**At Home**

LAST month this column discussed the problem of the maintenance and growth of the New International, and particularly the need to devise ways and means to assure that the magazine continues to go abroad to faces all difficulties. In partial response to this matter, the Political Committee of the Socialist Workers Party has set aside the entire month of March during which this section of the locality of the party is asked to arrange entertainments, dances, benefits, house parties, etc. for the benefit of the International Workers' Sustaining Fund. We earnestly hope that party units will proceed swiftly to the organization of such affairs. All proceeds are to be sent direct to the New International office. We request friends and sympathizers of the New International, party members and Y.P.S.L. comrades to give their full support to these affairs by their attendance.

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It is to be expected that the work of the large cities, such as New York, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, St. Louis, Boston, Minneapolis, Akron, Philadelphia, Newark, Detroit, Cleveland, Youngstown, St. Paul, Oklahoma City, and below, is being handled by the New International with particular attention, and that special efforts are made to stimulate the circulation of the magazine in the important industrial and political centers. But too much cannot be said for the fine, persistent and diligent labors of the smaller units of the party and the Y.P.S.L. for the magazine as well as other party tasks. Under far more difficult conditions, these comrades carry out their tasks. Often they are the only single comrade to handle all the literature—New Internationals, Appeals, pamphlets, and so on, and very often this comrade is engaged in important trade union, unemployed or other work as well. Functioning in a small town, with the prejudices of all kinds that a revolutionary magazine runs up against from undeveloped workers, as well as middle-class elements, is no easy task or much of a pleasure. All the more commendable, therefore, are the efforts of our comrades as: Ruth Quiero, Allenton, Pa.; Wm. Ballos, Fargo, N. D.; Henry Schnautz, Evansville, Ind.; Walter Birehmann, South Bend, Ind.; Hildagard Smith, Hutchinson, Kans.; George Whiteside, Whitewater, Kans.; A. Russell, Omaha, Neb.; John Boulds, Pentwyn, Mont.; Joe Tharston, Peoria, Ill.; Otto Kiefer, Columbus; Ed. Speyer, Ithaca, N. Y.; E. McCready, Fresno; H. A. Burns, San Diego; Harvey Davis, Youngstown; W. Omoogen, Washington; Otto R., Syracuse; J. T. Maley, Denver, Colo.; Ken. H., Houston, Texas; T. Hannuls, Gardner, Mass.; Pauline T., Wallingford, Mass.; John Smith, Quakertown, Pa.; Morris Krupka, Pittsburgh, Pa.; James Brown, Rochester, N. Y.; A. J. Mouni, Topeka; Mike Gordon, Jersey City, N. J.; Eddie Cohen, Paterson, N. J.; Marvin Meyers, New Brunswick, N. J.; Lee Calvin, Lynn, Mass.; Victor Harris, Hartford, Conn.; Morris Gandt, Highland Park, Ill.; Al Adler, Salem, Ohio; Abbott, Haskell, Thurman in Berkshire, Cal.; V. Fickels, Kansas City, Mo.; E. M. Portland, Ore.; O. E. Taylor, Seattle, Wash.; Genora Johnson, Flint, Mich., and others which do not come at once to mind as the above names of active New International workers are listed. They may be sure that the party appreciates their efforts for the magazine.

* * *

Many branches are now properly concentrating on a drive for renewal and new subscriptions. Bob Dulles of Cleveland showed that it can be done by sending in six new subscriptions or 30 50-cent renewals back. Comrade Dulles is one who is pleasantly occupied also with trade union and other tasks; if he can find time to canvass for subscriptions, surely other comrades, with far more time to spare, can engage in this important work. Harry Fisher, Chicago, continues to be a successful salesman, and recently a number of Glen Ellyn, Ill. comrades sent in a batch of subscriptions. Chas. Martell, a living example of how to do it, in Ohio, is organizing a subscription drive and promises to get results. Comrade Bob Ferguson, Akron, leading comrade who has been most assiduous in literature work, has been forced to give up this work because of serious illness. From Minneapolis quite a large number of renewals are still due, but we have no doubt that when Chas. Johnson, Tom Gaddis, M. Freed and others get going, these renewals will be coming in. In San Francisco, which, under the direction of a new committee consisting of Alan Callender, Glen Trimble and Eloise Booth, has shown marked improvement in recent weeks, a subscription campaign is being planned. Re-orders were placed by San Francisco for both the January and February issues, and the total for February jumped from 50 to 75. Nice work. Frisco, Philadelphia, too, with Sol Thomas and Carl Hartman leading the way, has been improving steadily. In greater New York a number of subscriptions have been obtained in the past month, but there are still more than a hundred renewals still outstanding. Mary Green, New International agent for New York, is now organizing the party branches for an intensive subscription drive, and we are confident of good results. But many cities are still extremely lax in this important work. To these, at this time, we only suggest: take a leaf from those which are pushing subscription activities.

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The work of the Branch agents in New York has not hitherto been specifically pointed out; the following comrades work assiduously to improve New International circulation: Bronx—Edward Phillips; Upper West Side—Chet Mannen; East Side Manhattan—Edith Konikow; Lower East Side—Miriam Gerson; Williamsburg—Harry Fishler; Flatbush—Boro Park—Abe Roth; Teachers—Jacobstein; Needle Trades—Greensha.

The Lower East Side Branch (Knickerbocker Village), New York, having now organized the educational and protest leaflet against a Stalinist effort to prevent the sale of the magazine in the store of Knickerbocker Village Apartments. The efforts were good: magazine restored; sales increased; contacts secured.

Special mention must be made of the interest of Mrs. H. O. Schur, Lower East Side Branch, who goes into restaurants and buildings throughout the area, selling the review, and of Miriam Gerson, also of the Lower East, who alone sold 47 copies of the December issue, and who each month sells a large quantity. On the Columbia campus, Mary Green did exceptionally well with sales of the January number. . . . New York Y.P.S.L. did better with the January number than with any previous number. New York Y.P.S.L. will receive this column's attention in the April number.

At the University of Chicago, Marjorie continues her fine work of selling large numbers of the magazine, and Sara Langar of the North West Side Y.P.S.L., along with Sam Alberts, deserve special mention for their work with the magazine. Local Chicago sold out completely of the January number; further, the Union Company News store, Chicago, not only sold its usual 40 copies but ordered an additional 20 copies and also sold them. Minneapolis likewise ordered after selling 50 copies of the January issue, and there were several re-orders from throughout the country. Among other cities which either increased or placed re-orders for either the January or February numbers are: Washington, D. C.; Hartford, Conn.; Philadelphia, Pa. (Philadelphia News handles 60 copies); Denver, Colo., which ordered 15 extra copies for the James meeting; Fresno, Cal. BUT, there have also been some decreases, as well as danger of complete elimination in a few cases for non-payment of bills: these are first being taken up for possible adjustment and specific reference is for the present omitted from the column,

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**The Manager**
The Editor's Comment

WHERE WAS THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE NAZI RALLY AT MADISON SQUARE GARDEN? — THE NEW DEAL'S APRIL FOOL'S JOKE UPON A MILLION UNEMPLOYED WORKERS—THE ROOSEVELT-HOPKINS POLICY OF "APPEASEMENT" TOWARDS BIG BUSINESS IN AMERICA — THE CURTAIN FALLS ON THE LAST ACT IN SPAIN

Where Was the Communist Party?

ON THE NIGHT of February 20 the Nazis, supported by other fascist organizations, carried out their greatest concentration so far in the history of New York City. They filled Madison Square Garden, New York's largest meeting hall; and for two and a half hours were roused into periodic frenzies by a continuous stream of anti-Semitic, anti-labor filth. The largest police force ever assembled in this country protected the meeting with a solid cordon shutting off the area surrounding the Garden for several blocks in every direction. Fifty to a hundred thousand anti-fascist workers, demanding their right to picket the meeting, and to show publicly their abhorrence of and resistance to the advance of fascism in this country, were assaulted, clubbed, ridden down and finally beaten back by the troopers of "labor's mayor", Fiorello LaGuardia.

One organization, and only one, had called for the anti-Nazi demonstration: the Socialist Workers Party. Every other organization, every other working-class political party and group, every one of the trade-union official bodies, every alleged anti-fascist association, had been completely, utterly silent. In spite of that silence, of course, the members of those organizations and unions were present by the thousands that night, acting with complete solidarity, often in the forefront of the demonstration.

Most conspicuous of all for its silence, most surprising in its silence, to the general public and to its own members, was the Communist party. Not a single word about the demonstration. Not a single statement that silence, of course, the members of those organizations and unions were present by the thousands that night, acting with complete solidarity, often in the forefront of the demonstration.

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There are some who wonder whether this silence of the Communist party was an "accident" or a mere isolated "tactical manoeuvre" adopted in the light of "concrete, special circumstances". It is altogether essential for every worker, and especially every Communist party member, to understand that there was nothing in the least accidental or special in this action (or, rather, lack of action) of the Communist party; that, on the contrary, it followed as the direct consequence of their entire present set of policies.

This conclusion is, indeed, apparent enough from the mere observation that the Stalinist behavior in New York is identical with what they have been doing (again, rather, failing to do) throughout the country during recent months. Nowhere, no matter what the provocation, do they lead or call for action against the fascists. In Los Angeles, on February 22nd, the New York situation of the 20th was reproduced. As in New York, the Socialist Workers Party alone called for a counter-demonstration to a scheduled Bund meeting, and carried it through; from the Communist party and press came no word of any kind. A week or two before that, in San Francisco, a similar incident occurred, with the same results.

How could it be otherwise? The entire Stalinist policy is oriented on support of Roosevelt's coming war. To this everything else is adjusted and subordinated. "We view all our problems," reports Browder, "in the light of the national interests of the United States." As the lackey of American imperialism, the Communist party must accept the premises of that imperialism. American imperialism wishes to reduce Latin America to a subject domain of exploitation? Stalinism must be in the vanguard of the imperialist thrust in Latin America. For American imperialism, the "fight against fascism" means no more and no less than imperialist war against Germany with meanwhile a free rein for reaction, including the beginnings of fascist reaction, at home. Then the same conclusion for Stalinism.

Stalinism must prove itself in action a "worthy ally" of Roosevelt imperialism. But the Roosevelt government, like every bourgeois government, believes in "free speech" for fascists; believes in tenderly protecting every right of the fascists; and believes in smashing the workers when they attempt to interfere with the fascists' freedom to prepare unopposed their counter-revolution. So, therefore, the Stalinists. Their "resistance" to the fascists at home can take only legalistic forms. They can only beg and plead with the governmental authorities to cancel permits for fascist meetings, or "dissolve the fascist gangs". They will not, cannot act, against the fascists. If, under mounting pressure from their ranks, they should on some occasion undertake an action, it would be only a momentary exception for the sake of quieting protests. They are committed by their policy, inescapably committed, to stand shamefully aside, to fold hands as did the German social democrats, while the fascists march ahead, grow strong and bold, make ready to carry their aggression direct into the hearts of the labor organizations.

How could they have supported the anti-Nazi demonstration in the streets of New York? Did not LaGuardia give the Nazi meeting his blessing? And is not LaGuardia their mayor? Were not LaGuardia's police protecting the Nazi meeting? How could the Communist party object to the action of LaGuardia's police? Are they not their police?

The members of the Communist party, most of them, want to fight the fascists. We know that; they have proved it a hundred times. But they have got to be made to understand that their party will not permit them to fight the fascists. We must make clear, irresistibly clear to them that they can fight the fascists; the fascists at home, the fascists who are the main and crucial enemy, the fascists who today plan for the tomorrow of concentration...
camps, only by breaking wholly and forever with their party and its criminal, infamous policy.

A Reminder to the Unemployed

WHAT WITH THE ENDING of the Spanish civil war, the Navy games, the Hines conviction, business appeasement, Bund meetings and counter-meetings, and daily exposures of graft in high places, a little item of some importance to thirty or forty million people has somehow dropped out of public sight. Could it even be that there is a certain deliberation in this studied forgetfulness?

You will remember, a month or so back, a controversy over relief funds. That particular controversy came to an end with passage by Congress and approval by the President of a $750,000,000 W.P.A. deficiency appropriation. Do you remember, also, the analysis made of that appropriation by Colonel Harrington, the W.P.A. administrator?

Colonel Harrington explained that with that sum available, he would be compelled to cut W.P.A. rolls substantially more than 1,000,000 before the end of the fiscal year on June 30th. He backed up his explanation with a careful statistical summary. Since Colonel Harrington gave his testimony, nothing has occurred to alter the laws of arithmetic. His conclusions follow just as certainly today as they did a month ago.

On April 1st—one of those April Fool's jokes of the New Deal—the mass cuts of the W.P.A. rolls begin. That is the schedule, and don't kid yourself into dreaming that the engineer doesn't intend to run on schedule. The cuts begin on April 1st, and, up to the present, no steps have been taken to stop them.

The plan of the administration and Congress is clear. They hope to catch the unemployed off guard. They are going to go ahead rapidly with the cuts before any resistance is organized. After the first weeks, they anticipate a rising wave of protests. They will have a chance to see and test how strong the mass opposition is. When it nears a point where militant direct action on a broad scale is threatened, Roosevelt will step in with a "demand" to Congress for a small additional appropriation. This appropriation will be insufficient for re-hiring any of the already dismissed workers and in fact will envisage still further, but slower, cuts from the rolls. But Roosevelt will figure that, through one of his usual sham fights with Congress, he will line up the labor bureaucrats and the Stalinists, and will be able to shunt aside the mass opposition. His ironic tactic is thus designed to utilize the labor bureaucrats and Stalinists in putting across a drastic lowering of the W.P.A. rolls, and to emerge at the end as the champion of the unemployed.

The prospect is grim enough; and the unemployed will have to take their own business into their own hands if they are to alter it. To wait for preparations until the cuts begin would be disastrous. Everything must be made ready now to fight back every inch of the way, and to show the administration that the unemployed will not tolerate a single move against them. The reply to the administration drive to cut the rolls must be the demand to extend the W.P.A. to include every unemployed worker at trade union wages.

The New Deal's Domestic Munich

WHEN IT WAS FIRST rumored that Harry Hopkins was soon to replace Daniel Roper as Secretary of Commerce in Roosevelt's Cabinet, the press reports anticipated a first class fight against the nomination on the floor of the Senate, with quite possibly a refusal to endorse. Hopkins had for years been painted up as the bad boy of the New Deal. General Hugh Johnson always refers to Hopkins in his column as a sinister communist-minded radical. Hopkins was the big spender, pouring out the W.P.A. funds. He was the rabble-rousing champion of the under-privileged. He was, according to Arthur Krock, who stated the famous principle of New Deal politics: "We will spend and spend and elect and elect." He, with Tommy Corcoran, was the man behind the Purge. He was the one accused of the manipulation of W.P.A. funds in the close State elections.

But, when the day came for Senatorial debate on the nomination, the roaring had turned to a whisper. A few scattered cracks from the die-hards, and Hopkins was overwhelmingly approved. What had gone on behind the scenes?

The answer is known. Congress and business had been tipped off by the administration to the fact that Hopkins was being put into the official Cabinet in order to take over leadership in the new program of "business appeasement," the necessary complement of the war preparations, the two together making up the content of the "fourth New Deal". The word passed around, and full reports were carried in the private Washington news letters. Raging editorials against Hopkins were revised, and the bad boy was pressed to Wall Street's bosom.

Since taking office, Hopkins has held daily discussions with corporation and bank executives in his huge, air-conditioned office within the grandiose new building of the Department of Commerce. The discussions have been uniformly friendly. Their summarized result was given in Hopkins' Des Moines speech, delivered on February 24th.

Let there be no mistake about "business appeasement". This is no scarecrow "Republican-Tory plot." It is the deliberate, determined policy of the government as a whole, transcending inter-party squabbles, and will be adhered to firmly. Its first fruits are already falling fast.

As recently as his January 4th message to Congress, Roosevelt announced that $400,000,000 to $500,000,000 new taxes would probably be necessary. Business objected. Six weeks later, in Florida, the President obligingly reversed his opinion and said that there would be no new taxes. Secretary Morgenthau followed up and went farther, promising to revise existing taxes which were felt by the business community to be deterrents to business'.

Hopkins, at Des Moines, put it this way: "While I feel there should be no general rise in Federal taxes this year, I believe any Federal taxes which tend to freeze the necessary flow of capital should be amended."

Early in February, the T.V.A. announced that it had reached a settlement with the notorious Commonwealth & Southern Corporation. T.V.A. is to pay approximately $80,000,000 for Commonwealth & Southern's Tennessee utilities properties. Some years ago T.V.A. engineers estimated that these properties were worth at the most $55,000,000. Commonwealth & Southern demanded $83,000,000. Commonwealth & Southern has been appeased to the tune of $25,000,000. The $80,000,000 figure means that T.V.A. is paying not merely an outrageous price for the physical plant of the Tennessee utilities but also for all of the watered stock which the utilities magnates have pumped in for a generation and even for such capitalist intangibles as "good will" and "value as a going concern". Not unexpectedly, on the day following the announcement of the deal, utility stocks on the New York Exchange bounded joyously forward.

A year ago, the projected monopoly enquiry was publicized as a new edition of the famous "trust-busting" investigation of pre-War years. From the day on which its public hearings started, its Chairman, Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming, has kept repeating that his object is in no way to hinder or expose business, but to aid business in becoming more efficient and making more profits.

Hopkins went to elaborate lengths to vow allegiance to profits. "Business men," he declared, "have to make money to hire workers." "We have all dedicated ourselves to the maintenance—the successful maintenance—of our American system of free enterprise." W. A. Harriman, Chairman of the board of the Union Pacific Railroad, understood perfectly what Hopkins meant by the last phrase. Commenting next day upon the Des Moines speech,
Harriman said that Hopkins “indicated his understanding of the necessity of the profit system. The address should be encouraging to everyone responsible for the conduct of business.”

Becoming even plainer, Hopkins observed: “With the emphasis shifted from reform to recovery, this administration is now determined to promote that recovery with all the vigor and power at its command.” The United States News, weekly newspaper specializing in Washington politics, echoed a few days later in its head article: “Recovery henceforth is really to be the first order of White House business. Reform interest, definitely, is checked.” “Recovery,” it should be kept in mind, means in the language of these soundrels, “profits”.

“Business appeasement” is just another way of saying, use all the devices of government to help capital make increased profits. This, looked at from the other side, however, is the same thing as carrying on a drive against the wages and living standards of the masses, since these are what the increased profits have got to come out of. Thus the smashing attack on the unemployed, already well started and due to get really going after April 1st, is an integral part of the program of business appeasement.

The new decisions of the Supreme Court, in their own way, likewise fit in. “Labor on its own side faces responsibilities and obligations,” said Hopkins. “Labor’s contribution to a rising national income must be tolerance and fairness in reaching just agreements with employers.” Three days later, the Supreme Court, through its decisions on the Fansteel, Columbian Enameling and Sands Manufacturing cases, showed what he meant. For labor to be tolerant and fair means to give legal sanction to employers, whatever they may wish to do—refuse to recognize unions, discharge workers without cause, make fink contracts, shoot strikers down in cold blood, flood workers with tear gas (every one of which acts the Fansteel Corporation was guilty of during the strike)—but to take police and court action against labor whenever it attempts to assert any of its rights.

Both sides of business appeasement, in their turn, are only the supplement for the main line of the Fourth New Deal: the preparations for the war. The government, its course set for the war, is harnessing all national forces to the war machine. The early New Deals of half-baked reforms and happy-go-lucky spending have miserably failed. American capitalism renews its intolerable crisis, and the way out is sought in the only remaining quarter—in external imperialist aggression. The war is to be fought for the salvation of the profit system; and through the program of business appeasement, the government makes this clear to every laggard business man, so that no anti-Roosevelt sentiment will gum up the war wheels. Meanwhile, labor will be dragged into line.

War and business appeasement: this is now the New Deal. It is on this that Lewis and Browder and Dubinsky and the New Leader ask us to pin our hopes! The central political task of the program of business appeasement is just another way of saying: use all the devices of government to help capital make increased profits. This, looked at from the other side, however, is the same thing as carrying on a drive against the wages and living standards of the masses, since these are what the increased profits have got to come out of. Thus the smashing attack on the unemployed, already well started and due to get really going after April 1st, is an integral part of the program of business appeasement.

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War and business appeasement: this is now the New Deal. It is on this that Lewis and Browder and Dubinsky and the New Leader ask us to pin our hopes! The central political task of the next period is to break the hold that this rotting war-and-profits New Deal has upon the American workers, a hold that, unbroken, will suffocate and doom the workers. The workers must break from its bonds into the clear air of independent class political action.

The Curtain Falls on Spain

THE LAST SCENE OF the current, infinitely tragic act of the Spanish Revolution is now being ended. Seldom in history have men displayed so wonderful a heroism as that of the Spanish workers and peasants; perhaps never in history has such heroism been so basely betrayed.

For two and a half years the Stalinists howled about Franco’s Fifth Column, covering thereby their slaughter of the militants and revolutionists of the Spanish working class. True, there was a Fifth Column within the camp of the Loyalists, a gang of traitors that handed Spain bound and gagged into the bloody clutches of Franco. That Fifth Column was composed of the socialist and Stalinist members of the bourgeois government and its counter-revolutionary institutions. It was they and they alone who swung the anti-fascist masses down the road into the pit prepared by British and French imperialism.

They were the agents and cringing lackeys of Paris and London. At the bidding of their scornful masters, they broke the back of the anti-fascist struggle. They drew tight again the halter of capitalism around the Spanish workers and peasants after that halter had been all but cast aside in the great days of the summer of 1936. They shattered the proletarian guards, disarmed the workers, smashed the collectives, brought the bosses back to the factories, re-built a bourgeois army, hounded and butchered every militant who even raised his voice in protest.

When the masses had been completely disoriented, demoralized and poisoned with disastrously delusive hopes, the fascist forces found it comparatively easy to deliver the final stroke. Yet, even they must have been astonished at the total lack of organized resistance to their conquest of Catalonia, just as they must have been inordinately pleased with the virtual capitulation of Central Spain, about whose readiness to fight to the end the Popular Front leaders continued to chatter bombastically to the end.

The main claim made for the People’s Front was that it united virtually everybody in the struggle against fascism—workers, peasants, middle class and “progressive capitalists”, to say nothing of the “democracies” abroad. It did unite the workers and peasants with the bourgeoisie, in much the same way that a bellwether “unites” a herd of sheep with a butcher. No partisan of Popular Frontism can ever escape his share of the responsibility.

Woe to those who do not learn the lessons of the Spanish tragedy!

Affairs—But Not Private

GRATIFYING AND ENCOURAGING, as we look back upon one year of publication of the second series of our review, is the truly world-wide support retained from the days when the very first issue came out, in July 1934, and the additional readers gained since then. It is not more than a statement of fact that the New International now has a larger circulation than any other theoretical organ devoted to the problems of the labor movement, with perhaps two exceptions in the entire world.

The distribution of the review in the English-reading countries outside the United States is impressive evidence of its international significance. In proportion to the given population, more copies are sold in Edinburgh than in Chicago, in Capetown than in Chicago, in Sydney than in Los Angeles.

We will not quote here from any of the numerous letters we keep receiving to show the favorable impression the review has made almost everywhere it is read; it is not our practice, although the all-powerful business manager does often smuggle into his page some excerpts from the monthly mail. But the communications we receive from readers show that the review has a wide circle of devoted friends.

It is to them that we appeal for help in the affairs of the New International, which are not private but as much theirs as ours. Up to now we have never made a “full-dress” campaign for funds but rather confined our efforts to asking quietly for assistance from a comparatively small circle. But despite the low overhead and general cost at which we try to publish the review, there is still a most annoying deficit, which sometimes becomes threatening.

To eliminate the deficit, we ask all readers for one of two things, or both. One, subscribe for a friend or get him to subscribe. This is basic, for once we reach a sufficiently large circulation, deficit problems will no longer exist. Two, send a donation to our maintenance fund, the larger the better. Without this aid, the very existence of the review will be endangered.
Behind the Kremlin Walls

EVEN FOR THOSE who are well acquainted with the protagonists and the situation, the latest events in the Kremlin are somewhat startling. I have felt this particularly clearly since the news came that Yenukidze, old permanent secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, has been shot. Not that Yenukidze was a prominent figure. The statements in some of the papers asserting that he should be counted a "friend of Lenin" and a "member of the closest circle which ruled Russia" are inexact. Lenin had good relations with Yenukidze, but not better than with dozens of other people. Yenukidze was a second-class political figure, without personal ambitions, with a constant disposition to adapt himself to the situation; that is precisely why he seemed a candidate least indicated for execution. The calumnies of the Soviet press against Yenukidze began in a completely unexpected manner shortly after the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial. He was accused of immorality and of being in connection with the enemies of the people. What does the connection with "enemies of the people" mean? It is very likely that Yenukidze, a good-hearted man, attempted to come to the aid of the families of executed Bolsheviks. The "immorality" signifies an inclination for personal comfort, too high standard of living, women, etc. It is likely that there is a bit of truth in this. Nevertheless, things have gone far in the Kremlin, very far, if they have come to shooting Yenukidze. That is why it seems to me that the simple recital of the life of this man will enable a foreign reader to better understand what is happening behind the ramparts of the Kremlin.

* * *

Abel Yenukidze was a Georgian from Tiflis, like Stalin. The Biblical Abel was younger than Cain. Yenukidze on the contrary was older than Stalin by two years. At the time of his execution he was about sixty years of age. From his youth Yenukidze adhered to the Bolsheviks, a fraction of the sole social-democratic party. In the Caucasus in the first years of the century a remarkable clandestine printshop was established which played not a slight rôle in the preparation for the first revolution (1905). In the operation of this printshop the brothers Yenukidze, "Red" Abel, and "Blacky" Simon, took an active part. The printshop was financed by Leonid Krassin, who was to become a remarkable Soviet administrator and diplomat. In those years the young talented engineer, not without cooperation of the young writer, Maxim Gorki, knew how to obtain money for the revolution from liberal millionaires of the type of Savva Morosov. From then on Krassin kept up friendly relations with Yenukidze: they called each other by their nicknames. It was from the lips of Krassin that I heard the Biblical name, "Abel," for the first time.

In the hard period between the first and the second revolution, Yenukidze, like the majority of the so-called "Old Bolsheviks," wandered away from the party. I don't know if it was for a long time. Krassin succeeded in becoming a prominent industrial business man during these years. Yenukidze did not amass capital. At the beginning of the war he was sent into deportation, from whence in 1916 he was called into military service with the men forty years of age. The revolution brought him back to Petersburg. I met him for the first time in the summer of 1917 in the soldiers' section of the Petersburg Soviet. The revolution aroused many old Bolsheviks, but they had a perplexed and unfriendly attitude toward Lenin's program of taking power. Yenukidze was not an exception, but he behaved more cautiously and more expectantly than the others. He was not an orator, yet he knew the Russian language well and in case of necessity he could give a discourse with less of an accent than the majority of the Georgians, including Stalin. Personally, Yenukidze produced a very agreeable impression because of the mildness of his character, the absence of personal pretensions, his tact. To this we must add an extreme bashfulness; at the slightest occasion Abel's freckle-covered face became intensely red.

What did Yenukidze do in the days of the October insurrection? I don't know. It is possible that he waited. In any case he was not on the other side of the barricades like Messrs. Troyanovsky, Maisky, Surin—not now ambassadors—and hundreds of other dignitaries. After the establishment of the Soviet régime, Yenukidze immediately entered into the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee and became its secretary. It is very probable that this was done on the initiative of the first president of the Central Executive Committee, Sverdlov, who in spite of his youth and his work as a secret agent was most likely to be found in the right place. Sverdlov himself attempted to give to the Presidium a political importance, and friction even arose because of this between him and the Council of People's Commissars, and particularly between him and the Political Bureau. After the death of Sverdlov in the beginning of 1919, a new president was elected—on my initiative, M. I. Kalinin, who has maintained himself in this post—the merit is not slight!—up until today. Yenukidze continued during all this time to remain as secretary.

These two figures, Mikhail Ivanovitch and Abel Safrovnitch, incarnated the supreme Soviet institution in the eyes of the population. On the surface the impression was created that Yenukidze held a good part of the power in his hands. But this was an optical illusion. The fundamental legislative and administrative work was done through the Council of People's Commissars under the leadership of Lenin. The principal questions, the discord, and the conflicts were resolved in the Political Bureau, which from the beginning played the rôle of a super-government. In the first three years, when all forces were directed toward the Civil War, through the march of events, an enormous power was concentrated in the hands of the military authority. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee occupied a not very well defined but in any case not independent place in this system. Yet it would be unjust to deny it any importance. At that time nobody feared to complain, to criticize, to demand. These three important functions: the demands, the criticisms, the complaints were addressed principally to the Central Executive Committee.

During the discussion of the questions in the Political Bureau, Lenin turned more than one time with amicable irony toward Kalinin: "Well, and what does the head of the State say about this subject?" It was not rapidly that Kalinin learned to recognize himself under this exalted pseudonym. Former peasant of Tver and student of Petersburg, he stuck to his unexpectedly elevated post with sufficient modesty, and in any case, prudence. It was only little by little that the Soviet press built up his name with his authority in the eyes of the country. Indeed, the directing of the country. Indeed, the directing work was done through the Council of People's Commissars, and of a super-government. In the first three years, when all forces were directed toward the Civil War, through the march of events, an enormous power was concentrated in the hands of the military authority. The Presidium of the Central Executive Committee occupied a not very well defined but in any case not independent place in this system. Yet it would be unjust to deny it any importance. At that time nobody feared to complain, to criticize, to demand. These three important functions: the demands, the criticisms, the complaints were addressed principally to the Central Executive Committee.

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intelligentsia he was diffident during the first years. It was here that he was particular in need of the aid of Yenikizde, better educated and more worldly-wise. In addition Kalinin traveled frequently; therefore at the receptions of the presidency he was placed by the secretary. They worked together amicably. Both of them by character were opportunistic; the two always searched for the line of least resistance, and they adapted themselves well to each other.

In view of his high functions, Kalinin was placed on the Central Committee of the party and even among the candidates for the Political Bureau. Thanks to the extensiveness of his acquaintances and his conversations he brought to the meetings frequently; therefore at the receptions of the presidency he was not a few valuable matter-of-fact observations. His proposals, it is true, were rarely accepted. But his considerations were heard not without attention and, in one way or another, taken into consideration. Yenikizde never entered into the Central Committee; neither, for example, did Krassin. These "Old Bolsheviks," who in the period of reaction had broken with the party, were admitted during these years to posts in the Soviets but not in the party. In addition, Yenikizde, as has been said, never had political pretensions. With closed eyes he reposed confidence in the direction of the party. He was profoundly devoted to Lenin, with a nuance of adoration, and—it is necessary to say this in order to comprehend what follows—he was strongly attached to me. In the not numerous cases where Lenin and I differed, Yenikizde suffered profoundly. I can say, in passing, that many were like him.

Without playing a political rôle, Yenikizde occupied nevertheless an important place, if not in the life of the country, at least in the life of the directing summits. The fact is that in his hands was centralized the housekeeping of the Central Executive Committee: from the cooperative of the Kremlin, products were delivered only on requisitions signed by Yenikizde. The importance of this fact became apparent to me only later, and moreover through indirect signs. I had passed three years at the front. During this time the new mode of life in the Soviet bureaucracy had commenced to form itself little by little. It is not true that in these years they swam in luxury in the Kremlin, as the White press affirmed. They lived in fact very modestly. However, the differences and the privileges had appeared already and accumulated automatically. Through his function, Yenikizde found himself, so to speak, at the center of these processes. Among many others, Ordjonikidze, who was then the first figure in the Caucasus, took care that Yenikizde had in his cooperative the necessary quantity of products from the soil.

When Ordjonikidze was transferred to Moscow, his obligations fell upon Orekhalachivili, whom everyone considered Stalin's flunkey. To the Kremlin from the president of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia, Budu Mdivani, came wine of Kakhetia. From Akhkhasia, Nestor Lakoba sent boxes of mandarins. All three: Orekhalachivili, Mdivani, and Lakoba, are now on the list of the executed. In 1919 I learned by chance that Yenikizde had wine in his warehouse and I proposed its prohibition. The lower personnel of the State had already learned to twist out of the difficulty: "And why then have you gained such popularity?" Finally the "gewgaws" were sent to the children's hospital or to the museum... My family did not change its habitual manner of living in the Cavalier's wing of the Kremlin. Bukharin remained at bottom an old student. Zinoviev lived modestly at Leningrad. Kamenev, in contrast, adapted himself rapidly to the new ways; in him at the side of the revolutionary had always lived a little voluptuary. Lunacharsky, People's Commissar of Public Education, was even more rapidly caught in the stream. I am not inclined to believe that Stalin greatly changed his conditions of life after October. But at this period he scarcely entered into my field of view. Many others paid little attention to him. Only later when he had gained first place was I told, that by way of distraction, apart from the bottle of wine, he enjoyed cutting a sheep's threat in his villa and shooting crows through the window. I am not able to ascertain the veracity of this story. In any case in the arrangements of his personal life, Stalin depended in this period a great deal upon Yenikizde, who treated his fellow countryman not only without "adoration," but also without sympathy, principally on account of his brutality and his capriciousness; that is to say, those traits which Lenin had judged it necessary to mention in his "Testament." The lower personnel of the Kremlin, who particularly appreciated Yenikizde for his simplicity, affability, and equity, displayed toward Stalin on the contrary an attitude of extreme hostility.

My wife, who administered the museums and the historic monuments of the country for ten years, remembers two episodes in which Yenikizde and Stalin manifested very characteristic traits. In the Kremlin, as well as in Moscow and throughout the country, an incessant struggle was carried on for lodgings. Stalin wanted to change his, which were very noisy, for some more peaceful. The agent of the Cheka, Belenki, recommended some reception rooms in the Palace of the Kremlin. My wife opposed this; the Palace was preserved as a museum. Lenin wrote a long letter of remonstrance to my wife: we can take the furniture of the "museum" away from several of the rooms of the Palace; we can take particular measures for protecting the place; Stalin needs an apartment in which he can sleep tranquilly; in his present apart-

One of the old servants of the Kremlin with a particular gesture of deference and familiarity which at once placed me on guard, opened the door to Kamenev's apartment. At a large table several dignitaries of the Kremlin were seated with their wives. On the table stood bottles and dainties coming, of course, from Yenikizde's cooperative. From its appearance all this was at a petty-bourgeois level, at most—middle bourgeois. But the general atmosphere of comfort repelled me. Without greeting anyone, I turned back, closed the door and started toward home. The servant this time had a slightly frightened and sober face. Our relations with Kamenev, which were very good in the first period after the insurrection, began to become more distant from that day. In justification for myself, I will say that I was not guided by some ridiculous puritanism but only by an immediate reaction: the affairs of the Civil War possessed me then completely and undividedly.

With the introduction of the so-called "New Economic Policy" (N.E.P.), the habits of the directing layer began to change at a more rapid rhythm. In the bureaucracy itself a process of differentiation began. A minority continued living while in power at a level not any better than in the years of the emigres and paid no attention to this. When Yenikizde proposed some improvements to Lenin in his personal life, Lenin evaded him with the phrase: "No, the old slippers feel better." From different corners of the country people sent him all sorts of local products, with the Soviet arms still freshly emblazoned. "They have sent some gewgaw," complained Lenin; "we must forbid it! And why does the head of the State do nothing more than stare?" he asked, severely knitting his brows in the direction of Kalinin. The head of the State had already learned to twist out of the difficulty: "And why then have you gained such popularity?" Finally the "gewgaws" were sent to the children's hospital or to the museum... My family did not change its habitual manner of living in the Cavalier's wing of the Kremlin. Bukharin remained at bottom an old student. Zinoviev lived modestly at Leningrad. Kamenev, in contrast, adapted himself rapidly to the new ways; in him at the side of the revolutionary had always lived a little voluptuary. Lunacharsky, People's Commissar of Public Education, was even more rapidly caught in the stream. I am not inclined to believe that Stalin greatly changed his conditions of life after October. But at this period he scarcely entered into my field of view. Many others paid little attention to him. Only later when he had gained first place was I told, that by way of distraction, apart from the bottle of wine, he enjoyed cutting a sheep's threat in his villa and shooting crows through the window. I am not able to ascertain the veracity of this story. In any case in the arrangements of his personal life, Stalin depended in this period a great deal upon Yenikizde, who treated his fellow countryman not only without "adoration," but also without sympathy, principally on account of his brutality and his capriciousness; that is to say, those traits which Lenin had judged it necessary to mention in his "Testament." The lower personnel of the Kremlin, who particularly appreciated Yenikizde for his simplicity, affability, and equity, displayed toward Stalin on the contrary an attitude of extreme hostility.

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ment we should place youths who can sleep even under the bombardment of cannon, etc. But the guardian of the museums would not yield to his arguments. Yenukidze placed himself at her side. Lenin named a commission for verification. The commission recognized that the Palace was not convenient for living. Finally the affable and accommodating Serebriakov gave Stalin his apartment. Stalin shot him seventeen years later.

We lived in the Kremlin jammed together in an extremely crowded manner. The majority worked outside the walls of the Kremlin. Meetings ended at all hours of the day and of the night, and the racket of automobiles kept us from sleeping. Finally, through the intermediation of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, that is to say, Yenukidze, a rule was established: after eleven o’clock in the evening automobiles must stop under the arches where the living apartments began; from there Messrs. the dignitaries must advance on foot. The rule was announced under everyone’s personal signature. But one automobile continued to disturb the peace. Awakened at three o’clock one morning, I waited at the window for the return of the automobile and questioned the chauffeur. “Don’t you know the rule?” “I know, comrade Trotsky,” responded the chauffeur, “but what could I do? When we came to the arches comrade Stalin ordered: “Drive on!”” The intervention of Yenukidze was necessary to compel Stalin to respect the sleep of others. Stalin, we think, did not pardon his fellow countryman this petty affront.

A very abrupt change in the conditions of life of the bureaucracy appeared after the last illness of Lenin and the commencement of the campaign against Trotskyism. In all large-scale political struggles one can, in the final score, discover the question of the beefsteak. To the perspective of “permanent revolution” the bureaucracy opposed the perspective of personal well-being and comfort. Inside and outside the ramparts of the Kremlin a series of secret banquets were held. Their political aim was to rally the ranks of the “Old Guard” against me. It was during this epoch (1924) that Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, and Kamenev chatted intimately around a bottle of wine in a villa at Zubalov. To the question as to what each liked best in life, Stalin, slightly exalted, responded with unaccustomed frankness: “To choose your victim, to prepare everything, to revenge yourself pitilessly, and then to go to sleep.” This conversation was repeated more than once by Kamenev, after he had broken with Stalin. Kamenev awaited the worst from his old ally, but despite all he did not foresee the terrible vengeance Stalin had reserved for him after long preparation. As to whether Stalin slept well the night after the assassination of Kamenev, Zinoviev, and others, I do not know.

The arrangements of the banquets of the “Old Guard” reposed in great part upon Yenukidze. They no longer limited themselves to the modest wine of Kalcheta. It was during this period that, properly speaking, the “immorality” began which was imputed as a crime to Yenukidze thirteen years later. Abel himself was perhaps never invited to the intimate banquets where the knots of the plot were tied and reinforced. In truth he himself did not strive toward them, although generally speaking, he did not shrink from attending banquets. The struggle which was opened against me went against his grain, and he displayed it in all the ways he could.

Yenukidze lived in the same Cavaliers’ wing as we. An old bachelor, he occupied a little apartment, where in former times some second-class functionary had his lodging. We met frequently in the corridor. He passed, weighed down, aging, guilty-faced. My wife, me, our boys he greeted with a redoubled affability in contrast to the others. But politically Yenukidze followed the line of least resistance. He aligned himself with Kalinin. And the “head of the State” began to comprehend that the strength was now not in the masses, but in the bureaucracy and that the bureaucracy was against the “permanent revolution,” for the banqueting for the “happy life,” for Stalin. Kalinin himself by this time had succeeded in becoming another man. Not that he greatly completed his knowledge or deepened his political conceptions; but he had acquired the routine of the “Statesman,” elaborated the particular style of an astute simpleton; he had ceased to lose countenance before the professors, the artists, and above all, the actresses. Little knowing of the behind-the-scenes life in the Kremlin, I learned of Kalinin’s new manner of life with great delay and, moreover, from a source completely unexpected. In one of the humorous Soviet revues, there appeared in 1925, as I remember it, a cartoon displaying—difficult to believe!—the head of the State in a very compromising situation. The resemblance left place for no doubt. Besides, in the text, very risqué in style, Kalinin was named by the initials, “M. I.” I could not believe my eyes. “What is this?” I asked several people close to me, among them Serebriakov. “That is Stalin giving a last warning to Kalinin.” “But for what reason?” “Surely not because he wishes to oversee his morality. It must be something in which Kalinin is offering opposition.” In reality, Kalinin, who knew recent events too well did not wish for a long time to recognize Stalin as chief. In other words, he feared tying his future to him. “This horse,” he said in a closed circle, “will some day drag our coach into the ditch.” It was only little by little, mumuring and resisting, that he turned himself against me, then against Zinoviev, and finally with yet more resistance against Rykov, Bukharin, and Tomsky, with whom he had been tied in the closest way through his moderate tendencies. Yenukidze followed the same evolution behind Kalinin, only more in the shadow, and certainly with more profound internal torments.

Because of his whole character, Yenukidze could not escape being found in the camp of Thermidor. But he was not a careerist and still less a scoundrel. It was difficult for him to detach himself from old traditions and yet more difficult to turn against the people whom he had been accustomed to respect. In critical moments, Yenukidze not only did not manifest any aggressive enthusiasm, but on the contrary, he complained, grumbled, resisted. Stalin knew this too well and more than one time gave Yenukidze warnings. I knew this, so to speak, first hand. Although ten years ago the system of denunciation had already poisoned not only political life but also personal relations, still many cases of reciprocal confidence were yet maintained. Yenukidze was a friend of Serebriakov, in his time a prominent militant of the Left Opposition, and quite often opened up his heart to him. “And what more does he [Stalin] want?” I complained Yenukidze. “I do all that he demands of me, but that is not enough for him. Into the bargain he wants me to take him for a genius.” It is possible that Stalin had already placed Yenukidze on the list of those upon whom he should revenge himself. But since the list proved to be very long, Abel had to wait many years for his turn.

In the spring of 1925 my wife and I lived in the CAUCUS at Sukhum, under the protection of Nestor Lakoba, widely known head of the republic of Abkhazia. He was (of all we must say was) a very short man, moreover, almost deaf. Despite the special sound amplifier which he carried in his pocket, it was not easy to speak with him. But Nestor knew his Abkhazia and Abkhazia knew Nestor, hero of the Civil War, man of great courage, of great firmness, and of great practical sense. Mikhail Lakoba, younger brother of Nestor, was Home Minister of the small republic and at the same time my faithful bodyguard during my stay at Abkhazia. Mikhail was (also was) a young Abkhazian, modest and jovial, one of those in whom there is no artifice. I never engaged in political conversations with the brothers. Only once did Nestor say to me: “I do not see in him anything of note: neither intelligence, nor talent.” I understood that he spoke of Stalin, but I did not pursue the conversation.

That spring the regular session of the Central Executive Committee did not sit at Moscow, but at Tiflis in the country of Stalin and of Yenukidze. Confused rumors of the struggle be-
tween Stalin and the two other members of the triumvirate were bruited about. From Tiflis an airplane left unexpectedly with a member of the Central Executive Committee, Miasnikov, the assistant head of the G.P.U., Mogulevsky, and a third passenger, in order to see me at Sukhum. In the ranks of the bureaucracy the possibility of an alliance between Stalin and Trotsky was strongly whispered. In fact, in preparing himself for the break-up of the triumvirate, Stalin wished only to frighten Zinoviev and Kamenev, who fell easily into panic. However, from a careless cigarette or from some other cause, the diplomatic airplane burst into flames in the air and the three passengers perished with the pilot. A day or two later another airplane came from Tiflis bringing two members of the Central Executive Committee to Sukhum, my friends, the Soviet Ambassador to France, Rakovsky, and the People's Commissar of the Postal Service, Smirnov. The Opposition at this time already suffered from persecution. "Who gave you the airplane at Tiflis?" I asked with astonishment. "Yenukidze!" "How dared he do that?" "Apparently not without the authorities knowing about it." My guests told me that Yenukidze was radiating, expecting a prompt compromise with the Opposition. However, neither Rakovsky nor Smirnov came on a political mission. Stalin, without tying himself in any way, was attempting only to spread illusions among the "Trotskyists," and panic among the Zinovievists. However, Yenukidze, with Nestor Lakoba, hoped sincerely for a change of course and they raised their heads. Stalin never pardoned them. Smirnov was shot during the Zinoviev trial. Nestor Lakoba was shot without trial, evidently in view of his refusal to confess "open-heartedly." Mikhail Lakoba was shot on the verdict of a tribunal before which he had given fantastic accusing depositions against his brother already executed. What has happened to Rakovsky since his arrest is something that still remains unknown.

In order to tie Yenukidze more strongly, Stalin introduced him into the Central Control Commission which was named to keep an eye on the party morale. Did Stalin foresee that Yenukidze himself would be accused of breaking this morale? Such contradictions in any case have never stopped him. It is sufficient to say that the old Bolshevik, Rudzutak, arrested upon the same accusations, was during the course of a number of years president of the Central Control Commission, that is to say, something like a high priest over the morals of the party and the Soviets.

Through the system of communicating channels, I knew in the last years of my Soviet life that Stalin had a particular archive in which he collected documents, circumstantial evidence, libelous rumors against all the high Soviet functionaries without exception. In 1929 at the moment of open rupture with the members of the right wing in the Political Bureau (Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky), Stalin succeeded in keeping Stalin in the Central Control Commission, that is only through the threat of defamatory revelations. That is, at least, what my friends wrote to me in Constantinople.

In November, 1927, the Central Control Commission, with the participation of numerous representatives of the Control Commissions in Moscow, examined the question of the exclusion of Zinoviev, of Kamenev and of me from the party.

The verdict was determined in advance. At the Presidium sat Yenukidze. We did not spare our judges. The members of the Commission were ill at ease under the accusations. Poor Abel was overcome. Then into the scene entered Sakharov, one of the most hardened Stalinists, true gangster type, ready to do all the sordid work. Sakharov's speech was filled with vulgar insults. I demanded that he be stopped. But the members of the Presidium who knew too well who dictated that speech, dared not do anything. I declared that I would have nothing to do with such an assembly and quit the room. After some time Zinoviev and Kamenev, whom some members of the Commission had tried to detain, joined me. A few minutes later in my apartment Yenukidze telephoned, begging me to return to the session. "How do you suffer the scum in the supreme institution of the party?" "Lev Davydovitch," Abel implored me, "what importance has Sakharov?" "More importance than you, in any case," I replied, "since he accomplishes what is ordered of him, and you, you well." Yenukidze stammered something indistinct, through which one could see that he hoped for a miracle. But I did not hope for a miracle. "You will not even dare to censure Sakharov?" Yenukidze became silent. "Will you not within five minutes vote for my exclusion?" A heavy sigh came as answer. It was my last discussion with Abel. Some weeks later I was already in deportation in Central Asia, a year later in emigration in Turkey. Yenukidze continued to remain secretary of the Central Executive Committee. It must be confessed that I began to forget Yenukidze. But Stalin remembered him.

Yenukidze was removed several months after the assassination of Kirov, soon after the first Zinoviev-Kamenev trial when prison terms of "only" ten and five years respectively were meted out to them as allegedly "morally" responsible for the terrorist act. There can be no doubt about the fact that Yenukidze, together with dozens of other Bolsheviks, tried to protest against the unfolding slaughter of Lenin's Old Guard. What form did the protest take? Oh, far from a plot. Yenukidze argued with Kalinin, telephoned members of the Politiburo, perhaps even Stalin himself. That was sufficient. As the secretary of the Central Executive Committee, Yenukidze was completely intolerable at the moment when Stalin placed his stake on the gigantic judicial frame-up.

But Yenukidze was still too important a figure, enjoyed too many comradeships and too little resembled a conspirator or a spy (these terms at that time still preserved a shadow of meaning in the Kremlin vocabulary) for him simply to be shot without formality. Stalin decided to act in instalments. The C.E.C. of the Transcaucasian Federation—upon the secret order of Stalin—turned to the Kremlin with a petition that Yenukidze be "freed" from the obligations of secretary of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. in order that it might be possible to elect him as president of the highest Soviet organ of Transcaucasia. This petition was granted at the beginning of March 1935. But Yenukidze had hardly succeeded in arriving in Tiflis before newspapers carried news about his appointment . . . as the chief of the Caucasian health resorts. This appointment, bearing the character of mockery—completely in the style of Stalin—boded nothing good. Did Yenukidze actually manage the health resorts for the next two and a half years? Most probably he was simply under the surveillance of the G.P.U. in the Caucasus.

But Yenukidze did not capitulate. The second Zinoviev-Kamenev trial (August, 1936), which ended with the execution of all the defendants, embittered old Abel. The rumor that Yenukidze wrote the quasi-apocryphal "Letter of an Old Bolshevik" which appeared abroad is sheer nonsense. No, Yenukidze was incapable of taking such a step. But Abel was indignant, grumbled, perhaps cursed. That was very dangerous. Yenukidze knew too much. It became necessary to act resolutely. Yenukidze was arrested. The original accusation bore an obscure character: a licentious way of living, nepotism and so forth. Stalin worked in instalments.

But Yenukidze did not capitulate even then. He refused to make any kind of "confession" which would have allowed him to be included in the list of defendants of the Bukharin-Rykov trial. A defendant without voluntary confessions is not a defendant. Yenukidze was shot without trial—as a "betrayer and enemy of the people". Lenin who was able to foresee much did not foresee such an end for Abel.

The fate of Yenukidze is the more instructive in that he himself was a man without striking traits, more a type than a personality. He fell victim to his belonging to the Old Bolsheviks. In the life of his generation there had been a heroic period: the clandestine printshops, the skirmishes with the Czarist police, the arrests, the deportations. 1905 was, fundamentally, the high-
est point in the orbit of the "Old Bolsheviks", who in their ideas did not go much further than the democratic republic. To the October revolution these people, already worn out by life and fatigue, adapted themselves in their majority, reluctantly. On the other hand with more assurance they began to find places in the Soviet apparatus. After the military victory against the enemies it seemed to them that now they had before them an existence peaceful and without care. But history deceived Abel Yenukidze. The principal difficulties were before him. In order to assure to the millions of big and little functionaries their beefsteak, their bottle of wine, and other good things, a totalitarian régime happened to be necessary. It is doubtful that Yenukidze—not at all a theoretician—deduced that the autocracy of Stalin follows from the thirst of the bureaucracy for comfort. He was simply one of the instruments of Stalin in the consolidation of the new privileged caste. The "immorality" which was imputed to him as a crime, constituted in reality an organic element of the official politics. It was not because of this that Yenukidze perished, but because he could not go to the end. For a long time he suffered, submitted, and adapted himself. But he arrived at a limit where he found himself unable to step beyond. Yenukidze did not plot or prepare terrorist acts. He simply lifted his graying head with dread and despair. He recalled perhaps the old prediction of Lenin: Stalin will drag us all into the ditch. He probably recalled the warning of Lenin: Stalin is disloyal and abuses power. Yenukidze tried to stop the hand which was levelling at the heads of the Old Bolsheviks. This was sufficient. The chief of the G.P.U. received the order to arrest Yenukidze. But even Henry Yagoda, cynic and careerist, who had prepared the Zinoviev trial, drew back from this mission. Yagoda was then replaced by the unknown Yezhov who was tied by nothing to the past. Without difficulty Yezhov placed under the Mauser all those whom Stalin indicated with the finger. Yenukidze discovered himself to be one of these. With him the old generation of Bolsheviks disappeared from the scene—he, at least, without self-humiliation.

Leon TROTSKY

A Party Without a Program

THE STATE CONVENTION of the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Association spent the two days of its session in St. Paul, January 27th and 28th, without giving any attention to the tasks of a working class party. It failed to adopt a program to help the farmers and workers of Minnesota in the capital crisis. Not one item was even considered that had any bearing on the immediate demands, to say nothing of a long time program, of the workers of the state.

The convention met after a split in the party and a stunning defeat. A challenging program, answering the needs of the workers, clearly was necessary to rally the Farmer-Labor forces for re-building the party. But the convention ignored this, made no analysis of the reasons for the defeat and no attempt to fix the responsibility. Nothing was proposed to set a new goal for the party or change its course.

Now "this was odd", because it is not quite the habit of Farmer-Laborites. Conventions in recent years have given less and less attention to program, but this was the first to hit zero. Former conventions have contained a strong current of criticism of the party leadership, seldom breaking into the open, but held down only by the patronage power and systematic management of the large bloc of state employees among the delegates. This year there was no patronage, and state employees, if still employed, discreetly stayed home. Yet the convention produced no protest against the old course, and no change of program.

The fact is that the Communist issue stole the show, and convention leaders managed to make it the whole show. The delegates were fed up with the manoeuvres and disruption of the Stalinists and determined to get rid of them. The F.L.P. leaders seized this sentiment and turned it into a futile "purge" which occupied the whole time of the convention, to the exclusion of the other issues that are life and death questions for the Farmer-Labor movement, problems that must be solved before the movement can reorganize or even rid itself of the Stalinists. The purge served as a substitute for real convention business. The assumption was that the presence of the Stalinists explained the party’s defeat and that the drive against them served as the needed change of policy. Feeling against the Stalinists ran so high that this accomplished its purpose of diverting the attention of Farmer-Laborites from the party managers and their share in the policies that have led the movement to defeat.

For real substance we must start not with the convention proceedings, but the unfinished business, the situation in the Farmer-Labor movement with which the convention had the duty of dealing.

The Farmer-Labor party was built for class action on a program of concrete class grievances, and was founded on the doctrine that no good could come out of either of the old parties. During the eight years in which the party has held the governor’s office and state administration in Minnesota there has been a steady drift away from independent working class politics and toward alliance with the old capitalist parties. Since this ran counter to the very reason for existence of a Farmer-Labor movement it met strong resistance from Farmer-Laborites, and had to be put over slowly. The alliance started with the formation of "All-Party Committees" to support the candidate for governor. These were committees of prominent "progressive Republicans and Democrats" who endorsed the candidate because of his "outstanding personal qualifications". They were supposed to attract voters from the other parties, on the basis that the candidate’s Farmer-Laborism didn’t really mean much and he should be elected as a good man. The All-Party supporters worked as an additional campaign committee, independent of the Farmer-Labor association, and graciously accepted state jobs after election.

The fight to maintain independent political action largely took the form of struggle between the "Farmer-Laborites" and the "All-Partyites". Farmer-Laborites didn’t like the watering down of the program. They didn’t like the appointment of old-party politicians to policy-forming state jobs. And they didn’t like the rewarding of All-Partyites with non-policy-forming jobs in preference to Farmer-Laborites who had done the real campaign work. The patronage issue took the spotlight in this dispute, each group accusing the other of being interested only in state jobs. That this charge was true in some cases must not hide the fact that it was untrue in many more. Most of the fighters on what was miscalled the patronage issue were trying to maintain the Farmer-Labor movement against old party inroads.

Next the All-Partyites began to move into the Association, and the labels became less clear. There was a perpetual but losing struggle against the increasing power of state employees in the Farmer-Labor clubs and central committees of the Association. In the affiliated trade unions this process did not go on, because no one can lightly join a union to get a state job or advance a political career. Trade union members are selected first because they are workers in the industry. But this change did produce a widening gap between the policies of the unions and the policies of the Farmer-Labor clubs in the association.
In general, within the clubs, and between the clubs and the unions, the old-time Farmer-Laborites felt that they were losing out to "band-wagon climbers" and "carpet-baggers" who had joined only for state jobs.

In 1935, when the Stalinists began moving into the Farmer-Labor party they were actually welcomed by some militant Farmer-Laborites who expected them to be allies for a working-class course and against entanglements with the old parties. It soon developed that entanglement with the old parties was exactly the Stalinist program.

In the 1936 election the All-Party movement blossomed into a complete coalition, with F.L.P. support for Roosevelt traded for the withdrawal of the Democratic candidate for governor. Need- less to say, this deal was made without consulting any part of the Farmer-Labor Association, and it sent a shock through the movement. But the Stalinists stepped into the breach with "left-wing" approval of this step toward "unity".

The Stalinists proved to be the most complete All-Partites and the most consummate political manipulators in the movement. In local politics they did not hesitate to form a bloc with anyone who would join with them, no matter how reactionary his record in the Farmer-Labor movement, and it frequently was the discredited reactionary who had lost all other support who turned to them. Whenever they gained any influence over a job-dispen- sing position they used patronage ruthlessly to build their faction, regardless of the damage to morale in the Farmer-Labor move- ment and the unions.

In a surprisingly short time the Stalinists won enough influ- ence in the Farmer-Labor Association to have a powerful bargain- ing position. They were favored by events. The death of Floyd Olson left several crown princes, each trying to build a machine of his own. With a bloc in the movement under control, the Stalinists could command favors from politicians eager to gather support for themselves and away from rivals. The Stalinists actually were able to give out a good many state jobs to build their organization.

In addition the Association was wide open for an organized fraction. Basically the Association is a federation of Farmer- Labor clubs, in city and country, and affiliated trade unions. As has been mentioned, it was hard for Stalinists or state employees to capture unions, although the Stalinists did set up some paper unions. But anyone could pay his $1.50 dues and join a ward or township club. The constitution barred from membership any- one "advocating change by means of force or by means of revo- lution", but the Stalinists either denied membership in the Com- munist party or pointed out the obvious fact that it doesn't advo- cate revolution any longer. Many Farmer-Labor clubs were taken over by the Stalinists and their allies. The process was helped along by filibustering which tired the old members and drove them out.

But, besides trade unions, any organization "accepting the program" could affiliate. And did. The Stalinists set up paper locals of the Workers' Alliance, workers' orders, reading circles, culture clubs, affiliated them (for a per capita of two cents a month per member) and swamped the central committee and conventions with delegates.

These paper affiliates were most active in the cities, but they also reorganized many rural counties. Few rural counties had had affiliates, since the unions are almost all in the cities; but the new affiliates were everywhere. They could affiliate cheaply just before a county convention, and claim any membership they pleased, since one month's per capita tax for a hundred members was only two dollars. The clubs could not compete with this, since the club dues for a hundred members came to $150.00. The affiliates and All-Partites would combine and vote out the Farmer-Labor Association officers.

Afterwards the Farmer-Laborites found that the new-comers were systematically favored by confederates higher up, not only on policies but with jobs in the highway department.

This type of "reorganization" drove thousands of Farmer- Laborites to the Republicans or to Hjalmar Petersen. But it left the Stalinists in control of what was left.

The neatness, efficiency—and economy—of this attack must command a certain type of mild admiration, tempered by the reflection that it always takes less brains to wreck an organization than to build one. But the damage in the Farmer-Labor move- ment passes all calculation. I have used a rural example here because the reaction in the farming areas had results of special importance, but the same sort of thing took place in the cities.

The Farmer-Labor organizations thus fell into three classes: 1. Trade union affiliates. Least open to capture by politi- cians, state employees or Stalinist factions. The unions are the most dependable working-class base. Theoretically, affiliated farm organizations could provide a rural representation similarly selected on a non-political basis, but actually farm organizations have not affiliated.

2. Farmer-Labor clubs, in city and country. These are the membership organizations, very much open to penetration but containing a large proportion of straight Farmer-Laborites, es- pecially in the rural counties. For the state as a whole the state employees were more important than the Stalinists in the clubs.

3. Paper affiliates. Stalinist fakes. In this organizational picture the Stalinist moves take a good deal of space to describe, but they must not be given more than their share of importance. The movement by party politicians toward the All-Party policy was under way long before the Stalinists entered the movement, and organized management of state employees was choking off the protest in the ranks against the alliance with the New Deal. The Stalinists only brought a new efficiency to the manoeuvres and a new pseudo-radical excuse for the line. Their fraction work was conspicuous enough to be important, and to account for the convention's preoccupation with them, but it did not start or change the trend.

Even the success of the Stalinist faction work had larger explanations. After all, Minnesota Farmer-Laborites are not exactly novices in politics. The Northwest has gone through a tremendous political education in the past twenty years, and is in some respects an advanced section of the country. Typical Farmer-Laborites may not know all the fine systems of fraction work or how to pad representation, but they are quite capable of running right straight over anybody who tries to stop them from doing something they really want to do, with a fine disre- gard for any fake representation.

At bottom the trouble lay in the fact that the movement wasn't really doing anything. It wasn't in motion for a program that really touched the interests of the workers and farmers. If it had been, manoeuvres and filibusters would have accomplished nothing. The movement would have shrugged them off.

The real explanation for events in the Farmer-Labor organi- zation lay in the Farmer-Labor program. The militant goal of class politics had been first diluted and then abandoned. The movement turned from problems of unemployment, low wages, low farm prices, debt, taxes and foreclosures. It turned to the alliances to win elections, fronts to gain votes, deals to get jobs. In that atmosphere workers and farmers lose interest, and they don't put up a real fight to keep the organization in line. They may drop out entirely and leave the management to the careerists.

The Stalinists succeeded because their program fitted. They preached surrender to the New Deal, and that was exactly the wish of the party strategists. It was easy to ride on Roosevelt's coat tail, but you had to run awfully fast to keep up with insurgent workers and farmers. The party leaders could work nicely with the Stalinists, because their programs fitted exactly, except that the Stalinists, on some issues, such as the question of war preparations, were even ahead of the party leaders in the race to the right. So they got along. Even most of the politicians who...
denounced the Stalinists at the convention had worked harmoniously with them beforehand.

In the 1938 elections the Farmer-Labor party stood as the state's representative of the New Deal, no more. Farmers and workers, cheated by the New Deal, were offered nothing better by the F.L.P. The 1938 convention adopted a pussy-footing platform, carefully toned down to offend no middle-class votes. Farmer-Labor leaders admit that the Republican platform was more liberal than their own. The Stalinists even insist on it, as showing that the Republican victory was a triumph for Farmer-Labor principles! (This also serves the Stalinists as a part of their campaign since the election to worm in among the "progressive Republicans" to gain influence in the new state administration.) At any rate, what the Republicans did worked. Their candidate for governor, Stassen, was elected by a majority which nearly broke the record. The record had been set two years before by the Farmer-Labor candidate for governor. That gives the measure of the political overturn on which this convention had to tally the reckoning.

The convention also had to reckon with the disorganized state of the movement, which was shown by a general lack of interest, by Farmer-Laborites dropping out of clubs, and unions leaving the Association.

The movement had suffered an open split the year before in the Minneapolis city primary election, with the labor unions and some ward clubs behind one candidate, and the Stalinist paper affiliates and other ward clubs supporting the other. The state organization and state administration supported the latter candidate, and he won the nomination, but by a slim margin. In the state primary in the spring of 1938 thousands of Farmer-Laborites deserted in a conservative direction to vote for Hjalmar Petersen, who was not supported by the unions. With the aid of votes from Republicans and Democrats who went into the Farmer-Labor primary to beat Benson, Hjalmar Petersen nearly won the nomination.

By the time of the 1939 convention, interest had gone so low that many unions didn't even bother to send delegates.

The politicians had their own view of the cause of all this, and their own program. In spite of their frantic efforts to be respectable, they had had the "Communist issue" pinned on them during the campaign. So they laid the blame, and also expressed their lack of real disagreement with the Communist line, in these terms, "If they'd stay in the background and work they'd be all right, but they always crowd up in front, and it ruins us. We've got to change our window-dressing!"

The background and the problem have been sketched, at more length than the report of the convention will take, but that is proper since the convention was so empty of anything but warnings. Before going to the convention proceedings let's stop at the door of the St. Paul city auditorium. Two programs are being presented here.

One is in the Minnesota Appeal, issued by the Minnesota section of the Socialist Workers Party. It analyzes the causes of the defeat, and presents a positive program as the basis for reorganization, saying, in part:

"Many reasons are given by Farmer-Labor politicians for the defeat. Most of them have a smell. They are alibis. They are not the real reasons.

"In our open letter to Governor Benson long before the election we tried hard to get the leaders to face the facts.

"We said, 'The truth is that the F.L.P. is in mortal danger of a defeat at the hands of reaction, unless the workers and farmers are armed with a program that will spur them to the utmost efforts."

"The Socialist Workers Party then made twelve proposals about housing, public works, unemployment, farm prices, Stalinist adventurism and war. On this page that program is repeated.'"

At another point:

"The Farmer-Labor party has been tied like a little dog to the New Deal.

"When the New Deal went down, the F.L.P. crashed with it."

At another point, speaking of the fight the politicians were preparing on the Stalinists:

"Now here is the irony of this teapot tempest: The Johnson-Lemmen group who are trying to throw out the Stalinists, propose the party to stay conservative. They want even closer unholy a program identical with that of the Stalinists! They both want wedlock with the New Deal. They want to gag the trade unions.

"What we suggest is: REPUDIATE THIS TEAPOT TEMPEST! FIGHT FOR MILITANT REVIVAL OF PRINCIPLES!"

Be it noted that this was the needed basis both for re-building the party and getting rid of the Stalinists. It would rebuild the party because it offered the things the workers and farmers needed, and would rally them for action. It would get rid of the Stalinists because it would break with them on program, not just by putting a new rule in place of the old rule which had proved useless. A Farmer-Labor party fighting for an independent working class program and against Roosevelt's war program would be a party without the Stalinists. They would march right out and no rules would be needed.

Another program is presented at the door, in the Communist Daily Record. The headline tells it in a glance, "Convention to Rally Progressives for New Deal!"

The convention was called to order at noon and opened with a preliminary report of the credentials committee, revealing that 57 delegates had been challenged under the rules, and the committee members differed on procedure. Thus the convention started with a debate on the Communist issue. The minority report, which seemed to promise the more severe slap on the wrist to the Stalinists, was pressed by politicians and conservative trade union officials, on the ground that the convention's rules would be needed.

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After a long barren wrangle the anti-Stalinist minority report was adopted by a substantial but not overwhelming majority. The rest of the session was consumed with financial reports, adoption of convention rules and election of convention officers. One day gone.

The session the following morning started with what could have been a discussion of program, since some time was allowed for a resolutions committee report, to fill in while the delegates were gathering. The committee brought forth nothing but routine resolutions re-affirming some former F.L.P. legislative planks. Then came a long collective security resolution, praising the Lima conference, and calling for united action by the democracies for economic sanctions against fascist aggressor nations. From the lengthy debate I quote Stalinist speeches:

"Japan will become a leading industrial nation and a competitor of the United States; and what good will it do the United States if Japan conquer the world?" I quote anti-Stalinist speeches:

"Let's be cautious. We've gotten into a lot of trouble at these conventions by passing ill-considered resolutions. Of course I'm sympathetic to the Loyalists in Spain, but we have to remember that there are a lot of Catholic votes in this state and we need those votes. Let's mind our own business."

The debate stayed at the level of War for Democracy and
American Industry versus straight political cowardice. Finally a motion to bring the resolution to a vote failed by a narrow margin and the convention moved to the report of the constitution committee.

This was to be the big business, the reorganization of the association. The opportunity to set the stage for a real reorganization, on program, had been passed by, but the movement was going to change itself all around by amending its constitution.

The first amendment changed the statement of purpose, which had read, "Its purpose shall be to unite the members of all farmer, labor and other kindred organizations, and unorganized elements which support independent political action by economic groups, into a political association." [Italics mine, W. B.] The committee proposed, "Its purpose shall be to form a political association to carry on an extensive program of education and organization incidental to participation in the political campaigns of the Farmer-Labor movement". All-Partyism for sure; even the words "independent political action" were to be pruned from the constitution. Possibly they stood in the way of rallying for the New Deal. Then Dewey Johnson (of the Johnson-Lommen group, organizing the fight to expel the Stalinists) proposed from the floor that the word "political" be stricken out and "educational" substituted. An "educational association" for the "educational campaigns"! Truly these anti-Stalinists had a program identical with the Stalinists!

The next amendment, aimed at the Stalinist paper affiliates, restricted membership to Farmer-Labor clubs and "chartered trade unions". Thoroughly good and much needed. A little rough on any real unemployed organization but the plague of paper Workers' Alliance locals left the convention no choice. The Stalinists fought hard for an amendment to include unemployed organizations and ladies' auxiliaries. The trade union and rural delegates opposed the amendment vigorously and it lost 2 to 1. The amendment carried as introduced.

The debate on this issue brought out the most ominous sign in the whole convention. Some rural delegates stated that there was sentiment among the rural clubs for eliminating all affiliates from membership. That is, they wanted to put out the unions as well as the Stalinist paper affiliates. Private discussion among delegates revealed more of this than was expressed from the floor; and the feeling was not confined to conservative farmers, it was held by some honest-to-goodness militant Farmer-Laborites.

This was the fruit of the "capture" policy of the Stalinist paper organizations in the rural counties. These farmers came into direct contact only with these affiliates, and not with genuine trade unions. At conventions it was the delegates from Stalinist affiliates who held the floor and made themselves conspicuous, and obnoxious. They had little opportunity to observe that the genuine trade union affiliates stood at the opposite pole on policy of the Stalinists. They had little opportunity to observe that the Stalinists and their affiliates were chartered by the association. This was the way to eliminate the unions as well as the Stalinist paper affiliates, it was held by some honest-to-goodness militant Farmer-Laborites. This amendment was carried as introduced.

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Fortunately the farm and labor alliance is not being left to the Stalinists or the fortunes of the Farmer-Labor political movement. The Farmer-Cooperative-Labor Council, organized by progressive trade unionists and farm leaders, is doing good work in cementing the alliance together. But the anti-union feeling among some rural delegates at this convention should be written in capital letters as a warning sign of the destruction that unprincipled hysteres can produce in the workers' political movement.

During all of this time the 57 protested delegates (about half of them protested as Stalinists and the rest protested by the Stalinists) had been barred from the floor pending investigation by the credentials committee. The convention suspended its other business at this point (mid-afternoon of the second day) to hear the final report. The committee report seated all the delegates except about a dozen who had signed a petition to put Brower on the ballot in 1936. The evidence against these (almost all insignificant figures) was not heavy, but at least it was definite and in writing, so it would serve as the much-needed window dressing purge. All of the purges who spoke in their own defense denied being Communists, and made no defense of the Communist party. Advocates of the Committee report, the same conservative unionists and politicians heard from before, spoke for it with as much vigor as if the report did not seat a large number of active Communists, while unseating a handful of minor stooges. The report was adopted, 383 to 158.

Back to the constitution, the convention turned to the next amendment, reading: "Provided, however, that no person who is a supporter of any other political party than the Farmer-Labor Party shall be admitted to membership. No adherent of Communism, Fascism, or Nazism may be a member of, or hold any position in connection with, the activities of the Association or the Party."

This was the big purge. The rule against Communists was to be replaced by another rule. The Communists were to be banned by name, by bell, book and candle, and everything else but—political program.

Now was the time for the Stalinists to shoot their bolt, and they did it. One of their spokesmen arose and moved to amend by adding the word "Trotskyism" to the list! This was the fight and it was all the fight that they made!

After some debate the chairman ruled that the word "Communism" included "Trotskyism", so the amendment was out of order as not changing the motion.

The amendment in its original form was adopted by the overwhelming vote of 479 to 52. From the size of this vote it appears that some Stalinists voted for their own expulsion, and so they did. For instance, in Hennepin County (Minneapolis) the Stalinists in ward clubs and paper affiliates had gained control of the association, and had restricted the trade union representation, so that Hennepin County vote was heavily Stalinist. Hennepin County voted 30 in favor of this amendment to the constitution.

Why? Discussion in the Hennepin County caucus reveals the reason. "Then this includes the Trotskyites. Let's vote for it."

Unprincipled but realistic. The rule won't hurt the Stalinists, and will certainly be applied against real radicals and progressives.

This constituted the purge and the convention business. One other amendment deserves comment. "And no person holding an appointive paid position in any department of the state government may be a delegate to any county, district or state convention of the Farmer-Labor Association". A little late, since the Republican state administration had already taken care of this matter, but it stands as a touching monument to the long fight against state employee control in the association.

The convention then elected a chairman, vice-chairman and secretary-treasurer of the Association for the coming year and adjourned. The state committee, the governing body between conventions, had already been selected at district conventions prior to the state convention. It contains its full share of stooges who have cooperated completely with the Stalinists.

People in Minnesota, as elsewhere, are still interested in wages and hours, farm prices and debts and taxes, security against
unemployment and old age, and peace. This convention, gripped by a faction fight and touching none of these things, could hardly be expected to arouse much enthusiasm. Nor did it. Even the "victors" are hardly interested in what they have won.

Events since have shown the futility of the purge and the failure of the convention to solve the crisis in the movement.

Hennepin County held a convention three days afterward and followed the letter of the law. Paper affiliates were seated only as "fraternal" delegates. Yet the Stalinists elected their full slate of county Association officers. Supervising representatives from the state committee sat in attendance, impotent.

On February 6, the Duluth Central Labor Political Committee, the political arm of the Duluth Federated Trades Assembly, formally withdrew from the Farmer-Labor Association. The Assembly itself had withdrawn the year before. This makes the separation complete.

More of this sentiment in organized labor is shown by the St. Paul Union Advocate, of February 2: "On no less than a half dozen occasions the majority of the Ramsey County [St. Paul] delegates were on the point of walking out of the convention in a body. Had they withdrawn from the convention it would not have been for the purpose of holding a rump convention but to definitely wash their hands of the Farmer-Labor party."

The worst feature of this potential Farmer-Labor breakup is that disillusioned Farmer-Laborites, in most cases, do not seem to recognize that the failure of the movement is due to its pronounced right wing course. Their reaction is to go conservative or to lose interest in politics altogether. The unions, except those under conscious progressive leadership which offers a positive program as a solution, are retreating back to "reward your friends and punish your enemies"—the blind alley they abandoned twenty years ago in Minnesota.

Many real Farmer-Labor militants are confused by the factional line-up. They see progressive trade unionists and Marxist revolutionists fighting the Stalinists, but they also see a host of professional careerists and fake-alarmists doing the same thing. These militants shy away from that camp because it contains the same All-Party politicians that they have always fought. The best asset of the Stalinists is the fact that they have some enemies to be proud of. Their recent close collaboration with these same enemies gets less attention, as does the fact that their program and actions put them even farther to the right than these conservatives. Also overlooked is the fact that the Marxists and progressives are fighting their conservative so-called allies on program.

Making clear the real alignment of forces is one of the tasks in Minnesota. The militants who are for a class program will not rally to what seems to be the camp of the conservatives. And they must be rallied, for the present retreat is fast wiping out the gains in political mobilization which the Minnesota workers and farmers have won by a hard fight through many years.

The Stalinist issue can be handled, but it can only be handled as what it is, an incidental obstacle in the fight for the program that workers and farmers need.

The 1939 convention did not handle the issue, or any other. It leaves only a lesson in the futility of trying to base working class politics on organizational moves instead of program.

Walter BEIRCE

The Struggle in California

ANYONE ATTENTIVELY observing the antics of American labor leaders after the New Deal defeats in the November election cannot fail to remark a certain similarity to the conduct of confirmed drunks on the morning following a big spree. Certainly all the outward symptoms of a first class hangover appear plainly: one notes nausea, loss of morale and an extremely pessimistic frame of mind—all of which is quickly followed by a desperate effort to find relief in . . . more drinking.

In California the sentiments differ from those of their Eastern brethren only in this respect—that one emerges from an attack of delirium tremens with some slight sense of relief. For it must be admitted that a six-year period has just finished in which so many of the elements of burlesque and violence were allowed to appear plainly: one notes nausea, loss of morale and an attack of delirium tremens with some slight sense of relief. For it must be admitted that a six-year period has just finished in which so many of the elements of burlesque and violence were contained that the union leaders must have sincerely believed themselves the victims of hallucinations.

It began with the buoyant hopes of the New Deal and the Epic Deal and the Epic Plan and ended in the sour Republicanism of Governor Merriam. The unprecedented militancy of the maritime workers—which began by producing the San Francisco General Strike and creating a splendid new section of the labor movement—almost petered out in a nightmarish wrangling of jurisdictional war. The sporadic mass uprisings of the agricultural workers, carried through with so much human sacrifice, brought forth only a monster of agrarian reaction: Associated Farmers. And when this horror had devoured unionism in the agricultural valleys with open violence, it bore down upon the workers in the cities with an increasing pressure which finally produced, as the legal expression of its notorious aims, the reactionary Proposition No. 1. This extreme measure, by the restriction it tried to place upon unions, openly sought to fasten a noose around labor's throat. And the union leaders, beleaguered, aiming the death pangs, struck back in a frenzy of self-preservation.

However, when the convulsions of election activity had ceased, labor's heads found themselves in possession of an unexpected but unquestionable victory. Proposition No. 1 was beaten back. The reactionary Merriam was overturned and in his place, elected with labor support, stood Governor Olson, who was considered a "radical" because of his activity in the Epic movement. Still these events have brought to the labor leader only a transitory release from care. Already he feels the ranks under him strain forward. But to him this means the provoking of Associated Farmers' wrath—and the return of DT's again. Not to go forward, either in fact or in fantasy, implies a return to the lean, gaunt, salary-bare years of the First Depression. To these courses he finds only one other alternative—a pleasing and slightly befuddled state of inebriation. To produce this he begs—from a New Deal gentleman who has no intention of giving up anything—a drink from a bottle that has long since been emptied.

2

If anyone were to confine himself to the milieu of California's official "Democrats" in a hunt for the key to this political paradox, he would rapidly bury himself in a straw pile of confusion. For it was neither the genial personality of Governor Olson nor the confused generalship of his labor lieutenants nor even the frantic propaganda of People's World that defeated Proposition No. 1, but solid support from the middle classes. Thousands of unexpected votes came to labor's aid from the army of "Thirty Thursday" Pension Plan supporters.

As a political force the "Thirty Thursday" organization exists as one of the last vital surges of the great middle-class movement of protest which swept over the country during the past eight years. In the early stages of the Roosevelt administration, while big Capital was gathering up the real benefits of N.R.A. in the increased accumulation of profits and while labor was stir-
ring in the first indications of the trade union revival, the dispossessed and bankrupt middle classes first realized that the New Deal offered no solution to their social problems. This led to an eruption of popular "left" variations of the New Deal which used up the whole lurid shelf of middle-class political patent-medicines. Yet in spite of superficial differences, the program of each successive stage of this movement was identical: a rather dubious leadership attempted to promote a platform of Utopian radicalism within the framework of the Democratic party. In this last point each of these organizations unconsciously confessed that its success depended solely upon the acceptance of its program by American capitalism, in this case represented by Roosevelt, and its impotence as a truly independent force. When Roosevelt firmly ignored the existence of these movements, each collapsed like a pricked balloon, and its following was swallowed up by the next oncoming popular wave.

These convulsions of protest attained their greatest intensity and widest scope in California. Upton Sinclair's Epic, Utopians, Inc., the Townsend Plan—all these overnight achieved statewide organization and gained mass support. The "Thirty Thursday" movement is merely the latest of this series. In the meantime similar movements over the rest of the country dwindled away under the influence of Roosevelt "prosperity" and their followings have returned to pseudo-liberal Republicanism at the first touch of recession. But in California the pension movement shows little tendency to diminish. To Upton Sinclair's 800,000 votes in 1934 the Pension Plan polled well over a million in the last election.

In the interval between these two elections another and far more significant change was taking place. As the movement evolved through successive programs and with changing leadership, its demands tended to become increasingly more simple and effective. While grandiose schemes of Epic demanded no less than the complete revolutionizing of society within the boundaries of California, today the Pension supporters confine themselves to the extremely justifiable demand for thirty dollars a week. At the same time, along with the narrowing of program, the struggles of this movement have given to many of its supporters some slight political schooling. In spite of the firm resolutions of its leaders to keep their flocks thoroughly respectable, sectarian and classless, the movement has moved gradually closer to the trade unions. Support of the Olson campaign became a common meeting ground in the last election, and in the heat of the battle both labor and pension movements—in a confused and not too effective fashion, to be sure—appealed to each other for support.

Already, although the Plan was defeated by a small margin in the election, its supporters are renewing the attack. Naturally the Plan's cynical and non too moral brain trust confines itself to corridor intrigues at the State Capitol. But the rank and file, believing a close sympathizer has been elected Governor, is stepping on the Democratic heels, confident that a victory in the long drawn out pension fight is near.

As for Governor Olson, having given left-handed support to the Plan in his campaign, he now tries to wiggle out of a tight corner by passing the buck to Washington. But he does this at the exact time when Roosevelt, putting the informal New Deal togs back into mothballs, is laying out his military uniform. Under these circumstances no one (including Olson) seriously anticipates Federal enactment of satisfactory Pension legislation, and the Plan's supporters must continue to clamor for action from the California legislature. But—leaving aside the political fact that Olson does not control the legislature and is the captive of the reactionary State Senate—only a huge increase in the State budget could make the smallest concessions possible. This would require an increase in taxable incomes based upon an overwhelming revival of agricultural prosperity and an exceptional expansion of the perishable fruit and vegetable industry which has been chronically depressed since 1930. With foreign markets for these products being steadily closed off and new productive regions being opened in the Southwest, this market seems destined for more drastic decline.

Already Olson has admitted that these fundamental factors bar any great increase of State income. Coming into the inheritance only of a huge, almost bankrupt state bureaucracy, his financial policies must necessarily confine themselves to the bleak road marked by the carcass of Merriam's late "economy" régime. For the expectant Pension enthusiasts this course holds an abrupt and brutal destruction of their fondest hopes.

While it cannot be said that labor is very acutely aware of this state of affairs, some sections of the workers have been sobered and reanimated by the victorious fight against Proposition No. 1. "Unity" movements of both A.F.L. and C.I.O. unions have sprung up from below. The two-headed dragon of legal suppression and illegal violence has come within sight of the whole movement within the past months. Everyone understands that if a return of the danger is to be prevented, the trade union movement must not only be united but widened and strengthened as well. That means above all a drive to organize the masses of agricultural workers. But this problem is now so hedged in by the bayonets of political, legal and vigilante forces that any major attempt to solve it on a purely trade union plane seems doomed to failure. Besides, the failure of simple unionism to provide more than an incomplete and precarious solution to their problems has repressed the enthusiasm of the advanced workers for further trade union activity.

As a result the unity movements have shown signs of becoming more deeply involved in political activity. Having beaten off legal strangulation at the bosses' hands only by an energetic political counter-attack they now wish to push forward. The logical, progressive end of such a movement can only result in the formation of a Labor party, and the progressive workers, generally, favor this as a distant goal. But they do not yet understand that upon a fairly rapid arrival at this goal depends not only a great part of the political future of California labor but the further progress of its trade unions as well.

Only a militant Labor party could promise and produce real protection against vigilantism, not in the form of reliance upon the platonic promises of the Democrats but by organized defense forces based on a united union movement. Only with such protection and encouragement could the agricultural workers' organization be attempted. Upon the success of this drive depends the ability of labor to strike a crippling blow at the schemes of Associated Farmers, to lay the basis for the complete control of California's economic life, and to add a hundred thousand of the most militant and devoted fighters to Labor's ranks.

That such a stormy renascence of the labor movement would have a tremendously magnetic influence upon the middle classes is beyond question. With Democratic betrayal of the Pension Plan already almost an accomplished fact its followers openly appeal for labor support. If the unions ignore this appeal—preferring instead the doubtful privilege of continuing to act as ballast in the Olson ship-of-state—the pension movement will wither away, and reaction will gather up its members within a short interval. On the other hand, a Labor party which would boldly incorporate the progressive essence of the "Thirty Thursday" Plan into its program could rally the million followers of the Plan to its banner.

Moreover, many Pension supporters are farmers of the poorest classes. In no other state is the farmer so directly and brutally dominated by capitalism as in California. In the past period federal crop destruction policies in the fruit and vegetable industries have produced some astounding monstrosities. Carried through directly by a state organization, the Pro-Rate Commission, these policies have consistently operated to the benefit of large producers and the ruination of small ones. But there is no illogic in this, for the Pro-Rate is directly dominated by huge corporation farms, which
in turn are owned directly by banks, canning interests and wealthy produce brokers. Its aims serve the ends of the land policies of this capitalist group, tending constantly to force the small producer onto less fertile lands and into farm tenancy. Besides, the ruined farmer is ground on the other side by the suppressed but persistent demands of the agricultural worker. Caught between these two forces he has vacillated between extreme vigilantism and a sullen rebellion against Pro-Rate.

The discovery of means whereby this embryo agrarian revolt against financial domination can be turned against capitalism itself is one of the primary tasks of the workers' movement. Aid by defense squads from the urban unions might enable agricultural labor to stand firm against the corporation farms, thus putting a quick finish to vigilante outrages and splitting the smaller farmers away from control by the corporations. A Labor party, in this situation, would have only to make Pro-Rate the subject of partisan politics to draw this oppressed class towards its influence.

Thus the labor movement in California is faced with an objective possibility of taking a tremendous step forward. On the national scene labor was much too preoccupied settling its internal accounts with William Green to take advantage of the initial upsurge of the middle classes. But now in California a well organized labor movement stands face to face with a political crisis which could be used to break the political hold of capitalism over the middle classes. Taking advantage of the renewed ferment in its own ranks, Labor could move forward and assume leadership of a decisive majority of the State's population.

To do this a Labor party need not create any new programs or involved schemes: it has only to adopt the progressive content of the struggles of the past eight years. Just as the pension movement has revealed the road to the urban middle classes and the agricultural workers' struggles have opened the way to the small farmer, so history, in the person of Upton Sinclair, has revealed how the unemployed can be rallied around the banner of Production For Use. These issues, the vital strands which connect the people with politics, are ready for labor to grasp. To weave these strands into a hangman's rope for capitalism is the great task of the Labor party. And in the near future, guided by a little clear thinking and with a little independence and audacity, labor can, and must, do this for California.

Unfortunately, a superficial glance at the internal condition of the state's trade union movement seems to reduce all these great possibilities to the level of fantastic day-dreams. For the unions are so upset by factional conflict and internal division that even the most elementary struggle against the boss has become almost impossible. The A.F.L.-C.I.O. division has existed in its most virulent and repulsive form. Recently within the A.F.L. a suppressed but bitter struggle for supremacy has begun between Teamsters' and Building Trades' unions. Into this mess the C.I.O.—already punch-drunk from Stalinist manhandling—has attempted to poke a clumsy finger.

Of much greater importance, the Stalinists—in the person of the outstanding trade union figure, Harry Bridges—have made their supreme attempt to achieve the smug respectability of the trade union bureaucracy. Long ago this effort had become so impassioned that even the A.F.L. leaders were frightened and for the past two years C.I.O. and A.F.L. have fallen all over one another in a race to determine which shall be considered the most loyal servant of the bosses. But this disgusting byplay, so flagrantly violating the militant traditions of the C.I.O., has produced discontent and flareups of revolt of which the Los Angeles Trade Union Conference was one of the first outbreaks.

Adding to the confusion, the powerful Sailors' and Firemen's Unions stand apart from this. For five years they have carried on a militant and largely successful struggle against the shipowners, Stalinist violence and government meddling. On the basis of the class consciousness and intransigent nature of their record one would expect to find these seamen in the front rank of those battling for a Labor party. But in the course of this inter-union fight, Stalinist factionalism has succeeded in cutting them off almost entirely from the main progressive stream of American labor. As a result, even while it has strengthened and sharpened their trade union program, the development of these unions has generated anti-political forces which try to push them into a sterile, isolated syndicalism.

But beneath all these apparently divergent groupings, two absolutely opposite tendencies constantly reassert themselves. Under the slogan of "Industrial Peace" the movement of Harry Bridges and his allies in the A.F.L. seeks to perform, by means of internal poisoning, what Proposition No. 1 failed to do legally—the smothering of the initiative and independence of the trade unions. By fighting to reassert the militant union traditions of California, the opposing forces, which have collided with Bridges at every step, grope almost blindly toward some program of liberation. The struggle of the seamen's unions and the Los Angeles Conference were stages in the formation of this program. The unity of these two forces, combined with the decisive aid of the revolutionary workers, could provide an immediate and impelling force for the formation of the Labor party.

5

Politically, the reactionary intrigue of Harry Bridges has attempted to bind the unions more securely with the rotting threads of New Dealism. In this he has received a helping hand from the Democratic bosses, who hope by this to secure their own insecure positions. In the past, California was a traditional Republican state, with the two-party system alternating between "regular" Republicans and "Progressives" led by Senator Hiram Johnson. At the outset these two groups reflected opposing sides in a great battle of the 1890's between the railroad trust and the farmers. But even though the banks had long since gobbled up both the Octopus and the farmer, thus erasing all possible political differences between them, two political machines existed which might have continued to squabble forever over patronage and control of the State's vote had not the growing Democratic party forced upon them the necessity of unity. The open support given by Hiram Johnson to the senatorial candidate of Associated Farmers, Phil Bancroft (himself a backslidden Bull Mooser!), symbolized the final healing of this breach.

Thus when Roosevelt's victory thrust the Democrats into national prominence in 1932, the California Bourbons found themselves without a suitable vote-catching machine. In 1934 their attempts to launch one on the fast running tides of middle-class discontent ended in failure; and even their humiliating acceptance of Sinclair's Epic Plan could not prevent the Republican machine from electing the unpopular Merriam. Approaching the last campaign, with Roosevelt losing ground, the Democrats would have again faced defeat had not the Stalinists gleefully joined hands with them. Stepping with brazen pride into their new rôle these latterday Judases turned a machine of considerable proportions, which had already been admirably trained for its new work, into the army of cigar-passing, back-slapping, hand-shaking, baby-kissing ward heelers that pushed Olson to victory.

With Olson in office the Stalinist party has received the fitting reward of becoming a well-oiled gear in the new Democratic machine. This is an event of considerable political importance and Earl Browder has already rhapsodized over it. The C.P. is able to enter a mad scramble for the political spoils of victory on an equal footing with other participants in American capitalism's political sideshow. The filling of important political posts by Stalinists and their labor bureaucrats, the opening of the State apparatus to hordes of Party functionaries and the complete identifi-
tion of the C.P. with the Olson government—these are events at which an aspiring politician does not sneer. But even though these things guarantee their further and complete degeneration as a separate political force in the State, it would be idiotic to deny that the increase of fat under the Stalinist waistlines will become the greatest obstacle to the development of a Labor party.

But in California labor cannot afford to wait! . . . Like the State’s perishable crops, political situations develop advantageously, but with some dangers. Today ripeness demands a quick harvest, tomorrow everything will be over-ripe, and the next day, rotten. In this there is more than a figurative truth. Capitalism today advances in the Eastern states behind a smiling mask of “liberal” criticism; but in California, although it has paused for the briefest possible instant, reaction wears no false face. In its day the Mer-
adversary, did that suffice to characterize country X as the aggressor?

No! Neither the diplomatic nor the strategical side exhaust the question. Another, much more important factor is decisive: the judgment from the standpoint of the whole historical development. Which of the two camps fought for the establishment of a national state, for the elimination of foreign rule and national dismemberment? Which of the two put an end, by this war, to the national movements within the country, in which country was the war preceded by years of national oppression and—as a reaction to it—long years of national struggles? In other words: which of the two camps fought for historical progress? Only in this way could the question be decided. It was not just that state which first declared the war that was conducting a war of aggression; that might be the case, but again it might not be. That state conducted a war of aggression which, by virtue of the whole situation, of the circumstances of the origin of the war, had to be acknowledged as the one that stood like an obstacle in the way of establishing an independent national-capitalist state. That state conducted a war of aggression which, by means of the war, suppressed a policy that hindered historical progress in the above-described sense. And consequently: that state conducted a defensive war which first received the declaration of war which was first assailed by the adversary—that might be the case, but again it might not be. That state conducted a defensive war which defended historical progress from the attacks of a powerful adversary; which conducted the war for the elimination of semi-feudal atomization, for the establishment of a national-capitalist state. 

Capitalism represented, in comparison with feudalism, historical progress. In comparison with capitalism, only socialism can be recognized as historical progress. Hence, in the epoch of the national wars, a defensive war could be conducted only when the united national-capitalist state was defended against a feudal or semi-feudal atomization. Today, in the epoch of imperialist wars, when capitalism has reached the stage of its highest unfolding, a war of defense is possible only when a victorious socialist state is being defended against capitalist-imperialist states. It is in this sense that Fr. Engels wrote in 1882 to Karl Kautsky that he does not rule out defensive wars after the victory of the proletariat, after its conquest of power; those would be wars in which the proletariat would be compelled to protect its social achievements against the capitalist states. 1

Thus we must know how to distinguish between a war of aggression or defense in the historical sense—which is the essential—and a war of aggression or defense in the diplomatic (and strategical) sense—which is of secondary importance. There are cases in which a defensive war in the historical sense is a war of aggression in the diplomatic or strategical sense; and conversely. Thus, for example, the wars of the Great French Revolution, of which we spoke in the first chapter. Even though they were often offensive wars in the diplomatic-strategical sense, they can nevertheless be characterized as wars of defense in the historical respect. Their historical significance consisted in this, that they had to defend the conquests of the Great French Revolution against the monarchies of the neighboring countries which endeavored to restore the old régime in France. If revolutionary France had not succeeded in offering resistance to the assault of England, which was already at that time fighting for her colonial predominance, if France had not held out in the wars against counter-revolutionary Austria—she would never have been able to defend and protect the conquests of 1789.

In order to be still clearer, we wish to adduce a few more examples. For the sake of brevity, we wish to employ only two terms from here on: the defensive war in the historical sense and the defensive war in the diplomatic sense.

The Italian War of 1859 as an Example of a Defensive War in the Historical But Not in the Diplomatic Sense

The Italian War of 1859 is the classic example of a national war. It was a typical war of defense, in the historical sense of the word. From the strategic-diplomatic standpoint, on the contrary, things were not so simple. For some time in Italy the national movement against Austrian foreign rule had been growing. After the Crimean War, the situation took on such shape from the diplomatic standpoint that Austria found herself more or less isolated on the international arena. Cavour, the main political leader of Piedmont, had every reason to assume that the given moment was favorable for an Italian war against Austria. He began to arm for the war, strengthened his army, recruited volunteers, etc. At the same time he also prepared a war in the diplomatic sense. He sought an ally and found one in Napoleon III.

Upon Napoleon's invitation, Cavour rode to him at Plombières for a secret conference, and there they concluded in complete secrecy, without even the knowledge of the governments of the participating countries, an offensive alliance against Austria. Napoleon wanted above all to assure himself in a diplomatic way of Russia's neutral attitude. At the same time, however, all the necessary steps were taken to strengthen the two armies. All the details were worked out. France set up an army of 200,000 men which Napoleon himself was to command. Piedmont provided an army of 100,000 men. The armies were to unite at a given spot and carry through a given strategy. In case of a partial victory, Napoleon III was to receive Savoy as compensation; in case of a great victory, Nice in addition.

Cavour was so imbued with the desire to plunge into the long-awaited struggle for Italian independence, that he was ready to declare war upon Austria, even though such a challenge would create an unpleasant impression and show the whole world that this war, in diplomatic respects, was a war of aggression on the part of Italy. But Napoleon III acted more coldbloodedly and prudently. With the aid of all sorts of diplomatic artifices he endeavored to have the declaration of war come from Austria. These dilatory methods of Napoleon III often drove Cavour to desperation. He believed that Louis Napoleon was imperilling the whole affair by his negligence. There was a moment in which it seemed that a diplomatic situation had been created in which war became altogether impossible. In despair, Cavour wanted to put an end to himself. That was the moment when England, on Austria's request, made the proposal to arbitrate the disputed questions at a congress, but on which the condition that Sardinia first disarm, for otherwise the congress could not meet in peace, Napoleon III acted as if he was in agreement. He demanded only—that Austria should also disarm. Austria could not agree, for she knew well enough that all the
war preparations had been made in Piedmont and that war must break out sooner or later. Besides, the financial position of Austria was such that she must either start the war immediately, or find herself unable to do it at all. The war budget had reached its peak. After the beginning of the war Austria might put through internal loans under compulsion and suspend a number of payments, and in this way be able to overcome a financial crisis. But by postponing the war, Austria would only be creating new financial difficulties for herself. Thus Austria was compelled to declare war upon Sardinia. She sent the famous ultimatum: disarm within three days. When Cavour received this ultimatum, he was happy, because it signified the war. Cavour was so overjoyed by this ultimatum that he almost fell on the neck of the Austrian ambassador who transmitted the document to him. He cried with joy like a child when his friends congratulated him on the impending war.

Austria, then, was the first to declare war upon Italy in 1859 and it was Austrian regiments who first crossed the enemy frontier. But in diplomatic respects Austria was not the aggressor, for the status quo was highly desirable for Austria; she did not want the war and would gladly have averted it. In diplomatic respects the war was one of aggression on the part of Austria’s adversary. But in the deeper, in the only correct historical sense, it was nevertheless a defensive war for Italy, in which Italian unity, which meant an historical advance, was created and the semi-feudal national and state atomization eliminated.

What was the significance of the diplomatic duel between Napoleon III and Austria? Why was each side so anxious to have the declaration of war come from the other? Naturally, only because the directors of foreign policy wanted to exploit for themselves the impression which the first step makes upon the masses of the population. Every camp is anxious to present the enemy as guilty of the war in the eyes of the people.

Chernychevsky, a contemporary of those events, described the impression of the Austrian ultimatum as follows: “The impudent ultimatum set all the neutral Powers and the public opinion of all Europe against Austria. Prussia, Russia, England protested against such behavior in the sharpest terms. The periodicals of all Europe were indignant over the senseless insolence of Austria. The French Emperor triumphed: the Austrian cabinet could not have anything to please him more. Napoleon’s whole diplomatic tactic was summed up in depicting Austria to Europe as guilty of the war, and now Austria had fulfilled his wish, even exceeding his hopes.” (Vol. V, Politik.)

Farsighted people like Chernychevsky immediately recognized that diplomatically Austria was not guilty of the war. Naturally, the protesting neutral Powers also knew this, but for the broad masses of the people, for the millions, for the “periodicals of all Europe” which shape public opinion, Austria was considered the aggressor even in diplomatic respects.

This is what we learn from the Italian War of 1859. We see here very complicated relationships. Napoleon III stood by the side of Italy—out of quite selfish “compensation interests”. He was as little concerned with national freedom as with the snows of yesteryear. He needed Savoy and Nice, he had to strengthen his authority in order to consolidate his position inside of France. In the Italian War, he appeared as the defender of historical progress—against his will. Similarly, reactionary Russia, by its neutrality, facilitated the Italian struggle against Austrian oppression.

And in spite of that, the War of 1859 was, in historical respects, a just war of defense on the part of Italy, that is, a war in which Cavour and Garibaldi stood on the side of progress and aggressor side out of quite selfish ends, a just war of defense on the part of Italy, that is, a war in yesteryear. He needed

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And in spite of that, the War of 1859 was, in historical respects, a just war of defense on the part of Italy, that is, a war in which Cavour and Garibaldi stood on the side of progress and fought for the cause of bourgeois national-state unification against the feudal national and state atomization.

In 1859 Austria—from the historical standpoint—was the aggressor side not because she was first to declare war, but because her armies were the first to cross the enemy’s frontier. Austria was the aggressor side even though the diplomatic offensive tactic of Cavour and his allies forced Austria to declare war first. Italy (Piedmont) was the defending side in 1859 not because she received the Austrian ultimatum but in spite of the fact that she had provoked this ultimatum.

The historical significance of the war is decisive. The diplomatic preparation of the war plays an entirely secondary role.

A still greater interest in this respect is offered by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, temporally closer to us and in its own way just as classic an example. Let us follow the diplomatic pre-history of this last of the great national wars in Europe! It is worth while dwelling on the details.

The German-French War of 1870-1871 as an Example of a Defensive War from the Historical Standpoint and an Aggressive War From the Diplomatic Standpoint

Marx and Engels predicted that the inevitable result of the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 would be a new war. Nevertheless, the War of 1870 came quite unexpectedly to all socialists—and not them alone.

At the beginning of July, 1870, i.e., scarcely two weeks before the outbreak of the war, the French Chamber of Deputies decided to reduce the number of recruits from 100,000 to 90,000. War Minister Lebeuf declared that he was in complete agreement with this reduction in the number of soldiers, for he himself wanted to underscore the pacific aspirations of his ministry. The president of the Council of Ministers, Olivier, declared, upon the interpellation of Deputy Jules Faure, that peace had never been so assured as at that moment, the political horizon was perfectly clear, there was currently no question that might engender any complications. Yet, in those very days, peace was already hanging by a hair. Behind the scenes the final preparations were being made for the war...
Leopold. At first he thrice refused it, then he accepted it. The Prussian King Wilhelm I was completely indifferent to the affair, even hostile at the outset. He wrote to Bismarck that at bottom he was opposed to the enterprise.

But in the circles of the French government there was a desire to make a casus belli out of this candidacy. A Hohenzollern prince on the Spanish throne is a humiliation for France, a threat to French interests—these were the slogans of the French war party.

The affair dragged out for a year. But then the decision neared. Leopold was ready to place himself upon the Spanish throne. A terrific chauvinist frenzy began. Napoleon ordered his Ambassador Benedetti to go to King Wilhelm, who was taking the cure at Ems, and to force from him the commitment that the Hohenzollern prince renounce the Spanish throne. Wilhelm declared that this was a private affair which did not concern him. Benedetti, however, insisted, began to threaten—and the Hohenzollern prince withdrew his candidacy. Accidentally meeting the ambassador, the king joyfully communicated the information to him. Wilhelm added that happily the spectre of a military collision between France and Prussia had now finally disappeared.

But Napoleon and his clique were not satisfied with this. They raised a new demand: Wilhelm must most solemnly guarantee that in the future also he will under no circumstances allow anyone from the House of Hohenzollern to accept the Spanish throne. If Prussia should not give the guarantee, France will know how to defend its interests and not recoil from the most resolute measures. This signified a direct threat of war. Nevertheless Wilhelm granted Ambassador Benedetti an audience again and explained to him very loyalty that there was no need of a guarantee and that France could rest quite easy, now that Prince Leopold had renounced the Spanish throne. He permitted Benedetti to use his words in an official communication to the French government.

Benedetti established contact with his government and received the instruction to demand solemn guarantees at all costs. Once more he sought King Wilhelm. The king granted him no audience, but informed him through his adjutant that Leopold's renunciation of the Spanish throne was final, and that peace was in no way imperilled. All the rest the French ministry could handle with the Prussian cabinet in the usual way.

At the same time, Abeken, on Wilhelm's instruction, sent a detailed dispatch to Bismarck in which the events of the recent days, the negotiations with Benedetti, etc., were communicated in a wholly peaceful tone. Bismarck was given the right to make this communication public in the press if he should deem it necessary.

When the dispatch arrived from Ems—Bismarck himself recounted later—he was at luncheon with Molekte and Roon. After he had read the dispatch, he handed it to his colleagues. When they had read the Ems dispatch, they lost their appetites: they saw that the affair was taking a peaceful turn and that all their hopes for an immediate war were destroyed. Thereupon Bismarck—as he himself recounts—took the telegram from their hands and sat down at a small side-table. Five minutes work—and the dispatch looked quite different. When Bismarck showed it to Molekte and Roon in its revised form, their spirits became cheerful again. "Now it sounds quite different," opined the taciturn Molekte. "Before it was a chamade, now it's a fanfare!" And the small but jolly company sat down again at the luncheon table with a new appetite.

Now it was clear that the war would have to come. The provocatively forged Ems dispatch was made public in the press of the entire world and there was a terrific ferment in Napoleon's circles. On July 19 France declared war on Prussia. The French Chamber of Deputies approved this important decision of the Napoleonic government against the opposition of a small minority.

That is what the external history of the origin of the Franco-Prussian War looked like. Who then was the aggressor from the diplomatic standpoint, and who the defender?

In his exceptionally interesting memoirs, Bismarck insists that France brought about the war. But from the facts which he himself describes it appears clearly and plainly that he, Bismarck, was the one who prepared and brought about the war.

Bismarck tells how on the night after the battle of Sedan he rode out with a group of superior officers to inspect the battlefield. It was very dark. Bismarck did not know all the officers who were in his suite. The talk ran to the causes which had directly brought about the war. Bismarck observed that he was absolutely unable to understand the French, for he had always believed that the candidacy of Prince Leopold for the Spanish throne was agreeable, if anything, to the French. The personal relations of Prince Leopold to the French court had always been excellent. Besides, once on the Spanish throne, he would have had to pursue a Spanish and not a Prussian policy. But since Spain was bounded by France and shared many common interests with her, Spain would have to endeavor to live in peace with her powerful neighbor. Nobody would have been able to demand that Spain take the part of Prussia against France.

Quite unexpectedly for Bismarck, a voice of protest suddenly rang out from the darkness. Among the officers was Prince Leopold himself, and he protested against the assertion that he, the Hohenzollern prince, could have had any sympathies for France.

Bismarck perceived that Prince Leopold had to protest under the given circumstances and be even apologized to him. But from this incident, Bismarck contended, it was perfectly clear that he had no special desire to see Prince Leopold on the Spanish throne.

Perhaps that was indeed the case. The Spanish throne in itself could not hold any particular attraction for Bismarck. But the Spanish episode was very welcome to him as an irreplaceable cause of war. Primarily because it was a cause which offered the possibility of attributing the guilt to the opponent. Bismarck says in his memoirs that he was always of the opinion that victorious wars can be easily justified only when they are forced upon one (or, appear to the people to have been forced upon one, he might have said).

In any case, the incident which Bismarck narrates proves nothing of essential importance to the question. How greatly Bismarck desired the war is to be seen from the fact that—according to his own story—he wanted to retire when it appeared that the Spanish incident would be settled in a peaceful manner. He had already communicated his firm decision to War Minister Roon and to General Molekte. He could not brook such "international insolence" on the part of France! He could not sacrifice his honor and the honor of Prussia for the sake of "politics." A "retreat" by Prussia in the Spanish conflict would have meant a humiliation.

His resolution was decided upon. He already had it in his pocket. Suddenly a new ray of hope flashed. The Ems dispatch arrived. "Without adding a word" he only "reduced" it and so altered the wording that the "difference" in the effect of the abbreviated text . . . was not the result of the stronger words, but only of the form, which made the document appear peremptory, whereas in Abeken's edition it would have appeared only as a fragment of the suspended negotiations which were to be continued in Berlin. (Gedanken und Erinnerungen von Fürst von Bismarck, Vol. II, Chap. on the Ems dispatch.) Only! Nothing more and nothing less . . .

The Spanish incident came as a boon to Bismarck also because he hoped (see his memoirs) that Spain would be indignant over the interference of France in her internal affairs and would likewise declare war on France. As is known, this did not happen.

"Spain left us in the lurch," Bismarck observes melancholically.

Bebel tells in his memoirs that the thorough fighting preparedness of the Prussian army at the moment of the war's outbreak made a deep impression upon him and his friends. This fact opened the eyes of Bebel and his fellow-thinkers as to where the immediate aggressor was to be sought. On the other hand, however, it appeared clearly from many important episodes prior to the declaration of war that the government of Napoleon was calling forth the war. Of the falsifying of the Ems dispatch nobody at
that time had the slightest notion. This "official secret" was carefully kept by German diplomacy. It does great honor to the perspicacity of Wilhelm Liebknecht that, as early as 1873, right after the appearance of the official communication of the Prussian General Staff on the Franco-Prussian War, he recognized that the Ems dispatch had been forged and that he attributed this falsification to Bismarck—openly in the press. But at the beginning of the war not even Liebknecht saw all the finesse of Bismarck's game.

Three decades after these events, Jaurès wrote a whole treatise on the Franco-Prussian War. He was interested least of all, of course, in justifying Bismarck and Bismarckian Prussia. But from his arguments it is clear that a large share of the guilt for the war of 1870-1871 fell upon Bonapartist France. In any case, it is clear that the situation was very complicated and confusing, so that at the moment when the events were unfolding, it was very difficult to ascertain on which side the direct guilt for the war was to be sought.

Since 1867 Bismarck had been intriguing systematically to force France into a war. The Spanish incident was very convenient for him, for it created conditions that enabled him to make it look to the outside world as if France was the immediate aggressor. On the other hand, says Jaurès, Louis Napoleon made spasmodic efforts throughout 1869 to establish an offensive alliance of France—Austria—Italy against Prussia. Austria displayed the greatest irresolution, for it feared to attack Prussia, but was absolutely inclined to conclude a defensive alliance against Prussia. Up to the very eve of the declaration of war in July 1870, Napoleon's diplomacy was firmly convinced that Austria would actively support France against Prussia.

Bismarck employed all sorts of ruses. Jaurès supposes that Bismarck, Roon and Moltke—while the conflict was developing—intentionally went to the health-resort in order to maintain their alibi before the wide public and to attribute to France with all the greater success the whole guilt for the coming of the war. The French minister de Gramon, in Jaurès' opinion, behaved like a man who had been thrown into complete confusion. He delivered threatening speeches, he sought to unleash the passions, he made impossible demands. Even after Leopold's renouncement of the Spanish throne, Benedetti telegraphed de Gramon that further demonstrations on the part of France would inevitably provoke a war. But the Bonapartist ministry continued the policy it had already adopted. It believed that the moment was favorable for an attack upon Prussia.

At the last moment, certain influential members of the Chamber of Deputies sought to stop the war. Thiers declared that it was madness ("c'est une folie") on the part of the French government. Others joined in with him. But—it was too late. The conflict had gone too far.

Jaurès characterizes the situation as follows: two nets of intrigue had been spun beyond traveling for several years before the war. On the banks of the Seine the war had been just as ardently prepared as on the banks of the Spree. Bismarck proved to be the foxier. Now, after the events, this is clear. But the responsibility for the war falls also upon Bonaparte’s adventurist government.

Another French socialist (now we can say—former socialist), who also never had any particular sympathy for the Germans, Gustav Hervé, did not venture as late as 1905 to say with certainty which side had been the aggressor in 1870. "France was the first to declare war," writes Hervé, "but if it is true that Bismarck, as he himself fassets, falsified the notorious Ems dispatch, it must be acknowledged that the German government bears at least half the responsibility for the declaration of war." (Gustav Hervé, Leur Patrie, p. 135.)

The example of the Franco-Prussian war shows us one thing as plain as day: the formal criterion which is supposed to show who was the first to attack, who was the first to declare war, offers the social democracy no point of departure for establishing its tactic in connection with the war. Had the German social democrats applied only this formal criterion during the Franco-Prussian War, they would have made a multitude of mistakes and would scarcely have fulfilled their duty.

In the strategical-diplomatic respect, Napoleon III began this war. He was the first to declare war, his regiments were the first to cross the frontier. But on the other hand the facts have shown that Bismarck forced him into it by cunning maneuvers—just as Napoleon III forced Austria into such a step in 1859. At the moment of the event—when the highly complicated situation is considered—even the most advanced men of those days could not correctly recognize the connection of things. From this arose many mistakes. But to appeal to these mistakes, to elevate them to a theory, as the social-chauvinists are now doing—means to muddle the question deliberately.

Formally, considered from the diplomatic standpoint, Napoleon III was guilty of the war. Actually, Bismarck was much guiltier. But the question of who was guilty in the diplomatic respect recedes into the background before the question of the historical significance of this war, which is what is important for the whole world. In the historical respect it was absolutely a question for Germany of a defensive war—and Bismarck's machinations cannot alter that in the slightest. Bismarck might have been the first to declare war, just as in 1859 Cavour was almost the first to begin the war. Bismarck's intrigues might have been dirtier than they were in reality. In the historical respect Prussia would nevertheless have been conducting a defensive war. Why? Because for Prussia, as we have already emphasized so often, it was a question of the historically necessitated unification of Germany and of the elimination of feudal atomization. Because Bonapartist France had stood for a long time as a direct hindrance on the road to this unification, because Napoleon III sought absolutely to prevent it. His whole position in Europe was conditioned upon the national atomization of Germany. Even as early as 1866 Napoleon III endeavored, as we saw, to acquire "compensations" on the German side of the Rhine. Napoleon III was now the main enemy who sought to prevent the German unification. A victory over Napoleon III had to result in two important facts. First, the unification of Germany: if successful, a unification from below, on the revolutionary path; if not, then unification from above, through Bismarck. Second, France would be liberated from Bonapartism; with Louis Napoleon, the worst representative of European reaction would be removed.

For this reason—quite independently of who was the instigator of the war from the diplomatic standpoint—it is correct to say that in the historical respect Napoleon was the aggressor and Germany the defender. From this perfectly correct view, many socialists of that time drew the entirely false conclusion that for this reason they must adopt the standpoint of Bismarck, vote for war credits, declare civil peace, become bourgeois patriots, etc. But this conclusion was completely false. Even in national wars the socialists have their specific tasks. Marx and Engels, Liebknecht and Bebel, as we saw in the preceding chapters, gave an example of socialist conduct even in such situations. (To be continued.)

HARTENSTEIN, SWITZERLAND, Aug. 4, 1916

Gregory ZINOVIEV

IN THE NEXT ISSUE

IN addition to the continuation of the second part of the highly topical article by Gregory Zinoviev, the next issue of The New International will publish an article entitled "Theses on the Jewish Question", by Charles R. Clementson, which was unavoidably held over from the present issue. Because of the importance of the question and its controversial nature, we call special attention to it as a basis for discussion.
Clarity or Confusion?

WE PUBLISHED IN NO. 3 of our review an article by Diego Rivera* which dealt with a programmatic letter written by Haya de la Torre. Comrade Rivera's article, as all our readers were able to see, took under consideration extremely important problems and, moreover, was written in an extremely serious manner. However, one of the A.P.R.A. journalists, a certain Guillermo Vegas Leon, responded with an article which can only be described as impudent and vile. Señor Vegas Leon under the guise of replying to the principal questions that were presented, uses personal insinuations and believes that it is possible to attack Diego Rivera as a man and artist.

Is it necessary to defend Rivera against stupid and filthy attacks? Vegas Leon con Lil comical scorn in each line calls comrade Rivera "painter," as if this word carries in itself a frightful condemnation. Señor Vegas Leon in order to add to the weight of his irony, the irony of an impotent philistine, should have spoken of a great painter"; if it is an evil to be a painter, it is incomparably worse to be a gifted master. Imitating Lombardo Toledano and other bourgeois "socialists," Vegas Leon accuses Rivera of selling his paintings to the bourgeoisie. But who can buy paintings in capitalist society if not the bourgeoisie? The overwhelming majority of artists, dependent upon the bourgeoisie because of social conditions, are united ideologically to the bourgeoisie. Rivera represents an exceptional case because he maintains complete moral independence towards the bourgeoisie. Precisely for this reason, he has the right to be respected by every socialist workers and sincere democrat. But Vegas Leon does not fall into either one of these categories.

Vegas Leon becomes indignant because Rivera treats Haya de la Torre like a democrat. Vegas Leon sees insult and calumny in this fact. Haya de la Torre "is not a democrat but a revolutionist," he exclaims. It is absolutely impossible to understand what this opposition means. On the one hand, the democrat can oppose the partition of monarchy or fascist dictatorship; on the other hand, and in different way, he can oppose the socialist. But to oppose the democrat to the revolutionary means almost the same thing as opposing a redhead to a lawyer. The democrat in France and the United States cannot, naturally, be a revolutionist; he is for the maintenance of the existing system; he is a conservative. But the democrat of a backward country, who finds himself under the double oppression of imperialism and police dictatorship, as is the case in Peru, cannot but be a revolutionist if he is a serious and logical democrat. This is precisely the idea which Diego Rivera develops. Diego Rivera reproaches Haya de la Torre for his position as a defender of democracy and not because he doesn't appear to be a socialist in his programmatic letter. Rivera takes this position, conditionally, and tries to demonstrate, in our opinion successfully, that Haya de la Torre appears to be an illogical democrat. This is what Leon should have answered.

Haya de la Torre calls the United States the "guardian of our liberty" and promises to address himself to the guardian in case of a fascist danger (Benavides is not a danger?) in "search of aid". Comrade Rivera justly condemns this idealization of North American imperialism. What is Vegas Leon's answer? Insults, he replies, and invokes quotations from Lenin and cites other statements by de la Torre... and insults once again. But he doesn't explain this anomaly, why this Aperista leader, instead of exposing the true rôle of that country, considered it possible on the eve of the Lima conference to present the United States—as Toledano did in Future—as a philanthropic hen who protects the Latin American chickens (including the tender little chickie Benavides) from the vulture across the ocean. Such an amendment to reality is doubly inadmissible when written by a democrat of an oppressed country.

Revolutionary Marxists can conclude practical agreements with democrats, but precisely with those who are revolutionary, that is to say, with those who rely on the masses and not on the protecting hen. The A.P.R.A. is not a socialist organization in the eyes of the Marxist because it is not a class organization of the revolutionary proletariat. The A.P.R.A. is an organization of bourgeois democracy in a backward, semi-colonial country. Due to its social type, historical objectives and to a considerable degree, ideology, it falls into the same class as the Russian Populists (Social Revolutionists) and the Chinese Kuomintang. The Russian Populists were much richer in doctrine and "socialist" phraseology than the A.P.R.A. However, that did not hinder them from playing the rôle of petty-bourgeois democrats: even worse, backward petty-bourgeois democrats who did not have the strength to carry out purely democratic tasks in spite of the spirit of sacrifice and heroism of their best combatants. The "Social Revolutionists" issued a revolutionary agrarian program but as is the case with petty-bourgeois parties, they were prisoners of the liberal bourgeoisie—this good hen who protects her little ones—and they betrayed the peasants at the decisive moment during the 1917 revolution. It is impossible to forget that historical example. A democrat who sows confidence in imperialist 'guardians' can only bring bitter illusions to oppressed peoples.

Comrade Rivera affirms in his theses, as well as in his article, that oppressed peoples can attain their complete and definitive emancipation only by means of the revolutionary overthrow of imperialism and that this task can be achieved only by the world proletariat in alliance with the colonial peoples. Señor Vegas Leon pours out a torrent of offensive objections and a few arguments of the same character on this idea. Putting the insults on one side, we shall try to locate the basis of his argumentation. The proletariat of the imperialist countries, he says, hasn't the slightest interest in the struggle of the colonial countries, and, consequently, the latter must pursue their own course. To consider that the fate of the backward countries is dependent upon the struggle of the proletariat of the advanced countries, no matter to how small a degree, is... "defeatism". We will not consider the absurdity of this viewpoint: Vegas Leon gives an example to prove the validity of his ideas: Mexico expropriated the petroleum enterprises. Isn't that a step towards the emancipation of the country from its imperialist dependence? Nevertheless, that measure was taken without the least participation of the American and English proletariat. This recent example demonstrates, according to Vegas Leon, that semi-colonial and colonial peoples can attain complete emancipation independently of the international proletariat's attitude. All this reasoning reveals that the A.P.R.A. publicist does not understand the ABC of the question which is of fundamental importance for his party, i.e., the inter-relation between the imperialist and the semi-colonial countries. It is absolutely true that Mexico has taken a step forward towards economic emancipation by expropriating the petroleum interests. But Vegas Leon closes his eyes to the fact that Mexico as a seller of petroleum products has now fallen—and it was inevitable—under the dependence of other imperialist countries. What forms does this new dependence assume or can it assume? History has not yet spoken the final word on this subject.

On the other hand, can it be affirmed that the concrete act—the expropriation of the petroleum enterprises—is definitely assured? Unfortunately, it is impossible to say so. Military or even purely economic pressure from abroad, together with an unfavor-

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* "Policy of Adaptation or Struggle Against American Imperialism," Clase, December, 1938, Mexico, D.F., Printed in the February, 1939 issue of the New International under the title, "Haya de La Torre and Democracy"
able international relationship of forces for Mexico, that is, defeats and retreats of the world proletariat, may force this country to take a step backward. It would be a hollow fanfare to deny such a possibility. Only lamentable Utopians can represent the future of Mexico, as well as any other colonial or semi-colonial country, as one of a constant accumulation of reforms and conquests until complete and definite emancipation has arrived. Likewise, the social democrats, those classical opportunists, expected for a long time that they would succeed in transforming capitalist society by means of a continuous series of social reforms and attain the complete emancipation of the entire proletariat. In reality, the road of social reforms was only possible up to a certain point when the dominant classes, frightened by the danger, launched a counter-offensive. The struggle can only be decided by revolution or counter-revolution. The accumulation of democratic reforms in a number of countries has not led to socialism but to fascism, which has liquidated all the social and political conquests of the past. The same dialectic law is applicable to the liberation struggle of oppressed peoples. Definite conquests that will aid the struggle for their further independence can be gained in a relatively peaceful manner under certain favorable conditions. But this by no means signifies, that similar partial conquests will continue without interruption, until complete independence is achieved. After granting a number of secondary concessions in India, British imperialism is determined not only to put a final end to reforms but to turn the wheel back. India can only be liberated by the joint and open revolutionary struggle of the workers, peasants and the English proletariat.

This is one of the question's aspects. But there is also another. Why has the Mexican government successfully carried out the expropriation, at least for the time being? Thanks, above all, to the antagonism between the United States and England. There was no fear of an active, immediate intervention upon the part of England. But this is a small matter. The Mexican government also considered unlikely military intervention by its northern neighbor when expropriation was decreed. On what basis did those calculations rest? On the present orientation of the White House: the "New Deal in national affairs was accompanied by the 'Good Neighbor' policy in foreign relations.

Vegas León evidently does not understand that the present policy of the White House is determined by the profound crisis of North American capitalism and the growth of radical tendencies in the working class. These new tendencies have found their clearest expression until now in the form of the C.I.O. Señor Vegas León complains that the C.I.O. does not interest itself in the fate of Peru. This probably means that the C.I.O. treasury has refused to finance the A.P.R.A. On our part, we are not in the least inclined to close our eyes to the fact that the political consciousness of the C.I.O. leaders is not superior to that of the left wing of Roosevelt's conservative party and, one can add, it falls below that miserable level in certain respects. Nevertheless, the existence of the C.I.O. reflects an enormous leap in the thoughts and sentiments of the North American workers.

The influential section of the bourgeoisie whose representative is Roosevelt says (or said yesterday): "It is impossible to govern by the old methods; it is necessary to achieve an agreement; it is necessary to grant partial concessions in order to safeguard that which is fundamental, i.e. private ownership of the means of production." This precisely is the meaning of the New Deal. Roosevelt extends the same policy to international relations, above all, to Latin America: to cede where secondary questions are involved in order not to lose the important.

Precisely, this international political relationship has made possible the expropriation of petroleum in Mexico without military intervention or an economic blockade. In other words, a peaceful step on the road to economic emancipation was possible thanks to a more active and aggressive policy on the part of large layers of the North American proletariat. As one can see, the issue is not whether Lewis and Co. "sympathize" or "do not sympathize" with the A.P.R.A. or the Peruvian people. Those gentlemen do not see beyond the tip of their noses and do not sympathize with anyone except themselves.

Furthermore, the extent to which the American workers today understand their struggle for emancipation to be tied up with the struggle of the oppressed peoples is not the issue involved. Although the situation when viewed from this angle may be very lamentable, it remains an indisputable and, moreover, extremely important fact that the intensification of the class struggle in the United States has extraordinarily facilitated the expropriation of the petroleum enterprises by the Mexican government. Mr. Vegas León, as a typical petty bourgeois, cannot understand in the least this internal logic of the class struggle, this interrelation of internal and external factors.

It would be radically erroneous to draw the conclusion from what has been said that the policy of the United States will continue to unfold in the same direction in the future without interruption, thus opening ever greater possibilities for peaceful emancipation to the Latin American people. On the contrary, it can be predicted with full certainty that the "New Deal" and "Good Neighbor" policy which didn't solve any question or satisfy anybody, will only arouse the needs and aggressive spirit of the North American proletariat and Latin American peoples. The intensification of the class struggle engendered the "New Deal"; a further intensification of the class struggle will kill the "New Deal," giving rise and preponderance within the ranks of the bourgeoisie to the most reactionary, aggressive and fascist tendencies. The "Good Neighbor" policy will inevitably be replaced, and probably in the very near future, by the policy of the "threatening fist" which might be raised first of all against Mexico. Only the blind or petty-bourgeois phraseologists of the Lombardo Toldano or Vegas León type, can close their eyes to those perspectives. A year sooner or later, the question will be presented in a very acute form: Who is master on this continent? The imperialists of the United States or the working masses who people all the nations of America?

This question, by its very essence, can only be resolved by an open conflict of forces, that is to say by revolution, or more exactly, a series of revolutions. The American proletariat in the interests of its own defense will have to participate in those struggles against imperialism; on the other hand, the Latin American peoples struggling for their emancipation and, precisely for that reason, will support the American proletariat's struggle.

It can be clearly deduced from what has been said, that we far from recommend to the Latin American people that they passively await the revolution in the United States or that the North American workers fold their arms until the Latin American people's moment of victory arrives. He who waits passively gets nothing. It is necessary to continue the struggle without interruption, extend and deepen it and in harmony with the actually existing historical conditions. But at the same time, one must comprehend the reciprocal relation between the two principal currents of the contemporary struggle against imperialism. By merging at a certain stage, definite triumph can be assured.

Naturally, this doesn't mean to say that Lewis and Green will become outstanding advocates of the Socialist Federation of the American continent. No, they will remain in the camp of imperialism until the very end. It also will not mean that the whole proletariat will learn to see that in the liberation of the Latin American peoples lies its own emancipation. Nor will the entire Latin American people comprehend that a community of interests exists between them and the American working class. But the very fact that a parallel struggle goes on will signify that an objective alliance exists between them; perhaps not a formal alliance, but, indeed, a very active one. The sooner the American proletarian vanguard in North, Central and South America understands the necessity for a closer revolutionary collaboration in the struggle.
against the common enemy, the more tangible and fruitful that alliance will be. To clarify, illustrate and organize that struggle—herein lies one of the most important tasks of the Fourth International.

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The example developed by us demonstrates sufficiently Senator Vegas León's general theoretical and political level. Is it worth the trouble after this to tarry over all his assertions? We will only consider two of the most important.

León attributes to us the idea that the U.S.S.R. is an imperialist country. Naturally, nothing resembling it is found in Rive­ra's article. We only said that the Soviet bureaucracy, in the struggle to maintain power, has transformed itself during the last few years into an agent of "democratic" imperialism. In order to gain the sympathies of the latter, it is willing to perpetrate every sort of betrayal at the expense of the working class and oppressed peoples. The attitude of the Stalinists at the pacific Congress in Mexico (September, 1938) revealed completely their betrayal of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples. Precisely for that reason, the left Aprists were in sharp opposition to the Stalinists major­ity at the congress. Is Vegas León in agreement with this or not? When this gentleman, assuming an air of importance, declares the leaders of the social-democratic party, also sealed the fate of the German minority in the mines. For weeks at a time, factories and mines were treated by the workers to emancipate themselves from capitalist exploitation. The Spanish revolution would have been invincible with these conditions. But the lawyers and lackeys of the landed prop­rietors, bankers, capitalists and clergy answered: "No, you are destroying unity!" Every revolutionary movement of the work­ers and peasants was implacably smashed in the name of "unity" of the exploited with the exploiters. All true revolutionary so­cialists and anarchists were victims of calumny, prisons, extermination; Moreover, the Czechoslovakian communist party was played by the Stalinist G.P.U. "No, you are destroying unity"—between the victims and the hangmen! We now see the results of that treacherous policy. The deceived workers and peasants have turned their backs upon the republicans and have fallen into despair, apathy and indifference. This is exactly what has assured victory to Franco.

Those who now repeat after the fall of Barcelona that the "Trotskyist" preachers division of republican Spain, demonstrate by this alone, that they are agents of the Spanish landed proprietors, bankers, capitalists and clergy. This alone is enough to force us to say openly to the Peruvian workers: Do not believe individuals of Vegas León's type; they are conservative petty bourgeois who do not understand the logic of the class struggle, and, consequently, are absolutely incapable of leading you in your struggle for national and social emancipation; they can bring you nothing but defeats!

We believe that enough has been said. Vegas León's insults and insinuations are not arguments. Shamelessness does not excuse ignorance. And ignorance is not an instrument of the revo­lution.

TRANSLATED BY BERNARD ROSS
MEXICO, D. F., Feb. 1339

CLAVE

The Great Test

In March 1919, when the German population of the Czechoslovakia concocted at Versailles on the basis of "the right of self-determination of the peoples" sought to make real use of precisely this right and endeavored to join the German Reich, it received not the right of self-determination of the peoples but lead from the rifles of the army of the young Czechoslovakian miniature-imperialism by grace of France and England. Naturally, in complete agreement with these two "democratic" Powers, who had indeed just fixed the frontiers of the new state in accordance with their tactical considerations.

The social revolution in Germany betrayed and strangled by the leaders of the social-democratic party, also sealed the fate of the German minority in Czechoslovakia for years to come. The Czech social democracy, royally devoted to the nationalism of the young Czech bourgeoisie, willingly and eagerly served its interests also in the question of the minorities. Not only by silently tolerating the measures of its government; no, it demanded and supported in practise the Czechification of the German region of the state, which it proudly labelled its own.

The German Social-Democratic party in Czechoslovakia followed strictly in the footsteps of its big Czech brother. As reward, it too became a government party and was allowed to squeeze into a few ministerial chairs of the Czechoslovak republic up to the middle of 1938.

The Czechoslovakian section of the Third International (C.P.C.), once the second strongest party of the Comintern in Europe, transformed itself slowly but surely, after 1933, into a Czech-national labor party. From 1937 onward, it entered into keen competition with the reformists for the prize for the best social-patriotism. In spite of the great competition—the old reformist bureaucrats knew their trade pretty well—it emerged as the acknowledged winner. At the beginning, it still put conditions for its support of the Czechoslovakian bourgeoisie in the question of the defense of the fatherland. "The rich must pay for the ar­maments; democratization of the army; away with the reactionary officers' corps; formation of a genuine people's government excluding the reactionary Agrarians"; etc.

Even the national question was treated by it only from the standpoint of the defense of the fatherland: "Satisfaction of the wishes for equal rights; state subsidies and state orders for the Sudeten German industry; all public works in Sudetenland to Ger­man businessmen; only a well-fed people is prepared to fight."

With these demands, however, the C.P.C. only landed at the tail-end of the Henlein movement, which came much closer to the mark and did not stop there. In the parliamentary and municipal elections, the C.P.C. was almost annihilatingly defeated. In the German region, it lost more than 60 percent of its votes. Similarly also the German social democrats. And this in spite of the fact that the Sudeten German Party of Henlein (S.d.P.) was compelled more than once to show its real face.

The short-lived economic revival which set in at the begin­ning of 1937 in Czechoslovakia as elsewhere, lead, especially in the German region, to big strikes in the glass and textile industries and in the mines. For weeks at a time, factories and mines were occup­ied after the French model. Most of the owners of the struck
factories and mines were widely known functionaries of the Henlein party. The Henleinist "German Workers Union" declared itself against the strikes. The greed for profit of the Sudeten German capitalists naturally stood higher than their nationalism. The Henlein party went through a heavy crisis. Under the pressure of its members, the Henlein union, in which 40 percent of the Sudeten German working class was then organized, declared itself against its own party. Yet the social democrats and the communists did all in their power to help the S.D.P. overcome this difficult crisis. The workers demand a 20 percent, in order once more to receive at least that wage standard that they had at the time of the depth of the crisis in 1932-1933. Instead of this, the free [social-democratic] trade unions, with the support of the communists who represented the strikes as being dangerous to the defense of the country, negotiated a single supplementary sum to cover high food prices, payable in three installments. The wage scales remained unchanged. The police—the Czech!—was let loose upon the strikers by the Henlein proprietor and the trade union bureaucrats, and the plants were cleared by police action. The bankruptcy of the two labor parties was now sealed.

The "solution" of the Czechoslovakian crisis should by now have clarified even the most stupid as to the "independence" of the state. Czechoslovakia was a Franco-English bastion against a possible expansion drive of German imperialism into Southeastern Europe and far beyond it. Now she is the vassal state of the Third Reich and an important strategical position for Hitler's march to the East. But who made Hitler's victory possible? Only, but really only, the agents of "democratic" imperialism in the ranks of the working class: the leaders of the parties of the Second and Third Internationals. Instead of leading the proletariat against its own bourgeoisie and weakening, if not overthrowing it, they united with the "democratic" imperialists for better or worse. For internal political reasons, Hitler would have thought ten times before attacking a country in which the working class had gone over to action. Instead of the imperialist alliance of the Franco-Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, the alliance of the Russian and Czechoslovakian workers in struggle for the United Soviet States of Europe—that's what the goal of a revolutionary policy should have been. The proletariat of Germany, in that case, would not have marched very long under the banners of Hitler.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia went so far in its patriotism as to urge the destruction of the German Reich by the armies of the "democratic" alliance, as the panacea for the next future of humanity. In place of the existing national oppression, these "communists" advocated a still more violent one. When the articles that appeared in the Roté list, the German organ of the C.P.C., are read over again, they fill the reader with unutterable revulsion.

Not very much was left of that Czechoslovakian democracy which we allegedly had to defend. Through the Law for the Defense of the State, which the C.P.C. also swallowed by abstaining in the vote, the whole country was placed under a military dictatorship. A general ban on all meetings was issued, the working day could be lengthened without restriction and without overtime pay if it was required in the interests of the state defense, strikes were made subject to military court action. Everybody at any time could be drawn into any work for the defense of the state, regardless of age or sex. The entire labor press was placed under rigorous censorship, so that the press of the C.P.C. appeared every day with large white spaces, and very often not at all. No, against the German Reich and its régime the press of the C.P.C. was forbidden to write anything; the government press reserved that prerogative to itself. Finally, the prohibition of the communist press was announced. That was Czechoslovakian democracy in the summer of 1938.

The more the C.P.C. was squeezed out, the more patriotic became its garb. Deputations appeared in the barracks with enormous bouquets of flowers and packages of cigarettes. This was called: "Fraternization of the working people with the army." In parliament, the C.P.C. complained bitterly that its gymnastic and sport clubs were not admitted to military training. In order to increase the patriotism of the Czech people, all the large Czech cities were given a run of the film "The Red Army," in which the latter's enormous strength was demonstrated. Stalin appeared on the screen and the workers sang the "International." But it went no further: the powerful "Red Army" was seen only on the screen. The Moscow radio propaganda competed with Gobbel's. "If Hitler attacks Czechoslovakia, 30,000 Soviet bombers will reduce Berlin to ashes on the same day. After three days every large German city will look like a heap of ruins. The Red Army knows its way in Czechoslovakia."

To the social-patriots, the unity attained in Munich between fascist and democratic imperialism over the fate of Czechoslovakia, was absolutely incomprehensible. The stiff wallop—and the long faces! Yet they went their way to the shameful end. The Czech bourgeoisie got into an ugly situation. A million and a half men under arms, the Czech Maginot Line chocked with troops, the population whipped into a patriotic frenzy. The trade unions pulled the workers out of the factories. Eighty thousand marched to the parliament. The C.P.C. undertook the leadership and put up the main speakers. Gotwald, the leader of the C.P.C., gave the slogan: "Resignation of the Hodža capitulation-government; the military in power; long live General Syrovy; defense of our republic to the last drop of blood; the Red Army stands ready!"

Syrovy, glorified by the communists as the "Red General," took over the government and . . . withdrew into silence. The press took over the job of making the bitter pill palatable. The government of the "Red General" Syrovy placed membership in the C.P.C. under heavy penalty; a little later it was banned and dissolved. The leadership fled. Neither hide nor hair is left of the third strongest party in the Czechoslovakian parliament (800,000 votes). The Czechoslovakian section of the Third International ended on the rubbish-heap of history. Its last act was a tender of services to the Czech social democrats who of course gave the beleaguered and uninvited guest a cold shoulder.

The Czech social democracy understood the sign of the times. It speedily declared its withdrawal from the Second International and, together with the remnants of the split-up Benes party, it founded a new one, the "Party of the Working People." Its program: in the first place, rejection of the class struggle as a dangerous heresy, which imperils to the utmost the further existence of the new state of Czechs and Slovaks; loyal collaboration with the government party; protection of the interests of the working people. . . . Chosen as president of this famous party was the former president of the Czech social democracy and trade union leader, Antonin Hampl. Tolerated by this party, the fascination of Czechoslovakia proceeds at a speedy pace. It is quite possible that Hampl will yet become Minister of Labor in a Czech-Fascist government.

It can be said again with absolute certainty, after the confirmation by the Czechoslovakian experience: At the first salvos of the now more imminent imperialist war, and even before it, the European parties of the Second and the Third Internationals will course down a house of cards. They will be swept away by the events like chalk before the wind. But the class struggle will go on and presently reach its greatest sharpness. The Fourth International will lead the world proletariat in its final, great struggle, and will triumph.

Only one single political current of the working class survived the test of social-patriotism: the Fourth International. That is the guarantee for its future. Our German and Czech comrades in Czechoslovakia did not waver or vacillate. Tirelessly they created clarity in their press on the position of the proletariat in the national question and the war question.

The right of self-determination of the peoples, including the
right of state separation, is an old, but still valid demand of Marxism. Yet it is not a dogma for Marxists. If the revolutionists came forward after Hitler’s victory against the Sudeten German regions joining the Third Reich, it was only out of purely class struggle considerations. With Hitler it is not a question of abolishing national oppression but of extending his strategic basis, of influence in Southeastern Europe. But neither do the revolutionists stand on the side of the Czech oppressors and their Franco-English patrons. It is the task primarily of the Czech proletariat of the oppressor nation, to fight against the oppression of the national minorities. The common task is to overthrow one’s own government and therewith to open up the struggle for the United Socialist States of Europe, for only the proletariat can really solve the national question.

“The main enemy of every people is in its own country.” Our comrades in Czechoslovakia held firmly to this splendid slogan of Karl Liebknecht for the proletariat of all imperialist countries in case of war. Living in illegality, denounced by the social-patriots, persecuted by the police, cut off from the international organization, they held aloft the banner of Liebknecht, Lenin and Trotsky. Their publications found an increasing circulation in the critical days and led to embittered discussions. After the events, voices were heard in increasing number to say: “The Trotskyists did judge everything correctly, after all; their defeatism was only too well grounded; we had completely forgotten that we are supposed to be Marxists.” In spite of the social-patriotic poison, internationalism nevertheless did break through in certain, if few, places. The social-democratic workers who were sent against the Sudeten German brigade and a few regular troop detachments of the German army, formed speaking choruses in certain places and cry: “Proletarians of all countries, unite!” rang across the frontier. There were only small, isolated actions. The working class would have marched in the September days. But for how long?

No matter how many more times Mr. Chamberlain boards an airplane, or with better weather crosses the Channel by boat, he will not stop the death-agony of capitalist society, nor banish from this earth the contradictions of imperialism. In the Fourth International, a new leadership has arisen for the world proletariat. It is possible that the ghastliest war of all times will precede the social revolution. But one way or the other—there is no other road left for the masses, they must and they shall rally around the banner of the Fourth International.

Feb. 1939

JULIK

The 3-Cents a Day Plan

For the last few months there has been an intensification of the campaign to enroll industrial and white-collar workers under the so-called three-cents-a-day plan for hospital care. The expense seems to be so small and the promised benefits appear so great that quite a number of people belonging to the lowest income group have succumbed to the ballyhoo and high pressure salesmanship exercised by the press and through the circularization of shops and offices; handing over hard-earned cash for something they should get free in any municipal or county hospital. One circular, for instance, from the largest of the fifty plans in the United States, asserts that it has a million subscribers. Numerous inquiries have reached us from more cautious workers regarding the advisability of subscribing to this “plan”, and we now submit the following observations.

A “non-profit” Community Service

All the hospitalization plans in this country insist that they are non-profit organizations doing their work for love, as a “community service”. Politically developed workers do not have to be told to look with suspicion on any claims of the ruling class alleging altruistic motives for any of its enterprises. The old Romans had a word for it: *timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.* (I fear the Greeks, even when they bring gifts). Too often have the philanthropic plans of the bourgeoisie turned out to be catch-penny schemes, devised to squeeze additional tribute out of long-suffering workers to insure their more complete economic enslavement.

As a matter of fact, the hospitalization plan, notwithstanding the hypocritical claims of its sponsors, was devised for the sole benefit of the private hospitals. It was a direct result of the depression which cut off these institutions from the endowment and contributions of the middle classes, the lucrative petty-bourgeois clientele and the labor aristocracy. When profits started to dwindle and salaries were mercilessly cut, large sections of the population were unable to meet the exorbitant private medical fees and hospital bills, and began to flock to the free municipal clinics and hospitals.

Something had to be done to keep the beds—particularly the ones in semi-private rooms—in the private hospitals occupied, and the physicians catering to the lower income groups busy. Various schemes were evolved to that effect, but the only ones which have met with any degree of success have been the “cooperative” medical groups and the sundry hospitalization plans. Like everything else under capitalism, these plans are based on the profit system. The profit may be less, but it is there just the same, and the larger turnover makes up in group quantity what was lost in larger individual accounts of the pre-depression period. In other words, the hospital financiers succeeded in loading the backs of the lower middle classes with the burden of their deficits—they socialized their losses.

The slogan of “three-cents-a-day” is calculated to give the impression of a small sum being involved; but a deeper study of this rate and of its benefits shows that for one who works for the present low standard of wages, the rates are relatively high and the returns few in comparison.

The standard rates quoted by most hospitalization services are ten dollars for single individuals, nineteen dollars for married couples and twenty-six dollars for married people and their unmarried children, under nineteen years of age. These sums are to be paid annually. For quarterly payments, the rates are $2.60, $4.85 and $6.60 respectively, or forty cents higher. If the children are a day over nineteen, or if they are married, they must each pay the regular rate per individual or couple, even if they depend on their parents for support. As a matter of fact, an unemployed individual cannot subscribe to the plan, no matter how anxious somebody else is to pay for him. On the other hand, if the worker allows his employer to deduct the amount from his pay-envelope, the plan will generously deduct from forty cents to $2 from the annual rate.

As to the smallness of the rates charged, one can draw one’s own conclusions from the following three facts, without resorting to any complicated statistics or controversial figures: First, the various plans admit that only *one family in five* has a hospital care in return for a monthly payment of $2 per family. The Ross-Loose Medical Group, organized on a profit making basis in Los Angeles in 1929, is able to give complete medical and dental care in return for a monthly payment of $2 per family.
to any family irrespective of its size. The same is true of the relatively small cooperative medical group of Elk City, Oklahoma (2,500 families), who pay $25 a year for complete medical and hospital care.

This means that for the same amount which the "non-profit" plans charge for hospital accommodations only, real non-profit and even some profit making organizations supply all the medical, dental and hospital services required by their subscribers.

Finally, some of the private insurance companies, who certainly make no pretense at being in business for the love of humanity, offer much better terms to their regular policyholders. Thus, I have before me a health insurance policy, the premium of which is $13 per year, guaranteeing $25 a week for fifty-two weeks in case of disability due to illness; another policy also issued by a company with an excellent business reputation for prompt payments, charges $12 a year for accident insurance and pays $25 a week for thirty-two weeks and in addition pays five thousand dollars insurance if the accident results in death, and corresponding amounts for loss of limb or eye. This means a cash indemnity amounting to as high as $1,300 a year with which you can pay your hospital and doctor's bills anywhere you choose.

Compare the benefits under the cash indemnity plans with the "philanthropic" hospitalization plan, under which the maximum guarantee is $6.75 a day for only thirty days, amounting to only $202.50 in any one year, and you can readily see that the latter is much costlier and inferior in every respect to ordinary health or accident insurance. It is probably such a comparison which compelled the New York Commission of the State Health Program, in its report (N. Y. Times, January 12, 1939) to urge, among other things, "the further study of the need and advisability of cash benefits for wage-earners temporarily incapacitated due to illness."

Of course, cash indemnity plans have many drawbacks, and insurance companies are not beyond haggling and chiselling when it comes to payments; but they at least do not claim to do us any favors and to make no profits.

From the above figures, it is easily seen that the hospitalization plans are nothing but a form of camouflage insurance with relatively high premium, and meagre benefits. That they are nothing but insurance schemes may be readily gathered from the fact that they are (in New York) under the jurisdiction of the State Superintendent of Insurance, as well as under the Department of Social Welfare, which supervises hospital finances. The sponsors of the scheme, realizing that there is a discrepancy between the rates charged and the actual cost of the subscribers' hospital bills, claim that the surplus goes into a reserve fund against unforeseen demands; but this is an obligatory feature of all insurance companies who make no humanitarian or non-profit claims.

What You Get

WHEN WE ANALYZE the actual benefits a subscriber to a three-cents-a-day hospitalization plan is supposed to get, we find that to a worker in the lower income brackets they are more apparent than real.

Duration of Benefits: First of all, you get only thirty days of hospitalization and no more. If your sickness lasts more than thirty days, you have to pay extra for each additional day in the hospital. It is true that most cases, especially among young adults, do not require more than thirty days, whether surgical or medical, but in older people a certain percentage will take more than a month. This is particularly true in fractures, when the bones take a longer time to knit and in operations on gallstones, tumors, etc., where there might be delayed healing; also in certain diseases like pneumonia, complicated with pleurisy, diabetic gangrene, kidney stones, and others too numerous to list.

Nursing: The accommodations are supposed to be semi-private, but the nursing allowed is only the "usual" kind. This is a joker which means that you do not get a private nurse, but must share her with the other three or four patients in the room.

Everybody knows that, following operations and in all serious illness, a private nurse is not merely a luxury, but is an actual necessity, particularly for a patient who has a weak heart, or is delirious, as his life is in danger unless there is a nurse in constant attendance. For such a nurse you have to pay extra.

Operating Room: The use of the operating room is included in the service, except after thirty days when you have to pay extra for it.

Confinements: Confinement cases are entitled to hospitalization, but not before at least ten months’ enrollment. This means that if your wife has reason to believe that she is going to have a baby, she cannot enroll and be delivered at the end of eight or nine months, but has to pay for the hospital herself.

New-born Children: After paying at least two year’s premium a woman’s maternity hospital bill will be paid, but the new-born baby will get no hospital care, except nursery service, unless you pay extra for it. Nor can you enroll the baby before thirty days after birth.

Laboratory Tests and X-rays: X-ray and laboratory examinations are supposed to be furnished free, but (there is always a "but") only those necessary to institute treatment of the condition for which the patient is admitted. Any X-ray or laboratory examination in the course of the treatment, such as "typing" of sputum or blood, or for another condition that may arise, has to be paid extra.

Anaesthesia: The administration of ether or chloroform is free, but only when given by a salaried employee of the hospital. In most hospitals the anaesthetist is not a salaried employee of the hospital, but a private physician who is paid by the surgeon (indirectly by the patient) in each case. Therefore, patients under the hospitalization plan either have to pay extra for anaesthesia or have the intern, who is not an expert, administer it. In most private hospitals, the internes get no salary from the hospital, hence these are technically entitled to extra compensation from a subscriber to the plan.

Medications and Dressings: The subscriber is entitled to ordinary drugs and dressings. This again means that the subscriber has to pay for any drugs or dressings that may be somewhat out of the ordinary. Thus, oxygen or serum in pneumonia, or any other serum or vaccine or any medication administered intravenously, transfusions, and a host of other medications or dressings which are absolutely vital, are not included under the ordinary terms and have to be paid for extra. Special orthopedic and fracture casts, dressings and apparatus are also extra.

Discounts: The subscriber gets a discount of one-third off the semi-private hospital charges, if he or she should have to stay more than thirty days. In view of the fact that the hospitalization plans were started to fill the beds which remained empty at the high semi-private rates prevailing before the depression, this discount represents no concession at all. It is similar to the "special" sales where we see tickets in the shop windows which have the original pre-depression price struck off and another substituted, giving a false impression of reduction; the new price being often higher than regular prices of similar goods in normal sales. We have all had experience with articles advertised at wholesale prices or at fifty per cent discount, which can be gotten for less at the neighborhood store.

Thus it is seen that the benefits one gets under the hospitalization plans are so thoroughly hedged in by "buts" and "extras" and exceptions that the subscriber actually gets very little. Let us now see what he does not get.

What You Do Not Get

Tuberculosis Care: First of all the subscriber does not get any hospitalization for pulmonary tuberculosis, a typical proletarian disease which accounts for such a large number of hospital cases among the lower income groups of our population.

Contagious Diseases: Secondly, if he or his child suffers from quarantinable disease, such as scarlet fever, measles, diphtheria,
cerebro-spinal meningitis, infantile paralysis and a number of other contagious or infectious diseases, he is not entitled to hospitalization.

Hospitalization for illness following childbirth: Likewise, if a woman, who has been a subscriber less than ten months, should develop any disease or condition requiring hospital service which can be traced to, or is a result of pregnancy, she is not entitled to "free" hospitalization.

Diagnosis and observation: Nor can the subscriber expect X-ray and laboratory examinations if his doctor does not know the exact illness or cannot make a positive diagnosis without such X-rays or laboratory examinations. In other words, he is not entitled to these services if he is sent in for "observation". He has to pay extra for tests when he is admitted for diagnostic purposes.

Nurses: We already know that special nurses have to be paid extra.

Services of doctor: Your physician, or surgeon, or dentist has to be paid by you. If any physician connected with the hospital is called in consultation or in an emergency, he has to be paid extra, of course!

Clinic: Should you have occasion to consult the clinic or dispensary of any hospital affiliated with the plan, you again have to pay extra.

Special Hospitals: Also, if you live in a district of a member-hospital which does not regularly accept certain cases for treatment, you are out of luck if you happen to have that particular disease or injury. You either have to go to another member-hospital which does treat such illnesses or injuries; or you have to go to a non-member hospital where, of course, you have to pay full rates, as if you were not a subscriber.

Residence: In order to join the hospitalization plan you must be a resident of the area served by the member-hospitals; otherwise you are out of luck. If there is no such hospital in your neighborhood, especially out of town—or if the hospital is not a member of the hospitalization plan—or if your doctor is not on the regular or courtesy staff of the hospital to which you are admitted, it's too bad! And there are quite a number of hospitals where physicians with chiefly proleterian patients particularly are not "privileged" to practice, even if they have a state license to practice medicine and surgery.

If, however, the subscriber is away from home and is admitted to a non-member hospital, the hospitalization plan will guarantee his bill up to $6.75 a day, which is below the costs of hospitalization, doctor's fees, special nurses and special services, often the price of the semi-private room alone being higher than this sum.

Age: If an applicant for enrollment happens to be sixty-six years old he is out of luck, he cannot join. As the reader may have already surmised, no "community service" or "non-profit" plan will be foolish enough—from the capitalistic point of view—to insure a man at an age when he most needs it. It is at sixty-six, or after, that most of the chronic conditions develop and that the period of hospitalization is most likely to extend to the full thirty days or beyond.

Must not be sick: Nor will the applicant be accepted if he really needs hospital care at the time he applies for enrollment. They want workers to become members when they don't need hospitalization.

Marriage and Idleness: The subscriber must also assure the plan, in his or her application, that he or she is either employed or self-supporting, giving the name and address of the employing firm. Subscribers can only enroll in a group of at least five to ten people, at certain intervals. Finally, a married woman cannot enroll by herself. She must enroll with her husband or under a family subscription.

From the preceding, any intelligent worker can easily see that the three-cents-a-day hospitalization plan, like all capitalistic "philanthropies" is a snare and a delusion. It may lower somewhat the unbearable hospital burden of the middle classes, but a proleterian has nothing to gain from it. It is a waste of money which he can use to better advantage in the purchase of indispensable food and clothes. At the present low scale of wages and uncertainty of employment, the rates of subscription are too high for the average worker and the corresponding benefits far too low.

When in need of hospitalization, the average worker will be wiser to enter a municipal or county hospital where the hospital bill, as well as all medical services, are free and for which he or she will have paid by piling up profits for capitalist employers, and more indirectly by paying exorbitant prices for consumer goods, not counting the host of direct and indirect taxes.

It is true that the medical and other services at our public hospitals leave much to be desired. Nor are all parts of the country provided with even this minimum of medical treatment and hospitalization; but whenever they are available, the wage-earner should take advantage of these facilities.

In another article, we'll consider various other proposals and experiments which have been made for the more scientific medical care of the population within the lower income groups, and their application to possible organizations of our own. At the same time, we intend to discuss the attitude of the industrial and white-collar worker towards these proposals in particular and their relation to the socialization of medicine in general. In other words, we propose to survey the entire field of disease-prevention and medical care, for which the American people spend haphazardly almost four billion dollars, in the light of our transitional demands and the ultimate aims of the Socialist Workers Party.

Paul LUTTINGER, M.D.

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Reading from Left

To Right

By Dwight MacDonald

NO COMMENT DEPARTMENT: "EDGEBUR, N. J., Feb. 16.—A sit-in protest was held in the plant of the Aluminum Company of America here today by several hundred employees in the rolling mill . . . Later in the day, L. H. Goldsmith, secretary of the C.I.O. in New Jersey, said the C.I.O. was "taking the strike over." Mr. Goldsmith said the men were being advised to leave the building.

Footnote on Imperialism: It is harder to be a good imperialist than the Nation perhaps suspects. I refer not to that monstrous "betrayal", the Munich Pact, but to the private war the British Army has been fighting on the Northwest frontier of India. "Strange as it may sound," reports the Indian correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, "one is forced to the conclusion on the frontier that the present disturbed conditions suit the tribes much better than peace." It appears that the British have been paying monthly allowances to the Mahsuds, a "friendly" tribe, to guard the roads against certain "hostile" tribes. These allowances come to $2,000,000 a year—a sum large enough to affect the economy of the whole region. Furthermore, the British Army must pay the Mahsuds for transport and provisions, bringing total annual expenses for the war up to some $15,000,000. The tribesmen seem to have admirably grasped the economic possibilities of their situation. A Mahsud can drive a truck loaded with supplies for some British outpost over the most "dangerous" roads in perfect safety, since the "hostile" tribesmen are just as anxious as are the Mahsuds to keep the British Army around. The abandonment of such
an outpost would be a blow to native industry comparable to the closing down of a textile mill in Lowell, Mass. The Guardian hints that the "hostile" and the "friendly" tribes are in cahoots to keep such profitable customers on the frontier. Its correspondent reports that since the Army arrived, the land has tended to go out of cultivation. The Fakir of Ipi (whom the Guardian describes as "a remarkable man in his own way") and the other border chiefs rule over a land barren of coal, oil, and iron. And so they exploit to the hilt their one great natural resource: the British regiments.

According to Living Age, which picks the story up from Literaturnyaya Gazeta, a Soviet author recently submitted a translation of Cornelle's Horace to the publishing house, Isskusto. Hearing nothing, the translator finally got an interview with the Director of Isskusto's dramatic department. "May I inquire about your report on Horace?" he asked timidly. "So you're this Cornelle, are you?" said the Director contemptuously, and, before the daunted translator could say a word, he read him the following report:

"Too little action. The whole play is built on long monologues dealing with duty, customs, etc. All action seems to take place offstage. The characters are not living persons but types. Very low level of artistic quality. Therefore, since the play is not suitable for production, I cannot approve its publication by the Isskusto."

In my series last summer in the New International on the columnists, I never got around to a rather minor but for all that quite interesting specimen: J. Otis Swift, founder and fäh rer of the Yosian Brotherhood, who contributes a daily nature piece to the Scripps-Howard press. J. Otis Swift is what an earlier generation would have called a "nature faker." Every Sunday of the year his Yosians—in a dozen groups—roam the hills and dales around New York City, looking for pitcher plants, tanagers, nut-hatches and other natural phenomena. Mr. Swift in person leads one of these expeditions, expatiating to his flock on the beauties of nature. He is said to have walked backward farther—in order to face his listeners—more miles than any other human being in history. In his daily column, "News Outside the Door," Mr. Swift also does a good deal of walking backward. His column expresses—on a rather primitive level, to be sure, but all the more plainly for that reason—the reactionary nature of modern Back-To-Nature philosophizing. In a lush style, reminiscent of the old Chautauqua tradition, ornamented with references to classical lore, Mr. Swift plays variations on two simple themes: "The City Must Go" and "The Old Ways Are Best." Unlike Wordsworth's Peter Bell, who could see in the primroses by the river's brim merely a primrose, Mr. Swift is an adept in the language of flowers. "The knot-grass, Polygonum Asiculare," he writes, "flings around what was the yard where children played, long after the family has scattered, the old folks sleep in God's Acre, the children have learned, out in the world, there is no place like home." The Virginia Creeper, or Woodbine, leads him to the most unlikely conclusions. This he includes in an essay on "historical weeds" because it "teaches that most great isms which started out to reform the world and bring about Utopia are 'gone where the woodbine twined,' that is, forgotten cemeteries." Although the woodbine would seem to be pretty thick on Mr. Swift's own philosophy, he seems to conceive of himself as a deep thinker: "the cosmic dreamer, sitting on a log in Fernlundgrot." "Oh yes," he concludes one column, "there is a lot of serious thinking to be done along the lovely Swampside Trail." A few days later he writes: "It is paradise at sunrise along the Swampside Trail. . . . Over the steps beyond the Eastern arm of the water course, where little green herons often fish, are tall yellow locusts from which policemen's clubs are made. Nature philosophers, loving peace, law and order, are glad there are so many locusts left in America."

Yes, indeed, there is a lot of serious thinking to be done along the Swampside Trail.

Harry Hopkins Comes to Munich: The "appraisal" policy of the New Deal towards Big Business proceeds at precisely the same rate as the New Deal's arms drive, since the one is patiently dependent on the other. Which is to say that it proceeds at a rather brisk pace. The most dramatic and blatant instance is the recent T.V.A.-Commonwealth & Southern deal. On January 30, the Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, threw out of court the suit which fourteen private utility companies had brought against the T.V.A. The majority opinion told the companies that "neither their charters nor their local franchises involve the grant of a monopoly or render competition illegal." The decision was so broad that it seems to open the door to the Federal Government's competing in any field of "private" enterprise. From a juridical point of view, this may well be the most important legal victory in the entire history of the New Deal. But law means very little when bigger matters are at stake. The leader of the fourteen utility companies was Wendell Willkie, head of the great Commonwealth & Southern Utilities Co., dominant in the Southern utility field. On February 4, five days after this great legal victory, T.V.A. announced it had come to an agreement with its defeated foe. T.V.A. has agreed to pay to Commonwealth & Southern for its Tennessee properties $80,000,000. "The deal," commented the N. Y. Times financial editor, "received yesterday the overwhelming endorsement of every financial and utility executive in Wall Street. . . . The outstanding preferred stock and bonds of the Tennessee Electric Power Co., the company to be sold, rose sharply yesterday in response to the settlement news." A business man's information service sent out from Washington notes: "Government is paying a fair price for power properties taken over by the T.V.A. The companies say so, publicly and privately." And the Saturday Evening Post exploits the latest hero of the business community, advertising in its current issue: "WHEN A BUSINESS MAN OUT TALKS POLITICIANS—That's News . . . The New Dealers, when they concluded the T.V.A.-Commonwealth & Southern deal, admitted they had met their master. Read the story of Wendell L. Willkie on page 10."

Celebration—for the business fraternity—was indeed in order. Mr. Willkie's original asking price was $86,300,000. T.V.A. countered with an offer of $55,000,000. A "compromise" at $80,000,000 means a complete rout of the New Deal. T.V.A. is now going to pay for such ghostly items as "Good Will" and "Value as a Going Concern." According to the Nation, Mr. Willkie included under the former "the value of having the highest ratio of domestic household usage and the lowest domestic rates in the United States." Since these assets were created only by his system's forced competition with T.V.A., this means that T.V.A. paid Mr. Willkie for assets which it had itself created.

But why this sudden and catastrophic rout of the forces of reformism in the very hour of their victory? The general cause, of course, is the necessity the Administration feels for placating business in order to enlist its support in maneuvering the nation into the next world slaughter. But the specific precipitant in this instance was that great champion of the underprivileged, Harry Hopkins, who now is fighting the battles of the overprivileged, Harry Hopkins, who now is fighting the battles of the overprivileged, Harry Hopkins, who now is fighting the battles of the overprivileged, Harry Hopkins, who now is fighting the battles of the overprivileged, Harry Hopkins, who now is fighting the battles of the overprivileged, Harry Hopkins, who now is fighting the battles of the overprivileged, Harry Hopkins, who now is fighting the battles of the overprivileged. According to a recent N. Y. Times dispatch: "While the case was still pending before the Supreme Court, Mr. Hopkins suddenly entered the picture. Reports sprang out of Washington that the President had asked him to seek a settlement of the row. . . . Within a matter of hours, the T.V.A. directors were soliciting an audience with Mr. Willkie." And Messers. Alsop and Kintner, whose syndicated NANA column is one of the best sources on the New Deal, recently made it quite clear what has happened: "Mr. Hopkins," they write, "has been living in an ecstasy of conferences with high business executives. He has impressed most of
them very favorably, and he has liked them well enough, so that now he hopes to bring some of the most eminent among them to serve as his especial assistants at the Department of Commerce. Meanwhile, he has heard from them (if he did not know already) what business wants.

Six days after Harry Hopkins persuaded the T.V.A. directors to be "reasonable," on February 10, the Public Utilities Commission of the state of Tennessee found the Tennessee Electric Power Co.—the subsidiary which Commonwealth & Southern sold to the T.V.A. for $80,000,000—guilty on 917 counts charging it with bribing the Chattanooga Free Press, a daily paper. It seems Tennessee Electric Power had paid large sums to the Free Press—in comparable name!—to slant its news and editorial columns against the T.V.A. The minimum fine on each of these counts is $500, making a sum total of $458,500 which Tennessee Electric Power Co. is legally supposed to pay the state of Tennessee. But again, these paper juridical matters shrivel in the fierce fire of actual capitalist property interests. I predict that either Tennessee Electric Power will get out of paying anything, or else—and this is by no means excluded—this fine was foreseen and T.V.A. assumed responsibility for it in advance. To quote the realistic formulation of Jo Conn Guild, Jr., president of Tennessee Electric Power: "This whole thing is a lot of bunk."

**BOOKS**

The G.P.U. Orders a Novel


Like his novels of the Chinese revolution, The Conquerors and Man's Fate, Malraux's Spanish book is less a novel than a fictionalized chronicle of the historical events. But with this great difference: in the Chinese novels the artist and observer put down what his trained eyes saw, with the result that he told far more than he knew: the strangling of the Chinese revolution by the Stalinist bureaucrats was unfolded before us. When the Stalinists told the workers to surrender their arms to their executioners; when the Stalinists turned the revolutionary terrorists over to the bourgeoisie—Malraux recorded such incidents indelibly. Despite his defense of the Stalinists against the Trotskyists in articles, therefore, his novels constituted an indictment of the Stalinist strategy in China.

The present "novel," a chronicle of the early months of the Spanish civil war, dealing with events in which the Stalinists conducted themselves a thousand-fold more vilely than in China in 1925-1927, reveals Malraux to have thoroughly divested himself of the rôle of artist and observer. The events are carefully sifted, not by aesthetic criteria, but by the standards of the G.P.U. Nothing is permitted to appear which is not decided by the eN. T. workers in Barcelona or approved by the Popular Front government. Incredibly, the C.N.T. and P.O.U.U. workers who were not dragged into the Popular Front by their leaders until months later and whose freedom from the Popular Front government enabled them to act independently and in spite of the Popular Front government in saving Catalonia on July 19.

It is a matter of historical record that the struggle in the Barcelona streets was entirely in the hands of the workers; the government leaders were nowhere to be seen; such police as remained loyal played an extremely minor rôle. But in Malraux's book the historical record is perverted to justify the Stalinist subordination of the workers to the Popular Front government. Incredibly, the most famous event in the Barcelona fighting—the storming of the Atarazanas barracks by the masses under the leadership of the two most outstanding anarchist leaders, Ascaso and Durruti (Ascaso was killed in the battle)—receives one line in this book, and that in the form of a radio report, while pages are devoted to the exploits of the Barcelona police!

The completely fraudulent character of this book is revealed by this incident, among others:

Colonel Ximenes [commander of the Barcelona police] was in charge of the whole district, and for the last few hours the heads of the local organizations had been coming to get instructions from him. . . .

Pulgi (anarchist leader) entered. . . .

"Where am I going to be, of the most use?" he asked. "I've a thousand men."

"Nowhere; all's well for the moment. But they'll be trying to get out of the barracks— from Atarazana anyhow. You'd better stay around for half an hour; you men may come in very handy any moment." (p. 29.)

Only a corrupt, consciously dishonest agent, could have written these lines. The C.N.T. was master of Barcelona in those hours; a C.N.T. leader no more thought of asking Ximenes for orders than he would have asked the fascist generals.

The real relationship of forces may be indicated by the discreet statement of the bourgeois Esquerra leader, Jaime Miravitles, explaining why the C.N.T.-controlled militia committee was established:

The Central Committee of Militias was born two or three days after the [subversive] movement, in the absence of any regular public force and when there was no army in Barcelona. For another thing, there were no longer any Civil or Assault Guards. For all of them had fought so ardently, united with the forces of the people, that now they formed part of the same mass and had remained mixed up with it. In these circumstances, went by without it being possible to reunite and regroup the dispersed forces of the Assault and Civil Guards. (Heraldo de Madrid, Sept. 4, 1936)

One could confront every page of this utterly dishonest book with the documented facts. This book is not a novel at all, but a piece of dirty work for the G.P.U.

Felix MORROW

**Imperial French Unity**

Reporting the December 4 demonstration in the capital of Corsica, Ajaccio, for solidarity with France against Italy, Le Temps de Paris (Dec. 6, 1938) writes:

IN the same row and marching arm in arm to give evidence of their perfect community of ideas on the plane of attachment to France, were the presidents of the Corsican political associations: Bonapartist Central Committee, Radical-Socialist party, French Popular party [P.P.F. of the fascist Doriot], Communist party and Socialist party, etc.

A dispatch to the Paris-Sair (Dec. 12, 1938) reporting a meeting held in Tunis on the previous day for the same purpose, observes:

THE secretary of the Communist Youth was seated between the delegates of the French Social party [P.S.F. of the fascist La Rocque] and of the French Popular party [P.P.F.—Doriot]. All of them appeared radiant, happy to feel daily enmities appeased.

WE direct the special attention of our readers to the offer made by the management for a free copy of last year's bound volume of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL, on the back cover of the present issue.
Correspondence

A Case of Mislabeled Identity

DEAR SIRS:

I am among the writers attacked in your January issue. A fairly definite answer—and one that touches the heart of the difference between us—can be made in one sentence, namely:

If the editors of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL and the authors of the article had a G.P.U. at their disposal they wouldn't argue with us in print; they would simply have us shot.

Yours truly,

Eugene LYONS

NEW YORK, Jan. 27, 1939.

IT is regrettable that Mr. Lyons, like his successor in the New Leader, Mr. Hartman, does not find it necessary to discuss any of the political questions dealt with in the January article to which he refers, but prefers to evade them. It is more than regrettable—it is understandable.

Just as regrettable, but after all, not unusual is the slanderous reference he makes in his last sentence to the editors of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL when he describes his own actions and the actions of his comrades of yesterday or of today.

Nor do we remember a word of protest from the editors of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL when the latter continually called upon the government of the United States to prohibit us from arguing with any body in print by outlawing and suppressing our movement along with several others.

It seems to us that Mr. Lyons might, without losing too much caste as a Democrat, show at least some concern over the real and present-day violations of freedom committed by his own friends that show us over the purely imaginary threat of freedom that we would in any case allege to exist at some future date.

KRUPSKAYA

AS WE go to press we learn the sad news of the death of Nadyezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, widow of Lenin. At the age of 70—she had just celebrated her birthday—one of the last remaining links with the greatest revolutionary organization history has known, was removed from life. With Lenin and Plekhanov, she was one of that brave handful who presided over the birth of the Russian social democracy, and later, of Bolshevism. After the October Revolution, she devoted her talents chiefly to the work of education. She joined somewhat belatedly in the Opposition's struggle against the Thermidorians until they drove her brutally into captivity. Her last years were tragic, for she had to endure then as a silencer the irreparable loss of a captive of which she was dragging the work of her generation into a mire. But not even her toil of that machine can obliterate the shining early record of a noble life.

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