

International VIEWPOINT

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POLAND SPECIAL :

**workers alliance
for socialism**

**Portugal's
growing instability**

**New rise of
workers movement
in Iran**



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INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT

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Grenadan government makes concessions on Humphrey

CHESTER HUMPHREY, acting chair of the Grenadan Technical and Allied Workers Union, has been on a limited hunger strike since September 2 (taking liquids but no solid food) to protest against his imprisonment and threatened extradition to the United States.

The American authorities are demanding that Humphrey be turned over to them to face charges of smuggling arms from the US to the movement that overthrew the dictator Eric Gairy in March 1979.

After the US occupation, Humphrey was interned, then released, and then reimprisoned. His return to jail was clearly a part of the government's campaign to housebreak the unions, which are the only remaining bastions of the mass movement.

Although Humphrey supported Coard in the fight in the New Jewel Movement, the continuors of the Bishop tradition, the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement, consider that he had

nothing to do with the murders and is being persecuted solely as a revolutionist and trade unionist.

This cause is provoking growing outrage on Grenada. Among other things, as the facing article points out, there is a major scandal about bribery of Ministry of Justice officials to get him delivered into US hands.

The final appeal hearing against extradition was to be heard on November 25. But because of Humphrey's grave physical condition, it was postponed to January. The government moreover has been forced to make concessions.

On November 8, Prime Minister Blaize ordered Humphrey's handcuffs removed. The unionist had been kept chained. Protests against the persecution of Humphrey and his threatened extradition are more necessary than ever, and should be sent to Prime Minister Herbert Blaize, Prime Minister's Office, St. George's, Grenada.

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A year after the "made in US" elections

A YEAR AGO, the United States achieved at least one of its objectives in Grenada, when the pro-Washington New National Party (NNP) won the December 3, 1984, elections. (1) This was the only success they could boast of after invading the island in October 1983. In every other respect, the situation was hardly brilliant from their point of view. The economy was going from bad to worse. The progressive unions could not be destroyed.

The memory of Maurice Bishop remained alive, and a new party, the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement, resumed the fight for his ideas. Now, only a year after taking office, the government is threatened with a grave crisis and the NNP may break apart in the coming months. In the following article, we will try to describe the forces present and the evolution of the situation in Grenada since December 1984.

ARTHUR MAHON

The NNP came out of a fusion of three parties, whose sole common point was allegiance to the United States. The first, the Grenadan National Party (GNP), was led by Herbert Blaize, an old conservative politician, who was to become premier again.

The second, the Grenadan Democratic Movement (GDM), was founded by Francis Alexis, a professor who lived in exile during the Maurice Bishop regime from 1979 to 1983 and worked with the CIA for the "restoration of democracy" in Grenada.

The last, the National Democratic Party (NDP), was formed after the invasion by George Brizan, who was once associated with Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM) and worked with the revolutionary government.

But for the strong pressure by the United States and their own fear of seeing the former dictator Eric Gairy win the elections, this motley coalition would doubtless never have come together.

Immediately after the elections, tensions began to show up in the government. Since then, Herbert Blaize's adversaries have complained constantly about his autocratic methods. Lacking confidence in anyone but his intimates, he has reserved all the ministries for those closest to him. In an entire year he has called parliament into session only twice, even though the NNP holds all the seats save one. Moreover, members of his family have been appointed to diplomatic posts.

Managing a situation as delicate and novel as the one in Grenada requires special qualities, and Herbert Blaize is hardly up to it, to say nothing of his poor state of health. Indeed, he was quite frank about his failings at the time of the elections.

When he was asked what his greatest strength was, he replied: "I have no strengths. I'm just an ordinary man who believes in the Lord, has confidence in Him, and knows that He will sustain him." (2)

Blaize is a typical representative of the traditional bourgeois layers in Grenada, who have always lived parasitical lives. Having been planters, they invested in trade.

Incapable of taking initiatives, Blaize has relied entirely on the Americans. When Vice-President Bush came to Grenada in the spring of 1985, he begged him to leave the occupation troops in position. He called for a "Marshall Plan" for Grenada, amounting to 500 million dollars, a totally unrealistic demand that could only discredit him.

After the departure of the US troops in June 1985, Blaize and his intimates, acting over the heads of the other ministers, began to use the elite paramilitary force trained by the US to suit themselves, for example, brutally shutting down a radio station, repressing street vendors, or even burning the dwellings of young marijuana smokers. Such actions have aroused strong protests from the population.

Washington is not unaware that such attitudes reveal Blaize's weak-

nesses and are accelerating the erosion of his regime's credibility. It is clear that the US wants to replace Blaize with Francis Alexis, a dynamic personality, who, together with his associate Keith Mitchell, could defend the US's long-term interests far better. And, in fact, for some months, despite their claims, Alexis' supporters have been trying to undermine Blaize's power.

In May, Alexis' supporters discreetly let it be known that the premier's right-hand man had handed out large sums of money to officials in the Ministry of Justice to speed up the extradition of the trade-union leader Chester Humphrey. (3)

In July, they made an initial attempt to oust Blaize from his post. At the same time, in private they have been accusing George Brizan of being a "Communist." Some observers predict that in two months, Francis Alexis will be premier, and George Brizan will form an opposition party.

The NNP won the 1984 elections with 59% of the vote. A year later, most Grenadans see the government as incompetent and corrupt. While Blaize's methods have accelerated the regime's loss of credibility, they are not in themselves sufficient to explain it.

More fundamental is the fact that the government failed to solve the burning questions facing the people, first of all unemployment. The rate of unemployment has gone from around 12% in 1983 to around 40% today. What is more, a lot of people who have a job often only work two or three days a week.

There has, of course, been a growth in the number of videos, motorcycles, and Japanese cars, which came into the country duty free or in the baggage of US soldiers. But this has not compensated for the rise in unemployment, higher prices, and the disappearance of the social programs set up under the revolution.

There is only one dentist on Grenada, but the authorities refuse to give work to young people returning from Cuba after finishing their dental studies there.

1. On the situation before and after the elections of December 1984, see articles of Laurent Beaulieu in 'International Viewpoint,' No. 64, November 26, 1984; and Steve Roberts in 'IV' No. 67, January 14, 1985. On the revolutionary experience in Grenada and the crisis that led to the murder of Bishop and the US invasion, see in particular the resolution of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (SU) published in 'IV' No. 54, June 4, 1984.

2. This and all other quotations originally in English have been retranslated from the French. — IV.

3. On the Chester Humphrey case, see 'IV' No. 85, October 28, 1985.

This situation has caused the greatest suffering in the countryside, and many young people have gone up into the hills to grow a little marijuana. Cocaine and prostitution became prevalent while the US soldiers were on the island, and burglary became common.

The young people have no hope, and it is indicative of the decay in the situation that in the past two years the number who pass their exams has declined by half.

Pursuing the "free enterprise" economic policy advocated by Reagan, the government has continued to dismantle the public sector set up under Bishop, which had become the driving force of the economy. For example, the old Holiday Inn that was purchased under Bishop has recently been rented out to a private concern at sixty cents a day per room.

The government hoped that foreign investors would pump new life into the economy. But these hopes have been cruelly dashed. "This is a sad story," Blaize was to conclude, when the US firm Ingle Toys shut down a few months after getting thousands of dollars in subsidies from the US government. Indeed, it was a sad story, and there have been a lot of others like it since.

The US government tried every means to convince company heads to go and invest in Grenada. But the only ones that rushed in engaged simply in speculation. It is true that by comparison with other Caribbean states, Grenada has a lot of disadvantages for an investor.

The island has a troubled past, to say the least. The government is weak. The youth still have a rebel spirit. And the unions are far from all having been tamed.

The infrastructure is inadequate, in particular as regards electricity supply. Industrialization is very recent, and still very poorly developed. The domestic market is small, to put it mildly. And on top of all this, Grenada is the Caribbean island furthest from the US.

After this failure with US companies, Washington's policy today is rather to encourage Grenadians, of whom there are many in Brooklyn, to set up small businesses in their home country.

In recent months, it is France that has shown the most interest in Grenada. A French business based in Florida, the Groupe International du Transport et de l'Industrie Petroliere, is building a 700-room luxury hotel, and is going to aid Grenada to set up a national airline, which it will control.

In September, Keith Mitchell visited France. And the French government reportedly committed itself to

partnership in the search for oil in Grenadan territorial waters, as well as to set up a hydroelectric plant and a modern telephone exchange.

As a leader of the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement put it, since this government cannot create productive jobs, it is confining itself to carrying out the tasks of a colonial government, that is, "filling in the potholes in the roads and collecting taxes."

A large part of the US aid is in fact going to road repair. This makes it possible to employ a few thousand people, who are working in primitive conditions, since the asphalt factories and stone-crushing works have been shut down or sold off.

Since the invasion, the US has given only 8 million dollars a year in aid. And a lot of people who voted for the NNP in the hope that this would bring the US dollars flooding in are now bitterly disillusioned.

No force in Grenada today has attracted the people on the rebound from the NNP. Two movements are, however, seeking to occupy the space that it has left empty, and have seen their following grow over the past year.

One is the Grenadan United Labour Party (GULP) of former dictator Eric Gairy, who was ousted from power by the revolution of March 1979. It got 36% in the 1984 elections. The other is the MBPM, which was credited with 5% in those elections, although in reality it got more.

Gairy has two big aces. On the one hand, in the 1950s he led a big agricultural workers strike that took an insurrectionary turn. He was imprisoned at the time, and in the eyes of the Grenadan peasants became the first figure to represent them in their conflict with the city people linked to the planters and to the colonialists. And the great majority of the Grenadan people still live from agriculture.

On the other hand, Gairy remains an adept demagogue, endowed with an unquestionable charisma. His social base is among the poorest and most backward, largely illiterate, strata.

In the past year, Gairy has been working to consolidate and extend his influence. He has gone "to the grass roots," which he did not do in the first period after he returned to the island. He has held several successful rallies. He has reestablished his old union, which is based mainly among agricultural workers.

In October, the former dictator launched a strike on the plantations for higher wages. At the start, the strike call was heeded by about 55% of the workers concerned. But after the government threatened to fire the striking workers, support crumbled rapidly.

On the other hand, Gairy has had scant success with the youth, who make up half the population. Having lived the better part of their conscious lives under the revolutionary regime, teenagers are turning more readily to the MBPM, which in May launched the Maurice Bishop Youth Organization.

At a meeting organized recently to pay homage to the martyrs of October 19, 1983, [Bishop and his Comrades], the average age of the 1,500 participants was hardly over twenty.

The Grenadan revolutionists came out of the October 1983 crisis almost totally isolated. They rebuilt links with the population through the Maurice Bishop Foundation, whose aim was to keep the memory and work of Maurice Bishop and his comrades alive. Then, they started the newspaper *Indies Times*. After that, they launched the MBPM, which had only a handful of activists when the election campaign started.

Revival of the revolutionaries

Through their electoral work the Grenadan revolutionists were able to get involved in mass political activity again and take their manifesto and proposals into the villages. Coming out of the elections, they had a new party that today claims about a hundred members, a not insignificant number for a country of 110,000 inhabitants.

The MBPM has to work under constant pressure from the intelligence services set up by the US. In Washington, Herbert Blaize made no bones about his intentions to repress the revolutionists: "You can't get rid of these people just with a rescue mission," he said, referring to the US invasion.

The MBPM suffers from three other handicaps. The first, and perhaps the main one, was explained by George Louison, one of the party leaders, in an interview in February 1985:

"If Maurice Bishop had been alive, we would have won the elections hands down. But we are burdened with the legacy of the October 1983 events — Maurice's murder on October 19 and the US invasion on October 25. The people say that they gave everything they had to a party, to a revolution, and to developing the nation. The collapse of the revolution shook their faith. Consequently, they lost confidence, they lost hope, and that is what has to be rebuilt." (4)

The crisis of confidence in the progressive movement that ensued from

4. This interview was published in 'Africasia,' March 15, 1985.

the crisis of October 1983 cannot be overcome until Grenada goes through major new experiences.

The second obstacle to the MBPM taking advantage of all the opportunities that exist today is its lack of cadres. Of the twenty members of the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement in 1979, only two are members of the MBPM. The others were killed or are in prison awaiting the start of their trial for the murder of Maurice Bishop.

Drawing the lessons from the failure of the NJM, which was a quasi secret party, the MBPM leaders have opened their party's doors wide. And this past year they have put the stress on internal democracy. But the lack of cadres is a brake on this process.

The third obstacle is the fact that the MBPM is a poor party. Unlike the others, it gets no aid from any fraction of the bourgeoisie. So, it has the greatest difficulty in getting its paper out every week, and it is unable to print enough copies. For this reason, international solidarity is more urgently needed than ever.

The MBPM is striving to become the majority party in the working class, as the NJM was on the eve of the revolution of March 1979. And it realizes that in order to accomplish that, it has to try to win Gairy's social base away from him.

But the US is not ready to let history repeat itself and stand by and watch an allied government be overthrown in a few hours, whether in Grenada or anywhere else in the Caribbean.

The US has withdrawn its troops from Grenada, because keeping them there was expensive, pointless, and politically counterproductive. But it did so after setting up a 600-strong police force, and in particular a very well equipped paramilitary force of eighty persons.

The US has done the same thing on several islands, and these units are integrated into a regional security system with its command center on Barbados.

Alongside US and British troops, these forces participated in exercises in September on the island of Saint Lucia. The scenario was an invasion of an island that had fallen under the control of insurgents supported by Marxist-Leninist states called "Carumba" (Cuba) and "Nigaro" (Nicaragua).

Such exercises are scheduled for all the islands, and this will enable the US troops to get a better knowledge of the terrain than they had during the invasion of Grenada. Having failed to gain any political or economic successes in Grenada in a year's time, the US is falling back on military power, its only certainty. □

The political crisis following the elections

IN THE APRIL 1983 elections, the government of Mario Soares, the leader of the Socialist Party (PS), won a comfortable majority of 36%. This gave the party the largest majority it had ever had in government because of the alliance between the PS and the main bourgeois party, the Social Democrats (PSD). This coalition government, known as the *Bloco Central*, lasted longer than any government since the April 1974 'revolution of the carnations'.

For the last two years this government has been implementing austerity policies which have slashed real wages by nearly 10%, according to trade union statistics; increased unemployment and reduced investment and consumer buying power.

Hence in the October 6 elections, 1985 the PS got only 20%, its worst result since before April 1974 and the PSD has formed the new government. These results and the preparation for the upcoming presidential elections in January 1986 show signs of an increasing political instability in the country.

FRANCISCO LOUCA

The final downfall of the apparently stable *Bloco Central* government was partially also a result of a change in the leadership of the PSD at its June 1985 conference. The majority of the PSD were no longer prepared to play a subordinate role, obediently supporting Mario Soares' candidature for the presidential elections in January 1986. A victory for Soares in these elections was supposed to redefine the relations between the two parties and re-cement the *Bloco Central*. However, in June, the newly elected leader of the PSD, Cavaco Silva, provoked the downfall of the government. In so doing he started from the supposition that the October 1985 elections would be a severe test for the government in which the PS's policy of austerity would be rejected. This would undermine, at the same time, the presidential ambitions of Soares and open up a new parliamentary conjuncture.

The October 6 elections confirmed his prediction. The PS lost 16% (nearly a million votes) and 47 deputies. Its parliamentary group dropped to nearly half of that at the 1983 elections. This was the worst result since before April 25, 1974.

The PSD formed a government with 30% of the votes. It is already

setting out a policy of limited increases in real wages and pensions in order to increase internal consumption. At the same time it is reducing interest rates. It is also hoping to embark upon changes in the country's economic position very quickly, even if that means incurring an external debt.

The other major surprise of these elections is the dazzling appearance of a new political force, the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD), sponsored by the current president of the republic, General Ramalho Eanes. This party has emerged as the main beneficiary of the loss of votes to the PS and, to a certain degree, of the losses of the Communist Party as well. The PRD got 18% of the vote and 45 seats in parliament.

The PS spent most of its campaign assuring people that 'there was light at the end of the tunnel' and that after two years of austerity it would now be possible for them to satisfy popular demands in government. Funds available from the European Economic Community (EEC) were presented as the guarantee of such a change.

The defeat of the Socialist Party can be explained by several factors. Firstly, austerity. The last two years have marked a massive offensive against the

workers by the most dynamic sections of the Portuguese bourgeoisie, that is the export manufacturers of large and medium sized enterprises, concentrated in the North of the country. For this sector, whose produce of textiles, shoes, and certain intermediary goods is virtually wholly intended for export to European and, to a lesser degree, American, markets, a period of rapid decline of the internal market is relatively immaterial. On the other hand any measures which put pressure on wages and on the jobs market suit them very well. It is from this point of view that they were demanding complete freedom to lay off workers, that they were already expanding the use of short-term contracts, keeping wages below the official minimum and using non-registered labour or sub-contracts with intermediary agencies.

The government proved sympathetic to this orientation and even agreed to what became a legal scandal known as the practice of 'delayed' wages. This system, as its name implies, means that the bosses do not pay wages at times which they vaguely describe as financially difficult. The workers carry on working and no checks are carried out. This situation is now very serious since it concerns more than 150,000 workers, that is about 500,000 individuals for a country of ten million inhabitants. During the election campaign cases came to light of public companies using this primitive method of accumulation. The Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR), Portuguese section of the Fourth International, highlighted cases of private, public employers and even of a workplace in the Lisbon local authority who were doing this.

Mario Soares supported by the US

A vicious policy of austerity, therefore, was the first reason for the rejection of the government. The people identified this policy with the Socialist Party. But there was a further reason. The promise of the 'light at the end of the tunnel' idea was beginning to wear a bit thin. On the one hand it had been repeated at every election, and yet, on the other, people knew that in the two years of the PS-PSD government there had been massive and unprecedented corruption and nepotism in the making of public appointments. There were judges fixing the price for the release of criminals and heads of state banks involved in monstrous misappropriation of funds. In fact one of them was financing a contraband network in Setubal headed, it was discovered, by police and tax depart-

ment chiefs. It is publically known that the PS national commission discussed the allocation of 400 civil servants posts for the EEC which are assigned to Portugal and which were hotly debated by various supporters. The reaction against this way of conducting political affairs, against the scandalous manipulation of the media — Prime Minister Mario Soares, for instance has, in two years, appeared on all the television news programmes, — finally benefited those parties who were making vague noises about a remoralisation of public life, that is the PSD and the PRD.

Mario Soares' candidacy for president has, in the last year, received clear support from the US administration. Within the Socialist International (SI) Mario Soares and the leadership of the Portuguese Socialist Party are seen as the most consistent allies of Reagan. Mario Soares was thus the first leader of the SI to organise a tour for Eden Pastora, one of the Contra leaders in Nicaragua. He was also the first head of state to support the US invasion of Grenada and the Star Wars project. This is why leading political circles in the US have intervened in favour of Soares' candidature. His most serious rival until last summer was General Firmino Miguel. He was favoured by the right, General Eanes himself and all his party, and he actually withdrew his candidacy after having been strongly advised to do so by NATO officials.

The above plan aimed to keep the PS-PSD coalition going, with, in this case the main role being played by the PS and to establish within it a kind of rotation mechanism, which would guarantee institutional stability. For it is here that the restructuring of the bourgeois state, destroyed by the fall of the dictatorship and the 1974-1975 pre-revolutionary crisis, has failed.

That the plan was so definitely formulated over the summer is evidenced in the statements of Frank Shakespeare, the American ambassador in Lisbon, on Radio Free Europe. In a session of the commission of the Chamber of American representatives, Shakespeare said that developments in Portugal were going in the direction of a stabilisation of the dominance of these two parties and of a marginalisation of all the others. This, as far as he was concerned, was a positive development. The break up of the coalition and the problems for the Soares' candidature in the presidential elections mean that this plan is no longer viable. Quite the contrary, for the election results go in the direction of increasing government instability which will be aggravated by the race for the presidential elections in January 1986, the results

of which are very uncertain. In line with its policy in government, the PS chose defence of institutional stability as its main electoral theme. In so doing it ran the risk that the electorate would understand this stability to mean the continuation of generalised corruption, the trading of favours and the manipulation of information.

The PS then added to these unpopular choices by putting a small monarchist party on its electoral lists. This party was aligned with the right when it was in the 1983 government. They put a man like Antonio Barreto at the head of the list in the district of Alentejo, a man who as minister had launched the first real attacks on the agricultural reforms gained during the 1974-1975 revolution. In the last months of his government he approved a law on 'internal security', which, from the formal point of view, was even more repressive than the laws which Salazar had bestowed, even if of course, the dictatorship went far beyond them in practice.

In order to confront the Communist Party (PCP), the PS decided to present joint lists with the PSD in the municipal elections due to take place in December 1985. However, since the break-up of the coalition government, the PSD was now in open competition with the PS in the run up to the legislative elections. Alliances have been formed with the PSD in nearly all the towns where the Communist Party heads the municipal councils. The PS and the PSD were united in almost a third of the country to overthrow PC-led councils. This alliance was formed during the September election campaign which gives some indication of the political opportunism and direction of Mario Soares. What is the significance of this?

The PC controls the majority of the popular quarters, of the industrial towns and of the areas affected by the agricultural reforms. The alliance of the PS with the main bourgeois party in these areas will inevitably take on the meaning of a class offensive and will be seen as such by the workers. It accentuates the PS break with its worker and peasant base.

What is more, due to an ironic twist of fate, the PS-PSD coalitions were not able to be legally ratified because of an administrative error caused by the fact that the signature of the PSD representative has not yet been certified. To deal with this problem, which cropped up after the PSD election victory, the formation of the new government and the withdrawal of the PS, the Soares leadership proposed to integrate the PS candidates as independents



Mario Soares' (Second on the left) government is sworn in, January 1978. At the microphone, President Eanes (DR)

on the PSD lists and vice-versa according to the areas. This is how it happened that in Almada, for example, which is a working class city of 150,000 inhabitants where the large naval shipyards of Lisnave are, there will be no PS list because the party will be supporting the PSD list. In other cases a mutual arrangement for a 'democratic list' has been set up. This type of electoral coalition suited both parties so well that, when the legal problems cropped up and they decided to change the nature of the alliance, they decided at the same time to stand candidates in towns where it had not been initially envisaged.

These choices cannot be explained without understanding the real nature of the Socialist Party. Formed out of a petty bourgeois group in 1973, under the patronage of Willy Brandt and with German social democracy and the bourgeois republican left in Portugal as its reference points, the PS turned itself into a big electoral party from April 25, 1974. At that time it expressed the desire for social justice, democracy, socialism. In other words it had all the aspirations of a movement finding its feet on the road to political independence. Since it has no real tradition or links with the workers movement the PS depends mainly on its integration into the state apparatus. Through this means it created a union structure, the General Workers Union (UGT). Here they established from the beginning that the leadership be made up of Socialists and right-wing parties. A worker-bourgeois or bourgeois workers' party, as Lenin described it, is the best way of understanding the basis of SP policies and current direction.

The transfer of votes from the PS to the PRD constitutes, in some ways, a reaction to the practice of the

government and to this way of operating. It was greatly facilitated by the established credibility of the PRD and its links with General Eanes.

He was the victor in the military coup d'etat on November 25, 1975, which ended the revolution of the carnations. Elected president in 1976 with the votes of the PS and all the right-wing, and again in 1980 with PS, PCP and sections of the right voting for him, Eanes is one of the guarantees of the continued stability of the state.

The PRD phenomenon

In drawing together dissidents from the bourgeois parties and the PS the new party got a vote very close to that of the PS on October 6 and could go beyond that in future elections. Whilst consolidating itself as a bourgeois party, it is nevertheless seeking to maintain a popular base among the workers and the petty bourgeoisie. By remaining outside the government it can keep up the slightly critical attitude which brought it such a good result. On the other hand, after the election of a new president in January 1986, Eanes will have to formally assume the leadership of his party. As the current president, Eanes has a certain prestige with the people coupled with a leftish image because of the persistent attacks of the right on him as an individual. He will be the main beneficiary of the discrediting of the political and parliamentary system.

But it is unlikely that the PRD will be able to stabilise its support in the long-term. Within the context of constitutional crises which are going to get worse, and in view of the

fact that it does not occupy a central place, the PRD will try to find room for manoeuvre by playing a balancing role in parliament and by becoming a pivot of stability within the crisis of the state apparatus. The PS tried to carry out this type of operation once. But social contradictions, in whatever form, will make it difficult to operate a policy based on moral promises which will have nothing to say concretely on issues like the security laws, the changes in the laws on redundancy and dismissal and the attacks on trade union rights which will be a constant feature of the PSD government of Cavaco Silva.

In fact, the PRD has already found itself up against a difficult choice in the presidential elections, between Colonel Costa Bras, Eanes' choice, and Lourdes Pintasilgo, whose popularity symbolises the declining confidence of the electorate in the traditional parties. This latter was a former ambassador under the dictatorship and prime minister of the transition from 1979-1980. She was defrocked as a nun and for some years now has been developing a kind of Third Worldist and populist demagoguery which brings her support from across the spectrum; from former far leftists through to a large section of the PS and PCP electorate. Up until now she has always remained outside of party structures and is the most highly rated candidate according to opinion polls. With its leadership going for Costa Bras and its base for Pintasilgo, the choice is a difficult one for the PRD. The attitudes and positions taken around the defensive class conflicts which are on the way will take on a huge importance in clarifying the contradictory situation after the elections.

The PCP participated in the elections through a formal coalition

THE PSR CAMPAIGN

THE PARTIDO Socialista Revolucionario (PSR), the Portuguese section of the Fourth International, conducted an excellent campaign in which they doubled their votes compared to the 1983 elections, even though tactical voting for the PS affected the results for the far left. It got 35,000 votes, that is 0.6% of votes expressed. The PSR campaign centred on the basic problems of the crisis that is unemployment, 'delayed wages'; and on the balance sheet of the PS's policy of alliance with the right. This orientation got an echo among sections of the popular masses and in the media.

The editor of the main cultural weekly in the country, and a PRD voter, published, during the campaign, an editorial underlining the main reasons for this impact: 'In the midst of all this, in the daily bombardment being rained down on the heads of the voters, there is only one party which is conducting a campaign worthy of praise and which has intelligent things to say; that is the campaign of the PSR, which gives such unprecedented television broadcasts.

'Recently the PSR provided us with one of the best pieces of televised news information for many years. In it, a woman named Teresa Rosa, a civil servant from the Setnave, explained how she had been arrested under suspicion of being a member of FP-25 (Popular Forces of April 25), an armed organisation of the far left, was detained for six months and then released because there had been an error ... I do not know if a vote for this party is 'useful' but its electoral campaign has certainly

been more than useful. From the cultural point of view I would even say that it is the only campaign that has been of any use. It provided news and exchange of ideas, revelations for those, who, like me began looking in the newspaper for the details of the next PSR programme. Its not so much an appeal for votes as an act of democratic justice. All sorts of ideas have come and gone but the radical ferment of this campaign remains.'

The television campaign was also used to popularise other initiatives such as the occupation of South African institutions to protest against apartheid; the symbolic occupation of the old Saint Jorge castle, overlooking Lisbon to protest against war and militarism; actions in defence of young people; meetings in the factories and the popular quarters; the defence of Otelo de Carvalho against repression and arbitrary police action, for he was on trial at the time, accused of being a leader of the FP-25.

The choice of this type of campaign was deliberate. The PSR refused the PCP's proposal to go onto their lists in exchange for getting a deputy elected. It preferred to conduct an independent campaign in which it could present the maximum number of candidates allowed under the law, that is around 320 in the country as a whole. The balance sheet is very positive. Revolutionaries can conduct electoral campaigns which, far from isolating them, will enhance their capacity for dialogue and influence in the mass movement.

entitled the 'Alliance for a united people' which got 15.5% of the vote, a loss of 3%. This loss benefited the PRD, whose formation has been supported by the PCP for the last five years in an effort to divide the PS. This latter goal was the PCP's main objective in the elections, which is why, despite their electoral decline and the victory of Cavaco Silva, they were able to characterise the results of October 6 as 'a victory for democracy'.

The PSD in government

This fight against the PS, largely facilitated by the alliances of the latter with the right-wing as the whole business of the town councils demonstrates, was the main theme of the PCP's campaign. Their main enemy in the presidential elections is Mario Soares and, in light of this, they are prepared to support Costa Bras. Although they are presenting a mem-

ber of their own central committee as a candidate, they make no secret of the fact that the principal objective of their campaign will be to persuade Communist voters not to vote for Soares or Pintasligo, before withdrawing at the end of the campaign in favour of Costa Bras, Eanes' designated successor whom they also supported in the 1980 elections.

The PCP's main error, which is disarming the trade union movement, is obviously the under-estimation of the danger represented by the formation of the new PSD government. Cavaco Silva is capable of launching a very dangerous offensive against the trade union movement. In the coming year he is likely to increase wages selectively and try to reduce certain social tensions in order to give himself the room to carry out anti-trade-union and anti-right-to-strike policies. This would be the best opportunity for enacting repressive laws against the trade unions and against certain rights that have been won. This is the main thing that the employers are

asking for at the present time. If such attacks are accompanied by a slight improvement on the wages front it will be very difficult to mount a serious opposition.

It is true that because it only got 30% of the votes the PSD government will be dependent on all sorts of parliamentary alliances, which is different from the 1980-1983 right-wing bloc which had an absolute majority. However, the government will probably have about one year in which to carry out its populist policies and have recourse to certain Keynesian type measures.

Cavaco Silva will therefore have to face the following challenge; to conduct a policy which is firm enough to satisfy the bourgeoisie — since his electoral success is a result of the decline of the traditional right since 1980 — and popular enough to attract the support of sections of the popular masses and the petty-bourgeoisie. Such an endeavour will be difficult to achieve for one basic reason. The political power of the most dynamic sections of the bourgeoisie is based on their economic strength and they are not yet reorganised. This is where the chronic instability and the role allotted to formations like the PS and the PRD came from.

Something the government can never hope to resolve is the increasing social crisis in the country. There are now half a million officially unemployed, 150,000 workers with 'delayed wages', one million in a precarious employment situation or underemployed. The standard of living is the lowest in Europe apart from Turkey and more and more churches are opening up soup kitchens for the impoverished population.

The tremendous upheaval of the October 6 elections indicates the scale of this crisis without offering the least solution. The crisis of political leadership, the lack of homogeneity and of direction of the forces at play, the crisis of the role of the state are all opening up a process of re-composition the outcome of which is uncertain.

The small workers vanguard formed during the resistance to the dictatorship and in the struggles from the end of the 1960s till the end of the 1974-75 pre-revolutionary crisis is today very isolated or integrated into the trade union bureaucracy of the state apparatus. There does not yet exist a new generation of militants which is why it is difficult for the workers movement to get to grips with the current demands of the struggle. But on the other hand the bourgeoisie is weak and divided and its leaders are providing no real direction. The country is changing but no one has any idea where it is going. □

New upsurge of workers struggles

THE FOLLOWING is the third and final part of a series of articles on workers struggles since the Khomeini regime unleashed a campaign of counterrevolutionary terror on a massive scale in June 1981.

SABER NIKBEEN

The upshot of the government's defeat over the labour code became evident in the weeks prior to May Day 1983. Despite all its preaching that "the All-Mighty Himself is a worker," the Islamic regime had refused to make May 1 a workers holiday. But this year in many factories workers had gone through the experience of "commissions" organized to discuss the proposed labour legislation. Now, they went on openly to set up May Day Committees. In response to its defeat and to this new open defiance in May, the government stepped up its repression. By the latter part of the month, a new wave of terror was rolling against the worker activists. (1)

As severe as the repression was, it was not able to achieve the same effects as before. By this time, not only did workers no longer entertain any illusions about the bourgeois reactionary nature of the Islamic regime and its so-called revolutionary institutions, such as the pasdaran and anjomans (2), but after two years of intense and unrelenting repression, they were more certain than ever about the importance of having their own independent organizations. Militant workers came out of this period having set up clandestine organizations in many factories and having learned more sophisticated methods of struggling under conditions of repression.

To avert reprisals against their representatives for example, workers tended to avoid putting forward their demands through any individual. As soon as any dispute arose concerning the majority of the workers, the normal course was to organize assemblies, which are difficult to repress. Workers were also more sensitive to the problem of reprisals against their comrades. They organized financial aid for the families of

the victims; and whenever the opportunity presented itself, they raised again and again the demand for the reinstatement of victimized workers.

In a number of strikes in this period, it is obvious that there was a secret committee of militant workers behind the action, leading and organizing the workers. In a few instances, such committees even made public statements and pronouncements. They more or less replaced the independent shoras [councils] of the previous period. Like the former, they did not restrict themselves to any particular demand or form of action. When, and if, necessary, they could act like a trade-union cell or a strike committee.

In this period, thus, we had a lot more strikes than in the previous one (over a hundred), and a lot more successes as well. The protests against the Islamic Anjomans [formed to replace the shoras] were more widespread. Protests against the war and its effects on the workers appeared, becoming a factor in this period. Furthermore, a rebellious mood began developing that could begin to prepare the way for a general strike. We also saw strikes or other forms of industrial actions developing in factories that had previously been in the rearguard of the struggle.

For example, shortly after the repression of May 1983, the Kontor Sazy-e-Ghazvin factory, which makes gas and electrical meters, went on strike on June 27. Since its opening 12 years before, this factory had never seen a strike, not even during the general strike that preceded the February 1979 revolution. The strike at this factory involved over 70% of the 1,700-strong workforce. Despite all sorts of machinations by the anjoman designed to frighten the workers into going back, the strike con-

tinued until the management met their demands.

In the Razy chemical complex in Mahshahr, the government had set up a special court, with the aid of the anjoman, to investigate militant workers. By early June, this court had ordered 130 sackings. A list of 350 more workers was drawn up by this court. Widespread protests, however, forced management to retreat. The court was subsequently disbanded.

In the Klaj factory in Ghazvin, the repression resulted in many sackings. In July, the workers went on strike. Some 240 workers were arrested, but the protests continued until all but five of them were released.

At the Chimiko Farma chemical factory, the workers elected representatives, as demanded by the management, to discuss productivity deals. The dispute over this question became very heated. The minister of labour invited the workers representatives to the ministry, and there he arrested them and sent them off to Evin prison. The workers went on strike until all of their representatives were released and the manager dismissed (in August).

Rise of antiwar protest

In the first few months after May, in addition to the ones mentioned above, there were strikes in Pars Metal, Neeting (Ghazvin), Parlon, the Tehran Bus Co., Bridgestone, General Steel, Khaneh Sazy (Ahwaz), etc., and other forms of protest in a number of factories. But the rise in struggles really got underway in late November. This was preceded, on the anniversary of the start of the Iran-Iraq war [September 22], by the first signs of widespread antiwar protests.

In Pars Metal, workers refused to accept shorter summer holidays in order to help the war effort. On August 13-14, in the Petrochemical Industry Development Complex, the Islamic Society tried to carry out Khomeini's order to collect financial support for the front. Hardly anybody paid, and, more important, none volunteered for the front (except, of course, the few anjomani zealots). In early September, the Parlon

1. It was in this period that the last clandestine workers journal published inside Iran, 'Nazm-e-Kargar' ("Workers Order") was silenced. It was a journal based on factory committees, initiated jointly by the Hezb-e-Kargarane-Socialist, Socialist Workers Party, Iranian Fourth Internationalists, and a group of comrades from the Fedayan (minority).

2. Imam's committees guards, the singular is "pasdar," the plural "pasdaran"; Islamic anjomans [societies] were set up by fundamentalists to replace the shoras (councils) that arose in the plants in the course of the revolution—IV.

workers went on strike because the management had deducted a day's pay from their wages for the front.

In Pars Metal, again the management tried to impose a half hour compulsory over-time during the Haftehye Jang (War Week). The workers refused to budge. In Iran National, the workers even subjected those who did do overtime work to verbal abuse.

In November and December, over the "Jobs Classification Scheme," there were many major disputes. In the Fiat factory (about 1,500 workers), the Islamic Shora and Anjoman appointed two workers "representatives" to participate in the joint worker-management-Ministry of Labour committee to classify jobs. The workers protested against this action, and collected a lot of signatures demanding a general assembly to elect real representatives.

An assembly was promised. The names of 22 workers were put forward as candidates. The Islamic Anjoman accepted only 12 of them (10 of whom were their own members). On November 23, the assembly was held. The workers protested the removal of their real candidates from the slate. The representative of the Islamic Shora called these workers counter-revolutionaries. The majority of workers walked out and held their own assembly, where they passed a resolution condemning the Islamic Shora and Anjoman and their undemocratic elections (by 750 signatures, as against 200 for the anjoman).

The Ministry of Labour was forced to annul the results of its elections, and indefinitely postpone new ones. A week later, pasdaran [Revolutionary Guards] came to the factory and arrested the militant leaders and threatened more arrests if the protests continued.

In December, the strike in the tobacco industry got wide publicity. This industry had been well known to be a bastion of the regime. In response to protests over wage cuts (after "job classification"), the manager, Montazami, issued an ultimatum. "A 12 hour day or no raises." The workers went on strike.

A mullah was brought in by the anjoman to try to persuade the workers to go back to work. The workers attacked him and forced him to flee. The pasdaran came in and arrested over a hundred workers, bringing the action to an end. Some 68 workers were sent to the Gohar Dasht jail in Karaj (and, reportedly, three of them were executed). The remainder were released, after being whipped.

In this period, there were also a number of strikes in Indamin (metallic shafts and springs), Tehran's Mineral Water Factory, Profil-e-Sabok (Con-

struction materials), Azmayesh (household durables), Philips, Madar (textiles), General Plastics, Luleh Sazy-e-Ahwaz (steel pipes), etc. In Azmayesh, the workers held an assembly and passed a resolution demanding the expulsion of all the representatives of the anjoman.

In Indamin, the workers boycotted the elections organized by the management and the anjoman. A few days later, the leaders of the boycott were arrested, but widespread protests forced the manager to retreat. In Madar, the first strike on January 10, 1984, ended in defeat and victimizations. Two days later, however, another strike was organized, forcing the managers to back down.

During February and March 1984, in addition to continuing protests against the "job classification scheme," there were many strikes and go-slows over the question of productivity and New Year bonuses. For example, such actions took place at Mazda (automobiles), Shinva (petrochemicals), Naset (razor blades), Sepehr electric, Alamtik, Sina Darou (chemicals), Iran Yasa, Chimiko Farma, Igar (textiles), Chit-e-Rey (textiles), Santap, Karoon (agro-industry), Luleh va Machin Sazy Iran, and Abyek (cement).

In Chit-e-Rey, the news of lower bonuses for the Iranian year going from March 1983 to March 1984 caused extensive protests and provoked strike threats. The Islamic Anjoman made a statement on March 10 saying: "God has given brains and intelligence to workers so that they can think and understand problems, so that when the government orders a small deduction from their wages, they will not listen to any traitor who protests." This pronouncement itself angered the workers. The next day, there was a strike, and the management backed down. The anjoman's statement was also withdrawn.

In Luleh Sazy on March 11, an interesting situation developed. There was a clash of interest between one of the managers and the Islamic Anjoman over the misappropriation of steel from the factory. The workers took advantage of this situation to go on strike and raise their demands. The strike was suppressed, and many workers, including anjoman members, arrested.

On May Day, 1984, there was a general go-slow. As before committees were set up to organize celebration of the holiday. In many factories, statements were made a few days before May 1 attacking the regime for not recognizing this day as a national holiday. In a good number of these, to prevent any possible incidents, pasdaran came to the gates on May Day.

The next major strike took place

in the Sasan soft-drinks factory on July 15. The management announced that production was low, and besides there was a war on, and so no productivity bonuses would be paid for the previous four months. Militant workers called on everyone to protest. The anjoman intervened to prevent a strike, but, nonetheless, one developed.

On July 18, the pasdaran came in and arrested four workers. In retaliation, the workers took a representative of the public prosecutor hostage. The pasdaran attacked, opening fire on the workers. Two persons were killed and many injured. Nonetheless, the workers counter-attacked, and forced the pasdaran out of the factory. The strike continued.

On July 24, Ayatollah Saniee (then chief Islamic public prosecutor) came to the factory and lectured the striking workers. They attacked him and took his four body-guards hostage. Five hundred pasdaran attacked the factory, killing many and arresting over 300 workers. The next day, the management announced the start of the summer holidays, and, with the help of the pasdaran, closed down the factory.

After the holidays the Islamic Prosecutor's Office set up a section inside the factory to determine which workers were responsible for the incidents. Beatings and torture were practised inside the factory, and many of the workers are still in jail. (A month later in this same factory, one of the foremen, a member of the Islamic Anjoman, was caught abusing women workers. He was expelled from the anjoman, but the women lost their jobs. Moreover, this case was utilized by the management as a pretext to lay-off more women.)

Hatred of the anjomanis

The news of the strike in Sasan and the ensuing repression spread to many factories, and in some neighboring plants (e.g., General Steel and Shisheh va Gaz) there were some solidarity actions. The repression, in fact, failed to block the rise of workers struggles. There were many more industrial actions against plans to shorten the summer holidays, against cuts in productivity bonuses, and against pressures for overtime work, or cuts in wages to support the war effort.

The lack of support for the war has become even more marked this year. In Iran Termus, despite the presence of the pasdaran, the workers, leaving aside what the management donated, did not give much. In Ghoveh-e-Pars (batteries), starting in June, the work-

ers refused to donate a day's wages per month. In the Sepanta plant, which in 1981 produced 360 volunteers for the Basij [volunteer Forces] only four put their names forward this year. In a meeting on June 14 to encourage the workers to contribute to the war, the organizers were forced to end the meeting, because the workers turned it into an occasion to condemn the regime's antiworking-class policies.

In Farsh-e-Pars, when a mullah came on July 14 to enlist volunteers for the front, only a few attended the meeting, to say nothing of volunteering. In Saypa, the management announced that, starting from September 22 (War Week), the workers would have to work compulsory overtime. In protest, the workers organized a go-slow. In Jam (a shoe factory), Barf Kar (textiles), Vagon Sazy Pars, and Mina (glass), there were many slogans against the war.

In this period, also, there were more extensive and more open clashes with the anjomans. In Sentab, Soviran (Chemicals), Khaneh Sazy-e-Ahwaz and Khaneh Sazy-e-Kermanshah, Raf Alborz (electrical), Tolidaru (chemicals), Benz-e-Khavar, Barf Kar, Gherghereh Ziba (textiles), Melli Shoes, Roghan Pars (cooking oil), Machin-Sazy-e-Arak, Momtaz (textiles), and many other plants, there were protests against the anjomans.

In Sentab and Soviran, workers beat up the *anjomans*. In Alborz and Tolidaru the workers pushed the *anjomans* out of the job classification schemes. In Benz-e-Khavar and Khaneh Sazy Kermanshah, the workers developed such a hatred of the anjomans that whenever there was any conflict between the management and the anjomans, they took the side of the management.

In Khaneh Sazy-e-Kermanshah, the manager sacked a leader of the anjoman for interfering in management. He got an order from the governor's office to reinstate the *anjomani*. The manager refused to accept this, saying "It's him or me." Workers arrested the *anjomani* inside the factory. Pasdaran came in and freed him. But, eventually, his sacking was confirmed.

In Gherghereh Ziba, the management discovered that the head of the anjoman was using company cars for his personal benefit. The workers took the opportunity to raise the slogan "Death to the Islamic Anjoman." In Roghan Pars, to spite the *anjomans*, the workers voted for a Jewish candidate against the anjoman! In Momtaz the workers arrested an *anjomani* whom they caught stealing from the factory and handed him over to the management.

During the latest strike in the



Workers in an Iranian car factory. Tehran 1975. (DR)

Fumenat (textile) factory neary Rasht, workers realized that the management was colluding with the anjoman to steal a lot of textiles from the plant. A workers representative who discovered this was sacked. On July 10, 1985, the workers went on strike. There were clashes with the *anjomans* and the management.

Pasdaran came in, started shooting, and arrested eighty workers. But the strike went on for two weeks until it was agreed that the *anjomans* were to be sacked and that the sacked workers were to be reinstated. (A few days after this agreement, pasdaran raided the homes of many militant workers, arresting eleven of them. The next day, they surrounded the factory and brought the anjoman members back in.)

In Chimiko Farma, there was a split in the anjoman. The head of the anjoman got a member of an opposing faction expelled from the factory through manipulation. The next day, when the sacked worker came to work, he was prevented from entering the factory. Clashes developed between members of the anjoman. The workers took the opportunity to demand the expulsion of the head of the anjoman. He was paid off by the management to retire early.

The most important victory in this period, however, was won by the strike of over two thousand construction workers at the Esfahan Steel Industries. The management had previously come up with a plan to force these workers out of the industry in May 1982. Now, they brought it out again. On November 11, the workers went on to strike and held an assembly to formulate their demands. They set a 15-day deadline for the management.

On November 28, the strike was resumed. It made a major impact on Esfahan, which has been a stronghold of the hezbollahis ["party-of-God" thugs]. The families of martyrs (war dead), *basijis*, and other strata of the hezbollah mobilized against the strike.

On December 6, the governor of Esfahan appeared on TV threatening workers with a general mobilization of the hezbollahis unless they ended the strike. He also said that the story that the management was planning to lay off the construction workers was simply a "rumour spread by counter-revolutionaries." He claimed that all that was involved was the transfer of some workers to other companies.

At Friday prayers the next day, Taheri, the chief mullah in Esfahan, appealed to the workers to end the strike. But it continued. The growing sympathy of the rest of the working class in Esfahan (especially the steel workers) for the strike and the determination of the strikers themselves forced the management to retreat.

The plan for forcing the construction workers out was shelved, and it was announced that any transfers out of the National Steel Industry would be on a voluntary basis. On December 10, the strike ended with a victory.

An explosive situation

The Esfahan strike clearly had a major effect on the combativity of the working class. In the following four and a half months alone, up until May 1985, there were over twenty other strikes. They occurred, for example in Bella (shoes), Machin Sazy-e-Arak, Samara (a contractor in the Mobarakeh steel project), Kafsh-e-Melli (shoes), and Profil-e-Pars (construction materials).

Given the worsening economic and political crisis of the Islamic regime, any increase in industrial disputes is going to have a major effect on the stability of the regime. This is especially so since, in order to normalize the bourgeois order, the government has to make further attacks on the working class. Undoubtedly, the next period is going to be of decisive importance for the future of the regime.

Many signs can be seen already that the mood of the masses has changed since the summer of 1981. In fact, a general discontent seems to be rising to explosive levels. The most minor incidents sometimes lead to major confrontations with the repressive forces of the regime. A particularly eloquent example is the one at the Amjadieh football stadium in early October 1984. Just because the management sold more tickets than it had seats, and therefore could not accommodate all the people who showed up, within a few hours an angry crowd, 60 thousand strong, was on the rampage, beating up the hezbollahis, almost burning down the stadium, and demonstrating on the streets until late into the night.

Many clashes have taken place in the poor neighbourhoods between the forces of the regime and the urban poor over questions such as water and electricity or housing, the latest coming in Ghaleh-e-Hasan Khan [in Tehran] in June. In that case, the conflict was over water. For almost ten days, there were constant clashes between the people of the area and the pasdaran and the gendarmes. The incident ended with the arrest of over 200 people and the demolition of eighty houses. We are going to see a lot more developments like this. The regime is now trying to evict the poor from the shanty towns that they have built in the last few years. Such attempts have already led to many violent clashes, for example in Zoor Abad outside Karaj, and Shak-e-Ahmadyieh, Khak-e-Sepid, Nazi Abad, and Afsarieh outside Tehran.

These problems are being aggravated by the growing unpopularity of a war that the regime cannot afford to end. In March and April of this year, there were many anti war demonstrations in Tehran, Ahwaz, Tabriz, and other cities.

On April 10, in the south of Tehran (Kuy-e-Sizdah-e-Aban), a youth was killed by a *basiji* thug. The people went on the rampage, burning tires and blocking the roads. Slogans of "Down with Khomeini! Down with the war!" were heard until late into the night. Hundreds of people were arrested by the pasdaran.

It is in these conditions, moreover, that we are seeing a rise in workers struggles. If this trend continues, the explosion of a mass movement against Khomeini becomes more and more likely. The wave of terror in the summer of 1981 indeed dealt a severe blow to the revolutionary mass movement. But over the last four years, it has been shown that this defeat was not so deep as to prevent a new rise in revolutionary struggles by the masses. □

Toward overcoming the crisis of Solidarnosc

THE FOLLOWING article was originally published in the Polish *Inprekor*, No 19, summer 1985. It is the second part of a long article on the crisis in Solidarnosc, the first part of which was published in English in *International Viewpoint*, No. 81, July 29, 1985.

In 1984, a book was published underground in Poland. Its title was *Konspira*, which might be translated "The Underground." It brought together and presented a series of discussions with several of the main leaders of the Solidarnosc underground that were carried out in 1982 and 1983.

This book gave an idea of some of the debates around strategic and tactical options for the independent union movement. Let us begin by citing some extracts concerning the debate that has taken place on rebuilding the Polish social movement after the institution of the state of war on December 13, 1981:

"The idea of building organizational structures in accordance with the universal principle of the construction trade, that is starting from the foundations and not the roof, was accepted overwhelmingly. But differences appeared as soon as it became necessary to define what the foundations were. In one region, it was the plants that should be the basis for construction. In another, it was independent groups, whose civic activity was to be based on a social milieu, on relations among neighbors or generational links.

"The regional commissions and possible national center were seen as upper floors to be built later, while ideas differed about how useful they might be. Thus, the organizational form adopted by the underground in a given region was determined by the view of the main trade-union leaders in that region.

"Zbigniew Bujak Wiktor Kulerski [Warsaw region leaders], opting for the old conception of the democratic opposition, chose the model of broad 'socialized' resistance. Wladyslaw Frasyuniuk, who was preparing Lower Silesia for a general strike, perforce put the stress on the plants ...

"The two Warsaw underground leaders stressed mass activity, which took various forms. On the one hand,

there was the fight in the plants essentially for the right to continue trade-union activity. On the other, there were divers social initiatives, such as the aid committees set up in the parishes — which took the responsibility for helping the victims of repression — the independent press and publishing houses, the national education councils, the councils for culture and science, or the networks of centers of the Society of Workers Universities. According to this conception, only such a mosaic of resistance could counterbalance the monopolistic nature of the regime. On the other hand, any attempt to give the underground cohesion, the cohesion necessary to prepare for a general strike would run the risk of failure ...

"The conception of the struggle put forward by Wladyslaw Frasyuniuk in Wroclaw was counterposed to the model of long-term resistance worked out in Warsaw. Frasyuniuk judged Bujak and Kulerski's ideas about improving the society by changing the thinking of people to be very high-minded, but it seemed to him that they bordered on capitulation. In Lower Silesia, charitable committees, study circles, mutual aid among neighbors or members of the same social milieu, and councils for culture and science seemed important but not decisive factors. In fact, Frasyuniuk said, it is the workers in the big plants, the shipyards, the steelworks, and the mines who will determine the future and not the intellectuals organized in friendly circles. This is why the main stress was put on building organizations in the plants in order to prepare the way for the general strike." (1)

To our knowledge, only *Inprekor* pointed out at the time that two dif-

1. Lopinski, Moskit, Wilk, 'Konspira-Rzecz o podziemnej Solidarnosci', republished in France by les Editions Spothania, Paris, 1984, pp. 53 and 69.

ferent strategic lines had appeared within the national trade-union leadership during the initial period of rebuilding Solidarnosc in the underground. (Cf. in particular, Zbigniew Kowalewski's article "The Line of the Factories") (2).

It is only with the publication of *Konspira* that leaders of Solidarnosc have recognized the existence of these two opposed lines. This is a positive development because this divergence is the essential starting point for understanding the evolution of the social movement in Poland after December 1981 and the reasons for its present state.

In an article written in May 1985 (3), we described the most recent symptoms of the grave crisis of the social movement as it was revealed at the time of the murder of Jerzy Popielusko and the price rise in February 1985. At the same time, we tried to analyze some of the underlying causes of this crisis. In this article, we want to take this up again.

In fact, we are convinced that a factor that contributed enormously, perhaps even decisively, to the crisis of the Polish social movement is precisely the fact that the "line of the factories and of a general strike" put forward by the leadership of Solidarnosc in Lower Silesia did not prevail throughout the country, and that it was abandoned even in the region in which it had emerged. It can be stated today that this represented a grave setback for the social movement.

This line aimed at preserving two essential gains, which were linked to each other, of the 1980-81 revolution. The first was the fact that the working class emerged as a subject, confirming its hegemony within the social movement. Thus, we advanced from the phase marked by the activities of the democratic opposition to that of the mass movement, whose proletarian character was consolidated at every step through the forms of organization, struggle, and democratic functioning that were adopted. The second gain was the experience of self-organization, which grew into an experiment in mass self-management, "The yeast for a future self-managed state of a self-managed society," as Frasiński aptly put it.

In a period of counterrevolution in which every social activity runs up against obstacles a hundred times greater than in a time of revolution, the preservation of such gains depends on the determination of a conscious minority, on its resolve not to let itself be stopped by obstacles or to halt only to gather forces to surmount them. In a period of revolution, the self-organization and independent activity of the masses result from a

spontaneous mass upsurge. However, while it is true that this process facilitates the advance of a self-management consciousness in the mass movement, it contributes to the working class developing political consciousness, while it depends only partially on the level of consciousness previously attained. It is quite different in a period of counterrevolution.

In such a period, the factor of consciousness plays an absolutely decisive role, because the self-organization and autonomous activity of the masses depend on it, even if it is represented only by a minority. If the leading bodies of the movement are not the vehicles for this self-management consciousness, they will tend to retreat and bring on a retreat of the movement as a whole.

Thus, we have seen certain leaders move backward, going back to the positions of the pre-August 1980 democratic opposition, despite the fact that the social base produced by the revolution of 1980-81 is incomparably broader than what existed before. The fact that the only concrete response to the murder of Popielusko was the setting up of the Defense Committees Against Violence is the most recent demonstration of this evolution.

"Where is the team that's going to weld the anti-tank barriers?"

The authors of *Konspira* state that in opting for the old conceptions of the democratic opposition, the Solidarnosc leaders chose a model of broad, "socialized" resistance. But this does not correspond to the reality, since it is the opposite that has happened. Nonetheless, it is the orientation of these leaders that has prevailed within the underground national leadership (TKK).

We do not claim that this was a conscious move from start to finish, although the Warsaw trade-union leaders obviously did everything possible to impose this line. Moreover, there is no need to have any strategy to achieve this. When you do not know what to do, to avoid problems, you adopt the line of least resistance. And, as Bogdan Borusewicz suggests, this is in fact what happened. The clandestine leadership of Solidarnosc "lost sight of the goal" of the struggle. (4) The fact that this was the result of a decline in self-management consciousness within this body emerges clearly today.

Implementation of the line adopted by the Regional Strike Committee of Solidarnosc in Lower Silesia (the RKS) proved much more difficult than it seemed at the outset. Frasiński had already realized this

before his arrest at the end of September 1982. He explained that the long and patient work of organizing the underground union was coming into conflict with the Polish national character, which prefers "fireworks," when what was needed in this case was to construct one relay after another, to carefully plan the struggle, to prepare backups in case of failure.

To *Konspira*'s authors, Frasiński said: "I regret that in April 1982, the TKK did not set a target date with respect to the preparations for a general strike in the regions. The problem, obviously, was not to set an exact date for the strike, that would be idiotic, but to fix a time for setting up enterprise structures, for developing systems of liaison, supply, and defense of the factories against the repressive forces, etc. Instructions, regulations, or established time-tables would serve no purpose unless there was organization at the basic level. Likewise, charismatic leaders would not solve our problems.

"Since January [1982], we have not ceased our old refrain: Build factory structures, build factory structures ... Some people answered us by saying, 'It's being done,' but we don't at all know why. 'The factory is organized, we are putting into practice the RKS's ten commanders of December 1981, we are helping victims of repression, we are collecting dues, we are putting our own journal, we are printing a version of *Z Dnia na Dzień* (5), we are organizing discussion clubs' — and what then? We met them and said to them, 'OK, is everything ready already? Do you think that if we call the general strike now, everything will come off smoothly?' 'No,' they answered, 'because we only have one treasurer and about twenty activists, even if the others pay their dues without having to be asked.' And I insisted, 'I am asking you where is the guy who is going to

2. Published originally as a supplement to *Robotnik 83*, Paris, May 1983, and republished in the Polish *Inprekor*, No 8-9, 1983. This article was then republished again in French in *Quatrieme Internationale*, No. 11, 1983.

3. The article in *Inprekor*, No 18, was republished in *International Viewpoint*, No 81, July 29, 1985, under the title of 'A Crisis of Leadership and of Perspectives.'

4. Interview with Bogdan Borusewicz, *Kultura*, Paris, No. 11, 1984. It was cited in *TV*, No. 81, July 29. Bogdan Borusewicz, one of the founders of the KOR, later inspirer of the struggle for free trade unions on the Baltic coast, one of the leaders of the August 1980 strike in Gdansk, was subsequently removed from the regional leadership of Solidarnosc in Gdansk. He went underground on December 13, 1981, and played an important role in restructuring the underground union in the region. After the arrest of Bogdan Lis in June 1984, he took the lead of the union in the region.

5. The central organ of the RKS in Lower Silesia. At the time it was published twice a week.

direct the defense of the gate, where is the team that's going to weld antitank barriers, what system of liaison with the other plants do you have?" Then they shook their heads, saying that it wasn't in shape yet, but in a month ... It is clear moreover, that the system of defense against the riot police will have to be different in Pafawag, or in Chemitex, or still more so in the port or the refinery. This is why no RKS, no Bujak, Lis or Frasnyniuk can invent anything brilliant without the activists in the plant in question. It's up to them to show their inventiveness. But they are waiting, saying, there is Bujak, all Poland knows him, the whole world knows them, so let him tell us how to make a gun or block a gate, or how many guys should be posted along the factory wall. Maybe I'm a pessimist, but I see already what is going to happen the moment the strike breaks out, workers wondering whether or not they should put on armbands ... And here's the chief of the RKS. We're going to ask him. But at that moment, it will be too late to discuss." (6)

"Spontaneity prevails in periods of uprising"

In part, the difficulties were related to the fact that Frasnyniuk had set rather ambitious objectives, which influenced the way he assessed the results. Moreover, the line proposed was quite static, too centered on the sole perspective of a general strike. It was only on the eve of his arrest that he started stressing the importance of struggles around partial and immediate objectives enabling the workers to accumulate a certain experience.

He was convinced, moreover, that it should be possible, with organization and a conscious and rational leadership, to limit the spontaneous element to the maximum. However, this factor has played a decisive role in every mass movement, and it is necessary to take account of it in the strategy you adopt.

Far from trying to eliminate spontaneity, it is necessary to try to take the best advantage of it by means of organization and an adequate leadership. Frasnyniuk posed the question in the following terms:

"It would be easy to launch the strike only when we are really ready. But it may be that at that moment the regime will also be well prepared for a confrontation. And what then? Then it's either failure or paying too high a price for victory. So, it is necessary to wait for the precise instant when the chances will be best and the price that will have to

be paid is least. But in order to be able to decide on the right moment, people have to be conscious of the implications of this choice, they have to be organizationally ready and patient." (7)

This was undoubtedly the weakest element in his strategy. Such a high degree of rationality on the part of the mass movement and that kind of influence by a conscious leadership in determining the moment to enter into struggle are quite simply impossible in a living social movement. Regardless of the level of organization and preparation, or the political and organizational solidity of the leadership, spontaneity prevails in periods of uprisings.

A partial or general mass strike never breaks out the way, for example that the Warsaw insurrection was unleashed in August 1944, that is, in response to an order from above. That is impossible, because what is involved is not a clandestine organization, political or military, but a social milieu involving the workers or one or several plants or the working class in its entirety. In October 1982, when Solidarnosc was banned, the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk went on strike without asking the question whether the regime was "well prepared" or not.

Moreover, this was not the sort of thing that the underground leaders considered, when trying to understand what had happened, they concluded that all that would have been needed to get a general strike going would have been for "Bogdan Lis [at that time, member of the TKK responsible for the Gdansk region] to go into the struck shipyard."

However, if it is true that everything then depended on what Lis did, this shows the decisive role of leadership in a struggle breaking out "unexpectedly." In fact, it is clear that the strike in the Lenin shipyard took the underground leaders by surprise. A poll carried out in the Gdansk workplaces shortly before October 8 "excluded any perspective of a general strike in response to the outlawing of Solidarnosc." (8)

When social tension mounts suddenly, no poll carried out prior to the event can give an indication of what reactions should be expected, because responses can change in a twinkling, they shift from day to day and evolve from hour to hour. It may be that the very workers in a factory that gave no sign of militancy 48 hours before will be precisely the ones that set the struggle rolling.

As for the preparedness of the enemy, in this case the Jaruzelski regime, at a given time, it has to be realized that the surprise effect produced by a mass action, with the

disarray it provokes or the differences that appear in the leadership, can disorient the ranks of forces that are "well prepared for confrontation," demoralize them, limit their capacity for making decisions. It may also turn out that the preparedness of the regime's apparatus does not necessarily mean that it has much fighting spirit, and that only a struggle can test that.

In a general way, it is always possible to retreat — even if this involves unavoidable losses — when the enemy demonstrates the sort of combat readiness that could inflict a defeat.

Does all this mean that organization, that preparation for combat have no importance? "In a word, should we improvise? That's fine for musicians and poets," Frasnyniuk said. "As for me, I'm against improvisation. As a driver by trade, I can't see myself driving an improvised vehicle, with an engine and no brakes, or vice versa." (9)

You cannot go from one extreme to the other. Mass struggle has better chances for success to the extent that it is based on good organization and well prepared. But it may very well get started in a plant (or a region) that, however "explosive" the situation there may be, is not in the best position to take the lead of the movement.

In that case, it is necessary to extend the struggle as rapidly as possible to other plants or regions that are better prepared and which, while they may not be "explosive," are, nonetheless, ready to join in the struggle that others have initiated. It is on them, moreover, that the continuation of the struggle will depend, until it becomes generalized. This is probably what would have happened in October 1982 if Lis had gone into the shipyard where a strike had gotten underway, and if Bujak had done what he was ready to do, that is, to go into the Ursus tractor factory and, together with the workers there, call a strike in Warsaw.

Two days later, Lower Silesia could have touched off a general strike, according to what Piotr Bednarz (who succeeded Frasnyniuk when the latter was arrested) told the members of the TKK. And since this was the only region, along with Nowa Huta, that was in any way prepared for a general strike, there is every reason to bet that it would have played a key role in the struggle.

You cannot expect to achieve a high level of social organization and preparedness for mass struggle uni-

6. 'Konspira', pp. 70-71.

7. Ibid. pp. 69-70.

8. Ibid. p. 141.

9. Ibid. p. 71.

formly within a single industrial center, and still less in a region or the country as a whole. The law of uneven and combined development applies fully in this regard. Combativity develops in an uneven way in a social movement.

Those underground union organizations that at a given moment have shown that they were best prepared to go into battle, fall back after a certain time, if the struggle does not take off, and such retreat is more or less prolonged. But at the same time other organizations that until then were behind come to a greater degree of preparedness.

If we criticize some aspects of the "line of the factories and the general strike" worked out jointly by Frasnyniuk and his comrades in Lower Silesia, Piotr Bednarz and Jozef Pinior, it is in a fraternal and constructive spirit, because we continue to think that the orientation that they have put forward represents the essential gain achieved by the underground Solidarnosc in terms of a strategy for the social movement.

Moreover, the weak sides of this orientation were corrected as the experience of the movement was enriched and as the development of the political situation demanded taking a less schematic approach. For example, after the August 31, 1982, demonstrations that affected the entire country, Frasnyniuk, in concert with the Solidarnosc leader at Nowa Huta, Wladyslaw Hardek, "insisted on going forward" towards a general strike, although they were aware that in most of the major industrial centers, the level of organization and preparedness were quite inadequate, and that even in their own regions, the situation was far from ideal. That means that they were relying to a large extent on the spontaneous factor.

Under the leadership of Jozef Pinior, the RKS of Lower Silesia took a big step forward in working out strategy and tactics for the mass struggle in the winter and spring of 1983. In an energetic way this leadership took the initiative in struggles around partial and immediate objectives. This approach was concretized in the week of protest in March 1983, in which the central slogans were for immediate and unconditional amnesty for all the political prisoners and for fighting the price increase.

Moreover, in the framework of preparing for an active defense of the plants during a general strike, it was proposed to set up a special trade-union structure, forming detachments of a Solidarnosc workers guard in the main factories that would play the role of executive organs of the RKS.



May 1 in Wroclaw. Solidarnosc marches under the noses of the military (DR)

Finally, Pinior thought that establishing social control over the economy would be one of the essential tasks that would determine the success or failure of a general strike. The arrest of Pinior and the adoption by the leadership that succeeded him of a diametrically opposite line led the Lower Silesian RKS to follow quite another course.

Two opposing lines

"Success of the strike line also depended," Frasnyniuk said, "on its acceptance and implementation in other regions. Wroclaw alone, isolated from the rest of Poland, could not win. The RKS thought that its tactic was the best, but it realized that if the other centers did not put it into practice, social activity would fall off in Lower Silesia as well." (10)

That is what happened as Frasnyniuk recognized immediately when he came out of prison at the end of the summer of 1984. Analyzing the state of the underground movement that he found, he said: "It is hard to talk about Solidarnosc as a multilayered organization covering the country. Here, I am thinking about plant, enterprise, regional, or inter-regional structures.

"I even have the impression that the question of setting up and building such structures has been put into the background in the work of the union. Likewise, as regards news on the problems of the plant, the space accorded it in the trade-union press is very limited. These are negative signs, pointing to the disappearance or breakdown of structures of the union that until recently were one of its foundations, that is the union committees in the factories and the factory news networks." (11)

In a taped statement played on September 6, 1984, in the Zolibroz neighborhood church in Warsaw, Bujak said, "We cannot be satisfied with the fact that Solidarnosc remains alive in our hearts. It has to be alive in our factories. Each one of us has to help to bring that about. Only what you do in your workplaces will count and will decide the future of Solidarnosc. All of you have to go back into your factories with that conviction."

This could be applauded, if it were not just preaching at the workers, since, unfortunately, to our knowledge, this orientation was never that of the Warsaw Solidarnosc leadership before or after that statement. And it is this leadership whose line prevailed in the social movement after 1982. Unlike the Lower Silesian RKS up until the spring of 1982, the Warsaw leadership never tried to focus the work on the factories, on building and activating trade-union and self-management structures in the core of the working class.

These two orientations did not simply reflect two different approaches, ideas and conceptions that could be analyzed on their own, leaving aside their social context. In fact, one was a working-class line, while the other was the product mainly of a milieu of the intelligentsia.

It is made clear in *Konspira* that the Warsaw Solidarnosc leaders, with the project of building an "underground society," opted for the conception held by the pre-1980 democratic opposition. You have to realize that the conceptions prevailing in this opposition came from the democratic intelligentsia.

What is more, it was no accident that a small fraction of this opposition,

10. *Ibid.* P. 70

11. 'Z Dnia na Dzień', No. 1/345, 1985.

grouped around the journal *Robotnik*, which turned toward the working class and played a decisive role in preparing the way for the outbreak of the revolution of August 1980, acted not only independently of the rest of the opposition but remained on the fringes of it.

In the new post-December 1981 context, a return to the orientation that prevailed within the democratic opposition in the past could not fail to have a social meaning. This could only favor the circles that had originated these positions, express above all their inclinations, assure that their needs would be served, and reflect their limits.

More or less explicitly, adopting this orientation was a way of turning away from the working class, of limiting its role as the leading element in the social movement. It then became inevitable that the technical activity, and the political initiative would pass more and more into the hands of the intelligentsia within the framework of this movement, with the working class being relegated again to its traditional passive role.

In pointing this out, we are not of course advocating a vulgar sociological approach that mechanically derives all ideological and political activities from a given social base. The idea of counterposing workers and intellectuals is far from our minds. There have been, and still are, many examples of fruitful collaboration between these two social groups in the underground Solidarnosc.

Away from the working class

Frasyniuk pointed out the important role played by the independent groups in the schools of higher education in Wroclaw in building the underground trade-union organization in the region. "They included doctors whose titles did not keep them from running a mimeograph. The university printers then trained the guys in the big factories so that they could bring out their press autonomously." (12)

For the democratic intelligentsia that takes its stand resolutely alongside the working class, convinced that the transformation of the society depends on the workers, the essential task is to transmit their own knowledge or skill to the workers so that they can be as independent as possible.

However, this has nothing to do with the notion that the workers have to swallow the elucubrations of the intelligentsia passively, or even with a practice of teaching them a series of useful things without giving them the means to manage for themselves.

Unfortunately, relations between the two social groups have evolved in this second way rather than in the first, perpetuating a division of labor contrary to the nature and aspirations of the social movement. It is not by chance that in the current vocabulary the term "society," without reference to class has replaced the other "society" that during the revolution was defined by factory smokestacks.

At the beginning of 1985, one of our Polish readers wrote us, saying: "During the past year, Solidarnosc has moved further away from trade-union and working-class positions, to turn its eyes more toward the 'national mysteries.' The concept of the nation is introduced into everything, with the class conflicts being melted down into this stew. Maybe this year has been a positive one from the standpoint of certain social layers as regards the growth and reinforcement of areas of independent cultural and political life, but from the standpoint of the interests of the proletariat it was a setback. This is one more proof that the underground leaders have diverted Solidarnosc onto the wrong track by focusing on the national question instead of mobilizing the masses of workers on the basis of defending and realizing their class interests. While the first question is very important, it is the second that is decisive."

Another problem is created by the fact that certain church circles are clearly trying to assert their dominance over the social movement. This does not refer, of course, to ordinary priests or even some members of the hierarchy who have devoted themselves entirely to the service of the social movement. It refers to elements of the church apparatus that want to transform the movement into an appendage of the religious institutions.

Pointing to the experience of a region in eastern Poland, the same reader wrote us: "You can see an offensive by a part of the church and its ideologues in the union to get the tasks that belong to the union taken over by the institutions linked to the church — the Family Pastorate, the Family Mutual Aid, the Workers Pastorate, the Youth Oases, the Independent Scout Movement, etc. These institutions enjoy advantages such as the moral support and collaboration of former internees and 'historic' leaders of the union, an extensive publishing and distribution network, well-tested educational structures.

"The existence alongside those of Solidarnosc of other channels for information and independent activity — in particular semilegal institutions protected by the church — is

leading more and more people to the latter. I do not think that this phenomenon is limited to my region. The Church is aiming openly to take Solidarnosc's place in the political game with the regime. The union is tolerating the Church's maneuvers, which are disarming it to the extent they are obliging it to moderate its fight against the ruling class. I am afraid that this process is cutting deeper and deeper, because no one is calling for putting a stop to it."

Moreover, we have seen an undermining of pluralism and democracy within the underground Solidarnosc as a consequence of the imbalance that has appeared between the leadership bodies and the base of the social movement, the weakening of the links between the leading organs and the factory commissions, and given the influence that the conceptions of nonproletarian currents have acquired in the underground leadership.

There are more and more cases of leading bodies putting material pressures on rank-and-file structures of Solidarnosc in order to bring them to heel. Some structures, considered too independent in their activity or their political orientation, have found themselves isolated by a cut-off of information concerning them. On several occasions, notably when the balance sheet of the boycott of the 1984 elections was drawn up and when *Konspira* was published, the organ of the Warsaw Interenterprise Committee of Solidarnosc (MRKS) has protested against such practices by Bujak. (13)

However, the most brutal and most significant attack against pluralism within the union has come in Upper Silesia. In the fall of 1984, the Regional Executive Commission (RKW) of Solidarnosc, represented in the TKK by Tadeusz Jedynek, who is today in prison, published a statement unprecedented in the history of Solidarnosc. Among other things, it said that the Provisional Coordinating Committee of the Mines (TKKG) active in the same region was "operating outside the union," because "the contacts and composition of the commission in question are unknown to us."

In fact, the organ of the RKW (14) showed clearly that what was involved was political differences between the two structures, specifically the TKKG's support for the British miners' strike and the RKW's accusing it of "ultra-leftist-anarchist deviations." The latter "concept," moreover, is taken straight out of the regime's propaganda.

There is only one way to get out of the crisis of the social movement.

12. *Konspira*, p. 39.

13. Cf. *CDN-Glos Wolnego Robotnika*, No. 80, 1984, and No. 104, 1985.

14. *RIS*, No. 11, 1984.



Dispersion of a demonstration of Solidarnosc in August 1983 (DR)

It is to build the self-organization and workers self-management current formerly embodied in the "line of the factories and the general strike." But this does not mean simply returning to this line, because today the conditions are different from those that prevailed during the first year after the establishment of the state of war. The social movement then was still to a large extent being "carried by the wave" of the pre-December 1981 period, drawing its strength from the gains of the period of the revolution. But this impetus has long since become exhausted.

The need to organize the workers self-management current

For a long while, the TKK has not included a single regional leader that could be considered to represent the "line of the factories" current or to be close to it. This does not mean that the situation may not evolve, but it is better not to have any illusions that things will improve on their own in this respect. In fact, as we have seen, the spontaneous trend is exactly the opposite.

So, there is no point of departure or natural springboard for building this current. The TKK and the regional leaderships, which are tending to move further and further away from the working-class foundations of the movement, are under growing pressure from milieus that are pushing, consciously or not, in the opposite direction.

The self-organization and workers self-management current cannot be

built today from below and horizontally. It can base itself only on scattered union groups, as well as on political or political-trade-union groups in which self-management consciousness remains strong, and which in turn base themselves on the workers or take on the task of defending the immediate and historic interests of the working class. What has to be done first is to end the dispersion of these forces, achieve coordination and cooperation among them on the basis of programmatic conceptions worked out in common.

This current has to adopt an orientation different in three aspects from the line of Lower Silesia. The first question that needs to be asked is why the latter orientation was not maintained, and the requisite conclusions have to be drawn from that fact. Indeed, those who put forward this line failed to realize that in a period of counterrevolution it would not be possible to maintain such an orientation, much less gather forces around it in the social movement, unless it were embodied in appropriate forms of organization.

Different forms of consciousness have to be matched by corresponding forms of organization. It is unconceivable that the union as a whole could be the carrier of a self-management consciousness. As a mass organization, the union includes workers with very different levels of consciousness — from those who are sensitive only to the immediate material and moral interests of their professional group or social milieu, to those who are conscious of the general and historic interests of the working class and who are struggling for its libera-

tion.

Therefore, there is every reason to bet that in the long run self-management consciousness may disappear, if it does not find its own organizational expression in the social movement.

This is why the coordinating committee (the "alliance," to pick up the term used in the debates underway in Poland) which is to provide a foundation for the self-organization and workers self-management current must have its own political and ideological identity and be based on a separate organizational structure.

However, the fact that such a current exists and organizes itself separately must not in any way alter the status of its components, in particular the various trade-union structures that may adhere to the alliance. The latter must remain what they are, that is, links in the Solidarnosc chain. For them, participating in such a coordinating body should be only to enable them to better accomplish their responsibility, to better carry out the tasks required to defend the rights, dignity, and interests of the workers. This coordination must arm them to better defend the program of Solidarnosc. It must aid them to work out effective tactics for the immediate struggle, so as to place the latter in the framework of a strategy designed to achieve the objective of its program, that is, to set up a self-managed republic.

In the second place, without losing sight of the question of the general strike, the "line of the factories" today has to be primarily an orientation of fighting for immediate

objectives, both partial and transitional. The wave that carried the mass movement ebbed finally in October 1982, when the leadership proved incapable of seizing the opportunity represented by the strike at the Lenin shipyard in Gdansk in response to the outlawing of Solidarnosc. That was the last moment for blocking a relative stabilization of the totalitarian regime and for assuring the continuity of the August revolution.

The question that is posed today for the social movement is how to assemble the preconditions for a new revolutionary upsurge starting from a more or less consolidated counter-revolutionary situation.

At the time, the problem was how to rekindle the flame of a national general strike from the fire of the Gdansk strike. Today, it is how to use a spark, such as the strike at the Rosa Luxemburg factory in February-March 1985 (15), to light the fire of a broader struggle in some other plants.

The example of the workers at the Rosa Luxemburg factory, was followed at the beginning of May by the workers at the Stella textile factory in Zyrardow, who fought for similar demands. On May 3, in the wake of the victory at the Stella factory, a strike for the right to Saturdays off broke out in the Pokires factory, another textile concern in Zyrardow. Every one of these strikes ended in a relative success.

However, these successes could have been much greater if the following conditions had been met: If each strike had not started just as the preceding one was ending. If the demands put forward by the workers at the Rosa Luxemburg factory had been taken up, as the Solidarnosc workers committee there had demanded, by a certain number of factories in Lodz with a mainly female workforce [most of the workers in all these striking factories were women], as well as by other enterprises. If the social movement's interregional structures had at least provided a relatively rapid circulation of information in these enterprises, to say nothing of coordinating the struggles in progress. And finally, if the personnel in the enterprise had had a higher level of trade-union organization and had taken on the task of calling for negotiations on the demands that were common to the plants that went out on strike after Rosa Luxemburg. The task of the current for self-organization and self-management is to help to promote just such processes.

The alliance in question should, therefore, work for advancing struggles around partial and immediate objectives that can open up the way

for struggles for transitional objectives, both socio-economic and political. It should promote the extension and coordination of such struggles. It should disseminate the demands that underlie them, stressing those demands that can unite the workers, whether this is on the level of a single enterprise, or several, or the working class as a whole.

The experience of past struggles and the forms of struggle that proved effective should be publicized. At the same time, the alliance should point up the slightest victories achieved in one or another place in order to indicate the way forward. It should also give information about missed opportunities in order to draw the lessons from them.

Another task is to teach people how to analyze the relationship of forces in a workshop, factory, region, or the country as a whole, as well as the art of exposing the weak points of the regime and discerning the strong points of social movement on all levels in order to be able to take advantage of them to advance the self-organization of the workers, their independent activity, and the defense of their interests.

Colonel Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, the military chief of the center for testing public opinion, said a few months ago at a meeting with the regime's propaganda heads that the level of social tension reached "would have already amounted to a revolutionary

situation if it had not been accompanied by a confidence no less high in the stability of the institutions." (16)

Quite right! What is needed is to alter this conviction, which is as false as it is widespread, starting in the factories. A mass struggle, even on a limited scale, well led and spreading rapidly to other factories and well coordinated is the means for getting workers to realize that the regime is far from being stabilized, and that it is possible through such a struggle to expose and increase its weaknesses.

Strategy for revolution

However, orienting to such struggles, patiently building the conditions that will enable them to grow, cannot at all mean abandoning the strategy of the general strike or relegating it to some indefinite future. To the contrary, the current for workers self-organization and self-management should be a constant and determined advocate of such a perspective.

Among workers in Solidarnosc, you often hear it said that the general strike is not "for tomorrow." It is easy to agree entirely with such a statement, but a general strike is never "for tomorrow." It was not in August 1980 either, up until the day that the workers at the Lenin shipyard decided to go into an occupation strike to win full satisfaction of their demands.

The main task today is certainly not preparing the enterprise and inter-enterprise trade-union organizations of Solidarnosc for a general strike. But in every one of the enterprise commissions set up, it is necessary at least to draw up a plan for occupying the plant, to maintain a minimum of contacts with the trade-union commissions in the neighboring factories, and prepare a system of self-defense for the plant in the event of a strike. As Frasyniuk said, it is necessary to find someone able to organize defense of the gate, someone who knows how to make antitank obstacles, how many are needed, and where to put them, etc.

The third and last point is that the programmatic foundations of the alliance should lay out clearer strategic perspectives, going beyond those that the RKS of Lower Silesia elaborated in 1982 and at the start of 1983. It is necessary to break from any notion of "self-limited revolution" and long-lasting compromise with the ruling bureaucracy. Starting from there,

15. On this strike, see "Crisis of Leadership and Perspectives," in 'IV', No. 81, July 29, 1985.

16. Quoted in 'le Matin de Paris' of July 1, 1985.



INPRECOR

The first issue of Czech Inprecor has been out several months and issue No 2 is due out at the end of January. Inprecor is published under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International in Czech.

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the strategy of the general strike has to be linked to the question of power, and it has to be shown that the essential task of the coming Polish revolution will be precisely to solve the question.

It is impossible to smash the system of totalitarian power without replacing it by an independent, self-managed working-class system of rule arising out of the organs of a general strike. Whether they are struggles or immediate objectives or forms of self-organization resulting from them, it is only in the framework of such a strategy that mass struggles today and in the future can be transformed into a first conscious step toward the self-managed republic.

Today, as in the past, the independent union Solidarnosc is and will remain the essential form of self-organization for the workers, the main springboard for the advance toward workers self-management. It is the basis today for having a minimum of organization, coordination, and leadership in the mass struggles for immediate objectives. In such mobilizations, it is Solidarnosc that has to be built. It will be the basis for the establishment of dual power in a pre-revolutionary situation, as well as for organizing all workers for a revolutionary assault on the totalitarian power system.

The unions and the social movement called Solidarnosc is the gain of the working class and the Polish revolution of 1980-81. It is in it that the workers are organizing and acting today. Without this movement, the workers are condemned to atomization, to impotence, and to passivity. Any notion that it is possible to turn your back on Solidarnosc because there is some kind of alternative to it, whether it is a prayer circle or a political party, means deluding yourself and heading down a road that leads to defeat.

Even for those sections of the working class that are in full retreat, which retain only the idea of Solidarnosc, it is the only idea that can congeal into a material force when the time comes. Any form of independent social or political activity that is not designed to, or does not, help to build Solidarnosc cannot be called working-class activity.

This is why the current for workers self-organization and self-management must seek to rebuild and reinforce the independent union in the enterprises, in the cities and regions, in the core of the working class. It is only on this basis that it will be possible to set more ambitious objectives.

It is Solidarnosc that embodies the organization, unity, consciousness, and the struggle of the Polish working class! □

New currents in the Polish opposition

FOUR YEARS after General Jaruzelski's coup d'etat, the bureaucracy is redoubling its attacks against the working class. Although it has been weakened by the bureaucratic crackdown and faces systematic repression, Solidarnosc has maintained a level of organization that is unprecedented in the states under bureaucratic domination outside of periods of revolutionary upsurge. But this movement is in the grip of a crisis of orientation that is seriously undermining the working class's capacity for struggle.

The failures of Solidarnosc are today giving rise to a polarization within the Polish opposition. Certain currents are, in varying degrees, abandoning the gains of the 1980-81 revolution; others are trying, by good methods or bad, to preserve them. In this context, the emergence of a current, the Workers Opposition, that identifies with the working class, stands for its self-organization, and poses the question of the revolutionary overthrow of the bureaucracy, assumes an importance that cannot be underestimated. In the following article, we consider these various currents in the opposition to Jaruzelski's regime.

ARTHUR WILKINS and CYRIL SMUGA

"Anyone who does not strike is not going to eat or work any more." that was the slogan launched by *Hutnik*, Solidarnosc's bulletin in the Lenin steel complex of Nowa Huta. (1) It is a slogan that should be taken up by the Polish social movement as a whole. The underground leaderships of Solidarnosc have proved incapable up until today of extending strikes when they have broken out in significant plants.

In order to overcome this incapacity, it is essential to get rid of the idea that prevails in these leaderships that you can call a mobilization of the workers without preparation for abstract or illusory objectives. A good example of this approach is the call for a one-hour general strike last July 1 to show that the "society" wanted an economic reform and to put pressure on the regime to carry it out.

What is needed is to orient toward patiently building a relationship of forces based on the workers' basic demands, and then using the first victories as a lever to set in motion a transitional dynamic. But the orientations of the national and

regional leaderships of Solidarnosc remain far from such a line.

For some months in 1985, the Solidarnosc leaders devoted themselves more to building the boycott of the "elections" to the Diet than to organizing the fight to defend the material interests of the workers. One might wonder about such a choice of priorities. According to Solidarnosc's estimates, the October 13 elections to the Diet were boycotted by 34% of the citizens. This boycott certainly had a political meaning, because it showed that the "normalization" of the system of bureaucratic rule was far from being achieved. But it did not lead the bureaucracy to change its policy, because it could not. Such a "strategy of pressure" has proved ineffective more than once. And, in particular, it did not advance the self-organization of the masses one step.

The appearance in 1984 and especially in 1985 — in the period leading up to the Diet elections — of a new opposition current represented an important political development. This

1, *Hutnik* (Nowa Huta), No. 9 1985.

current has sought above all to find an opening for legal activity in the framework of the bureaucratic system of rule. Thus, it is taking up a position on the border line between opposition to the regime and collaboration with it.

"Loyal" opposition?

This current is very heterogeneous. It includes both the "neorealists," advocates of a so-called new rationalism, whose most well known figure is Andrzej Celinski, former secretary of the National Commission of Solidarnosc, as well as the nationalist sectors linked to the Young Poland movement, and, finally, the "independent neoconservatives" grouped around the journal *Res Publica*.

The neorealists consider that Solidarnosc has suffered a definitive and irrevocable defeat, that the present system of rule must be regarded as something that is going to last, that it is impossible to change it, and that therefore it is necessary to operate within its framework. In order to get out of the tragic situation in which Poland now finds itself, they think, it is necessary to establish a political accord on the basis of which the conflict between "the society and the regime" could be transformed in the future into collaboration.

If the society agrees that Poland cannot in the foreseeable future become a democratic state, this would make it possible to reach a situation in which the regime would respect the laws, govern the state effectively, and get the economy out of crisis. Along with this, the various social layers could express their interests in such a way as not to challenge the essential interests of the ruling stratum and not to worry the USSR. The neorealists were ready, for the sake of all that, to put up candidates for the Diet, if the regime of General Jaruzelski would agree to include them on the slates.

This "new rationalism" has been rejected unanimously by all the leaders of Solidarnosc and of the democratic opposition (i.e., the old KOR). Jan Litynski, who before August 1980 was one of the main forces in the journal *Robotnik* and is today in the underground leadership of Solidarnosc in the Warsaw region, has published a detailed critique of the positions of the neorealists. (2)

From the cell in which he was awaiting trial in Gdansk, Adam Michnik wrote the following about the neorealists: "We do not accuse anyone who disagrees with us of lacking good faith. We assess in a proper and serious way those who decide to

accept nomination from the general and to sit in the seats of the parliament. But if we, the people of Solidarnosc, are offered a private cage or a separate house in this zoo, we will answer with a calm conviction, 'play the game without us ...' Tomorrow, my trial may begin. Who gets a seat in the Chamber, and who gets a seat in the dock? ... I would rather sit on the defendants' bench with Bogdan Lis and Wladyslaw Frasyniuk than in the Diet with Rakowski and Siwak." (3)

The Young Poland movement was formed in August 1980, and its main base of support was the student youth in Gdansk. It subsequently worked with Solidarnosc, and its members could be found in particular among the full-timers in the union apparatus. It presented itself as a national-Catholic organization, harking back in a selective way to Roman Dmowski, the leader of the National Democracy, the very right-wing big bourgeois party that collaborated with the Russian authorities under czarism.

After the proclamation of the state of war, the Young Poland movement gradually withdrew from the activity of the underground Solidarnosc and sought "apolitical" means of legal activity, for example, in the self-managed university institutions.

The following is an analysis of the evolution of the Young Poland Movement and of the current around the journal *Res Publica* that appeared in *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, the weekly of Solidarnosc in Warsaw:

"Today we are seeing a change in tactics by at least a part of the old leaders of Young Poland. Seeking ways by which they can exert a real influence on the course of political events, they have reached the conclusion — and on this point they identify with Dmowski — that it is necessary to collaborate with the regime. Their critical attitude toward Solidarnosc and the underground activity is only the logical consequence of that. They think that this activity is leading down a blind alley, and that the boycott of the regime organized by Solidarnosc is a political error.

"The group that developed around the independent journal *Res Publica*, which also dates from before August 1980, has reached the same conclusion, despite different ideological premises, *Res Publica* harks back to conservative thought, the European tradition in which Christianity stood in the forefront. It was an elitist journal, with pronounced nationalist connotations. The people grouped around *Res Publica* aspired to produce ideology and, unlike the Young Poland movement, they avoided direct political commitment. But these two groups had a common approach to

politics, which they treated as a sort of game for the top echelons.

"This is why these two currents rejected the program of social self-management so as to concentrate on political thought elaborated by an elite. The critical assessment of Solidarnosc that was made on this basis before December 1981 naturally brought together the activists of both currents. So, the unofficial news from these circles that a part of them have undertaken negotiations with the government, proposing, among other things, participation in the future Diet, does not come as a surprise." (4)

The leaders of the Young Poland movement and the editors of *Res Publica* sought to obtain the support of the Catholic hierarchy for their negotiations with the regime. These dealings ended in a fiasco. The representatives of Young Poland did not get on the slates of candidates for the Diet, and *Res Publica* did not get legal status. The moves of these two groups have been criticized by *Tygodnik Mazowsze* and *Kos*, the journal of the Social Resistance Committee, among others. (5) As a result of this fiasco and the danger they ran of being discredited in the eyes of the activists in the social movement, the leaders of the Young Poland Movement and *Res Publica* felt obliged to publicly disavow the reports about their negotiations with the regime.

The critical attitude of the dominant currents in the Solidarnosc leadership and the democratic opposition toward the neo-realists and other potential capitulators to the regime does not, however, mean that the former have themselves abandoned the hope for a "national understanding." The old illusions and the conscious political options that derived from the "strategy of self-limited revolution" are still present in these circles.

However, when the positions of the currents dominant in the Solidarnosc leadership are criticized it cannot be forgotten that these are currents that are fighting, who stand on the right side of the barricades, facing the bureaucratic regime, and that they represent the social movement. But at the same time it has to be kept in mind that these currents also represent a political line that bears a very heavy

2. J. Litynski, "Nowy Racjonalizm czy stare złudzenia ('New Rationalism or Old Illusions')", *Kultura* (Paris), No. 9, 1985.

3. A. Michnik, "Wybory do sejmku PRL" ("The Elections to the Diet"), *Kultura*, No. 9, 1985.

4. *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, (Warsaw), No. 124, 1985.

5. *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, No. 124, 1985; *Kos* (Warsaw), Nos. 74 and 75, 1985.

responsibility for the present crisis of the social movement.

Michnik writes that Solidarnosc "is building a pluralist society in a totalitarian state and thereby seeking to impose an understanding, the essence of which is institutional recognition of this pluralism." Stressing that the social movement is not trying to overthrow the present regime through struggle, he says:

"You cannot exclude it if you are realistic, that even such a demand [for ousting the regime] could be formulated by the nation in another situation. The Communists have no divine right to rule Poland until the end of the world. Today, however, such a demand would mean a confrontation with the military power of the Big Brother." (6)

As was the case several times in the past, Jacek Kuron expressed an original political position. Before the "elections" to the Diet, he wrote that the "silent majority" of Polish society, which he estimates at 50%, today supports neither the regime nor the underground Solidarnosc. The supporters of the latter he said "come mainly from the proletariat in big industry and the intellectuals (and it is no accident if the best sections of Solidarnosc are based in the big industrial enterprises and the research institutes)."

Kuron stated: "The crisis can only get worse. The 'silent half' will have less and less reason to hope for improvements in its living conditions, and, once it reaches the depth of despair, there is always a danger of revolt. The authorities are certainly not unaware of this sombre reality. But this is not enough to get them to agree to resume contact with Solidarnosc. In the meantime, they have chosen the road of repression. Do they think that they can lock up all the oppositionists, that is, a quarter of the population?"

"There is reason to fear that such a tightening of the repression can lead to an explosion of anger. What then can we do to avert such a catastrophic course of events? What can we do in our situation, where the proximity of Soviet tanks rules out any idea of changing the regime? We must exploit all opportunities for putting pressure on the Communist regime in order to lead it to moderation and oblige it to take account of public opinion. Thus, for example, we are going to call for a boycott of the coming elections to the Diet in order to demonstrate our faith in a form of authentic social understanding. But can we convince the "silent half" of the effectiveness of our slogan?" (7)

Kuron feared that the answer to his last question would be "no,"



Identity check by armed police during an unofficial ceremony to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising (DR)

that, while today it is paralyzed by fear of the regime and its repressive apparatus, this "silent half" tomorrow could impel a revolt, which he thinks could have catastrophic results, and which he, therefore, fears.

Zbigniew Bujak also takes seriously the possibility of a social explosion. He explains: "The scope of such an explosion, its context, and its dynamic cannot be predicted today. We do not know what line of conduct the repressive apparatus will adopt then, to what extent the authorities will be able to quell the explosion, or how far they are prepared to go in making concessions. The leadership of Solidarnosc can limit itself to two demands — recognition of trade-union pluralism and, of course, stopping the repression of political activity. But will the social demands stop at that level? I suppose not. A lot will depend on the dynamic of the movement. All that the TKK can do is build a communications network nationally and organize the dissemination of information. That is why we support the creation of the greatest possible number of journals and publishing houses, because they will be able to take charge of this. We are also preparing to give expression to the social demands and to offer the means to realizing them." (8)

It seems that while Kuron fears an explosion and wants to avert it, Bujak accepts that it is inevitable and is trying to assure that it will find organization and leadership. However, it is difficult to say if these two approaches are really different in practice. That may be doubted,

if you think back to past experiences. There is no question that if a social explosion took place, its scope would far exceed the organizational frameworks and leadership capacities that can be built up in advance in underground conditions.

"Only in the plants that the regime can be defeated"

In such a situation, it is unfortunately possible that Bujak and the leaders of the social movement politically closest to him will try to prevent the explosion of revolt and find themselves taking up positions similar to the one expressed by Kuron. Their behaviour at the time of the last major manifestation of social tension, that provoked by the murder of the priest Jerzy Popieluszko in October 1984, attests that such an assumption is not purely hypothetical. At the time, they left no stone unturned to prevent an explosion.

The attitude of the underground leadership of Solidarnosc on that occasion has been criticized recently by Jozef Pinior, the former chair of the Lower Silesia Regional Strike Committee: "They murder a priest before the eyes of all Europe, they cynically admit it, and we do not react. It is like testing a cake with a knife to see if it is done. You stab

6. A. Michnik, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 11.

7. A statement by Jacek Kuron, 'Le Monde' of August 10, 1985.

8. "Wywiad ze Zbigniewem Bujakiem," ('Interview with Zbigniew Bujak'), 'Kultura', No. 9, 1985, p. 46.

a knife in and you feel a resistance. They are testing a society in the same way ... The problem was then not to arouse a determination to struggle, to wake people up. It was clear that the human tide wanted to protest. Was it possible to organize the protest? It was necessary to show that that tide had its own organization, capable of focusing it around an objective and a slogan. Today, it is quite obviously unimaginable that the TKK should proclaim a general strike. We are all waiting for spontaneous strikes, when the limit of pauperization is passed and people turn off the machines. But in the wake of Popielusko's murder, the situation was different from the one today. The sea was stormy, and what was needed was to find an opening so that the storm could explode." (9)

This statement by Pinior indicates that among the main leaders of Solidarnosc there are today serious political differences. The position expressed recently by Andrzej Slowik, chair of Solidarnosc in the Lodz region, confirms the existence of such differences. Before the proclamation of the state of war, Slowik was one of the advocates of the "hard" trade-unionist and self-management line in the national leadership of the union. Imprisoned on December 13, 1981, he was released in the July 1984 amnesty. Today, he has written the following about the situation:

"People have lost hope in the possibility that the regime will on its own abandon its monopoly position and its supremacy over the people. No new compromises are realistic today because the people know that the regime will not respect them. This is why more and more citizens are realizing the absolute necessity of changing the present political system for one that would offer even a minimum of guarantees that any future accord would be respected by the regime. Today, there is no guarantee that the basic political and economic aspirations of the citizens will be met by the present team ...

"People know today that the regime does not serve the society, that it counterposes its interests to those of its own country. As never before, they see the squandering of all that they have gained in their lives, the squandering of their chances as individuals and those of the nation. The working people in the cities and rural areas of Poland realize today that the Communists have done nothing for them in forty years except to assure them a chance to work every day in trying conditions and to little effect. They retire, and

sink into poverty. And this is supposed to be a workers state? The handful who support the regime are cynics who are only looking out for their own interests."

What is the perspective for the future and what are the tasks that flow from this for the underground structures of the social movement? Slowik gives a clear answer to this question: "The 1980 scenario will not be repeated exactly, but history will repeat itself, that is sure. The Communists can count on that like money in the bank, because there is one thing that they know how to do better than anybody, and that is arouse the discontent of the workers. And we have to be prepared for that."

What this means concretely, in Slowik's opinion, is that "the first task is to build and strengthen the structures in the enterprises so that when there is a new political crisis they can take the leadership of the union," because "it is only in the plants that the regime can be defeated." (10)

The Alliance of the Workers Opposition

In the spring of 1985, a new socio-political current started to form within the Polish social movement. The editorial boards of four underground journals set up a coordinating committee that took the name "Alliance of the Workers Opposition Press" (PPOR). They published a draft program around which they are seeking to bring together those forces that have declared themselves in favor of an antibureaucratic revolution, waged by the working class and aimed at achieving the full liberation of the working class.

The PPOR wants to contribute to building and broadening the mass workers struggles around partial and immediate demands and the self-organization of the workers themselves.

The following journals have joined the PPOR: *Front Robotniczy*, *Sprawa Robotnicza*, *Glosno*, and *Wolny Robotnik*. The first two have been published since the summer of 1984 by groups that are working for workers self-management and identify with the revolutionary left. In its first issue, *Front Robotniczy* published excerpts from the "Open Letter to the PZPR" written in 1964 by Jacek Kuron and Karol Mozelewski. In so doing, it demonstrated its intent to link up with the revolutionary tradition of the Polish antibureaucratic opposition, which, by the way, the authors of that work have today abandoned.

For its part, *Sprawa Robotnicza* announced in its first issue that it

considered itself "a link in the international working class community." It wrote, moreover, that it "has enemies with whom no accord or alliance can ever be concluded — they are the bureaucracy (that is, the social layer that exploits the workers); as well as the bourgeoisie, which guarantees the survival of the long bankrupt bureaucracy."

Wolny Robotnik is the organ of the Union of Workers Councils of the Polish Resistance Movement (ZRP-PRO). This organization, which is based on clandestine groups in the factories, has operated in Upper Silesia since 1982. In a draft program published at the start, the ZRP-PRO came out for overthrowing the bureaucratic dictatorship based on a general strike led by workers councils formed clandestinely, and for establishing workers power in the state in order to guarantee the building of socialism.

Glosno is the organ of the Provisional Coordinating of the Mines (TKKG) of Solidarnosc. It also operates in Upper Silesia. The TKKG has made itself known in the West by its support for the British miners' strike, which attracted important notice in the British left and far left press, in particular in the *New Statesman* and the *London Labour Briefing*.

The TKKG is a coordinating committee of the underground trade-union commissions in many mines, and is in conflict with the Regional Executive Commission (RKW) of Solidarnosc, which represents the underground national leadership of the union.

The PPOR has formed an Executive Commission that includes a representative of each of its components and functions by consensus in order to maintain their autonomy. This commission is responsible for the publication of a common monthly bulletin called *Przelom* ("breach") the first issue of which appeared at the end of the fall of 1985. (11)

The emergence of the PPOR represents an important step in the process of building the workers self-organization and self-management current in the Polish social movement. The existence of such a current is essential in order to overcome the crisis of political and strategic orientation in which the movement finds itself today.

The following are the documents issued by the PPOR at the time of its founding, as well as a selection of articles taken from the journals belonging to this coordinating body. □

9. "Obecnosc", (Wroclaw), No. 10, 1985.

10. "Rozmowa z Andrzejem Slowikiem," ("Discussion with A. Slowik"), *Dziennik Polski* (London), No. 43, 1985.

11. "Przelom", No. 1, 1985.

Draft platform of the Workers Opposition

IN THE PRECEDING article, we explained the significance of the emergence of the Workers Opposition current and placed this within the context of the differentiations taking place in Solidarnosc and the democratic opposition in Poland today. The following two documents were adopted by the Press Alliance of the Workers Opposition.

1. *The class struggle.* The political struggle that has been going on in Poland since 1980, which has been generally termed a fight between the society and the regime, is primarily a class struggle. It is essentially a struggle between the working class, which is subjected to economic exploitation and deprived of all political or economic power, and the bureaucratic state power, which is

based on the PZPR, as well as on the military and police machine and the economic and administrative apparatus. Only the working class has the capacity to overthrow the bureaucracy, and it is only thanks to it that the social groups can liberate themselves from the yoke of the bureaucracy.

2. *Self-management.* The fundamental aim of our struggle is to get the working class to transform itself

from an object into a subject. This will only be possible through a system of generalized self-management. Such a system would involve self-management councils in the enterprises, linked together by horizontal and vertical structures on the regional and national scale, as well as institutions of self-management organized on a territorial basis. Self-management, a form of direct political and economic democracy, will thus become the principal factor in organizing social and political life.

3. *Political pluralism.* Self-management can only function in conditions of unrestricted political pluralism. It cannot be foreseen today what will be the exact forms of the social organizations and representative bodies set up. We cannot say exactly what will be the role of the free elections to the Diet that we would like to see. But it is clear from the start that the principle of political pluralism has to govern all forms of participation in political life for the society.

4. *The revolutionary struggle.* The transformation of the working class from an object into a subject is only possible through revolutionary changes. The belief in the possibility of a compromise with the bureaucracy is a dangerous illusion that could prove fatal. In fact, there is no way to reconcile the introduction of a system of self-management, that is, the realization of the interests of the working class, with the domination of the bureaucracy. One course for the antibureaucratic uprising could be a revolutionary general strike turning into an active strike [ie, a takeover of the factories by the workers], supported by actions outside the factories. It is only in such revolutionary conditions that we could expect a part of the army, primarily ordinary soldiers, to join in the uprising of the working class, when they see that the working-class forces have a chance of success.

5. *Self-organization.* A revolutionary goal for the struggle requires a revolutionary strategy, that is, a strategy based on consistently advancing the self-organization of the working class. Such self-organization is the common element in all the phases of the development of the workers' struggle, from the present fight for partial objectives to the future struggle for a system of self-management, in which the principle of self-management will find its fullest expression. Every battle, even on the most limited question, bears within it an embryo of the future revolution, inasmuch as it contributes to the self-organization of the workers. This is why the demands put forward by the workers movement in its programmatic docu-

THE FOLLOWING is an appeal by the Press Alliance of the Workers Opposition for workers self organization and self-management around a political platform.

In view of the deterioration in living and working conditions and the need for effective defensive actions and for unifying them, it is urgent to create, around a political platform, an alliance of workers groups determined to fight for the interest of the working class, for workers self-management, and the liberation of labor.

We will open up the columns of our publications to workers groups and activists ready to take part in drawing up the platform of the Workers Opposition, which is what we call our common bloc. The name points up our political choices and the class character of our struggle.

Unlike the "national-independence opposition" and the "democratic opposition," we put the fight for working-class causes first. This does not in any way mean that we underestimate the importance of democracy or national independence. To the contrary, we think that the liberation of labor is only possible in a politically sovereign country, and not one subjected to economic exploitation. We think that democracy can only be achieved fully in a system without oppressed and exploited classes. Neither "actually existing socialism," or "verbal socialism," nor any version of capitalism — American, Swedish, or Polish — represents such a system.

We refuse to keep silent in the face of the clear facts that this country — which claims that it is "socialist" or that it is "building socialism" — is becoming more and more dependent politically and economically on the West, that is, on monopoly capitalism; and on the Kremlin, that is the Soviet bureaucracy.

We say no to a Poland reduced to the role of a colony, a source of raw materials and cheap labor, to a Poland where the only liberty would be to enrich oneself at the expense of the workers.

We think that the workers today have to take up a flag under which they can march united in the fight to defend workers rights, without divisions because of ideological differences. Neither the PZPR nor the opposition, in its present political configuration, in our opinion can play such a role. Because of their attachment to conceptions of a unity of the entire society against the regime, the central structures of Solidarnosc are not playing it either.

In a situation in which the wrong policy of its leadership has led Solidarnosc into passivity and in which the preponderance of procapitalist currents in the opposition outside Solidarnosc is becoming more and more clear, when the exploitation of the workers is increasing, we decided to take up the struggle, in the conviction that victory is ours sooner or later, and that it will be won by a workers movement that rejects both bureaucratic and capitalist exploitation.

*Executive Committee of the Workers Opposition Press Alliance
'Wolny Robotnik,' No. 30, June 1985*

ments must always take into account three elements:

— They have to correspond to the needs of the working class.

— They have to be in tune with the level of consciousness of the workers at the time.

— They have to make it possible, in the struggle itself and on the basis of its success, to raise the level of self-organization of the working class and of the other social groups allied with it.

6. *The independence of the workers movement.* Today, the existence of an independent workers movement is the main form of self-organization and the main precondition for the struggle of the working class. The fight against the bureaucracy entered a qualitatively new phase in 1980, when the strikes opened up the way for the formation of Solidarnosc, the first national independent structure representing the workers that we have seen in the history of the bureaucratic system in Poland. Today, building and strengthening workers organizations in the plants independent from any organization or institution outside the working class remains the principal task.

7. *Pluralism within the workers movement.* Pluralism is necessary within the workers movement in order for it to be able to develop politically. The right of the workers to organize freely in clubs, groups, currents, and political organizations has to be defended. Open politicalization of the workers movement, based on clear principles, can only strengthen it. Attempts to smother this process, under the pretext that it "weakens the union," is "factional" activity, or "provocation," on the other hand, can only undermine the movement, or in fact divide it, and they involve all the characteristics of provocation.

8. *Self-determination.* Understanding the class character of social relations in Poland involves rejecting the nationalist imagery that reduces our fight to a struggle against the Soviet Union for independence. The basic dividing line in our nation is not a schematic opposition between patriots and traitors but one of opposing interests among different social groups. This is why national independence, as an effect of the struggle of the working class for social liberation represents from the standpoint of the working class, the full achievement of the indispensable right to self-determination.

9. *International workers solidarity.* The Polish working class is not isolated in the struggle. It has friends and allies abroad. They are the workers of the entire world. The Polish workers movement can and must draw on the strength of international

workers solidarity. The differences between East and West cannot hide the fact that the workers of both camps are linked by common interests, by a common struggle for a common end — the transformation of the working class from object into subject — against common enemies. The question of international solidarity is one of close cooperation of the various national contingents of the revolutionary workers movement; it is one of interaction between the development of the class struggle, for example, in Poland, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain.

10. *Socialization.* The indispensable precondition for the liberation of the working class is for it to lay the economic foundations of its liberty, that is, socialization, outside of the state and in the framework of a system of workers self-management, of the means of production that are today statized. It is in this way that the working class will obtain the material guarantee of realizing its interests, as well as the legitimate interests of the other groups in society. The aim of the revolutionary workers movement, flowing from the essence of the social relations against which it rebels, is not the reprivatization of state property or giving it autonomy but to genuinely socialize it. We regard the taking of political power as a means for the working class to assume economic power.

Joint work by radical worker

activists with a view toward forming a workers opposition to the bureaucracy is essential to draw up a program for the Polish workers movement and to gain support for the revolutionary struggle aimed at establishing a system of self-management, a self-managed republic in the full sense of the term. By establishing coordination among the organizations, or in the future by building revolutionary parties, we are not opposing ourselves to the workers movement in the broad sense. To the contrary, we want the revolutionary current, which is a component of this movement, to be consolidated within its own structures so that it can better contribute to building an independent mass workers movement. From that flows the basic significance of this platform. That is, the victory of the Polish workers depends in the first instance on adopting a strategy for revolutionary struggle against the bureaucracy. In practice, the advance to social self-management has to be based on a revolutionary political identification by the workers. It involves the workers becoming conscious of their social and economic interests, as well as the independence of the political-organizational institutions of the working class. This is why it is the responsibility of those who share the ideas expressed in this platform to unite their forces in the struggle for our common cause. □

'Wolny Robotnik', No. 30, June 1985

For working in the Workers Councils

THE FOLLOWING article from *Front Robotniczy* deals with the question of tactical use of the workers councils that are part of the official system of plant management by activists whose aim remains to overthrow the bureaucratic regime.

On the Polish political map, we occupy a place that might be called extreme, that of the revolutionary left. However, our conception of the state, the social system, and the social relations is only one of those present. You can no longer count the number of programs and manifestos being published clandestinely. These are of course important questions, but in the immediate, what is important primarily is to say what actions are reali-

zable today that correspond to the general aims set. And it would be good if all the authors of programs offered an answer to this question.

The maximalist "all-or-nothing" approach is simply the expression of a dreamer's attitude in politics, a refusal to take account of the reality. We think that it is possible today to act for the socialization of the Polish state as well as of others, and we will support any activity that goes in this

direction. Activity in the Workers Councils fits into this framework. Of course, these councils are hobbled today, and action within them rapidly runs up against limits. But even in this situation, these bodies can fulfill a certain number of tasks that we think are important:

— They can help the workers gain a consciousness of who is the legitimate master of the means of production.

— They can prepare the workers for taking full power in the plants through comanagement.

— They can serve as a school of democracy, if there is good preparation for the election of these councils.

The activity of genuine worker militants in these Workers Councils can also have other effects, if only developing a sense of security among the workers. But these effects are difficult to measure and therefore hard to describe.

Where the election of the Workers Councils has not been boycotted but trade-union activists decided to use this opening, it has in general been workers with the confidence of their mates — most often former Solidarnosc leaders — who have been elected to these councils. This is the case in the FSO auto factory in Warsaw [where the Fiat 125p and the Polonez are made]. In this plant, the new unions set up by the regime include only 10% of the workforce. And the great majority of their members — 80% — are professional personnel. This can be seen as one of the positive effects of the Workers Council, whose activity has helped to reduce to a minimum the space that can be filled by the regime's house unions. In one of the departments of the FSO, where 1,400 people work, only fifty joined the new union.

The FSO Workers Council has taken advantage of all the openings for action and negotiation that the law allows. It has done this, moreover, from the outset, including in the democratic organization of the election to the council itself. The results are clear. In some departments of FSO, all the former leaders of Solidarnosc have been elected to the council. By the way, we should note that in another Warsaw plant — the Huta Warszawa steelworks — the workers have managed to win the point that the ballots for the council elections must mention the organizational affiliation of the candidates, which will make the voters' choices easier.

The council can also influence the amount and division of the social fund, housing fund, and wage fund. In the FSO, it has kept watch to see that housing is allocated according to just criteria. Moreover, it has been able to modify the system of granting coupons



that make it possible to get cars without going through the public distribution network [and thus without having to wait several years to get the car after you have paid out the money for it]. This modification was also aimed at eliminating the glaring injustices. This is, moreover, an interesting example, because the council is not legally authorized to concern itself with the allotment of these coupons. But in negotiating with the manager, it managed to get him to understand that if he did not accept this proposal, the council might oppose him in another area where he needed its greenlight. Give and take.

Such diplomacy, thus, makes it possible for the council to make incursions into areas that are beyond its legal competence. In the FSO, the council has also been able to modify the system of assigning vacation allowances. Previously, only those who used vacation centers run by the Workers Vacation Fund (FWP) could claim such benefits. Now every FSO worker gets a bonus during the summer period that he or she can use as they like.

A certain skill is necessary sometimes to resolve questions in order most effectively to safeguard the interests of the workers. For example, while it is the council that determines the rules governing the granting of bonuses, it is the plant manager that grants them. So, in order to keep the management from using the bonuses to reward the more servile, the FSO Workers Council has set such strict rules that only workers who have genuinely contributed to increasing the production in the factory can get them.

In the case of the wage fund, the council has to use another method. This fund is determined by the management, but it has to be approved by the Workers Council. So, all it has to do is keep rejecting the various proposals until the management gets

tired and makes concessions. Since the text of the law governing the activity of the councils contains the word "conflict," the council can take on the management without exposing itself to the accusation of subversion or antistate activities.

Moreover, basing itself on certain paragraphs in the statute on the councils, you can protect the workers that the management wants to get rid of. It is sufficient to elect them members of the council. If the council has a two-tier structure (councils in the departments and a central council for the plant), as is the case in the FSO and in many big factories, it is possible to protect activists by electing them once to the department council and then to the central one, and to keep this up for years. This makes any attempt to fire people much more difficult. By the way, the FSO Workers Council is building links with other councils in other plants both in Warsaw and in the provinces by offering them help and experience.

In comparison with our revolutionary goals, the activities of the councils as described here seem limited. But since the councils genuinely represent the workers (if a minimum of democratic criteria are observed in the elections), they are a grain of sand in the gears of the bureaucratic machine. They make it possible to learn how to run the enterprise, to learn democracy, to get the workers to understand that the machinery, raw materials and products belong to them. If it is seriously taken up, work in the councils can be an excellent school for tomorrow. When the time comes for a national general strike, the worker cadres able to take over running production and distribution outside the bureaucratic tracks will have come from these councils. □

Front Robotniczy
No 5-6, February 1985

For electing workers advocates

THE FOLLOWING article from *Wolny Robotnik*, like the preceding one, deals with a tactical problem in the work of antibureaucratic activists in the plant. But unlike the preceding article, it is not about using an institution of the regime, such as the Workers Councils, but about the election of the "workers advocates," which is neither authorized nor banned by the law. The status of these workers representatives, thus, depends on the relationship of forces that can be established between them and the plant management.

Workers' advocates, directly representing their fellow workers and democratically elected by them, who enjoy the workers' confidence and thereby have an authority in the plant, can help to place limits on the arbitrariness of the employers. They can also help the workers to have a greater control over the labor process, since they will be real, independently elected representatives of the workers. Moreover, these advocates will have a greater authority, inasmuch as they will have the same problems as all the other workers, be among them every day, and be subject to their control every day.

In order for all this to be able to work, and in order for the mandate of these representatives to be clear, this institution should be based on three documents that would take the form of an independent social accord within the group of workers. These are the following:

- A written mandate limited in time for every person who assumes the function of a workers' advocate signed by the person concerned.

- A written statement from the persons elected stipulating that they accept the function entrusted to them of representing every one of their mates who voted for them, with copies for every worker in the group.

- A letter of resignation from every one of the workers, as well as a collective letter from all, with an empty space for the date, in order to ensure solidarity with the persons elected if they are subjected to repression by the management or the political police.

Added to these documents should be a protocol of the electing assembly stipulating the aims of the post set up.

At an early stage, before this initiative is generalized throughout the enterprise (or group of enterprises), the workers advocates should retain

anonymity and in their action seek to set an example for the other workshops and departments in the plant. In fact, in order to be able to surmount the fear of repression, it is indispensable that workers advocates appear throughout the plant and that the example spread to other plants.

However, once it becomes a general thing, the election of workers advocates will make it possible to create a not inconsiderable social and moral force in the plants. In fact, the various workers advocates will be obliged by the nature of things to link up and cooperate. In this event, they will in practice become an element of workers control. They will be real representatives of the wage workers confronting the state bourgeoisie at the plant level. They will be able in an effective way to limit the arrogance and arbitrariness of the floor bosses, the foremen, etc.

The individual and common activities of the workers advocates could include petitioning, making grievances, etc., forms of action provided for by the law. Their role would not be legal, but it would not be illegal either, since the law does not prohibit such activities. The aim of their activity would not, obviously, be to overthrow the regime but to make the workers conscious of their rights and their situation, to present the arguments for and against one or another modification in this system, as, for example, in the present case, the advantages and disadvantages of the new wages systems. Indeed, such a collective awareness of common interests is always the primary foundation of any collective action.

If it became generalized, this institution could become a decentralized means for expressing the workers' opinions and a form of crystallizing the tensions within the plants. It would also be a basic component of

the self-management to come, a component that can be established right now. It would be a part of our own independence and self-management, very different from what the state bourgeoisie calls by that name, because it would grow out of the very foundations of the organization of work, groups of workers in the brigades, workshops, departments, and establishments.

If self-management develops from this level up, it will be a sign to us that we are ready for self-management. Such an institution would also enable the wage workers to create their own social representation, which would be a potential leadership at the base. This would certainly be important in the event, for example, of a strike.

Already today there are plants in which genuine solidarity and militant unity on the part of the workers have put the management, in particular at the bottom level, in a position where it cannot act without at least the tacit accord of the workers who enjoy the esteem and confidence of their coworkers. Police repression is ineffective in this case, because there is no formal structure. The "leaders" do not carry on any clandestine activity, but the workforce respects their advice and opinions. As a result, the management becomes dependent on these worker leaders. It has to consult them before acting, to negotiate with them and get their agreement. This is already a step toward formal recognition of such structures and such leaders. It is clear that in these conditions it becomes easier to build clandestine work, to collect union dues, to distribute leaflets and newspapers, to drive out the collaborators, etc.

Such informal leaders could play a role in the workshops similar to that played by Lech Walesa today on the national scale (although we would hope that they would do it better and more effectively). The plant management would have to fear them, and the underground union structures would have to protect them.

All the problems of the plant — work safety, hygiene, wages — would have to become the concerns of informal groups formed around a leader recognized as a workers' advocate. With time, this sphere of concern would extend naturally from immediate social questions to other problems from the economic arena to the political one, which is an integral part of the perspective of class struggle by the workers and the intelligentsia against the state bourgeoisie.

Wage workers, organize yourselves. □

Wolny Robotnik
No 27, February 1985

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
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Ten years on: feminism lives!

AFTER MORE than ten years in existence, the women's movement is still alive and well. This was the conclusion from two very successful national conferences of the women's movement in the Spanish state and France in November and December 1985. At the Spanish state conference, attended by 4,000 women, an open challenge to government anti-abortion measures was made when it was announced that during the proceedings two abortions had been performed in a closed workshop.

JUDITH BAKER

The *jornadas feministas* in the Spanish state took place in Barcelona on November 1,2,3. Two thousand women were expected and 4,000 turned up. Among them were many young women, who held their own workshop, and also women from the Womens Assembly of Euskadi, representing many different organisations from the Basque country. It was estimated that over 80% of the women were representing local groups of one kind or another, a fact that demonstrates the grass roots support for the movement.

There were workshops on lesbianism, women and peace (which was attended by 400 women) young women, sexual violence and new reproductive technology, amongst others.

'We have brought you together to tell you that in line with the decision in the workshop on abortion rights in the Spanish State and following on the discussion on Friday in commissions and groups and in the plenary, this morning our commission performed two abortions.' This announcement on the Saturday afternoon of the conference brought massive applause and support from women present. [The one dissenting voice came from Lidia Falcon of the Feminist Party.]

This action was a direct challenge to the pathetic law introduced by the Socialist government earlier this year [see *International Viewpoint* No 76, May 20, 1985], which only benefits about 2 to 3% of women seeking abortions.

When the police arrived in the evening demanding to know who was responsible for carrying out the abortions, the women present shouted '*Todos somos responsables*' ('we are all responsible'). The baffled policemen had no choice but to retreat.

The stand taken by the women on the abortion issue marks the beginning of a wide campaign to over-

turn the new law, and the women have announced that they will all declare themselves guilty, thus posing the authorities with severe problems. The abortions were filmed on video.

This incident demonstrates the continuing combativity of the women's movement and its willingness to challenge the state in an active and campaigning way.

Women from the women's movement in the Spanish state received a rapturous response also from the conference of one thousand women which met just outside Paris, France on December 6 and 7. Again the conference was attended by hundreds of women active in local groups and campaigns, and was an attempt to draw the movement together on

a national level around national initiatives.

Coming out of the conference there was a proposal for a summer university and also for broad activities on March 8, 1986.

Yvette Roudy, Socialist Party minister for women's affairs addressed the conference. She tried to excuse her lack of action on so many issues by saying that she was all alone in power.

The conference showed that feminists are linking up with other struggles, in particular the fight against racism which is very important in France at the moment. A delegation of women and a speaker were sent to the SOS-racisme demonstration on the Saturday, and the workshop on sexism and racism decided to call a day of action on women and apartheid.

Furthermore issues like the new flexibility of work bill which the government is introducing and which will particularly affect working women were taken on board. To counter the increasing violence against women (protests have occurred recently around three particularly serious rape cases) the women in the commission concerned proposed days of action and 'reclaim the night' demonstrations throughout France every third Friday of September, every year.

Both these congresses show that in France and the Spanish state feminism will not go away and cannot be co-opted, but on the contrary will continue to pose a challenge to the establishment, and can begin to show the broad mass of women a way forward. □

Statement of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), Spanish State section of the Fourth International.

With respect to the two abortions carried out last weekend in Barcelona in the conference commemorating Ten Years of Struggle by the Feminist Movement, we wish to express our total and unconditional support for this action by the feminist movement. If it provoked such a scandal in the media and in the ranks of the right, that is because it touched a wound from which women suffer, and at the same time pointed up the wretchedness of the PSOE's partial depenalization of abortion....

We consider, therefore, that this action represents a very important step forward in the fight for the right to abortion in its clear and resounding denunciation of what has been touted as a progressive law and which has served only to hand aces to the right, the Church, and the middle class to deceive and confuse the people, to deny an elementary right to women, and to force the few who can meet the conditions set down in the law to beg for it. At the same time, the law allows Social Security doctors who refuse to perform abortions to go on doing so with impunity.

We hold that the feminist movement has the full right to force de facto recognition of the legitimacy of its demands by carrying them out in practice. We approve of and support all the actions and methods of struggle that the feminist movement and specifically the Right to Abortion Committees [Comisiones pro Derecho a Aborto] may use to advance the cause of recognition of women's rights and specifically the right to abortion.

Therefore, we express our solidarity with the actions referred to above, and once again declare our commitment to continue fighting for the right to free abortion on demand, to be paid for by the state health system, until full recognition is achieved of the right of women to make the decisions affecting their lives.

Madrid, November 5, 1985