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NOTES OF THE MONTH

PRESIDENT'S ORDER    RUSSIAN WAR AIMS
NORTH AFRICA

NATIONAL QUESTION IN EUROPE
Resolution of Workers Party

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Another Presidential Order

Roosevelt's proclamation ordering selected areas of the nation on a forty-eight-hour work week, and the prominence given it, makes little sense unless it is related to the national clamor for higher wages—and, especially, the miners' demand for a $2.00-a-day wage increase.

Ostensibly, the purpose of the executive order is to increase production—particularly the production of war materials, although all industries are affected. The facts, however, show that the national average for machinery workers—i.e., for war production workers—is forty-nine hours a week. Many of these actually work sixty or more hours a week. In general, there are few war industries or plants of any size or consequence that operate on less than a forty-eight-hour week basis.

Further, there was nothing in law or fact to prevent any industry's operation on a forty-eight-hour schedule—provided overtime rates were paid for hours worked in excess of forty hours. Thus, where a given industry or plant did operate on a work week under forty-eight hours—and these, for the most part, are in the consumers' industries—the reasons had absolutely no connection with the absence of an administrative decree. Either materials were lacking, or manpower was excessive in the circumstances of restricted production or the health hazard was such as to make a longer work-week impossible. And the shifting of manpower from the consumers' industries to war production had already been provided for in other decrees, threats or the simple absence of work.

We have not seen a single editorial or column which claimed that the President's proclamation would materially raise production. Why, then, the order?

Its real significance can only be understood in the light of the WLB decision, issued on the same day as the work-week order. In this decision the WLB denied a general wage increase to 180,000 employees of the "Big Four" packing companies, and thus reaffirmed its Little Steel formula.

There is every indication that the timing of the forty-eight-hour order and the WLB decision was more than a coincidence. Rather, the one was unmistakably a cover-up for the other. That is to say, Roosevelt issued his order in such a way as to reaffirm the WLB's Little Steel wage formula with a maximum of camouflage, and at such a time as to intimidate the movement for higher wages. Thus, Economic Stabilizer Byrnes, through whom the executive order was issued, very explicitly stated that "There must be no further increases in wages beyond the Little Steel formula."

And that is precisely the issue. Labor has damned the Little Steel formula as a repressive, wage-cutting imposition. With prices having risen far beyond the 15 per cent wage increase allowed by the Little Steel formula, and with prices continuing to rise, every section of the labor movement has joined in a unanimous cry for the revision or complete elimination of the WLB formula. Murray, Green, the railroad brotherhoods—they are all vigorously (for them) demanding wage increases commensurate with the rise in the cost of living. Above all, however, the United Mine Workers have announced their position on a new contract: a $2.00-a-day wage increase.

Roosevelt's order, and the publicity attending it, was, in effect, a statement of policy on the mine workers' demands. The reputation of the miners' union among workers in other industries is high. Regardless of what workers in auto or steel may think of Lewis, they respect him and his union as men who get what they are after. It is known that the miners will refuse to work, when the old contract expires on April 1, without a union contract, or an agreement making any pay rises retroactive to the date of expiration of the old contract. It is further known that Lewis intends to ask for and get the $2.00 increase, just as a year ago the anthracite miners forced a $1.00-a-day increase. And where other union leaders, under the impact of irresistible upsurge in the ranks, merely ask for a revision of the formula upward, Lewis has declared himself against any kind of restrictive formula.

Now, it is plain that should the miners break through the restrictions of the WLB wage policies, there would be no stopping the rest of the labor movement. It would, in effect, be a green light for militant wage demands that could not possibly be halted, especially with the labor movement already in turmoil, and the union leaderships responding to the pressure from below. And, under the momentum of success, this upsurge might quite conceivably go beyond mere wage demands to include broader issues, notably, the right to strike. The sentiment in labor's ranks for rescinding the no-strike pledge has already assumed organizational expression in the UAW. In the context of the struggle for wage increases, with class lines drawn sharply as labor is pitted against government and employer, on a clear-cut issue of class division, the movement might easily get out of "control."

That is why the Roosevelt order, and the Byrnes explanation, laid particular stress on the overtime rate provision. Where the capitalist press hailed the order, in general, it wailed in anguish against the punishment of decent, law-abiding employers who would gladly operate their plants on a forty-eight or ninety-six-hour schedule if they didn't have to cut too deeply into their pay-triadic profit reserves. But, as usual, Roosevelt showed greater perspicacity than his class—even if in this case it may backfire. (Sometime later, with the immediate issue "solved" and the wage movement crushed, it will be much easier to legislative or decree overtime pay out of existence.)

What was Roosevelt trying to do? He was calling attention to a "bulkier pay envelope," seeking that way to head off the mass demand for higher wage rates. That is, he was trying to confuse and "demobilize" the wage movement, scare the more servile union leaderships, and map his position for the impending battle with the mine workers.
But the fact remains that labor, at least in the mass production industries, is already receiving that "bulkier pay envelope" based on time and a half for all work over forty hours. And the fact equally remains that this "bulkier pay envelope" is demonstrably skinny when it comes to purchasing power. So skinny, that with new price rises anticipated and with taxes digging deeply into the worker's pay check, a serious cut in the standard of living of the workers is unmistakably threatened. Consequently, whatever Roosevelt may do to head off the movement, his efforts are likely to have been in vain. Already, after a day or two of silence in which they seemed to have been routed by the executive order and the packing house decision, the labor leaders have returned to the attack on the Little Steel formula.

Whether the executive order proves to be a dud, or succeeds in its purpose of vanquishing the wage movement, rests largely now in the hands of the miners. Roosevelt has hurled his challenge. It is now labor's turn to reply. And the miners hold the key to the answer!

E.G.

North Africa Interlude

The invasion of North Africa by the Allies and the subsequent Casablanca conference of the Anglo-American leaders heralds a turning point in the war. Involved in these events is not only the military strategy of the United Nations, but more important, its political strategy, and even its moral position in the world.

Hardly more than a year ago the military position of the Allies was quite feeble; its strength was to be found essentially in its economic and military potential. But its military position largely influenced its political and moral conduct. There is a striking parallel between the former weak military position of the democratic camp and the liberal-democratic, and at times, even radical, political and moral positions assumed by the Roosevelt-Churchill declarations.

It is not difficult to recall the great prominence given to their meetings which produced the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. The bourgeois liberals were not merely certain of a new era; it was guaranteed, they declared, by the Anglo-American and the right of self-determination of all national minorities, the occupied countries and, some even thought, the colonial peoples. Moreover, the right to free speech and free press were declared an inviolate right of all humanity. This was not merely a military struggle, said the leaders of the Allied camp. It was a political and moral crusade against fascism, intolerance, bigotry and the darkness of the Middle Ages. Truly, if words were accepted as reality, a millenium, even if a little one, was on its way.

Yet, in the midst of endless palaver delivered from the high places and the low, there were many events which gave unmistakable evidence that, behind the liberal façade forming the public face of the Allied camp, there lurked the real war aims completely incongruous to the professed programs.

The Four Freedoms Applied

The Indian situation became very acute in the midst of the democratic splurge. In this particular case, the British attitude was made abundantly clear through the declaration of the Prime Minister that the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter had no application to India. The attitude of the British did not find a happy accord in the United States, where national interest desired an Indian solution which would accrue to the American position in the Far East.

There were other smaller incidents occurring with monotonous regularity which indicated the wide gulf between the real and the verbal. But the dénouement came in North Africa. Here was a concrete circumstance in which the Allies could have demonstrated, if it were in any degree an integral part of its economic, political and military physiognomy, that despite almost insurmountable difficulties and immense contradictions which reside in its alliance, the democratic political aims which it professed would be realized step by step with an improvement in its military position. But quite the contrary took place. As military improvement came, political degeneration accompanied it.

The deal with Admiral Darlan, which Roosevelt was compelled to announce as a temporary political expedience, thus placating, at least momentarily, the bitter reactions which followed all over the world, especially among his own "New Dealists" colleagues, was fortuitously "solved" in the assassination of Pétain's collaborationist disciple. In the Darlan case, however, the American leaders were able to plead military needs for the arrangements which were made. Subsequent events, however, do not have even this reason to justify the political collaboration with the reactionary Giraud, the fascist General Nogues, the numerous other fascist and semi-fascist military men of Vichy, and the political collaboration with similar fascists and semi-fascists, the outstanding example being the appointment as Governor of Algeria, the fascist Peyrouton.

Morality and Bourgeois Politics

The buck-passing which has followed the storm of protest from all official quarters is merely subterfuge. Any and all explanations are given by Secretary of State Hull for the conduct in North Africa. He even found it "expedient," when questioned by The Nation Washington correspondent, J. F. Stone, to ask if his name were not really Feinstone! It is now explained that General Eisenhower had nothing to do with the Peyrouton appointment, that he was enlightened about this fascist gentleman who received exit papers in Brazil on the orders of Hull, by his brother, Milton Eisenhower. The blame was then placed on the State Department's special man in North Africa, Robert Murphy, long noted for his reactionary views and associations. But Murphy acted in complete concert with directions and agreement of the State Department. In all these machinations, the liberals of the New Republic and The Nation would have you believe that President Roosevelt was uninformed about all these events, or was unable to intervene; that Hull, unable to fight any longer, succumbed to the pressure of the fascists, semi-fascists and reactionaries who are his subordinates, and finally, that the liberals in Washington, the true Rooseveltians, were completely powerless.

Only a few days ago, the Social-Democratic New Leader published an article which declared that the whole North African venture was laid many months ago through Churchill and Roosevelt, and that behind Vichy stood a large group of the French industrialists and financiers. It is this same group of bourgeois reactionaries who were described by Winkler in The Nation as playing the delicate game of repairing their fences in case the Allies won the war, or retaining their relations with Hitler in the event of a German victory.
Obviously, it is impossible now to know everything that is happening behind the scenes. And it is really not of fundamental importance. Without doubt, the State Department's rôle in North Africa is indeed a sorry one; it drips with hypocrisy and is shallow in its detail. The fundamental thing to be remembered is that this is not, and never was, a moral or political war in the sense in which the Allied protagonists have stated. The bourgeoisie is incapable of fighting a true war for genuine freedom—it can only carry on a purely military struggle for capitalist aims. Once this is understood, the events in North Africa become clear, the conduct of General Giraud can be probed, the appointment of Peyroulon has significance, the anti-democratic and reactionary nature of the set-up is understood as inevitable.

Is the reéstablishment of the French Empire in consonance with the Atlantic Charter? Obviously not. Is the continuation of British rule a form of the self-determination of the Indian people? To ask the question is to answer it. Is the declaration by the British (New Republic of February 8) that "she had no intention of ever giving up Hong Kong" an illustration of the surrender of extra-territorial rights in China, to which she and the United States assented in treaty? The answer is clear. All of this has sense when it is borne in mind that it is the intention of the State Department to use anyone and any means justified by military strategy. From the point of view of imperialist capitalism, from the standpoint of the real nature of this war, it is both logical and consistent. The wailing and the moaning of the liberals are also logical and consistent. Their rôle is decades old, their reactions patent, their performance typical and monotonous.

**Internal Life in the Allied Camp**

Another outstanding feature of the current situation is that the inner conflicts in the camp of the United Nations are becoming sharper and even more public. The Casablanca conference, badly handled from a journalistic-propaganda point of view, was held to map the military strategy of the Allies. That its deliberations have not been made public is natural. Only fools would believe that Roosevelt and Churchill planned a public exhibit of their war strategy for the next stage. The demand for more information on what actually took place is a sort of compensation for the fact that the conference did not advance the political unity, strength and perspectives of the Allies. China was not present and not invited. Stalin could not attend because he was directing the war in Russia! A proposal to move the conference to the Middle East could not compel him to leave his post! Nor to send a "qualified" representative! And so, once more, the Allied strategy is in the hands of America and Britain, with the former retaining hegemony.

There is a strange unity among the United Nations. Each member is fighting for its own national salvation and interest. They are united only by the common threat of Axis imperialism. Beyond that the do not have much in common. Stalinist Russia acts the rôle of a lone wolf, wary of her Western allies. China, completely subordinate to the major strategy of the Allies, plays a minor rôle in the top circles. Besides, her relations with Russia, arising out of the involved Pacific situation, have worsened to the point of danger for the Anglo-American position in the Far East. Britain, which has yielded so much to the United States, is a junior partner in their closest alliance of all time. But Britain is completely uncomfortable in this relationship, especially as she observes the debates in Congress and the rise of a neo-imperialism of Luce's Life-Time-Fortune set. Thus, as the military position of the United Nations improves, political deterioration follows. The coming year will be an extremely fateful one for the "democratic" camp, but it will be even more fateful for the workers, peasants and colonial peoples of the world.

Mindful of all the above, how degrading become the outpourings of the philistines and renegades from Marxian socialism, who deplore again and again the amorality of Bolshevism. A decadent bourgeois society has become their standard of moral measurement.

A. G.

**Russia's War Aims**

With the upturn in the military fortunes of the Allies, the war aims of Stalinist Russia have again become of utmost concern to the bourgeois world. Stalin has recently been as silent as a Sphinx on this question. But the concern of the Allies undoubtedly reached the Kremlin, for Pravda, under the by-line of David Zazlavsky, a new political observer for the Russian Stalinists, repudiated the "rumors" about Russia's annexationist aims in Europe and Asia. The basis for the article was a London report stating that Russia sought territory in Asia (China), Iran, sea outlets in the Baltic and the Black Sea, as well as European territories.

In his May Day address of last year, Stalin had declared that: "We haven't, we can't have such a purpose in this war as the conquest of foreign territories or foreign peoples in Europe or Asia, including Iran." Zazlavsky, in referring to this portion of the speech, went on to say that the régime was fighting to keep the "Soviet state intact," and that Bessarabia and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are organic parts of that state.

Why are they organic parts of the Russian state? Because they were incorporated by the Soviet Constitution! These are the territories which were obtained by force and violence during the hey-day of the Stalin-Hitler pact. They were forcibly seized and incorporated into the Soviet Union in violation of every principle of proletarian internationalism. But Stalin's allies are in a quandary. Great Britain in particular cannot challenge the position of the Soviet Union, even though it is an express declaration of Roosevelt and Churchill not to recognize any seizures and territorial incorporations by force and violence. If the territorial expansion and acquisitions by the Soviet Union are questioned or challenged by her Allies, Stalin can, with equal justification and right, question Britain's rights to her empire. And he can go a lot further than that. Thus, it is apparent, they will recognize each other's "rights."

Interestingly enough, Zazlavsky makes no mention of that part of Poland which was Russia's during the division of that nation with Germany. Nor is anything said about Finland, whether it is intended that parts of that country seized during the Russo-Finnish war will be retained or whether all of Finland shall come under the reign of Moscow. Nor is any specific denial made of other parts of the London report.

The reference to a speech of Stalin made a year ago, is in our opinion, of considerable significance. Since the recent military victories of the Red Army and at a time when Russian war aims are discussed by her allies, the Holy Father of Russia has not uttered a single word on this question. But two things stand out sharply. First, Russian aims are completely nationalist, seeking immediate preservation of the existing state and
The National Question in Europe

Its Relation to the Socialist Revolution

The struggle for national independence is part of the struggle for democracy. In a whole series of countries of Europe, the advance of fascism has not only made the struggle for national freedom necessary once more—a century and more after the period of the formation of the great national states—but has made this struggle an indispensable prelude, and part of the struggle for socialism.

German Fascism and Imperialism

The old imperialist powers built their empires at or beyond the rim of the advanced capitalist countries basing them, with very few exceptions, principally upon the rule of the advanced white imperialist over the backward colored colonial slave. The only plausible argument for the progressive character of imperialist rule and expansion, specious though it was in reality, was that they lifted the backward countries and peoples out of their historical stagnation and brought them at least some of the benefits of modern capitalist civilization. The fulfillment of that task was the notorious “white man’s burden.”

German imperialism, in its second incarnation, comes upon the world scene belatedly and in its most reactionary form. With all its boasted strength it has not yet been able to break out of the rim of Europe and into the classic lands of imperialist exploitation. Like the rotten old Austro-Hungarian Empire, it must establish its colonies at home. But German imperialism cannot even put forward the hypocritically plausible argument by which the older imperialisms (British, French, Dutch, American) sought to justify their colonial annexations. The blessings of its “civilization” are to be bestowed not upon backward peoples, stagnating on the sidelines of history, untouched by modern culture, but upon modern, culturally advanced peoples at the very heart of contemporary civilization. It is a striking commentary on the depths of depravity plumbed by moribund capitalism when it must record that in order to live nowadays it finds itself compelled to reduce to a most barbarous colonial slavery tens of millions of advanced and civilized peoples!

That is what fascism has done in the conquered countries of Europe. Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the Ukraine, White Russia, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Greece—all these are now colonies, to all intents and purposes, of the German Empire. Allied countries, like Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary, which have a somewhat preferred position in the “New Order,” are not very much different from semi-colonies. Even Italy is threatened with reduction to that level. Continental Europe is now to Germany what the great Asiatic and African empires were, and to a large extent still are, to Great Britain.

The announced economic policy of Germany toward the conquered countries is substantially the same as that pursued or political novice can believe that Stalinist Russia is the purveyor of this outstanding pillar of Marxism. The above-cited reference to the Pravda article is only additional evidence of the nationalist degeneration of a once glorious workers’ state.

A. G.

The National Question in Europe
by imperialist motherlands toward their far-off colonies: to prevent them from existing or developing as industrially advanced countries, to keep them within a Greater Germany primarily as agricultural hinterlands. The political policy of fascism toward the conquered countries easily matches and often exceeds the colonial cruelties of old and infamous memory. For the “white man’s superiority” the Nazis have substituted the still more aristocratic and more preposterous “Nordic superiority” of the German over all the other peoples.

The conquered countries enjoy no political rights whatsoever. They are all ruled by pro-consuls, supported by massed bayonets and the Gestapo. In some places, particularly in the East, wholesale transplantations of peoples are undertaken for the purpose of dispersing the national community, of atomizing all national coherence. Conquered peoples are placed in the position of legal inferiors, that is, in the eyes of the victor’s law, the German and his subject are not equal. These legal disabilities are only a reflection of the economic, political and social disabilities, discriminations and disfranchisements to which the conquered are subjected. Lack of docility, to say nothing of active resistance, is answered by the most appalling wholesale persecutions, arrests and massacres known in our time. Millions are rounded up for shipment to Germany to be used as slave labor, subjected to conditions at least as cruel as the enslaved diamond miners in England’s African empire.

The closest parallel that can be found is in the records of the most cruel of the classic imperialist systems in the colonies.

Growth of Resistance to Hitler

This enslavement of the workers and peasants is accompanied by corresponding actions against the bourgeoisie classes. The small merchants, the middle classes, the better-off professionals are dispossessed, expropriated, driven into the ranks of the working class or the peasantry, and their wealth and positions generally turned over to a deserving Nazi, if not of German nationality then to a subservient Quisling. The big bourgeoisie and the ruling governmental bureaucracies of the conquered lands are treated with no more, if any, consideration. The policy of the conqueror has been to confiscate the big bourgeoisie properties in the conquered countries or to force their owners to sell them to the German trusts and corporations at ridiculously low sums of money which the involuntary seller is more often than not deprived of by any one of a number of devices employed by the Nazis. Those bourgeois elements who, for one reason or another, cooperate with the conqueror, or make a pretense at cooperating with him, are vouchsafed a privileged position—but privileged only in comparison with the slave position of the traditional native compradore bourgeoisie in the colonies of the East. The aim of the Nazis is not the preservation of Czech capitalism, or Norwegian or French or Belgian or Greek capitalism, but the destruction of all of them in the interests and for the benefit of German capitalism.

This unprecedented régime of totalitarian exploitation and oppression in Europe has generated a mass movement of opposition to the fascist overlords in every country. Under conditions of the all-pervading Gestapo espionage and terror, this movement has not reached the stage of centralized and integrated organization, democratically representative, programmatically equipped, hierarchically construed. It is scattered, atomized, decentralized, isolated, local, inchoate, with very few exceptions. But whatever its form in the different countries, there is no doubt whatever of its composition, the support it enjoys, and the aims it pursues. Its ranks are composed overwhelmingly of the most active and sacrificing workers and peasants; large sections (comparatively) of the petty-bourgeois participate in the illegal groups and the work they carry on or else give them sympathetic support; bourgeoisie and petty bourgeois intellectuals are also to be found there; so are some of the demobilized military officials, bureaucrats of the conquered régime, members of the clergy; finally, so also are some members of the big bourgeoisie—just how many is hard to tell in the very nature of the movement, but it is reasonable to suppose that their numbers are not great and where they do support the movement it is more with sympathy and financial aid than with direct personal participation.

There is no doubt that wherever these groups carry on a struggle against the German oppressor, they enjoy the almost unanimous support of their countrymen. As to their aim, however much the various groups in the various conquered countries may differ on any number of questions, what they have as a common objective may be summed up in the two words: national freedom.

Movements of Independence

Another phenomenon must be recorded along with this one. The working class movement, as an organized independent class movement (unions, political parties, cultural organizations, cooperatives, etc.) exists nowhere in Europe, except in the form of a tradition (a living tradition, to be sure), and in the form of small “cadre” groups, generally isolated from each other. Of cohesive, centralized organizations, there are none, or virtually none. The working class (this applies with ten-fold force to the peasantry) feels atomized and paralyzed from a swift succession of terrific blows: the outbreak of the war it did not want and for which it was unprepared in any sense whatever, the stupefying speedy defeat at the hands of Germany, the shattering of their economic, political and social lives and the crushing installation of the new régime. To think that a working class that has undergone these vicissitudes in the period of three-four years, is just as alert, as vigorous, as militant, as confident as it ever was, is to believe in a special bureaucratic kind of miracle. What these workers want is fairly clear. The inhuman class exploitation to which they are subjected is so thoroughly interlinked with the national oppression of the land, the two are so closely identified in their minds, that the first thing they want, hope and long for, is the restoration of national sovereignty by driving out the fascist invader.

The working class as a whole is still in a sort of strangled stupor. But the most aggressive, most conscious, most heroic elements of that class have already shaken off the mood of despair and have entered the field of organized struggle in the illegal groups. The intensity of the exploitation and oppression of the conqueror, rising constantly, helps to enlarge the ranks of these groups by driving the more spirited workers to join them, and the indications are that this trend will continue.

It would, however, be a gross error to conceive of the “underground” movement as “classless” or politically uniform.

In the first place, it is more accurate to speak not of a movement but of movements, not of a group but of groups. Despite the difficulties in the way of getting reliable reports from continental Europe, it is sufficiently clear that every political current, from native, anti-Hitler fascist to revolutionary-socialist, is represented in the general movement in varying degrees of strength and popularity. It is also clear that,
far from fusing completely with each other, each political current seeks to assemble wider sections of the population, more specifically, wider sections of the underground movement, around its program and its organization and, as speedily as possible, to acquire political and organizational leadership over the underground movement as preliminary for leadership over the people as a whole. There is a general national movement in the conquered countries which enjoys almost universal popular support, not in the sense that it has no program save "national freedom" but in the sense that only this demand is common to all the groups—and no other. All the Polish underground groups are united in their strivings to be rid of the German oppressor; not many of the groups are united on how this is to be accomplished; still fewer among them agree on what kind of free Poland must be established. Similarly for the movement in Yugoslavia, or France, or elsewhere.

In the second place, although there are members of all classes and all social strata in the underground movement, it does not follow that all are equally represented or that they are of equal weight. The bourgeois elements are rarely to be found in the underground movement; those who are not following the course of enthusiastic or ostensible collaboration with the Nazis confine their support of the underground to financial aid and, above all, to direct and indirect efforts to dominate the movement ideologically and politically. What is left of the middle class elements supports, as a rule, the movement for national freedom, but it has neither the tradition nor the stomach for sacrifices on an organized, systematic scale, much less for the exceptional sacrifices demanded of any genuinely anti-fascist movement under Hitlerian rule. The vast majority of the active participants in the underground movement and groups is therefore made up of workers and, to some extent, of peasants. That is, by its social composition the movement is overwhelmingly proletarian. The proletarians in it, generally speaking, have been educated and trained in the socialist, communist or at the very least the trade-union spirit and from the standpoint of the bourgeoisie they retain to a large extent most of their class "prejudices," even if their class point of view is now heavily tinged by nationalist and even imperialist influences.

In the third place, the workers in the underground movement, as well as the peasants who most often support it, are not striving for national freedom and nothing else, that is, for a return of the status quo ante bellum, that is, for the Poland, the France, the Yugoslavia, the Greece of August, 1939. That is the falsehood that the various "governments in exile," their propagandists and apologists would have the "outside world" believe. The masses want to be rid of foreign rule in order that, under conditions of national independence, they may be able to put their native capitalist class "in its place." Wide differences undoubtedly exist among the masses as to what the future "place" of the French, Polish, Yugoslav, Greek, Dutch, etc., capitalist classes should be. Views on this score surely range from the vague notion that a "people's government" should keep firm control over the bourgeoisie to the revolutionary conception of a workers' government that expropriates the bourgeoisie of all its social power and lays the foundations of socialism. Whatever the precise nature of these views may be, not a single serious report indicates that any substantial section of the people is striving to drive out the German oppressor in order to welcome back with enthusiasm the rulers or the régime they had up to the outbreak of the war.

What Is to Be Done?

What is the task of the revolutionary vanguard? In the first place, it must find its place right in the heart of this underground popular movement, especially now, when the movement is still in a fluid state politically, before it has become programatically and organizationally rigid in a bourgeois or petty-bourgeois sense, that is, before any of the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois political currents in the general movement has succeeded in completely centralizing it and imposing its political program and leadership upon it. This it must do for several reasons:

(1) The aim of this movement, in the very first place, is a just one: it expresses the legitimate aspirations of the masses of people in Europe for freedom from national oppression. As at present constituted, it is for the most part a genuinely popular and democratic movement.

(a) This movement is made up of the most revolutionary and most courageous elements of the population in general, and of the working class in particular. In the struggle for freedom, the weight of the proletariat—due not only to its social position in general, but also to its strategical position in economic life (factories, transportation, communications)—will be greater than that of any other social grouping. The old (and new) trade union activists of diverse political tendencies, who constitute the factory cadres today, will become the leaders of the proletarian wing of the struggle and powerful leaders in the national struggle "as a whole." It is impossible to influence the revolutionary elements without participating in their struggle and by their side.

(3) This movement is the only serious mass movement in Europe today, and it is impossible for the otherwise completely isolated revolutionary Marxists to establish contact with the masses without becoming part and parcel of this movement.

(4) Precisely because elements from all the social classes participate to one degree or another in this movement, and because all sorts of political views are represented in it (from the extreme right to the extreme left), a social and political differentiation in its midst is absolutely inevitable. Unless the revolutionary Marxists are in the movement from the beginning, it will be impossible for them to accelerate the process of differentiation and influence it in the direction of revolutionary proletarian hegemony and policy. The proletarian forces in the movement will come under the influence and domination of the national bourgeoisie through the medium of the middle class and its ideology. Or, given a favorable development of the situation, and a correct policy by the Marxists, the latter can influence the middle class elements (peasants, small merchants, etc., lower rank army officers, students) through the medium of the working class.

(5) In the same sense, there is at present every good reason to believe that the recreated economic and political mass movement of the workers will have its origin in the underground "national" movement in which the process of differentiation, both social and political, is still incipient. Again, to accelerate its rebirth, to influence its political character, the presence and activity of the Marxists in this movement is indispensable.

The Leadership of Imposters

The participation of the Marxists in this movement is made possible as well as necessary by the fact that it is not yet
a homogeneous, centralized political organization, dominated by an organized bourgeois-imperialist or social-imperialist leadership. Far from it! That is what the various "governments in exile" would like to believe, would like to be true; but it is not.

Even if there were not already enough concrete evidence at hand, it would still be reasonable to suppose that various secret rank and file movements in the oppressed countries do not feel they owe any allegiance, much less acknowledge the impudently assumed leadership of the various "governments in exile." The heroic militants of underground Poland can hardly be expected to acknowledge the Sikorski gang as their leadership, or as the government they yearn to put in power once they have the Hitler gang off their backs! The French fighters are not going through their tenacious resistance to the Gestapo in order to bring gentlemen of the stripe of de Gaulle and de Kerillis into power, to say nothing of the newly-baked democrats like Darlan, Giraud, Peyroux, Nougues and the rest of the fascist scum drained off from Vichy and already imposed upon North Africa! The protests from the rank and file inside France against the policy of "Darlanism" show that the underground fighters have not abandoned their class view in taking up the banner of national struggle, that they oppose the Nazis not only because they are Germans (i.e., foreign oppressors) but because they are fascists, and that fascists of French birth and under a French flag are not acceptable to the masses at home. They want to drive out the German fascists in order to be able to settle accounts with their own fascists, their own reactionaries. To a greater or lesser degree, that holds true in every other case of the relationship between underground movements at home and the reactionary bankrups who call themselves "national committees" and "governments" abroad. The latter are working with might and main, and of course with the approval of their Allied masters, to achieve a good stranglehold on the rank and file movement. But thus far they are still far removed from success.

This is not to deny that the underground movements are imbued, for the most part, with democratic-imperialist illusions and prejudices. They are, and this fact represents a grave peril to their revolutionary development. Reactionary elements, from the extreme right to the social-democrats and Stalinists, work night and day to deepen these illusions and prejudices in order to facilitate the establishment of their political and organizational dominion over the movement. But this, too, is still far from accomplished. The presence of the revolutionary vanguard elements in the movement, and above all, a correct policy, are urgently required to counteract reactionary imperialist and social-imperialist currents. Otherwise, the definitive victory of these currents will convert the movement into a reactionary tool of imperialism and nullify its progressive significance.

Inside the movement it is necessary to combat mercilessly the two most dangerous, because relatively most powerful, forces, the imperialists and the Stalinists.

The imperialists seek to convert these movements into obedient, disciplined auxiliaries to the Anglo-American armed forces. The achievement of this aim would mean the corruption of the movement, inasmuch as it would be deprived of any independence of program or movement, would cease to be a popular democratic movement, and become a mere instrument of the imperialist powers. Not only that, but it would cease to be a movement for genuine national freedom, having been converted into a weapon for the restoration of the reactionary empires which existed on the eve of the war, in which Poles oppressed Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Jews, Czechs oppressed Hungarians, Slovaks and Germans, Serbs oppressed Croats, Slovenes and half a dozen other nationalities, in which the Dutch oppressed a vast East Indian empire and the French a no less exploited Asiatic and African empire. Furthermore, the movement would become a means of freeing the now oppressed countries only in order that they, or some of them, might rule a Germany reduced to the level of a colony. How disastrous the domination of the popular movement of resistance by the imperialists can be, is beginning to be illustrated by the consolidation of the control of the Serbian reactionaries, represented by Mikhailovich, over the fighting forces who simply want an end to German tyranny and not the restoration of Greater Serbian national oppression of other peoples. The struggle against the imperialists and their ideologists is a sine qua non to the healthy and progressive development of the national movements in Europe.

**The Threat of Stalinism**

The seizure of control of these movements by the organized Stalinists—not the sacrificing rank and file militant, but the organized bureaucratic clique—can be no less disastrous for the future of the struggle for national and socialist freedom. A victory over the German oppressor which brought the Stalinist bureaucracy to power would open up the road to a new totalitarian slavery for the just-liberated people. To realize this truth it is only necessary to look at the national oppression and disfranchisement suffered by numerous non-Russian peoples under the totalitarian rule of the Great-Russian autocracy. The revolutionary Marxists must be tireless in their explanations to the workers of the real significance of Stalinism. The idea that because the Stalinists are strong and influential, and not yet completely discredited among the workers, it is correct revolutionary policy to raise the slogan of "Let the Communist Party take power," is based on a complete misunderstanding of what appears to be a similar slogan raised by the Bolsheviks in Russia in the middle of 1917. When the Bolsheviks called for a Menshevik-Social Revolutionary government (by their slogan of "Down with the Ten Capitalist Ministers"), it was on the basis of the belief that such a government would be a democratic (i.e., a bourgeois-democratic) government, which would allow such democratic political rights to the workers and all other parties, the Bolsheviks included, that the Bolsheviks could sincerely pledge themselves not to resort to violence against that government but confine themselves to persuading the masses propagandistically, utilizing their normal democratic rights. To apply such a tactic to the Stalinists would be absurd. A social-reformist régime is a bourgeois-democratic régime, more or less. A Stalinist régime, call it "proletarian" or anything else, is unmistakably a totalitarian, anti-democratic régime. From all experience, the conclusion flows with unquestionable certainty that whatever such a régime may hold in store for the bourgeoisie, its first action would be the utilization of state power for the promptest possible physical extirpation of the revolutionary proletarian elements, to be followed immediately, if not accompanied, by the destruction of all democratic and independent working class organizations and institutions. The revolutionary Marxists must seek to organize the firmest and bitterest proletarian resistance to the seizure of power by the Stalinists in the present national movements as well as to the seizure of state power by Stalinist reaction. The tri-
The triumph of Stalinism can only result in the gutting of the movement for national freedom or proletarian socialism.

It is not enough, however, to resist the deleterious and reactionary tendencies represented by imperialism, social-imperialism and Stalinism. The revolutionary Marxists must elaborate their own positive program in the ranks of the nationalist movement.

A Marxist Program

The Marxists seek, first of all, to establish the hegemony of the proletariat and of proletarian policy in the general movement. They must therefore agitate for the incorporation of progressively bolder economic demands for the workers into the program of the national movement and into its daily activity. If the bourgeois elements, against whom such demands would be directed, at least in part, threaten to desert the national movement, if the workers press their own class economic demands, it is only proof of the Marxian contention that the bourgeoisie holds its property interests higher and dearer than its devotion to the cause of national freedom.

The working out of a militant, concrete program of economic demands to protect and promote the interests of the workers, is therefore the most urgent task of the revolutionary vanguard inside the national movement. From the standpoint of reeducating and training the proletarian elements to the fulfillment of the great independent class tasks ahead of them, the elaboration of such a class program is of the highest value. It is no less valuable from the standpoint of speeding the process of freeing the working class forces from political and ideological domination by the "national bourgeoisie" and from the reformist and Stalinist factions which preach to the workers the pernicious doctrine of economic and political self-abnegation, self-effacement and self-emasculating in order "not to alienate" the bourgeoisie of their own country, the "good" bourgeoisie which is cooperating in the "national front." The priority of the working class, of its interests and its program, must be persistently pressed with the greatest emphasis placed upon the idea that all the sacrifices made and energy expended at the present time will have been of little avail if the workers succeed only in exchanging their new slavery for the old slavery.

The same course applies just as forcefully to the question of the peasants. No section of society in Europe has suffered so cruelly from the devastation of the war and the nightmare of fascism as the peasants. The revolutionary socialists must work out a concrete and bold program of economic demands for the peasants, particularly for those in the Eastern and Southeastern countries of Europe, where feudal relations existed side by side with capitalist industry even before the German invasion. In general, for these countries, the slogan of destruction of the big landed estates, the land to those who till it, and a moratorium on all debts, is best calculated to satisfy the hunger of the peasant, undermine the position of expectancy of the reactionary landlord class, and win the agrarian masses to the side of the urban proletariat.

The "hegemony of the proletariat" in the national movement does not mean the abandonment of the struggle for national liberation in favor of the "purely socialist" struggle, in view of the fact that in the actual movement, "hegemony of the proletariat" would only mean the hegemony of the more advanced elements of the proletariat, who would still have to appeal for the support of the main body of the working class as well as the peasantry. The latter will respond quickly only if the "activist" movement puts at the head of its demands the war cry of national freedom.

On the Slogan of the United States of Europe

The Marxists are distinguished from all other groups because, among other slogans, they put forward the slogan of "the Socialist United States of Europe." They link this slogan to the call for national independence of the oppressed countries, because they understand that fundamentally it is impossible to establish genuine national and social freedom in Europe except in the form of a socialist united states.

The experience of recent years must be utilized to the full to bring home the fact that there is no way out for Europe except economic and political unification. The unification of Europe under Hitler is in no way progressive because it is the union of slavemaster and slave, imperialism and colony; because its object is to carry on war in permanence, or rather until German imperialism dominates the world; because it is conceived on the theory of contracting the productive forces of the continent to the exclusive benefit of Germany's productive forces. The European war aims of the Allies are reactionary through and through because they are predicated on the restoration, in one form or another, of the hopelessly un­lifeworthy small-states and vassal sub-empires of pre-war Eu­rope, economically impotent and rent by crises, politically in a state of permanent tension and permanent dependency upon one or more of the big imperialist powers and their "balance-of-power" games. Only a socialist United States of Europe can resolve the problem of a continent being bled white and threatened with ruin and decay. It alone can make an effi­cient economic unit of the continent, guarantee the maximum of political liberty, and assure an unviolated freedom of cul­tural development to the multitude of national groups in Eu­rope. No reactionary power or combination of powers anywhere in the world could seriously attack such a union. On the other hand, the examples of progress such a union could assure would have an irresistible effect upon the capitalist world and contribute to its speedy downfall. Short of a so­cialist union, it is no exaggeration to say that Europe is headed for sure doom.

The revolutionary socialists must now more than ever before lay stress upon this point of view, which is the strategical key to the fundamental problem of Europe today.

However, under the concrete circumstances in Europe today, the slogan of "a Socialist United States of Europe" is primarily a propaganda slogan, which is by no means to be identified with the agitational and action slogan of "national independence" which clearly and simply expresses the wishes of the broad masses. The propaganda slogan is a socialist slogan; the agitation slogan is a democratic slogan. While, in the conception of the Marxists, there is no Chinese wall between these slogans, the two should nevertheless not be identified, used interchangeably or mixed together indiscriminately. The reason has nothing to do with literary distinctions, but with two important political considerations.

First, it is not reasonable to believe, and past experience does not warrant the belief, that the masses of people, having been ground into the dust for years by a dictatorial régime, in which they did not enjoy the slightest semblance of demo­cratic rights, will, upon overturning such a régime, proceed directly to the establishment of an "authoritarian" socialist, proletarian government, which would immediately "break the united democratic national front." There is even less reason to believe that they will do this in consideration of the fact
that most workers and peasants identify a "socialist government" with the horrible caricature of it which is the Stalinist dictatorship. Having been deprived for so long of any democratic liberties, the masses, once they have overthrown the Hitlerite despotism, will in all likelihood demand "democracy in general," that is, bourgeois democracy. To identify "national liberation" with the slogan of the "Socialist United States of Europe," which means the proletarian dictatorship on a European scale, can only tend to cause the masses to counterpose the struggle for national independence to the struggle for socialism, whereas in reality the fullest accomplishment of the former is possible only by the victory of the latter. This truth must be learned by the masses in the course of their own experiences, however, and not dogmatically imposed upon them in advance by erroneous political pedagogy of the Marxists.

Secondly, the slogan of the "Socialist United States of Europe" was first put forward by the Marxists under conditions when the European proletariat was ready for the socialist struggle for power, but, above all, when Europe was divided into a number of independent states. To believe that this slogan should occupy the same place in the Marxian program and, above all, in the Marxian platform, in the revolutionary transitional demands, now, when Europe is divided into one independent state and a whole series of subject nations, is the keenest kind of abstractionism and dogmatism, and represents a failure to understand the radical change that has taken place in the European situation. Before the masses can see the "Socialist United States of Europe" as a realistic slogan, they undoubtedly want to have at their disposal independent national states capable of deciding freely whether or not they want to be federated into a continental union. A false line in this respect can easily be interpreted by the masses, or interpreted to them by reformist and reactionary demagogues as an attempt to shift them from one forced continental union in which each people or nation is deprived of its identity, to another union by compulsion, even if the first represented Hitlerite tyranny and the second represents the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat. Here again is seen the error and the great harm that can be done by identifying the democratic slogan for national liberation with the socialist slogan of the United States of Europe. Here again, it is necessary to emphasize that only by speaking and acting as the most resolute champions of unequivocal national liberation for the now oppressed peoples of Europe can the revolutionary Marxists help these peoples learn most speedily from their own experience that true national freedom and equality for all of them can be assured only under the banner of a socialistically united continent and, eventually, a socialist world.

The Role of Democratic Demands

The slogan of national liberty is only one of the democratic demands that the revolutionary Marxists must make their own in Europe, although it is the most important of all the democratic demands that can be made. However, if all the indications point to the probability of a "democratic" interval between the overthrow of Pan-European despotism and the direct struggle for socialist power, it is necessary to put in the forefront other fundamental democratic demands. These demands are aimed at reawakening the combative and solidarity of the workers and peasants, primarily the former, which must first be raised out of its scattered condition and reconstituted as an active, independent class. The demands that are calculated to help accomplish this end are first of all all the right to organize, and with it the right of free press. Without these rights, it is impossible to centralize and unify ideologically the now crushed and atomized working class.

The advancement to the foreground of democratic demands raises the question of what attitude the revolutionary Marxists take toward the reformist movement to reestablish the Weimar Republic, the Third Republic in France and their equivalents in the other European countries. The Marxists are most decidedly not the champions of such movements. They are the champions of democratic working class rule. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the greater likelihood is that the masses will at first incline to the restoration of bourgeois democracy, with a strong "social" tinge. Given the overwhelming preponderance of proletarian and peasant elements in the national movements, the bourgeois demagogues will (many of them already do) promise that the new independent republics must be the "socially most advanced" in the world. Undoubtedly attempts will be made by the bourgeoisie and their labor aids to keep the working class from continuing with its struggle until it has won class power for itself, by presenting it with a repetition, even a more radical repetition, of Russian Kerenskyism, of the Spanish "workers republic of all the classes," of the German post-war "socialist" régime which ushered in the Weimar Republic. But there is no reason to believe that the "democratic interval" will or can be more than an interval. That is what must be stressed and stressed all over again, until every thinking worker understands it. If, in the pre-war crisis of European and world capitalism, bourgeois democracy proved unable to solve any serious problem in Germany and was so sickly that it could not last out fifteen years, there are no grounds for believing that in the post-war crisis bourgeois democracy will prove to be stronger and more viable. If the bourgeois-democratic republic could not hold out for five years in Spain before the war, there are no grounds for believing that it will hold out for half that time after the war. Similarly in other countries.

The task of the revolutionary Marxists, therefore, is to explain to the masses, on the basis of their own experiences (which sometimes must be repeated and repeated before their lessons are finally assimilated), that the democratic rights and democratic institutions which the masses desire cannot be assured by the bourgeoisie in power, but only if the workers continue their struggle to the end of taking power in their own hands, of ruling through the most democratic and representative bodies, the councils of workers and peasants.

How the relations between the struggle for national freedom and the struggle for socialist power will manifest themselves concretely, depends on a variety of factors and cannot be foretold exactly. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to foresee, on the basis of an analysis of present trends and of accumulated experiences, what will be the most probable course of events in its most general outlines. Even in outline form, however, it may be seen how vitally connected is the struggle for national liberation and the living perspective of the socialist revolution in Europe.

Likely Developments in Europe

The first period after the overthrow of German rule will undoubtedly be the period of "democratic illusions," to one extent or another, in one form or another. This is the clear lesson of the first 1917 revolution in Russia, the revolution in Germany of 1918, the Spanish revolution of 1931. The power will, so to speak, lie in the streets. The mass will instinctively incline to take hold of it in its own name. Its
difficulties will lie in the fact that it is just emerging from a period of non-organization, or only the most fragmentary organization. Organization is precisely what it needs for the seizure and holding of power. The reformist and Stalinist organizations will of course not lead the proletariat to class power. In other words, some interval will undoubtedly elapse before a revolutionary party is properly organized and reaches the leadership of the organized proletariat.

Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie comes out of its hole or returns from exile. Its advantages lie in its greater self-confidence, in its being accustomed to rule, its more intimate contacts, its age-old skill and craftiness. It has wealth at its disposal for the acquisition and control of the means of influencing opinion (press, radio, etc.). It will undoubtedly have at its disposal what is sure to be one of the most powerful social weapons: the food under the control of the imperialists who are planning, long before the event, to use it as an aid to "order," that is, as a tool of counter-revolution. In the circumstances, the bourgeoisie will probably put forward—for a very brief period of time—its most "democratic" representatives. It is not at all impossible that in the first days of the "new freedom" the masses, or sections of them, will even be impatient of the "sectarianism" of the extreme left wing which "rupturs" the general jubilation with sharp warnings and with political attacks of the new "democratic government" or "people's government."

On the other hand, however, a phenomenon of the highest importance manifests itself. It is the duality of power right in the very midst of the new and by no means stabilized bourgeois régime. To overthrow the régime of national oppression, armed struggle was needed. Even assuming that the burden of this struggle is borne by advancing Allied imperialist troops, a good deal of it will have been accomplished by armed, organized workers who have not been incorporated into regular imperialist formations. There, at the very outset, is the core of the future proletarian army. Despite all democratic illusions, experience has shown that this popular armed force will regard with suspicion and meet with resistance any attempts by the new bourgeois government to disarm it in favor of "regular" troops. Secondly, in the very process of driving out the Germans, the most natural, elementary and immediate step that the workers will take through their factory committees (which will be promptly created if they do not already exist) is to run out all German factory superintendents and managers or those who did the dirty work of the Germans. In most cases, steps will be taken to replace them outright with factory committee control. Immediately, the decisive question faces every worker: Now that the Nazis or pro-Nazis have been driven out of the factories, who is to own and control them? To be sure, the old owners, especially those who fled when the Germans came, will put in appearance and coolly claim ownership of their property, on legal grounds and on the political grounds that they remained good patriots throughout the trying days. It is incredible that in all or even in most cases, the workers will simply bow to these claims and, without another word, resume work where and how they left off in 1939. In many cases they will demand that the "state" take over the factories and mines and mills, that they be "nationalized." And, until this is done, they will probably continue to hold the properties "in trust," under their own control. In other words, the dual power in the factories will exist from the very first day of the "national" revolution.

Combining the National and Socialist Struggles

An example of one of the many and very complex forms that the duality of power may take in the struggle against national oppression is already provided by the situation in Yugoslavia. Already there are two more or less distinct groups conducting the struggle against the Germans. One, led by Mikhaiovich as representative of the Yugoslav government in exile in London, is thoroughly imbued with Great-Serbian nationalist-imperialism and simply aims at the restoration of the reactionary Serbian semi-fascist, semi-monarchical rule over the subject peoples who made up the majority of the former Yugoslav empire. It is not accidental that this movement is given official aid and recognition by Anglo-American imperialism. The other movement, the "partisans," seems—detailed and fully authoritative information is wanted—to be thoroughly plebian and more or less democratic in composition and aspirations. If, as appears to be the case, it is Stalinist-inspired and largely Stalinist-led, this leadership has not yet had the chance to become as extremely dominant and totalitarian as is undoubtedly the aim of Stalinism, and the indications are that the movement continues to be popular, democratic and organizationally and programmatically fluid. The bourgeois press reports about the "partisans" including in their ranks "Stalinists, Trotskyists and anarchists" are less significant for their accuracy than for what they probably truthfully imply, namely, that it is the political currents and ideologies of the working class that are dominant in this movement, and that these currents are as yet able to contest with each other for influence. What is at bottom the separation of the classes—the duality of power in its most primitive stages—is evident not only in the Yugoslav movement, but to one degree or another in virtually all the other countries.

Once the "national revolution" has triumphed, the struggle begins in earnest between the two class forces in the duality of power. In their resistance to the demands of the workers and peasants, the bourgeois elements in power will not hesitate to call for the armed intervention of big imperialist powers or even to surrender real or nominal power to victorious foreign imperialism in the hope of crushing the masses. The latter will then see more clearly that the national struggle of their own bourgeoisie was only a husk covering the aim of restoring their old class property and power. From realizing this fact to a realization that the national struggle of the masses was only a form within which they too must fight for their class position and power, is not too far a step in the political development of the people. In any case, it is not necessary to predict the course of the struggle or its precise outcome at any given time and in any given place. What is most important is that a favorable outcome for the workers depends primarily upon the degree of political development, the extent of influence, and the correct policy of the revolutionary socialist party that must still be built. The degree of its political development, in turn, will be based not only upon its fullsome participation in the living class struggle but upon the thoroughness with which it has assimilated the fundamental lessons of irreconcilable class struggle tactics and strategy to be drawn from the victorious Bolshevik revolution, on the one side, and from the vanquished revolutions in Germany in 1918-19, in Spain in 1931-36, etc., etc.

The intimate connection between the "national revolutions" and the socialist revolutions is realized almost everywhere by the bourgeoisie, but above all by Anglo-American imperialism and by the Stalinist bureaucracy. The imperialists are already preparing for a variety of concrete situations
and are working out the policies and instruments suitable for each of them. Special schools have already been set up for the political training of military administrators to rule countries and territories "liberated" from Nazi rule; other schools are engaged in training special occupational police. It is not hard to foresee that in the event the Allied armies are victorious in the war, attempts will be made to use them as the enforcers of "law and order," as was so widely the case in the First World War. At the top, feverish but organized and deliberate steps are being taken to gain maximum assurances of the essentially conservative, if not outrightly reactionary, character of the regimes to be established in the "liberated" territories, Germany included. That—and not some episodic considerations of military expediency—is the fundamental reason for the policy of Darlanism. Anglo-American imperialism is perfectly well aware that the "national revolutions" open wide the door to socialist revolutions. It is therefore determined from the very beginning to insure itself against the victory of the people by imposing upon them such tried and true conservatives and reactionaries as are today represented in the various governments in exile and national committees in exile, all of which together cover only the very short political range between de Gaulle, Wilhelmina, Haakon Otto Habsburg and Peyrouton, Sikorski, George of Greece, Mikhailovich and their similars. These candidate-rulers and candidate-dictators are being assured in advance of military support against their own people by imperialism. At the same time, extensive preparations are being made to blackmail the resurgent and insurgent peoples with threats of starvation if they do not observe "law and order." Food stores, food distribution, these are being organized with an eye to tomorrow in Europe, and there is no doubt that it can be converted into a formidable weapon against the socialist working class and the socialist state.

The International Character of the Struggle

From this standpoint, a tremendous responsibility lies upon the shoulders primarily of the British and American working class. A series of revolutions in Europe is a certainty. To a large extent, however, it depends upon the workers of the two big imperialist lands whether these revolutions succeed—and the world rises to a new height—or they are strangled in the egg by imperialist intervention and blackmail—and the world is hurled to a new depth. Active, aggressive international solidarity, in deeds as well as in words, is mandatory upon the Anglo-American working class in this connection. For the European workers, who stand on the threshold of great decisions, this solidarity is an indispensable ingredient in the formula of victory.

Just as the European masses must be exceedingly watchful of the machinations of the imperialist powers now playing the rôle of "benefactors" of the oppressed on the continent, so too must they be vigilant against the plans and actions of a much more subtle, and therefore more dangerous, enemy, Stalinism. The Kremlin machine understands better than anyone else the significance and potentialities of the various national movements and groups and struggles in Europe today. Everywhere on the continent its representatives and agents penetrate the underground and fighting movements. In some countries, especially in the East and Southeast of Europe, there is no lack of substantial material aid, in the form of money, arms and other equipment of warfare. In the border countries above all (but not exclusively), Stalinist propaganda persistently insinuates the idea that the masses must look to the Kremlin as their liberator, protector and patron. The Russian bureaucracy does not for one minute intend to surrender these prizes of war to its Anglo-American partners without a struggle! These countries are rich booty not only for London but also for Moscow. Indeed, some of the authoritative Stalinist spokesmen in the United States are already speaking pretty openly about the desirability and even inevitability of Moscow being the center for all of Eastern Europe, that is, of the Stalinist bureaucracy being given Eastern and perhaps Southeastern Europe as its "sphere of influence," that is, as its imperialist stamping ground, as its share of the imperialist spoils. There is no doubt that these voices will grow bolder to the extent that Russia's military position improves, and will tend to wane to the extent that the position of Anglo-American imperialism improves. The appetites and aims of the Stalinist bureaucracy will not alter substantially, however. It seeks to enhance its economic and political class position, its domestic and foreign status, by extending its reactionary rule as far as possible—not only in Europe but in Asia as well. The revolutionary socialists, who understand the true significance of Stalinism, must combat it and its influence in the national movements and most particularly in the ranks of the working class with relentlessness and patience, in political education and in action, stressing and explaining how the extension of Stalinist rule means the swallowing up of new millions of workers by the new slavery it represents.

Again and again the Marxist vanguard must emphasize that the struggle for democratic demands and for socialist power are not in contradiction to each other. They must understand how to prevent bourgeois and reformist politicians from representing these two struggles to the masses as mutually exclusive. The revolutionary movement cannot be regrouped and consolidated, cannot reach once more the position of leader of the workers and peasants without absorbing the fundamentally important conception that the masses can be set into motion again primarily on the basis of democratic demands. The link between that struggle and the victory of socialism is represented by the fact that the democratic and social aspirations of the masses cannot be achieved fully, cannot be guaranteed against reactionary assault and loss, unless the masses continue their struggle to the point of taking power into their own hands. Once that is accomplished and with a revolutionary Marxian party in the leadership, the advance to socialism is the inevitable sequel.

In the national movements, the question of their general and specific relationships toward Allied imperialism in the war is of vital importance. It is of the same importance to the revolutionary vanguard. The first thing to understand is that it is not at all settled that these movements will be mere tools of imperialism and not develop a full independence of their own. The decision, one way or the other, will be arrived at only after considerable internal struggle, accompanied by a deep-going process of differentiation. The second thing to understand is that the revolutionary and proletariat elements must fight tooth and nail in these movements for the attainment of their complete political and organizational independence from the imperialist powers and from alliances with these powers.

The third thing to understand is that just as the main enemy of the people in occupied China is Japanese imperialism so the main (not the only, but the main) enemy of the
people in occupied Europe is Hitlerite imperialism. The workers in the national movements therefore should not hesitate to come to practical agreements with Allied imperialism, or its agents or representatives, by which they are provided with material aid and supplies for the struggle. That means, furthermore, that the line of policy advocated by the revolutionists in these movements includes the advice to take all the arms that may be put at their disposal in the event of an invasion of the continent by the Allied armies. It is to be assumed that the latter will immediately endeavor to subordinate the rank and file partisans to the commands and the complete political and military control by imperialism. It is even likely that in the first period, at least, the imperialists will have little difficulty in realizing their program with regard to the national movements. In that case, the struggle for the latter will be part and parcel of the general inter-imperialist conflict, toward which the revolutionary internationalists have already established their fundamental attitude. However, they have no right to assume that this, the worse variant, is a foregone conclusion. They must double and redouble their work toward the end of fortifying the independence of the national movements, which can be achieved only under the militant class leadership of the proletariat. Under conditions of proletarian leadership of the national movements, it is possible to make the most profitable use out of the military vicissitudes and conflicts of the imperialists, at present as well as in the case of the famous "second front."

In other words, in Europe, as in the colonies, the struggle for national independence can be assured against degeneration into a subordinate, an auxiliary, an integral part of the imperialist war—thus depriving it of its progressive significance—only under the leadership of the proletariat. But such a leadership, and its infusion with a revolutionary ideology, cannot be assured unless the Marxists know how to grasp and operate the most powerful lever now available in Europe for setting the masses of the people in motion in a forward direction—the lever of the struggle for national liberation. Only by effectively employing this lever can the oppressive yoke be lifted from the shoulders of the enslaved peoples of Europe so that they can once more set foot on the highway leading toward the triumph of socialism.

The Cost of the War

A Preliminary Survey

At the end of World War I, when an economic assessment was completed on its costs, the world was shocked by what it then considered astronomical expenditures made by all the warring nations in a futile imperialist conflict. The direct financial expenditures for that war were almost equalled by indirect costs, i.e., capitalized value of life and property losses. A summary of the costs of the First World War revealed that the Allied Entente made a net direct expenditure of $125,690,476,497, while the Triple Alliance spent directly $60,648,160,600. The total direct costs of the four years' war were over $186,000,000,000. Indirect costs of the war, capitalized in life and property losses, totalled over $151,000,000,000, thus making a grand total of almost $338,000,000,000, representing the total cost of the First World War.*

Since the outbreak of the present conflict, various attempts have been made to estimate the costs of prosecuting a global war. From time to time reports of war expenditures for one country or another have been published, but no over-all picture was drawn. It is much too early to determine total costs, and information which is the property of government bodies is rarely made public in a coordinated way or for mass consumption.

How the Powers Prepared

In the February 6 issue of Foreign Commerce Weekly, however, Leon S. Wellstone, of the Division of Commercial and Economic Information of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, has written a preliminary observation on this subject entitled, The Cost of Hitler. Extremely interesting tables of war budgets and expenditures by all the warring countries make up the main content of the study, but the opening theme is that the war budgets and war expenditures are the result of the existence of Hitler and the Nazi régime.

Naturally, from an historical point of view, this has no fundamental significance; it is only a partial truth, or half-truth. The real truth is that war is the decisive way in which capitalist society endeavors to solve its inherent contradictions. Thus, Mr. Wellstone stretches a point when he includes in his estimates the war budgets of many countries dating from 1932. For the most part, the big powers (the United States, Great Britain and France) did not materially increase such budgetary expenditures in the early years of Hitler's reign. It was only in 1938 that Great Britain and France announced a huge increase in the military budget. Up until that time, the bourgeois régimes in these two countries at least were quite prepared to aid or appease a "revitalized" German imperialism. Prior to that time, expenditures were not unusual for normal peacetime military budgets. The smaller countries, Poland, Belgium, Holland, etc., whether content or not, followed the lead of their masters.

The military budgets of all the countries rose sharply only when war appeared imminent, when all hope for an understanding with Germany had paled. The degree of preparedness by the powers is graphically revealed by the following figures.

It is common knowledge today that Hitler began preparations for war almost from the day he became Chancellor. As a matter of historical truth, the German industrial and financial ruling class prepared for a new war from the day Germany signed the Versailles Treaty, in order to seek again what it failed to achieve in the last war, namely, a redivision of the world in its favor.

The War Budgets

The estimate of German expenditures for war since Hitler's assumption of power is over $100,000,000,000. A much poorer country, Italy, under Mussolini, has had an enormous military budget for many years. Since her entry into the war
in June of 1940, Italy has spent about $8,000,000,000. This comparatively small amount has, however, resulted in a complete dislocation of the weak Italian economic structure.

No figures are supplied for Japanese war expenditures since they are almost too difficult to obtain. Japan has been at war with China for many years. Even though this war was not fought on so nearly as large a scale as the present, it has been very costly. Despite an extremely low national standard of living, the Japanese war budget and direct expenditures, considering the experiences of all other countries, must run into billions of dollars.

What is the cost of the war to the United Nations? It is vastly greater than that of the Axis. In first place comes the United States. The actual expenditures have risen from $6,700,000,000 in 1940-41 (fiscal year) to an estimated $77,000,000,000 by the end of July, 1943. The presidential budget plan calls for an actual expenditure of $97,000,000,000 for the fiscal year 1942-43, while Congress has already agreed to a national debt expansion of $200,000,000,000. Wellstone writes: "Taking only the expenditures already used or now appropriated we arrive at the total of $112,500,000,000 for the last three years."

The fact that the United States is the arsenal for the United Nations has created some confusion to the effect that her Allies have no means to finance the war and rely entirely upon the efforts and resources of Washington. A cursory examination of the war budgets of the Allied countries will easily dispel this notion.

Behind the United States stands the United Kingdom (note that this does not include the Commonwealth). The British budget rose from 102,999,000 pounds sterling in 1932-33 to an estimated 4,500,000,000 pounds in 1942-43. The total expenditures of the United Kingdom have been 14,439,000,000 pounds, or $58,200,000,000. As will readily be seen, the expenditures of the United States and the United Kingdom alone exceed those of the Axis. Canada, with a relatively small population, has already spent almost $5,000,000,000 for war. The three additional British dominions, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, have spent almost two and a half billion dollars.

Although knocked out of the war in its early stages (June, 1940), France had expended over ten billion dollars in a relatively short period of time. Over a billion dollars was spent by Holland, Belgium, Norway, Yugoslavia and Greece. More than two and a half billion dollars was the cost of the devastating war to Poland.

Outside the orbit of the capitalist countries stands the Soviet Union. The figures presented by Mr. Wellstone, which cannot be verified by independent or Soviet sources, are extremely interesting. They show that the military expenditures of Russia jumped sharply from a billion and a half rubles in 1932 to almost fifteen billion rubles in 1935; that great yearly increases followed up through the year 1941 (there are no figures for 1942). On the uncertain estimate of forty cents to a ruble, the report shows that the Soviet Union has spent about $56,000,000,000, a sum greater than that of the United Kingdom and its dominions! A partial answer to those seeking the source of military strength of the Red Army is to be found in the military expenditures of the Stalin régime and the unquestioned preparedness by Russia for war.

Adding the costs to Czechoslovakia, Mr. Wellstone's preliminary survey shows that the United Nations have already expended $295,000,000,000 for this war. If we include the expenditures of the Axis, the figure will rise to over $400,000,000,000.

A Forecast of the Future

The economic editor in the Department of Commerce has not considered the increased budgets and expenditures of Latin American countries. Nor does he supply any figures on what the war has cost the Chinese.

The above figures concern only budgetary and direct expenditures. They do not take into consideration the capitalized value in loss of life and property which has already greatly exceeded such losses during the four years of the First World War. The figures cited in the opening paragraph of this article showed that the latter losses equalled direct costs. Mr. Wellstone takes note of this fact when he says: "...it would be difficult, if not impossible, to make estimates in human life and property losses at this writing. It may be noted, however, that during the First World War they were considered equal to moneys expended in military operations."

For this reason alone his estimate that the war will cost $500,000,000,000 before it is ended, is far too low. The economic editor "assumes" that the war with Hitler will end in another year, an assumption that is pure speculation. If we accept the estimate of other costs to be equal to direct costs, the war cost now is swiftly reaching toward one thousand billion dollars!

It is impossible to leave this subject without recalling the congressional struggles over the New Deal budget for unemployment relief and insurance, WPA projects and social security taxes. The struggle of the reactionary bourgeoisie against a six billion dollar budget sought by the reformist Roosevelt Administration to "alleviate the suffering of more than fifteen million unemployed" is contrasted to the swift passage of a military budget more than thirty times as great! The same situation prevails in Great Britain in the early skirmishes over the Beveridge Plan, which is a more diluted form of social insurance without even the social significance of the American New Deal.

Behind these astronomical figures on the costs of the war one can observe the disintegrating tendencies of capitalism busily at work. If the capitalist order continues for many years, the costs of this global war will be placed, as it is now, entirely on the shoulders of the workers, peasants and colonial peoples of the world. The increasing disproportion between the living standards of the capitalist classes in all the warring countries and those of the masses, the workers, the peasants, the middle classes and the colonial peoples becomes greater day by day. The destruction of the existing low living standards, not only nationally, but throughout the world, is sharply contrasted to the enrichment of the international capitalist class in the midst of the present conflict.

SAM ADAMS.

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Politics and Rosa Luxemburg

A Critical Review of Frölich's Biography

Hundreds of articles and biographical sketches have been written about the most gifted of all the women revolutionists and one of the truly great leaders of the international proletarian struggle for socialism. Her writings and contributions have been the subject of innumerable controversies in the labor movement. Some have praised them highly; others have discounted them as minor and insignificant. She has been defended, on the one hand, by "followers" with little understanding of her theories in order that they may attack the "orthodox, rigid and outlived" principles of Marxism; she has also been attacked and proscribed by others in the name of "Leninism." Only on a rare occasion has an article appeared which attempted to present some of her ideas within the scope of the historical conditions under which she lived and worked. For the most part her writings have remained untranslated from their original language and are therefore unavailable to great sections of the world labor movement.

Such a state of affairs alone would make the appearance in English of Paul Frölich's "Rosa Luxemburg" most welcome, were it not for the fact that the man who was the chief editor of her collected works and who had the opportunity of studying her writings and learning her methods through years of intimate collaboration, has produced a book which does not do justice to his subject. It leaves one with the feeling that the book's sole virtue rests in the fact that it is the only full-length biography of Rosa Luxemburg available to us. The reader is not given the "feel" of the movement in which Luxemburg functioned, as is the case, for example, in Mehring's biography of Marx. This in itself might not be too serious, but the lack of historic setting makes it virtually impossible to get a clear understanding of a number of her ideas and it leaves Frölich explaining some of her opinions on very superficial grounds. This is especially true of those sections of the book which deal with the disputes she had with her contemporaries, most particularly with Lenin.

Throughout the book Frölich seems to suffer from an ailment which is common to centrists—he cannot decide or offer definite opinions on issues in dispute. Instead he resorts to the "on the one hand, and on the other" method which superficially appears to be very objective. Torn from their historic context, principled differences are reduced to matters of political expediency, and differences in approach and emphasis are turned into principled differences. In this review we shall deal with two such instances, not merely as illustrations, but because they happen also to involve questions which are still alive today and problems which remain as yet incompletely solved.

Among Luxemburg's great contributions was her struggle against the revision of Marxism, both on the part of the reformists and the centrist, Kautsky. Her brilliant defense of the validity of Marxian theory at a time when a triumphant capitalism seemed to refute many of the developments Marx had foreseen is a tribute to her theoretical abilities. Her recognition of Kautsky's weaknesses and her break with him at a time when even Lenin was defending him reveals once again her fine political perceptibility. This phase of her achievements, however, like many others, is treated very sketchily by Frölich.

On the Rôle of Accumulation

Luxemburg was not merely a defender of what Marx had already put down in writing; she studied and knew Marx, but she also extended his theories and made a number of very positive contributions of her own. The most important of these is contained in her book, Accumulation of Capital. On the basis of Marx's formulations on accumulation and extended reproduction, she demonstrates that expansion, without which capitalism cannot exist, proceeds by a vast extension of the world market through penetration into and exploitation of non-capitalist areas. This process of development she divides into three phases: the struggle of capitalism against primitive self-sufficing society, the struggle against simple commodity production and, finally, the fierce rivalry of world capitalism for the last vestiges of foreign markets—the last chance of accumulation.

By extending its market into non-capitalist areas, it not only finds customers, but an arena for the export and investment of capital and the setting up of capitalist production. At first, capitalist competitors struggle with each other for the possession of these areas, and when the last of these have been seized, they fight for a redivision. With this, Luxemburg proved the inevitability of imperialism and wars in a capitalist world. At the same time she showed that imperialism is no solution to the contradictions of capitalism, but rather brings about their intensification.

On the basis of her theory, Luxemburg proved the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism, that it cannot emerge from its contradictions and continue limitless expansion. She therefore put socialism on a more scientific footing, stripping it of its last shreds of utopianism. However, she did not believe, as her critics have tried to impute to her, that the collapse of capitalism would be automatic and mechanical and that the working class could just sit back and wait for this to happen. She counted on the active intervention of the proletariat and believed that the international revolution would come long before capitalism had a chance to run its full course. For she wrote:

Imperialism is simultaneously a way of prolonging the life of capitalism and a way of very effectively limiting it. Naturally, this does not mean that the final limits will be reached inevitably and mechanically; however, the tendency toward these final limits is making itself felt already in a way which indicates that the final phase of capitalism will be a period of catastrophes.

And further:

The more violently capitalism liquidates the non-capitalist strata at home and abroad, and depresses the standards of living of all working people, the more the day-to-day history of international accumulation develops into a never-ending chain of political and social catastrophes and convulsions, which, taken together with periodically recurring economic upheavals in the shape of crises, will render the continuation of capital accumulation impossible, and make the rebellion of the international working class against capitalist dominance necessary even before capitalism has reached the natural self-created limits of its economic possibilities.

Frölich presents the basic concepts contained in Accumulation but there is no step-by-step development of Luxembourg's ideas which would have been particularly valuable to English readers, since Accumulation has not been translated.

It is in dealing with the critics of Accumulation that Frölich falls down completely. For example, on two occasions he points out that she made a number of errors which were uncovered by Bukharin, and he even states that if these objections are granted, her theories need modification, without, however, stating what these "errors" were or what modification is needed. In the German edition of this biography, Frölich states one of Bukharin's criticisms, but in the present edition there is only a reference to it without specification. In the earlier edition Frölich agreed with Bukharin. It is not indicated whether he changed his mind between the two editions, or whether he did not think the matter worth going into.

Luxemburg's work was not limited to literary efforts. Like all great revolutionists, she was a theorist and an activist. Together with Lenin and Trotsky she was one of the few who remained unshakably loyal to the internationalists' principles of socialism during the war, although she did not see eye to eye with Lenin on the formulations which would translate her opposition to the war into slogans of action. Her name is thus indissolubly linked with the founding of Spartacus and the subsequent organization of the German Communist Party.

The German Events

Little is actually known, in this country at least, about the Spartacus uprising, and even less about the specific rôle of Luxemburg in it. Frölich, himself a participant in the revolutionary upheavals which followed close on the heels of the war, although she did not see eye to eye with Lenin on the formulations which would translate her opposition to the war into slogans of action. Her name is thus indissolubly linked with the founding of Spartacus and the subsequent organization of the German Communist Party.

The young Communist Party led by Rosa Luxemburg was therefore faced with a very difficult task involving many conflicts. It could not accept the object of the movement—the overthrow of the government—as its own, but at the same time it could not let itself be separated from the masses who had joined in the movement. Despite the difference of opinion the party had to remain with the masses in order to strengthen them in their struggle against the counter-revolution, and further the process of revolutionary maturity by making the circumstances and significance of their action abundantly clear to them. The Communist Party therefore had to show its own face and make its own position crystal clear, but without breaking the revolutionary solidarity it owed to the fighting workers. Its rôle in the action had to be at once negative and critical on the one hand, and positive and encouraging on the other.

Among other reasons for Luxemburg's rejection of Radek's advice was the fact that the movement was beginning to spread to other sections of Germany and she believed that the struggle conducted with sufficient determination and energy would compel the government to make concessions which would advance the position of the revolution. Frölich declares that Luxemburg was justified in her general policy, but ends by saying:

"However, there still remains a residue which causes real misgiving. The party tactics consisting in defending the revolution, but the defense should have been conducted actively and not passively; it should have consisted of mobilizing every possible resource of the revolutionary proletariat for an offensive to compel the enemy to retreat both politically and militarily. And when it became only too clear that this mobilization of the revolutionary masses was impossible, and that a military offensive was also impossible, then surely energetic pressure should have been put on the 'Revolutionary Committee' in the interests of thousands of workers occupying strategically very unfavorable positions and in order to arrange for their retreat to safety.

"It is not very clear whether Frölich himself believes that 'energetic pressure should have been put on the Revolutionary Committee' or whether he is merely posing the problem. Assuming the former to be the case, he must then mean that this pressure should have been exerted by the Communist Party. What then becomes of his earlier explanation that the Communist Party was too small and too weak to play that kind of independent rôle? It is plain that Frölich himself, knowing the significance of the January defeat and the rôle it played in the inner life of the Communist Party, does not wish to commit himself.

And lastly, in dealing with the Spartacus events, Frölich should have felt it incumbent upon himself to place these events in their historic context. How important was the January defeat? Was it of transitory importance or did it have far-reaching effects which influenced the future course of the German Communist Party? It is necessary not only to give all the pertinent information about these events (which Frölich obviously does not do), but also to indicate their place in the history of post-war Germany.
disagreements on the "organizational question" and the second is in reference to the national question on which Lenin and Luxemburg had pricipled differences but which Frölich presents as a strategic difference resulting from "the fact that objective conditions had placed the two great working class leaders in different positions."

It is understandable that Frölich should try to minimize the differences that Luxemburg had with Lenin on the organizational question because they have been deliberately exaggerated and distorted by the Stalinists in order to convert "Luxemburgism" into a political punching bag (much in the same manner that "Trotskism" was invented). In order to carry out their perversion of Lenin's concept of democratic centralism and the rôle and function of the party, the Stalinists twisted Luxemburg's "theory of spontaneity" into a my- thological system and used it to justify their bureaucratization of the party as the Leninist concept. In reality, they overstressed Luxemburg's worst fears (and Lenin's too) when they warned against bureaucracy. The author writes:

"The theory of spontaneity which Rosa Luxemburg is supposed to have developed is said to be the negation, or at least the deprecation of the rôle of the party as the leader of the class struggle; an uncritical worship of the masses as such; an overestimation of the impersonal and objective factors; a negation, or at least a deprecation of the importance of conscious and organized action; and, finally, complete abandonment to the mechanical fatalism of the historical process.

Frolich is absolutely correct when he defends Luxemburg against this charge, pointing out that her whole life, her pre-occupation with getting the party on a correct political footing, her whole drive to action, are a refutation of it. For Luxemburg believed that the party must stand at the helm of the working class, that it must issue directives, must influence its actions, and set its aims as the achievement of the socialist revolution.

He is likewise correct in chasting her so-called followers who think that Luxemburg's opposition to Lenin meant that she was against centralism and discipline, for she believed that the party must be democratic and centralized, united and disciplined, as was demonstrated by the Polish Social-Democratic Party which she helped to found.

What then were the differences between Lenin and Luxemburg?

In order to understand them it is necessary to examine the differences in the situations which each faced. When Lenin wrote "What Is to Be Done?" and "One Step Forward, Two Back" he was writing about the Russian movement, which was then composed of illegal, isolated, practically autonomous groups, scattered throughout that vast country, and often pursuing opposing policies. His main argument was against the "Economists," who, believing that the coming revolution in Russia would be a bourgeois revolution, sought to limit proletarian activity to the economic struggles against the employers.

**What Kind of a Party?**

It was Lenin's contention that the working class, through its independent development, could achieve a trade union consciousness, but only a vanguard party, composed of professional revolutionists completely identified and fused with the working class, could imbue it with a socialist consciousness and make it aware of its great historic mission. In his pamphlets Lenin outlined the organizational steps necessary to be taken in order to achieve this kind of organization. He wanted a vanguard party closely connected with the masses, but hierarchically organized, with definite bodies, committees, and a program to which all members adhered, and which they actively carried out. The party was to be headed by a central committee which was responsible to the party congress, with the political leadership in the hands of the editorial board of the central party organ, which board could organize and reorganize the units of the party, admit or reject members, and make all political decisions.

In these pamphlets Lenin was referring to the Russian party at the turn of the century. He later explained that he deliberately exaggerated the points he made in order all the more effectively to argue against the "Economists." Lenin's concept did not favor a bureaucratic party, as was demonstrated by the democracy within the party during his lifetime, especially prior to the revolution, and his specific proposals were in connection with the given party, functioning under Czarist illegality, at a given time. They can be understood only in this connection. The fact that the party, during the course of its history, adopted different organizational forms is testimony of the fact that Lenin did not conceive of his proposals in 1900 and 1904 as universal and eternal. What Lenin regarded as a principle, however, was democratic centralism. But Luxemburg also believed in it.

Frölich points to the possibility that in his earlier writings Lenin might have exaggerated his formulations in order to drive home his arguments, but that he was elastic enough to change his tactics in situations calling for such change. As a matter of fact, Lenin himself explained his exaggerations, for he stated that:

"The basic mistake of those who polemize against "What Is to Be Done" today is that they tear this work completely out of the context of a definite historical milieu, a definite, now already long past period of development of our party.... To speak at present about the fact that Iskra (in the years 1902 and 1903) exaggerated the idea of the organization of professional revolutionists, is the same as if somebody had reproached the Japanese, after the Russo-Japanese war, for exaggerating the Russian military power before the war, for exaggerated concern over the struggle against this power. The Japanese had to exert all forces against a possible maximum of Russian forces in order to attain the victory. Unfortunately, many judge from the outside, without seeing that today the idea of the organization of professional revolutionists has already attained a completely different form. This victory, however, would have been impossible if, in its time, this idea had not been pushed into the foreground, if it had not been preached in an "exaggerated" manner to people who stood like obstacles in the way of its realization.... "What is to Be Done" polemically corrected economism, and it is false to consider the contents of the brochure outside of its connection with this task.

While agreeing with its political arguments against "economism," Luxemburg polemized against Lenin's organizational concepts. In order to understand her opposition, Frölich should have pointed out that she was arguing from the viewpoint of one functioning in the German Social-Democratic Party, which was a mass organization with long established institutions, with a strong base in the trade unions, itself, under socialist direction, with a substantial representation in the parliamentary field. In this party, "centralism" meant control by a party leadership which held the masses back, relied upon trade union and parliamentary activity as a means of struggle to such an extent that it became an end in itself. To break through this conservatism on the part of the party leadership she relied upon the independent activity of the masses, which she believed would correct the errors of the leadership.

Unless this dispute is set against its historic background it cannot be understood. Frölich mentions this in passing, but he does not give it as the key to the disputes. Instead he
makes references to Lenin's ability as a tactician who could swiftly change his point of view or deviate from his "principle" when conditions demanded it, and to a difference in character between the two leaders.

But Luxemburg differed with Lenin on the rôle of the party. These differences too were based on their different experiences with the party. Lenin saw more clearly the specific importance of the party, its rôle as that of educator and organizer of the actions of the masses. Luxemburg believed that the forms of organization would be determined by the struggle itself, that it was unwise and unnecessary for the party to decide in advance what the tactics of struggle should be. This was born out of the conditions of the German Social-Democratic Party, whose leadership tried to confine the struggle to the trade union and parliamentary tactics, whereas Luxemburg foresaw that new tactics would be developed in the course of the struggle. Lenin, on the other hand, believed that the party should try to work out and organize these tactics in advance.

In general, Luxemburg overestimated the historic process and underestimated the importance of the subjective factor—the party. For the whole post-war period elevated the importance of this factor—a period in which the historic process has produced numerous revolutionary situations which were missed because of either the absence of a revolutionary party or the weaknesses of existing revolutionary parties.

**Differences on the National Question**

The attitudes of Lenin and Luxemburg on the national question were distinctly different. Lenin proclaimed the principle of the right of self-determination for the small oppressed nationalities of Europe and for the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The defense of this right by the workers, especially those of the large, imperialist countries, was based on his concept that it was the extension of bourgeois democracy in the field of the national problem and as with all bourgeois democratic rights, the working class should strive for as full an achievement of them as possible.

Luxemburg rejected the right of self-determination in principle, declaring that its achievement was impossible under imperialist capitalism and that under socialism its application was unnecessary. She wrote:

> National states and nationalism are empty vessels into which each epoch and the class relations in each particular country pour their particular material content.

While Lenin was for the right of Poland to establish itself as a free and independent nation, Luxemburg favored cultural autonomy for Poland in a Russian democratic republic. Over a period of many years this disagreement produced a number of lively polemical articles on both sides and it is obvious to anyone reading this material that the difference was one of principle. While it is true that the objective conditions in which each of the great leaders functioned, Lenin in an oppressor nation which had within its borders a hundred different nationalities, and Luxemburg in an oppressed nation which sought its independence, largely influenced their respective positions on the national question, it is not correct to say, as Frölich does, that this was the real reason for their disagreement. Neither Lenin nor Luxemburg would have agreed to such an explanation.

During the war, the position of Lenin and Luxemburg with regard to one of the countries involved in the dispute on the national question, e.g., Poland, coincided. This was due to the fact that regardless of their difference on the principle of the right of self-determination, both were, above all, revolutionaries who placed the international interests of the working class as a whole above the interests of any of its national sections. The imperialist war of 1914-18 was the all-determining factor and determined for both Lenin and Luxemburg their attitudes toward the national struggles which had become subordinate to it. *During the war,* Lenin was no longer an advocate of Polish independence, because a higher principle—opposition to the imperialist war—had come into conflict with it.

To draw the conclusion from this that their differences on the Polish or national question were reconciled, as Frölich does, is false and does not do justice to Luxemburg. Their agreement on Poland was episodic; they were brought together on this question, so to speak, by their common attitude toward the war. In 1916, Lenin wrote in defense of the Polish Social Democrats (party of Luxemburg) when they opposed the slogan of national independence for Poland and he emphasized throughout that their position was correct "at present," "in the present epoch," etc. (during the imperialist war). This in no way constituted a change of position with regard to the general principle of the right of self-determination.

When Frölich attempts to show that Lenin was in agreement with Luxemburg in her solution of the strategic problem for Poland by quoting this famous passage of Lenin, without Lenin's underscoring of the phrases quoted above, he confuses the entire problem. For in the same article from which he quotes, Lenin takes the Polish and Dutch Social-Democrats to task for transforming their particular position on Poland and Holland into a general opposition to self-determination. While agreeing that their arguments are correct from the particular position of Poland "in the present epoch," he goes on to say that they are obviously incorrect in the general form in which they are presented. This is the key to understanding Lenin's position.

When the Polish Social Democrats claimed that the realization of Polish independence would mean the creation of a small Polish state which would be a military colony of one or the other group of great powers, Lenin wrote: "All this is very true in opposition to the slogan of Polish independence at the present time, for even a revolution in Poland alone would not alter anything, while the attention of the Polish masses would be diverted from the main thing: from the connection between their struggle and the struggle of the Russian and German proletariat." He goes on to condemn the position of the Polish nationalists, the right wing of the Polish Socialist Party, and to praise the Polish Social-Democrats for opposing Polish nationalism during the war. However, he adds: "But the very arguments which are correct from the standpoint of the particular position of Poland in the present epoch are obviously incorrect in the general form in which they are presented."

If this does not make clear that Lenin's agreement with Luxemburg on the Polish and national question was conjunctural during the war, the following should.

**Views in the Junius Pamphlet**

In her Junius pamphlet, Luxemburg demonstrates that during the war all national struggles had become submerged in the general imperialist conflict and that any small country wishing to conduct a struggle for independence during the war could do so only as the tool of one of the imperialist
camps. She concludes that in the imperialist epoch there can be no more national wars. Frölich tries to bridge this by saying that what Luxemburg meant was that "nationalist wars between imperialist powers were no longer possible."

It is not clear from the Junius pamphlet that Luxemburg is referring to national wars on the part of imperialist countries. Only when her statements in this pamphlet are understood in connection with her other writings does it become obvious that she is referring to national wars waged by small countries. (At the time of writing of the Junius pamphlet Lenin was not aware of the author’s identity. Had he known that it was Luxemburg he would at once have been certain of what was meant in some of the more obscure passages.)

In the Junius pamphlet, Luxemburg refers to Serbia’s right to self-defense, except that it had become a pawn in the hands of Russian imperialism in the war and therefore the Serbian socialists were correct in refusing to vote for war credits. "All small states, as, for instance, Holland, are today in a position like that of the Balkan states. . . . Whether it wished to or not it would become a member of one of the great national alliances." Following this she concludes: "Thus it is always the historic milieu of modern imperialism that determines the character of the war in the individual countries, and this milieu makes a war of national self-defense impossible."

It was against this thesis that Lenin argued, pointing out that such a position "loses sight of the national movements against imperialism" and that it is tenable only if the "world has been divided up among a handful of great imperialist powers, and therefore, every war, even if it starts as a national war, is transformed into an imperialist war and affects the interests of one of the imperialist powers or coalitions."

It is impossible to bridge the differences between Lenin and Luxemburg on this question by a purely conjunctural agreement as in the case of Poland.

For a time after the war it seemed that the national question in Europe was "solved," and that the dispute could be considered an academic one. However, this question has come up again and again, in the Soviet Union as well as in capitalist Europe. The inability of the labor movement to give a satisfactory answer to it gave the advantage to the fascists, who knew how to make demagogic use of the national aspirations of the peoples of that continent. The present war has once again placed the national question before the revolutionary movement, and it is in this connection that the opposing viewpoints of Lenin and Luxemburg take on practical significance. All the more important is it to have a clear presentation of these views.

The two weaknesses which characterize the book are so marked that they tend to destroy its value. The lack of historic outlook and the fruitless attempt to reconcile opposing points of view make it virtually impossible to get from the book a clear understanding of Luxemburg’s work and rôle. A whole generation has grown up and entered the revolutionary movement since her heroic death, a generation confronted with problems handed down from the First World War. They naturally look to the lives and teachings of the great leaders not for outright answers to these problems, but for guidance and method of solving them. A book on the life of Luxemburg could have been of tremendous value had it been written in such a vein. But this book serves no such function. While containing stray bits of interesting information about the life of Luxemburg, it contributes nothing important to the knowledge of those already acquainted with the history of that period, and will surely confuse rather than educate the young student of our movement. A definitive biography of Rosa Luxemburg has still to be written.

REV A CRAINE.

An Analysis of Russian Economy

The Final Installment

(Editors’ Note: The following is the final installment in the series of articles on Soviet economy. They are the product of an extended study of this subject by the writer. The New International takes no responsibility for the articles, presenting them as discussion material on the subject of the Russian economy.)

D—Social Classes in Russia

Our study of the Russian economy would be barren of any social significance were we not to examine the production relations characteristic of the mode of production. Stalin said that there were no classes in the Soviet Union “in the old sense of the word.” Let us see. Social classes are defined by the rôle they play in the process of production. What places do the “classless” groups known as the proletariat and the intelligentsia occupy in the economic system that still retains the name of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics? Who runs the economy? Whose life-blood cements and expands it? Who benefits from it? In order of their origin, let us analyze the evolution of the “social groups” during the Five Year Plans.

I—The Proletariat

1—The Worker and the Law

Throughout the life of the First and Second Five Year Plans labor fluidity was great. The trial of the “Trotskyist-Bukharinist fascist wreckers” only served to heighten the workers’ restlessness and not merely the fluidity of labor (labor turnover) but the actual flight of labor away from the city assumed disastrous proportions. To try to check this development a decree of December 28, 1938, introduced labor passports. This decree had no teeth in it because the worker was not the least intimidated by the threat of being fired for a day’s absence. Since he could always get another job but could not quit his job without giving a month’s notice, the worker very often took advantage of the fact that coming late twenty minutes made him a truant and caused his dismissal. On June 26, 1940, “as a consequence of the current international situation,” the 1938 decree was greatly “elaborated.” It forbade the worker to leave his job. Truancy and other infractions of the law were punishable by six months’ “corrective labor”—labor in the factory, that is, with a 25 per cent reduction in pay. Furthermore, the workers’ hours were increased from seven to eight, with a proportionate increase in the “norms” of work but no increase whatever in pay. Toward the end of that year, on October 2, 1940, the State Labor Reserves were created, which, as we saw, gave the worker free training of from six months to two years and made it obliga-
tory for him to work for the state for four years "at the pre-
vailing rate of wages." But even these Draconian anti-labor
laws did not succeed in making the Russian wage slave a
slave of old, an integral part of the means of production. The
Russian worker found all manner and means to circumvent
the legislation.

Reviewing six months of operation of the law of June 26,
1940, the Pravda of December 26, 1940, had to report that in
many enterprises, especially coal mines, truancies were greater
in October than in the months prior to the enactment of the
barbarous anti-truancy laws. The reports to the eighteenth
conference of the RCP in February, 1941, complained of the
fact that the workers still abstained themselves "particularly
after pay day." And on April 16, 1941, two short months be-
fore the invasion by Germany, Shvernik, head of the so-called
trade unions, reported to the eleventh plenum of the Central
Executive Committee of the Trade Unions that 22-32 per cent
of the workers still do not accomplish their minimum
"norms"; that, furthermore, workers of the same category
get different wages in different factories, sometimes even in
the same factory, and, worst of all "evas"; some factories con-
tinue to pay on the basis of experience rather than on the basis
of the piece-work system.

However, the fact that the Russian worker has been able
great measure to circumvent anti-labor legislation does not
mean that he is the proletarian of the high morale of the days
of his own dictatorship. It is sufficient to confront the hero
of those days to the "hero" of today to bring out the change
in morale in striking relief. Simply contrast the Subbotnik,
who gave his Saturday services without pay to his state, the
Stakhanovite, whose pay envelope is twenty times that of
the rank and file worker! The Subbotnik neither complained nor
boasted of his economic conditions—they were bad but the
movement of the economy which he ruled over was such that
he gained by the progress of the state. When, by 1928, pro-
duction had gained its pre-war level, the workers' wages were
125 per cent of that level. The Stakhanovite boasts of his pay
envelope and complains to the state of the disrespectful atti-
ture toward him on the part of the "ignorant" (read: rank
and file) workers who "preen themselves of their proletarian
origin."

When the First Five Year Plan was launched the enthu-
siasm of the workers for the Plan was so high that during the
first year all norms set by the Plan were over-fulfilled. The
bureaucracy saw the blue in heaven and raised the slogan:
The Five Year Plan in Four. But then the trade unions and
shop committees were still functioning and collective labor
agreements were in force both in state institutions and at
those private concessionaires that still existed, such as the
Lena Gold Fields. Rulings made by the Workers Conflict
Commissions generally favored the workers in their fight with
the management. On January 5, 1929, for example, Economic
Life, the organ of the Council of Labor and Defense, empha-
sized that piece work rates are subject to the approval of the
Workers Conflict Commission but that the responsibility for
fulfilling the financial program rests exclusively with the man-
agement. That issue of the publication reports also that it is
an ordinary occurrence for a worker dismissed by the man-
agement to be reinstated by the labor inspector.

When the worker, however, found that agricultural prices
had soared so high that his salary could not even cover the
purchase of sufficient food, his enthusiasm subsided and pro-
duction lagged far behind the Plans. Immediately the state
struck out against him. On January 24, 1929, a decree was
promulgated making workers responsible for damaged goods.
In 1930 it became obligatory for a factory director to insert
into the worker's payroll the reasons for his dismissal. That
same year the labor exchanges were instructed to put the
workers who left their jobs on their own initiative on a "spe-
cial list" (read: blacklist) and deprive them of unemploy-
ment compensation.

Of food there was such scarcity that rationing had to be
introduced in 1930. For the manual worker the rations were:
twelve pounds and five ounces of black bread a week, and the
following items, in quantities, per month: two and a half
pounds ten ounces of herring, thirteen ounces of sugar and
two and a half ounces of tea. Soon tea disappeared from the
meager diet and we read of the workers having a kipyatok,
which is plain boiled water, without either sugar or tea.
Meanwhile, unemployment had been declared officially to be
nonexistent and unemployment insurance was actually abol-
ished. The worker's ration card was transferred into the hands
of the factory directors.

The workers became restless. The rate of labor turnover
in 1950 was 152 per cent. But the slogan of "The Five Year
Plan in Four" was not changed. The controlled press voiced
criticism of the trade unions and blamed them for not seeing
to it that the workers fulfilled their "norms." In 1932 it was
declared that the worker could be fired for a single day's ab-
sence without permission. Moreover, the factory director
thereupon could deprive him not only of his food card but
also of the right to occupy the premises owned by the factory,
that is, the worker's living quarters. To stifle the expression
of dissatisfaction on the part of the workers, it was decided
to deprive the worker of any form of redress through his trade
unions by "statification" of the latter. In 1933 the liquida-
tion of the Council of Labor and Defense into the Economic
Council was decreed. Thus, while the factory director had
control over the worker's food and lodging, the worker had
no trade unions independent of the state to take up his griev-
ances. But it was impossible to decree slavery. So long as in-
dustry was expanding and workers were necessary to man the
machines, the workers took advantage of that one fact and
continued to shift from job to job.

The 1938 law was no harsher than the 1932 law but no
more effective. The barbarous 1940 law was likewise found
inadequate. Shvernik proposed that, instead of bare decrees,
the state use the indirect method to get the most out of labor.
Shvernik raised the slogan "To liquidate to the end equali-
itarianism in pay." In other words, piece work should be the
rule not only in 70 per cent of the enterprises, as heretofore,
but be 100 per cent prevalent. "Petty bourgeois equalitarian-
ism" and "depersonalization" must be "liquidated." The
Leader had been wise when, as far back as 1931, he had said
that there should be an end to depersonalization. It was high
time to realize that slogan.

What, precisely, does "putting an end to depersonaliza-
tion" mean?

2-Ending Depersonalization and Creating Stakhanovism

Although the state, as the owner of all means of produc-
tion, is the over-all employer, every state enterprise must pro-
cure its own labor force and there is keen competition be-
tween individual enterprises because (1) there is a shortage
of experienced labor; (2) productivity is so low that there is
a constant need for more labor than theoretically is necessary
according to the Plan. For instance, the First Five Year Plan
called for an increase of laborers to 15.7 million. Actually,
22.8 million laborers were used even to achieve the unattained production plans. Living quarters in the city became unbearably overcrowded but the famished peasants continued to flock to the city in millions so that a large reserve army of labor was finally created. In 1933 passports had to be introduced to restrain the peasants' search for employment in the city. In tune with the times, Industry, the organ of the Commissariat of Heavy Industry, in its issue of March 16, 1933, informs managers who had not fired their "poor" workers because heretofore there had been severe shortage of labor that now they have a "trump card: there are more workers in the shops than is necessary according to plans." (Emphasis in original.) In analyzing the excessive turnover the writer of this front page article has the gall to attribute it to the "enthusiasm" of the Don Basin miners for collectivization, which made them leave their work and "themselves" put through collectivization in the village! "But, why," he continues, "is there still excessive labor turnover?" One of the reasons he admits to be "In the communal dwellings, which have been built in the past months it is filthy, uncomfortable, boring." But the biggest cause for labor turnover is the search for better wages. He asks management to stop bidding against management for workers. Neither this appeal nor the anti-labor legislation that was enacted nor the fact that the proletariat was deprived of the use of the trade unions which had become part of the administrative machinery of the state accomplished the trick of straight-jacketing labor. The 1931 slogan, "Let there be an end to depersonalization," needed a big stick to enforce it. So the state arranged for a "gift from heaven" to be sent them in the form of Stakhanovism.

Here is V. Mezhlauk's (the then chairman of the State Planning Commission) explanation of this "gift from heaven": "A plain miner, the Donetz Basin hewing, Alexei Stakhanov, in response to Stalin's speech of May 4, 1935, the keynote of which was the care of the human being and which marked a new stage in the development of the USSR, proposed a new system of labor organization for the extraction of coal. The very first day his method was applied he cut 102 tons of coal in one shift of six hours instead of the established rate of seven tons." So this "gift from heaven" came on August 31, 1935, "in response to Stalin's speech of May 4." In the four months that elapsed between the two events a lot was done by the state to set the stage for "the miracle," so that the press, the photographers, the wires of the world immediately heard of "the gift from heaven." Contrast the hullabaloo about Stakhanov with the silence as to the hot-house conditions created for Stakhanovites who get the finest tools and spoil them at the fastest pace without the necessity of paying for them as the workers have to pay for damaged goods, and the silence as to the brigade of helpers who do all the detail work but get no Stakhanovite recognition either in fame or in money! These record-breakers for a day do not repeat their records but retire behind swivel chairs while the mass of workers are now told that the "miracle" should really be their regular "norm!"

Armed with Stakhanovism, the state was able to revive the 1931 slogan, for now they had the wherewithal to enforce it. Piece-work was made the prevailing system of work in Russia. In the state of Lenin-Trotsky, where the Subbotnik was the hero, the range of pay was one to three; in the Stalinist state, where the Stakhanovite is the hero, the range of pay is one to twenty!

3—Ending Rationing and Producing Luxury Goods

Ending depersonalization and creating this extreme differentiation in pay had its corollary in ending rationing and producing luxury goods, for the rise in pay would have meant nothing to the Stakhanovites if they could not put it to use. It is interesting, therefore, to note that whereas production of articles of mass consumption kept little pace with the demand for them, the production of luxury goods leaped almost to the miraculous heights achieved in the production of means of production goods. The tremendous increase in realized output of luxury goods contrasts sharply to the very slight increase in articles of mass consumption. Let us look at the luxury goods first: (28)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Watches</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>538,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gramophones</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>357,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameras</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>557,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk (million meters)</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>512,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even the Perfumery Trust, headed by the cultured Mme. Litvinoff, showed a great increase. (27) Contrast the 270 per cent increase in "production" of perfumes to the measly 44 per cent in the production of cotton goods for the period of the Second Five Year Plan!

Even so the Stakhanovite was dissatisfied, for it was irksome to him to be favored only in the matter of luxury goods, whereas in the articles of first necessity the manual worker with his ration card was still favored by the state stores. And the prosperous kolkhoznik who was not entitled to a ration card, of what good was his prosperity to him? Clearly, the status of these two groups contradicted the reality of rationing. The state took steps to end this contradiction.

On November 15, 1935, the first All-Russian Conference of Stakhanovites was called to order. It was addressed by the Leader himself and Pravda waxed editorially enthusiastic about the "salt of the Soviet earth." It initiated a campaign to teach the people "to respect those leaders of the people." It tried to counteract the detestation of the rank and file workers toward these unsocial speed-demons. That hatred had no bounds and it was not altogether an unheard-of event that individual Stakhanovites were found murdered. The press hushed down the occasional murder and played up the state praise. These Stakhanovites, the masses were told, were "non-party Bolsheviks." The Stakhanovites themselves were favored with something more practical than the label "non-party Bolshevik": rationing was abolished!

The abolition of rationing made it possible for the Stakhanovite to reap full advantage of his high salary. The abolition of rationing benefited the prosperous kolkhoznik who had heretofore not been entitled to a ration card. The abolition of rationing worsened the conditions of the mass of toilers.

The state, however, pictured the abolition of rationing as a boon to the workers. A lot was said about the "rise in the consumption of the masses." What they cited as "proof" of that was the increase in gross (not net) retail turnover. The State Treasury does not divide its revenue from turnover tax into that obtained from articles of mass consumption and those from heavy industry, but we know, through the manner in which it taxes individual items, that in no case could the

*Stalin's expression; see his speech on November 23, 1935.
percentage of turnover tax from heavy industry have been higher than 10 per cent. Hence, if we examine the gross retail turnover, we will see that there was not so much an increase in the turnover of goods as in the money turnover:(8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross Ret. Turnover</th>
<th>Turnover Incidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>19,915.5 6,735.1 13,180 51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>27,465.2 10,607.8 16,868 62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>61,814.7 37,615.0 24,200 155.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>81,714.1 51,900.0 29,814 174.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the effect of the turnover tax was "a rise in consumption of the masses" (read: a rise in the incidence of the tax) from 51.1 per cent in the first year of its adoption to 174.1 per cent in 1935, when rationing was abolished. According to the table above, that is according to the value of goods, production of articles of mass consumption more than quadrupled from 1930-35. But we know that, at best, production only doubled (that is, even if we take the Soviet economist's gauge of value output and exclude only the turnover tax).

Clearly, no more commodities could be consumed than were produced. But even if we accept the doubling in production of articles of mass consumption, we can still, by no stretch of the imagination, conclude that that meant a rise in the consumption of the masses. The high prices in effect after rationing made it difficult for the ordinary worker to buy even the few commodities he had bought during the rationing period. The rise in "mass" consumption meant a rise in the consumption of the labor and kolkhoz aristocracy and a decrease in the consumption of the rank and file workers, as we shall soon see.

The Russian statisticians would have us believe that there was a decrease in the prices of articles of mass consumption after rationing. As proof of that, they place parallel the prices in effect before and after rationing was abolished. However, what they place alongside of one another is not the rationed and non-rationed price but the open market prices, which were completely beyond the reach of the rank and file workers, and the commercial prices, that is, the state store prices after rationing was abolished and the prices were raised. As the table below will show, the reduction in the open market price (the single uniform price) was a tremendous increase nevertheless over the rationed price, which the worker had heretofore been entitled to:(9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rationed Prices</th>
<th>Open Market</th>
<th>Single Uniform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black bread</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutton</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower oil</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black bread</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>2.25</td>
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<td>2.85</td>
<td>3.76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunflower oil</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the "victorious reduction in prices" reveals a tenfold rise in prices since the initiation of the First Five Year Plan. The change from the open market price to the single uniform price benefitted only those who were not entitled to a ration card and had to buy in the open market. But for the mass of workers the abolition of rationing meant such a rise in price as must considerably decrease his standard of living. This deserves more detailed treatment, for his standard of living has deteriorated even more since then, as we shall see in examining his real wages at the outbreak of the Russo-German war.

4—The Worker's Standard of Living at the Outbreak of War

The above table was the first official glimpse we have had of the rising cost of living since the discontinuation of the publication of the food index in 1930. Further data in regard to the rise in retail prices in government stores in Moscow in 1939 and 1940 were gathered by the American Embassy and published in the November, 1939, and May and August, 1940, issues of the Monthly Labor Review. In addition to reporting the prices of food, the Review also records the fact that, although there were 129 items of foodstuffs in state stores in 1936, there were only 88 on January 1, 1939, only 85 on June 1, 1939, and only 44 items on January 1, 1940. Further, that such essential commodities as milk, butter, eggs, sugar and potatoes which were listed as available, are available very irregularly. The prices quoted have been disputed by no one.* The only subterfuge left to the Soviet apologists is that it is insufficient merely to show the rise in cost of food without knowing the Russian worker's preference in food—he may prefer herring to caviar. But our method of measuring the worker's standard of living takes away even that shabby subterfuge since the goods used are those found by an official study in Moscow in 1926 to be those consumed by the masses.**

**

COST OF FOOD IN CZARIST TIMES AND BEFORE AND AFTER THE FIVE YEAR PLANS (9)

(In rubles per kilo, except milk in liters and eggs in units)

Foodstuffs consumed weekly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foodstuffs</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black bread</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat flour</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>2.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutton</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunflower oil</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using 1913 as 100, the index of the cost of food for 1928 is 187 and for 1940 it is 2,248. The weekly wages for those years were: 1913, six rubles; 1928, fourteen rubles, and 1940, 85 rubles. Again using 1913 as our base for nominal weekly wages, we have an index for 1928 of 335, and for 1940 of 1,883. We can now construct our index of real wages by dividing the nominal weekly wage into the real cost of food, thus obtaining 125 as the index of real wages in 1928 and 62.4 per cent for 1940, when compared to Czarist times, we must not forget! Had we considered the further rise in food prices by October, 1940, it would have been a mere 55 per cent of 1915! And even that appalling low figure, which so glaringly proves the deterioration in the worker's standard of living, does not

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**Further, the benefit of the doubt in each case goes to the state. For example, of the eleven items listed in the 1928 budget, we have listed only ten because the eleventh, rice, was unavailable and rather than guess at a substitute we have simply taken for granted that the worker did without rice. Again, when the 1928 list did not mention the quality of food, we in each case put down the cheaper quality. Thus the price for beef is that of beef for soup, not either roast beef or beefsteak; the prices of butter and wheat flour are second quality, etc.

(89) The 1918 figures are from Prokopovits's Bulletin, No. 1-2; 1928 prices as in note (99); 1940 figures for beginning of year from "Monthly Labor Review"; starred figure, 1939. The 1936 study, including quantities, reproduced in International Labor Review.
picture the situation at its worst for we have considered the single uniform price in 1940 and not the open market price (to which the worker sometimes had to resort because few foods were available in state stores). On the average, the open market prices are 78 percent higher than the state store price! There is supposed to be no black market in Russia but in the officially recognized free market beefsteak sold for seventeen rubles a kilo when the state stores sold the same commodity at ten and a half rubles!

The full significance of the miserable living standards of the Russian worker first fully dawns upon one when he reads the Stalinist publicity of the "socialized" wage—that is, the free medical care, education and reduced rent that the Russian worker is supposed to count as part of his "wages" and of which he was deprived during Czarist times. First of all, even that would not bring the worker's real wages to more than 70.8 percent of Czarist time, which is not much to boast of for a "socialist" land. But more than that, the point as to the "socialized" wage does not affect our comparison with 1928. All of the beneficial legislation was enacted in the first years of the workers' state. Both in relation to education*** and health**** the worker fares worse, not better, after three Five Year Plans than before their initiation. And in comparison to his 1928 standard of living his 1940 standard is but one-half! His standard of living deteriorated not only in regard to the main basis, food, but also in regard to his four square meters of living space and his clothing (in rubles):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article of Clothing</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calico, meter</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolens, meter</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>120.00</td>
<td>83.5 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men's leather shoes</td>
<td>9.35</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>89.4 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's leather shoes</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>73.8 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galoshes</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>66.7 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We see here a fourteen-fold increase in the cost of clothing as compared to 1928. If, because of the paucity of data, we have not included rent and cost of clothing in computing the worker's standard of living and real wages, that, too, was in favor of the state. The inescapable conclusion is that even from the most optimistic view the worker's standard has decreased 20 to 30 percent from Czarist times and by half since 1928! Neither should it be forgotten that we took the average weekly wage: the minimum weekly wage of 25-50 rubles would have been insufficient to pay for his food alone, much less consider clothing and rent! Contrast to this deterioration the fact that the per capita income has increased from 52 rubles in 1928 to 196 in 1937 and that the "national wealth" leaped from six billions in 1928 to 178 billions in 1940, and you have the most perfect polarization of wealth in an "industrially advanced" society!

We have traced the development of the "social group known as the proletariat"; let us now scan the social physiognomy of the "classless intelligentsia," which is not a class "in the old sense of the word" (Stalin), but nevertheless performs the function of ruling production and the state.

II—The Intelligentsia: The Social Physiognomy of the Ruling Class

Stalin was addressing the eighteenth party congress of the RCP in March, 1939: "Notwithstanding the complete clarity of the position of the party on the question of the Soviet intelligentsia," the Leader complained, "there are still within our party those who have views hostile to the Soviet intelligentsia and incompatible with the position of the party. Those who hold such incorrect views practice, as is known, a disdainful, contemptuous attitude toward the Soviet intelligentsia, considering it as a force foreign, even hostile, to the working class and the peasantry... incorrectly carrying over toward the Soviet intelligentsia those views and attitudes which had their basis in old times when the intelligentsia was in the service of the landowners and the capitalists...."

"'Toward the new intelligentsia a new theory is necessary, pointing out the necessity of a friendly relation to it, concern over it, respect for it and collaboration with it in the name of the interests of the working class and the peasantry.'"(81)

The following day the press waxed enthusiastic not only of the Leader but of the group he extolled, the intelligentsia. Izvestia assured us that "these leaders of the people" were "the salt of the earth." Stalin, being a practical man, said that these "cadres" should be valued as "the gold fund of the party."

Molotov, addressing the same congress, was very specific as to who constituted the intelligentsia. He listed 1.7 million directors, managers, kolkhoz heads and "others"—that is, the politicians—who constituted the "most advanced people." When to the "most advanced" he added the rest of the intelligentsia, he got a total of 9.5 million who, with their families, constituted 13-14 percent of the population.*

Zhdanov, the secretary of the party, drew some practical conclusions from the Leader's "theory" and Molotov's statistics. It was true that since there were "no exploiting classes" there could not be any bosses. But there were factory directors and they were a part, a most essential part, of the intelligentsia, the very part whom it was necessary "to respect and obey." Therefore, he, Zhdanov, elaborated a plan by which to pave the way for smooth collaboration of these "classless" groups. The plan boiled down to a proposal to change the statutes of the party in such a way as to erase all distinction of class origin.** In arguing for the change, Zhdanov fairly wreaked tears of pity from his listeners when he told them the sad tale of a certain Smetanin who at the time that he was a worker at the factory Skorokhod had become a candidate for party membership. Before action was taken upon his application for membership he turned, first, into a Stakhanovite and immediately thereafter into the director of the factory, whereupon, according to the statutes of the party, he was placed in Category 4, for alien class elements. He protested: "How am I worse now that I am made a director of the factory?"

The eighteenth congress of the CP—not the factory Skorokhod "unanimously decided" that he was no "worse," and the old statutes of the party were thrown overboard. The party, at any rate, toed the "theoretic" line of Stalin and decided that there were no classes in Russia and the "vanguard" party therefore need have no class distinctions in its statutes. But the course of the economy which proceeded upon its way more along the line of the world market and less along Stalin's rationalizations, the production process which gave birth to a class and was in turn determined by it clearly revealed the social physiognomy of the rulers. Much as the Central

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*(81) Problems of Economy, No. 8, 1938.

**The 1940 census was not yet published. Molotov based his figures on the 1937 census, which was not made public because it was "defective."

***When the NEP was introduced, the party of Lenin decided to keep career elements out of the party by establishing three categories, in the order of the accessibility of entrance into the party: the worker, the peasant and the employees.
Administration of National Economy statistics tried to give the 1939 census a "classless" physiognomy, and incomprehensive as the data were, there is much we can learn from them in regard to the actual existence of classes from it. Here is how the Central Administration of National Economy grouped its population statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Pct. of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workmen in towns and villages</td>
<td>54,566,283</td>
<td>32.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees in towns and villages</td>
<td>29,738,484</td>
<td>17.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolkhoz members</td>
<td>75,616,380</td>
<td>44.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual peasants</td>
<td>3,089,079</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicraft workers organized in cooperatives</td>
<td>3,888,434</td>
<td>2.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicraft workers outside of cooperatives</td>
<td>1,394,209</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-working population</td>
<td>60,006</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals without indication of social standing</td>
<td>1,235,479</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These percentages were further reshuffled in order to compare the social composition of the land of "socialism" with the land of Czarism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Group</th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers and employees</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>40.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers and cooperative handicraftsmen</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourgeoisie (landlords, merchants, kulaks)</td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual farmers and non-cooperative handicraftsmen</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (students, pensioners)</td>
<td>236</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-working population</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not listed</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that the whole population is accounted for by using the family as the unit. That helps hide both child labor and dependents on wage earners. Note, further, that the population is practically one homogeneous mass of "classless" toilers: almost 50 per cent of the population are workers and employees and the collective farmers constitute practically all of the other 50 per cent. And where are the intelligentsia we heard so much about? The reader will search in vain for them. Yet every "academician" who set out to analyze the above figures in the official periodicals had much to say about the rise of the intelligentsia. Who are they? What do they do? In order to find them and learn their social physiognomy, we shall have to break up the single category of "workers and employees," which hides the ruling class under its broad wings. Let us turn to the occupational classifications and find out how Russians earn a living. The headings of the following groupings are mine, but the categories are from official statistics:

**ARISTOCRACY OF LABOR** (thousands)

- Heads of tractor brigades: 97,6
- Heads of field brigades: 549,6
- Heads of livestock brigades: 105,1
- Tractor drivers: 809,1
- Combine operators: 131,4
- Skilled laborers in industry, including metal workers, lathe operators, welders and molders: 5,374,4
- 7,059,0

**"EMPLOYEES"** (thousands)

- Economists and statisticians: 822
- Legal personnel (judges attorneys) 96
- Engineers, architects (excl. those acting as directors): 290
- Doctors and middle medical personnel: 762
- Middle technical personnel: 836
- Agro-technical personnel: 96
- Teachers: 1,288
- Cultural and technical wkr.s. (jnsts., labs, club dir.) 495
- Art workers: 46
- Bookkeepers, accountants, etc.: 1,795
- 6,451

**THE ADVANCED INTELLIGENTSIA**

Factory dirs. and mgrs., kolkhoz, sovkhoz and MTS pres. 1,778
- Agromenists: 80
- Scientific wkr.s. (incl. provs. of hgher. ed. insts.): 98
- Others (incl. the army intelligentsia): 1,560
- 3,474

We thus get a total of 16.9 million, or only 10.02 per cent of the total population who are considered a part of the "classless intelligentsia" in the broader sense of the word. The "most advanced" of the intelligentsia, "the genuine creators of a new life," as Molotov called them—those, that is, who are the real masters over the productive process—constitute a mere 3.4 million or 2.05 per cent of the total population. (We are not here considering the family unit since we are interested only in those who rule over the productive process, not their families who share in the wealth their husbands extract). The remaining eight per cent share in the surplus value and sing the praises of the rulers, but it is clear that they leave to the latter the running of the economy and the state.

The Central Administration of National Economy statistics, needless to say, did not reveal the exact share of surplus value appropriated by this "advanced" intelligentsia. But at least we now know who this group is and what it does. The part it plays in the process of production stamps it as clearly for the ruling class it is as if indeed it had worn a label marked "Exploiters." Just as the Russian state could not "liquidate Category 4" merely by writing it off the party statute books, so it could not hide the social physiognomy of the ruling class merely by choosing for it the euphemistic title of "Intelligentsia."

F. Forest.

**Correction:**

In the article, "An Analysis of Russian Economy," which appeared in the December issue of The New International, under the table on the "Relationship of Industrial Level in the Development of Russia and Capitalist Countries; Per Capita Production of Russia in Percentages as Compared to the U.S.A. and Germany," Russian industrial production as a whole when compared to Germany's appeared as 28.4 per cent. It should have been 46.2 per cent.

*One million in the Far Northern territories was unavailable for analysis.
*Stakhanovites are not listed separately; they are spread among the aristocrats of labor and "advanced" intelligentsia.
**Double-starred figures are those given by Molotov; I could find no later figures.

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What Does Spartacus Want?

[Continued from last issue.]

But we have now reached the point, comrades, when we are able to say that we have rejoined Marx, that we are once more advancing under his flag. If today we declare that the immediate task of the proletariat is to make socialism a living reality and to destroy capitalism root and branch, in saying this we take our stand upon the ground occupied by Marx and Engels in 1848; we adopt a position from which in principle they never moved. It has at length become plain what true Marxism is, and what substitute Marxism has been. [Applause.] I mean the substitute Marxists which has so long been the official Marxism of the social democracy. You see what Marxism of this sort leads to, the Marxism of those who are the henchmen of Ebert, David, and the rest of them. These are the official representatives of the doctrine which has been trumpeted for decades as Marxism undefiled. But in reality, Marxism could not lead in this direction, could not lead Marxists to engage in counter-revolutionary activities side by side with such as Scheidemann. Genuine Marxism turns its weapons against those also who seek to falsify it. Burrowing like a mole beneath the foundations of capitalist society, it has worked so well that the larger half of the German proletariat is marching today under our banner, the storm-riding standard of revolution. Even in the opposite camp, even where the counter-revolution still seems to rule, we have adherents and future comrades-in-arms.

Let me repeat, then, that the course of historical evolution has led us back to the point at which Marx and Engels stood in 1848 when they first hoisted the flag of international socialism. We stand where they stood, but with the advantage that seventy additional years of capitalist development lie behind us. Seventy years ago, to those who reviewed the errors and illusions of 1848, it seemed as if the proletariat had still an immeasurable distance to traverse before it could hope to realize socialism. I need hardly say that no serious thinker has ever been inclined to fix upon a definite date for the collapse of capitalism, but after the failures of 1848, the day for that collapse seemed to lie in the distant future. Such a belief, too, can be read in every line of the preface which Engels wrote in 1895. We are now in a position to cast up the account, and we are able to see that the time has really been short in comparison with that occupied by the sequence of class struggles throughout history. The progress of large-scale capitalist development during seventy years has brought us so far that today we can seriously set about destroying capitalism once for all. Nay, more; not merely are we today in a position to perform this task, not merely is its performance a duty toward the proletariat, but our solution offers the only means of saving human society from destruction. [Loud applause.] What has the war left of bourgeois society beyond a gigantic rubbish heap? Formally, of course, all the means of production and most of the instruments of power, practically all the decisive instruments of power, are still in the hands of the dominant classes. We are under no illusions here. But what our rulers will be able to achieve with the powers they possess, over and above frantic attempts to reestablish their system of spoliation through blood and slaughter, will be nothing more than chaos. Matters have reached such a pitch that today mankind is faced with two alternatives: it may perish amidst chaos; or it may find salvation in socialism. As the outcome of the Great War it is impossible for the capitalist classes to find any issue from their difficulties while they maintain class rule. We now realize the absolute truth of the statement formulated for the first time by Marx and Engels as the scientific basis of socialism in the great charter of our movement, in the Communist Manifesto. Socialism will become an historical necessity. Socialism is inevitable, not merely because the proletarians are no longer willing to live under the conditions imposed by the capitalist class, but, further, because if the proletariat fails to fulfill its duties as a class, if it fails to realize socialism, we shall crash down together to a common doom. [Prolonged applause.]

Here you have the general foundation of the program we are officially adopting today, a draft of which you have all read in the pamphlet, Was will der Spartakusbund? Our program is deliberately opposed to the leading principle of the Erfurt program; it is deliberately opposed to the separation of the immediate and so-called minimal demands formulated for the political and economic struggle, from the socialist goal regarded as a maximal program. It is in deliberate opposition to the Erfurt program that we liquidate the results of seventy years' evolution, that we liquidate, above all, the primary results of the war, saying we know nothing of minimal and maximal programs; we know only one thing, socialism; this is the minimum we are going to secure. [Hear! Hear!]

I do not propose to discuss the details of our program. This would take too long, and you will form your own opinions upon matters of detail. The task that devolves upon me is merely to sketch the broad lines wherein our program is distinguished from what has hitherto been the official program of the German social democracy. I regard it, however, as of the utmost importance that we should come to an understanding in our estimate of the concrete circumstances of the hour, of the tactics we have to adopt, of the practical measures which must be undertaken, in view of the probable lines of further development. We have to judge the political situation from the outlook I have just characterized, from the outlook of those who aim at the immediate realization of socialism, of those who are determined to subordinate everything else to that end.

Our congress, the congress of what I may proudly call the only revolutionary socialist party of the German proletariat, happens to coincide in point of time with a crisis in the development of the German revolution. "Happens to coincide," I say; but in truth the coincidence is no chance matter. We may assert that after the occurrences of the last few days the curtain has gone down upon the first act of the German revolution. "Happens to coincide," we say; but in truth the coincidence is no chance matter. We may assert that after the occurrences of the last few days the curtain has gone down upon the first act of the German revolution. We are now in the opening of the second act, and it is our common duty to undertake self-examination and self-criticism. We shall be guided more wisely in the future, and we shall gain additional impetus for further advances, if we study all that we have done and all that we have left undone. Let us, then carefully scrutinize the events of the first act in the revolution.
The movement began on November 9. The revolution of November 9 was characterized by inadequacy and weakness. This need not surprise us. The revolution followed four years of war, four years during which, schooled by the social democracy and the trade unions, the German proletariat had behaved with intolerable ignominy and had repudiated its socialist obligations to an extent unparalleled in any other land. We Marxists, whose guiding principle is a recognition of historical evolution, could hardly expect that in the Germany which had known the terrible spectacle of August 4, and which during more than four years had reaped the harvest sown on that day, there should suddenly occur on November 9, 1918, a glorious revolution, inspired with definite class-consciousness, and directed toward a clearly conceived aim. What happened on November 9 was to a very small extent the victory of a new principle; it was little more than a collapse of the extant system of imperialism. [Heart! Heart!]

The moment had come for the collapse of imperialism, a colossus with feet of clay, crumbling from within. The sequel of this collapse was a more or less chaotic movement, one practically devoid of reasoned plan. The only source of union, the only persistent and saving principle, was the watchword, "Form workers’ and soldiers’ councils." Such was the slogan of this revolution, whereby, in spite of the inadequacy and weakness of the opening phases, it immediately established its claim to be numbered among proletarian socialist revolutions. To those who participated in the revolution of November 9, and who nonetheless shower calumnies upon the Russian Bolsheviks, we should never cease to reply with the question: "Where did you learn the alphabet of your revolution? Was it not from the Russians that you learned to ask for workers’ and soldiers’ councils?" [Applause.] These piggies who today make it one of their chief tasks, as heads of what they falsely term a socialist government, to join with the imperialists of Britain in a murderous attack upon the Bolsheviks, were then taking their seats as deputies upon the world revolution. A study of the existing situation enables us to predict with certainty that in whatever country, after Germany, the proletarian revolution may next break out, the first step will be the formation of workers’ and soldiers’ councils. [Murmurs of assent.] Herein is to be found the tie that unites our movement internationally. This is the motto which distinguishes our revolution utterly from all bourgeois revolutions. On November 9, the first cry of the revolution, as instinctive as the cry of a new-born child, was for workers’ and soldiers’ councils. This was our common rallying-cry, and it is through the councils that we can alone hope to realize socialism. But it is characteristic of the contradictory aspects of our revolution, characteristic of the contradictions which attend every revolution, that at the very time when this great, stirring, and instinctive cry was being uttered, the revolution was so inadequate, so feeble, so devoid of initiative, so lacking in clearness as to its own aims, that on November 10 our revolutionists allowed to slip from their grasp nearly half the instruments of power they had seized on November 9. We learn from this, on the one hand, that our revolution is subject to the prepotent law of historical determinism, a law which guarantees that, despite all difficulties and complications, notwithstanding all our own errors, we shall nevertheless advance step by step toward our goal. On the other hand, we have to recognize, comparing this splendid battle-cry with the paucity of the results practically achieved, we have to recognize that these were no more than the first childish and faltering footsteps of the revolution, which has many arduous tasks to perform and a long road to travel before the promise of the first watchwords can be fully realized.

The weeks that have elapsed between November 9 and the present day have been weeks filled with multiform illusions. The primary illusion of the workers and soldiers who made the revolution was their belief in the possibility of unity under the banner of what passes by the name of socialism. What could be more characteristic of the internal weakness of the revolution of November 9 than the fact that at the very outset the leadership passed in no small part into the hands of the persons who a few hours before the revolution broke out had regarded it as their chief duty to issue warnings against revolution [Heart! Heart!]—to attempt to make revolution impossible—into the hands of such as Ebert, Scheidemann, and Haase. One of the leading ideas of the revolution of November 9 was that of uniting the various socialist trends. The union was to be effected by acclamation. This was an illusion which had to be bloodily avenged, and the events of the last few days have brought a bitter awakening from our dreams; but the self-deception was universal, affecting the Ebert and Scheidemann groups and affecting the bourgeoisie no less than ourselves. Another illusion was that affecting the bourgeoisie during this opening act of the revolution. They believed that by means of the Ebert-Haase combination, by means of the so-called socialist government, they would really be able to bridge the proletarian masses and to strangle the socialist revolution. Yet another illusion was that from which the members of the Ebert-Scheidemann government suffered when they believed that with the aid of the soldiers returned from the front they would be able to hold down the workers and to curb all manifestations of the socialist class struggle. Such were the multiform illusions which explain recent occurrences. One and all, they have now been dissipated. It has been plainly proved that the union between Haase and Ebert-Scheidemann under the banner of "socialism" serves merely as a fig-leaf for the decent veiling of a counter-revolutionary policy. We ourselves, as always happens, in revolutions, have been cured by our self-deceptions. There is a definite revolutionary procedure whereby the popular mind can be freed from illusion, but, unfortunately, the cure involves that the people must be blooded. In revolutionary Germany, events have followed the course characteristic of all revolutions. The bloodshed in Chausseestrasse on December 6, the massacre of December 24, brought the truth home to the broad masses of the people. Through these occurrences they came to realize that what passes by the name of a socialist government is a government representing the counter-revolution. They came to realize that anyone who continues to tolerate such a state of affairs is working against the proletariat and against socialism. [Applause.]

Vanished, likewise, are the illusions cherished by Messrs. Ebert, Scheidemann & Co., that with the aid of soldiers from the front they will be able forever to keep the workers in subjection. What has been the effect of the experiences of December 6 and 24? There has been obvious of late a profound disillusionment among the soldiery. The men begin to look with a critical eye upon those who have used them as cannon-fodder against the socialist proletariat. Herein we see once more the working of the law that the socialist revolution undergoes a determined objective development, a law in accordance with which the battalions of the labor movement grad-
ually learn through bitter experience to recognize the true path of revolution. Fresh bodies of soldiers have been brought to Berlin, new detachments of cannon-fodder, additional forces for the subjection of socialist proletarians—with the result that, from barrack after barrack, there comes a demand for the pamphlets and leaflets of the Spartacus group. This marks the close of the first act. The hopes of Ebert and Scheidemann that they would be able to rule the proletariat with the aid of reactionary elements among the soldiery have already to a large extent been frustrated. What they have to expect within the very near future is an increasing development of definite revolutionary trends within the barracks. Thereby the army of the fighting proletariat will be augmented, and correspondingly the forces of the counter-revolutionists will dwindle. In consequence of these changes, yet another illusion will have to go, the illusion that animates the bourgeoisie, the dominant class. If you read the newspapers of the last few days, you cannot fail to perceive plain manifestations of disillusionment conjoined with indignation, both due to the fact that the henchmen of the bourgeoisie, those who sit in the seats of the mighty, have proved inefficient. [Hear! Hear!]

It had been expected of Ebert and Scheidemann that they would prove themselves strong men, successful lion-tamers. But what have they achieved? They have suppressed a couple of trifling disturbances, and as a sequel the hydra of revolution has raised its head more resolutely than ever. Thus disillusionment is mutual, nay universal. The workers have completely lost the illusion which had led them to believe that a union between Haase and Ebert-Scheidemann would amount to a socialist government. Ebert and Scheidemann have lost the illusion which had led them to imagine that with the aid of proletarians in military uniform they could permanently keep down proletarians in civilian dress. The members of the middle class have lost the illusion that, through the instrumentality of Ebert, Scheidemann and Haase, they can humbug the entire socialist revolution of Germany as to the ends it desires. All these things have a merely negative force, and there remains from them nothing but the rags and tatters of destroyed illusions. But it is in truth a great gain for the proletariat that naught beyond these rags and tatters remains from the first phase of the revolution, for there is nothing so destructive as illusion, whereas nothing can be of greater use to the revolution than naked truth. I may appropriately recall the words of one of our classical writers, a man who was no proletarian revolutionary, but a revolutionary spirit nurtured in the middle class. I refer to Lessing, and quote a passage which has always aroused my sympathetic interest: "I do not know whether it be a duty to sacrifice happiness and life to truth.... But this much I know, that it is our duty, if we desire to teach truth, to teach it wholly or not at all, to teach it clearly and bluntly, unagnostically, unreservedly, inspired with full confidence in its powers.... The cruder an error, the shorter and more direct is the path leading to truth. But a highly refined error is likely to keep us permanently estranged from truth, and will do so all the more readily in proportion as we find it difficult to realize that it is an error.... One who thinks of conveying to mankind truths masked and rouged, may be truth's pimp, but has never been truth's lover." Comrades, Messrs. Haase, Dittmann, etc., have wished to bring us the revolution, to introduce socialism, covered with a mask, smeared with rouge; they have thus shown themselves to be the pimps of the counter-revolution. Today these concealments have been discarded, and what was offered is disclosed in the brutal and sturdy lineaments of Messrs. Ebert and Scheidemann. Today the dullest among us can make no mistake. What is offered is the counter-revolution in all its repulsive nudity.

The first act is over. What are the subsequent possibilities? There is, of course, no question of prophecy. We can only hope to deduce the logical consequences of what has already happened, and thus to draw conclusions as to the probabilities of the future, in order that we may adapt our tactics to these probabilities. Whither does the road seem to lead? Some indications are given by the latest utterances of the Ebert-Scheidemann government, utterances free from ambiguity. What is likely to be done by this so-called socialist government now that, as I have shown, all illusions have been dispelled? Day by day the government loses increasingly the support of the broad masses of the proletariat. In addition to the petty bourgeoisie there stand behind it no more than poor remnants from among the workers, and as regards these last it is extremely dubious whether they will long continue to lend any aid to Ebert and Scheidemann. More and more, too, the government is losing the support of the army, for the soldiers have entered upon the path of self-examination and self-criticism. The effects of this process may seem slow at first, but it will lead irresistibly to their acquiring a thoroughgoing socialist mentality. As for the bourgeoisie, Ebert and Scheidemann have lost credit in this quarter too, for they have not shown themselves strong enough. What can they do? They will soon make an end of the comedy of socialist policy. When you read these gentlemen's new program you will see that they are steaming under forced draught into the second phase, that of the declared counter-revolution, or, as I may even say, the restoration of the preexistent, pre-revolutionary conditions.

What is the program of the new government? It proposes the election of a President, who is to have a position intermediate between that of the King of England and that of the President of the United States. [Hear! Hear!] He is to be, as it were, King Ebert. In the second place they propose to re-establish the federal council. You may read today the independently formulated demands of the South German governments, demands which emphasize the federal character of the German realm. The re-establishment of the good old federal council, in conjunction, naturally, with that of its appendage, the German Reichstag, is now a question of a few weeks only. Comrades, Ebert and Scheidemann are moving in this way toward the simple restoration of the conditions that obtained prior to November 9. But therewith they have entered upon a steep declivity and are likely ere long to find themselves lying with broken limbs at the bottom of the abyss. For by the ninth of November the re-establishment of the condition that had existed prior to the ninth of November had already become out of date, and today Germany is miles from such a possibility. In order to secure support from the only class whose class interests the government really represents, in order to secure support from the bourgeoisie—a support which has in fact been withdrawn owing to recent occurrences—Ebert and Scheidemann will be compelled to pursue an increasingly counter-revolutionary policy. The demands of the South German states, as published today in the Berlin newspapers, give frank expression to the wish to secure "enhanced safety" for the German realm. In plain language, this means that they desire the declaration of a state of siege against "anarchist, disorderly and Bolshevik" elements; that is to say, against socialists. By the pressure of circumstance, Ebert and Scheide-
mation for the expense of dictatorship, with or without the declaration of a state of siege. Thus, as an outcome of the previous course of development, by the mere logic of events and through the operation of the forces which control Ebert and Scheidemann, there will ensue during the second act of the revolution a much more pronounced opposition of tendencies and a greatly accentuated class struggle. [Hear! Hear!] This intensification of conflict will arise, not merely because the political influences I have already enumerated, dispelling all illusion, will lead to a declared hand-to-hand fight between the revolution and the counter-revolution; but in addition because the flames of a new fire are spreading upward from the depths, the flames of the economic struggle. (To be concluded.)

ROSA LUXEMBURG.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

The Black ‘Republic’

LIGHTING UP LIBERIA, by Arthur I. Hayman and Harold E. Preece. Creative Age Press; $2.50.

“Lighting Up Liberia,” by Arthur I. Hayman and Harold E. Preece, is a study which has just made a timely début in the book world. Timely, because the headlines have just finished announcing President Roosevelt’s visit with the President of Liberia, Edwin J. Barclay. And Mr. Hayman has just returned from Liberia, where he worked as an engineer for the Firestone Rubber Co.

The book is a passionate plea that the United States mend its ways and install democracy in Liberia, or at least help the Liberians attain democracy. The authors are afraid that “progressive” United States will be swayed by Tories like Roosevelt with the native chief and that the same evils exist today as existed when the League commissioners made their tour of Liberia.

A native testified: “We are building roads without pay or feeding. We pay taxes. We are bearing this condition because here is our country, and yet the President says we must go to Fernando Po (a plantation). How can this be done? We cannot send people to Fernando Po and to the road. Where we get such an amount of people?”

This testimony and the testimony given by other chiefs resulted in their being arrested and fined $10,000 in American money, besides cattle, rice and other property stolen from the natives. Shortly after the League administrators visited Liberia, “President Barclay drew $1,500 from Liberia’s always half-empty treasury and headed south with fifty soldiers and eighty porters ... to lay down the law to his disobedient vassals. He told them: ‘I am directing this country, not the League of Nations. If any of you talk any more, I will wipe out the villages.’”

The authors go on to state: “Then to teach truly lasting lessons, the soldiers began entering the huts, beating and abusing their occupants, picking up their few miserable possessions. ... By the time the trip was concluded, the President’s expedition required 150 conscripted bearers to carry all the gold, cloth, ivory, goats, chickens ...”

Because its headmen had talked with League representatives, “Fishtown had to forfeit all its land, and twenty-eight men were shot.”

As for trying to change conditions by means of the ballot, Liberia’s elections, like that in many another republic, are a farce.

President Barclay, running for his first elective term, faced the stiffest opposition ever encountered by any candidate. Since one must be a property owner to vote, the Secretary of the Treasury worked frantically for days, issuing bogus titles....

As a final precaution, Monrovia’s one printer (Monrovia is the capital of Liberia) had been instructed to print only a limited number of red ballots (People’s Party) and an unlimited supply of the blue slips handed out by the True Whigs (President Barclay’s party).

Never in its history had Liberia seen such a drunken orgy.... The supporters of President Barclay erected sheds with long tables groaning under the weight of food and cane juice. Natives were rounded up and deposited these in boxes, shouting and shrieking as they went from one polling place to the other, calling for more cane juice.

The representative of the People’s Party went from one precinct to the other challenging the vote. The election judges laughed in his face; the court judges refused to accept his warrants. Three hundred Liberian soldiers massed in front of the polling places with their guns cocked, threatening to massacre the members of the People’s Party if through some accident it happened to win the election. People’s Party workers were shoved around by the soldiers and the police, who placed several of them under arrest of “disorderly conduct.”

For us, the most interesting section of the book is the one
that deals with the Firestone rubber empire in Liberia. The authors do not delve deeply enough into the story of the Firestone interests, their tie-up with the Liberian government and the United States government. But the few facts given reveal how American dollar imperialism works.

THE ROLE OF FIRESTONE

During the First World War, Under Secretary of State Robert Lansing promised Liberia a loan of five million dollars to secure Liberia's passive support and to prevent the little "republic" from falling under the sway of German imperialism. After the war, however, the United States Senate refused to grant the loan because Liberia had never been known to pay its debts.

But that little drama had not been lost upon the shrewd, rotund figure who became America's Secretary of Commerce. As an engineer, Herbert Hoover had bossed jobs performed by underpaid colored workers over a wide section of the world. Like many other American promoters, he may have wondered how the British and Dutch monopoly of rubber might be broken. When he learned that his friend, Harvey Firestone, was seeking a rubber concession in Africa, the machinery of the Department of Commerce began to move in the interests of Harvey Firestone.

There were also other considerations in the mind of Herbert Hoover. Agents were sending alarming reports to Washington—reports of native unrest, of African independent movements being tapped out by the drums across the breadth of that volcanic subject continent. The news from Liberia, always regarded as a docile, semi-protectorate of the United States, was particularly disconcerting to those whose main conception of liberty was to choke it with yards of stocks and bonds.

Firestone would make no agreement unless Liberia agreed to accept a loan, and to prevent Britain or France from ever obtaining control of the country. . . . Liberia, if she wished to continue as a sovereign nation, must accept whatever bounty America offered her—and on America's own terms.

Thus one million acres of Liberia's richest land, or any smaller area that Firestone might designate from time to time, fell into the hands of the rubber company for an annual rental of six cents per acre. In addition, Firestone was given rights to develop any industry in the country. The Firestone Company agreed to use its influence to secure the loan of five million dollars for its new step-child. Eventually, the Finance Corporation of America agreed to advance this sum with the provision that American advisers supervise the collection of all Liberia's revenues.

Meanwhile Firestone agents had come to the country to claim their pound of flesh—or rather acres of ground. Soldiers drove the tribes off the land without any compensation whatever. Hungry natives came to the plantations looking for work and this situation threatened to upset the slave traffic. Who would be left for the slave traders to kidnap if everybody went to work for Firestone?

The book goes on to explain how a labor hiring (actually a rubber concession) agency was set up, compelling Firestone to rent his labor from the state. Eventually, after the League expired, Firestone had to do his own hiring—this is done and the wage paid is eighteen cents a day!

Another interesting section of the book talks about Liberia's untapped natural resources. According to the authors, there is enough gold in Liberia to start a "boom which would eclipse California's gold rush of '49, but there is not one single gold mine." The natives wear ornaments of diamonds which they have found lying on the ground. There are huge quantities of mica, the coffee bean, sugar cane and cocoa which go to seed in Liberia for want of development.

... The Monrovia oligarchy for its own very good reasons has discouraged any attempt toward the building of factories. It permitted the Firestone Rubber Co. to come in simply because the government was penniless after years of graft and extravagance which did not put one pair of shoes on one pair of native feet. . . . The ruling clique fears the coming of industry as the Southern slave owners feared Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. . . . It would bring together native workers in large numbers who might show far less patience with bullying employers than they do with Firestone.

The solution to all this, as proposed by the authors, is for Marxism which has so long been the official Marxism of the United States to develop Liberia altruistically, and it is with this romantic, childish dreaming that one is bound to lose patience.

Needless to say, I do not advocate the plundering of Liberia by greedy nations. I only hope that the post-war world will give us a new concept both of nationality and world citizenship so that exploitation will end. The old way would lead inevitably to a Third World War, complicated this time by a continent-wide revolt of the native peoples which would shake the very pillars of the earth as we know it.

What a vain hope! We hope that the natives don't wait for a Third World War to disillusion them with the "liberating" qualities of American dollar imperialism!

SARA KLEIN.

A Bourgeois Mirage

PLANS FOR WORLD PEACE THROUGH SIX CENTURIES,

Now that the world bourgeois politicians are wracking their brains for peace plans, this little volume comes in handy as a guide to the principle reasons for the failure of previous plans.

These plans vary from that of Dante for a world state led by an all-powerful emperor, who would be comparable to God in the city of Heaven, to the more elaborate plans of Cruscé and Henry IV in the seventeenth century, providing for an international assembly to settle disputes among nations. Mr. Hemleben also describes the Holy Alliance and the Concert of Europe of the nineteenth century and the various proposals for international courts of arbitration of the twentieth century. In the main, these plans all proposed some form of a league of nations with a court to settle disputes among nations and a council to discuss and solve problems of international law, commerce and politics.

They were proposed by men like Erasmus, Cardinal Wolsey, William Penn, Immanuel Kant, William Ladd, Johann Bluntschli and James Lorimer. However, the majority of these never were put into effect, but those that were, all failed. The alliances of "Leagues of Nations" were instruments of oppression used by the stronger nations against the weaker. Despite the failures extending over several centuries, the bourgeois politicians of decadent capitalism proceeded to organize the now defunct League of Nations.

All previous plans were based on the theory that kings and ministers were responsible for wars. Again, all proposed to enforce the measures of their leagues by armed force, thus insuring a continuation of war as a social policy. Thirdly, they sought to convince kings that war was wrong by rational, logical arguments and that it didn't "pay—an ancient version of the modern theory that war in unprofitable. What they all failed to grasp is that most wars are fought for good, sound economic reasons. For the merchant class of the Middle Ages, the capitalist class of the nineteenth century and the imperialists of today war was the means by which important economic and commercial advantages were gained. No plan dedicated to maintaining the status quo in Europe or in any part of the world could have succeeded because it ignored the whole process of international capitalist development and expansion which swept aside all plans for peace.

However, in all due fairness to these men it must be said that many of them were the authors of proposals and concepts which lay ahead of their times. For instance, Erasmus in the sixteenth century pointed out that a previous plan for peace failed because "certain persons" who profit by war made the
realization of the plan impossible. He also maintained that wars should not be declared by heads of governments “but by the full and unanimous consent of the whole people.” Crucé, in the seventeenth century, recognized the importance of the development of commerce and industry in securing peace. He also pointed out that hostilities between nationalities are not matters of nature and reason but are only political. In turn, Jeremy Bentham, in 1843, proposed that nations should renounce their colonies and disarm. He also pointed out the evils of secret diplomacy and that diplomats resort to it because they fear the “power of public opinion.” Kant also asserted that wars should be voted on by the people and therefore the governments of all the nations of the world should be republics.

Mr. Hemleben, in summing up all these plans, says that, in practice, all the schemes devised to settle disputes and maintain peace, such as arbitration and economic sanctions, failed because the system of alliances and the concept of the balance of power gave rise to secret diplomacy and “fostered the growth of suspicion, distrust and fear.” In a very apologetic way, he has to admit that “the idea (of a union to maintain peace) was sound, but it was nullified in large part by a philosophy which gave full vent to exaggerated nationalism, to selfish imperialism and to almost unbridled militarism.”

But don’t be misled. Mr. Hemleben isn’t one of your hare-brained radicals who thinks that wars can be eliminated as a way of life only by the destruction of capitalism. Horrors, no! Being the head of the Department of History and Social Studies at Fordham University he comes forth with the only solution we could expect him to have. That is that the state must be subject not only to the positive law of treaties, customs, usages, etc., but also to “the moral law of nature, which is divine in its origin. . ..” International conduct must be ruled by ethical standards. If permanent peace is to be attained, men must turn to God for guidance and strength.” And so they have turned for centuries and so we have had war for centuries.

FRANCES GREY.

### CORRESPONDENCE

#### Reviewing Indian Books

In the December issue of The New International, you carried a review of a book entitled India Without Fable by Kate L. Mitchell. When I saw the head on the review, “Stalinism With Fables,” I was as mystified as the reviewer, Francis Taylor, seems to have been by the political line of the book. So far as I could discern, K. L. Mitchell is not a Stalinist, and the book did not leave the impression that there are two fables being perpetrated on the reader, as the reviewer would have one believe.

First for the fables: The British improved land irrigation and they “brought” political consciousness to the people. Now, I am not an Indian expert, but it seems to me that there is nothing erroneous in saying the British improved land irrigation, which without a doubt they did. It would be erroneous to say this without qualifying it and explaining that the British did this only with a view to developing India sufficiently to make her exploitation greater. And this I believe the author does in the book. She says that in order for Britain to develop an Indian market for British goods, the British had to construct “an extensive network of railways, development of roads and ports, the establishment of postal and telegraph services, renewed attention to irrigation projects, the introduction of an English system of education to train the necessary clerks and subordinate members of the civil service. . . .”

In her description of the beginnings of the Nationalist Congress, she points out very clearly that the British were instrumental in its formation only to stem the tide they felt arising. The baby grew into a monster for British imperialism and they dropped it like a hot potato. To extract these so-called fables from context is a spirit very alien to the Marxist movement.

Now for the “fraud” and “swindle” that the author of the book is supposedly putting over on the reader in her political views.

I wish the reviewer would re-read the book in a spirit of inquiry rather than rage. There certainly are enough bones of contention we have with the political line of the book to attack it for what it is—not for what the reviewer would read into it. A novice let alone a person with some political savvy, can see from the manner in which Mitchell “objectively” treats the views of the leaders of Indian nationalism that she believes that Nehru is the man to head the Indian government. This she believes because Nehru to her is a genuine anti-fascist and knows best how to compromise with the British and set up a government for defense of India against Japan. On the basis of this, to categorize her as a Stalinist is to use the Stalinist’s method of the third period—lumping everyone together. Thus Roosevelt became a fascist. In a similar manner Mitchell becomes a “liberal-Stalinist type.”

The Marxist movement has always used great care in labels. Labeling a bottle “Poison” without saying what kind can lead to theoretical errors of no mean proportion. Who would put Pearl Buck and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn in the same camp? No more can you put K. L. Mitchell in the camp of the Stalinists on the basis of this book. Can you put Henry Wallace in the camp of the Stalinists? Of course not. Objectively their lines coincide on a whole host of questions, but
actually they are motivated by different phenomena. Gurley Flynn on what is best for Russia, Pearl Buck and Mitchell on a desire for Indian independence which can never be achieved by their methods, and Wallace by a desire to preserve democratic imperialist America—an equally ephemeral hope.

It is just as wrong to say that the author "really" is not on the side of the Indian people in their struggle against imperialism. If by "really" you mean the proletarian revolution, you must attack her from another angle altogether. The trouble with the liberals of the type of Mitchell and Pearl Buck is that they don't want Indian freedom, but they do not conceive of the working class playing a decisive rôle. To them Indian freedom is something maneuvered on top by the British and the Congress leaders. But unlike the Stalinists (whom they are not at all loathe to play ball with), they do not decide that up to June 21 they are for independence by whatever means necessary and on June 22 they are not. Also the liberals draw their strength from the petty bourgeoisie, the Stalinists do not.

It is interesting to note that in the closing pages of this book, which are appended on to an otherwise good layman's guide to the history and background of India, no mention of Russia is made. A strange Stalinist indeed. And the Indian Stalinists, if mentioned at all (I do not have the book on hand) are certainly not glorified.

The program of the revolutionary socialists is certainly of such a character that it can take all comers and refute their arguments on the grounds on which they stand. It is not necessary to categorize them falsely in order to destroy their arguments or policies.

SYLVIA MERRILL.

Editor's Note:

We are in receipt of a letter from R. Fahan complaining about some distortions in his article, "World Politics and North Africa." He says in part:

Due to either bad typography or bad proofreading, the article as printed is incomprehensible in two important sections. Lines 10 to 20 of the first column on page 14 have been put in place of lines 20 to 28 on the second column of page 15, while the latter passage in turn belongs where the former has been misplaced. Thus, the article which begins with a discussion of the premeditated character of the Darlan deal suddenly jumps into some lines about political prisoners while on page 15 the section on political prisoners suddenly jumps into some lines about the character of the Darlan deal. This, of course, destroys the continuity and comprehensibility of much of the article.

We can understand the feelings of our contributor and promise to pay closer attention to proofreading.—The Editor.