New threats against Nicaragua

The Polish May Day

Crisis of the Irish economy

8 FF, £0.65, US dollars 1.50, Skr 9, DM3.50
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The Nicaraguan Revolution Under Attack
by Daniel Jebrac

New Advances by Solidarnosc
by Jacqueline Allo

Revolutionary Unity in the Portugese Elections
by International Viewpoint

Austrian Fourth Internationalists Call for SPO Vote
by Rainer Baubock

Violent Repression Against Peruvian General Strike
by Livio Maitan

The Legacy of Lancaster House
by Charlie van Gelderen

No to the Executions in Turkey
by International Viewpoint

Grenadans Celebrate Revolution
by Roland Eliasson, Veikko Saarinen, Anna Soederberg

Cold War Atmosphere as France Expels Soviet Diplomats
by Christian Picquet

Ireland — An Economy in Crisis
by People's Democracy

The ‘Welfare State’ Fades in Sweden
by Tom Gustafsson

Around the World: Italy, Greenland, China, Iceland, Netherlands

To the Workers of the World
Document

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Nicaraguan revolution under attack

With the escalation of imperialist attacks on Nicaragua, the political and military situation in Central America is polarizing rapidly.

In the last fortnight, Under Secretary of State Enders warned Nicaragua that something drastic could happen if it brought heavy Soviet equipment or troops onto the isthmus.

Revelations by the Washington Post in the same period made it quite clear what the purpose of such warnings and artificial panics are — to prepare the way for an escalation of direct U.S. military intervention.

The Washington Post reported that nearly a year and a half ago, after a National Security Council meeting on November 16, 1981, Reagan ordered the drawing up of "contingency plans to deal with unacceptable military actions by Cuba."

This title, in fact, was a fig leaf for preparations for U.S. intervention against the liberation struggles in Central America, as the documents obtained by the U.S. daily made clear.

Far from viewing Soviet or Cuban military involvement as the fundamental danger, a paper prepared for a National Security Council discussion in April 1982 saw it as offering some advantages.

"Introduction of MIGs into Nicaragua could be exploited to obtain financing for upgrading of Honduran Air Force and stationing U.S. squadron in Honduras."

The greatest worry the paper expressed, according to the Washington Post, was that congress would not back Reagan's policy in El Salvador and would order an end to military aid.

Fact, the growing crisis of the Salvadoran military is more and more notorious.

On April 18, the Salvadoran minister of defense, General Jose Gillermo Garcia, announced his resignation. He was replaced by General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casa nova, director of the National Guard, which is believed responsible for the massive campaign of murder and torture against civilians.

The following article deals with the effects in Nicaragua of the increasing polarization in Central America, including the escalation of the counterrevolutionary attacks.

Daniel JEBRAC

As of now, Ronald Reagan is engaged in a semi-open aggression against Nicaragua. There is a wealth of eye-witness testimony to the role of U.S. advisors in organizing the military operations carried out by former Somocista National Guards, who are based just across the Honduran frontier.

The recent revelation of plans to build a U.S. radar station in Honduras capable of monitoring air traffic throughout the region has added a new and important piece to the picture of U.S. intervention in Central America.

The Reagan administration seems to be in a hurry. In Salvador, the relative success that Washington achieved in carrying off the March 1982 elections was largely neutralized by the weight of the extreme right in the Assembly that was elected.

The divisions in the government and in the army have deepened. The dictatorship's crisis of bourgeois leadership thus remains as acute as ever. The U.S. more and more fears that it may see a break-up of the Salvadoran army and regime similar to what happened to the Somocista National Guard in 1979.

Thus, the presidential elections scheduled for the end of the year can only achieve their objective of restructuring the dictatorship and improving the international image of the Salvadoran regime if they coincide with a clear shift of the military situation in favor of the dictatorship's armed forces.

It is in this context largely that the United States needs to internationalize more its intervention in the region. By striking at Nicaragua, it is trying to cut off the source of military aid to the FMLN in El Salvador and isolate the Salvadoran revolution.

However, while U.S. imperialism is trying to create the best possible conditions for inflicting a serious setback on the FMLN forces before the late 1983 elections, it is also seeking to deal blows to the Nicaraguan revolution.

IMPERIALIST MILITARY ESCALATION

By putting military pressure on the Nicaraguans through its Somocista allies, the U.S. wants to force the Sandinistas to devote considerable resources to military spending and thereby to block the rebuilding of the country's economy.

While it cannot immediately undertake actions designed to overthrow the Sandinista government outright, U.S. imperialism wants to see the legitimacy of the Managua government seriously challenged and undermined. Those engaged in this imperialist destabilization campaign clearly are capable of anything, and, logically, the U.S. is surrounding itself with the most hard-headed opponents of the Sandinista revolution, the former Somocista National Guard.

For this reason, the military incursions of the past weeks, the statements of the counterrevolutionary command of the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) that it has established bases in three of the country's fourteen provinces, and the rumors that a provisional government is going to be declared cannot be taken lightly.

If these objectives are achieved, they would give the imperialists new cards to play and concrete chips for large-scale bargaining in the region. In fact, U.S. imperialism does not exclude the possibility of "negotiations," if the relationship of military forces were more favorable.

In this sense, it can be said that U.S. imperialism is still seeking to create the conditions for an overall political discussion concerning the region, the need for which was cited by Mexican President Lopez Portillo on February 21, 1982, in his Managua Appeal.

At that time, Lopez Portillo proposed an overall peace plan designed to solve "by separate but converging channels" three kinds of conflict — the one involving Nicaragua, the one involving El Salvador, and the problem of relations between the U.S. and Cuba.

Obviously such a position could create some diplomatic problems for the U.S. military initiative in Central America. But at the same time, it is designed to put such governments as the Mexican, the Spanish, and even the French in a position where they could serve as mediators in negotiations.

Nonetheless, right now, the sort of positions taken by Lopez Portillo help to isolate the American policy of aggression on the diplomatic level. This process has taken shape more clearly since the spring 1982 Malvinas war.

Sandinista Nicaragua has been elected to the UN Security Council. Countries such as Venezuela or Colombia, which were among the U.S.'s best allies in the region, have shifted their policy some-
what. At a summit meeting held on the Panamanian island of Contadora in January, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama adopted a joint statement calling for separating the Central American conflicts from the U.S.-Soviet confrontation and for solving them through negotiation.

During the Security Council debate on the situation of Nicaragua by Somocista commandos, allies of the U.S. such as the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Spain went so far as to question the American version of the facts. Only Honduras and El Salvador, which are not members of the Security Council, gave total support to the U.S. policy.

Larger and larger sections of the American people are opposing the slide of Reagan's policy toward direct intervention in Central America. Within the American bourgeoisie itself and in congress, voices are being raised against the dangers of region-wide war and the present political and military orientation of the Reagan administration.

The line of the Reagan administration has even made some allies of U.S. imperialism edgy. In this regard, Alvaro Jerez, spokesman of the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE), the anti-Sandinista organization made up of elements of the old anti-Somocista bourgeoisie who have withdrawn to Costa Rica, declared recently "if the Reagan administration wants to democratize Nicaragua and bring peace to the region, it is not going about it in the right way."

This grouping is afraid that the military operations cooked up by Washington will only lead in the long run to reinforcing the legitimacy of the revolutionary Sandinista regime within the country and internationally by exposing the direct role of imperialism and Somocista diehards in the aggression against Nicaragua.

THE COURSE OF THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION

These imperialist maneuvers in fact involve the risk for the U.S. of touching off a new anti-imperialist radicalization in Nicaragua, of making irreversible the already profound break that exists between the Sandinista government and what remains of the local bourgeoisie. The delicate balance of the "mixed economy" could be broken once and for all by new sanctions against private sectors suspected of collaborating with the aggression.

Up until now, the Sandinista leaders have always declared their respect for political pluralism and their commitment to what they themselves call a system of "mixed economy." But since the overthrow of Somozas, a conflict has raged between the bourgeoisie and its allies and the revolutionary government. And the outcome of this is that the relationship of forces has shifted more and more in favour of the Sandinistas.

To be sure, political pluralism is still respected, inasmuch as there are several legal political formations outside the Sandinista Front, there is a real pluralism in the labor movement, and papers reflecting different points of view are published.

However, the elements representing the bourgeoisie have been continually breaking off from the government. In the spring of 1980, Alfonso Robelo and Violetta Chamorro left the cabinet set up at the time of Somozas's overthrow. This was in protest against the fact that the Sandinista current got an absolute majority in the Council of State.

Arturo Cruz, and others who took Robelo and Chamorro's place in the cabinet, resigned in their turn in protest against their lack of any real power. After being named ambassador to the U.S., Cruz defected once and for all.

After renegotiating the country's foreign debt, the chairman of the central bank, Alfredo Cesar, went into exile in May 1982. In December, Cruz's successor as ambassador to Washington, broke with the Sandinista regime. His pretext was that an interview in which he came out for lifting the state of emergency decreed in September 1981 and for free elections was censored.

Finally, Eden Pastora, deputy minister of the Sandinista army, and considered close to the Socialist International, went into opposition in the spring of 1982. Together with Alfonso Robelo, he founded the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance.

Today, it is the church hierarchy led by the archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo, that is trying to fill the vacuum left by the flight of the main representatives of the bourgeoisie. It is functioning as the focus for opposition to the Sandinista revolution within the country. But in so doing, it is running the risk of setting in motion a process of social and political differentiation among the faithful, as was shown by the pope's recent trip to Managua.

As for the "mixed economy," it has evolved toward greater and greater control by the Sandinista government. While it is true that the private sector still predominate strongly both in industry and agriculture, it is more and more hobbled in by the government's almost total control over credit and foreign trade.

Moreover, while the state sector embraces only 20% to 30% of agriculture, it is closely linked to a constantly expanding cooperative sector. Big private agriculture, nonetheless, continues to play a key role in the production of cotton, which is a key crop. In industry, successive expropriations have expanded the public sector until it accounts for 40% of production. The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie has lost the bulk of economic decision-making power.

At each test of strength with sectors of the bourgeoisie, the Sandinista leadership has acted in the same way. It has blown hot and cold. For example, in the fall of 1981, it jailed the top leaders of the employers organization, COSEP. And in the spring of 1982, it released them in order to participate in negotiations. But the confrontations and periods of tension have always led to the same result - a compromise on the economic level but a strengthening of the political authority of the FSLN and of its dominant role in the country.

The Sandinista leaders have, moreover, been very clear on this point. At the time of the conflict with Alfonso Robelo and Violetta Chamorro in March 1980, they declared frankly that elections would not be held until after the revolution was consolidated. By naming the replacements itself for Robelo and Chamorro, the leadership of the Sandinista Front clearly indicated that it had a greater authority than the government.

Following the defection of Eden Pastora, the national leadership of the FSLN again issued a statement that left no room for misunderstanding: "We pledge not to change our anthem, to continue to stand side by side with the peoples struggling against oppression, to continue to exercise our right to sover-
eighty, to arm to defend ourselves, not to return the confiscated property, not to give back to the big landowners the lands that our peasants have regained and which they are working today, not to extend an amnesty to counterrevolutionaries and their accomplices, never to return the banks to their former owners, to continue with our plans for education, public health, and housing for the working people. We pledge that this Sandinista people's revolution, this revolution of the workers and the poor, will never be betrayed. Those who are threatening us and attacking us shall not pass."

This statement also affirmed the determination of the Sandinista leadership to advance toward "building a society without exploited or exploiter."

Two weeks later, in his May 1 speech, Tomas Borge took up the same theme: "Some workers think that the main enemy of the working class is still the bourgeoisie. But the bourgeoisie as a class has been mortally wounded in this country. And the dying are never the worst enemy. The worst enemy of the working class is division in its own ranks.... Our people, the working people, know in what direction we are going. So I ask you workers and peasants assembled here today: Where are we going? Toward socialism!"

The constant necessity to assure the self-defense of the revolution against imperialism is putting a terrible pressure on the country's economy. It is imposing new sacrifices on the workers and peasants, who suffered during the civil war before. But at the same time, it is deepening the revolution.

TOWARD A RADICALIZATION

In fact, the struggle against the counterrevolutionary operations underway on the Honduran border or on the Costa Rican one is draining off a large part of the financial resources freed by the state sector. The Sandinistas are obliged to maintain an army of nearly 40,000 people and take on the cost of mobilizing the militia. And this is to say nothing of the loss resulting from the diversion of part of the labor force from production to tasks of defense. According to official figures, in 1982 the militia took part in seventy military engagements.

As for the bourgeoisie, or what remains of it, it is following a policy of sabotage. The World Bank itself estimates that private investment, which represented 90% of the total under Somoza, amounted to no more than 10% at the beginning of 1982.

Illiteracy has receded spectacularly. The same goes for infant mortality. The public health system assures free medical and dental care to those who need it. Overall food consumption has increased by 40% by comparison with the Somoza era. However, the distribution system is still faulty. A 1982 study in Managua showed no significant improvement in the diet of the poor. The 1982 floods and drought did grave damage to the crops.

The fall in prices of certain raw materials dealt another blow to the economy. Father Xavier Gorostiaga, director of the Economic Institute of Nicaragua, recently told an American journalist: "The problem comes not so much from the volume of production as from its value. Two years ago, sugar sold at 24 cents a pound. It is now at 9 cents. We may have lost 140 million dollars in 1982 simply because of the deterioration in the terms of trade. This reduced the total income from imports and held back the process of reforms."

Another factor is the foreign debt, which exceeds 2.5 billion dollars, and is continuing to mount. Already in 1981, service on this debt absorbed 28% of export revenue. Moreover, because of the agreement on rescheduling the debt, the creditors will be presenting the big bills in 1985.

In order to try to get the firmest possible grip on the throat of the revolution, the U.S. is considering reducing the Nicaraguan sugar import quota at the same time that it is stepping up its military pressure on the country. This is what the National Security Council is demanding, on the pretext that Nicaragua's quota reports 2.1% of total sugar imports, whereas the quota for the U.S.'s "loyal ally," Honduras, amounts to only 1%.

A representative of the Nicaraguan embassy in the U.S. immediately made a statement saying that the threatened reduction of the quota would mean an economic attack aimed "at killing the Nicaraguan revolution." The cut would result in an annual loss of about 12 million dollars to the Nicaraguan economy.

The Sandinista regime has inherited an archaic industrial structure not adapted to meeting social needs. In 1982, according to the official figures, industrial production dropped by 5.8%. This is after a drop of 26% in 1979, a rise of 13% in 1980 and a further increase of 2.8% in 1981. But behind this overall decline, there is a difference between the public sector, where production has increased by 4.1%, and the private sector representing two-thirds of industrial production, where there has been a drop of 11.7%.

This situation cannot go on for ever. The military tests of strength may precipitate the final resolution. In January, wholesale trade in such essential products as cooking oil, flour, and soap, was nationalized. In January also, an extraordinary mobilization of 100,000 workers made it possible to save the coffee crop, which had ripened prematurely. A record harvest of 140,000 quintals (1 quintal equals 100 pounds) was brought in.
In February, a housing law was drawn up with the help of the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS). This legislation provides for giving title to 67,000 dwellings to the tenants living in them. It does not offer compensation to the owners except in exceptional cases (for example, if they themselves live in the dwellings they own).

Moreover, while the military aggression against Nicaragua might demoralize sections of the population that are not particularly militant, its overall effect has been the contrary. It has activated a reflex to defend the revolution and its gains.

An American reporter has attested to this writing: “The war and austerity measures have not provoked much discontent here. In fact, the war seems to be stimulating national unity. The Nicaraguans understand what their Sandinista leaders are doing a good deal better than they did a year ago....A lot of them seem to think now that it is American intervention that is making things worse in the country. This makes the shortage of products relatively less difficult to endure.” (1)

THE BOURGEOIS OPPOSITION AND THE DEBATE ON PARTIES

Among the Nicaraguan opposition, the unleashing of the counterrevolutionary military escalation is polarizing things to the right. The former Somocista National Guards, who in the last analysis are simply the agents of imperialism, are setting the tone. They are pushing the entire opposition into confrontation. When a conflict becomes armed, people inevitably have to choose their camp.

It is the FDN, the main armed opposition group, however, that is responsible for the invasion of Nicaragua in March from across the Honduran border. It is made up almost exclusively of former Somocista National Guards based in Honduras and led by Colonel Enrique Bermudez.

The Nicaraguan Democratic Union-Revolutionary Armed Front (UDN-FARN), led by Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli and based in San Jose, Costa Rica, is now reportedly coordinating its actions with the FDN. It claims to have infiltrated about 600 guerrillas into the country over the last eight months. (2)

The UDN-FARN is supposed, moreover, to have broken with the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) of Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pastora because these figures refused to accept collaboration with the Somocista forces that they were fighting only a few months ago. While Eden Pastora announced with considerable fanfare in March that he was getting ready to open up a new military front against the Sandinista regime in the south, Robelo declared that the ARDE would not participate in any joint actions. And he ruled out any invasion in the near future. (3)

In fact, the ARDE leaders have preferred to wait in the wings as a reserve card for negotiations rather than compromise themselves irremediably by lining up with Somocistas out to make a comeback. But the room for “third force” politics is clearly very limited.

At the same time that the bourgeois opposition was more and more lining up in the name of the second struggle against the Sandinista regime, a symposium called by the Council of State was held in January 1983 in Managua to discuss the draft law on political parties.

The Doctor Ramiro Sacasa Sebastian Democratic Coordinating Committee, which includes the deputies of the bourgeois opposition undermined by the departure of Alfonso Robelo, refused to take part in these discussions. It argued that there was a lack of freedom for both oral and written expression.

Instead The Democratic Coordinating Committee sent on a Latin American tour a delegation made up of representatives of COSEP, the Constitutional Liberal Movement (MLC), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Nicaraguan Workers Confederation (CNTE) and the Confederation for Trade-Union Unity (CUS) to present its positions. One of the main demands of the Democratic Coordinating Committee is for elections to be held in 1984 instead of in 1985, as is scheduled.

On the other hand, the six parties that make up the Revolutionary Patriotic Front (FPR) did participate in this symposium. They are PSD, the PSN, the two Stalinist factions represented by the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) and the Nicaraguan Communist Party, as well as the People’s Action Movement (MAP)—which has Maoist origins—the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), and the Social Christian People’s Party (PPSC).

The main criticism of the law on parties raised by the six parties concerns the role assigned to the parties, which will remain subordinated to the institutions. The two formations demanded that parties be able to select political power by winning an electoral majority.

On the other hand, the PCN and the MAP, which are not represented in the Council of State, criticized the draft law as being too liberal. The former, which characterizes the Sandinista revolution as “bourgeois democratic,” denies any legitimacy to bourgeois parties. Along with this, it demanded the nationalization of the means of communication. The latter called for the suppression of all activity by the parties of the right “because the bourgeois must not have any rights....”

The PPSC, which broke with the Social Christian Party because of the role played by the hierarchy in the opposition to the Sandinista regime, considers the FSLN as the vanguard of the revolutionary process. While agreeing that the purpose of political parties is to gain power, it considers that in the present conditions elections should not “put in question either the objectives or the process of the revolution.”

The FSLN, which is far stronger than the other five small formations in the Revolutionary Patriotic Front, wants to continue such consultations with respect to the draft law on political parties and the elections rules that will be instituted.

However, if the first discussions have demonstrated a desire to respect a certain political pluralism, they have also shown the limitations of it in practice. The elections to come are conceived of essentially as a form of consultation. The election result will remain subordinated to the defense of the revolution.

The attacks that are going on increase the weight of this argument, revealing more and more the historic and organic links between the bourgeois opposition and the Somocista attackers backed by U.S. imperialism. In fact, facing the imperialist and counterrevolutionary attack, the only effective answer to the bourgeois agitation for immediate elections is to extend the real powers exercised by such organs of people’s power as the CDS and the militia.

While it is true that the FSLN’s five partners in the discussion on the draft law on political parties are all very small organizations, it is nonetheless important this debate took place and that it did so publicly.

At a time when the Western press, even its most “enlightened” representatives, is keeping its eyes peeled for the slightest sign of authoritarianism in Nicaragua, the following facts must be noted: The bourgeois parties, even though they openly oppose the regime, have the right to exist. The existence of parties, however, does not mean that they are capable of representing the revolution.

Moreover, the presence of left parties independent of the FSLN shows that political discussion is being maintained. These facts alone represent democratic practice in a country that is being besieged militarily and economically by imperialism.

The response to the escalation of imperialist attacks will necessarily involve a new radicalization of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua. The state will be obliged to intensify more in the private sector to deal with sabotage and to maintain the infrastructures necessary for defense. It will have to increasingly push aside internal opponents that are in flagrant collusion with the attackers.

At the same time, the Sandinista leaders will continue to be anxious to preserve the pluralist image of their revolution and not to do anything that could play into the hands of the imperialist operation in the region. They are not unaware that in the medium term the future of their revolution is tied to that of the revolution in El Salvador.

1. The Christian Science Monitor, April 4, 1983
2. The FARN have just announced that they are continuing discussions with the FDN “in an attempt to achieve unity of action in the struggle.” Inforpress Centroamericana. Ciudad Guatemala, April 7, 1983.
New advances by Solidarnosc

Jacqueline ALLIO

"For a regime that has declared war on its own society, May 1 will be a day of apprehension and fear. What the regime has to fear is that once again it will be seen to be surrounded only by opportunists, careerists, and members of the apparatus of terror. What it has to fear is that our celebration will show the world the truth about Poland...."

"We call on the society to demonstrate under the following slogans:

"Freedom for the political prisoners!"
"Stop the price increases!
"To the society belong the fruits of its labor.
"Peace and solidarity!
"Restoration of trade-union rights!
"Restoration of civil liberties!"

This is the appeal launched by the underground leadership of Solidarnosc after the meeting between five members of the TKK (Provisional Coordinating Committee) and Lech Walesa.

Coming out of his attitude of reserve, the national leader of Solidarnosc decided to support the TKK. In turn, the TKK has called on all the clandestine structures to make public what actions they intend to carry out on May Day, the routes of march, the sites of meetings and other forms of demonstrations.

This was a stinging rebuff to the pri- mate, Glemp, who only a few weeks ago condemned any idea of demonstrations as "artificial initiatives that would not have the support of the people."

To justify such statements, Glemp argued that it was necessary to "maintain a realistic attitude toward General Jaruzelski." He claimed also that Solidarnosc was no longer a "united" movement. He even said: "An underground movement with a program of frontal attack on the regime seems to me to be divorced from reality."

The attitude of open defiance adopted by the TKK and by Walesa and the determinations of all those who took part in the counterdemonstration commemorating the Warsaw ghetto uprising — who in fact were headed up by representatives of the Catholic church — led Glemp to lower his tone.

In fact, everything indicates that the conditions are developing for a very large mobilization throughout the country. The scenes shown by Western TV of Polish workers clashing with the "forces of order" in several cities on February 13 and March 13 reminded those who might have forgotten that the resistance movement is very much alive and capable of initiatives, even if its appearance has partially changed in the last 15 months.

This is something that even the bureaucrats are obliged to recognize. Sixteen months after Jaruzelski and his clique seized power, the daily Rzeczpospolita that they created, has had to admit: "The normalization process is proving complicated and is running into problems."

THE REGIME HAS NO ANSWER BUT REPRESION

It is clearer than ever that the regime has no recourse but repression, arrests, firings, and even tanks and bayonets.

"As always, the Polish people can continue to count on the organs of the state as a guarantee of the established legal order. Their mission is to assure that it is respected by firm and effective action."

This scarcely veiled threat was raised in the government communiqué that followed the TKK call for mobilizations on May 1. Once again, a scare campaign has started up around the themes of "extremists," "adventurists," and "foreign manipulations." The threat to cancel the pope's visit is being used as a means of blackmail to persuade the workers not to come into the streets on May 1.

Preventative arrests, charging of known leaders (such as Janusz Onyszkiewicz, former spokesman of Solidarnosc, who is accused of taking part in the preparations for the May 1 demonstrations) and in particular the severe penalties being handed down in the trials against Solidarnosc leaders are the main methods the bureaucrats are using to try to disarm the underground movement.

Such national leaders of Solidarnosc as Andrzej Sowiak from Lodz, Wlady- slaw Prasynuluk from Wroclaw, and Zbigniew Romaszewski from Warsaw have already been sentenced to terms of four to six years in prison for taking part in the activities of the underground union movement.

Now, new trials are underway against the leaders of the MRKS (Inter-Enterprise Coordinating Committee of Solidarnosc in Warsaw) and Janusz Palubicki, a released interned and member of the TKK for the Poznan region, who was arrested in January.

In particular, the military regime wants to make an example of the five leaders of the KOR who were "arrested" in September 1982 in the internment camp where they were being held and several members of the national leadership of Solidarnosc who were "apprehended" in similar circumstances on the eve of the "suspension" of the state of war.

The KOR defendants are charged with "conspiracy against the state," the Solidarnosc leaders of seeking to "overthrow the regime by force and violence." The fact that all of them had been behind barred wire since December 13, 1981, made no difference to the government.

What is going the dictatorship to fury against all those who are seen to repre- sent Solidarnosc and who, each in their own way, represent those currents that were most militant when Solidarnosc was legal is the junta's total failure to achieve the "normalization" that it talks so much about.
Despite the frontal assaults on the working class, reflected by a 35% drop in the workers standard of living, productivity has not increased. To the contrary, it has declined in almost all industries, with the exception of coal mining.

The government’s new unions have brought in only a tiny percentage of the workers, despite the bureaucracy’s attempts to buy the workers off by offering all sorts of material inducements. In fact, even less than half the party members have joined the new unions.

The bureaucracy’s very assiduity in playing up Glemp’s calls for calm and social peace in the press reveal its inability to regain any mass base whatsoever in the working class. In order to accomplish that, it would have to have something more to offer the workers than blows over the head from a policeman’s club.

**SOLIDARNOŚĆ REORGANIZES**

After a difficult phase following the failure of the November 10 general strike, a deepgoing reorganization of Solidarność was undertaken in most areas of the country. The slogans put forward for May Day, in fact, attest to the increased political maturity of the underground movement.

Up until now, the demands mainly dealt with the fight against repression and the issues of democratic and trade-union rights. Now for the first time, rejection of the price increases and the demand for workers to have control over the fruits of their labor have come to the fore as central objectives in the struggle that is to be waged. This reflects the concern, already expressed in the TKK’s programmatic statement (see IV, No. 27) to offer concrete perspectives for mobilization around immediate economic objectives.

This concern is also reflected in various strikes that have taken place recently. One example is the action by the workers at the Gdansk refinery, who rejected the introduction of a new wage scale that set up differentials that they considered unacceptable. Another is the strike by workers at a plant in Warsaw to get boots that the management refused to issue them, in violation of the most elementary requirements of security.

There has also been a variety of forms of mobilization. Listing the possible different forms of limited strikes, Bogdan Lityński mentions slowdowns, sitdowns, organized absenteeism, and even certain forms of active strikes (that is, where production is maintained but on the basis of decisions made by the workers and not the management).

We could add the “mass resignation strike,” an example of which was carried out by the workers in the FADOM home-building enterprise in Blesznow, where 105 persons were fired after the November 19, 1982, national strike.

All the workers threatened to resign if their mates were not rehired, and the fired workers rejected for seven days proposals that they accept reemployment in jobs lower on the scale than those they previously held. This strike ended in almost total victory.

An example of the slowdown is the struggle waged by the FADROMA workers in Wrocław. They resorted to this method to force the management to rescind the political layoffs it had announced. For a week, the 6,000 workers employed in this enterprise, most of whom are on piece work, cut production by the equivalent of eight workhous, thereby losing a considerable part of their wages.

Given the success of this type of action, the regional leadership of Solidarność in Lower Silesia to follow suit during a week of action from March 21 to March 26 to demand amnesty for all the political prisoners, rehiring of the fired workers, and to protest against the price increases.

Such struggles are an example for the other plants, and can initiate a process of well-organized and successful limited actions that will play a decisive role in giving concreteness to the program put forward by the TKK, and prepare the way for the general strike.

**GROWTH OF THE UNDERGROUND MOVEMENT**

Another important element tending to strengthen trade-union activity is the decision by various plant commissions to take charge of providing the social benefits traditionally provided by the unions. Such tasks are now supposed to be the responsibility of the “official” unions. The authorities are counting on this as a means of pressuring hesitant workers, as well as those who need these benefits to make ends meet, to join the unions that they have set up to above.

Far from having secondary importance, the example already given by several enterprises in Wrocław, Warsaw, and Cracow in deciding to set up mutual-aid funds and provide loans for those who regularly pay their dues to Solidarność is an important step forward. It bolsters the credibility of the union and strengthens the ties between the underground leadership and the mass of workers.

Since the announcement of the decision, the payment of dues has increased enormously.

All these elements testify to the continuing combative activity of the Polish workers. Moreover, despite the government’s boasts that it has made 1,310 seizures of printing equipment, the bureaucrats cannot conceal the fact that the volume of printing without being jammed has diminished. In most major cities, between ten and forty bulletins appear regularly.

Fifteen clandestine radio stations have supposedly fallen to the police. But the overall number has increased. Some regions are able to maintain regular broadcasts. In Lower Silesia, for example, one such broadcast went on for fifty minutes without being jammed.

The authorities’ crowing over the seizure of a big transmitter in Warsaw on April 13 did not prevent Radio Solidarność from broadcasting the TKK’s appeal for May Day demonstrations in the Polish capital only forty-eight hours later.

All this gives a picture of a movement that is far from “running around in a blind alley, mad with hostility,” or one whose “influence is vanishing day by day,” as the army daily Zolnier Wolnosci claimed in the wake of the broadcast of the TKK appeal.

Nonetheless, the fact that the junta’s position is increasingly difficult does not mean that the underground movement is united on what strategy to follow.

An article written in the April 18 issue of IV, the TKK’s programmatic statement represents a real step forward toward combining the results of the

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**Józef Pińior arrested**

Józef Pińior, chairman of the Lower Silesia Strike Committee, member of the Provisional Coordinating Committee of Solidarność (TKK) and one of the five signers of the TKK’s call for demonstrations on May 1, was arrested by the Polish bureaucracy’s security forces on April 24, according to the official Polish news agency PAP.

PAP announced that “documents proving that he (Pińior) devoted himself to antistate activities” were found in the Solidarność leader’s apartment. The captured also allegedly told that Pińior “had control of considerable sums of money.”

Pińior is the third chairman of Lower Silesian Solidarność jailed by the dictatorship. In February 25 in an interview, Pińior commented on the arrests of his predecessors:

“You know that the chairman of the union called in this region, Włodzimierz Frąsyński, and his replacement Piotr Bednarz have been arrested. They were my closest friends. They now have been condemned to severe prison sentences. I think that it is very important that it not be forgotten that these workers were democratically elected by their fellow workers. The third member of the presidium of the regional leadership, Karol Modzelewski, is still in prison. He got the largest number of votes at the first regional congress of the union in Wrocław. You have to understand what this election to the leading bodies of Solidarność meant for us. It was the first time that our representatives were elected in a genuinely free election. The workers elected Frąsyński, Bednarz, and Modzelewski and these elected representatives of the workers have now been put in prison.”

The same remarks now apply to Pińior, who, moreover, was one of transgent defenders of the principle that only the action of the masses of ordinary working people could defeat the dictatorship.
discussions, experiences, and proposals for action of the various sections of the movement. But it has not conjured away the differences over strategic orientation and tactics that have existed up till now among the leaderships of the various regions.

For example, the Lower Silesian Solidarnosc is concentrating on building a clandestine trade-union organization in the plants. Its objective is to construct an organization that can lead mass struggles today around limited objectives coordinated from the big plants, to prepare the way for overthrowing the military dictatorship by a general strike. The Warsaw Solidarnosc, in accord with the Social Resistance Committees (KOS), puts the emphasis on passive resistance. It has concentrated on setting up a network of clandestine bulletins and publications, educational programs, and in general, on developing an independent social consciousness. All these objectives are presented as ends in themselves.

In Gorzow, Solidarnosc calls for a centralized organization of professional revolutionists.

In particular, it is clear that the approach of Zbigniew Bujak (the Warsaw leader) differs markedly from that of Jozef Pinior (leader of Lower Silesia) and from others in the TKK. Bujak does not exclude "the possibility of slow and mild reforms" that would offer an opportunity for rebuilding the trade-union movement, that is, an independent movement but one different from what Solidarnosc was. He counterposes this possibility to a general strike, although he agrees that the general strike has to be considered. For their part, the KOS — which identify with Bujak's ideas — see "neither the possibility nor the usefulness of organizing a mass confrontation."

In contrast, Pinior says: "To count on the good will of the government, on 'deals,' on somebody intervening on our behalf is naive. We can only count on ourselves. This is why the regional committee of Solidarnosc envisages resorting to a general strike when society reaches the point where it can no longer bear the poverty that is getting worse and worse...

A lot of people are afraid that a general strike will touch off military intervention by the USSR. The only way we have to ward this off is to prepare the action effectively. The less well prepared we are, the more chaotic the strike will be, and the greater the chances will be for a direct aggression."
The proposals for action put forward by Bujak and the KOS with the aim of developing independent cultural activity and raising the social consciousness of the masses, are not in themselves contradictory to the systematic organizing of underground union structures in the plants and their preparing the way for a general strike.

Carrying out the sort of plans for independent publishing and education that they propose and setting up education circles can only reinforce the capacity for political thinking of broad sections of the society. Likewise, the workers universities or "flying universities" that are functioning today in several cities are helping to dispel the distorted views and totalitarian ideology dispensed by the bureaucracy.

However, such activity will only be useful if it serves the self-organization of the masses, if the content of the independent press and publications corresponds to the concerns and needs of the workers and those of their trade union organizations in the plants. That is, this activity will only be profitable if the line that predominates is "the line of the factories," which is upheld most consistently by the Lower Silesian leadership.

These differences of approach show how far the movement has yet to go before it achieves unity on the essential objectives and especially on the question of the general strike and preparing for confrontation with the regime.

INCREASING POLITICAL MATURITY

However, nothing is said in the programmatic statement about the means by which the working masses are to defend themselves against the probable attacks of the militia and the army. Will the workers have to face machine guns with nothing but their fists? How is the general strike to be kept from becoming a repetition of December 13, 1981?

In the spring and summer of 1982, in the discussions that took place on the question of the general strike, those in the TKK who supported this perspective foresaw that such an action would have to be combined with active defense of the factories. Today, this is no longer being talked about.

Before his arrest on December 28, 1982, Janusz Palubicki correctly said: "The only possible armistice is one based on a real relationship of forces." More precisely, this means a situation of dual power, that is, the continuation of the revolution after the overthrow of the military dictatorship through a general strike.

Whether or not the regime continues to wear a military uniform, it will remain, in essence, totalitarian, even if it is hard hit by a general strike. Janusz Palubicki was correct to point out: "Before December 13, our fundamental error was to think that it was possible to cultivate a little democratic garden in the midst of a totalitarian state."

While the programmatic statement offers no clear answers on this point, the TKK's decision, supported by Walesa, to call the workers into the streets on May 1 despite all the regime's threats reflects the growing awareness that any perspective of a "national accord" not based on a relationship of forces is illusory.

"Here in Poland we are not fighting simply for ourselves," the TKK writes in its appeal to the workers of the world. "We are profoundly convinced that our struggle has a universal dimension. It widens the area of liberty and justice in today's world. We need your support. This May Day demonstrate your solidarity with the struggle of the Polish workers."

Everywhere, in all the marches, in every city, in every country, let us show the Polish resistance that we have heard its internationalist appeal, that we are supporting it in its struggle, and that we also are convinced that its struggle is part of the fight of all workers for liberation.
Revolutionary unity in the Portuguese elections

INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT

As soon as special legislative elections were called for April 25, 1983, the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR), began moves to get agreement on a united revolutionary slate.

The PSR's objective was to build a revolutionary current that would put forward a program of class independence and offer an alternative to the class collaborationist policy of the Socialist Party of Mario Soares and the Communist Party of Alvaro Cunhal.

But a united slate was also necessary to avoid a proliferation of left slates, to give a focus to the interest aroused by the PSR's proposals for struggle, and to increase the chances of electing revolutionary deputies.

In the October 5, 1980, elections, for example, the PSR got 1.03% of the vote and came within a few hundred votes of getting a deputy in Lisbon. While at that time the UDP, the far left organization with the strongest base, lost 40% of its usual vote, it nonetheless managed to maintain its Lisbon seat.

For all these reasons, therefore, the PSR wanted to reach an electoral accord based on a clear political platform. It wanted to put together a slate large enough to serve as the basis for a national campaign, and at the same time enable the signatory organizations to put forward their whole program.

On February 16, at a press conference the leaders of the UDP and the PSR signed an accord setting up the "UDP-PSR Electoral Front."

The agreement provided for running candidates in the most important election districts. In Lisbon, Mario Toma, who has held a Lisbon seat for the UDP since 1979, headed up the slate. In Oporto, the slate was headed by Heitor de Sousa, a member of the Central Committee of the PSR and a public transport worker.

This is the first time that an electoral front of this type has been achieved. In all districts where there is not a slate for the front, the PSR will run its own candidates. This assures its autonomy in the election campaign and in presenting its own political positions over TV and radio.

The political platform of the UDP-PSR Electoral Front points out the disastrous consequences of the policy of the Alianca Democratica (AD), the right-wing coalition in power. It notes that "the SP leadership, in the name of 'national consensus' is preparing to take the PSD (a bourgeois party that calls itself 'Social Democratic') into the government after the elections."

At the same time, the CP's electoral coalition, the Alianca do Povo Unido (Alliance of the People United) "which claims to oppose the SP leadership's alliances with the right, is proposing a 'democratic government.' The effect of this is also to extend a hand to the reactionary chiefs of the PSD. It shows, moreover, that the CP also wants to subordinate the workers struggle to a so-called 'social pact.'"

Therefore, to make the workers' voice heard in parliament "the UDP and the PSR, two revolutionary organizations with different programs, have assumed their responsibilities. They have succeed-

ed in achieving the necessary unity to establish an electoral coalition based on a program of fighting back against the crisis and the right. The objective is to combine the vote of the people's camp and elect revolutionary deputies on April 25.

"Today, more than ever, it is essential for the workers' struggle and unity to elect UDP-PSR deputies to parliament who can be real standardbearers of a determined struggle against conciliation and alliances with the right, who will be intransigent defenders of the people's demands, as Mario Toma has been in parliament."

Those deputies elected on the UDP-PSR Electoral Front slate will be committed to maintain five courses of action set down in the electoral platform of the coalition.

"1) Firm opposition to the AD and the parties of the right.

"The UDP-PSR deputies will support the demand for the ouster of the parties of the right from the government. This is the immediate demand of all Portuguese workers. In parliament, they will firmly oppose the reconstitution of an AD government with the parties of the right.

"2) Independence from a government formed around the SP.

"The UDP-PSR deputies will maintain total independence from a government formed around the SP. They will oppose alliances by the SP with any party of the right whatever. They will reject any kind of 'social pact' and mobilize the workers to block any concession by such a government to the bosses, as well as to force the capitalists to meet the most urgent demands of the workers and the poor masses."

"3) Unity and struggle against the 'social pact.'"

"The UDP-PSR deputies will defend the unity in struggle of all the workers and their class organizations...In the trade-union movement, they will defend democracy and the right to free expression of all currents in the union, opposing the bureaucracy and divisions that keep the workers and their representative bodies from uniting against the right."

"4) Support to workers, people's, and democratic struggles and the most urgent demands raised in these struggles."

Under point no. 4, the coalition calls for fighting "against the rise in the cost of living and for the right to a job for all. That means an end to layoffs, a 40 hour week, etc. It calls for defending the liberties and rights of workers, i.e., reinstatement of fired union activists, equal pay for equal work for women and youth, for a law on abortion."

It calls for "defense of the agrarian reform law decreed" in 1975, during the revolutionary crisis. It calls for the "defense of the poor peasants against imperialist interference, that is, for a Portugal without foreign military bases and out of NATO."

"This means opposing the entry into the Common Market and the measures of the International Monetary Fund. It
means opposing sending troops to Lebanon and Angola.”

Point 4 calls for “fighting for peace against all imperialist intervention, a nuclear-free Europe and a nuclear-free world, for solidarity with the revolutions and struggles of workers throughout the world against the imperialist policy of war and pillage.”

“5) For electing revolutionary deputies who will devote themselves to advancing the unity and struggles of the working people.

“In presenting this electoral agreement, the UDP and the PES call on all revolutionists and the workers who support the SP and APU, or no party at all, to unite and fight for the demands of the masses. Increasing the support for revolutionary candidates, a massive vote for the UDP-PES coalition is the best assurance that the workers will have an independent voice in parliament and that the mass momentum will be built up for a real turn to the left, which can be won today by a determined independent struggle of the Portuguese workers.”

Austrian Fourth Internationalists call for a vote for the SPO

In the recent period, the Austrian Social Democrats have been more firmly entrenched in government than anywhere else in Europe. The country has a particularly large public sector, which to a considerable extent is the heritage of Soviet occupation of a part of the national territory.

Austria has also been the last country in West Europe to be hit by the international capitalist crisis. Because of all these factors, the Austrian Social Democrats present their country as a model of the Social Democratic “third way.”

The following is the position of the Austrian Fourth Internationalists toward the April 24 elections to the Nationalrat, the main house of parliament, and the Vienna City Council. It is from the February 9 issue of Die Linke, the paper of the Gruppe Revolutionäre Marxisten (GRM, Revolutionary Marxist Group), the Austrian section of the Fourth International.

Rainer BAUBOCK

Behind the so-called Red-Black polarization in Austria, there are two social camps. Even if they do not necessarily agree with the policy of the SP leadership, class conscious workers vote for the SPO (Socialist Party of Austria) in order to keep out the OVP (Austrian People’s Party) and the FPO (the Liberal Party of Austria).

As long as there is no credible left alternative, this class polarization has to be the starting point for considering what the left should do in elections. What we revolutionary Marxists want to accomplish by our criticism of the SPO’s policy is to get a hearing among sections of the party’s rank-and-file supporters. The conditions for this are better if we call for a vote for the SPO. They are better also when an SPO government is in power.

What counts for us is certainly not the SPO government’s “record of accomplishments.” In fact, the SPO has no idea of how to stop the spread of the international economic crisis to Austria.

The policy of “Austro-Keynesianism,” that is, the strategy of trying to control cyclical movements by state spending, is reaching its limits. We will soon reach a point where the expansion of the state debt will serve primarily to retire old debts and not to pump money into ailing sectors of the economy.

The only way out in this situation is a massive expansion of state-owned industry and, above all, large scale economic planning in this sector rather than capitalist business management. But this is a road that the SPO cannot and will not take, because it would mean breaking with social partnership and “peace on the labor front.”

In the area of social reforms, the balance sheet of the SPO does not look any better. What remains of the promises Kreisky made in 1970 that the government would democratize all areas of this society and open them all up to public view?

There was the minor Brodas reform of the criminal code. But the rescinding of the old section on abortion had the drawback that the new provision gives doctors the right to deny women the right to abortion if their conscience prevents it, or, we might suppose, if their patients have not paid them enough to overcome such pangs of conscience.

The period of compulsory military service has been reduced, although only by one month instead of the promised three. But all of these reforms were years ago. In the recent period, people have come to identify the SPO less with democratization than with the scandals over the building of the AKH hospital complex in Vienna.

Of course, the SPO has often shown a flexibility toward the new social movements. In Austria, peace demonstrators are not beaten up by the police (although this may also be because they are notably respectful of authority here). State secretaries Dohnal and Fast are actually doing something to reduce discrimination against women. And it may be that even a Kurt Steyr is serious about applying some environmental protection. But what have they really accomplished, really changed?

The real policy of the SPO toward the new protest movements is to kill them with kindness so that it can get away with actually carrying out the policy of such right-wing figures as Benya, Kery, and Kienzl.

There is, thus, every reason to fight for a socialist alternative to the Social Democracy. But there is no reason not to care about the danger of the political right gaining strength.

After the April 24 elections, there are three possibilities. Of course, our votes are not going to change very much in this rotten capitalist system. But they will have an effect on which of these three possibilities comes to pass — that is, an SPO government, a government of the SPO in coalition with one of the bourgeois parties, or an bourgeois-party cabinet.

An all-bourgeois-party government is the least likely variant. But if the SPO suffers drastic losses, then there is going to have to be a marriage between Mock [OVP leader] and Steger [head of the FPO]. And that means more layoffs in the state sector than the SPO alone would risk carrying out; it means sharper social cutbacks.

And what would be the result in the SPO of the party being ousted from government? If it were in opposition, there might be a bit more rhetoric. But the differences between the right at the top and the left at the bottom that exist in the Social Democracy would be covered up.

That leaves the second variant — a Black-Red coalition. This is the most likely variant if the SP loses votes, and it is the worst for left politics in Austria. This is Sallinger’s dream, and one that Benya shares to a certain extent. It would amount to making social partnership not just a check on the government but the government itself. Finally, the representatives of the capitalists could again determine policy in Austria directly, and the SPO would take on the job of stifling any opposition. Every critical and left element in the Social Democracy and the unions would be gagged by the leadership.

No, we do not expect an extensive reformation policy from a new SPO government, not even a guarantee of jobs. If anything changes in Austria in the direction of socialism, it will not come from a government run by this party, even though it still calls itself “socialist.” But while this party has sole responsibility for government, the conditions are better for a fight back getting underway by workers to layoffs by youth to the programming imposed on them, by women to oppression, by those who suffer from examples of pollution to the destruction of the environment, and by foreign workers to expulsion.
An SPO government would have a more difficult time in dealing with such resistance than any other government that could be formed today.

Inside the Social Democratic organizations themselves, the very qundary the SPO leadership is in about what kind of policy it should follow to meet the responsibilities of government for the next four years creates favorable conditions. It increases the chances that in the context of such disunity at the top over budget cuts, reductions in the workweek, etc., that the left will be able to come together and propose a policy of its own.

In this sense, voting for the SPO does not mean confidence in [Chancellor] Kreisky and his team. Nor does it mean choosing the lesser evil. It is part of a policy for mobilizing the oppressed in all areas and for fighting the policy that the SPO leadership is conducting toward them. It is also a call to all the left in Austria to come out of its ghetto and to try to make an impact on the organized workers movement.

What alternatives are there? If we leave aside the politically murky bourgeois Green slate, there are two alternatives — the Communist Party and the Alternative Slate for Austria (ALO).

The CP may indeed stand to the left of the SPO on a number of questions. On these issues, such as the thirty-five-hour week and the NATO missiles, collaboration with it is necessary, although difficult. But as a Stalinist party, it will be shunned by Austrian workers, and correctly so. A socialist alternative to the Social Democracy in Austria is certainly not going to come out of the CP.

The question of the ALO, which still resembles the Greens very much in its program and in its generational makeup, is more difficult. After the split from Fux and Tollmann, it is certainly going to be seen as a more serious force by a lot of people on the left. But outside Vienna, the ALO groups nowhere represent a left alternative to the SPO. They are oriented rather toward tapping a potential bourgeois protest vote.

The ALO can stimulate the development of a left alternative in this country. But its party-building scheme and its slate of candidates for the Nationalrat do not constitute such an alternative.

**Violent repression against general strike in Peru**

Livio MAITAN

On March 10 Peru was practically paralyzed by a general strike. The initiative in calling the strike was taken by the Peruvian General Workers Confederation (CGTP). This is by far the most powerful union federation, and is dominated by the Communist Party.

The other union federations, including that linked to the American People's Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), never powerful, but now reduced simply to a skeleton apparatus — peasant organisations, and other popular organisations then associated themselves with the call.

The purpose of the strike was to protest against economic policy adopted under the dictat of the International Monetary Fund by the former prime minister Manuel Ulloa, and taken over by his successor Fernando Schwabl.

The government responded to the decision of the trade-union and popular organisations by proclaiming a state of emergency, and suspending constitutional guarantees in the region of the capital for five days. Moreover, the regime attempted to defuse the workers and popular mobilisation by proposing some concessions at the last minute (partial wage rises, delaying the rise in the price of petrol, control of the price of bread, etc.).

But these measures were insufficient to halt the general strike movement. Bread sectors of the population remained determined to act. The tolling masses have seen their conditions of life deteriorate massively.

Half the active population is condemned to unemployment or under-employment. Inflation has reached a rate of 16 per cent in only the first two months of 1988, which means that it has more than doubled in relation to the previous year.

The general strike of March 10 was a big success, even though it did not reach the level of mobilisation and combativity of the general strike of July 19, 1977.

In the capital, Lima, key sectors of industrial production were completely blocked, and in general, about 60 per cent of the population took part in the strike. Transport was almost totally shut down. At Cuzco, in the south-east of the country, the mobilisation culminated in a meeting in the central square of around 10,000 people.

At Puno all activity was also halted, and 15,000 people gathered at the central square on the call of the FOP (Front of Popular Organisations).

The response to the strike call was similarly widespread in other towns such as Ayacucho, Tacna, Huancayo, Chimboró, etc.

It is worth noting that the guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso did not participate actively in the strike, and took no initiative to prepare it in any region of the country. On this point it should also be remembered that Sendero Luminoso was opposed to the first general strike in 1987, explained that it was 'imperialist' and 'urban', (cf International Viewpoint No 26, March 21, 1983, interview with Hugo Blanco 'The repressive course of the Belaunde Terry regime').

The Peruvian section of the Fourth International, the PRT, considers that the strike dealt a severe blow to the government, considerably increasing its social isolation. For its part, the PRT threw all its forces into the mobilisation for the strike.

The repressive attitude of the government led to violent confrontations between the police and demonstrators in several towns. In Lima there were four deaths and hundreds of arrests. In the days after the strike most of those arrested were released. But until now some fifteen, including members of the PRT, are still imprisoned.

Among the militants still held, five are accused of belonging to the PRT. These include Oscar Wong Ortigas, craftsman, and organisation secretary of the departmental committee in Callao. He was arrested as he was returning home at the end of the demonstration (this comrade was already held under arrest for 45 days in 1980). The others were Pedro Espinoza García, electrical worker, general secretary of the Transfer Service Workers Union, presently unemployed, arrested in the main street, and whose house has been seized; Fredy Joo Gonzales, independent worker in Villa el Salvador who has been violently treated since his arrest; Marco Mandilla Guevara, secondary school teacher also from Villa el Salvador; and Pablo Cruz, 26 years old, arrested in Villa el Salvador, who has been severely beaten up since his arrest.

Actions are being organised in Peru to demand the release of all the militants still being held. These should develop as unified actions, despite the political differences between the organisations of the workers movement. If these activists are not promptly released, an international campaign demanding their release should be organised.
The legacy of Lancaster House

Charlie VAN GELDEREN

When the Zimbabwe African National Union swept to power in 1980, Africa's struggle for freedom took a big step forward. It was rightly hailed as a great victory and the harbinger for the final liquidation of white minority rule in southern Africa.

But the victory could only be consolidated if the new regime carried out the programme for which thousands of Zimbabweans had fought and died: in particular, a thoroughgoing agrarian policy which would give land to the peasants who had formed the main force in the liberation armies, and the raising of the living standards of the urban and rural workers.

If he had wished to effect his socialist rhetoric, Robert Mugabe would have had to break with the Lancaster House agreement. This agreement had the specific intention of binding the new Zimbabwe regime firmly in the coils of imperialism. The longest section of the agreement, which was signed by Joshua Nkomo as well as Mugabe, expressly forbids the seizure of lands. It must be transferred on a 'willing seller, willing buyer' basis (Section 16). This legal barrier is reinforced by the British government, which is committed to paying half the cost of resettlement. Should Mugabe defy this clause and seize the land, British funds would be withheld.

When ZANU came to power in April 1980 with a huge majority, it had a clear choice. It could faithfully carry out the neo-colonialist commitments of the Lancaster House agreement or it could mobilise the people to take the revolution forward on the road to socialism. This would entail grave risks. It meant seizing the land of the 4,500 wealthy white farmers who own 38 per cent of the country and produce 90 per cent of the country's agricultural goods, earning 47 per cent of its foreign currency.

If Mugabe had embarked on such a course, this would almost certainly have resulted in a mass exodus of the whites, taking with them their technical know-how. There would have been a temporary set-back of the Zimbabwean economy. This is what happened in Mozambique and Angola and, as in these countries, South Africa would have embarked on an immediate policy of destabilisation with both economic and military means.

Mugabe made his intentions clear even before the results of the elections were known. In an interview with the New York Times (5 March 1980), he said:

'We recognise that the economic structure is based on capitalism and that whatever ideas we have we must build on that. We are not going to interfere with private property whether it be in mining or the industrial sector.'

This is one promise he has faithfully adhered to. What he has not carried out is the land policy for which the militants fought.

Today there are still 700,000 African families crammed into the old Tribal Trust Lands. The change in nomenclature in no way improves the fertility of the land, or the misery of the families living there.

While the rich white farmers have been able to consolidate their positions, the black peasants have had to be content with rhetoric. In the winter of 1981, Mugabe announced that 54,000 families would be resettled in the coming three years. In January 1982, that target was raised to 162,000. In fact, three years after the ZANU victory, only 20,500 families have been re-settled. By contrast, the government has encouraged the development of a middle layer of black farmers who could act as a buffer between it and the peasantry.

As in agriculture, we find the same contradictions in the urban areas. In commerce and industry, 70 per cent of the assets are owned by multinationals. The South Africa-based Anglo-American combine, owns almost the entire sugar industry, dominates mining and has interests in four commercial banks, six finance houses, three building societies and many other industries. So powerful is the influence of Anglo-American that it has been able to pursue policies which are in its own economic interest and not necessarily in the interest of the people.

Thus it was able to persuade the World Bank and the cabinet to finance a new power station which experts maintain is not needed. But Anglo-American now has an outlet for the low grade coal which it mines at Hwange and which is almost unsaleable in other parts of the country because of high transport costs.

Bernard Chidzero, the Minister in charge of the National Development Plan, is quite frank about the direction of government policies:

'Government recognises the need to stimulate private sector investment by creating a favourable investment climate and taking necessary fiscal, monetary and other financial measures' (The Guardian 24 March 1983).

To this he could have added that the government would also create a 'favourable' political climate by retaining the oppressive state apparatus which it took over from the Smith regime which restricts free trade unions, bans strikes, and ensures a low-wage labour force.

MOTO, a pro-ZANU journal, published in Harare, in what may very easily be the last issue in which it is still allowed free expression, gives a very clear picture of the actual situation in Zimbabwe:

'Both the right and the left have ideological reasons for disagreeing with the government. There are people on the right both inside and outside Zimbabwe, who would like to reverse the achieve-
ments of independence, seeing as they do a threat from the government of Prime Minister Mugabe. There are also people on the left who are unhappy with the present government’s direction because they feel that it does not reflect a clear enough commitment to a socialist transformation — people who are frustrated with the pace and quality of the change. There is a third group of people who are unhappy with the government for purely sectarian tribal and regional reasons, which they place above the national interests. There would have been such disenchanted people in Zimbabwe, whichever party had won the elections.

’There are also economic reasons for dissident activity which are intrinsically mixed with the political lack of meaningful employment opportunities and unchanging relationships to the means of production. The years of hardship during the struggle gave way during the election campaign to high expectations of a new society. As the months went by after independence and the guerrillas still found themselves in the assembly points, frustration built up.

’Chances of education and achieving skills that they sacrificed during the struggle have not materialised.’ (MOTO, March 1983)

It is very important to distinguish between those whose dissidence springs from the criticisms and frustration of the combatants, who see the aspirations for which they fought and made sacrifices disappear into some distant future, and the avowedly counter-revolutionary forces backed by and based in South Africa. Their hostility is directed against the sovereignty of the people of Zimbabwe. Revolutionary socialists and the whole labour movement must unconditionally defend Zimbabwe against these elements of counter-revolution.

The frustrations of those who fought in the battle for liberation is quite another matter. These frustrations are by no means confined to the Matabele areas. Black soldiers in Rhodesia in 1977 (DR)

although this has been given greater prominence in the press here and because Matabeleland is the political base for Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union. (Although it should be remembered that Nkomo was still a member of the government when the armed forces were sent into Matabeleland to deal with the dissidents.) But the primary responsibility for the diversion of the discontent among the people into tribal lines belongs to the Mugabe government.

South Africa, of course, is taking full advantage of the situation. Undoubtedly the Pretoria regime has infiltrated people into Matabeleland to stoke up the fires, especially members of the so-called Matabeleland Brigade, which is trained in South Africa. To confuse these two elements — the genuinely frustrated and the South African agents — is highly dangerous.

The media in this country has largely concentrated on the Korean-trained Fifth Brigade and its reign of terror in Matabeleland. But the bulk of the Zimbabwian army is being trained by 165 British officers, including the notorious Task Force whose activities, though less publicised, have been equally effective in subduing the people, both in the Ndebele and the Shona areas.

It was illuminating to hear, on the BBC Panorama programme on 21 March, a British officer defending the activities of the army in Matabeleland as necessary for the maintenance of law and order. Lord Carrington, who master-minded the Lancaster House agreement is on public record supporting the move towards a one-party state in Zimbabwe.

The British labour movement has an important role to play in defence of the democratic rights of the people of Zimbabwe. Labour’s election manifesto must make it clear that it would not regard the restrictive clauses in the Lancaster House treaty as sacrosanct. It must, especially, withdraw Section 16 and give unconditional financial aid to the Zimbabwe government so that it could seize the land of the wealthy white farmers and give it to the people who fought for it.

While it is for the people of Zimbabwe themselves to decide their own destiny, socialists internationally must give every support to those who are striving to establish trade unions free from bureaucratic control or manipulation by any of the political parties (ZANU or ZAPU); it must give aid and encouragement to the growth of co-operatives in manufacture and agriculture and other forms of self-organisation by the workers and peasants.

After the Republic of South Africa, Zimbabwe is the African country with the most political and economic structures, with a history of militant struggle against the multinational oligarchies which control the country’s economy. The emergence of a workers’ party with a socialist programme, and in alliance with the poor peasants is the road forward for Zimbabwe. (Socialist Action Ap. 8, 1983)

Amnesty International called on April 11 for an emergency campaign to save the lives of seven Turkish socialists sentenced to death by a military law court of the military dictatorship.

Since the Amnesty appeal, one of the eight, Sener Yigit, has been hanged, and it is feared that the execution of the other seven is imminent.

Yigit was convicted of killing the wife and daughter of the Austrian ambassador. He had no connection with any political group, it is the method of the military dictatorship to lump together non-political prisoners convicted of atrocious crimes with political prisoners accused of terrorist actions.

Yigit was obviously executed first to prepare public opinion for the execution of the other seven, who are reportedly members of Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left). They are Sadettin Guven and Bakir Altin, accused of the murder of former prime minister Nihat Erim; and Ahmet Fazil, Aktas Sener Yildirim, Tayfun Ozok, and Harun Kartal — accused of the murder of a police chief and his bodyguard.

Terrorism both by left and rightist groups was widespread before the establishment of the military dictatorship. The rightist terrorists enjoyed support and encouragement from the military and police, and were used to help prepare the way for a military coup in the name of restoring order.

Basing its claim to rule on its ability to ruthlessly suppress terrorism, the junta has no reason to be very scrupulous about making sure that it is convicting the people who actually committed terrorist acts.

The Amnesty statement noted: “Death sentences have been called for by prosecutors in thousands of cases at present being tried or awaiting trial in martial law courts...Amnesty International is concerned about the sharp increase in the number of executions since the beginning of 1983.”

If the government can execute these eight without protests, the lives of thousands of others will be in immediate danger.

Amnesty called for protest telegrams to President Kenan Evren, National Security Council, Ankara Turkey. Copies should be sent to Cumhuriyet, Halkevi Sokak 39/41 Cagaloglu, Istanbul, Turkey.
Grenadans celebrate their revolution in the face of US threats

In the context of the escalation of imperialist-backed attacks on Nicaragua, Washington has also begun issuing threats against Grenada, a tiny island in the eastern Caribbean. Grenada lies just off the coast of Venezuela, far from Central America, Cuba or the United States.

It is obvious that Grenada can constitute no material threat to the U.S. or any U.S. interest. Its total population is just over a hundred thousand. The island is physically too small to conceal any military bases.

In fact, the threats against Grenada make it absolutely clear what Washington is worried about in the Caribbean area.

The only way that Grenada can threaten U.S. imperialism is by the power of its example on the masses throughout the English-speaking Caribbean and among the Black and nonwhite peoples of the United States itself.

The danger that Grenada represents to the United States is that it has a government based on mobilizing the people and on serving their interests. Even in such a tiny, economically dependent country, this has made possible real benefits for the population at a time when the already abysmal standard of living and public services in the region are declining further.

Grenada has a government that tells the truth about imperialism and its responsibility for the poverty of the West Indies and Latin America, a government that appeals to the people to mobilize themselves to change their fate. That makes even a tiny island a big threat to the world power that dominates the region.

On March 28, Grenada’s foreign minister Unison Whiteman said at a news conference in New York: “If our tiny country is a threat to the United States it’s not difficult to imagine what the United States plans to do to remove the threat.”

The following article describes the reaction of the Grenadan people themselves to the imperialist threats, which coincided with the fourth anniversary of the Grenadan revolution.

The following article is from the April 7 issue of Internationalen, the paper of the Swedish section of the Fourth International. It has been slightly shortened.

A military parade that ended with a swinging West Indian hit about how crazy capitalism is, then a caravan of trucks in which everyone could ride free.

That was the Grenadan revolution celebrating its fourth anniversary. The occasion was marked by mass enthusiasm but also by the threat of a U.S. intervention hanging over the tiny Caribbean island.

This year the commemoration of the revolution was planned to be smaller than in previous years. Instead of having a mass rally, the idea was to hold the celebration in the workplaces. Energy and resources were to be concentrated on the commemoration next year, when the government plans to open the new airport.

Nonetheless, the festival week got off to an energetic start. On Tuesday, March 8, there was a contest of local calypso bands. On Wednesday, calypso bands from abroad performed in Queen’s Park, outside St. George’s. There was good music and a pleasant atmosphere that lasted long into the night.

On Thursday, President Reagan made a heavy attack on Grenada over the Voice of America. This, along with the deployment of stronger U.S. naval forces in the area, marked the festival and the commemoration for the rest of the week. It reinforced the mobilization and the unity behind the revolution.

On Saturday, March 12, the Sandino Plant was formally opened. This is a cement factory that is to produce cement for 500 houses a year and at the same time help supply material for the building of the new airport. After Reagan’s threats, the ceremony at the Sandino Plant turned into a big rally, at which Deputy Premier Bernard Coard sharply denounced U.S. imperialism.

The highpoint came when Coard announced the premier, Maurice Bishop, had landed at the airport and was on his way to the rally. There was a big outburst of cheering. Bishop was returning directly from the meeting of the Non-aligned States in New Delhi.

On Sunday, March 13, there was a military parade. The orchestra played “Capitalism Gone Mad,” a popular song by the Mighty Sparrow, a soul-calypso artist from Trinidad. After that, a motorcade went round the island. Everyone who wanted to, jumped on a truck and came along.

In the evening, after the motorcade returned to St. George’s, the general of the People’s Revolutionary Army gave a speech calling on the people to defend the revolution and fight the threat from U.S. imperialism. Bishop ended the commemoration with another appeal to the people to remain prepared and alert.

Monday, March 14, was an official holiday. In the evening the foreign calypso bands played for the last time at The Dome in Grand Anse, where the rally is usually held. Three leaders of the People’s Revolutionary Government spoke — Maurice Bishop, Jaqueline Creft (the minister of education) and Selwyn Strachan (minister of mobilization).

There was an outburst of cheering when Maurice Bishop — at the urging of Blue Boy, one of the most popular singers — joined in the chorus. The roof nearly flew off. Then people’s spirits started to rise, and some people started dancing. The imperialist threat seemed very far away now.

The answer to those who claim that the popular support for the revolution has diminished is very easy — Come to Grenada and look for yourself!

What is the meaning of the fact that the Grenadan Gross National Product increased by 5.5% over 1982 and that an increase of 3% to 4% is projected for 1983, when the GNP in most other countries is declining?

What is the meaning of the fact that the proposed budget has been discussed by about 20,000 people out of a total population of 110,000? What is the meaning of the fact that all pensions are going to be increased by 22% over two years, after public workers have gotten a similar wage increase?

There are problems, but the leadership of the country is not afraid to discuss proposed measures with the people. Unlike the other Western governments, the authorities in Grenada are trying to solve problems, not to cover them up.

The authorities have chosen to stand on the side of the working people. They are trying to end the country’s economic dependence, they are trying to eliminate the effects of colonialism and underdevelopment.

The mass involvement in the discussion of the budget shows the determination of the people to participate in political life and decide their own affairs. We need many more such examples to advance the fight for socialism.
A touch of the Cold War as France expels 47 Soviet diplomats

Christian PICQUET

'Red Spies: The Roundup'. This headline in the Paris bourgeois weekly magazine 'Express' last week is a good reflection of the hysterical anti-communism which gripped certain circles after the expulsion of 47 Soviet diplomats by the French government. Le journal du dimanche, a weekly gutterpress newspaper, totally unafraid of making itself ridiculous, claimed that the KGB was preparing assassination attempts against personalities as dangerous to it as Lecanuet (leader of the small bourgeois group Centre des democrates sociaux, which forms part of the pro-Giscard coalition, the UDF, of which Lecanuet is chairman).

As for Figaro-Magazine, weekly voice of the new right, it quite simply denounced the presence of 15,000 Eastern European agents in France. No less.

No one doubts that the different aspects of Moscow's diplomatic representation serve as a cover for espionage networks. Every state has the same practice. And in intelligence-gathering, infiltration, and destabilization, the imperialist centres can hardly be said to lag behind the USSR. This is particularly so in this period of crisis, of increased competition between the bourgeoisies of different countries, and international tension.

In July 1982 the director of the CIA admitted to the Wall Street Journal that his agency was 'again active in clandestine operations'. France, whether before or after the election of Mitterrand on May 10, has hardly any lessons to learn. We remember the active service operations of the French secret service, the SDECE, in Africa: Katanga and Biafra in the 1960s, the secret war in Angola in 1975, staged in concert with the CIA, the failed invasion of Benin in 1977, the coup d'etat in the Comore Islands the following year. And in the last few months we have seen the aid given to the groups most closely linked to the Quai d'Orsay (French foreign office) in Central Africa, Chad, etc.

One would have to be very naive to believe that the action of the French authorities was really motivated by the stealing of military and technological secrets from our country. The decision by Francois Mitterrand was motivated by other considerations. As the Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 1983, explained it, 'The Socialist leader has proved President Reagan's stoutest supporter on the Continent for the past two years...a dramatic change from the time when his conservative predecessors tried to act as intermediaries between Moscow and the West.' In this sense, the expulsion of the Kremlin representatives is a new sign of this government's re-entry into the Atlantic orbit.

Mitterrand had two immediate objectives in giving his action such a spectacular character. First of all, he wanted to get the maximum concessions from his American ally in the major bargaining that is going on between the Western powers in preparation for the Williamsburg summit.

It was no accident that the decision in Paris happened a few days before the meeting of the COCOM (The Committee for Co-ordination of East-West Trade, the body which unites the Nato countries and Japan), which is to discuss the export of technology to the USSR and its satellites.

We know that American and European interests on this point are largely contradictory. This was demonstrated by the open dispute over the recent Franco-Soviet agreement on the gas pipeline. In addition, it was a way of showing the determination of the government to keep the French dissuasion force outside the Geneva negotiations on Euromissiles, despite the demands of Moscow.

In this affair Mitterrand and his government have acted as zealous defenders of the interests of the imperialist alliance, and the French bourgeoisie. They have whipped up a climate of opinion worthy of the Cold War. This operation offers arguments for the plans of those in the West who are engaged in an arms race that threatens all humanity.

By backing Mitterrand's line the Socialist Party and the Communist Party are widening the gap between themselves and the evergrowing anti-war movement in Europe.

French workers have nothing to gain from this sort of thing. Moreover, there are quite a lot of people who have observed that, while the government has exhibited great determination on the diplomatic front, they have shown a good deal less in dealing with those who speculate or remove capital from the country. The cost to the country of such activities is however a lot heavier than the harm that can be done by a few spies. In fact, speculation and capital flight are costing the country tens of billions of francs. After the latest austerity plan there is a deep malaise at the base of the majority parties. The development of the sort of foreign policy represented by Mitterrand's action can only deepen it.

(Rouge No 1059, April 15-21, 1983)

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ENTERNASYONAL No 2 NOW OUT

After the coup in Turkey on September 12, 1980, every form of opposition was crushed. The most elementary rights of the workers and the Kurdish people were removed.

This created a very difficult situation for the work of the Turkish left, and led to many deepgoing debates. The centre of the struggle against the military dictatorship shifted towards the two million Turks and Kurds who live in Western Europe.

Revolutionary Marxists are contributing to this discussion with a new review published in Europe, Enternasyonal.

Following its first edition in January 1982 (see IV No 23) the second edition has just come out. Within this issue a large amount of space is given over to the revolutionary Marxists active in Turkey.

In a text entitled 'The evaluation of the situation and our tasks', our comrades in Turkey give their political analysis of the world situation, the effects of the economic measures applied in Turkey since 1968, what they expect in the period to come, the state of the political movements at present, and the tasks of the socialist movement, and the 'resistance front'.

Thus Enternasyonal reflects the political continuity of the revolutionary Marxist movement in Turkey. This continuity, demonstrated above all by political coherence, constitutes an important step in the founding of a political tradition.

Other articles in this issue include:
- The results of the referendum on the Constitution in November 1982
- The Constitution and political life in Turkey
- On the military coup d'etat of September 12
- Order and the Constitution
- The LCR/LO electoral agreement in France
- Fifty years ago: Hitler
- Orders to Enternasyonal, Librairie La Breche, 9 rue de Tunis, 75011 Paris.
- Price: 8FF plus 2FF postage.
Ireland—An economy in crisis

Some 170,000 Irish workers took industrial action on Wednesday April 13, to protest against the slashing attacks on their living standards in the budget presented by the coalition Fine Gael/Labour Party government on February 9.

The action was supported by the two major unions, the southern Irish Transport and General Workers Union, and the all-Ireland Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union, as well as the teachers union.

The focus of the protest was the sharp rise in income tax, which the Financial Times of February 15, 1983, estimates will bring a 10 per cent cut in real living standards this year for wage earners, even for married couples who are treated more favourably than single people. This action has been preceded by many other protests against the taxation of the employed in Ireland, who are among the most heavily taxed workers in the world. Their taxes have been used to provide incentives for foreign capital to set up operation in Ireland.

This has not been the only form of Irish workers protest against the efforts of all the major political parties in the South to make them pay for the economic crisis. There have also been a number of important industrial struggles, and the number of days lost in strikes has been rising continually.

In 1981 the then Fianna Fail government threatened to close down the nationalised sugar production plant in Tuam near Limerick in the west of Ireland. This would have affected not only the workers in the plant but those in other plants owned by the company which engineered machinery for the sugar processing, as well as the local small farmers who had been encouraged to grow sugar beet, and the local people who found seasonal work in the harvest or in the plant — in all, probably some 60 per cent of the local population were involved in the sugar processing industry.

The local population, led by the workers, mobilised against the proposed closure — which had been proposed by an all-party government committee which had never as much as visited the plant — and won a stay of execution for a year, later extended for another year, and government subsidy.

The workers at the Clondalkin paper mills went into an 18 month long occupation in 1982 protesting against the run down of one of the last indigenous industries, and the proposal to close the mills, despite the continuous election promises by both Fine Gael and Fianna Fail to keep it open. Eventually the Fine Gael government nationalised the mills and kept them open.

The third of the more significant recent struggles in the South of Ireland was that by workers at Ranks Douglall Hovis in Dublin against redundancies. The workers occupied the factory to prevent the management removing the machinery before their redundancy payments were made. The support won from other unions and workers, organised mainly through the Dublin Trades Council, put the possibility of a general strike on the agenda. But the management backed down and the workers were released.

Economic crisis is nothing new to Ireland. Formal independence for the South has done nothing to create a viable economy which can afford a reasonable standard of living for Irish people. Today we have one million poor. And according to EEC sources, practically every economic indicator shows Ireland continuing to fall further behind Europe.

The depth of the present crisis raises a number of basic questions: is there any other course open to the South under Partition except crippling dependence on foreign banks? What alternative is there for an artificial economy other than high unemployment and low living standards? In short, the present crisis raises once again the question of Partition and national unity.

Partition itself raises another question. While the Irish people are divided between Catholic and Protestant and between Northern Catholic and Southern Catholic the rich and powerful elite which owns and controls the wealth of the nation is not divided. The banks, the stock exchange and the multinationals are all 32 County institutions. Partition does not obstruct them. On the contrary, Partition helps them keep Ireland, North and South, a weak dependent economy; Partition thereby facilitates and justifies their parasitic links with Britain, Europe and American imperialism.

The struggle for national unity, therefore, can only succeed by organising the working people of Ireland against the rich and privileged clique which rules the two states of Ireland. The only form that Irish unity can take is that of a Republic governed by workers and their allies: a Workers Republic.
IRELAND FOR SALE

The 26 County state is in a deep economic crisis. The State's foreign debt amounts to £4 billion, which means it owes more money, per head of population, than does Poland. Business representatives and conservative economists are clamouring for huge cuts in public expenditure and for the reduction of real wages, a view supported by all three major parties. The economists charge success in the past with mismanagement and overspending. Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour, needless to say, blame each other.

Both the conservative economists and the politicians treat the State's financial debt in isolation, whereas large scale public borrowing is part and parcel of a whole economic strategy, which has been in operation since the late Fifties. This economic strategy centred around 'opening up' the Irish economy to foreign capital at three levels:

1. Investment: jobs were to be created in Ireland not by developing native industries but by attracting multinationals to invest in Ireland and establish factories there.

2. Trade: protective tariffs around Irish industries were gradually removed.

3. Borrowing: from foreign banks to help create a 'social infrastructure'.

The policy of borrowing from foreign banks was, and is, part of an economic package which was meant to make the country prosperous. It has certainly succeeded in creating prosperity, but only for a minority of the population. For the vast majority of working people and youth, it has proved a dismal failure.

Since the second world war most countries in the West and the Third World have sought to expand their economies through borrowing heavily from the banks and began borrowing in the mid-Fifties. This delay was because the Irish government declined to ask for loans, but because international banks were unwilling to lend money while Ireland discriminated in favour of Irish industries. In 1956 the secretary of the Department of Finance, Ken Whitaker, prepared a report which advocated the 'opening up' of the Irish economy. The report was accepted in principle by the government, and in 1957 a memorandum was sent to the US-controlled World Bank which outlined the case for Irish financial aid:

'The expansion of the Irish economy in the last 30 years has depended on and been financed in the main by national savings. These savings have not been sufficient to cope with the requirements of an underdeveloped economy... The rate of progress could be considerably accelerated by an inflow of external capital directed to types of development which would increase the country's productive capacity and which would bring with them new techniques and methods. The Irish government would welcome such investment.'

'Ireland has the significant advantages of political stability, and plentiful and adaptable labour supply, ample power resources and an extensive transport system. Dividends, interest and profits on all investments may be freely transferred to the foreign investor's country in the appropriate currency.'

Stated this way, it is clear that the policy of foreign borrowing was, from the beginning interlinked with, and dependent upon, the 'opening up' of the economy to foreign capital.

The cornerstone of the new strategy was to make Ireland attractive to investment by foreign companies. The Industrial Development Authority (IDA) was established to entice industries to Ireland. A number of factors assisted: Wages were and are low by European standards, and the grants available to companies setting up here are exceptionally high. Export profits are tax free. In addition, the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement (1966) and entry into the EEC (1973) opened up the British and West European markets to companies based in Ireland.

THE 'BENEFITS' OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

The IDA receives great praise for its success in attracting foreign companies, so it is worth examining the actual effect of its endeavours. There are four basic ways in which a 'host' country might benefit from having foreign industries based upon its territory:

Employment. The IDA speaks about having created 80,000 new jobs by bringing foreign companies to Ireland. But this does not mean that today 80,000 more people are working in manufacturing industry than there were 20 years ago. The true increase is about a third of that number.

1980, £1,688 million was pumped through the IDA and other agencies to fund industrial growth. The modest growth in industrial employment in the Sixties and early Seventies came nowhere near to absorbing the tens of thousands forced off the land by the 'opening up' of the economy.

Taxation. A host state might, in theory, benefit by imposing taxes upon foreign industries; the revenue raised could be used to finance growth in other sectors, and improving social services. In reality this is not possible. The Telesis report commissioned by the Irish government points out that tax incentives are a main reason for companies locating here. If they are taxed they will take their leave.

Linkages. Government planners hoped that foreign industries would become integrated into the Irish economy. The expectation was that by purchasing raw materials and other imports, these industries would create a chain effect which would both stimulate indigenous growth in the economy and reduce the likelihood of foreign companies pulling out once the state grants and the tax free holidays were over.

A report commissioned by the IDA itself reveals very clearly that this just has not happened. Only one-sixth of raw materials and other imports used by multinationals in Ireland are actually purchased here. The rest are imported. The reason for this is simple. Most foreign companies which set up in Ireland are part of large multinational corporations based in the major capitalist countries, in particular the US, the UK, West Germany and Japan.

While retaining the key sections of the industries (management, engineering, research and development) in their home countries, these multinationals have

| TOTAL IN MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|
| YEAR                      | 1951 | 1971 | 1974 | 1979 |
| (000's)                   | 177  | 214  | 222  | 205  |

Employment in manufacturing industry has not risen at all since our entry into the EEC. Such failures are not because the IDA has not attracted new industries to Ireland. Rather, the number of new jobs created by foreign investment has not been equalled by the number lost. Traditional companies have been unable to compete against much larger British and Western European companies.

A recent report casts doubt on IDA claims. Between 1970 and 1978 'Of the 96,000 jobs approved in the period, only companies committed to 77,000 jobs came to Ireland despite public announcements of their agreement to come. Of these 77,000 potential jobs, only 28,900 currently exist.' Between 1974 and found it more profitable to farm out later stages of production, which involve less skills to countries with lower wages. A considerable number of these - approximately a third - the Irish branch of the corporation is engaged only in an intermediate stage of production. The product is then 'sold' to an affiliate of the same corporation in another country.

In other words, the bulk of foreign industries established in Ireland are part of transnational operations, and are not linked with other industries in Ireland. Accordingly, there is little or no overspill of capital into other sectors of the economy.

High Wages. Perhaps the most persistent claim by supporters of government
economic strategy is that the new industries have led to higher wages. It is certainly true that multinational companies have generally paid better wages than traditional industries, but this is only one side of the story. For one thing, the closer integration of the Irish economy into the British and West European markets has greatly increased prices, especially for basic items like food, drink and clothing.

Real wages in Ireland are further reduced by exceptionally high income tax rates. Not only is income tax higher than in most European countries — especially for low paid workers — but it is not compensated for by an adequate welfare system. Instead, a major cause of the high income tax rate here is the huge sums of money which the State pays out to subsidise foreign investment. Moreover, so long as Irish economic growth is dependent upon attracting foreign companies there is a very definite ceiling to real wages here which prevents them catching up with the rest of the EEC. For, as explained earlier, one of the major attractions of Ireland for multinationals is its low wages relative to other EEC countries. If wages here were on par with France, Holland or West Germany then foreign countries would find Ireland much less profitable and much less attractive for investment.

The picture of foreign capital entering Ireland to modernise its economy and enrich its people is one which bears little relation to reality. The usual IDA grant to foreign companies is 30 to 35% of its capital costs and can be as high as 60%. It is estimated that another third of capital costs is raised by borrowing from Irish banks. Bearing in mind that US manufacturing companies in Ireland have an annual profit rate of 25 to 30% (two and a half times the EEC average), then it becomes apparent that they recuperate these initial costs within a couple of years.

The truth is that foreign money is not flowing into Ireland. Irish money is flowing out. What has occurred over the last couple of decades is not industrialisation of Ireland, but the restructuring of the Irish economy under the domination of the multinationals.

AGRICULTURE IN A DEPENDENT ECONOMY

It is not only Ireland's industrial structure which has been distorted by increased dependence of the Irish economy. The closer integration of Ireland into the British and West European economies has effected major changes in the agricultural sector and has considerably deepened social inequality in rural Ireland. Over the last few decades the numbers employed in farm work, be they owners, relatives of owners or wage labourers, has fallen dramatically.

Paradoxically, the fall in agricultural employment has occurred at a time when both the output and the price of agricultural produce has risen considerably. Between 1960 and 1970 output rose by 17%. Between 1968 and 1976 prices of agricultural goods trebled. The rising prices were mainly a consequence of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement and membership of the Common Market. These may have benefitted all farmers, but it has not benefitted them all equally. Farm sizes vary considerably.

Small holdings are usually on the least fertile land in the West or in upland areas. Agreements and agreements, while the proportion of holdings over 200 acres is small they account for about 18% of total farm land.

The increase in output has resulted from the mechanisation of farm work. For the most part, it is only large and middle-size farmers who could afford to buy new machinery. Even as regards borrowing, banks are reluctant to lend to small farmers, regarding them as a greater risk. Where small farmers could borrow they generally paid higher interest rates because smaller amounts of capital were involved. It is significant that over a third of Irish holdings have not increased their output in the last two decades.

State subsidies go mainly to farmers producing for export, and in the case of cattle they invariably go to big farmers. Small farmers who produce young cattle that are later fattened by large farmers, receive minimal subsidies. Similarly, State policy is directed towards the 'rationalisation' of agriculture, which means funding those farmers who already own large tracts of land, and who wish to invest in more machinery or buildings.

Since our entry into the EEC £2,000 million has been invested in agriculture, subsidising agricultural incomes by about a third. But despite having the largest agricultural sector in the EEC, Ireland imports not only its farm machinery but most of its fertiliser. No attempt has been made to finance industries directly linked to Ireland's major sector of production, agriculture.

Briefly, the huge rise in agricultural prices and output since entry into the EEC has enriched a layer of large farmers. It has not overcome disparities in income between large and small farmers. Indeed, it has deepened them. Furthermore, the absence of any kind of serious taxation system means that there has been no return to State revenue from the enrichment of large farmers. Instead of assisting the country's economic growth, the agricultural boom produced by entry into the EEC has actually impeded development.

BEHIND THE BORROWINGS

The major growth in employment over the last couple of decades has been in the services sector.

There is nothing exceptional about this. In most EEC countries the services sector accounts for between 55% and 60% of total labour force. The major component in the growth of services has been the expansion of the State sector: health, education, welfare, transport, communications etc. Again this is not exceptional. Quite the contrary. Public expenditure in Ireland per head is lower than any EEC country. With the possible exception of Greece, our social services remain the most backward in the Common Market.

TOTAL UNEMPLOYED

<table>
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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(000's)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>146</td>
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</tbody>
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TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN 26 COUNTIES

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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
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<tr>
<td>(000's)</td>
<td>1,217</td>
<td>1,052</td>
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<td>1,035</td>
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FARM EMPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
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<th>YEAR</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(000's)</td>
<td>485.8</td>
<td>368.3</td>
<td>262.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What is unique about Ireland is that the expansion which has occurred in the public sector has not been financed by the growth of industry and agriculture. Although the State ploughs vast sums of money into foreign industries and into agriculture there is little return to the State on this investment because these sectors are subject to only minimal taxation. Consequently, in order to expand the economy and to maintain its apparatus, the State has had to borrow huge amounts from foreign banks. It relies almost exclusively upon taxing incomes of PAYE workers and consumer goods to pay back its debt to foreign banks. That debt has grown until the situation has been reached that the State is now borrowing just to pay back its interest. The prospect is that the international banks may refuse to lend any more while of course still demanding repayment of earlier loans.

The conservative economists' solution to this is to force down further the standard of living of working people through lowering real wages, increasing tax on consumer goods and cutting the social services. The three major parties accept the need for such austerity, although unlike the economists they have to face the
distasteful task of periodically confronting the electorate. The effect of such austerity measures will be to drive hundreds of thousands of Irish people below the poverty line.

This is not a temporary situation. There is no light at the end of the tunnel. Austerity measures only abate the immediate financial crisis of the State. In the long term they solve nothing.

A RETURN TO PROTECTIONISM?

Somewhat belatedly the conservative economists admit that the 'open economy' policy is riddled with problems, but they insist that there is no viable alternative. The protectionist policy of De Valera, they argue, proved disastrous. Ireland by the mid-Fifties was economically stagnant.

The figures show that the policy of protectionism enabled industrial employment to more than double in the two decades following De Valera's coming to power. Yet, by the mid-Fifties, Irish industry was in crisis. Many companies went bankrupt. There were recurrent balance of payment crises. The conservative economists suggest that this failure was inevitable given the small size of the Irish market, and that any strategy for industrialisation which sought to base itself upon the home market was doomed.

This argument is essentially superficial because it fails to take into account the overall socio-economic context within which protectionist policies were pursued.

The real weakness of De Valera's protectionist programme was that it sought to modify, rather than fundamentally alter, the neo-colonialist character of the Irish economy.

THE ECONOMICS OF NEO-COLONIALISM

The withdrawal of British troops from the 26 Counties and the establishment of a separate state was not accompanied by any significant changes at a social level. The new state left the colonial administration and the existing property relations intact. This effectively ensured that the deformations in Ireland's economic structure which colonial rule produced continued to impede industrialisation. In particular:

(1) banking capital, as opposed to industrial capital, was overwhelmingly dominant within the Irish economy.

(2) the Irish banks were completely integrated into, and dependent upon, the financial institutions of the City of London.

A leading official in the Department of Finance wrote in an internal memorandum in 1923: 'apart from the banks we have no big financial institutions, and the banks are largely influenced by opinion in London where they keep their reserves, their floating balances and practically all their investments.'

The Cosgrave government (1922-1932) was dominated by big farmers and businessmen who were heavily reliant upon trade with Britain. Their economic policies were virtually indistinguishable from those pursued by Westminster prior to the achievement of 'independence'.

The Fianna Fail government which took office in 1932 was much more distant from big business. The bulk of their electoral support came from (and still comes from) urban workers and small farmers. Their policies were largely designed to placate their electoral base. The introduction of tariffs to protect existing industries and to build up new ones was bitterly opposed by big farmers and commercial strata because it threatened retaliation from Britain. They went as far as organising a mass fascist movement, but lost their nerve when they saw it provoking an uncontrollable backlash from republican workers and small farmers.

De Valera was not, however, prepared to preside over the social transformation hoped for by many of his supporters. His very first act upon being elected was to reassure all the leading civil servants that their employment was quite secure. The right of large property, including the banks, was likewise respected. By failing to confront the power of large capital, the De Valera government deprived itself of the real economic levers which could have enabled Ireland to break its economic dependence on Britain, and to overcome underdevelopment.

The basic problem with protectionism is that it went too far, but that it did not go far enough.

(1) Only a small part of capital available in Ireland was invested in industry. A much greater amount was invested abroad, mainly on the London money market.

(2) Until the late Fifties, no Irish government engaged in large scale borrowing to stimulate economic expansion. This was partially because of the reluctance of Department of Finance officials, but more fundamentally because the money was not forthcoming from the banks.

(3) Ireland has never possessed a capital goods (i.e. machine making) industry. Even during the protectionist period industries had to import the machinery. As a general rule the capital goods sector is the most dynamic and profitable part of an economy; productivity and prices tend to rise most rapidly. Industries in countries lacking a capital goods sector find their import costs increase more rapidly than domestic costs. They are consequently pressed to reduce profits or force down wages.

Protectionism then only modified Ireland's dependence. It did not break it.

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| EMPLOYMENT IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY (in thousands) |
|------------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1931       | 1936   | 1946   | 1956   |
| 63         | 101    | 116    | 154    |

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| EMPLOYMENT IN SERVICES SECTOR AS % OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT |
|------------|--------|--------|
| 1960       | 1970   | 1979   |
| 39.0%      | 43.0%  | 47.1%  |

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Irish workers have the highest cost of living in the EEC (DB)
By the mid-Fifties protectionist policies had reached their limits. Irish industry was stagnant and unemployment rates soared. The Fianna Fail party had become emmehes with big business and were only too willing to further subordinate the Irish economy to international capital in return for short term growth and easy profits.

**TOWARDS ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE**

The present crisis is a symptom of Ireland’s deepening dependence upon foreign capital. It can only be overcome by winning economic independence and placing the Irish people firmly in control of their own economy. An anti-imperialist government would have to introduce a radical economic programme along the following lines:

**Nationalisation of Irish banks, insurance companies and major industries**
This is a vital prerequisite in order to direct the economy towards the sort of growth that can benefit the people, and not just provide quick profits for the elite, and to ensure that money made in Ireland is invested here.

**Withdrawal from the EEC**
Control of our own economy is incompatible with having major decisions made by a bureaucracy in Brussels, which is itself dominated by high finance and industrial capital.

**State monopoly of foreign trade**
All imports and exports should be processed through a State agency. This would prevent industrialists hostile to national control of the economy from removing plant and machinery from Ireland. On a more long term basis it would establish a pattern of trade that would be most beneficial to balanced growth.

**A national plan of development**
A national plan should be drawn up to coordinate economic activity and direct new investment. This plan should not be the exclusive work of economic technicians acting in isolation, but should be the culmination of a full debate involving not only producers at every level but consumers as well. Among its chief tasks would be the development of our national resources, the building up of industries linked to them and servicing them, and the redirection of agriculture so that its primary objective would be the production of food for people living in Ireland.

**Workers’ self management**
Nationalised industries should function under the control of a body democratically elected by all those working there. Workers’ control would not reduce productivity but would increase it, because workers would know that any innovations made to improve output would be to the collective benefit, and not just in the interests of an elite. In privately-owned industries democratically elected workers’ committees should have full access to all company books and should coordinate production with management. Any industry whose owners attempted to sabotage production would be nationalised.

**State aid for small farmers’ cooperatives**
The State should encourage small farmers to work their land cooperatively by providing farm machinery or by making loans available to them at minimal interest rates. This would greatly improve agricultural productivity.

**Nationalisation of big farms**
If their response to De Valera’s protectionist measures in the Thirties is anything to go by, an anti-imperialist government would face bitter opposition from big farmers who would kill livestock and destroy crops before producing food at a reasonable cost for working people. This should be pre-empted by nationalising large farms and placing them under control of those who work them.

**A public works scheme to reduce unemployment**
One of the first tasks of an anti-imperialist government should be the introduction of a crash programme of public works (eg building hospitals, schools etc) to provide work for the unemployed. Any government attempting to introduce such a programme, or any mass movement campaigning for it would meet ferocious opposition from the propertyed elite in Ireland and from international capital. To succeed it would have to rely wholeheartedly upon the strength and enthusiasm of Irish working people, urban and rural, mobilised to the fullest and determined to fight for what is theirs by right.

This is not an abstract question. If the present economic strategy is not radically changed then in the coming decades we are going to experience more social inequality, more poverty, more unemployment, more children hungry, more emigration, more crime, more despair. All this and a lot more repression to maintain law and order.

**Abolition of the Border**
The border is not just a political entity. It has an economic importance. The major banks and companies quoted on the stock exchange, and privately owned firms operate across the Border. To leave the Border intact would leave major assets of these companies intact. It would mean that important resources which rightfully belong to the Irish people would be denied them in their efforts to build a society for working people.

The time has come for anti-imperialists to link the struggle for political independence in the North with a new struggle for economic independence throughout the whole of Ireland. We must bring that message into every arena of Irish life and we must be present wherever working people resist the attacks upon their living standards and their rights.

We must offer a clear alternative to the corruption and bankruptcy of Fianna Fail, Fine Gael and Labour. Towards that alternative we must subordinate our differences to the common goal. There is too much at stake to do otherwise.
The "welfare state" fades in Sweden... Palme presses austerity

Palme offers the outstretched hand to the chief of the bosses federation—the workers show more reluctance (DR)

Tom GUSTAFSSON

A half year has passed since the Swedish Social Democrats regained governmental power, after being in opposition for six years.

With more seats in parliament than the three bourgeois parties together and with the support of the Swedish Communist Party (the Vpk), the Social Democrats were able easily to oust the bourgeois "center" coalition from the government. Olof Palme could resume the place at the helm that he sought so eagerly.

The former government parties, the Center Party and the People's Party, suffered a stinging defeat (the People's Party saw its vote nearly cut in half; it got barely 5.9%). On the other hand, the furthest right party, the Moderata Samlingsparti, which was outside the coalition, scored new gains.

It was the six years of falling real wages, growing unemployment, social cuts, and massive redistribution of income from the worst off to the best off that brought the bourgeois government down.

The Social Democrats (SAP) had also been suffering a decline of their popularity before they left the government in 1976, and they had a difficult time regaining credibility while they were in the opposition. Nonetheless, through waging an energetic electoral campaign, and above all as a result of the negative experience of the years of bourgeois government, they reemerged as a positive alternative in the eyes of most working people. They were also able to increase their vote among government employees and middle layers, as well as to get a larger share of the youth vote.

At the same time, tens of thousands of bourgeois party voters shifted from the "middle-of-the-road" parties to the more aggressive and dynamic rightist party, which served as the main channel for a big-business-backed scare campaign against "the socialist threat" and "too much power in the hands of the unions."

AN ABOUTFACE BY THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

While the election campaign and the results reflected an increased polarization in the society, the Social Democrats in power over the past months have done everything possible to dampen the class struggle.

On the night of the election itself, Olof Palme "extended a hand" to the outgoing government parties, offering them "constructive cooperation over and above the dividing lines of parties and coalitions."

This February, Palme made a new major overture to the Center Party and the People's Party with the aim of neutralizing their opposition and widening the rift between them and the Moderata Samlingsparti. According to Palme, there was now sufficient agreement about the economic situation, how to deal with unemployment, income-distribution policy, and foreign policy to permit extensive collaboration between the SAP and the two parties.

Palme's February overture was the crowning touch to a series of shifts and adjustments with respect to the SAP's position in opposition and during last year's election campaign.

In the election campaign, the SAP made a lot of noise about the "fractured front and misrule of the bourgeois parties." It thundered against their "exaggerated and unjust austerity line" and their "antilabor policy." It showed in figures how the standard of living had declined by more than 10% in 1976-82 and that, after five years of constant decline in real wages, the average real wage was now lower than in 1974.

The SAP documented the massive redistribution of income "from the poor to the rich," denouncing the "coupon-clippers' economy" as well as the furious speculation in stocks, real estate, jewelry, gold, and silver.

It promised a "cleanup" of this situation, an "equal sharing of the burdens," and at the same time a "rigorous, dynamie, and progressive economic policy" coupled with an energetic jobs program that would "provide work for all in due time."

The truth today is that the Social Democrats not only continued the austerity policy of the bourgeois parties but tightened it and stepped it up. The conditions for the working people have gotten notably worse.

GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT

This January, there were 147,000 registered jobless, that is, 3.4% of the workforce (among youth, the figures were respectively 48,000 and 7.5%). This is 6,000 less registered unemployed than a year ago (what accounts for the difference is that a lot of jobless have been put on relief work and various other schemes have been set into operation.)

In December 1982, there were 18 people looking for work for every job offered.

If you combine the official and concealed unemployment (i.e. those workers in retraining programs, doing relief work, or involved in other such schemes), the number of jobless goes up to 390,000 or 9% of the workforce.

At the present time, 70,000 persons are doing relief work. In the past year, the number of youth involved has doubled.
If you also include those who have been partially or entirely excluded from the labor market (that is, people with part-time jobs or who are not registered as looking for work), the figure comes up to 566,000 (54,000 more than a year ago), that is, a good 13%.

If you include, finally, people retired early — 302,000 in January 1983, half of whom have been obliged by varying degrees of pressure to take early retirement because of the situation in the labor market and who, therefore, can be considered concealed unemployed — the figure comes up to 718,000 people in Sweden who are unable to get the work they want.

The number of people suffering prolonged unemployment is increasing, as well as the number of jobless who are not collecting unemployment benefits. Before long, 50,000 Swedes will be forced to depend entirely on social welfare (according to the calculations by the National Labor Court Commission, LO).

In the last two years, municipal spending for home relief has increased by 90%.

This situation is the worst since the second world war. It is a far cry from the so-called welfare state with the full employ- ment that was supposed to go with it. And the trend is for things to get worse. This represents a drastic change for the Swedish people.

A STRUCTURAL CRISIS

The origins of this development lie primarily in the following factors;

— Sharpened international competition, with the corresponding growth of "excess capacity" in the traditionally important industries in Sweden — iron mining and steel, shipbuilding, and the lumber and paper industry.

— Continued difficulty for Swedish business either to keep up with international competition in the traditionally important export sectors or to find sufficient substitute markets or new "niches."

— A conscious policy by the Social Democratic government to stop the expansion of the social service sector (which before could absorb a lot of those pushed out of industrial production and whose growth was accompanied by a sharp increase in employment of women who had previously not worked outside the home).

— The acceptance by the trade-union leadership of the main features of this development and of the Social Democratic government's policy. At the same time, it itself has become an advocate of capitalist proposals for increasing productivity and for more automation.

The result is that the number of industrial jobs has dropped from 1 million (in January 1982) to 990,000 in December of the same year, and to 970,000 this January. More than a thousand more miners are threatened with layoffs in Sweden. In the coming years, the authorities plan to eliminate 3 to 4 thousand jobs in the specialized steel industry, along with a couple of thousand of jobs in shipbuilding, and that is over and above the large-scale layoffs that have already occurred.

As usually happens in capitalist crises, certain regions (such as Norrbotten in the far north) and certain sections of the population (women, youth, immigrants) are being especially hard hit. But the crisis is no longer confined to any one region or section of the population but is spreading.

The development of this crisis has been partially moderated by new gains by Swedish capital in certain industries (such as machine and special-steel production, electronics, biotechnology, road and hydraulic construction, and the conversion of traditional shipbuilding to construction of oil rigs and other new lines). The Swedish car industry (VOLVO but also SAAB) is continuing to make gains for the time being. The Swedish paper and pulp industry has benefitted from the devaluation of the krona. Industry is also getting a shot in the arm from the new and very controversial Social Democratic proposal to build a Swedish fighter plane (JAS), which calls for spending 25 billion kronor in the coming years.

However, these are counter-currents in the context of a structural weakening of the Swedish economy, which will continue to be reflected in a trend toward increased unemployment. In view of severe budget strains, with a deficit of 90 billion kronor forecast for fiscal year 1983/84, and the possibility of a 20 billion kronor balance-of-payments deficit in the same period, the room for major new steps to stimulate the labor market is narrowing. This also weakens the "security net" that is supposed to safeguard the society against economic ups and downs.

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AUSTERITY WITH CAPITALIST APPLAUSE

But there are also other dark clouds on the Swedish horizon. Immediately after taking office, the new government got off to a rip-roaring start by ordering a 16% devaluation of the krona (which in one blow drastically increased the prices of the one third of mass consumption goods that are imported). In fact, Palme's government was in such a hurry to come into line with the new finance minister, Kjell-Olof Feldt, that the negotiations for the devaluation with the other Scandinavian finance ministers before the Palme government was even formally installed.

The result will be a direct cut of about 5% in the real wages of workers as the devaluations's effects are felt. At the same time, the big companies will realize windfall profits of about 5 billion kronor.

This measure was consciously designed to "give investors in industry a boost." But its primary result was to throw the stock markets into a tizzy, promote higher profits for the corporations, and raise stock dividends.

"Fantastic! Unbelievable! Unimaginable! The sky is the limit! (English in the original)." According to the financial publication Affarsvarlden, that was the reaction on the stock market floors in the late fall of 1982 and the beginning of 1983.

In mid-February, another financial paper, Vekans Affarer noted:

"The big Swedish companies are rolling in money. Never before have they had this sort of liquidity. The ten biggest firms — headed, of course, by VOLVO — have over 35 billion kronor in liquid assets.

"However, excessive liquidity has become a problem for the economy. Investing in Sweden is no longer an attractive enough proposition. Instead, the companies want to place their money abroad. But the Riksbank (the National Bank) is imposing restrictions on this. In this situation, the companies prefer to put their money in short-term investments and securities."

In the first four months after the SAP won the September 19, 1982, elections, the wealth of stockholders increased by 50 billion Swedish kronor! I wonder if this is not a record accomplishment for a workers party in power.

And what has been the response of the government, of the party that before the elections talked in such contemptuous terms about the bourgeois parties "speculation economy"?

"Basically, I think that it is healthy that the stock market has gone up," said the finance minister, Kjell-Olof Feldt. "And we'll see to it that there is no sudden drop, either."

Thus, the devaluation fell on fertile ground. But a lot of capitalists stressed that an isolated measure was not sufficient. In order to increase investment, it is also necessary to cut real wages, the employers association, the SAF, intoned. It demanded loosening of the restrictions on foreign transactions, a "more flexible" employment policy, and lower taxes. (Swedish corporate taxes are already among the lowest in Western Europe!)

As the government has done them one good turn after another in more and more areas, the capitalists are becoming positively delighted.

A "TIGHTER" BUDGET POLICY

— The government's project for so-called wage earners funds, which offer possibilities for a certain increase in the influence of the trade-union and state bureaucracy over investment policy in return for holding down wage demands, has been put off pending "further study." It is supposed to come back for consider- ation in a "moderated" form. (The original proposal has already been "moderated" four or five times.)

So, the capitalists have also lowered their tone. During the election campaign they had raised a terrible commotion about the wage earners funds, claiming that they represented creeping socialism. (This claim was totally unfounded since
the funds were never to be given a majority or even a key minority position in decision making. And the trade-union members themselves would never be able to exercise any direct influence over them!"

— Big capital could also take comfort in the fact that the government, despite its election promises, has not moved against state subsidies to encourage workers who buy shares in the companies they work for, a "reform" that was introduced in 1980 over the Social Democrats' protests. "The stock market got a shot in the arm from that," the financial press wrote.

— The decision to build the JAS fighter plane came at the same time as the news that subsidies for state enterprises are going to be cut, municipalities are going to be pressed to reduce their spending, and all this was accompanied by talk of a "tight-budget policy." This also delighted the capitalists.

— Irritation that, despite everything, the SAP intended to fulfill, more or less, its four symbolic election promises — including, higher pensions, better medical insurance, and increased support for building day-care centers (financed by higher indirect taxes) — was quickly mollified. The capitalists were reassured when it became clear that there would not be too many reforms in those areas, but that to the contrary the Social Democrats were beginning to discuss slaughtering a lot of their old "sacred cows." That is, they were discussing imposing charges to make social services pay for themselves, reducing the adjustments to retirement benefits for increases in the cost of living, and increasing the waiting period for the payment of sick benefits, among other things.

— When the budget was presented to parliament at the beginning of January, it was greeted by the financial press as "something less than we feared." The projected deficit was less than what had been planned. The budget included a package of concealed cuts in the form of reduced compensation for inflation in public expenditure, which will not fail to have an effect on social spending. Although there was an increase in programs to promote employment (by 1.5 billion kronor), there was a general freeze on reforms.

Pressure was to be stepped up on the municipal governments. More support was allotted for firms that showed a willingness to enter new export markets. They were to be given additional export credits. There were to be rewards for innovations, as well as bigger appropriations for training and research. All this was designed to accelerate shifting over to new markets and to reduce dependence on the traditional export sectors.

All of this was in accordance with the Palme government's doctrine of the "third way" to economic growth. It is supposed to make it possible to avoid massive unemployment by an active policy to stimulate the labor market and by bold export ventures, combined with stimulus to investment to increase production and a "tight" budget policy to reduce the budget deficit and foreign borrowing.*

— The bourgeoisie could also take comfort in noting that the Social Democrats had changed their attitude to some "symbolic" questions of foreign policy. They did a turnaround and decided to stay in the Inter-American Development Bank, which they had severely criticized before. And the government abstained in the UN vote to condemn Indonesia for aggression in East Timor, which reflected Indonesia's growing role in Swedish trade.

It was not for nothing that the executive director of the Chamber of Commerce commended the new government's "extraordinarily reasonable economic policy."

The fears that many capitalists had about what the 1982-83 contract negotiations would bring have been quieted. Would the unions be out for revenge after five years of falling real wages? Would there be discontent in the unions if the installation of the new government was not used as a lever to secure their interests?

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<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1976</td>
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<td>23,225</td>
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<td>1982*</td>
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*To November

Source: Statistics Sweden

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**The Expectations That Followed the Elections**

At the start of the latest contract negotiations, Finance Minister Feldt declared:

"Industry seems to have a certain confidence that a Social Democratic government will influence the big organizations that operate a labor-market policy so as to avoid mistakes and misunderstandings in the conduct of wage policy."

"Business knows that we have a capital of confidence that we can call on now that we are going into a period of decline in real wages."

There were a lot of implications in this statement.

When the Social Democrats were voted back into government a half year

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* Mr. Kjell-Olof Feldt, the Finance Minister, distinguishes the "third way" from both the expansionary and belt-tightening policies pursued by other industrial-capitalist countries. Boosting private consumption and employment through expansionary policy, he says, led eventually to an enlarged payments deficit and higher inflation, while a tough deflationary line would result in unemployment and a considerable waste of resources. Social Democrats propose to pursue a mix of expansionary and belt-tightening measures. Priority will go to employment but, in the short term, Social Democrats will suffer a considerable fall in real incomes and living standards.

(\textit{Financial Times} January 11, 1983)
ago, that reflected the hope of hundreds of thousands of workers in Sweden that they would "guarantee jobs," "defend the various forms of social insurance," and "build a future for Sweden." (These were the SAP's election slogans!) That is, the vote the SAP got reflected the opinion of these workers that it would do this better than another, openly capitalist, government.

Most workers had no very high hopes. They did not expect the SAP government to carry out any big operations, to introduce any anticapitalist measures. They did not expect any basic rejection of "necessary belt-tightening." But they did have a certain hope that a SAP government would do a better job than a bourgeois one and that they would benefit from that.

What has become known as "crisis consciousness" in public debate had spread. Most of the SAP's voters were probably ready for some form of sacrifice and to give some time to a government that they had a certain confidence in, or at least saw as the lesser evil.

This situation was reinforced moreover, by the fact that the change of government came about in a "cold" way. The SAP was not lifted into government on the crest of a wave of workers mobilizations. That does not mean that there have been no workers struggles in the last years. The fight waged in 1980 against an employers association that thought it could win in a frontal assault on the level of workers wages was sold out by the leadership of the trade-union movement and ended with a traditional Swedish "compromise." That sowed demoralization and skepticism among the most militant groups of workers. But it was also a new experience for many other Swedish workers.

Sweden's first workplace occupations — in a mine in central Sweden and in a textile factory in the north — did not end in victory. But they introduced a new element into the Sweden of the 1970s and 1980s.

There were also protests by steel and shipyard workers against the closing of their workplaces. A movement sprang up among metal workers to demand the right to vote on their own contract (which they do not have to this day). It snowballed to include tens of thousands of workers. Some sections of workers raised the demand for a political strike against the austerity policy of the government of the bourgeois parties then in power and its attacks on employment. These and other forms of action that developed in the past period have not failed to leave their imprint. But it is hard for the workers in Sweden today to link up immediately with these experiences in an entirely new situation.

A BEGINNING OF UNEASESS

After the change of government last year, a general wait-and-see attitude set in. People have been waiting to see how the new government will act, what it will do about its elections promises, what the effects of its measures will be.

But a wait-and-see attitude does not mean total passivity. That is particularly true among the hardest hit and most militant sections of workers, which are now beginning to show an open skepticism and distrust of the new government. This skepticism is also beginning to find a reflection within the Social Democratic "movement" itself.

When the state mining corporation, the LKAB, threatened layoffs at the Svappavaara mines in the far north of Sweden, the workers had a certain confidence in the government. They openly discussed occupying the mine, welding the gates shut, and defending themselves against attacks. All this was conceived of as a means of putting pressure on the government and the Social Democratic Party.

"The pot keeps boiling. If you are standing on the brink and thinking of jumping, anything can happen," the miner Eilert Stalmacke said. "I think that the only thing to do is to weld the gates shut and face them off."

When it became clear that the government did not intend to assure continued operation of the mine but rather to "put it in mothballs," there was an outburst of anger. Accusations of a "sellout," "betrayal," and "a bureaucratic mentality" were hurled at the government.

But the occupation talked about never took place. The traditional Swedish footdragging and the lack of a conscious, organized political force dissipated the resistance and wore out the workers.

But this example, along with others, has made an impact on new sections of the working class. Despite the defeat in Svappavaara, it represents future capital for the Swedish working class.

The growth of skepticism about the government's policy and uneasiness about its measures is also reflected in the official trade-union press.

The LO was able to get the membership to accept restraint in wage demands on the clear condition that the Social Democratic government would take responsibility for maintaining employment," the confederation paper, LO-tidningen, wrote in a critical editorial directed at the government.

This attitude is also reflected in a decline in interest in the activities of the Social Democratic Party. A study done among Social Democrats in Goteborg shows that this has reached a low ebb.

The education association ABF, linked ideologically to the SAP, reports a decline in activity. Above all, study groups on social questions and the labor market have lost membership. This has also particularly affected the study circle directly tied to the SAP leadership, the "Framtid for Sverige" (A Future for Sweden).

"A certain discontent, to put it mildly," is beginning to spread in the workers movement, the LO-tidningen wrote recently.

And LO's evening paper, Aftonbladet, wrote in an editorial:

"The party has been obliged to follow a different policy in government than in opposition, and that is cutting a bit into its capital of confidence."

Jan Nygren, chairman of the Social Democratic youth organization, the Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbundet (SSU), described the situation as follows:

"Neither I nor other SSU members can say that we are finding the same enthusiasm as before. Questions are being raised. A feeling of uneasiness is spreading.

"Now is the time to raise criticisms and concerns, because time is running out. Before we know it, elections will roll around again.""

It is the awareness of this, that the next elections are only two and a half years away, that prompted the Social Democratic government to introduce a series of unpopular measures right away. It did so in the hope that in this way it would get more maneuvering room later, and in the hope also that it would get a boost from a certain economic upturn.

The wait-and-see attitude that set in after the change of government is beginning to turn to irritation and uneasiness in some sections of the Swedish working class. The task of socialists is to translate this into activity and a political alternative, into initiatives in struggle and organization. Only in this way can the defeat of the bourgeois government in the 1982 election be extended into a defeat for its austerity policy. Only in this way can it be carried forward into a radical change of course for the Swedish workers movement.
CONGRESS OF THE ITALIAN FOURTH INTERNATIONALS

The Lega Comunista Rivoluzionaria held its second congress March 25-28 in Milan. Under the name Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (GCR) the Italian section of the Fourth International had previously held 21 national congresses. Some hundred delegates participated in the conference.

Delegations from other far left organisations were also present; from the PDUP (Proletarian Unity Party), DP (Proletarian Democracy), and Lotta Continua per il Comunismo (Struggle Continues for Communism). A delegation from the LCR (Revolutionary Workers League), who are having discussions on fusion with the LCR was also present, as was the LSR (Revolutionary Socialist League) which, having participated in the formation of the Parity Commission of Moreno and Lambert after they split from the Fourth International, has since taken an independent position towards all international organisations. A leader of the FIM (one of the metalworkers unions) of Milan, and a representative of the factory committee from Alfa Romeo were also present. All these delegations, with the sole exception of the LSR, gave greetings to the conference, taking up the political themes being debated.

Some of the major Italian daily papers, and one of the national television channels, mentioned the holding of the conference. The main independent radio station in Milan, Radio Milano Popolare, gave a lot of information about the conference, and broadcast interviews with leaders of the LCR.

The public part of the conference was the first two days. These were given over to discussion of the reports given on behalf of the Political Bureau by Franco Turigliatto and Elettra Deiana which centred on the political situation and the state of the trade-union movement respectively. Preparatory texts had also been circulated throughout the organisation. The debates did not bring out any major differences, and the texts were finally adopted unanimously, or almost so.

The following two days were only open to delegates and members of the outgoing central committee. These were devoted to a debate on the balance sheet of activity since the previous conference, and a report on the political and organisational perspectives for the years to come.

As one of the press statements of the LCR explained, the debate centred on three themes:

- the form and programmatic content of the fight against austerity and for a workers alternative
- the characteristics of the workers and trade-union movement's struggle against the social pact, and for a trade-union movement based on factory committees
- the commitment of the LCR to orient towards the new youth radicalisation on the themes of the struggle against rearmament, solidarity with the revolutionary struggles in Central America, and support to the Polish workers and Solidarnosc.

The campaigns mentioned in the third point, together with those against the worsening standard of living and education for young people in the last few months, have led to the formation of groups of young revolutionaries in a number of cities. Organisationally independent, they nevertheless declare their political solidarity with the LCR.

The LCR plans to participate in the legislative elections which will take place in 1984 or later.

The LCR has branches in the main cities in the north and centre of the country, but remains very weak in the south, apart from in the industrial centre of Taranto.

The congress ended with the election of a central committee of 25 comrades.

THE ICELANDIC ELECTIONS 'A DANCE ON THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO'

Spiraling debt and inflation in Iceland have lent the April 23 elections to the "world's oldest parliament" more than usual international interest.

Inflation has been a chronic problem of the tiny Icelandic economy. But it is now nearing 70% a year. The foreign debt equals half the entire national income.

The government that has been in office for some years includes one of the two main workers parties, the Althingshubandalag (People's Alliance, a party that has a Stalinist element in its background). But the right made gains in 1982 local elections. In its April 16 issue, the British business magazine The Economist viewed the Icelandic situation with alarm, "the country slides ever deeper into debt, the electorate is being invited to take part in what looks like a leisurely dance on the edge of a volcano."

The Fylyking Bytingarsinnadhra Kommunista (FBK - Revolutionary Communist League), Icelandic section of the Fourth International, is calling for a vote for the workers parties. The editorial in the March 27 Neisti, the FBK paper, said: "In Reykjavik, the Fylyking will vote for the Althingshubandalag and calls on its supporters to do likewise. In other places we do not think there is sufficient reason for people who have voted for one or another workers party before to vote for another one now."

In the previous general elections in the 1970s, the FBK ran candidates.

This time, it decided not to. Neisti explained the decision as follows: "In those years, the so-called left movement existed. It was first and foremost radical students and intellectuals who were drawn into radical struggles in 1967-73, who gave impetus to the Vietnam Movement, the Peace Movement, the radical feminist movement, the Maoist groups and the Fylyking itself...

"This movement is now dispersed and many of its former members who did not join the Fylyking are now seeking other solutions either in the Althingshubandalag, the Kvinnarafambod (women's party), or the Bandalag Jafnadræmane (populists)....There has not been another student movement that has involved people in political struggle.

"This development...weakened the Fylyking, since it was part of this movement and tried to relate to it. For example, the resolutions at our thirty-third congress sought to strengthen this old left movement. The Fylyking never tried to break loose from it....

"But in our most recent congress, we decided to face up to this development by turning away from the old left movement and building the organization in the workers movement and among young high-school students unspoiled by the prejudices and desperation of the old left movement. These are the changes and the kind of building the Fylyking must take on in the next period. It is this work that will best buttress the Fylyking to take part in future elections..."
RELEASE LIU SAN QING

In December 1981, Liu San Qing, a long time activist of the solidarity movement with the Chinese Socialist Democracy Movement in Hong Kong went to Canton in the People’s Republic of China to visit the families of activists of the Democracy Movement who had been hit by the wave of repression launched by the Chinese government in April 1981.

Since that time nothing more had been heard of Liu, despite extensive enquiries by his family and the Defence Committee that was set up. This was reported in International Viewpoint No 11, July 19, 1982, where his name was spelt Lau San Ching in the Hong Kong style.

On March 30, the Defence Committee announced that Liu had indeed been arrested and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. This information was given orally to Liu’s father by the senior authorities of the Court of Justice in Canton, where Liu’s father had gone to find out more about the fate of his son.

However, neither the exact verdict nor the exact date of the trial have been made public. The Chinese authorities have stated that close relations will be able to visit Liu San Qing in about one month, and that his father will be informed of the opportune time through the Hong Kong government.

Last October the Hong Kong government informed Liu’s father, and the Defence Committee, by letter, that Liu had been detained for ‘illegal activities’. This information had come from the Chinese government through the British embassy at Peking. The Chinese government considered that, although Liu San Qing is a citizen of Hong Kong, his trial related to the internal affairs of China. However, it is obvious that Liu has been condemned for the support he has given to the Chinese Socialist Democracy Movement by his activity in Hong Kong.

The Defence Committee is calling for actions to demand his release, and for the veil of silence over his sentence, and the charges against him, to be lifted. They call for messages of protest to be sent to the government of the People’s Republic of China, and to the Chinese embassies in different countries.

DUTCH REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH COMMITTED TO OUST GOVERNMENT

The Dutch revolutionary socialist youth organization, Rebel, held a congress February 26-27.

The congress decided by majority vote to set two central priorities for the coming period: the fight against the lowering of wages for youth and cutbacks in unemployment benefits, as well as the struggle against the deployment of the new U.S. missiles in the Netherlands.

During the congress, a public rally was held under the title “Rebel! Against the Crisis and for Socialism,” which was attended by about 150 people.

The rally was opened by a speaker representing the Salvadoran liberation front. There were also speakers from the Socialist Young Guard, the Belgian revolutionary socialist youth organization; and the French Revolutionary Communist Youth.

The congress decided that the political focus of the organization’s work for the coming period would be the fight to oust the bourgeois Lubbers government.

“In our paper and our actions we must continually repeat that this government has to go, that in our actions and mobilizations we have to strive to make sure that this government does not remain in office until the next regularly scheduled elections.

“Our alternative to the Lubbers government is not a new coalition between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats but a government of the workers parties based on the struggle of the labor movement and the mass movement, a government that will keep the missiles out. For our work in the coming period, two things are important.

“The first is to promote unity...

“The second is to put forward anti-capitalist demands....

“The best way to get people to oppose the Lubbers government and to build actions against this government is to play an active role in fighting around the central political issues around which the struggle will be organized.”
To the workers of the world

Appeal from the TKK for May Day

In the name of the self-managed independent trade union Solidarnosc, in the name of the Polish workers, we extend our greetings to the workers of the world for this May Day. Polish workers will demonstrate on this day under the banner of international solidarity.

The festival of May 1 was born in the struggle for the dignity of human labour. In 1886, in Chicago, workers paid with their lives for the right to their own trade-union representation. For us, the Polish workers, Chicago was repeated in Gdansk 1970, in Silesia 1981, in Lublin in 1982. And we are aware that it could be repeated many times again.

In the countries governed by the Communists the trade-union movement has been destroyed, and the fake trade-unions placed totally under the control of the State-Party-Boss. In August 1980, for the first time in one of the countries of “actually existing socialism,” we, by our struggle, won the right to independent trade unions. The Communist regime, feeling its monopoly of power threatened, refused to accept this.

On December 13, 1981, the counter-revolution hit back. Once again, like one hundred years ago, workers’ blood flowed. Tanks and machine guns were turned against unarmed people, in order to destroy the independent trade-union movement.

For more than a year, our trade union continued its activity illegally, in conditions of police terror. Thousands of Solidarnosc activists passed through the internment camps and prisons. Thousands of others are still languishing there, under harsh sentences. Strikers and demonstrators have been assaulted, hundreds among them have been crippled, several dozen murdered in cold blood, for having desired to defend their liberty and their dignity.

Repression continues. Trade-union activists are being sacked, many factories have been militarised. The setting up of forced labour camps has been announced. People have been persecuted for exercising their natural human rights. Arrests and political trials continue. At present, preparations are underway for the trial of seven members of the highest level of the trade-union leadership, who have been in prison for 15 months. The stage is also being set for show trials of the ex-members of KOR (Committee for Workers Self Defence). The Polish government has violated every international agreement on workers and citizens’ rights it has signed. It has broken all the agreements it has made with its own society. It has trampled underfoot all its declarations.

Solidarnosci will not allow itself to be destroyed. Solidarnosc lives, and is well rooted in the enterprises. The trade union continues its actions, and will not give up defending the rights of workers, nor fighting to institute social and economic reforms in Poland. We are struggling to get the right to legal activity, freedom for the political prisoners, a stop to the hunting down of activists of the independent trade union. We will act with determination, perseverance, and good sense. Our objective is social peace based on respect for the laws that the society recognises as its own. Only then, can the labor of millions of Poles bring about cultural enrichment and material well-being for the entire people.

The workers showed, when they organised demonstrations a year ago, that, for the labour movement in Poland, May 1 has become a day of struggle for social rights.

We are not alone in our fight. From the first days of August 1980, we have been able to see the support of workers throughout the world. On the eve of this May Day we thank the trade unions of other countries, as well as the organisations, and all those who have acted as individuals, whose devotion is proof of human solidarity.

For all those workers who still have to take the first steps towards the creation of their trade unions, we extend our greetings and our warm encouragement. To those who live in the democratic countries, we express our hope that they will persevere in developing and strengthening an independent trade-union movement.

Here in Poland we are not fighting simply for ourselves. We are profoundly convinced that our struggle has a universal dimension. It widens the area of liberty and justice in today’s world. We need your support. This May Day—demonstrate your solidarity with the struggle of the Polish workers.

Zbigniew Bujak (Warsaw), Wladyslaw Hardek (Cracow), Bogdan Lis (Gdansk), Jozef Piotrow (Wroclaw), Eugeniusz Szumiejsko (member of the Praesidium of the National Commission).

Temporary Co-Ordinating Committee of the self-managed, independent trade union, Solidarnosc.

March 23, 1983