

International VIEWPOINT

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SOUTH AFRICA : Lessons of exemplary struggle
Implications of the Anglo-Irish Accord
The Sikh problem in the Punjab today

INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT

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It all costs money

With this issue, IV goes into its fifth year of publication. We have already come a long way from the first special numbers we put out in the heat of the protests against the Stalinist crackdown in Poland, when tens of thousands of people marched in Paris in support of Solidarnosc many of them carrying red flags and singing 'The Internationale.'

As Ernest Mandel's article in this issue on the anniversary of Die Neue Zeit and the history of the international revolutionary press indicates, five is already a respectable age for a publication of this type.

Like its ancestors, IV has had to grow fast, because it was founded at a time when the scope of international revolutionary politics was expanding.

With age comes responsibility. As IV has become established in its role, the demands on us for

broader and more in-depth coverage have been steadily increasing. It is harder and harder to meet them without publishing at least occasional expanded issues.

However, our budget is very tight, and a 36-page issue costs us about 4,000 francs more than a regular 26-page one. We keep getting suggestions from readers for more coverage, features, and technical improvements. But everything extra costs more money.

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Papandreou's austerity sparks a massive upsurge

THE PAPANDREOU government's adoption of a series of austerity measures in mid-October, in particular its decision to freeze wages for the next two years and to restrict the operation of automatic cost-of-living allowances, touched off a series of working-class mobilizations. These actions culminated in the general strike of November 14, which was doubtless one of the major working-class and popular mobilizations since the fall of the dictatorship of the colonels in 1974.

This mass opposition to the policy of the government of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) has opened up cleavages within the ruling party itself, in particular among its trade-union activists and officials.

Sofronis Papadopoulos, a member of the leadership of the Internationalist Communist Organization, the Greek section of the Fourth International, gave the following interview on these developments to Jacqueline Allio in Athens on November 30.

Question. What explains, in your opinion, the November 14 general strike and the massive support for it?

Answer. The government's latest measures were the last straw. The two-year wage freeze and the attack on cost-of-living increases were a kick in the stomach to the working class. While the rate of inflation went over 20% in 1985, cost-of-living increases will not be given for the last four months of that year, which means a real wage cut of about 10%.

Moreover, despite the authorities' claims that this measure was not a first step toward outright abolition of the sliding scale of wages, the cost-of-living increase will be fixed beforehand for the next four months, without any possibility for adjustment if the real rate of inflation exceeds the projections. What is more, the rise in the prices of imported commodities will not be taken into account in making these estimates.

In order to assure that its decision will be strictly respected, the government adopted a decree forbidding bosses to give wage increases, under penalty of draconian fines going as far as 5% of the company's income. Now, the sliding scale of wages is an important gain for the workers, which the PASOK was forced to concede in the heady atmosphere of its electoral victory in 1981.

This is why the working masses have reacted so sharply to this government attack. This was in fact the most important decision made in the series of measures that were adopted in the framework of the government's austerity policy, but, of course, it was not the only important one.

The Papandreou government has decided to make major cutbacks in social spending. It is trying to reach into the pockets of the middle strata by drastically increasing taxes on the self-employed, as well as by stepping up its fight against tax fraud. The latter policy is aimed in particular against the very small merchants and artisans who represent an essential part of the parallel circuits of the Greek economy. The application of this decision will be a very harsh blow for the poorest strata.

Wage earners, in fact, make up only 45% of the economically active population, and the incomes of the poorest families depend in large part on the parallel trading economy. On top of this, there is the devaluation of the drachma, the Greek currency, that was decreed in October. Officially, it was devalued by the 15%, but in fact its value was cut by 18%. This measure also hits the least well-off the hardest. Overall, you could say that these measures have brought on a 10% decline in real incomes.

Q. Did this mobilization take the working-class leaderships by surprise?

A. Yes and no. There had already been a series of struggles at the start of 1985 in response to the effects of the economic crisis. But they had ebbed in the period preceding the June elections, which again gave the PASOK a majority in the parliament. (1)

Immediately after the elections, prices started going up every week. A social explosion then became predictable, although there was not yet a general mobilization. In response to the rumors that started going around about the austerity measures that the government intended to take, a series of struggles started up in the private sector over the questions of prices and unemployment.

These actions were controlled by the pro-Moscow Communist Party, which is called the CP-Exterior; and supported by the Eurocommunist CP, known as the CP-Interior.

In the public sector enterprises dominated by the PASOK, such as the banks, the postal service, telecommunications, electricity, urban transport, and the railroads, mobilizations developed in protest against the government's failure to implement the socialization measures it promised.

Of the entire program announced by the PASOK, in fact, the only thing that was put into practice was that "Enterprise Committees" were set up. These are co-management structures in which workers sit alongside managers and representatives of the administration. These bodies are designed to promote a trend of class collaboration, and the workers are saying clearly that they want none of them.

However, these struggles were dispersed. Nonetheless, as soon as the government's austerity measures were announced, on October 11, the response was massive. It involved the main unions organized in the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), with the exception of teachers and government employees (who belong to the confederation of Public Employees, which has about 300,000 members).

Q. Who led this mobilization?

A. The backbone of the struggle were the unions that had mobilized before, that is, those controlled by the pro-Moscow CP, some politically independent or semi-independent unions, and the public sector unions dominated by the PASOK that had responded to the government's failure to keep its promises about socialization. This group was joined by the

1. See "Papandreou won, but what was his game?" in "International Viewpoint", No 78, June 17, 1985. IV.

ΕΡΓΑΤΙΚΗ ΠΑΛΗ



ΠΟΛΩΝΙΑ

Ἀσήμαντες οἱ
αὐξήσεις
Ἰδια τὰ κριτή-
ρια μ' ἐκεῖνα
τῆς Ν.Δ.

Ἐνα ἀκόμη ἔγκλημα
τοῦ σταλινισμοῦ
— Ὁ ἀγώνας τῶν πολωνῶν
ἐργαζομένων συνεχίζεται
— Κάτω ἡ σταλινική χούντα
— Ἀλληλεγγύη μὲ τὴν
«Ἀλληλεγγύη» τῆς Πολωνίας

Paper of the Greek section of the
Fourth International

Coordinating Committee of Unions in
Private Factories, controlled by the
PASOK, which includes the unions at
about 150 big factories.

The Confederation of Public Employees also decided to protest against the government's measures. But it proposed to do this by separate initiatives that were to culminate in a general strike of teachers and government employees on November 28.

All of this shows the breadth of the movement at the rank-and-file level. This pressure was so great that 26 of the 45 leaders in the Executive Commission of the GSEE formed a bloc against the government's measures and called for a general strike. They put the wing of the PASOK favorable to the austerity policy in a minority, which included the president and treasurer of the GSEE, who were removed from office.

Of these 26 trade-union leaders, seven were also leaders of the PASOK in the main public sector enterprises, and three were members of the Central Committee of the PASOK. As soon as it came out that they were taking their distance from the Papandreou government's decrees, they were expelled from the party.

Q. After that, how was the demonstration organized?

A. Actually, the process was often complex. In general, the Bloc of the 26 controlled the local labor exchanges, which coordinate all the unions, while the PASOK sometimes kept control of the unions in the enterprises, especially the small workplaces. Sometimes, it was the other way around. But, in any case, the three main industrial centers — Athens, Salonica, and Piraeus, representing three quarters of the organized working class — fell in behind the initiatives of the Bloc of the 26.

So, the PASOK did everything to sabotage the functioning of the trade-union bodies in agreement with the 26, calling on their representatives to resign from the union leadership bodies and trying to put a damper on the decisions that were taken, etc.

This did not keep the mobilization from building up, even if the PASOK leaders involved in the Bloc of the 26

tended to take initiatives on their own. From October 11 to November 14, the date of the general strike, hardly a single day passed without a strike or demonstration, in Athens as well as in the rest of the country. These were revolting actions that finally culminated on November 14 in an almost total general strike.

On that day, more than 80% of production ceased. There were assemblies in all the working-class centers, and massive demonstrations almost everywhere. This was the biggest mobilization since the fall of the dictatorship, and much more active and militant than those in recent years.

The November 14 mobilization was no doubt decisive for the breadth of the public workers general strike that took place two weeks later, on November 28. It has to be noted that out of the 25 leaders of this confederation — which is quite tightly controlled by the PASOK — only one expressed support for the austerity measures.

For example, the president of the Confederation of Public Workers, who is a member of the Central Committee of the PASOK, wanted to resign from the leadership of the party, and it was only because of very strong pressures that were brought on him that he gave up the idea.

Moreover, the struggles did not stop after the public workers strike. The taxi drivers went on strike. And yesterday, November 29, the air controllers went out. The movement is continuing.

Q. In a more general way, what are the implications of all this for the PASOK? How has the leadership reacted?

A. The PASOK leadership is trying to extricate itself as best it can, using the instruments at its disposal, first of all the judicial machinery. In fact, as soon as the Bloc of the 26 called for the mobilization, the courts intervened to rule that the decisions taken were illegal, inasmuch as this bloc did not represent the official leadership of the GSEE.

Moreover, the tribunals think that they can impose new trade-union leaderships by judicial decrees, both in the GSEE and in various federations and specific unions. These measures have not yet been implemented, but the rulings have already been made. It remains to be seen what is going to happen.

In addition, the PASOK has spread slander everywhere accusing the leaders of the Bloc of the 26 of being provocateurs linked to the right-wing parties, of trying to destabilize the PASOK, and trying to undermine the policy of "The Change." The most venomous attacks have been reserved for

the seven former leaders of the PASOK, who have been called enemies of the people and agents of imperialism. The PASOK has gone even further, organizing groups that have intervened alongside the cops to break the strikes.

Q. What are the perspectives today?

A. It seems, unfortunately, that the Bloc of the 26 is retreating step by step. Of course, the members of this group continue to proclaim that the fight has to be continued, and that attention has to be focused on the contracts for each union and federation, etc. In this respect, it is unlikely that the seven former PASOK leaders will rejoin the party in the short term. But, at the same time, we know that the Bloc of the 26 is maneuvering behind the scenes in an attempt to reach an agreement with the PASOK leadership.

For the moment, the masses have confidence in the reformist leaders who took the leadership of the struggle, and there are real possibilities that the mobilization will broaden. We know for example that more than forty enterprises are going to close soon because of bankruptcy. These are plants controlled by the PASOK, and only some of them took part in the November 14 general strike.

Now, the unions in these enterprises, who are aware of the economic situation, have set up a coordinating committee to prepare a response. So, another sector linked to the PASOK is ready to take its distance from the party and link up with the Bloc of the 26. But the problem is to outline perspectives for unity to keep the mobilization from ebbing.

If the Bloc of the 26 maintains its positions against the austerity policy, there is a good chance that these leaders will be ousted from the leadership of the GSEE and that they will be tempted to leave the confederation.

We think that they have to be stopped from taking such a decision, because one split leads to another and we will soon be faced with a total dispersal of forces. In that event, the PASOK will not fail to do anything it can to divide the movement, and the weakest and least organized sectors — those that will be the first to pay the price for the government's policy — will be in danger of finding themselves completely isolated.

However, if you consider the sum of the forces ready to struggle, it is clear that, if they coordinate their efforts, the government can be forced to backtrack. It was taken completely by surprise by the scope of the response and has its back to the wall.

In any case, if the reformist leaders, who took a step forward in opposing Papandreou, betray the hopes of

the masses, it is very likely, given the atmosphere of determination that exists, that we will see the emergence of a new vanguard workers current basing itself on the experience of the present mass struggle.

For our part, we think that the emergence of an anticapitalist front is possible, and that this would represent a decisive advance for the Greek working class. Our group must work for such a perspective, alongside the other far-left groups that are convinced of the crucial importance of what is going on at this moment in the working class.

This is why in all the mobilizations in which we participate, we constantly hammer away on the question of trade-union independence and unity against austerity, inflation, and unemployment and for reducing working hours and a 35-hour work and for nationalizations.

Q. What role is the youth playing in this context?

A. The mobilizations that have just taken place have been very massive. It all started after the demonstration to mark the anniversary of the Polytechnic uprising. (2) The police have moved with an unheard-of brutality, with clubs and teargas, against the youth who have been gathering every evening in a square in Athens. In this way, they killed a young anarchist.

So the youth decided to occupy the Polytechnic, and several far-left groups called for a demonstration that brought out about 5,000 young people, including a part of the CP-Interior youth. This initiative, moreover, brought on a very grave crisis and a split in the youth organization of this party, because while the leadership at first called for taking part in the demonstration it did an aboutface at the last minute. But its base did not accept this, and participated anyway.

It should be stressed that the mobilization spread like wildfire through the rest of the country, and almost everywhere we have seen occupations of universities and high schools, as well as demonstrations.

We think that we are seeing a new situation with respect to the youth radicalization, and we believe that it is possible to define perspectives for achieving a linkup between these mobilizations and those of the workers. □

2. The demonstration at the Polytechnic in November 1973 prefigured the fall of the regime that came in July, 1974, following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The first bourgeois democratic elections since the takeover of the colonels were held on November 17, 1974, the first anniversary of the Polytechnic uprising, which became the traditional date to celebrate the regaining of freedom by the Greek people.



Members of the Democratic Unionist Party demonstrate inside Hillsborough

The Anglo-Irish deal who gains who loses?

THE PACT OFFICIALLY known as the "Anglo-Irish Agreement" was signed on November 15, 1985, by the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, and the Irish taoiseach (premier), Garret FitzGerald. An elaborate ceremony was arranged for the signing, for the sake of a media circus, at Hillsborough Castle, County Down, a symbol of the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland.

The ceremony followed months of secret negotiations and a series of deliberate leaks about the likely outcome. Both Thatcher and FitzGerald proclaimed that the main aim of the "Hillsborough Deal" was the defeat of Sinn Fein and the Irish Republican Army. (1)

JOHN MEEHAN

Since the H-Block/Armagh hunger strikes of 1981, Sinn Fein, under the leadership of Gerry Adams, the abstentionist member of parliament for West Belfast, have successfully contested elections in the British-ruled six-county enclave, getting about 13% of the total vote (about 42% of the vote of the oppressed Catholic population). This compares with about 18 per cent for the bourgeois nationalist Catholic Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which is led by John Hume, member of parliament for Derry.

The SDLP, who were deeply involved in the confidential Dublin-London discussions leading up to the signing of the deal, now desperately need to see it bring some concessions for the Northern nationalist

minority so that they can regain ground lost to Sinn Fein.

It is now clear that there will be no significant concessions. The Unionist majority have voiced their own opposition to the agreement in their traditional "no surrender" style. This has included a series of bellowing reactionary speeches, in particular from the rable-rousing preacher, Ian Paisley, who is the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and member of parliament for North Antrim; a frenzied mass rally in Belfast; and the resignation of all the

1. For an assessment of the November 1-2 1985, "Ard Fheis" (congress) of Sinn Fein, see "Sinn Fein Moving Leftward, the stakes for the national liberation movement," in "International Viewpoint" No 87, November 25, 1985.

Unionist MPs from the London parliament. Bye-elections for the 15 vacated seats will take place on January 23, 1986.

The Loyalist hysteria does have an intimidating effect on the nationalists. On the other hand, the traditional cries of the Protestant ascendancy on the defensive, "no surrender" and "Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right" (2) reminds them of their downtrodden position in the Six Counties.

In this context, nationalists react not uncommonly by thinking, "If the Loyalists don't like it, maybe it has something to offer." This is a naive, knee-jerk response, which is entirely self-deceptive. But its effects can be seen particularly in the neo-colonial south, where there is much less direct experience with British imperialism. There, opinion polls indicate that a large majority of the population look favourably on the pact.

FitzGerald lays the constitution at Maggie's feet

This pressure is reflected by the sinuous course of the bourgeois party that has traditionally most exploited nationalist sentiment, Fianna Fail. At first, the party leader, Charles Haughey, raised the shout of "betrayal," accusing FitzGerald of selling out to Britain. The day after the deal was signed, Haughey declared that it was "an astronomical setback and a bad day for Irish nationalism."

A few days later, he told the Fianna Fail Parliamentary Party in notably mellower tones that the party would not be "destructive of the agreement" if it would "ameliorate the condition of the nationalist community." There was a clear connection between Fianna Fail's dithering and its score in the opinion polls. In one week its lead over the unpopular Fine Gael-Labour coalition government dropped from 11% to 6%.

There was no wavering by Sinn Fein. In a statement released immediately after the deal was signed, Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams said that the Dublin government had formally recognised partition, thereby repudiating Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution.

FitzGerald had insulted the "long suffering nationalist people of the Six Counties," Adams said, by telling them in the Irish language that they could now raise their heads. "It is because we have raised our heads," Adams continued, "and have struggled and made sacrifices for our civil and national rights that the running sore of British involvement in Ireland has been addressed at all."

The agreement, Adams said, amounted to the "total abandonment of SDLP, Fine Gael and Fianna Fail assurances that they would not accept any internal Six County arrangement.

"Sinn Fein's position remains clear. We will continue to give principled leadership to the nationalist people." The Sinn Fein president said that the only way Unionists and nationalists could get together would be if the Unionist veto were withdrawn in a "Britishless" Ireland.

What is actually in the Hillsborough agreement, and what are its long and short-term prospects?

The very first article of the agreement says, "any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland." (3)

This provision is directly contrary to Article 2 of the Irish constitution, which does not recognise any such entity as "Northern Ireland." It says, "The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and its territorial seas."

The only qualification of this position in the constitution is in Article 3, which states that "pending reunification of the national territory," laws passed by the 26-County parliament (the Dail) shall cover the Southern state only. But this article also notes that this is "without prejudice" to the right "to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that [national] territory."

The Hillsborough agreement's claim that "there is no derogation of sovereignty by either government" is, therefore, absurd.

In its duplicity, the Dublin government risks leaving itself very exposed. Shortly after the deal was signed, Garret FitzGerald repeated a position that he has publicly held for several years: that Article 2 should be deleted from the 26-County constitution.

But he did not fail to add, with his characteristic cowardice, that he would not seek a referendum on the question. FitzGerald knows that his pro-Unionist view would be defeated.

Dependent on its more nationalistic base, Fianna Fail will not go along with any dropping of Articles 2 and 3.

In promoting the Hillsborough deal, FitzGerald claims to be an "Irish nationalist" and represent "Irish nationalism." This, of course, infuriates the Loyalists. But what do the British think about it?

The answer came in a December 3 speech by British "Northern Ireland" Secretary Tom King to a group of business people in Brussels:

"In Northern Ireland now we have signed an agreement in which the

Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, notwithstanding the fact that he faces, or has to live with, a constitution that has aspirations about sovereignty over Northern Ireland, has, in fact, accepted that for all practical purposes and into perpetuity, there will never be a United Ireland." (*Irish Press*, December 4, 1985.)

Left holding the bag by this arrogant imperialist official, FitzGerald furiously demanded an apology to save at least some face. The insensitive King, who had the bad grace to speak plainly, duly obliged with a tangled statement at Westminster. He claimed that he had only been expressing a personal opinion:

"I recognize that the way I expressed this indicated that I considered this also to be the view of Dr. FitzGerald. I, of course, accept that this is not the case." (*Irish Times*, December 5, 1985.)

In a statement, People's Democracy, the Irish section of the Fourth International, commented: "After the Forum Report, Margaret Thatcher said 'Out, Out, Out!' to a United Ireland. After the Anglo-Irish Deal British Direct Ruler Tom King says Garret FitzGerald agrees 'there will never be a United Ireland.'"

"Garret, Maggie's Parrot, squirms, squeals and protests. It will do no good. He has chosen the humiliating and degrading path of putting forward 'views and proposals'; quoting the agreement — to King, Thatcher, RUC supremo Jack Hermon and company in the Irish Conference!

"There is 'no derogation' of British sovereignty in this deal. Iron Britannia rules OK."

The southern state is up to its eyes in collaboration with British imperialism. It was founded in 1920 by a Westminster Act of Parliament, and consolidated its rule through a brutal civil war in 1922-23, involving the internment and summary execution of thousands of Republicans [militant nationalists].

Today, Portlaoise and Limerick jails are full of people who took Articles 2 and 3 of the constitution seriously. "Special" courts sit in Dublin without juries to try anti-imperialist activists. The police use brutal methods condemned by Amnesty International. (4)

Through Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act, Sinn Fein is banned from

2. Unionists call the Six County state "Ulster." In fact, there are nine counties in the historic province of Ulster, only six of which were included in the Northern Ireland state when it was formed in 1920.

3. All quotations are taken directly from the full text of the deal. This can be found in the November 16, 1985, issues of the "Irish Press" and the "Irish Times".

4. For an example of a significant victory over the South state, see "The Release of Nicky Kelly" IV No 60, October 1, 1984.

national TV and radio. Such blanket censorship does not operate even in Britain or the Six Counties.

The Hillsborough deal offers plenty of scope for "improving" such collaboration. For example, Article 8 declares that the Anglo-Irish Conference [an all-Ireland consultative body set up by the agreement] "shall consider whether there are areas of the criminal law applying in the North and in the South respectively which might be harmonized."

Are the British government thinking of extending a "Section 31" to all of Ireland? The Hillsborough agreement opens the gate for that.

Another example of craven collaboration by Dublin is the extradition from the southern state to the Six Counties of people wanted there for political offenses.

Until recently, southern courts invoked the constitution and refused to extradite anyone to the Six Counties if they were wanted for offenses connected with the Republican struggle against the British authorities and the Loyalists.

Extradition of republicans

In 1982, this policy was turned on its head by the ex-Fine Gael TD [*teachta Dala*, member of the Irish parliament] and Blueshirt (5) Chief Justice Tom O'Higgins. He declared that people up for extradition could only claim their offenses were political if they were "engaged in what reasonable, civilised people would regard as political activity."

Following this, Dominic McGlinchey and Seamas Shannon became the first republican militants ever to be extradited to the north for political offenses. Other cases are pending.

The Hillsborough deal seeks to seal this treachery by allowing the South to sign the 1977 "European Convention Against Terrorism." Up till now, the South has invoked the "political exception" and refused to sign this convention.

In the wake of Hillsborough, FitzGerald announced that the Dail would now comply with the British request.

Article 3 of the Hillsborough agreement associates the Dublin government with the British policy of devolving power "within Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community."

This policy represents a substantial retreat from the 1972-74 policy of "power sharing," which explicitly allotted a place within any Six-County

government to the SDLP. After only five months in office, the "power-sharing" government was brought down in 1974 by a work-stoppage of Protestant workers organized by the reactionary Ulster Workers Council (UWC).

The Hillsborough agreement's reference to devolution arises from a British desire to end "Direct Rule," instituted in 1972 after the rise of the mass civil rights movement forced the London government to suspend the Unionist parliament at Stormont.

Under direct rule, a British cabinet minister has overall responsibility for the Six Counties. This colonial posting has been pithily described by a previous Tory occupant, James Price, as "the dustbin of British politics."

After the H-Block/Armagh campaign came to an end in 1981, Price himself dug into the garbage and retrieved Stormont, wrapped in a scheme called "Rolling Devolution."

The Loyalists, especially Paisley, co-operated with enthusiasm. But the SDLP was incapable of playing its designated collaborator role. Sinn Fein, reversing its previous no participation policy, contested the elections on a "boycott Stormont" platform. The SDLP was obliged to follow suit.

Sinn Fein won a respectable vote, and the new Assembly at Stormont was left as a rump full of bickering Loyalists.

Without the collaboration of the SDLP, the British were afraid to devolve any real powers on the Assembly, which was a purely Protestant ascendancy body. A rash move could have increased the electoral support for Sinn Fein, with incalculable potential spill-over in the South.

From the British government's standpoint, the Hillsborough deal is a manoeuvre to get around this roadblock. So far, it has produced results. FitzGerald and the SDLP have openly called for talks with the Loyalists.

Should the British decide now on a unilateral concession to the Loyalists on devolution, the Dublin government and the SDLP will be in serious trouble. The quisling nationalists cannot afford to pull out without conceding ground to the anti-imperialist resistance movement.

After this stunning catalogue of capitulations, one might wonder "Did they get no concessions in return?" The answer is no.

There has been some vague talk about rescinding the Flags and Emblems Act, which bans the flying of the Irish flag. It has also been suggested that it could be made legal to put street names in the Irish language. The fact is that the people in the nationalist neighborhoods have already taken these rights on their own.

Before the signing, some other carrots were dangled, such as a review of some judicial frame-ups of Irish people in Britain during the 1970s. Two notorious cases in this respect are the "Birmingham Six" and the Maguire family.

None of these people were at all connected with the republican movement. The Maguires were supporters in London of the British Tory Party! For this reason, some establishment figures, after innocent people have spent over ten years in jail under terrible conditions, consider that such "soft" convictions might be overturned. Similar frame-ups involving republican militants are ignored.

As yet, however, there has been no action on this front. It is quite possible that the paranoid Loyalist antagonism to the Hillsborough agreement and a real fear that calling into question any link in the chain of repression could open up a Pandora's box will stay any judicial review, even of the most obvious and counter-productive frame-ups.

It might seem strange at this point that the Loyalists have reacted with such outrage to a deal that offers them so much. That is, in fact, a useful question to consider.

First of all, let us look at the Loyalist backlash. On November 23, over a hundred thousand people [about one tenth of the total Protestant population of Northern Ireland] gathered in Belfast in front of a platform including 14 of the 15 Unionist MPs, all of whom have resigned to force a "referendum" on the deal.

Ian Paisley has made statements that the role accorded to Dublin "in joint control of Ulster's affairs is tantamount to putting Adolf Hitler in the Israeli cabinet." (*Irish Times*, December 3, 1985.)

Loyalist elected representatives have physically attacked Tom King inside and outside Belfast City Hall. All Loyalist district councils are boycotting the British ministries.

Such a deep gulf has opened up between these Frankenstein's monsters and their creators that King's deputy, Nicholas Scott, has threatened to suspend the Stormont Assembly.

A "moderate" Unionist grouping, the Alliance Party, accuses the Loyalists of planning an Ian-Smith-style Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

Tom King's Brussels misstep — "No United Ireland in perpetuity" is one example of British efforts to calm the Loyalist monster.

5. The Blueshirts, imitators of Mussolini's Blackshirts and Hitler's Brownshirts, were a fascist organisation active in the 26 Counties during the 1930s. They are direct ancestors of today's Fine Gael, the most pro-imperialist of the big bourgeois parties.



Glasgow, Scotland. Paisley addresses an anti-Pope march (DR)

Another has been an internal memo in the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) from the chief constable, Jack Hermon, which denied a claim by FitzGerald that in the future the police would accompany patrols by the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR).

In some odd way, FitzGerald seems to think that RUC participation in these patrols would be a "reform." It is true that the UDR, a Loyalist-staffed British army regiment, has an atrocious record of attacks on Catholics.

But the RUC has plenty of skeletons in its cupboard too — for example, the shooting in cold blood of unarmed republicans Roddy Carroll and Seamus Grew in Armagh. (The officer responsible, Robinson, was later acquitted of murder by Judge Gibson, who praised his "marksman-ship.")

The Hermon memo was produced at a DUP press conference on December 4. With a mind-boggling disregard for reason and logic, the Paisleyites called Hermon a "collaborator" and a "paid lackey of the Dublin and London establishments." (*Irish Times*, December 4, 1985).

This incident, among other things, shows the futility of trying to conciliate Loyalist bigots. They are too rabid and bloodthirsty for that.

I referred before to the Loyalist strike that scuttled the last major British political initiative, "power sharing." All the Unionists united on the fundamental point of defending the Protestant caste privileges, defence of the Orange anti-Catholic ascendancy.

High unemployment and social deprivation among Catholics convince

the Loyalist working class that "in the land of the blind, the one-eyed is king." This is similar to the attitude of the white workers to Blacks in South Africa, or that of Israeli workers and poor to Palestinians.

The Unionists see any Dublin involvement — or any SDLP role — in the Northern state as a threat to the Protestant ascendancy. The Loyalists are furious for being excluded from the year-long Dublin-London secret talks.

The coming electoral battles

They had seen Prior's Rolling Devolution as a quick way back to Stormont rule, and are incensed at extra delays and manoeuvres. Then there is the intolerable sight of 59 Sinn Fein members in district council chambers!

Tactical divisions in the Loyalist Bloc still play a role. Paisley stresses devolution. The Official Unionists, led by Molyneux, have in the recent past focused on "complete integration" into the United Kingdom.

These differences led to constant squabbling in the Assembly. But with the rise of a common enemy, Sinn Fein, such divisions receded into the background.

The Loyalists are clearly hoping to be able to repeat 1974. Whether or not they succeed in achieving that, there is no doubt that they have pushed the political pendulum to the right. In this situation, the anti-imperialist response to the Unionist bye-election campaign takes on a critical importance. The same is true of the problem of a long-term anti-imperialist strategy for

the South of Ireland.

Four of the 15 constituencies in which bye-elections will be held have potential nationalist majorities. They are Mid-Ulster, Fermanagh/South Tyrone, Newry and Armagh, and South Down. Sinn Fein have declared that they will contest the bye-elections, and have offered a "nationalist pact" to the SDLP.

However, nationalist unity has been rejected in blunt terms by the SDLP. The party leader, John Hume, pointed out that while the SDLP supports the Hillsborough deal, Sinn Fein opposes it.

In itself, there is nothing wrong in proposing a "nationalist pact" to the SDLP. But it is important that this be done within a clear principled framework of mobilising the masses against the deal. That means collision with the SDLP leadership, which is committed to Hillsborough.

On the other hand, Sinn Fein could propose a united resistance in these elections — including with sections of the SDLP — by incorporating in proposals for a united platform issues of democratic rights and opposition to repression, such as the following:

- * Immediate British withdrawal
- * Disbanding the UDR and the RUC
- * Amnesty for political prisoners
- * An end to the Diplock Courts [Special courts for trying political prisoners].

People's Democracy believes that such conditions must be placed on negotiations with the SDLP or any other nationalists. Moreover, PD is calling for structured discussions around a "Freedom Charter" for Irish Unity. The national liberation movement needs a whole new strategy to confront the new ruling class offensive, in particular in the South. □

The Basque country under the PSOE

THE FOLLOWING interview with "Bikila," a leader of the Liga Kommunista Iraultzailea (LKI — Revolutionary Communist League, the Fourth Internationalist organization in southern Euzkadi, the part of the Basque nation incorporated into the Spanish state) was given to Gerry Foley in Paris on December 18, 1985.

Question. About a year ago the bourgeois Basque Nationalist Party, the PNV, made a parliamentary pact with the Spanish Social Democratic party, the PSOE, which opposes national rights for the Basque people. What has this agreement entailed and how has it held up?

Answer. The PNV found itself obliged to make a major political turn for it that provoked a very big internal crisis. They had to get rid of the *lehendakari*, that is, the president of the Basque autonomous government, and replace him with a bureaucratic nonentity.

The policy that had been pursued by the *lehendakari* who was purged, Garaikoetxea, was to try to work with the centralist forces to develop the autonomy statute granted by the central government. However, the centralists, then represented by the PSOE, engaged on a course of cutting back the operation of the statute. And at the same time, they followed a repressive policy against the radicalized nationalists, who did not support the statute and were conducting a frontal struggle against the state apparatus.

So, the PNV drew the conclusion that it could not continue on the road. The transfer of powers to the Basque autonomous government was being blocked by a deadlock in the Basque parliament between the PNV, the majority party, and the opposition — the PSOE, the Spanish right, and the Basque moderate left.

The political turn the PNV took involved dropping some features of its nationalist policy, moderating its opposition to the central government, and a more bureaucratic and administrative approach to the statute of autonomy itself. That is, it turned away from the potential uses of the statute to expand the national rights of the Basque people.

In exchange for this accommodative attitude, the PNV got the central government to open up the way for the transfer of some administrative powers to the Basque autonomous government and it got the support of the PSOE in the autonomous parliament, enabling it to pass budgets and laws that it otherwise could not have gotten through the Basque legislature.

The consequence of all this is that the central government has gained a freer hand, with the support of the moderate nationalists, to repress and isolate the radical nationalists.

Obviously, this did not come off without hitches. The crisis is continuing in the PNV. Moreover, the source of conflict is not just opposition to this line but the fact that the PNV is attempting to solve its internal problems in more and more authoritarian and undemocratic ways.

There continue to be tensions in the relations between the PNV and the PSOE in the Basque parliament because whenever the centralists get concessions from the nationalists they try to tighten the screw further, both by stepping up repression and their fight against the nationalists on the ideological level. At various points, the nationalists have found it necessary to take some distance from the PSOE.

But, fundamentally, and that is the unfortunate thing, the legislative pact is being maintained. And that indicates that the PNV's willingness to stay tied to the centralists for the sake of some small concessions in the autonomous administration is greater than it seemed at the beginning. So, we are seeing a major tactical turn.

Moreover, the PNV thinks ahead. It is a party that historically has to play a double game. It has to make accommodations with the centralists, coexist with them. At the same time, it cannot get away from the fact that

it has to hang on to its nationalist voters.

The formula it has adopted to resolve this contradiction is the following. The PNV leaves the implementation of pacts and compromises with the centralists to the Basque government. As a party, it strives to maintain its formal independence. It is left to the heads of the party to raise criticisms and nationalist demands.

This game is not a new one for the PNV. It does this as a provision for the future, so that if it is obliged to make a political turn, it can dump the present *lehendakari* and team of managers and opt for another policy.

But the PNV is getting caught up in the trammels of the pact, and will find itself in a difficult position in particular with regard to the European elections. Both the Catalan nationalists and the Basque bourgeois nationalists are demanding that the autonomous regions be taken into consideration when the districts are drawn up. The central government, however, insists that they will be drawn up in a uniform way throughout the Spanish state.

Moreover, the European tax could undermine the *conciertos economicos* that exist now. These amount to a sort of economic pact allowing the autonomous community to collect taxes and then later pay a percentage to the Spanish state. This tax-collecting power gives the nationalist bourgeoisie an important margin for maneuver.

Q. To what extent has the repression worsened under the pact between the PNV and the PSOE?

A. For example, at a conference of Latin American police officials, the Guardia Civil lieutenant general Cassinello said that the Spanish government had developed an imaginative police operation. On the one hand, it had gotten the French government to agree to extradite Basque nationalists and deport others out of the French Basque country, that is north Euzkadi. It had also extended its means for repression, achieving the elimination of outstanding leaders of ETA and the Comandos Autonomos. He referred to the GAL, the Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion, that is, parallel police forces that have murdered many ETA activists in north Euzkadi.

It seems that this was a slip by the lieutenant general. But it is something well known in the Basque country. It shows that the police and the central government are involved in waging a "dirty war," that they are ready to use any and all means to repress the radical nationalists.

Besides this threefold operation, combining French backing, intensified

police repression, and the use of parallel police forces in a "dirty war," the government has begun in the most recent period using political tactics to wear out the resistance of the radical nationalist forces. It is trying the method of getting political prisoners to "repent" that has been used in Italy.

This involves getting certain political prisoners or political refugees to accept a course of reintegration into society, in which they renounce their political past, not just the method of armed struggle but also their radical nationalist ideas. That is, they agree to accept the Spanish constitutional framework, whether this is specifically the Spanish constitution or the statute of autonomy, which is an extension of the Spanish constitution.

For the time being, this method of repentance has not produced much. Mainly, those who have seen the light have been members of ETA-Politico Militar, who had already departed from the armed struggle road and that of radical resistance and had lined up with the policy of Euzkadiko Ezkerra (EE). The latter represents a moderate left nationalist that accepts the Spanish constitutional framework.

However, the government has achieved some successes that it can play on. One such case was the capitulation of a former leader of ETA-Militar, who had left the organization some time before and was outside the country. Both the Basque government and the central one allowed him to enter the Basque country so that they could use this case to project the idea that already in ETA-Militar cases of desertion are occurring.

So, you can see that in this political operation, for the first time, the autonomous government and the central government have collaborated, although in a semi-official way. So far, there have been different forms of applying the policy of repentance to suit the political advantage of the autonomous government and the central one. The central government has followed a very rigid policy, demanding virtually total capitulation. It has gotten practically no results. On the other hand, EE has encouraged its supporters to follow a third way that involves negotiating the reinsertion of certain legal activists into society with the Basque government.

In any event, these courses have brought very little results, because of all those who have declared their repentance, only a fourth have managed to get out of jail or to be able to return from exile.

Q. What about the accusations that torture of Basque political pris-

"SPANISH DEMOCRACY'S" BLOODY HANDS

The mysterious appearance of Mikel Zabalza's body in the Bidasoa river near San Sebastian in mid-December not only provoked very broad protests in the Basque country but focused international attention on the "dirty war" that the Spanish repressive forces have continued to wage against revolutionary Basque nationalism.

"Is Spain's Guardia Civil still torturing confessions out of prisoners," the West German magazine *Der Spiegel* asked in a headline over a major story in its January 6 issue. It quoted his sister, Arantza, as saying, "They beat our Mikel to death and then threw his body into the river."

Zabalza had been arrested on November 26, charged with membership in the Basque guerrilla organization, ETA. He was seen bound and hooded in the San Sebastian headquarters of the Guardia Civil. Witnesses, according to *Der Spiegel*, saw him carried on a stretcher and heard screams. The body was bound. The police claimed that they had lost him when he made a dash for the nearby French border while he was taking them to an ETA arms cache.

In connection with Zabalza's death, *Der Spiegel* noted the case of Joseba Arregui, who, as it put it, "did not survive an eight-day interrogation in Madrid's central police headquarters."

In its December 21 issue, *Zutik*, the paper of the Liga Comunista Iraultzailea, the Fourth Internationalist organization in the part of the Basque country under the Spanish state, commented:

"Mikel is dead because the guardians of 'democracy' are the same ones who defended the dictatorship. This is a crime of the state, as was the death of Joseba Arregui.

"Mikel is dead because the Antiterrorist Law allows the Guardia Civil to act with total impunity, because this law passed by the PSOE [the Spanish state Social Democratic Party] encourages torture. The responsibility for this crime falls on the government and a Socialist parliamentary majority that has sponsored legislation to repress freedom.

"Basing themselves on the PSOE's laws, the civil governors have prohibited the Basque people from demanding clarification and identification of those responsible. Given cover by the Socialist civil governors, the police have savagely repressed those who were trying to voice these demands.

"All this is consistent — a state maintained by the repressive forces of the previous political system, a legislation designed to preserve the state, the need to shut the mouths demanding an end to torture, an end to repression, and an end to the servitude of the Basque people."

On December 18, a general strike was called in the four Basque provinces (supported by some forces only in Navarra and Guipuzcoa). Mass demonstrations were called in San Sebastian and Pamplona [Iruña] on the 21 and 22 respectively. The peace demonstrators in Madrid on December 17 observed a minute's silence for Zabalza, in Zaragoza they shouted, "We are not all here, Zabalza is missing." In Barcelona, they denounced the Antiterrorist Law and Guardia Civil.

oners has continued under the PSOE government?

A. This collaboration in the area of repression is complicated by the factor of torture and other illegal actions by the police. This came out in an explosive way with the death of the ETA-Militar activist Mikil Zabalza. Some of the gravest aspects of this case also have to do with the antiterrorist law. This legislation was adopted with the support of the Spanish right and the PSOE. Even the moderate nationalists, the Communist Party, and EE opposed it, as did, of course, all the revolutionary and radical groups.

While this law has not yet been applied to its full extent, because this would involve a virtual state of siege, it is being applied in certain respects. For example, activists are being constantly arrested on charges of membership of specific ETA commando groups. They are then held incommunicado for ten days. They cannot see lawyers. They cannot have visitors. The police have a com-

pletely free hand.

When such detainees are finally brought before a judge, 80 to 90 percent of them are released. Thus, the law is being applied in an indiscriminate way, against political supporters of radical nationalism, not just against the armed militants. In this way, the authorities are trying to break the resistance of the political activists and generate an atmosphere of intimidation.

In the Basque country today — as Amnesty International says, and even the PNV and the EE and their representatives in parliament recognize — torture is a fact of life. This is attested by many denunciations both by people released immediately after their arrest and those imprisoned. It has been highlighted by outrageous and tragic cases, such as that of Arregui, a Basque militant who died in the Direccion General de Seguridad in Madrid as a result of torture.

Of course, another example is the case of Mikel Zabalza. But in this case there was another dimension.



Demonstration against police brutality (DR)

Zabalza died in the course of being "disappeared." He was taken to the Guardia Civil barracks at Inchaurredo in San Sebastian, a notorious place today. He was interrogated for several hours. His fiancée and other activists could see him hooded, and then, suddenly, he disappeared. About three weeks later, he was found dead, supposedly drowned, in a place where the Guardia Civil said he had escaped while going to point out an arms dump.

Anyone familiar with this part of the river knows that it is a very well defined and small area where the current is blocked by a dike. The divers worked for three or four days in an area of 300 or 400 meters without being able to find anything. Then, after two weeks, the body turned up, although bodies normally come to the surface after nine days.

Q. What role has the Spanish press played in the case?

A. After being on the defensive for several days, now, of course, the press and the government have taken the side of the Guardia Civil. But no one who knows anything about the matter is going to be convinced by what they say. This special pleading in the press for us is just additional confirmation that in fact Zabalza was murdered in the Guardia Civil barracks itself.

Not only is torture systematic in Inchaurredo but also ill-treatment. For example, we know of cases of anti-war activists being held for some

hours in this barracks and kept hooded with plastic hoods. People who have been arrested in demonstrations in a lot of places end up in this barracks and are all put in plastic hoods so that they will not see the installations nor recognize the interrogators.

What is more, on the first inspection the judge found out that there was no record book of arrests. This is either because they arranged for it to go missing so that it would not come to light that Zabalza was held there, or in fact no such book has been kept. If the second is true, it means that there was a deliberate policy of keeping no record of the repressive activity of the Guardia Civil in this barracks.

On the other hand, this entire business shows how repressive a Social Democratic government can be, as does the record of the last British Labour government in Ireland. In the last analysis, in adopting the Spanish constitution, which denies the right of self-determination of the Basque people, the PSOE regime is ready to use any and all means of police repression against the conscious struggles of the revolutionary nationalists and revolutionary Marxists who defend the right of self-determination of the Basque country.

Q. In your opinion, how effective has the response been to Zabalza's murder?

A. It is still too early to tell. But the indications are encouraging. One important aspect is the response of

Zabalza's fellow workers. He was a bus driver for the San Sebastian municipal transport company. He belonged to the union ELA [Eusko Langileen Alkartasuna — Basque Workers Alliance], which is the moderate nationalist union [close to the PNV]. So, all the bus drivers protested against his murder by driving a caravan of buses around the city. And the majority union in the bus company is the PSOE-dominated confederation, the UGT.

On top of this, there have been a lot of student demonstrations that were effective in drawing people's attention to this case, since for about five days it went more or less unnoticed. So, demonstrations have been snowballing, and all of them have run into repression. Not just the radical forces but also the moderate ones — ELA and the Comisiones Obreras del Pais Vasco — have found themselves obliged to support the call for a protest general strike in the provinces of Navarra, from which Zabalza came, and Guipuzcoa, where he lived.

Q. What has the LKI done so far on this case?

A. Besides raising the biggest outcry we could about it and supporting all the mobilizations, we managed to get the Comisiones Obreras in Guipuzcoa, to adopt a resolution calling for an inquiry into this case and identification of those responsible. The motion was presented by our comrades. □

The struggle against apartheid in Natal province—two recent examples

WE PUBLISH below two articles about events in Natal province. Both were originally published in the South African review *Work in Progress*, No 39, October 1985.

Work in Progress is one of several independent reviews produced in South Africa which attempts to analyse workers' and popular struggles in the country. Among other things it publishes a list of the different strikes occurring in any one month and attempts to explain the causes and results.

The first article published below concerns the organisation of a boycott of white businesses organised in the towns of Howick and Pietermaritzburg in connection with the important BTR SARMCOL strike. The strike started when BTR SARMCOL, a firm sponsored by British capital, made 950 workers redundant.

The consumer boycott became an important method of struggle during 1985 in most parts of the country. The target of such movements in general was the military presence in the townships and the state of emergency, the idea being to put pressure on the white traders who would in turn put pressure on the government. But this type of action proved to be very difficult to organise. One of the problems which came up was that of the sometimes tenuous link between the community organisations who initiated the boycott and the independent trade unions.

The case taken up below is important because the boycott was organised around workers industrial action. The industrial working class were at the centre of this united and broad-based action. This is still something which occurs only too infrequently for it not to be underlined. Although it is no absolute guarantee, this experience does prove that a worker and trade-union presence in the movement is an important precondition for successful organisation.



The second article deals with the violence of the Inkatha party against, in particular, activists in the United Democratic Front (UDF). The recognised leader of Inkatha is Buthelezi, the chief of the KwaZulu bantustan. This party is simply an instrument of control and intimidation of the Black population in the Durban area. Leaders of the UDF and trade-union leaders are under constant threat from Inkatha gangs.

A Black lawyer who took up cases of UDF members in particular, Victoria Mxenge, was assassinated in August 1985 and Buthelezi's men are under strong suspicion.

Buthelezi cultivates a deliberately ambiguous stance. In contrast to other bantustan chiefs he declares himself violently opposed to the apartheid system and aligns himself with the liberals in putting forward solutions aimed at reform.

On the other hand he and his party constitute one of the strongest cards that the regime has against the African National Congress (ANC) and against the mass movement whether in the name of the 'national Zulu identity' or pure anti-communism. Inkatha tries to act like the single ruling parties in other African states but in reality it can never operate outside of the watchful control of the racist regime. It has helped the emergence of a layer of Zulu capitalist businessmen who are attempting to integrate themselves into economic life in Natal.

At present Inkatha constitutes a grave danger for the mass movement in this region. It has a not unimportant base amongst a section of the Zulu population and this situation places an increased burden on the different organisations, and in particular, as the article points out, on the UDF, for a special vigilance and structuring of their organisation.

As in every region in South Africa, Natal has a particular history and situation of its own. The laws of the apartheid system have dictated that the Durban area (the capital) is a preferential one of the employment of Indians. Consequently there exists here a strong Indian proletariat alongside of the African working class which consists in large majority of Zulus and Xhosas. The latter come from the Transkei and Ciskei bantustans. Natal is thus an area where the question of unity between the different ethnic groups is most difficult and most essential.

In August 1985, there were a series of skirmishes between Zulus and Indians and on December 25 of last year a real battle broke out between Zulus and the Xhosa people. KwaZulu is made up of pockets of territory surrounding Durban and this favours the control of the Zulu townships by the Buthelezi regime. Durban itself is made up of a large petty bourgeoisie and a section of Indian small employers. Apart from this the main large industry in the regions is concentrated in chemicals and textiles. In 1973 a massive strike movement exploded in Durban and marked a new era for Black trade-unionism and workers struggles.

Twelve years on it was in Durban that the November 30, 1985, founding congress of COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) was held. As well as showing the particular situation in Natal all this also demonstrates its importance for the revolutionary struggle in the whole of South Africa. □

Pietermaritzburg, the unions take the lead

YUNUS CARRIM

Possibly the most effective consumer boycott outside the Eastern Cape was in Pietermaritzburg. It was organised specifically around local demands: for the reinstatement of 950 BTR SARMCOL workers in Howick and the signing of a recognition agreement with their union, the Metal and Allied Workers Union (MAWU). Launched on August 15 and ended on September 26, the boycott did not achieve these ends. But it demonstrated to a wide cross-section of white Pietermaritzburg the power of Black consumers.

A survey by the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce revealed that in the first two weeks of the boycott, white businesses experienced a 60-70% drop in turnover. This varied with the type and locality of business. Even John Orr's and the Hub, not highly reliant on Black custom, admitted to a 15% drop. Most large supermarket chains refused to comment and referred all queries to their head offices, which also gave no definite answers.

A MAWU spokesperson said a monitoring committee believed that the boycott of white businesses varied between 30% and 90%. Large supermarkets in the Indian area reported an average of 25% turnover increase. Indian businesses in the mainly white Central Business District and others in the Indian area of the city complained of lost turnover as the boycott kept consumers out of the city.

Despite few precise details, the boycott was clearly effective for at least three weeks. It then tapered off and was officially called off at the end of the sixth week. Organisations supporting it began discussions to end it in the fourth week.

Support for the boycott arose in the course of the sustained campaign over the preceding three and a half months by unions and community organisations to win the SARMCOL workers' struggle.

SARMCOL dispute

On April 30, 950 MAWU members went on strike at BTR SARMCOL in Howick (20 kilometres from Pietermaritzburg). The dispute was over terms of a recognition agreement. On May 3 all 950 were fired, and at a mass

meeting they launched a consumer boycott of all white businesses in Howick from May 6. The objective was to cause business to pressurise SARMCOL to reinstate workers and recognise MAWU.

In Howick, a supermarket owner reported a 50% drop in takings in the first two days. One business closed and several others feared possible closure. A local businessman pleaded with strikers at a mass meeting not to treat him as white and donated 200 rand to their cause. Businessmen complained whites from outlying areas feared to come into town.

The boycott was successful because Howick is a small town with a cohesive, united Black community and a strong MAWU presence. SARMCOL workers are a significant proportion of the township workforce and white business relies strongly on township custom.

But SARMCOL management refused to budge, and employed scab labour from Pietermaritzburg and surrounding areas.

Taking their struggle to Pietermaritzburg, workers met community organisations and church groups to raise material and political support. Black, and particularly Indian businessmen were approached for donations in cash or kind, and asked to provide basic groceries to the support fund at reasonable prices. The response was good.

The Pietermaritzburg public was forced to notice the SARMCOL struggle when during peak shopping hours on Saturday June 29, a convoy of ten buses of striking workers jammed main street traffic. Posters, leaflets and stickers were distributed to explain the struggle and appeal against scab labour.

On July 6, at a 2000-strong mass meeting, union and community organisation representatives endorsed a FOSATU proposal for a one-day stayaway if the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce did not get SARMCOL to negotiate with MAWU. It did not, and the stayaway took place on July 18. Some 92% of African workers and 70% of all workers, including whites, stayed away. Township schools were boycotted and 80% of all Black businesses were shut.

Still SARMCOL management would not budge. Unions and commu-

nity organisations then discussed FOSATU's proposal for a consumer boycott. Because of this threat and the success of the stayaway, the town mayor and the Chamber of Commerce invited MAWU and community organisations to a meeting. MAWU was criticised for organising the stayaway and urged not to extend the struggle to Pietermaritzburg. Chamber representatives said they could not influence SARMCOL to meet the union, but agreed to try to set up a meeting between MAWU and the company. There was a meeting but SARMCOL rejected all MAWU's proposals. The consumer boycott went ahead.

Debating local tactics

Momentum for the boycott came out of the preceding months of struggle and was propelled by violent confrontations between people and police, and between strikers and scabs. Three were killed and scores arrested. Five strikers have been jailed for up to a year for 'violent intimidation'. Other cases are pending.

Added to the momentum was the declaration of the state of emergency, the UDF [United Democratic Front] proposed national consumer boycott, Victoria Mxenge's death, a schools' boycott and a defiant, militant youth.

The goal of the boycott was debated. The unions and the African Peoples Democratic Union of Southern Africa, APDUSA (1), supported a boycott based on the SARMCOL issue. The UDF and its affiliates felt that lifting of the state of emergency should be included as a demand immediately, to reflect the militant township mood. It argued for inclusion of a demand for the release of all detainees including those detained during the stayaway. The issues could not be separated, the UDF believed, and inclusion of such demands linked the union and political struggles. The UDF said that to mobilise maximum support, demands appealing to the widest number of people should be included.

The unions responded that if the SARMCOL and emergency demands were linked, SARMCOL management could respond that even if workers were reinstated, the boycott would continue until the emergency was lifted. Management would say pressure

1. African People's Democratic Union of Southern Africa (APDUSA) is one of the small organisations which came out of the ending of the Unity Movement at the end of the 1950s and beginning of the 1960s. It seems that the organisation in question here, that is the APDUSA (Natal) was integrated into the New Unity Movement, a wider organisation which has emerged in the last few months.

should be brought to bear on the government, rather than SARMCOL. MAWU also felt the SARMCOL struggle was at a crucial stage and needed intensified effort as management showed signs of giving in. MAWU stressed that it recognised that the state of emergency was a major issue, but a coordinated national strategy was necessary to combat it. Unions were discussing national action, and local unions had no mandate unilaterally to support a boycott over national issues.

MAWU argued that local dynamics should dictate the terms of the boycott. 'The specific way we combat the state of emergency is through the SARMCOL issue', said a union organiser.

Compromise

Unions and the UDF compromised, deciding to launch a consumer boycott based on SARMCOL demands for the first ten days. It would then be reviewed to see if lifting the emergency and related issues should be added as demands. The boycott would begin on August 15, and they set no date for its conclusion.

Organisations committed to the boycott were: FOSATU, CCAWUSA [Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union]; GWU [General Workers Union]; the UDF and affiliates, especially COSAS [Congress of South African Students], the Natal Indian Congress and various youth and civic organisations; National Education Union of South Africa (NEUSA); Detainees Support Committee (DESCOM); APDUSA; the Azanian Students Movement (AZASM); Lawyers for Democracy; Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA); and the Pietermaritzburg Youth Cultural Society.

About 70,000 leaflets and 30,000 stickers in English and Zulu advertised the boycott of white business. Black businessmen were approached, informed of the boycott and asked not to use it as an opportunity to profiteer. They responded positively.

A monitoring committee representing unions and community organisations was set up. It administered the boycott in terms of mandates from weekly joint union and community meetings. Decisions at FOSATU shop stewards council meetings provided direction for the joint meetings.

Several community organisations complained they had not been properly consulted during planning of the stayaway, but concerted consultation over the boycott between unions and community organisations helped alleviate these tensions.

Pietermaritzburg is a relatively small town and most white business is situated in a central business district. There are a fair number of alternative Black businesses even though they do not match white business in variety or prices.

On August 24 a 2,500-strong mass meeting endorsed continuation of the boycott based on the SARMCOL issue. On September 2, largely on FOSATU and other unions' initiative, consumer boycotts were launched in Durban, Pinetown and Hammarsdale to oppose the state of emergency and related issues. These boycotts did not take up the demands of the SARMCOL workers. In the event, the Pietermaritzburg boycott never formally included demands relating to the state of emergency. But as other Natal union branches did, popular perception probably linked the Pietermaritzburg boycott with the state of emergency.

The Durban boycott appears to have been least effective, but it was evidently successful in Hammarsdale and particularly in Pinetown. The crisis in Inanda, (2) the confrontations between Inkatha and progressive township organisations and the spate of arrests of activists contributed to limiting the boycott's success in Durban. It was called off on October 6.

The boycott spreads

By the time the Durban boycott was called, the Pietermaritzburg boycott was flagging. After the mass meeting on August 24, there were no further attempts to consolidate it. Money had run out, and the township community organisations were in disarray. Confrontations with police and the need to escape detention hampered activists. And confrontations with Inkatha took a severe toll. Many activists fled their homes and open campaigning around the boycott was impossible.

Inkatha was not prepared to support the boycott because it had not been consulted, but did say that it sympathised with the plight of the SARMCOL workers. It believed consumer boycotts were a legitimate and powerful non-violent strategy but said the time was not right. Inkatha said a boycott had to be nationally coordinated and planned and must have majority support.

The Inyanda Chamber of Commerce, an organisation of businessmen affiliated to Inkatha, was stridently against the boycott. Its president, PG Gumede, 'declared war' on FOSATU and called on Inkatha in Pietermaritzburg to 'crush' the

boycott. He urged consumers to 'flock' to the city centre on Saturday September 28, assuring them that Inkatha would protect them against 'intimidation'. Gumede said KwaZulu's Chief Buthelezi made it plain that FOSATU's persistence with the boycott was a challenge to Inkatha and to his own leadership.

The Pietermaritzburg chairman of Inkatha and the secretary of Inyanda disassociated themselves from Gumede's statements. But the Inyanda Chamber of Commerce local secretary had said earlier that Inyanda did not support the boycott. African traders did not benefit but Indian traders did, he said.

Ending the boycott

A pamphlet jointly produced by the Pietermaritzburg City Council, the Chamber of Commerce and the Afrikaanse Sakekamer was air-dropped over African townships. Entitled 'Boycotts harm you' it stressed that boycotts 'hurt you and your family first', drive business away and lead to price increases and unemployment. Four editorials over seven weeks in the *Natal Witness* echoed the same sentiment and repeatedly suggested that intimidation was endemic to consumer boycotts.

The boycott was called off on September 26, after two weeks of discussions. Organisations involved in it stressed that they had not succumbed to Gumede's threats. In the discussions CCAWUSA workers said management had threatened them with retrenchments if the boycott persisted. They suggested calling off the boycott and organising another stayaway in which CCAWUSA members would not be singled out for victimisation. But already the boycott was beginning to peter out, and there was no sign that the SARMCOL management was prepared to give in.

At a meeting on September 19, the majority of union members suggested that the boycott be called off. The UDF felt that this would discourage those boycotting in other areas, and suggested that it be revitalised. The unions argued that local dynamics should dictate whether the boycott continued or not, but the UDF was asked to investigate the possibility of financing the necessary leaflets and investing more energy into the campaign. But at the next meeting on September 24, the UDF agreed with other organisations that the boycott be called off.

2. Inanda is the township which has in the past been the scene of unrest between the Zulu and Indian populations.

Some 30,000 leaflets were distributed informing people of the end of the boycott. The leaflet was reproduced in the *Natal Witness*. It said that 'the boycott has achieved one of its main objectives — namely to focus attention on the struggle of the SARMCOL workers, and no useful purpose is to be served by prolonging it. At the appropriate time we will decide to resume the boycott should we consider it to be in the interest of the SARMCOL workers'.

White businesses were clearly jolted by the boycott and did put pressure on SARMCOL to negotiate with MAWU — but SARMCOL was intransigent. The Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce said that the boycott made it realise 'the need for increased dialogue and negotiation on the socio-economic situation' with organisations supported by the Black community.


The boycott also had lessons for those organising it. Clearly it was important to consult properly with Black traders around practical issues like sufficient and appropriate stock. Also, Black traders did not match white businesses in prices and goods range, leading to considerable sacrifices by consumers.

To succeed, a consumer boycott must maintain broad support, which calls for more delicate balancing of competing interests than in other popular campaigns. Prospects for inculcating working class content into a consumer boycott campaign are limited, because workers, particularly those in the commercial sector, are most vulnerable in such a class alliance: their jobs are at risk and they are less able to support a long-term boycott. Also, women in the community bear the brunt of immediate material consequences of a consumer boycott.

But the fact that in Pietermaritzburg, the unions and the Congress, Unity Movement and Black Consciousness traditions held together for the first time ever, is a positive precedent.

The Pietermaritzburg boycott provided opportunity for democratic exchange among a wide variety of organisations. There were tensions. Unions suggested that community organisations offered more rhetorical than practical support. Community organisations felt the unions exerted too-rigid control, not allowing the former space to operate more effectively. But both now understand better the dynamics, structures, strengths and weaknesses of the other. This will allow more realistic expectations of each other in struggles waged together in future.

The central political and organisational question which emerges is surely that of the relationship between trade unions and community organisations. □



United Democratic Front under attack

RICHARD DE VILLIERS

United Democratic Front treasurer and political lawyer Victoria Mxenge was assassinated on August 1, 1985, outside her house in Umlazi, Durban. By August 13 violence throughout the Durban area had left 63 dead and about 1,000 injured. Over 42 shops and shopping complexes were looted and burned, and many dozens of homes destroyed.

Youth 'rampaged' through the Umlazi and Kwa Mashu townships, setting up roadblocks, stoning police and burning down administration board offices. Indians and Africans clashed in a series of riots in the Inanda/Phoenix area. The Ghandi settlement on the outskirts of Phoenix was destroyed. Many companies closed early on August 8 and 9. And several schools had total boycotts. Leaders and representatives of all political persuasions publicly expressed fears of another Zulu/Indian race riot like that of 1949.

On the face of it, it is difficult to link these events with Mxenge's assassination. Initial explanations ranged from assertions about 'agitators' whipping up feelings among an essentially passive populace, to declarations that 'the people have had enough'. But these explanations are too superficial.


There is proof that a mob of Inkatha supporters surrounded Mxenge's home, and threatened to burn it down the day before her funeral. Winnington Sabelo, KwaZulu Legislative Assembly member for Umlazi, also led an *impi* [armed group] against a group of mourners at a funeral of unrest victims on August 17.

The exact significance of these incidents in the overall picture is not clear. One factor, however, which underlines the bloody fortnight is the relationship between Inkatha and the UDF.

Since the formation of the UDF in Natal, both organisations have seen each other as rivals. More than that, they have attacked and condemned each other persistently in the media and on public platforms.

One of the first issues Natal UDF contested was the murder of UDF-supporting students on the Zululand University campus towards the end of 1984. This set the tone for an extremely antagonistic relationship between the organisations.

The UDF and Inkatha had already rejected the new constitutional deal and the Koornhof Bills. Both were committed in principle to a national convention — as expressed by the UDF at its Rocklands launch and Chief



Map of Natal showing KwaZulu bantustan

Buthelezi in a recent statement. They also protested against the increase in the bread price. In spite of these similarities, the organisations never attempted to work together on these issues. In fact spokespersons for both organisations were at pains to deny any possible common ground. Each continually insisted that their anti-Koornhof Bills campaign and anti-bread price campaign were different. The relationship remained antagonistic.

Despite these campaigns, and the heightened level of political awareness throughout the country, neither organisation was able to tackle its own serious grassroots organisational problems.

The UDF lacked organisational structures but had tremendous potential support. Inkatha, though it had strong organisational structures, drew on, at best, ambivalent support.

Apologists for both organisations would deny these charges, and no doubt there are variations and subtleties according to class, age and area. But the general trend seems that Inkatha was weakly supported in the greater Durban area and the UDF was poorly organised in the African townships.

Inkatha's mode of organisation shows many of the characteristics of the fascist political movements which emerged in Europe after the depression in 1929. Ideologically,

appeals to symbols of Zulu nationalism and anti-Indian rhetoric are obvious examples. However, more significant is its mode of organisation. Patronage based on the provision of jobs to civil servants and trading licences to small businesses, the 'gauliteir' system of neighbourhood cells, and a private army (the *amabutho*) not averse to using force against recalcitrant 'supporters', are very similar to the mode of organisation of Hitler's Nazi party. Street violence of the 1930s has its echo in Durban of the 1980s.

The UDF in Natal is difficult to categorise. Unlike many mass-based left-inclined organisations around the world, it has no relationship with powerful worker organisations and trade unions. At the outset, SAAWU affiliated to the Front, but had its own problems of leadership. The Natal UDF made little effort to forge links with the more powerful FOSATU affiliates. So it was left to develop a mass base entirely on its own — something it was not designed or able to do.

The UDF, relying on community based affiliates, had a weak presence in Umlazi, Kwa Mashu, and the informal squatter camps in Inanda. Its affiliates were powerful in the small townships of Lamontville, Chesterville and Hambanathi. However, the leadership that emerged there became cut-off from day-to-day community

concerns and was swallowed up in broader national UDF activities. Generally, the largely Indian intellectual middle class leadership of the UDF made little progress trying to organise from the top down.

Youth organisations were the conspicuous exception, and it was largely from these groups that the UDF filled its many mass rallies. Unfortunately, well-attended public meetings, spiced with anti-Inkatha speeches and slogans, do not protect supporters when they go home to the townships.

Against this background, it was almost inevitable that the two organisations headed for a series of confrontations.

Whether there was a state 'dirty tricks department' involved in the clashes, or whether Inkatha leadership simply decided to eliminate the UDF in the urban areas in August is not entirely clear. There are indications of a conspiracy: the fact that police casspirs [jeeps] escorted bus loads of *amabutho* to break up funerals. But further information is needed before categorical statements can be made.

A conspiracy is not really at issue here. The state can be expected to play whatever cards it has ruthlessly. What is clear is the outcome of the clash. With the police turning a blind eye, Inkatha has burnt out and harassed UDF supporters in all major townships in and around Durban. In one instance, known UDF supporters were hounded out of Hambanathi and sought refuge at a priory in Verulam.

Inkatha has secured Umlazi and Kwa Mashu by appealing to the older members of the community, promising to discipline the youth and restore law and order. No doubt this is convenient for the state as it contemplates the 'Natal Option'.

UDF affiliates like the Joint Rent Action Committee and the Detainees Support Committee have been unable to operate successfully since that August fortnight. Township people, aware of the dangers of being associated with the UDF, are concerned to distance themselves from the organisation. The UDF has little attraction for them: it appears to be Indian-led, with a predominately radical, and by implication, violent, young membership which displays anti-worker tendencies in its calls for stayaways. As they see it, to belong to the UDF now almost certainly means having your home burnt down, and possibly death.

With the UDF leadership in detention, and a weak organisational infrastructure, the UDF is unable to defend itself and its supporters against the combined onslaught of Inkatha and the state. □

End of the road for a sect

IN LATE OCTOBER and early November the British media turned its full attention to a bizarre sect, the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP). For several weeks headlines ran like: "Red in the Bed Scandal" and "Girls Lured to Red Gerry's Casting Couch". The cause of this was the revelation, following the expulsion by the WRP's Central Committee on a majority vote (27 to 11) of 73-year-old Gerry Healy, for several decades the cult leader of the organisation and its predecessor, the Socialist Labour League. Healy was accused, amongst other things of having abused his authority to force sexual relations between him and 26 young women party members.

PETE CLIFFORD

Whilst the bourgeois press was able to triumphantly use this blow up in the WRP to drive forward its witch hunting attacks on the left as a whole, socialists in Britain also welcomed this rupture in Healy's organisation. For the course of events since then have begun to unravel and confirm for the workers movement as a whole what a caricature of Marxism Healy and his outfit actually were.

The WRP Central Committee now led by General Secretary Michael Banda and university lecturer Cliff Slaughter have the support of two thirds of their organisation, probably about 500 members (and certainly nowhere near the 10,000 Healy always claimed for members).

A much smaller breakaway group, also calling itself the WRP, claims to have expelled the minority and is still supporting Healy. It is led by Alex Mitchell, a prominent journalist for Healy's press, and well-known actors Vanessa Redgrave and her brother Corin.

Healy's international supporters organised in the so-called 'International Committee of the Fourth International' (ICFI) have also divided. The majority including organisations or supporters in America, Australia, Ireland, Peru, Sri Lanka and Germany have endorsed Healy's expulsion; whilst a minority, including the Greek and Spanish organisations along with Healy's supporters in Britain claim to have expelled the rest and back Healy.

Clearly the roots of this divide lie beyond the allegations of Healy's abuse of power. The Banda-Slaughter

Newsline now points to Healy's reduction of the class struggle to a permanent revolutionary situation — an insurrection or fascism round every corner — out of which, through the super-activism of the membership, the masses could be won direct to his outfit. From this ultra-left view came the necessity to have daily papers and an apparatus bloated out of all proportion to the size of the organisation, and its actual relation to the class struggle.

The Banda-Slaughter supporters now allege that Healy prettified the politics of Middle Eastern leaders from Ghadaffi to the Iraqi government in order to secure financial assistance for this. They claim this went to the depths of the WRP endorsing the murder of 21 Iraqi communists in 1979 and supplying photos to the Iraqi Embassy in Britain of Iraqi dissidents.

Along with what Slaughter calls this 'opportunist sect', came a regime which allowed Healy, the party's guru, to expel bureaucratically, physically bully members who were not subservient to him and sexually assault women members.

In reply the Healy supporters do not deny any of the charges. They simply explain that the Banda-Slaughter group cannot take the pace politically and are moving to the "extreme right"!

In order to break with Healy, the Banda-Slaughter WRP are having to open themselves outwards and grapple with their past. In late November the WRP held a London public meeting on

"Revolutionary Morality and the Split." This attracted amongst the 400-strong audience many former members of the WRP and SLL. It was significant that amongst those the platform invited to make contributions were Alan Thornett, (expelled in 1973); a representative of the Lambertist group in Britain (the Socialist Labour Group); and, speaking as a Socialist Action supporter, Connie Harris (expelled in 1960). *Socialist Actions* were well received by those attending. Also sold were forty copies of *Healy's Big Lie* — a collection of statements by revolutionists throughout the world answering Healy's slander methods.

The main platform speaker, Cliff Slaughter, explained to the meeting: "We cannot separate ourselves from Healy by just his expulsion, we have to take responsibility for what happened. ...many of those who left (the WRP) are in better shape to fight Healy than those who stayed." To be sure, both Slaughter and Banda were themselves responsible for, and central to, the "Healy clique" for over 25 years.

These statements and recent developments present an important opportunity for Marxists. Firstly because this split enables us to re-examine and explain the consequences of ultra-left sectarianism, in particular the result of Healy's turning away from the vast majority of Marxists who re-unified the Fourth International in 1963 and instead establishing his own fake International Committee of the Fourth International. Secondly because if those who break from Healy are really to confront their past, they will have to make their reference point the traditions of our movement from Marx and Lenin to Trotsky's fight for the Fourth International.

Healy's big lie tactics

There is today the possibility of a dialogue with some of these forces breaking from Healy which can affect their political evolution. Finally, the Healy clique has politically insulated the WRP from the Fourth International through the method of lies, slanders and frame-ups. They have particularly used this against the US SWP in the mid-1970s. Joe Hanson and George Novack, long time leaders of the SWP and collaborators of Trotsky, were accused by the WRP of being agents of the Soviet GPU which murdered Trotsky. Later, the present leadership of the SWP were branded as FBI agents. Today there is still a court action in the USA pending by a WRP/US Workers League agent - Alan Gelfand - to this effect.

Now, with the same methods being

applied to his former collaborators — Healy accuses David North, leader of the US Workers League and Banda/ICFI supporter of being a CIA agent — the opportunity exists to set the record straight on these gross allegations and focus on the political issues at stake.

This re-examination of 'Healyism' however, cannot focus, as Slaughter indicates, primarily on the last ten years. It has to grapple with two key features of the WRP's sectarian past — its stance towards living revolutions and its position on the British Labour Party.

In the post-war period Fourth Internationalists were both bitterly divided and suffering from isolation imposed by the right wing political situation and the weight of Stalinism in the labour movement. The process of re-unifying the Fourth International was encouraged by a positive response by the bulk of those calling themselves Trotskyists to forces breaking from the CPs, after the Hungary events of 1956 and Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin. This was accelerated by an enthusiastic response to the Cuban revolution.

As James P Cannon, a leader of the US SWP wrote at the time "what would our talk about revolution be worth if we couldn't recognise a revolution when we see it?" But Healy could not fit his rigid notions of 'theory' to the events: the revolution began as a national democratic one, and the Castro-led July 26 movement did not come from the Trotskyist tradition. Instead of re-examining his theory, Healy junked the revolution itself. Indeed it was Banda who said "there is little or no difference in the type of state set up by Castro or Battista" (*Newsletter* June 18, 1966).

Turning his back on the Cuban revolution and the new forces of the international class struggle, the Healy clique split from the majority of the International Committee of the Fourth International which unified the International Secretariat in 1963 and thereby drew to an end the ten year period of division of Fourth Internationalists.

Alongside this turn away from the new revolutionary forces who internationally could contribute to the resolving of the crisis of leadership came a turn by the Healy clique away from the British Labour Party. In place of the tremendous advances the SLL (the WRP predecessor) had made as a tendency throughout the 1950s in the Labour Party which linked-up with the left-wing Bevanite movement, Healy began to separate himself from this key focus for the struggle for leadership in Britain inside the Labour Party.

Instead of engaging in the struggle in the organisation that the bulk of



Gerry Healy (DR)

Britain's trade unions are affiliated to, and millions of workers look to and vote for, the Healyites embarked on a binge to cut loose from the Labour Party and its left wing.

As Ernest Germain wrote in *Marxism vs Ultra Leftism*, Healy's political strategy began to look more and more like "third period Stalinism". In 1964 Healy supporters to a large extent set up their own expulsion from the Labour Party and its youth wing, the Labour Party Young Socialists, triumphantly declaring themselves as the alternative to it. To this year the Healyites have ritualistically marched past the Labour Party conferences appealing to participants to leave and join them.

The test of Action

As the SLL/WRP confronted each new event in the class struggle, so the tragedy turned to farce. Having failed to recognise the Cuban revolution, it is not surprising that the revolutions in Nicaragua and Grenada in 1979 for the Healyites merely threw up "bourgeois nationalist leaders" (1983 WRP Congress). In Britain the Healyites managed to avoid massive popular movements such as the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign in the late 1960s. In 1968 the Healyites leafleted the 100,000 strong London demonstration in support of the Vietnamese struggle for self-determination with a statement titled "Why We Are Not Marching"! Accompanying this ultra-sectarian course was Healy's transformation of Marxist theory away from its purpose as a *guide to action* into a dogma to justify his isolation. Healy became a self-proclaimed expert on dialectics — which party members

swore religiously to uphold without having any comprehension on its application to the living world.

Such a sect inevitably has shock waves sent through it when hit by reality. Two key events in Britain in the last period have assisted this. The first was the Malvinas war, where Healy's paper failed in the first weeks to come out for the defeat of British imperialism in its war against Argentina. It has now been revealed that a sharp debate opened up around this question in the WRP. The second was the miners' strike, whose impact has shaken up every section of the British labour movement. Forced to confront, on the one hand, the reality of the bosses offensive, and, on the other hand, the rise of the Scargill leadership with its class struggle methods — a leadership again outside the ranks of Healyism, the WRP began to tear apart.

Today the Banda-Slaughter-led WRP stand at the cross roads claiming to want to fight not only Healy but "Healyism". But they have not yet grasped that the roots of Healy's sickness lie in the political *ultra-left sectarianism*.

Contrary to the claim made by the so-called International Committee of the Fourth International in its statement endorsing the expulsion, there is nothing positive that Healy has contributed to the movement. In so far as he fought for anything separate or new from our traditions, it has been wildly *wrong!* In particular to continue the fake battle against "Pabloism" — when for 22 years Pablo has been outside the ranks of the Fourth International — will educate no-one.

If the WRP and its satellite groups are to really confront their past, that cannot be achieved through a re-writing of history within their movement to slate the personal faults of G Healy. Rather it will be achieved by a thorough going break organisationally and politically with their ultra-left sectarianism.

The alternative will be to resurrect Healyism under another name and join those from Lambert to Moreno who have proven unable to recognise the reality of living revolutions and their leaderships.

Finally, one question will indicate the extent to which the WRP can break from the organisational consequences of its sectarianism — this is a simple and clear cut withdrawal of the slander and frame-up campaign against leaders of the US SWP and other prominent leaders of the Fourth International. (1) Such a step is essential for establishing a meaningful dialogue. □

1. The US SWP is prohibited by reactionary legislation from being a section of the Fourth International. It does however collaborate with and work towards the same goals as the Fourth International.

The Punjab elections and the course of the Rajiv government

DESPITE THE RECENT installation of an elected provincial government, the Punjab remains the single most important trouble spot for the Indian government. To understand the nature of the deal between Rajiv Gandhi and Sant Longowal, [moderate leader of the Sikh Akali Dal Party] and the subsequent events, we must look back at the history.

INDER SINGH

By early 1985, it was clear to everyone that the central issue was no longer the demands concerning water rights for irrigation or the integration of the city of Chandigarh to Punjab, thus altering the state boundaries. (1) What was at stake was the future of a beleaguered and imperilled community — the Sikhs. The events of the last half a decade, and especially of 1984-85 have both made them far more community conscious than before, and reduced them to a kind of second class citizenship status. The responsibility for this lies with the Akali Dal, the Congress (I), and the pro-Bhindranwale fundamentalists.

Rajiv Gandhi's leadership on the issue has essentially made no difference. The last parliamentary elections were fought under an openly Hindu communal banner. Activists of the Hindu communalist organisation, RSS, campaigned openly for many Congress (I) candidates, ditching their usual vehicle, the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party].

In the post-election period, that is from January 1985 onwards, discrimination against Sikhs, far from being abated, has been in the process of being institutionalised, in the army,

in the government services, etc. Anti-Sikh sentiments are often whipped up in various ways. TV viewers in Delhi were treated, a few months back, to an interview with one of the generals in charge of "Operation Bluestar" to the accompaniment of the constant sound of machine gun firing. (2) In the same city, according to many people, the least disturbance is often followed by official anti-Sikhism in various forms, such as the open display of hostility to bearded and/or long-haired persons.

These are not the only reasons the Sikhs feel threatened. As the green revolution spreads to other parts of the country, the importance of Punjab as a surplus grain-producing province will decline. This will mean a reduction in prosperity. Since the majority of Punjabi rich peasants are Sikhs, it is easy to lend a communal or religious colour to this as well. In short, some genuine and justifiable problems and grievances of the Sikhs as a community will remain and even increase. It is the extremists — Khalistanis — who will feed on these grievances.

Punjab politics in 1985 has gone through a number of phases. But all the time, the central question was, what would a reconstituted Akali Dal (AD) look like, what would its relationship with the centre be and what kind of leadership would it be able to provide?

Despite its communal nature, the Congress government at the centre had to adopt a conciliatory approach in the post parliamentary election period. It needed a bourgeois "solution" to the Punjab crisis in order to usher in a period of "stability". There are serious problems in the way of finding long-term stability. But a medium range stability, or even a one-

year breathing space would be useful.

The centre's problem was in getting a strong group with which it could negotiate, and in not giving the impression that the group had 'sold out' to the centre. To achieve this goal, the centre followed a two-track policy. On the one hand, repression was stepped up. The new anti-terrorist act is draconian by any standards. But it was promulgated not so much because the government had hopes of frightening the terrorists as of weakening them by whittling away at their extremist base. On the other hand, a series of steps were taken to show that this time, a genuine attempt would be made for some kind of agreement. In conceding the demand for a judicial probe into the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi (though till now no significant developments have materialised in this respect) it was shown that the post riot or post Bluestar set of demands, like abolition of the special courts, or even abrogation of the anti-terrorist act, could become negotiable.

But beyond this the centre could do little, while the battle was fought out for control of the Akali Dal. Since November 1984, Hindus and Sikhs alike, in their vast majority, have come to view the Sikhs as a separate community. This reinforced the tendency of the Sikhs to fall in line behind the Akali Dal, which is the principal political leadership and expression of the Sikhs as a community.

All the contenders for Akali leadership were communalists. But the Longowal/moderate faction wanted a settlement. The Longowal group was solidly based on the Jat-Singh peasantry, which needed a settlement for the resumption of normal economic activities. The Talwandi faction had a stronger extremist-fundamentalist base, and it used Bhindranwale's father, Baba Joginder Singh, as its public face.

Since Bluestar, however, extremism had taken several hard knocks. Joginder Singh was no substitute for Bhindranwale. The severe crack-down had also weakened the terrorists and substantially reduced their extremist base. Nonetheless, any settlement needed as a basic precondition a further strengthening of the AD-Longowal. Hence Longowal had to make

1. Chandigarh is an administrative centre which houses two provinces — Punjab and Haryana, hence the demand for its full integration into Punjab. This demand was all but conceded at the August 1985 accord. The green revolution in India requires high amounts of irrigation. The Punjab's share of the waters of the rivers Ravi and Beas is quite low. See "International Viewpoint" No 57, July 16, 1984 for more information on this. All notes by "IV"

2. Operation Bluestar is the operation carried out by Indian crack troops when they occupied the Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar, which was being used as a shelter by the 'extremist' Sikh leader, J S Bhindranwale and his supporters. Bhindranwale died in the attack.





Sikhs on guard in the Golden Temple (DR)

contradictory statements, now threatening renewed agitations, now appearing as the soul of the peace party, etc. He could neither walk into a settlement too fast, nor launch a stiff anti-Congress agitation for fear of being elbowed out by the Bhindranwale followers as had happened two years back.

The settlement, when it came, was only a partial and temporary solution to the problems at hand. It did not resolve the basic issues. But it did buy time to tackle some of the deeper problems. By conceding some of the legitimate demands of the Sikhs and of Punjab, tension was somewhat defused. Most of the specific demands of the earlier phases of the movement were conceded. The judicial probe was extended to Kanpur and Bokaro. It should be said here that this is totally inadequate. It was necessary to set up judicial probes for all major riot-hit areas. What is more, the probe into the Delhi riots is, at the time of writing, yet to take off. Instead of assisting it in the interests of speedy justice, something which Rajiv Gandhi's sycophants claim as his 'own thing', the government is persecuting all civil rights organisations which have tried to highlight the plight of riot victims, the people of Punjab, etc. A pamphlet issued by the Citizens for Democracy has been banned. Another pamphlet, "Who are the Guilty?", brought out by the People's Union for Democratic Rights and the People's Union for Civil Liberties, has been under constant

attack. Several thousand copies of its Punjabi edition, brought out by the AFDR, Punjab, were seized.

Some features of the agreement are downright reactionary. The most important of these is the expression of willingness by the centre to consider the All-India Gurdwara Act. The Akali Dal's communal character is heavily reinforced by the links it has with the reactionary SGPC [Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee]. (3) An all-India Gurdwara Act will greatly strengthen the financial clout of the SGPC and enhance its influence over the AD. This in turn will strengthen the Longowal group. By getting the government to agree to this demand, they could steal much of their rivals' thunder.

The settlement made an election inevitable. But once again, it posed problems. Unless the AD-Longowal won at the polls, there could be no stability. But with a very large Hindu minority, it was feared that any sizeable fragmentation of the Sikh vote might result in a Congress victory. Even a Congress-AD-Longowal alliance, whether pre or post election, would have been almost as bad, since it would have seriously weakened the latter's political credibility and status among the alienated Sikhs.

Consequently, the feeling of relief was very short lived in Punjab. The Talwandi - Joginder/Bhindranwale "extremists" were not routed. Their tactics ranged from rejecting the agreements, calling for poll boycotts, to

putting up a few candidates or demanding a party symbol from the Election Commission. And because the Akali Dal as a whole is communalist, it was fairly easy for 'moderates' like Prakash Singh Badal, the former chief minister, then switch to the 'extremists'. And then came the assassination of Longowal.

Even if Longowal had lived, factionalism would have created enough trouble for the Akalis, and the 'moderates' would still have been separated from the 'extremists' by degree, not quality. But they would have been able to present a somewhat more united and pro-agreement face. With his death, they were left leaderless. The selection of former Union Minister, Surjeet Singh Barnala as leader came about mainly because the *jathedars* rallied behind him. But important leaders like Badal refused to accept his supremacy.

In the medium term, this vacuum in the leadership can be utilised by the Khalistanis. The position for an independent Khalistan is still not accepted by the majority of Sikhs. However, a small but determined minority has adopted this idea. 'Law and order' methods, meaning the continuation of state terrorism in response to pro-Khalistani terrorism, cannot tackle the latter. On the contrary, each incident of state terrorism since it hits the innocent as much if not more than, the terrorists, makes heroes of the latter, and strengthens their appeal.

Assassinations and elections

Nevertheless, even after the declaration of the elections, state terrorism continued. The assassinations of Congress leaders Lalit Maken and Arjun Dass brought out just such a response from the centre. These two were amongst those who instigated the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi in November 1984, as several reports attested. These killings did not constitute the murder of "innocents". But they were totally counterproductive. Such killings help to widen the gulf between Hindus and Sikhs. They also provide an excuse for massive state organised repression. Using these killings and the atmosphere of public fear created by them, the central government is carrying out totally unjustifiable "preventative" arrests. Many of the arrested "suspects" are regularly tortured, and in quite a few cases, they have died as a result of torture. These deaths are

3. The SGPC is a committee elected by the Sikhs to run the historic shrines or "Gurdwaras". It is made up of *jathedars*. Under the new legislation all "Gurdwaras" across the country will effectively be under Akali control.

announced blandly as cases of "suicide" while under detention. The courts have also joined in. The Supreme Court went out of its way to denounce civil rights activists.

It was in this situation of renewed tension that the Punjab polls were conducted. Massive police arrangements and large scale arrests marked the restoration of democracy. At the end of the exercise, the voter turn-out was high, and the Akali Dal won over 60% of the votes and 73 seats. This massive victory can be read as a popular endorsement of the Rajiv Gandhi - Sant Longowal accord. It does not mean, however, that a decisive breakthrough has been made. The continuing factionalism in the AD is reflected by the refusal of the Badal faction to reconcile itself to Barnala's ascendancy and join the ministry. The communalism of both the Akali Dal and the Congress constantly threatens to undo the bonds of amity between Hindus and Sikhs. Nor are the terrorists and their extremist base defeated. In fact, Barnala's first pronouncements on them after he took over as chief minister indicate that he will try to placate them if he can. At the same time he also asserted that terrorism would not be accepted. This reflects the pressure from the centre to deliver the goods. By signing the accord and taking part in the elections, Barnala's party has, in so many words, agreed to play according to the rules of the game of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, and to take over the task of policing the province and keeping peace on behalf of the central regime. On the other hand, while the base of terrorism is narrower than before, continuation of the centre's policy of repression is likely to prove fruitless, and detrimental to the standing of the new provincial government.

The elections were noteworthy in various other ways. Above all, they were used to further curtail democratic rights. During the election campaign, an ordinance was promulgated saying that the death of independent candidates would no longer mean the cancellation of elections in the constituencies which they were contesting. Since the Indian election laws stipulate that a party must secure a minimum percentage of the votes cast in at least five states to get the status of a national party and the same percentage of votes in one state to be recognised as a state party in that state, "independent" candidates include those who belong to smaller parties as well. In itself, this law is discriminatory and undemocratic. But the implications are even more serious, in view of the repeated attacks on these independent candidates. In the 1985 Rajasthan assembly polls, an independent candidate was murdered by the police. In Bihar province, an

activist of the radical tribal party Jharkhand Mukti Morcha who was contesting the assembly polls was murdered. The new law thus increases actual physical risks for members of unrecognised political parties. And the majority of them, in many provinces, represent various socially oppressed groups.

For the left, the crucial task both before and during the election campaign should have been the creation of an anti-communal front. A step, however slight, was taken in that direction by the communist parties, the CPI and the CPI(M) (4). These two parties this time abandoned their traditional lines of aligning with one bourgeois party or the other. Instead, they formed a purely left front, and fought on a secular programme. This resulted in a fall in their votes and a dramatic reduction in the number of seats won (the two parties had a total of 13 MLAs in the last Punjab Assembly, against the solitary CPI MLA this time). But it is fairly clear to anyone that the votes they received this time were committed secular votes.

This electoral venture thus has the potential for becoming the spring-

board for an anti-communal front which will fight against all communalisms, all communalist groupings and all bourgeois parties in all possible terrains. At the same time, the past role of these two parties, regarding minority communalism (which they have often condoned or turned a blind eye to) indicate that unless the far left and all other secular forces make serious efforts, this step will not necessarily lead to the formation of such a front.

Any settlement of the Punjab crisis requires several socio-economic and political measures. These include setting up agro-industrial units and the provision of jobs for Punjab's alienated Sikh youth. From the bourgeois point of view, however, restoration of stability requires striking a balance between the aspirations of the regionally based, primarily agrarian bourgeoisie. Any anti-communal front will thus have to combine class tasks with anti-communal work. □

4. The Communist Party of India which has a base among a broad base of the population in Punjab. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) has practically the same social base as the Akali Dal. See "IV" No 57, July 16, 1984, for more information on the positions taken by these two parties.

For a South Asian nuclear weapons free zone

THE FOLLOWING is a statement published by the Inquilabi Communist Sangathan (ICS), the Indian section of the Fourth International, calling for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia.

There can be no doubt that Pakistan is very close to developing a nuclear weapons making capacity. In view of the negative repercussions it might have the country is unlikely to announce it through any kind of Pokhran-type explosion. (1) Indeed the government in Islamabad is likely to pursue a policy of keeping the last wires [of the bomb] unconnected so that technically she cannot be accused of being a nuclear weapons power.

India had, of course, demonstrated her nuclear weapons making capacity at Pokhran in 1974. Since all nuclear regimes (whether in authoritarian societies like the USSR, China or in bourgeois democratic societies like US, Great Britain, France) are fundamentally undemocratic, the

Indian public, has no way of knowing whether, or how many, 'bombs in the basement' India has. The country certainly has enough weapons grade-fuel to construct a number of bombs, possibly with the 'last-wires-unconnected' also.

For some years now, a systematic hysteria has been generated [in India] about the 'Pak bomb'. Its purpose is to gather public support for the Indian government's policy on the bomb. This policy is not one of nuclear disarmament or to see to it that Pakistan also disarms, but to

1. India's first nuclear power plant was built with US help in 1970 near Bombay. Canada helped India build two reactors. In May 1974 at Pokhran, a nuclear device was exploded underground. - IV.

keep the option open for India to produce the bomb openly and establish a proper nuclear weapons programme (which is much more than just having the capacity, or even keeping a few 'bombs in the basement whenever it decides to do so.)

This is why Rajiv Gandhi has, on the one hand, rejected proposals from Pakistan for mutual inspection of nuclear facilities or for establishing a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia and on the other, keeps warning of the danger that a 'Pak bomb' will cause to the sub-continent and the need for "re-evaluating" India's nuclear policy if this happens. At the same time, he and others in the government repeat that India has no intentions of going in for nuclear weapons, and only wants to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. What this whole approach amounts to is a policy of *nuclear ambiguity*, of deliberately creating uncertainty as a way of maintaining some leverage vis-a-vis Pakistan, as well as the other nuclear powers.

In fact, Pakistan is also pursuing a policy of nuclear ambiguity to maintain its own leverage vis-a-vis other powers. However it is more serious and willing than India to close the nuclear option for both countries by having a NWFZ in South Asia.

This is not because General Zia of Pakistan is more peace-loving than Rajiv Gandhi. It is that he and other experts realize full well that if there is a nuclear arms race in South Asia, the burden of 'matching the enemy' will be much greater on Pakistan than on India in every respect (economic, political, social) because of the great imbalance in power, resources, size, population etc. That is why Zia would be prepared to have 'non-nuclear parity' between Pakistan and India through establishment of a NWFZ. That is why, although India says the Pakistani proposal for NWFZ is just propaganda, they will never dare to call Pakistan's bluff in this matter.

The Indian government, in fact, argues that just because Pakistan and the US as well as other nuclear powers, want such a zone for their own reasons, 'we' should not be 'manipulated' into accepting this. This is a typical example of the kind of thinking which is responsible for promoting proliferation (both horizontal and vertical) of nuclear weapons. This kind of thinking fails to recognise the unique nature of nuclear weapons which are capable of mass destruction and tries to treat them like conventional weapons — as legitimate instruments of foreign policy to secure so-called 'national interests' as defined by the bour-

geois ruling class. But the nuclear weapons can never be used to defend territory. The threat of nuclear weapons far from leading to stability through deterrence, only leads to even more insecurity and a spiralling arms race. If there is to be genuine disarmament of nuclear weapons then, they must not be used as instruments of foreign policy.

The question of nuclear security must as far as possible, be separated from other issues of national security. Nuclear security can be defined as the legitimate right of people of, say, South Asia to be progressively free of the use, the threat of the use, and even the possibility of the use embodied in the very existence of nuclear weapons. The only alternative to such an approach will be a proliferation in the name of national security which only leads to greater insecurity at ever higher levels of danger. This is precisely the experience of the super-power arms race which has reached "insane" levels of overkill capacity on both sides and still shows no signs of even stopping temporarily.

Regardless of the motives of the US, USSR or Pakistan in wanting a NWFZ, the *objective* value of having a NWFZ in South Asia is profound. Keeping the nuclear option open for both countries through a policy of nuclear ambiguity means that the option can well be exercised or realised if pressures to do so build up beyond a point.

Having a NWFZ in South Asia does not mean the India-Pakistan conflict will disappear or that there will not be clashes. But it does mean that both sides agree that neither side will ever use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against each other's population, even if war breaks out between the countries. This will be an immense gain and advance for sanity. It is up to India to respond positively to the Pakistan proposal for mutual inspection and a NWFZ, whatever the latter's motives, and to try and establish such a zone.

The arguments by the Indian pro-bomb lobby and by Rajiv Gandhi against such a zone are dishonest, hypocritical and weak. In fact if Pakistan's bomb is the real problem then this zone is the best way to eliminate the danger. That is why most Indian objections to such a zone have nothing to do at all with Pakistan! To take some of these objections:

— Rajiv Gandhi has publicly declared that having a NWFZ in South Asia is meaningless because it will not prevent clandestine betrayal, that it cannot guarantee against non-violation. In which case why bother to have any treaty of any kind. No political pact can guarantee non-violation. Why bother to call for a zone of peace in

the Indian Ocean which the Indian government does? Nothing can prevent US or Soviet submarines from violating such a zone of peace if they want to. But does anyone doubt that if the zone of peace proposal was accepted by all concerned including the US and USSR that it would be a great political advance?

Nuclear weapons no deterrence

The NWFZ is above all a *political* proposal of great merit. Like all such proposals it will work best when those governments who are party to it *want* to make it work and share an interest in maintaining it. The weight of mass opinion in the sub-continent must be brought to bear on the governments of India and Pakistan (the other South Asian governments except Bhutan [sic] are all in favour of such a zone) to accept the establishment of a South Asian NWFZ.

— The other major argument used by India's pro-bomb lobby is that if India gives up its nuclear option it has no defence or deterrence against nuclear blackmail by US, China or other nuclear powers. This is an insidious argument because (a) it deceptively implies that keeping the option open could enable India to have such a deterrence; (b) it ignores the historical character of conflicts and tensions and argues on an essentially, abstract, absolutist and *hypothetical* level. For example, China has never threatened India (nor Vietnam) nor any other country with nuclear weapons. Neither the USSR nor the US has ever threatened with success any other non-nuclear nation. We continue to live in a world where the correlation of class forces on a world scale do not make it possible for any national bourgeoisie or state to get away with fulfilling such threats against the masses of another country.

Nor does keeping the option open help India to deter, even in a theoretical sense another nuclear weapons power. It is not enough to have the option or even a few weapons. To have any hope of deterring other nuclear weapons it is necessary to have what is known as a "credible deterrent equation," that is a sufficiently developed nuclear weapons programme of warheads, missiles and other delivery systems which can promise massive retaliation even after an enemy first-strike. India is so backward (as UK and France are with respect to the USSR) in this respect that it can *never* have an effective nuclear deterrent against the superpowers who are going further and further ahead.

With respect to establishing a credible nuclear deterrent against China, it is 15-20 years behind. If it embarks on a programme to "match" China (1) it can do nothing to prevent nuclear blackmail by China during the long years of Indian preparation; (2) it will spark of a nuclear arms race in the sub-continent, since Pakistan will go ahead with its own nuclear weapons programme; (3) it will make China and the US more hostile about Indian intentions. Even the Soviets will be more suspicious, not to mention greatly disturbing India's smaller neighbours which will have every reason to worry about India's "hegemonistic" ambitions; (4) it will in all probability still fail to "match" China because the latter will simply maintain if not extend its lead by making further advances in its own nuclear weapons programme.

All this only goes to show the fallacy of thinking that going in for nuclear weapons will enhance Indian security. It will not. But it does fit in with the ambitions of the Indian bourgeoisie and its state to increase its prestige, authority and control over the South Asian region. Even here it will create more problems and instability than the "stability" (read domination) that the Indian state wants.

What is more, going in for a nuclear weapons programme will have dangerous domestic repercussions.

— Although having a few bombs is not expensive, having a proper nuclear weapons programme is, and updating it constantly or embarking on the escalator of a regional nuclear arms race will mean an enormous diversion of resources from other sectors and needs such as proper housing, health-care, food, education for the Indian masses.

— Establishing a "nuclear regime" in India means further militarising of civil society, greater erosion of democratic rights in order to "protect" military secrets or "security", proscription in various forms of protest against such nuclear weapons production and deployment etc. Such a nuclear regime will also mean greater concentration of power in the executive and even less control by the masses over what is literally for them, a life and death issue.

— Finally, such a nuclear weapons programme could quite possibly aggravate a delicate situation by weakening communal harmony between Muslims and other communities in India.

The Inquilabi Communist Sangathan [ICS] unequivocally calls for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. □

The hundredth anniversary of "Die Neue Zeit"

IN 1885 THE leadership of the German Social Democracy decided to establish a theoretical magazine, entitled *Die Neue Zeit*. Karl Kautsky was its editor in chief, and Franz Mehring very quickly became its editorial writer. It began as a monthly and went weekly in 1891.

For a quarter of a century, *Die Neue Zeit* served the function of the theoretical and political organ of international Marxism. In fact, first throughout Europe and then in the rest of the world where the socialist movement took root, the magazine was considered the forum for Friedrich Engels and the Marxist wing of the Second International, which was led by the German SPD and, above all, by Bebel and Kautsky, who were collaborators and friends of Friedrich Engels.

In the entire history of the workers movement, no other press organ has been able to render such service to the world proletariat and its revolutionary vanguard as *Die Neue Zeit*.

ERNEST MANDEL

Die Neue Zeit's contribution was first of all theoretical. It is enough to mention that Marx and Engels' letters, collected under the title of *Critique of the Gotha Program* were published for the first time in *Die Neue Zeit* to assure this journal once and for all time a place in the history of Marxism. Also published in *Die Neue Zeit* were many original articles by Engels, such as "Socialism in Germany" and "The Peasant Question in France and Germany" as well as numerous letters. But its contribution to the development of Marxism is far richer than that.

It was in the pages of *Die Neue Zeit* that were published the first contributions by economists to the Marxist theory of crises (including, I might note in passing, the theory of "long waves"), to the theory of imperialism, and to the theory of money (see the famous triangular debate between Kautsky, Hilferding and Eugene Varga).

The great debates that forged the Marxist movement

It was in the pages and supplements of *Die Neue Zeit* (the *Beihefte*) that appeared the first notable applications of historical materialism to ethnology, to the criticism and history of literature and art, to military history, to the history of bourgeois revolutions, and

to that of the emergence of modern capitalism.

The pages of *Die Neue Zeit* in its heyday amount to more than a thousand fascicules. The richness of their contents remains unequaled, and in large part still unknown to readers unversed in German, since most of this material has not been translated.

The magazine also had a more directly political role. It was in *Die Neue Zeit* to a not inconsiderable extent that the battle was waged between the reformist right in the Second International (led by Bernstein) and the united left of the period, led by Kautsky, Bebel and Rosa Luxemburg.

It was in *Die Neue Zeit* that Rosa Luxemburg waged her great battle against Millerandism (the participation of French socialists in the cabinet) and against the reformist deviation of the Belgian POB. It was in *Die Neue Zeit* that a very deepgoing debate took place around the Russian revolution of 1905, which led Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg to within two hairs breadth of Trotsky's strategy of the permanent revolution.

It was in *Die Neue Zeit* that the great theoretical and political battles were conducted against the Russian "legal Marxism" of Tugan Baranovsky, which were inspired by Plekhanov, Lenin and Martov. It was in *Die Neue Zeit* that an initial left nucleus formed



in the Belgian POB around Louis de Brouckeres and Henri de Man.

It was in *Die Neue Zeit* that the shameful procolonialism of the reformist far right around the Dutch Van Col and the German Schippel were combatted. It was in *Die Neue Zeit* that the problem posed by the small oppressed nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian empire and the problem of Polish nationalism were subjected to critical analysis.

It is in *Die Neue Zeit*, moreover, that we find the first Marxist analyses of the revolution in the East, notably the Iranian revolution of 1909, the Chinese revolution of 1911 and the twilight of the Ottoman empire. The list could be continued.

But the examples already mentioned attest to the magazine's character as an instrument of an active Marxism, a Marxism involved in the international class struggle, a Marxism that hardly confined itself to "pure theoretical research," even if it did not shy away from the most complicated questions and the most arduous theoretical tasks.

This two-sided character of *Die Neue Zeit* became apparent when it went weekly. At first Engels was skeptical about the proposal for a weekly. (1) He had too many bad experiences with press organs that did not survive the first rough patch, and he placed a high value on continuity. Later, he became the proposal's most enthusiastic advocate. He did not hesitate to write that every week he

waited impatiently for the arrival of *Die Neue Zeit* to read Franz Mehring's editorial. (2)

However, this transformation itself reflected an organizational fact — the growing strength of the German Social Democracy, its command of activists, financial resources and political influence. It reflected a concrete political need — to educate every week several thousands of political cadres engaged in the daily struggle.

Moreover, the magazine played another role that its founders had not entirely foreseen: it provided a common theoretical reference for the Marxist current in many countries where there were already sections of the Second International and promoted a greater homogeneity.

Lenin never concealed what he owed to Kautsky and to *Die Neue Zeit* in this respect, even though it was this magazine that published the harshest criticism of his *What is to be Done?* — the article "Organisational Problems of the Russian Social Democracy" by Rosa Luxemburg.

Since *Die Neue Zeit* was closely linked to a political and organisational project — that is, the construction of the SPD and the Second International under the aegis of the Bebel team, whose principal theoretician was Kautsky — the magazine's history blends in with that of the "Marxist center" of the SPD, which was marked by three periods.

War and revolution

The first runs from its foundation up until 1908, reaching its culminating point on the eve of the Russian revolution of 1905 and the general strike for universal suffrage that the latter stimulated in Austria. This was the golden age of *Die Neue Zeit*, its heyday. It was sidetracked by the centrist position adopted by Kautsky toward the question of the seizure of power in Germany (controversies with the party leadership over his pamphlet *Der Weg Zum Macht* ("The Road to Power"), which he agreed to censor himself, and then over the agitation for the political mass strike that Rosa Luxemburg unleashed.

The second period runs from 1908 to 1914-15, during which *Die Neue Zeit* took a centrist position between the reformist right led by Ebert/Scheidemann and the revolutionary left led by Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Leibknecht and Clara Zetkin. The left still had a foot in the door, because the editorial writer Franz Mehring was with it. Rosa Luxemburg's articles continued to be published, although followed by answers from Kautsky. He wavered on every political question,

as the debates published in *Die Neue Zeit* indicate.

Kautsky lost his footing on the question of imperialism, going so far as to predict that war would become impossible because of "ultra-imperialism." The article appeared on the eve of the outbreak of the First World War.

He later lost his footing on the question of war, where he remained largely passive confronted with the shameful capitulation of the reformists, starting with the majority of the SPD leadership, to the imperialist war in August 1914, a capitulation that took the form of voting for war credits.

It is true that he exhibited some oppositionist inclinations, supporting the centrist minority in the party leadership around Hugo Haase, who broke finally with the SPD in 1916 and founded the USPD. This was the opportunity for the party leadership to remove him as editor in chief of *Die Neue Zeit*, and replace him with the main theoretician of the right, Cunow.

At this point, the third period of *Die Neue Zeit* begins, which was to last only four years. In the wake of the German revolution of 1918-1919, *Die Neue Zeit* was scuttled by the SPD leadership.

A "government party" (in coalition with the bourgeoisie), a party involved in rebuilding capitalism, had no use for a theoretical organ devoted in principle or in name to Marxism or semi-Marxism, even if it had become totally revisionist. Subsequently, for a decade longer, the SPD was to publish the magazine *Die Gesellschaft*, a pale substitute for *Die Neue Zeit*, even in its revisionist form.

Die Gesellschaft was edited by Rudolf Hilferding. It went down with the victory of fascism (on the eve of which Hilferding, repeating Kautsky's exploit in 1914, declared that Hitler could not take power).

The decline and fall of *Die Neue Zeit* reflected more than the decline of the SPD as an objectively socialist force. Because the attempt of the German Marxist left to replace it with the magazine *Die Internationale*, which was founded by Rosa Luxemburg in 1915 and then made the official organ of the young KPD (German Communist Party) in 1919, had no real vitality except for a few years.

Although the KPD had brilliant theoreticians (Levi, Thalheimer and Korsch are the best known abroad), *Die Internationale* never came up to the ankles of *Die Neue Zeit*. This was not only the result of the terrible pressures exercised by the ripeness of the situation in Germany for revolution

1. Letter from Engels to Bebel on December 3, 1892.
2. Letter from Engels to Bebel on March 8, 1892.

and the priority this meant for tactical questions, as well as by the gravity of factional struggles. It reflected a turning point in history.

The center of gravity of the revolutionary Marxist current had shifted away from Germany. Perhaps also the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and her closest collaborators, Liebknecht, Jogiches, Levine, as well as the death of Mehring and later that of Levi also played a role.

The thread of continuity

The center of gravity of the revolutionary Marxist current was manifestly in Russia in February, 1917. For a number of years, the Marxists living in Russia were put in the forefront in the reaffirmation and development of Marxism by a powerful chain of events — the revolutionary upsurge; the rise of the Bolshevik Party; the victory of October; the founding of the Third International, whose center was in Moscow; the transformation of the new International at its second congress in 1920, after it had won the support of mass parties in about ten countries; and its extension into Asia, above all China and India.

The magazine *Communist International*, backed up by *Russian Correspondance* and then by *Inprecator*, at that time played a role analogous to that of *Die Neue Zeit*. The press of the International, edited essentially by Zinoviev and Radek, and relying on numerous contributions by Lenin and Trotsky, as well as valuable foreign collaborators such as Souvarine (whose *Bulletin communiste* often complemented Moscow's publications), Victor Serge and the leading Italian and German Communists, accomplished a prodigious labor of Marxist analysis and education.

But this richness lasted less than ten years. Very soon, the ebb of the international revolution and the bureaucratization of the Bolshevik Party, spreading rapidly into the Communist International, transformed these organs into mere tools of the Stalin faction for theoretical miseducation and political disinformation. The tragic destiny of the Second Chinese revolution in 1927, and then the still more tragic defeat of the German proletariat in 1933, sealed definitively the fate of this degenerated International.

In vain, Leon Trotsky and the Left Opposition strove to maintain the revolutionary Marxist tradition through the *Biuletin Oppositsii* (Bulletin of the Opposition"). The organizational base was too narrow. Then the murder of the cadres of the Opposition in the Stalin terror was to destroy what

remained of Leninist continuity in the Soviet Union.

For a time, it seemed that the center of gravity of the Marxist current was going to shift to the United States. The magazine *New International* and later the *Fourth International* managed to maintain a continuity for nearly two decades, if not on the level of *Die Neue Zeit* at least on that of *Die Internationale*, the *Bulletin communiste* or the *Biuletin Oppositsii*.

Once again this crossing of the Atlantic was not simply the result of a political and organisational project inspired by James P Cannon, the founder of the Trotskyist movement in the United States. It reflected the rise of the American proletariat in the big strikes of 1934-37 and 1945-46.

However, this rise was limited in time, cut off by the lack of a political outlet, and this ushered in a long decline following the adopting of the Taft Hartley Law and the onset of the Cold War and McCarthyism. The split in the Fourth International in 1953 was a by-product of this, and undermined the creativity, if not the continuity of this branch of our current.

The only Marxist theoretical revue that has been able to last more than twenty years and maintain a very rich content is the *New Left Review* in London. From the theoretical point of view, it represents the best since *Die Neue Zeit*, but from the theoretic point of view only.

The *New Left Review's* political differences are evident. They flow from the fact that unlike *Die Neue Zeit* and its various successors, this magazine is not linked to any clear

political-organizational project, that is, to building a vanguard party of the working class.

So it is in the French language that the revolutionary Marxist tradition has turned out to be the most constant, from the *Bulletin communiste* through the Opposition organ *Lutte de classe* leading to the *Quatrieme Internationale* published underground under the Nazi occupation and the one that has come out legally since 1946.

This makes more than half a century since *Lutte de classe* was launched in 1929, a half century interrupted several times by the vicissitudes of the Trotskyist movement in France, as well as the difficulties arising from working-class defeats and organizational and financial weaknesses.

The modesty of this theoretical production is obvious by comparison with *Die Neue Zeit*. The political analysis is more impressive, in particular thanks to the contributions from Trotsky in the 1930s. But on the basis of an objective balance sheet, we can say that in general the continuity of Marxist analysis and the development of Marxist thought have been maintained in the face of new and unforeseen events and in contrast to the aridity and theoretical poverty of the Communist and Socialist parties. This holds, for example, both for the analysis of fascism and Stalinism and the colonial revolutions, the anti-bureaucratic revolution in the East European countries, the rise of the workers and revolutionary movement in Latin America, or the prediction and analysis of May 1968 and those of the present capitalist crisis. □

New Arabic journal published

A new journal in Arabic called *Al Mitraqa* (the Hammer) has just been launched under the auspices of the sections of the Fourth International in Lebanon and the Israeli state in conjunction with the sympathising section in Tunisia. The first issue came out in October 1985, and the journal will appear quarterly.

The journal will include an analysis of events in the Arab region as a whole and will also carry articles and features on general international issues.

The first issue includes articles on Tunisia, Lebanon, Israel as well as extracts from the Twelfth World Congress of the Fourth International's resolution on Central America.

For more information and orders write to S Jaber, c/o 2 rue Richard Lenoir, 93108 Montreuil, France.



AROUND THE WORLD



Congo Brazzaville

STUDENT PROTESTS

The decision on November 6 by the Congo-Brazzaville Council of Ministers to set up a competition for high-school graduates applying for higher education grants, about 600 French francs (around 80 US dollars a month) sparked a wave of protests among high-school students.

On November 6 and 11, major school student demonstrations took place to protest these measures, which were carried out by the regime in the name of austerity. These were severely repressed.

In solidarity with the high-school students, the students of the University of Brazzaville took this occasion to express their discontent about other measures imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that suspended hiring by government departments.

The support of the university students paved the way for a broadening of the strike mobilization on November 12, 1985. The protest took on such force that the regime decided to close the schools in the municipality of Brazzaville for about a week.

On November 13, the chief of state launched an attack on "reactionary" forces that he said had recently exhibited a "feverish activity, as demonstrated by their vain and mad attempt to exploit the naivety of certain elements" of the Congolese youth.

This implied amalgam with politicians ousted from power is a classic procedure to try to discredit the mobilization of youth for their own demands. The reaction of the regime was all the more violent — the army reportedly opened fire, wounding many people — inasmuch as this mobilisation of the youth revealed a deeper crisis.

In a country where there were 650,000 high-school and university students in 1984, or one third of the total population, these events have illustrated the gap between the corrupt team in power that bandies around Marxist and Leninist terms and the youth and people who are subjected to the bitter realities of a neocolonial system fraught with economic and social crisis, as in all the countries of Black Africa.

In this case, the crisis has been aggravated in particular, by the falling price for oil (see "The Effects of the

Black 'Goldrush' on African Neocolonial Economies" by Claude Gabriel in *International Viewpoint*, No 22, January 24, 1983).

Representing 90% of exports, the oil bonanza could be used to give the team in power a bit of maneuvering room. The projects for building up the economic infrastructure that were conceived in the atmosphere of the oil boom could make the Congolese leaders appear to some extent as serious people to the popular masses looking for concrete achievements.

However, the nose dive of oil income and falling oil prices were to burst these bubbles. Nonetheless, these projects had the effect of drawing the country onto a slippery slope of indebtedness, leading to increased dependence.

Officially, the Congo's foreign debt amounts to 4 billion dollars for a total population of 2 million. At this level, the "Marxist-Leninist" proclamations of the Congolese leaders have little effect on the neocolonial mechanisms, which have the result that the country's oil is still being exploited by French companies and the Congo is a member of the franc zone.

This situation has now been aggravated by the IMF's determination to impose an austerity policy requiring the Congolese leaders to take very unpopular measures. This has accelerated the crisis of the neocolonial education system. The backwardness of the education system inherited from the French model under the Third Republic has now been combined by the IMF with a freeze on hiring in public employment. Of course, the latter is swollen, but in the present state of affairs, it is the only prospect for many students.

Given the percentage of the population in school, which is one of the highest in the Third World, the education system may in the coming months become a particularly acute focus of the crisis of Congolese society. □

Tunisia

SOLIDARITY

At the end of October, the Tunisian government launched a large-scale offensive against the workers movement by attacking its predominant trade-union organization, the Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT — General Union of Tunisian Workers).

After several months of escalating repression, the government sent its

police and the ruling party's militia in to occupy the offices of the UGTT in most of the country, including the capital. Dozens of trade-union cadres were arrested. The secretary general, Habib Achour, was put in "administrative" detention.

Sections of the proletariat, especially in the southern part of the country resisted the regime's offensive, unleashing a series of general strikes and organizing the defense of the trade-union headquarters. They have unfortunately remained isolated, the response having been weak in the rest of the country. International solidarity moreover, has been negligible.

This is why, after having launched its offensive, the government has been able to maneuver with the majority of the trade-union bureaucrats in order to get them to accept its repressive intervention into the internal life of the Union.

Although in "administrative detention," Habib Achour has been kept in the leadership of the union, but he has been replaced as secretary general. The autonomy of the UGTT has been flouted, and the regime will take advantage of this to push forward the projects that have been imposed on it by the International Monetary Fund and imperialism.

The situation, however, has not been stabilized. The workers retain a fighting potential that the trade-union bureaucracy, moreover, has to take account of in its negotiations with the regime. More than ever, they need solidarity from the world workers and democratic movements, especially from the trade unions.

The Fourth International calls on the workers organizations to offer solidarity as soon as possible. It is necessary to call for the release of the jailed trade-unionists, the evacuation of the repressive forces from the occupied union headquarters, and complete restoration of the independence and liberties of the trade-union movement.

Bureau of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International

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POS OFFICES RAIDED

Four persons, including Pierre Carette, the alleged leader, suspected of belonging to the CCC [Fighting Communist Cells], an extremely violent and ruthless terrorist group of dubious principles and origins, were arrested in Belgium in mid-December. Immediately after this, the minister of justice, Gol, one of the principal figures in the rightist government, sent police to search the headquarters of the Brussels branch of the Parti Ouvrier Socialiste (POS), the Belgian section of the Fourth International.

At 5 am both uniformed and plain-clothes police entered the party headquarters and bookstore. They broke open the doors, turned everything inside upside down, and took away a typewriter.

The following is excerpts from the editorial from the front page of the December issue of La Gauche, the French-language paper of the POS.

An initial result of the anti-terrorist hunt. Carette and his gang have just been nabbed in the GB-Quick in Namur. It was not the special commandos or tanks that got the CCC. It was a well staged operation by the judiciary police that trapped this enigmatic organization. It is quite clear today how Gol has managed to exploit the psychosis that he himself reinforced. He did this in order to move toward strengthening the state at the expense of democratic freedoms.

Already Gol is moving his pawns forward. He is broadening the circle of repression. While the successful arrest of Carette shows exactly where to look for the terrorists, Gol is aiming his blows in another direction, as in Operation Mammouth, which was focused on the left of the workers movement.

Despite the amalgams that are being made of some general "extreme left" or "the violent elements," the POS has nothing to do with terrorism. There is nothing "criminal" about it.

We are a party that fights out in the open, not hidden behind any mask. We want to win the majority of the working class through a battle of ideas. We present our views regularly to the working people through our newspapers, our leaflets, our pamphlets and our public meetings. Since 1977, the POS has participated in all the elections — parliamentary, municipal, provincial and European.

Our activists are not in hiding. They are not making bombs. They are ordinary men and women among

ordinary men and women, well known by thousands of people. They hold positions of leadership in the unions, in the women's movement, in the youth, in the movement for peace, in the fight against apartheid and in the struggle to defend a free and socialist Nicaragua against the state terrorism of Reagan.

From the moment that the CCC planted its first bomb, 14 months ago, we expected that Gol and his gang would strike at our party. Because we know from the experience

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the three unions in which revolutionists still hold key positions — the BGWU, the CIWU, and the AGWU.

The instrument for this operation is the Seamen and Waterfront Workers Union (SWWU), which has long been led by a bureaucracy linked to the AIFLD. The SWWU started by preventing the BGWU physically from pursuing its activities in the port of St. George's.

Then, with the complicity of the government and the employers, the SWWU managed in some workplaces to win the bargaining rights away from the BGWU. The workers in these enterprises are now complaining that the SWWU has done nothing for them.

Layoffs (40% of the workers are unemployed) have greatly weakened the BGWU. After the invasion, the airport workers, in particular, who had been organised by the BGWU, were laid off. And the workers subsequently employed by the US firms that continued the construction of the airport could not join unions.

In all, the BGWU has lost half its members (1,200 out of roughly 2,400). The AGWU virtually ceased functioning shortly after the invasion. And the SWWU sought to extend its base to the agricultural workers.

Subsequently, the AGWU has resumed its activities. But it faces an undoubtedly more dangerous rival than the SWWU — the union of the former dictator, Eric Gairy, which was once very influential among the agricultural workers.

On the other hand, the CIWU has kept the same number of members as before October 1983 (about 5,600), and has formed new locals.

The AIFLD's second objective is to take over the leadership of all the unions. It has accomplished this end in the Technical and Allied Workers Union by taking advantage of the forced exile of the union president, Jim Wardally, and the imprisonment of its vice-president, Chester Humphrey.

Today, the TAWU is the biggest union on the island. On the other hand, the AIFLD has failed in the

in other countries — as Gol himself did — that terrorism whose origin and practice in this case are extremely dubious — is *always* used as a pretext for attacking the anti-capitalist left of the workers movement.

Thus the special commandos and tanks in our cities today are not aimed at the terrorists but at the social struggles that the workers will wage tomorrow against this iniquitous government. And yes, our party will be present in those struggles, alongside the workers. □

Public Workers Union and in the Grenada Union of Teachers.

Nor has the AIFLD been able to take over the Trade-Union Council, which remains overall left leaning, and condemns the SWWU's disloyal activity. In 1985, Anselm Debourg, a former member of the NJM and president of the CIWU, was elected first vice-president. The president is Basil Harford of the Public Workers Union.

At the May 1 demonstration, which brought out 3,000 workers, that is, more than the preceding year, Basil Harford distinguished himself by making a militant speech.

He denounced the anti-working class policy of the bosses, the government budget, and the decision to extradite Chester Humphrey. After this speech, he was removed from an important post he held in the Ministry of Finance, and the government prevented him from attending the annual meeting of the International Labour Organisation.

The AIFLD, the government and the employers are working together. The latter are trying to take back what they had to give under the Maurice Bishop government. Arbitrary firings, intimidation and threats are common.

Despite the laws left from the revolutionary regime, some employers are refusing flatly to recognise the unions. The government takes an attitude of seeming to smile on both the unions and the bosses. But behind the scenes it is negotiating with the latter. And it is advising them to give nothing to the more progressive unions.

The government has let it be known that trade union activities will not be permitted in businesses set up by the Americans. The government's policy is, in fact, being entirely dictated by the US. The decision to extradite Chester Humphrey shows this clearly. This is highlighted still more by the fact that the deputy premier, Ben Jones, paid two high Ministry of Justice officials 10,000 dollars in US money to speed up the extradition of Chester Humphrey. The government wants to keep him from fighting in the TAWU against the minions of the AIFLD. □

US tries to continue the invasion in the trade-union movement

THE FOLLOWING article describes the campaign by the US and its local agents to complete the work of the invasion by housebreaking the Grenadan unions. It points out that the imprisonment and attempt to extradite Chester Humphrey is a key part of this campaign. Humphrey has been on a limited hunger strike since September, taking only liquids, and because of his serious condition, his final appeal hearing has been postponed until this month. There may still be time to stop this crime. Protests should be sent to Prime Minister Herbert Blaize, Prime Minister's Office, St George's, Grenada.

ARTHUR MAHON

On October 19, 1983, Vincent Noel, president of the Bank and General Workers Union [BGWU]; and Fitzroy Bain, president of the Agricultural and General Workers Union [AGWU] were executed, along with Maurice Bishop. The Grenadan trade-union movement thereby lost two of its outstanding leaders.

Up until 1979, the Grenadan trade-union movement had been dominated by bureaucrats who were often linked to the American Institute for Free Labor Development [AIFLD].

During the revolutionary period, the trade-union movement experienced major growth. Some 80% of the workers were unionised. At the same time, it underwent a deepgoing renewal.

Maurice Bishop (DR)



The BGWU was founded by Vincent Noel a few weeks before the revolution, and became the most powerful union. The AGWU took the place of the union dominated by the former dictator, Gairy, among the agriculture workers. In the May 1, 1983 May Day demonstration, it had the largest contingent.

Moreover, in most of the unions the revolutionists waged a successful struggle to achieve democratization.

After the invasion, the trade-union movement became one of the main targets of the US offensive. The first weeks were grim. Many trade-unionists were arrested and questioned and intimidated before being released. The occupation troops seized the vehicles

of the Trade Union Council (the union umbrella group); and its journal, *Workers Voice*, which had been set up under the Gairy regime by Vincent Noel, ceased publication.

The offices of several unions were ransacked. The bosses gave the impression that the unions no longer existed. And the union leaders no longer had any way to move around and visit the workplaces.

Three weeks after the invasion, a US team visited the country and declared that the leadership of most of the unions was "composed of thugs and highly polished Soviet bloc-trained polemicists." It recommended that the AIFLD "should take the lead in restructuring and training the unions as soon as possible."

An office of the AIFLD was set up in Grenada and allotted a large budget. At the same time, a slander campaign against the leaders of several unions was orchestrated in the workplaces.

The teachers union wanted to consult its locals in order to be able to take a position on the invasion. It was forced to give up the idea. A rumor was set in motion that the union was building an anti-American demonstration. As a result of all these pressures, some union leaders were led to resign.

Union-busting drive runs into resistance

The events that preceded the invasion had demoralised and disorientated the workers, who in their great majority, had supported the revolution. This was made worse by the fact that some unionists, following the orders of the New Jewel Movement, had tried to discredit Maurice Bishop in the week before he was executed. They opposed the strikes and demonstrations that demanded his release.

The president of the Trade Union Council, Chalkey Ventour, a member of the Political Bureau of the NJM (today imprisoned with Coard) played a particularly pernicious role. This situation obviously facilitated the offensive launched by the Americans against the trade-union movement.

However, this offensive rapidly reached its limits. Thus, at the start of 1984, the AIFLD's key agent, Osborne Baptiste, who was leading the slander campaign, was expelled from the Commercial and Industrial Workers Union (CIWU). Moreover, the AIFLD was forced to disavow him at a meeting of the TUC, which issued a communique condemning his machinations.

The US wants to attract investors to Grenada. For that purpose, they need docile unions. The first objective of the CIA and the AIFLD is to break

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