around the question of clandestine or public activity. This difference seems to me today to be a thing of the past. But I have the impression that another, deeper one has emerged. It might be described schematically as a counterposition between those who stress the question of a market reform and are therefore prepared to envisage the workers making certain material sacrifices, and those who stress the fight against austerity at the plant level. The second option appeared, for example, in an article by Henryk Wujec and Maciej Jankowski and in some positions defended in the magazine *Robotnik*.**

As regards the document — a very good one in my opinion — by Wujec and Jankowski, it presents the position of Solidarnosc. It has not, unfortunately, had the impact that it should have. That is, it has not helped to get things moving in the plants. This document is not at all in conflict with the reform. In Solidarnosc's view, it is necessary to organize actions for immediate demands in the plants in order to defend living standards, and it is necessary to carry out the reform. These are two different levels.

In other words, introducing the reform is inseparable from the struggle for what is involved in the reform, and on this terrain various social groups are going to act in order to defend their interests. This may slow the tempo of the reform, but it will be useful. In fact, what the government proposes is some kind of economic jungle, free enterprise à la Milton Friedman, and Solidarnosc must, of course, defend itself against that. But an economic jungle is one thing, and a market system is another.

On the other hand, it is possible that *Robotnik's* position is based on another point of view, that is the conviction that a market economic reform means lowering the standard of living of the workers. I do not agree with such an analysis. I think that it is necessary to make normal economic decisions, and that the question of how everyone has to defend themselves is sec-

ondary. In other words, in the framework of the present system we have nothing to defend because we are living in a country that is not only in an economic crisis but in a state of economic breakdown. What is at stake is ending this breakdown.

It is obvious that through material demands alone and maintaining the existing structure out of ideological attachment to such a structure we will get nowhere. On the other hand, I think that the economic reform would make it easier to defend the standard of living, because it would lead to an economic redeployment, there would be more goods in the stores, and it would be easier to defend the standard of living.

■ **If I understand your point of view, you think that the introduction of the market would mean that more goods would be produced?**

Yes, I think that the development of the mechanism of the market, of private enterprise, of cooperatives, of local industry and self-management are the only way today to increase the supply of goods. It is clear that the present system, by its very nature, treats consumption only as a necessary evil.

■ **In the framework of the present system, private enterprises can seem more efficient because they operate in areas neglected by big industry. But it is equally true, I think, that if the Polish market were opened up to international trade, that could lead to a de-industrialization of the country. The productivity of Polish industry is in fact far inferior to that of the developed countries, and it would not stand up against international competition.**

But de-industrialization and all that has already happened. We have machines that are out of use, the air is polluted, the soils have been impoverished and so on. If we continue in the framework of this system, the breakdown will be total. The Poles will become a degenerate nation in the heart of Europe; we cannot permit that. This system can no longer be saved; it has no more reserves. Reserves can only arise by the people's initiative — that is, if people create private enterprises, if the state enterprises cease to be that and begin to operate normally on the market, if there is normal competition. There are obviously a mass of problems tied up with that.

The question of private enterprises, moreover, is peripheral. What is important is for people to be able to work with a hope of making gains, that they produce with the idea of selling what they produce. In this country, thousands of millions have been squandered. I know no other solution, if we want to see a radical improvement in the situation, than the one that involves the market. I agree that it is necessary to have mechanisms for defence against the effects of the market, but how can we defend ourselves against something when we do not even know what it is!

■ In 1981, the National Congress of Solidarnosc declared for a new system of managing the economy based on a combination of democratic socialized planning and workers' and social self-management, not only at the plant and local level but also at the national level — with a chamber of parliament representing the self-management bodies — and with market mechanisms. Since then, this project seems to have disappeared from Solidarnosc's proposals, in favor of a system based essentially on the market.

It disappeared because since then a number of new facts have come to light. It has proved simply impossible to patch up the system, and what is more, the Polish crisis is not a specifically Polish one. That is, it is not due to any particular corruption of the Polish regime or any particular revolt of the Polish people, but it is a general crisis of this type of system. The arrival on the scene of Gorbachev in a way testifies to this. Discussions about some hypothetical ideal system do not interest me. It is clear that the socialism that exists, that "actually exists," as they love to repeat, is a system that leads to a total impasse. And we have no other alternative model to that of the market; no one has dreamed up any others.

So, that is what we have to head for. We are aware of the enormity of the problems we will face. The problem is knowing what public enterprise should do in the framework of the reform. It is not in the first instance to open the way for the development of private enterprises, even if that is certainly necessary and useful. In this case, free-enterprise is utopian. Our free enterprises think that once the state allows private enterprises, we will see a boom and we will live happily ever after. That is wrong. There will be social problems to solve, but in the framework of a process leading to the introduction of a normal market. Economic development, all economic factors, have to be governed by the market and not by central planners, because they cannot do it.

■ A little while ago, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was formed in Poland. What do you think of this initiative?

First of all, I would like to stress my personal point of view. I am not interested in working in a party. I prefer to act through social movements and a union, not through a political party. In this sense, the PPS does not interest me either, and in general, I am not interested in parties whose programs aim at taking power. But I am not against the formation of such parties, because I am in favor of a multi-party system.

So, I have an outsider's point of view. I think that when groups that identify with the right are very active, the appearance of a group that says "We are socialists, we are left," is a good thing. In this way, the life of the society is enriched. Instead of taking the form of attacks by right-wing groups on Solidarnosc, political discussions take on

the character of a discussion between two opposing political orientations.

On the other hand, it seems to me that forming political parties today is a bit premature, but that's not my business.

Finally, and this is the most important aspect in my opinion, it is a bit anachronistic today to divide along left and right lines. In some ways reality seems to prove me wrong, because this cleavage does exist and it has to be taken into consideration. But I think that this sort of polarization is not relevant to the practical tasks in the present situation, although it is possible that that may change in the future.

For example, in the documents of the right-wing groups there are a lot of things that I agree with. Although they are expressed in a language that is not to my liking, I agree with some of their practical conclusions. In particular in Polish conditions, I am afraid that left-right counterpositions might take the rigid form of ideological contention. I would rather see differences appear around practical questions: what concrete solutions for questions such as that of the social costs of the reform, or that of common action with other peoples in the Soviet camp, or the question


of what attitude to take toward the reforms. If it doesn't happen that way, too bad. In any case, the formation of the PPS helps to enrich the political map, even if, in my opinion, the political picture does not fall into a left-right pattern.

■ Don't you think that the emergence of political parties and groups should find an expression inside Solidarnosc, or even in its leadership, which might precisely become a common framework for concrete action for various ideological currents?

To know whether activists from such groups should or should not come into the leading bodies of the union, you would have to know whether they have made up their minds or not to act within it. By its nature, Solidarnosc has to be pluralist, to include various currents.

I think, precisely, that there is room in Solidarnosc for differences over practical and not ideological questions. Solidarnosc has contained different points of view, and will continue to do so. But I think it would be a good thing if it could free itself from the weight of political differences in a strict sense. ★

"People no longer have anything to lose"



**Interview
with Josef
Pinior**

JOZEF PINIOR is the regional treasurer of Lower Silesian Solidarnosc. He gained a place in history as the person who, shortly before the institution of the state of war, withdrew 80 million zlotys from the bank, money that served to finance the union's underground activity.

In November 1982, he took the leadership of the Lower Silesian

Regional Strike Committee (RKS) and came into the underground national leadership (TKK) of Solidarnosc. He participated in the development of the "line of the factories" — a militant orientation that was put into practice in his region. Arrested in April 1983, he was released in the summer of 1984.

Subsequently, Pinior was ordered

by the courts to pay back the 80 million zlotys used to finance the union. From September 1986 to October 1987, he belonged to the Provisional National Council (TRS) of Solidarnosc, which operates openly.

In November 1987, he took part in the founding of the Polish Socialist Party, and he is the vice-president of its General Council. Since then, he has not participated in the leading bodies of Solidarnosc.

WHAT DO you think of the referendum results?

In my opinion, they reflect above all a lack of confidence in the regime, in the whole policy that General Jaruzelski has been carrying out since 1981, and not just a lack of confidence in the proposed changes in the economy. Poles said "no" to this regime. The society is in favor of political and economic reforms, but real ones and not a facade that was to be legitimized by the referendum.

■ But the introduction of enormous price rises is one of the aspects of General Jaruzelski's economic reform. Wasn't the referendum result also a rejection of these rises?

People find it hard to accept a growing pauperization, especially without any of the guarantees offered by the possession of civic and political freedoms, even at as elementary a level as trade-union pluralism and the right to defend your own interests through independent trade-union representation. When you have such rights and guarantees, then you can discuss price increases and material sacrifices. But such a discussion is impossible in the absence of elementary political and trade-union freedoms. It is evident that the referendum result was also a response to the government's schemes for raising prices.

■ Do you think that the workers would be ready to accept price rises in exchange for trade-union pluralism, and that they would not immediately take advantage of a legalization of their independent union to win wage rises to compensate for the price increases?

No. That is something unimaginable. And the government does not think in such terms. It has no intention of compensating for the price rises and growing pauperization of the society by granting trade-union freedoms. There is no doubt that in Poland we will see a struggle by the majority of the society for a decent material life, a struggle on the most basic questions. This is the result of the "Albanization" that is advancing year by year, of an enormous impoverishment. People no longer have anything to



lose; they have no future. Their standard of living is extremely low, and it may fall lower still.

We will witness natural reactions, explosions of struggles for better living conditions. But these struggles are going to crystallize at the political level as struggles for trade-union freedoms, for self-management rights and for political liberties. In fact, in Poland, given the sort of social consciousness that exists, it is unlikely that the expression of these struggles will be different. It is unimaginable that the resistance to the price rises and the defence of the standard of living will not be linked to the fight for trade-union freedoms, or that people might fight for trade-union freedoms without at the same time fighting to defend living standards.

■ One of the new forms of social resistance is the emergence of initiatives aimed at winning legality for independent factory unions. I know that you support these initiatives.

In the Wroclaw area today, at the rank-and-file level, Solidarnosc organizing committees are being established, which are trying to get independent trade-union organizations recognized at the factory level. This is clearly a manifestation of the social situation we talked about. This is above all a movement of young people, young workers of 18 to 20 who were not in Solidarnosc in 1980-81, and who started to work after the establishment of the state of war. Today, they are beginning to discover what classical work for immediate demands is.

For these young workers, these plant-level Solidarnosc union organizing committees are an attractive form of organization, because they are at the same time a means of fighting for the right to legal trade-union activity and a means of operat-

ing out in the open. Such committees have appeared in Lower Silesia in several enterprises — in Polar; in the Hydral arms factory; in the Polkowice mine in Walbrzych; and in the Domel factory, a traditional Solidarnosc bastion in Wroclaw. We will see how this develops.

I think that these committees will have to go through two stages. The first involves an elementary organizational question. You have to find ten people with the courage to form such a committee. I repeat, with the courage, because although forming such a committee is technically legal, it will immediately face repression by the administration and the SB [the political police]. For seven years already, Solidarnosc has been trying to get over this first hurdle. But what will be decisive for such a committee's success is completing the second stage, developing a plant-level trade-union program, that is a program through which the workers in the plant in question can identify with the ten brave souls.

What is needed is a very concrete program of demands that can be met within the framework of the relations between the organizing committee and the factory manager. The workers have to regain the audacity to struggle, if only on basic questions — improving working conditions, safety, anything that can be won without having to confront the higher authorities. If these committees are able to do that, if they develop such programs, that will be a success. They do not even have to win a victory at the outset; what is important is for them to formulate demands and undertake a campaign to win them. Then they will get massive support from the workers in their factories.

■ That way of presenting the tasks of the union appears only rarely in the independent press, leaving aside the statements of Solidarnosc's leading bodies. On the other hand, a lot of space is allotted to the question of the need for establishing a free market.

In the Polish opposition, there is a general problem. In my opinion, it can be summed up as the need for a pluralist opposition. Seven years ago, Solidarnosc represented both a platform of national identity, a union in the classical sense of the term, and a fight for a free market. Various movements existed within Solidarnosc. It was a social movement that proved to be an excellent means of struggle against totalitarianism. Over these seven years, the lay of the land, however, has changed. We are witnessing an evolution of this system — I don't know whether you can call this a reform, but the system is changing nonetheless. This is why the form of unity characteristic of Soli-

damosc seven years ago is finished, why it no longer serves much purpose.

We are witnessing a very clear emergence of systematic contraposition between two opposing poles. On the one hand, we have Marcin Krol and his magazine, *Res Publica*¹ and the economic societies², which are trying to organize and agitate for a classical free-market economy. On the other hand, on the left, we have the formation of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). We are in a period of diversification of the opposition.

For the good health of the opposition and more generally of the independent society, this diversification and crystallization of political philosophies and ideologies are important and useful. One might get the impression that all this is happening to the detriment of Solidarnosc, but that is wrong, because it is a natural development of Solidarnosc. The old formula of Solidarnosc does not hold up any more. Everything that joined together in Solidarnosc is developing today outside of it in the form of clearer ideological platforms.

If you take Solidarnosc as a union, what is most valuable in my opinion is what is happening in the plants, that is the work of the organizing committees that I spoke of, that of Solidarnosc's underground commissions, and also the growth of the union press. In speaking of the union press, I am thinking of the independent journals published in the plants by the underground commissions. That is the level of trade-union struggle to which I am the closest.

■ What do you think of the letter of the 22 union leaders addressed in September to Lech Walesa, in which the signatories pointed to the danger of Solidarnosc losing its trade-union identity and stressed the urgency of developing a program of immediate demands of the type you spoke about, only at the national level?

I think that we are in a situation today in which demands link up at various levels in Solidarnosc, but especially at the rank-and-file level — in the underground factory commissions, organizing committees working openly, and the union press (and I stress again, the press published in the plants). Demands also link up at the level of the regions and in various forms at the national level, both through the platform of the 22 or that of the National Executive Commission (KKW) or by other means. Today all this should be bolstered by a certain political platform, and from that flowed the idea of founding the PPS.

It seems to me that the time has come to struggle to make the socially and economically oppressed groups political subjects [as opposed to objects]. That is, the time has come to reinforce the trade-union struggle at the basic plant level by developing a political platform. We think that that should be the task of a political party, concretely the PPS. We want, through the PPS, to give a political strength to the socially

oppressed groups.

■ Could you explain the objectives of the PPS?

What is new in the political experience involved in the creation of the PPS is that we are clearly defining the social interests that we want to represent. This is new in relation to Solidarnosc as an anti-totalitarian social movement that expressed various interests, primarily those of the socially oppressed groups, but not only theirs. Moreover, Solidarnosc is still at that point. But we think that the time has come to express the interests of the socially oppressed more clearly, that it is time to take a clear stand. This is what the PPS is doing.

We do not intend to represent the society as a whole but only the interests of some of its sectors, that is, of the workers and more generally of all the socially and economically oppressed. This is a qualitative alteration in the political landscape of our country created by the economic changes introduced by the regime, by the pauperization of the society, by the evolution of the system. And we want to offer these social groups a political force. In one way or another, these groups are becoming a social subject at the trade-union level, although this is illegal, and also at the self-management level [in the official self-management bodies]. But it is necessary to constitute a social subject that can make them into a political force.

The PPS is a sort of self-convoked gathering on the left. Today in Poland, you can fight for a free market, or do what the church is doing — I am thinking of its defence of the national identity — but you can also fight in defence of the oppressed. That is our choice. Of course, the left grouped in the PPS is not uniform. Several currents, groups and opinions exist within it. In Wroclaw, for example, we have anarchist-inclined groups, others typical of what is called the "new left," and finally social democrats in the traditional meaning of the term. The PPS aspires to become a pole of regroupment on the left. Its name points to a tradition with which we are all in agreement. The PPS was a party that is not in any way compromised in Polish history.³ We will see how this reference to the

PPS tradition will be concretized at the programmatic level, and what programmatic variant will prevail.

■ The PPS's program has not yet been worked out?

For the time being, there is only a basic political statement in which we explain what we want to do — represent the socially oppressed groups and offer them a political force — and the things we are fighting for, such as trade-union freedoms, self-management rights, political freedoms for the workers, the right to refuse military service, protection of the environment and the abolition of the death penalty. In other words, the classical objectives of the left throughout the world.

We say clearly that we do not accept the constitutional system in force in People's Poland, for example the dominance of the Communist Party written into the constitution. Now, on the basis of this statement, we have begun to draw up a program. The provisional statutes that we adopted guarantee the right to put forward various political platforms and to organize around them within the party.

■ The Paris daily *Libération*, in its November 28-29 issue, suggested that the PPS identified with the social doctrine of the church. That seems to be in contradiction to the tradition of the PPS, a party that throughout all the phases of its history was strictly secular.

This is a confusion. In our statement of principles, we noted that the historic PPS — the party that existed before the first and second world wars — was an anti-clerical party. In the totalitarian system in which we are living, the situation is very different. The present PPS will not be an anti-clerical party, because times have changed, and we think that within our party there is a place for socialists inspired by the social doctrine of the church and of Pope John Paul II.

■ Does this mean that the PPS hopes to include socialists of Christian inspiration as well as, for example, Marxists?

Yes, certainly, and that is what *Libération* misunderstood. I think that our position on this matter is quite clear.

1. *Res Publica*, an independent journal that identifies with the "neo-conservative" right, the only opposition publication legalized (in 1986) by the Jaruzelski government. This neo-conservative current criticizes Solidarnosc for its "bitter-endism," in the name of a purported realistic and constructive opposition to the established regime.

2. Economic companies, independent organizations for promoting private enterprise, which are beginning to emerge in the wake of the economic reform. One of them in Cracow has gained legal recognition.

3. The Polish socialist movement was divided from the outset between a revolutionary internationalist wing, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), led by Rosa Luxemburg; and a pro-independence wing, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) founded in 1892. The latter split in two in 1906. The PPS-Left fused in 1918 with the SDKPiL to form the Communist Party. On the other hand, the PPS-Revolutionary Faction took up armed struggle (of a

terrorist sort) for national independence. In 1918, its members, along with other groups, reconstituted the PPS on a reformist and anti-Communist social-democratic basis.

This party was the biggest working-class party between the two wars. Under the Nazi occupation, the PPS apparatus went underground under the name of Freedom-Equality-Independence (WRN) and played the leading role in the political (but not the military) structures of the clandestine Polish state. At the end of the war, some Socialists agreed to reconstitute a legal PPS in the framework determined by the Stalinists. This party fused with the Polish Stalinist party in 1948 to form the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). For its part, the PPS-WRN remained underground, refusing to recognize the Stalinist regime, which smashed it. The secretary general of the PPS-WRN, Kazimierz Puzak, died in prison in 1951. After 1948, the organized socialist current that identified with the traditions of the PPS ceased to exist, until the appearance this November of a party taking this name.

■ To conclude, I would like you to explain the character of the demonstration organized in Wrocław by the Orange Alternative on the anniversary of the October Revolution. You took part in that demonstration. Contradictory reports were published. On the one hand, it was reported to be a political demonstration, whose participants demanded notably the rehabilitation of Leon Trotsky; and, at the same time, it was presented a student joke. What actually happened?

The Orange Alternative is part of the alternative culture movement. For some time, it has been organizing street actions in Wrocław in the form of "happenings." The content of these actions has been on the borderline between culture and politics, and had a surrealist form. This form has caught on in Wrocław. The Orange Alternative started with elitist actions, in which only a few people took part, but it was transformed into mass actions, during which the police held as many as 150 people for a few hours, which was already an important political fact.


The founder of the Orange Alternative is a young independent writer in Wrocław, Waldemar Hydrych. It is not a formally constituted group but rather a center of initiatives that proposes concrete actions and invites the various independent organizations — Solidarnosc, the Freedom and Peace Movement (WIP) and now also the PPS — to take part.

I personally am a great champion of the Orange Alternative, and I always take part in its street actions. As regards the event organized on the anniversary of the October Revolution, it was a surrealist version of the classical ceremonies organized by the regime.

About 150 people — university students, high-school students, independent culture groups and Solidarnosc activists — participated in this event. Every group came with its own slogans. For example, one of the groups came with a banner saying "We support Boris Yeltsin." [This refers to the Moscow Communist Party leader who was removed supposedly because he tried to carry out the *perestroika* too quickly.] Imagine the surrealism of such a situation! Another group carried a banner with the slogan "We demand the full rehabilitation of comrade Leon Trotsky." It is obviously hard to say where the surrealism ended and political philosophy began. I think that both aspects were present, that undoubtedly the people who carried the banner with the slogan about Trotsky must have had something in common with him, although in Poland there is a large dose of surrealism in such a reference.

The Orange Alternative's last action was held two days before the referendum vote. The participants engaged in a parody of political self-criticism, declaring that they would "vote 'yes' twice." Once again the police held about 150 people in custody for a few hours. ★

"Polish society no longer believes in Communist reform"



**Interview
with Andrzej
Gwiazda**

ANDRZEJ GWIAZDA was deported to Siberia with his mother at the age of five. As an assistant at the Gdansk Polytechnic School, he took an active part in the March 1968 student rebellion. In 1976 in Gdansk, he organized help for the strikers who fell victim to the repression.

In 1978, Gwiazda founded the Baltic Coast Free Unions' Organizing Committee. A member of the Gdansk Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee in August 1980, he became vice-president of Solidarnosc.

At its first congress, he stood against Lech Walesa for the presidency of the union. He was elected to the National Commission. Imprisoned on December 13, 1981, Gwiazda was only released in the summer of 1984.

Andrzej Gwiazda is now working as a painter 300 kilometers from his home. He is one of the signatories to the open letter of 22 Solidarnosc leaders to Lech Walesa.

WHAT ATTITUDE did you take on the referendum?

I thought that regardless of the content of the questions, our answers and our intentions, participating in the referendum had only one meaning. The government was looking for a popular endorsement. It was the same with the 1946 referendum. Instead of asking us the fundamental question — whether we wanted a Communist Party government in Poland brought in by the Red Army — they asked us three substitute questions: Did we want social reforms, a single-chamber parliament and borders on the Oder-Neisse line.¹ In participating in this referendum, we could say that we relinquished the western territories, but not that we could do without a Communist government.

We could not make the same mistake as before. In the recent referendum, we were asked to give up our right to defend ourselves against exploitation. On December 13, 1981, the regime responded to the demand for reforms to be carried out under the supervision of the society by instituting a state of war. Instead of looking for the cause of the crisis, they accused Solidarnosc of provoking it, and the reform theme was used to justify the continual price in-

1. This border was far to the west of Poland's pre-war western borders. The settlement granted lands to Poland that had been Polish centuries before in compensation for the eastern lands of inter-war Poland, which were incorporated into the Soviet Union.

creases, inflation and restricting the rights of the workers.

After six years of uninterrupted reforms, young people no longer have any chance of finding a place to live, and most families have been tightening their belts for a long time, despite working harder and taking on second jobs. The most burning question today is the defence of workers' material interests. So, what had to be done was to call for a boycott with the slogan, "By boycotting the referendum, you are protesting against exploitation!"

■ What is your assessment of the referendum results? According to the French press, Professor Geremek [Lech Walesa's main advisor] considers that it was a setback for everybody, because the government compromised the ideas both of the referendum and the economic reform.

If such views have been expressed, they are utter nonsense. The result of the referendum is a spectacular blow against Jaruzelski. It testifies to the fact that the Polish society no longer believes in any reform by the Communists. This is the result of 40 years of a Communist regime. Jaruzelski told Moscow that he had everything under control, and that he had achieved total normalization. He could even claim that there was general support for the economic reform, because it was supported by Lech Walesa, the Solidarnosc leadership and its experts. The referendum showed that all that was nothing but propaganda.

People gained confidence after the referendum. They feel more sure of themselves. Only they no longer think, as they did before, that there is a leadership and that it will lead their struggle. After I got out of prison in the summer of 1984, I travelled through the country for a year. I discussed with the main leaders of Solidarnosc, as well as with ordinary activists in the plants. I could see then that combativity was flagging, and that the leadership's authority was also on the wane — it was the TKK at the time. Today, the evolution of the situation will depend to a large extent on the correlation between these two processes. If the leadership's authority continues to decline, but not combativity, then people will begin to organize autonomously. Before, these two processes were parallel. Now, even before the referendum, the ranks had begun to think independently. The referendum result is the expression of that.

■ What do you think of the position taken on October 25 by the Solidarnosc National Executive Commission (KKW) on the referendum?

It was the worst imaginable. I was in a small provincial city at the time, and I discussed with a Solidarnosc activist there. He told me, "You don't understand anything, because Walesa says that the reform is a good thing, but that there is no need to vote." The whole Solidarnosc leadership

took the same position as Walesa, that the society is hoping for an economic reform, that this reform is necessary but that, despite everything, it was better not to go to the polls. Onyszkiewicz, the representative of the Solidarnosc leadership, said that it was better to go fishing or gathering mushrooms, because in any case the referendum results would not matter. That was very bad propaganda. On the other hand, the government conducted more intelligent propaganda than ever. But despite this, the people refused to give their support. They are starting to think independently.

■ In your opinion why was the government so mistaken in its predictions?

Everyone is asking themselves that question today. Why did Jaruzelski hold this referendum? I think that the team in power today is taken in a lot less by its own propaganda than those that preceded it. But it let its head be turned by the Solidarnosc leadership's propaganda. It thought that this leadership faithfully represented the opinion of the society.

I have heard such an opinion voiced by a representative of party and police circles. All you had to do, according to them, was listen to Walesa, the Solidarnosc leadership and the church and you would know it all. That is what convinced them to hold the referendum. They did not realize that the views of the Solidarnosc leadership had diverged from those of the society. That is because the society has no way of expressing itself, not even in the underground press. The Solidarnosc leadership and the groups linked to it have established their monopoly over this press. The existence of the independent press and publishing houses is a marvelous thing. I say that without any irony. But the distribution of the press and independent publications is weak.

In Warsaw, it seems otherwise, because there is a plant press in the Ursus tractor factory, in the Huta Warszawa steelworks, in the FSO auto factory and in the Polkolor electronics factory. But there are provincial cities and more generally many regions that this press does not reach. So, despite the existence of this press, the Western radio stations remain the main source of information. But these stations are no less given to censorship than those of the Reds. A document not approved by Walesa, the Solidarnosc leadership or its experts has no chance of getting on the air.

Consequently, the Solidarnosc leaderships have made the same error as the PZPR (the Polish CP) — they have imposed their monopoly on the independent press. Only their views are broadcast by Western radio stations; the others are eliminated. And so these groups are convinced that the whole society shares their opinions. This news monopoly functioned effectively for a period, as it did for the Communist system. Every individual thought, "I have a different view, but all the others think like the press" (the clandestine press in our case). Before the referendum,

people said, "I will not go, but the others certainly will." It was not like that.

■ What do you think of General Jaruzelski's economic reform program?

In the first place, the regime is basing this reform on an economic theory of the free market. The West demands that Jaruzelski base himself on this theory, and this is demanded above all by International Monetary Fund. But this is absurd, because there is no free market; this theory has no application here. Secondly, our economists, who are trying energetically convince us of the soundness of their reform, are people who have undoubtedly never seen a factory, who have no idea of what is going on in industry nor of how the production process unfolds.

They imagine that a big drop in the standard of living will lead to an increase in labor productivity and to an improvement in the quality of products. Since they have nothing to do with productive labor, they think that if you drive the proles to get on with the job under the goad of hunger or the whip that they will work hard enough to raise the standard of living of the others. In fact, all those who are discussing how to get society to work have living standards several times higher than most.

I am working now as a painter on a heating center building site in Ciechanow in the center of the country. A welder of scaffolding earns 25,000 zlotys a month.² A top category welder with dozens of years of seniority earns 30,000 zlotys. This is what the wages of most workers are like. Of course, there are enterprises where wages are better — steelworks or shipyards. But I am talking about typical enterprises, like mine. Such wages are not enough today to feed a family, so most Poles are looking for supplementary jobs to do after their eight hours, obviously manual jobs.

For example, the boss on my building site clears away rubble after his workday, and the foreman at the end of his eight hours lays paving stones. And they are asking these people to let their real wages be cut in half! And they tell them, "If you want to keep your standard of living, you have to increase productivity." I don't doubt that they will manage it. I don't know how, but through their collective intelligence, they will do it. Only at that time, I will refuse to go up with my brush onto the scaffolding built by my fellow workers, because I would be afraid that it would collapse under my weight.

If the Polish economy is sick, this sickness is caused by norms that are too high and therefore lead to a false productivity and in reality engender immense losses. In 1980-81, I was invited to drink coffee with some ministers, because they wanted to know what I thought should be done to get

2. According to the calculations made by Solidarnosc last October, to live on the "breadline" a person needs an income of 10,660 zlotys; and to live at a minimum social level, a family of four needs an income of 53,400 zlotys a month.

the economy moving again. I told them that before anything else they had to lower the quantitative production norms by 40 per cent without cutting wages and create the conditions for quality production. It is only after that we can start to increase productivity, while increasing wages proportionally. But the regime has always done exactly the opposite. And this produces nothing, because Polish workers are very imaginative.

I have been working in industry for thirty years, and the workers still surprise me by their imagination. Their norms are increased, and despite that they manage to maintain their wages at the same level. I am a worker with a number of skills. I have worked as a lathe-operator, a welder, and now I am a painter. So, I can judge how much time is necessary to make a given product. The norms are such that it seems totally impossible to do the work in the assigned time, but they manage it. Simply, they do not respect the technological process. From the outside, the product seems to meet specifications. It even has, if necessary, the indicated dimensions, but this product maintains its use value ten times less time than it should, because it is produced by eliminating 80 per cent of the specified technical operations. All the workers' inventiveness is directed toward finding means for eliminating them.

The present economic reform will force workers to find more tricks of this sort. On paper, productivity will increase, and they will therefore maintain the level of their wages. But the economy will breakdown still more.

■ You are one of the signatories to the letter of the 22 Solidarnosc leaders to Lech Walesa. In this letter you criticize the Solidarnosc leadership's lack of interest in defending workers' living standards and you demand the convocation of the National Commission elected by the union's congress in order to solve the problem of its leadership. Could you explain this demand?

The only document that defines what Solidarnosc is and how it should function is its statutes. According to these statutes, the union leadership is made up of the National Congress of Delegates, the National Commission and the Control Commission. The tasks of the National Commission, the statutes indicate, are the following: to represent the union as a whole in dealings with the state, the economic administration, as well as with the other institutions and organizations, coordinating the activity of the regional union organizations and adopting the budget.

A demand for convoking the union's only statutory leadership should not surprise any member. It is the right and duty of every member to do this, and in particular of a member of the National Commission. If anybody were to ask us to justify our demand, they would only show their ignorance of the rules that govern our union.

Why did our demand make so many

waves — even arouse hostility? The object of every rule is to curb individual and group interests in the name of the general interest. The statutes of Solidarnosc are such rules. They oppose individuals' actions contrary to the interests of the union as a whole. It seems that we have people in Solidarnosc who are opposed to respecting the statutes. I am with those who demand that the statutes be respected and applied. The present leadership of Solidarnosc is not a statutory body.

■ But after the establishment of the state of war, it was not possible to act in accordance with the statutes. In the place of the National Commission, replacement bodies were to appear. The Provisional Coordinating Commission (TKK) was the first.

I was very happy when the TKK emerged. I was in an internment camp at the time. The need for forming the TKK was clear to everyone, because then it was impossible to do otherwise. However, the situation has changed since. When I got out of prison, I realized after a few months that there was absolutely no problem about convoking the National Commission. There were technical difficulties, to be sure, but they were far from being insurmountable. I have taken part in many meetings in which there were more than 200 unionists, and these meetings could be held. The National Commission has less than 100 members. Since then, conditions have become still more favorable.

If it is possible to apply the statutes, that should be done, if you want to stay in the framework of Solidarnosc. In such a situation, those who fail to apply the statutes place themselves outside the union Solidarnosc — not outside the social movement Solidarnosc, but outside the union. That seems clear to me. If a group makes it impossible to call a session of the statutory leadership of the union, then that group is standing the way of the union functioning.

■ Why do you think this problem exists?

It is very simple. Monopoly conditions have appeared, and the group that has imposed this is doing everything it can to maintain it. The existence of groups aspiring to monopolize power is a natural thing. But democracy's purpose is precisely to make this impossible by establishing a balance between such groups and guaranteeing that they will keep a check over each other.

■ Nonetheless, the leading group in Solidarnosc contains members who have various points of view. For example, some give priority to the fight for a market-type economic reform, while others favor giving priority to the trade-union struggle in the plants, like the signatories to the letter of the 22, who consider that Solidarnosc is not paying enough attention to this question.

Release Kornel Morawiecki

"WE CALL on all members of the union Solidarnosc to undertake actions for the release of Kornel Morawiecki, our fellow trade unionist, a delegate from the Wroclaw region [in Lower Silesia] to the National Congress.

For six years, Kornel Morawiecki has led Fighting Solidarnosc, an underground independent organization against which vast police forces have been mobilized. It is largely thanks to Kornel Morawiecki's activity that the Wroclaw region has become the most active in recent years. We can defend him only with firmness and solidarity. Kornel Morawiecki's arrest is a new test of strength in the war against the society."

Joanna Duda-Gwiazda, Andrzej Gwiazda, Ewa Kubasiewicz, Wieslawa Kwiatkowska, Kyril Kramentowski, Roman Urbanski, Jan Kulas, Halina Mikolajska. ★

It is not paying any attention to it at all. Solidarnosc may be a social movement today, but it is certainly not a union. Since the establishment of the state of war, the groups that have taken the leadership have not been carrying out trade-union activity. Henryk Wujec is an exception, because from time to time, timidly, he reminds people that after all we have to be a union.

I will give only one example: In the fall of 1984, I met in Warsaw with a group of 40 workers from a plant, rank-and-file members of Solidarnosc. The workers sat quietly through the whole meeting; they said nothing. Only the leaders talked. Shortly before midnight, the leaders left, and then the workers started talking, until 5am. I learned from them — not from the leaders — that new contracts were in the pipeline. When I came out of prison, none of the regional leaders talked to me about that. Either they did not know anything about it, or else they weren't interested. In that meeting, we discussed how to defend ourselves against this looming threat.

Later, I travelled through the country, and I collected documentation about this question. I drafted a statement, and I intended to publish articles on this affair in the underground press. At that time, they were still publishing what I wrote, because I had just got out of prison and had to be reckoned with. Unfortunately, Father Popieluszko's murder diverted everybody's attention, and the regime then took advantage of that to force through the new contracts, without arousing any protests. This question simply did not interest either the TKK or the regional leaderships, because they did not feel that they were in the shoes of union

leadership. That has not changed.

■ **You are very hard on the present leadership of Solidarnosc.**

Yes, that's so. I have a negative assessment of the work of the comrades who make up the KKW and the preceding leaderships. I am in complete disagreement with their political line, with their conception of an understanding with the regime and their attempts to orient to it. I should add that I am equally shocked by the attitude they took following the recent arrest of Kornel Morawiecki, the underground leader of the Fighting Solidarnosc Organization. As you know, the regime accuses Morawiecki of terrorist activity.

The KKW poses the problem in the following way: Solidarnosc has never been implicated in terrorism, but despite that we have to protest. In fact, that means the KKW giving legitimacy to the accusations made by the prosecutor and the propaganda of the government's representative, Jerzy Urban, who says that Fighting Solidarnosc is a terrorist organization. That is an inadmissible and scandalous attitude. In common with some other independent activists — including Halina Mikolajska — we drew up a statement on this matter that I would like you to publish alongside this interview [see box].³ If the differences that exist in the opposition were to lead us to treat each other the way Walesa and the KKW did Morawiecki, then the government would very soon be able to put us all in prison, including the comrades of the KKW, because no one would want to defend us, and rightly so.

■ **The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) was formed recently. What is your attitude toward this initiative?**

This could be a historic event and a turn in the situation. Over the past five years all the independent groups enjoying some influence have evolved very far to the right. Even those that in the past were identified with the left have taken positions today that would be seen in the West as very right wing. And this is to say nothing of our right, which is something that must be hard to imagine in the West. It is an eighteenth or nineteenth century right!

On the left there is a vacuum that it is essential to fill. The PPS has a chance of filling it and of becoming the party of all the left. And there is an immense demand in Poland for left-wing thought.

■ **Did you join the PPS?**

No. But I took part in its founding congress, and I look on the creation of this party with a lot of sympathy. If I did not join it, that is because I think that the PPS has to resolve a series of questions that I consider very important.

First of all, after the experience of the communism that appeared under the name of socialism, we have an immense conceptual confusion. The PPS will have a big job to do in defining the concepts, in develop-

ing a language and recovering from the Communists the symbols that they have appropriated. To take only one example, the goal the PPS set itself was to establish socialism in Poland. In 80 to 90 per cent of people, that immediately arouses a negative emotional reaction. So the PPS has to clearly define what it means by "socialism" in 1987.

This is not a concept with only one meaning, because various socialist parties and currents in the world give it a different content, and, what is more, in Poland it is a concept that has been emptied of all content. The same is true for the red flag, the traditional banner of the socialists, which has been usurped by the Communists. In 1981, when the National Commission of Solidarnosc was discussing what attitude to take toward May 1, and how to celebrate it, I said, "Comrades, the question is not how to celebrate it, but how to clean away the Communist imprint from the flag of the workers' struggle for a better future." The PPS must take its distance from the compromised slogans, but maintain their real content and translate it into a new language.

Secondly, the PPS has to take a stand on the socialist tradition. The history of the Polish Socialist Party and its program are known today only to historians. Our knowledge in this area is very limited. We know that during the partition of Poland, this party placed the fight for social justice and for independence on the same level, that it organized strikes, and that for years Jozef Pilsudski was one of its leaders.⁴ Few people know about this party's attitude toward Marxism, and few know that the keystone of the Socialists' program was social ownership of the means of production.

It is not enough today to identify with the tradition of the Socialist Party, not only because it is little known in our society, but also because this party had several traditions, among which you have to choose. For example, in 1906, the PPS split into two parties. The PPS-Revolutionary Faction led by Pilsudski took up an armed struggle for independence. On the other hand, the PPS-Left fused with the SDKPiL to form the Communist Party of Poland, an agent of the USSR.

During the last war, there existed the PPS - Freedom - Equality - Independence (PPS-WRN), which fought the German occupation and, after the war, opposed the Bolshevization of Poland. At the same time, there was the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists (RPPS). After the war, it founded the "new" PPS, which collaborated with the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), fusing with it in 1948 to form the PZPR.

Which tradition does the present PPS identify with? There are a lot of possible choices. Concretely, it has to say whether this is the tradition of collaboration with the Communists, that of the PPS-Left and the RPPS, and whether it should aim for legality, that is, recognition as a party by the PZPR, and seek to govern in common with

the Communists?⁵ Or whether, conversely, it will organize the society to fight for democracy and independence in accordance with the tradition of the PPS-Revolutionary Faction and the PPS-WRN? These are essential questions. Maybe they are troublesome ones for the founders of the present PPS, but they have to be asked and answered.

Thirdly, it has to be remembered that Marxists and non-Marxists coexisted in the historic PPS. The new PPS has to define its attitude toward Marxism. That is hard. The Communists have tried to sell us the idea that Marx and Lenin invented everything, maybe even the multiplication table. We have believed a number of propaganda claims along these lines. For example, what we are offered as Marxist economics is really only the economic theory worked out by Ricardo. Marx only added the idea that under capitalism wages have to decline continuously, and on this thesis he based his social theory.⁶ The same is true as regards philosophy. Certain theories cannot be rejected for the sole reason that Marxists lay claim to them. The others can, and must, be abandoned. The PPS has to make a choice and present it in two versions — a popular one and a theoretical one. This will also be difficult, and maybe troublesome, but it is necessary.

Fourth, it is essential that the PPS explain how it views social ownership of the means of production. I think that it is infantile to think that state ownership leads only to bad things and social ownership only to good things. The PPS should be in favor of democracy, of normal parliamentary democracy. In a free and democratic country, the state apparatus is a sum of functionaries that society employs to handle the matters determined by the institutions that represent it. In such a country, state ownership is simply social ownership.

There are other questions of this sort that must be clarified. I hope that the PPS will clarify them in the best way, and provide answers that will induce the maximum number of people to join, and make it possible for me to join also. ★

3. Helena Mikolajska is an actress and recipient of two state prizes for her artistic activity. She was formerly a very active member of the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR), which was victimized for the 1976 Radom strike and became the political nucleus of the Polish opposition.

4. Jozef Pilsudski (1867-1935). Initially a prominent figure in the workers' movement, editor of the PPS journal *Robotnik*. After the 1905 revolution, he launched terrorist actions against Czarism and evolved toward bourgeois nationalist positions. At the time of the First World War, he was one of the commanders of the Polish Legions formed under the sponsorship of the Central Powers. After Poland regained its independence, he was chief of state (1918-22). He provoked a war with Soviet Russia. After the Bonapartist coup d'état of May 1926, he ruled the country as a dictator until his death.

5. The discrediting of communist traditions by Stalinism has often impelled Polish anti-bureaucratic activists to identify with the anti-Communist currents in the history of the PPS.

6. Like many Poles, Andrzej Gwiazda obviously bases his view of Marxism on the courses taught by Stalinists that he had to endure in his youth.

ANC anti-apartheid conference in Tanzania

BUILDING a broad movement in active solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle is far from an easy task. The concrete application of an economic boycott, for example, poses various problems. (See IV 124, July 13, 1987.) It is increasingly evident that solid support can only be built on a basis of mobilizing the youth, working people and their organizations.

Saying this does not mean that any other democratic battle is useless. But everything now indicates that the revolutionary struggle of South African Blacks brings into play political and strategic questions of such an importance that the "anti-apartheid" conscience of some bourgeois, liberal and reformist circles will be quite unreliable.

In this context the position of the Soviet Union will be crucial. This fact has just been demonstrated by the international conference held in Arusha, Tanzania by the African National Congress (ANC).

Given the present difficulties in the mass movement inside the country, diplomatic moves can maintain a certain pressure on the Pretoria government. But here also the particular difficulties of this sort of activity can be noted in view of the big international negotiations underway.

We are reprinting below an article on the conference published in the December 11, 1987, issue of the *South Africa Weekly Mail*, a well-informed left-democratic weekly generally sympathetic to the ANC.

HOSTING and organizing its own international congress is a bold step for a liberation movement, particularly when the guests include government representatives. The African National Congress' conference last week in Arusha, down the road from Mount Kilimanjaro, allowed the movement to show off its immense international prestige.

Solidarity groups from more than 50 countries, from Kampuchea to the United States, participated in the gathering, which an ANC official described as the "parliament of the world anti-apartheid movement". Given all the fanfare, though, many observers did not really understand the purpose of the conference, the theme of which was the "world united against apartheid". Predictably, it ended with a call to intensify efforts to impose comprehensive mandato-

ry sanctions and to work toward the total diplomatic isolation of Pretoria.

A programme of action was drawn up, containing specific goals such as the ending of all financial loans to Pretoria and the fostering of grass-roots "people's sanctions" against South African products. There is little new in these calls and their impact is likely to be lessened by the fact that the conference in Arusha was a gathering of the already-converted party faithful aimed, in the words of an ANC representative, to "give a further boost to the international solidarity movement".

Their unanimity on the need for drastic action against Pretoria did not overcome the major hurdle in the ANC diplomatic offensive: how to break economic and other links which Western countries such as Britain, the United States, Japan and West Germany maintain with Pretoria — and which

undermine the effectiveness of sanctions.

On several levels the conference was a disappointment. Many of the major invited celebrities failed — for a variety of reasons — to attend. Entertainer Stevie Wonder and US presidential contender Jesse Jackson, along with many of America's black anti-apartheid activists, stayed home to attend the funeral of Chicago's mayor, Harold Washington.

The top command of Umkhonto we Sizwe [the ANC's armed wing] — commander Joe Modise, chief of staff Chris Hani and political commissar Steve Tshwete — was not there, nor was Communist Party secretary and organizing its own international congress is a bold step for a liberation movement, particularly when the guests include government representatives. The African National Congress' conference last week in Arusha, down the road from Mount Kilimanjaro, allowed the movement to show off its immense international prestige.

Over 50 solidarity groups attend the conference

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we [the ANC's armed wing] — commander Joe Modise, chief of staff Chris Hani and political commissar Steve Tshwete — was not there, nor was Communist Party secretary Joe Slovo. "Someone has to hold the fort," explained an ANC official. "They are tired of endless international conferences," explained another.

Much of the conference time was spent on endless solidarity messages which, after a few hours, all seemed to sound the same and make exactly the same points.

ANC spells out its perspectives

Many ANC people who were there collectively resembled a diplomatic corps without a government — "ambassadors" posted to faraway places with memories of "home" fading with the long years in exile. As a diplomatic initiative, the conference at the very least allowed the ANC to spell out to the world solidarity movements, who emerged even more clearly under the wing of the organization, its perspectives on the struggle ahead.

The ANC position on negotiations is that it recognized the need for talks at the end of the road — but only if they are about the transfer of power to majority rule. Before then the organization will not renounce or suspend the armed struggle.

Negotiations in the near future with the National Party government are thus ruled out, subordinated to the international, political and, most important, military struggles which the ANC is waging against Pretoria.

The long-term goals of the ANC are thus highly dependent on a guerrilla war which, despite repeated promises of dramatic escalation, remains largely ineffective. ANC sources indicated that something "major" would happen in the next few months, seemingly confirming the recent words of warning from Steve Tshwete, but cynics said they had heard it all before.

The ANC realizes that it has to escalate the armed struggle if it ever wants to bring

substantial bargaining chips to the negotiating table. For that reason, recent reports of influential Soviet political scientists advocating a political settlement are potentially more dangerous to the ANC than a flagging of the sanctions campaigns in the West.

These reports were vociferously slapped down by members of the Soviet solidarity committee at the conference and one even suggested that the "dissidents" — Gleb Starushenko and Victor Goncharov of the Africa Institute in Moscow — should be published.¹ They claimed that Starushenko and Goncharov had been expressing their "personal" views for 20 years, which were only receiving attention in the West now because they were publishing in English.

However, official action by the Soviet government — in particular, the joint action with the United States in September to block South Africa's expulsion from the International Atomic Energy Agency — came under fire from several delegates. One of the key points of the programme of action which was adopted declared that South Africa should be expelled from the agency next year.

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sent a message of "uncompromising full support for the liberation of South Africa", a ment echoed by the deputy chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, YY Vagris, who addressed the conference. But compared with the statements by Nyerere and ANC president Oliver Tambo, the Soviet position on ANC negotiations with Pretoria was surprisingly mild.

Vagris said a political solution — which the Soviet Union supported — could materialize if Pretoria released political prisoners, lifted the state of emergency, withdrew all troops from the townships and lifted the ban on the ANC and other political organizations.

Joint action around boycott campaign

But it was Pretoria's continued links with Western countries which provided delegates with their biggest headache in finding practical means to intensify sanctions against South Africa.

It was against these countries — and particularly British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who labelled the ANC a "terrorist organization" at the Commonwealth conference in Vancouver — that much of the rhetoric of the conference was directed.

Other than a statement of intent to intensify the sanctions campaign, the conference did not in itself answer the question of how this was to be achieved.

It did, however, provide an opportunity for solidarity groups to get together and start planning joint action, the boycott against Shell being the clearest example of where this could be effective. ★

1. Gleb Starushenko and Victor Goncharov have expressed views in articles or conferences that were thought to reflect the Kremlin's opinion. Both seemed favorable to a minimum political accord between the ANC and the regime. Goncharov even introduced the idea of an agreement between Moscow and Washington on this matter. Their positions have been published in the South African democratic press and extensively commented upon.

COMRADE YY Vagris, deputy chairman of the presidium of the supreme soviet of the USSR, addressing the conference:

“ The possibilities of a political settlement of the problems of Southern Africa have been widely discussed lately. We are in favour of such a settlement.

As far as we know, the ANC, despite the policy of repression against it, does not reject the possibility of a political solution. However, the willingness of the Botha government to search for a solution is quite doubtful.

We believe a political settlement presupposes first of all the necessary climate, which means releasing all political prisoners, lifting the state of emergency, withdrawing the troops and police from all Black settlements, lifting the ban on the ANC and other political organisations.

Meanwhile, we do not see any measures to create favourable conditions to start the settlement process by the Botha government. Moreover, the recent attack of the South African army on the camps of Namibian refugees in Southern Angola can only be regarded as a challenge to the international community. ★ ”

AROUND
THE
WORLD

SENEGAL

**Revolutionaries
contest elections**

PRESIDENTIAL and legislative elections will be held during February in Senegal. In allowing political and trade-union pluralism, Senegal is unusual for an African country, and is generally put up as an example of "Western-style" democracy. President Abdou Diouf uses and abuses this label on the international scene. The ruling Socialist Party, a member of the Socialist International, finds in the French Socialist Party an attentive godfather. A good example of the duplicity of official ideology was the organization of an international anti-apartheid show in Dakar in 1985, from which the opposition was banned and at which a demonstration of those in favour of Black South African rights was suppressed.

Senegalese institutions have been one means of channeling the very diverse opposition, going from bourgeois currents to small far-left organizations. This apparent freedom of expression, however, has led many organizations into an impasse. Having obtained the right to have a public existence, they have never challenged the framework of the ruling party and have avoided mobilizations so as not to put their "legality" in peril. This is how the three pro-Soviet factions have been carrying on, fighting over some teachers trade-union groups, but incapable of carrying out real mass political activity.

In this context, the Senegalese elections obviously retain a very formal character. Tampering with the electoral lists is certainly very generalized, but the ruling party also has a real base that transcends the general corruption.

A number of opposition organizations set up the Senegalese Democratic Alliance (ADS) in order to lead an ongoing and united battle around democratic freedoms. (See IV 130.) But the pressure of the coming elections has broken up the Alliance.

The leader of the PDS, Abdoulaye Wade, has presented himself as the sole candidate representing the opposition. Noting the more and more rightward drift of this party (Wade has become president of the International Liberals!), two other organizations belonging to the Alliance have decided to run their own election campaign. The first is And-Jeff, of Maoist origin, and the second the Workers' Socialist

Organization (OST), Senegal section of the Fourth International, who are now running a joint campaign with And-Jeff in support of their candidate, Landing Savane.

In a joint declaration the two organizations called for a "left alternative". Going beyond the ups and downs of the elections, they spell out that: "This unity must last past the elections with all the components of the revolutionary movement, so that we can struggle together hand in hand against the attacks of the state and of imperialism, and discuss together the ways and means of building a revolutionary party".

**Withdrawal of French
troops from Senegal**

Their campaign will be organized around a platform entitled "Serving the People". This document takes a position for the withdrawal of French troops from Senegal, annulling present agreements for military cooperation and for pulling out Senegalese forces stationed in neighbouring Gambia. It also calls for agrarian reform, cancelling the external debt and for the independence of the workers' movement.

And-Jeff and the OST anticipate the for-

mation of local support committees. Although most far-left organizations have opted for supporting a "democratic" candidate or have simply been paralyzed, the And-Jeff/OST initiative appears as a new step forward. Indeed, it is the first time in a country like Senegal that two movements of such differing political formation have sought to collaborate.

It is also the first time that an alliance of this sort has not just limited itself to formal protests, but proposed to continue to organize and reflect on the possibilities for building a revolutionary party. ★

Assault on Nicaragua

The publication of this new book, subtitled "The untold story of the US 'secret war'", was reported in our last issue on page 26, but at the time we did not have the details of the price. The book costs \$4.95 and is available from Walnut Publishing Co., 3435 Army St., # 308, San Francisco, CA 94110, USA (add on \$1 for post and packing). ★

Errata — IV 132

MANY apologies to our readers for the following errors that occurred in our Xmas issue:

● Please note that page two and page five of the 1987 index were accidentally transposed

● On page 19 of "Imperialism and the Gulf war" the first line of the page was missing, and should read: "towards Iraq and the firm American..."

**INTERNATIONAL
MARXIST REVIEW**

The significance of Gorbachov
Ernest Mandel

THE WINTER 1987 issue of *International Marxist Review* contains reports from the 1987 International Executive Committee of the Fourth International:

- The significance of Gorbachov
Ernest Mandel
- Feminism in Latin America
Heather Dashner
- First lessons of the Philippine revolution
P Roman
(with alternative positions by *S. Brown*, *FIT, USA* and *Socialist Action, USA*)
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THE LIST of Palestinian activists to be deported was finally announced on January 3 by a spokesperson for the Israeli defence minister, Itzhak Rabin. Apparently as a result of secret talks between Tel Aviv and Washington, the list, which was supposed to include a hundred people, affected "only nine activists" that the Zionist government had decided to drive from their homes, cut off from their families and friends and exile from their homeland. It cannot be repeated often enough that such deportations are not only a crime forbidden by the Geneva Convention; they are a barbarous act practiced by no regime in the world, no matter how dictatorial, except Israel.

More than two years ago, when Rabin decided to resort once again to this measure after it had been abandoned de facto by Menachem Begin, we said that behind this obsession about deporting so-called ringleaders there was something still more horrible — the hope that some dare to express out loud of expelling hundreds of thousands of Palestinians en masse from their homeland.

Today, we are not the only ones saying this. It has been said, for example, by the daily *Hadashot*, which has talked about "mini-resettlements." In this way, it was referring to the various schemes of the right-wing parties for massive expulsions of the Palestinian population.

Over and above its symbolic value, the decision to deport nine Palestinian leaders, or persons alleged to be so, is a response to a political need. The objective is to foster the illusion — in particular to persuade the Israeli population — that concrete measures have been taken to avoid a new explosion.

Anniversary of El Fateh's founding

Supposedly all you need to do to convince yourself that calm is going to return is to neutralize some so-called agitators. In the eyes of the Zionist leaders, the recent popular uprising cannot be spontaneous, since their assumption remains that the great majority of the population, willingly or unwillingly, supports the status quo.

This also explains the great relief of political and military leaders on the evening of January 1. The authorities had made this day, traditionally the anniversary of the founding of El Fateh, a test of whether order had returned to the West Bank and Gaza. Thousands of extra soldiers were

No peace in the occupied territories

THE MILITARY CRACKDOWN on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as the expulsion of so-called Palestinian ringleaders, will not achieve anything. The situation in the occupied territories remains explosive. (See editorial on page 3.)

The following article by a leader of the Israeli state section of the Fourth International reports on conditions following the anniversary of the founding of El Fateh.

MICHEL WARSCHAWSKI

mobilized. The General Staff announced that there were three times as many soldiers in the Gaza strip than had been necessary to conquer it in June 1967. By arresting more than a thousand activists and terrorizing the entire population, the occupation forces left nothing to chance. They announced loudly that they were just waiting to see what would happen.

Authorities announce "end of the rebellion"

As could be expected, nothing happened. Of course, a curfew was decreed in several refugee camps. In some localities, demonstrators were dispersed with tear-gas grenades. But January 1 was a non-event. That, however, did not keep the authorities from saying that they were satisfied and from announcing the end of the rebellion.

The editorial writer in the daily *Haaretz* seemed more in touch with reality: "It cannot be ruled out that the people of the West Bank and Gaza, after catching the Israeli leaders by surprise with what has seemed on several occasions to be a mass uprising against the occupation, wanted next to send a message to their 'legitimate representatives,' saying in essence: 'It is not the PLO but we on the spot who will decide when and where the confrontation with Israel takes place'. It seems, both from what happened and what did not happen, that the events of the latter half of December were a local development and not something remote-controlled by Yassar Arafat."

Of course, the PLO continues to be regarded as the national leadership by the majority of the population. But what has been

clear for some weeks is that the new Palestinian generation, what is called the "occupation generation," considers itself capable of taking its own struggles in hand. It is no longer content just to take orders from outside. Its tactical sense led it to avoid a confrontation when the relationship of forces was very unfavorable and the ground had been chosen by the enemy.

For those who persist in ignoring what is happening in the mass movement, this seems to be a setback for the PLO and a confirmation of a return to calm. On the other hand, those who refuse to accept the claims that the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who have mobilized over past weeks are being "manipulated by outside forces," or by a few dozen local ringleaders, can easily see what is happening.

Dragging hundreds of young demonstrators before courts and deporting a few dozen local personalities will, in the long run, only exacerbate the anger of the masses and their determination to fight the Israeli occupation. ★

