KOESTLER AND JEWISH FASCISM

The New INTERNATIONAL

FEBRUARY 1947

AFTER FRANCO—WHAT?
An Editorial

The Traditions of Polish Socialism
The Influence of Rosa Luxemburg
By A. RUDZIENSKI

Post-Stuttgart Germany
Rival Strategies of the Occupying Powers
By GERTRUDE BLACKWELL and HENRY JUDD

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EDITORIAL COMMENT:

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Imperialist Rivals Jockey for Position

The days of Franco's régime in Spain have been numbered ever since the end of World War II. The Spanish clerico-militarist reaction which arose in the 30's to head off the rising tide of social revolution had not only donned the trappings of the successful fascist movements of Hitler and Mussolini, but, what was far more important, conquered power and consolidated it solely due to the military, financial and diplomatic support of Rome and Berlin. The doom of Franco's régime was, therefore, sealed with the destruction of its German and Italian precursors and mentors. Deprived of its international props, isolated in a world atmosphere in which "classical" fascism had become unpopular even with the ruling classes, faced by an aggressive Russian policy seeking a new sphere of influence on the Mediterranean, too compromised by its pro-Axis role in the war to permit even Great Britain to render effective assistance, subjected to pressure by the United Nations as a "menace to peace," Franco's régime is rapidly becoming a new "sick man of Europe" about whose impending death there is as much general agreement as there is violent controversy over who should take his place. The essence of the Franco question is, therefore, to be found, not in whether Franco's régime will survive, but in how it will be displaced and by whom.

The forces that are struggling to determine the successor to the Franco régime can be divided into three general camps. Of these, two are prominently in the public eye—the Russian camp and the Anglo-American camp—while the third—the camp of social revolution—remains hidden by the imposing police façade which continues to mask the widening fissures in the Franco edifice and to maintain an outward appearance of great strength. As during its Civil War, Spain is again both a battleground of internal class struggle and a pawn in a contest between two imperialist camps that ranges across the face of the earth. Spanish politics are once more closer interwoven with international politics. In reality, the latter is the key to the former.

Within Spain, the political struggle is waged by the traditional fighting tactics of the proletariat under a police dictatorship. Internationally, the struggle is waged within the United Nations and within the rival coalitions of Spanish politicians in exile. But the two struggles act and react upon each other. The reverberations of the rising resistance within Spain spur the imperialist rivals to more frenzied activities to consummate their particular aims before the revolution from-below takes charge and announces the day of reckoning for the old régime. The international maneuvers around the Spanish question, in turn, embolden the underground and ascertain for it the fact that the régime will soon topple. Sit-down strikes in Barcelona textile plants and speeches at Lake Success have, therefore, their own peculiar inter-relationship. But the main spur to the mass opposition to the Franco régime is the whip-lash of unrelied hunger.

Conditions in Spain

Only the dark pen of a Goya could adequately portray the profound misery of the Spanish people today. As in war-torn Europe, the black market remains the only possible source of food and clothing but at prices that the workers and peasants cannot possibly meet. A New York Times dispatch from Madrid, dated January 1, 1947, gives a hint of the misery that exists in the following words:

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This stark picture could be further illustrated in the language of figures if we were to draw a graph with two legends that respectively represent the catastrophic fall in national productivity and the inflationary rise in the size of the national budget. (Of this budget, over 50 per cent regularly goes to the upkeep of a fantastic military and police establishment that includes twelve admirals for Spain's tiny navy.) An example of what has happened to agriculture, Spain's main source of wealth, can be had by noting the downward spiral of figures for wheat production. In 1942, the wheat crop, which regularly accounts for 42 per cent of all agricultural production, stood at 2,900,000 tons. By 1945, the harvest had slumped to 1,800,000 tons. During the years of the Spanish Republic, 1931-35, the annual production of wheat averaged 4,563,000 tons. The smallest wheat harvest on record in recent decades was that of 1924, when only 3,514,000 tons was produced. Yet a comparison of this figure with that for 1945 reveals that in the latter year less than half this previous record low was produced.

A similar situation is to be found in the industrial sector as well. The production of iron and other minerals has fallen to half the pre-war figures. Since it is the export of agricultural and mineral products which provides Spain with the foreign exchange necessary to purchase coal, petroleum, cotton and other raw material for Spanish industry, Franco has been compelled to seize a larger portion of the drastically reduced agricultural crops for export purposes. Despite the "reign of


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hunger" imposed on Spain by Franco, industry continues to operate under crippling restrictions due to a lack of necessary imported raw materials. Because of this and other reasons, many factories are idle, while it is estimated that others are forced to operate at 60 to 70 per cent of capacity.

The Rising Resistance

Impelled not only by their hatred of the fascist tyranny, but spurred on as well by their desperate economic condition, the workers cautiously but firmly demonstrate against Franco's régime of hunger. That more strikes than ever before are taking place against the Franco régime is reported in the capitalist press. What is not reported, however, is that these strikes are taking place without police interference. The workers strike without fear of punishment or reprisal. La Batalla, published in France by the left-wing Socialist group, POUm, relates the following events in its issue of November 15:

On Monday, November 4, the workers, men and women, 4,000 in number, of the important textile firm, Battlo and Trinchat, stopped working. For three days in succession they maintained the same attitude. Although they came to the factory, they refused to start the machines. The demands of the strikers were those imposed by the present situation: itself, more food and an increase in wages.

A little while after the strike started, a large number of armed police arrived, ready to repress the movement. But the workers were not intimidated by the police and firmly refused to go back to work, saying, "We do not wish to work, because we die of hunger. We lack the strength to keep the looms going." These irrefutable arguments morally disarmed the police. The police, who receive a bigger food ration than the civil population, lost their initial arrogance when confronted by the spectacle of these starving workers resolved not to yield until their demands had been met. The police left, saying they would not intervene unless there were acts of sabotage or violence.

Despite the slow revival of working-class opposition in the factories and the ever-wider circles of workers participating in the organized activity of the joint committees of the NGT and CNT unions, the immediate threat of an upheaval is not from this quarter. The armed forces of the Spanish underground, in the main, represented by the Democratic Alliance, are as yet too weak and inadequately prepared for such an attempt without an internal crisis of the régime. Franco's main and immediate danger consists of the growing and articulate opposition that emanates from the bourgeoisie and the military hierarchy. Under its influence, even Franco's fake Cortes has come to life, and on December 30 the Caudillo was confronted by an unmistakable "parliamentary" opposition. Out of 500 deputies, only 189 voted on a question involving tax increases, and of these, 68 voted against the bill! A startling symptom of the decomposition of the Franco régime.

Intrigues with the Generals

As for the military hierarchy, Franco came to power with its aid and he cannot remain in power without it. Yet it is no secret that Franco has lost favor among the military despite the tremendous sums set aside for them in the annual budget. Franco has been forced to send one general after another into genteel exile, usually for a few months on the Island of Mallorca, for opposition to his régime. So numerous are these departures that the saying in Madrid is, "One general comes, another one goes."

One monarchist general, Kindelan, upon being allowed to return to Madrid from exile, stated publicly a few weeks ago that "I think as I did before that only the monarchy can save the country." Perhaps even more revealing is the atmosphere of intrigue and conspiracy which surround General Antonio Aranda, just sent into exile. Aranda is one of the most important figures in the military caste, having commanded Franco's mercenaries on the Asturian front during the Civil War. Aranda was exiled to Mallorca on the very day he was scheduled to testify at a trial of fourteen Spanish republicans found guilty of conspiring to overthrow the Franco régime in 1944. According to these members of the Spanish underground, they had discussed the question with General Aranda. The court found the fourteen guilty, sentenced two to death at the hands of a firing squad, the others to long terms in jail, but declared Aranda innocent of the charges. Aranda's exile to Mallorca has, for the present, disrupted the negotiations he has obviously been carrying on with leaders of the Democratic Alliance. More than this "punishment" Franco dares not inflict on members of the military caste.

A New York Times dispatch from Madrid, dated January 1, states: "New talks among all the opposition parties in Spain except the Communists have led to a definite agreement among them to work for the restoration of the monarchy. Socialists, Republicans, Monarchists and Catalan Autonomists are said to have been represented in talks ten days ago. At that time they decided that the most important point was to change the régime without disorder and that the best means to do so was through the restoration of the monarchy." The nature of the transitional régime is made explicit in a later paragraph which says: "The need has become urgent enough, to have brought all the opposition elements together except the Communists. The plan is said to be for the formation of a secret 'shadow' government of three generals and three political figures to prepare plans for reforms and then when ready to present the demand that they be allowed to take over under the aegis of the King and direct the country until elections can be held."

That Aranda was involved in these talks is indicated by the fact of his exile. That the spokesmen of the underground in this case were representatives of the Democratic Alliance is established by the repeated phrase, "except the Communists." The Democratic Alliance is led in exile by the right-wing Socialist, Indalicio Prieto, and is composed of a coalition of Catholic Republicans, right-wing Socialists, Catalan Autonomists, UGT union leaders, plus a section of the Anarchists. As the Spanish front for the Anglo-American camp, it aims to exclude the Stalinists from power when Franco falls. Its main strategy is to present the world with the accomplished fact of a "transitional régime" inside Spain, established through backdoor negotiations with Franco's generals and the Catholic hierarchy. Such a step would void the "legitimate" claims of the self-avowed government-in-exile, headed by Giral.

Until now, the Prieto group has given conditional support to Giral and has been represented by two ministers in the cabinet, Enrique de Francisco, Socialist, and Trifon Gomez, UGT leader. But, confident that an agreement will be reached with the Spanish military caste, Prieto has been urging the Socialist Party to withdraw from the Giral cabinet. On the eve of the joint conference of the UGT and the Socialist Party in Toulouse, France, on January 14, it was announced that Prieto's two representatives, Gomez and de Francisco, would withdraw from Giral's cabinet. The announcement was made by another member of the Prieto coalition, Rafael Sanchez Guerra, a representative of the Catholic Republican group in the Giral cabinet. Guerra said he would also resign because his group considered the Giral cabinet too far to the Left.
Role of the Stalinists

Deprived of the Socialist and UGT support, the Giral régime becomes almost entirely a front for the Stalinists. Giral, a bourgeois political hack, represents nobody in his own right. In this respect he continues to play the same role he occupied throughout the Civil War—that of providing "respectable" window dressing for a succession of cabinets. His reward was always the same, the opportunity to remain in office.

The Stalinist forces themselves, however, represent a considerable power in the Spanish underground. It is entirely likely, as some sources maintain, that the Stalinists have the largest and best-organized movement within the resistance. However, the greater the mass participation in the underground, the smaller will become the specific weight of the Stalinists. For the traditions of the Spanish masses are rooted in the Socialist and Anarchist movements, and as successive layers of the now dormant proletariat move into action, the underground organizations identified with the old movements will grow more rapidly than the Stalinists. It is for this reason that the latter are driving to secure the quickest possible downfall of Franco. Time is not on their side.

However, their desire for speed in removing Franco is not so great as to cause them to risk igniting a general revolutionary conflagration. The Giral-Stalinist group has, of course, attacked the proposals for a restoration of the monarchy, a transitional régime and a plebiscite. Yet every group and party in the Giral régime, including the Stalinists, has announced itself willing to participate in a government that includes monarchists and generals to avoid a revolutionary upheaval. Moscow no more desires an uncontrolled movement from below in Spain than does London-Washington.

On February 24, 1946, the New York Times correspondent, C. L. Sulzberger, obtained an interview with a Stalinist party underground functionary in Spain. According to the interview, the Stalinist declared: "Should Don Juan succeed to the government, contrary to general belief we will make no precipitate move until we ascertain the objectives and program of the new government." In addition, the Stalinist said: "We seek a peaceful solution and are ready to negotiate with all groups opposing Franco, including monarchists. We would like to form a provisional government, representing all factions, and then submit the final form to a popular plebiscite." Clearly, it is not to Prieto's program that the Stalinists object, but to their exclusion under Prieto's scheme from governmental power. Here again we see that the domestic program of the Anglo-American and Russian camps do not differ. It is the international orientation that is decisive.

Against this background, the actions of the British in the UN become clear. By agreeing to the diplomatic gesture of withdrawing their chief envoy they placate public opinion at home and block the Russian-Polish move to invoke economic and diplomatic sanctions against Franco, a move that might precipitate events in Spain too quickly for the British. Meanwhile they are working feverishly to bring about an agreement between the military and clerical hierarchies and the Prieto group for the purpose of installing a "transitional régime" and thus head off the Stalinist-backed Giral régime. It need not be added that though London has taken the initiative in the matter, it acts with the consent of Washington.

It thus becomes apparent that all the agitation in the UN over the Franco régime is in reality agitation over the possible consequences of his removal. The Anglo-American camp and the Russian camp both fear that the removal of Franco will strengthen their rivals. But both camps have a common fear that the removal of Franco may unleash social forces that will prove difficult to control. The UN intervention against Franco turns out to be a precautionary intervention to intercept a possible social upheaval against Franco.

The bankruptcy of the Franco régime is complete. Its economic, political and moral props are gone. Its military prop is waverering. The Spanish people are preparing to set accounts with their bloody oppressors. The intervention of the imperialist powers, whether in the guise of the UN or not, can only, on the one hand, afford Franco with capital for nationalist demagogy, while on the other it prepares the machinery of intervention against the Spanish Revolution. The line which the Fourth Internationalists must follow, therefore, is the following: No imperialist intervention in Spain! All possible world proletarian support to the Spanish Revolution!

*Such as the public blessings of the Vatican.

Post-Stuttgart Germany

Yesterday's Partners in war are stalking one another. The enemy's safe was cracked, the door blasted open and a preliminary division of the vast loot took place. But much remains, including the safe itself. The oaths and promises of bygone days are discarded; pledges of eternal fidelity and friendship dissolve in the acid of distrust and growing hatred. Hitler is gone; his principal associates are gone. The partners in the democratic crusade stand face to face—and how revolting they find each other!

"Mr. Byrnes" speaks "in the role of American protector of Germany," according to Mr. Zhukov of Russia's Pravda. Russia refuses to "carry out the Potsdam accord," is the counter-accusation of Mr. Byrnes. England, most anxious to end the Potsdam accord by any expediency, supports the Byrnes accusation loudest of all. The French, glancing up a moment from their concentrated task of plucking the last shred of meat from the bare bones of their section of Germany, wring their hands and mourn the growing mutual distrust. The partners stalk each other on the soil of Germany, knives sharpened and muscles tensed. The war ended one and a half years ago. The trend in Germany has been reversed, something not difficult to have foretold. The object of this article is to examine that reversal.

Two unheralded announcements indicated how clear had been the reversal in policy, particularly as concerns America and its western zone of Germany. The Army of Occupation announced it is considering the question of turning over surplus military materials (trucks, jeeps, tractors, bridges, steel, rolling stock, etc.) to the German occupation government. The value of this material, announced as one billion dollars, could
hardly be paid for by a bankrupt, stagnant Germany. Therefore, it was clear that a possible loan to Germany was being considered, meaning the opening up of a billion dollar credit to Germany’s account. This has now been confirmed. Secondly, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation announced on October 7, its intention to send an economic mission to “study ways of reviving German industry sufficiently to enable the American zone to repay in exports what it is currently receiving in imported goods essential to its survival.” The primary objective of the twelve-man commission will be to “assist in the revival of the zone’s economy.” Quite a different tune from the proud boast of General Eisenhower, in October, 1945, that German industry in the American zone had been reduced to “10 per cent of its capacity”!* 

The Potsdam Agreement had marked the peak and highest possible point of cooperation between the Allies of yesteryear. Behind its imperialist facade, a pseudo-legal basis was provided for a common policy of outright thievery, plundering and pillage. The four conquerors of Germany shared, to the greatest possible extent, in a parcelling out of the greater portion of Germany’s remaining liquid wealth. Each power, of course, sated his lust in his own unique manner, as has already been described in our magazine. (cf. The New International, May and August, 1946.) Once this process had been completed, the appetites of expanding rival systems necessarily took the upper hand and an entirely contrary process began. We are now in the earliest stages of this contrary process.

**Opposition to Potsdam Terms**

The first rumblings against the Potsdam Agreement to cut down and rigidly control German industry came from the British, who saw the loss of their best Continental customer, as well as an indirect but equally dire effect upon the small nations of Western Europe and France. The more positive aspect of Potsdam, the treatment of Germany as an economic unit by the Four Powers, never went into effect. Practically speaking, this was due to the heavy milking by Russia and France which excluded any fulfillment of the Potsdam terms. The lack of raw materials in the American zone (coal, in particular), and a similar lack in the British zone (due to French insistence upon getting the entire output of the Ruhr mines) made these two Powers especially favor and advocate the carrying out of some form of German economic unification. But, for some time now, it was clear that nothing would come of this, except on an entirely new basis. As long back as 1944, Russia had expressed its negative attitude toward common economic plans by refusing to join the Emergency Economic Committee for Europe, an outfit created by the Allies to organize a clearing house in the British zone for exports and imports to a defeated Germany. Early in 1946, the British discovered they were losing 80,000,000 pounds sterling ($320,000,000) per year, in order to maintain the minimum living standards set for their zone. This was an added compulsion to their desire to liquidate Potsdam and its stagnant consequences, replacing it with a new and more satisfactory accord.

Any effort to draw up plans and carry out the economic clauses of Potsdam led to nothing but wrangling and dispute. For example, General Clay, head of the American zone, insisted that complete free trade exist throughout Germany, and that the proceeds of any exports should go to Germany as a whole. When Russia rejected this proposal, he suspended the shipment of dismantled plants to Russia (as provided in the Potsdam Agreement), announcing that shipment would not be resumed until the Four Powers “agreed to treat Germany as an economic unit.” The breach was widening.

On July 7, 1946 the British authorities piously announced that their obligations under Potsdam had been met, but that—in accordance with their prior declaration of alarm (June 12, 1946) that their zone was in danger of complete economic collapse—they were in complete agreement with the American zone commander’s statement that removal of all economic assets from Germany, as reparations, must be halted. All this was preliminary to the opening of negotiations for the merger of the British and American zones, an action now officially completed. Within less than one year the Potsdam Agreement was deadlier than the proverbial dodo. The Molotov speech at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris, followed by Byrnes’ counter-speech delivered at Stuttgart, formalized its interment, and signified that a new stage had been reached—one of open tactical and strategic struggle for mass support from the German people, as an essential (even if long-range) step in the preparation of war. Molotov, leader of Stalinist imperialism abroad, publicly vied with Byrnes, leader of the Anglo-American imperialist bloc, for political control over the whole of Germany and for allies. The actions and policies pursued by the new rivals are today mere aspects of this general strategic aim.

The most practical and clearest step forward in the Anglo-American bid for mastery of Greater Germany has been the unification of the British and American zones along economic and now political lines. This unification is based on a decentralized federal scheme, with central controls through top Allied agencies. The apparatus for a thorough coordination of the economic life of Western Germany has been set up with the aim, as expressed by the American general, Draper, of creating “a self-respecting, self-supporting Germany, able to pay for its food imports in spite of the loss of rich agricultural territory.” The small French zone, minus the Saar, will undoubtedly be squeezed into joining this American-built federation of western Germany. The process of restoring the entire area into a unit of world capitalism, confronting the Russian empire, will proceed apace.

**The Capacity of Pre-War Germany**

It is often stressed that Germany, lying at the heart of Europe, dominates the Continent and that the direction of its economy and the political action of its people are, in historic terms, decisive for Europe. This is true today as before, when properly understood and qualified. With this basic struggle between Anglo-American imperialism and Russian imperialism now on, it is worth reviewing the economic and social resources of the country as a whole, to obtain a clearer picture of what is at stake.

The population of Germany in 1939 (less Austria and the Czech Sudetenland) was 60,000,000 living in a 181,360 square mile territory, or a density of 382 Germans per square mile.* This Germany was a vast empire of modern production, second only to the United States, that determined the direction and trend of European economy. Basing themselves upon rich natural resources and basic materials, powerful industries in

*The official economic merger of the British and American zones, as of January 1, 1947, has disclosed the extent to which these two powers are prepared to prime German economic life. In 1947, the two powers will make available one billion dollars worth of raw materials and food, for purposes of reviving the German export trade, to German manufacturers. It is estimated that by 1950, three billion dollars will have been invested to place the merged zones on a self-sustaining basis (by Anglo-American imposed standards).

*Compare with present estimation of 65,900,000 Germans, living in an area of 127,000 square miles or a density of 474 per square mile.
chemicals, machine tools, synthetics, metals, building materials, etc., were built up. Complex manufactured products, rivaling those of the United States, were sold on the international market—ball bearings, tractors, cars and trucks, electrical equipment, alloys, etc. Clearly defined areas of industrialization—the Ruhr-Essen valley; the Saarland; the Berlin area; the lower Silesia regions—dominated the country. Food was the one essential item in which national Germany was weak. Although it employed the most advanced agricultural techniques to produce enormous quantities (e.g., five and one-half million metric tons of wheat; fifty-six million tons of potatoes; seventeen million tons of beet sugar in 1939), the country had an annual food shortage of approximately 20 per cent, which it had to import from abroad. Food imports averaged about 33 per cent of total yearly imports.

German economy had, naturally, basic ties with the world market, particularly with the United States, England, Argentina, France and the smaller countries surrounding Germany proper. In 1938 German imports amounted to five and a half billion Reichmarks (two billion dollars, if we accept the forty cents valuation of the RM at that time), as against exports of five and half billion Reichmarks. Imports included wheat, butter, coffee, fruits, raw cotton, wool, oils, some coal, copper, timber, etc.—material for the German mills. Exports were characteristic of this industrial nation—coal, silks and rayons, woolen and cotton goods, leather, paper, dyes, pharmaceutics, glassware, iron, steel and copperware, electrical equipment, etc. In examining the separate zones we shall detail more about the productive capacity of Germany. A solid floor under this vast productive apparatus was provided by 185 million tons of coal, twenty-three million tons of ingot steel, and ten million tons of iron ore (1939).

**Capacity of the German Zones**

The rush of the Allied forces across the face of Germany when Nazidom fell had other purposes beyond that of sealing the victory over Hitler. Besides assuring against any possible revolutionary efforts, or the emergence of “dual power” tendencies by anti-fascist groups, the victors were anxious to guarantee occupation of territories allotted by long, prior arrangement. So delicate was the balance of forces that those powers that overran their allotted territories (French and Americans) were obliged to withdraw at a later stage. Then was created the sealed zonal system into which Germany is, still, substantially divided. The character of each zone expresses more than the geographic-tactical proximity of its particular occupant; it expresses to a greater degree the economic and social character of the occupant—above all, what that occupant is after.

The zonal territorial and population division is as follows:

- **American Zone** ......... 42,600 sq. miles — 17,000,000 Germans
- **British Zone** ............ 37,000 sq. miles — 23,000,000 Germans
- **French Zone** ............. 17,000 sq. miles — 6,000,000 Germans
  (Western Zone)
  **Total** .................. 96,600 sq. miles — 46,000,000 Germans
- **Russian Zone** ............ 46,000 sq. miles — 20,000,000 Germans

In general, each zone had the following economic capacity and comparative standing before the collapse:

The **Russian zone** (if we include the areas now occupied also by Poland—a legitimate inclusion since the Russian system merely “farms out” these territories to the equally occupied and equally unhappy Poles), was first among the zones in agriculture, and second in industry. It created one-third of the national income, and its population included 40 per cent of Greater Germany’s agricultural population, and 33 per cent of its workers. In 1936, this area was self-sufficient in food, and produced a 10 per cent surplus for the rest of Germany. It has the greatest proportion of cultivated land and, with the inclusion of Saxony and Thuringia, was a mighty productive industrial unit. Although it was dependent upon the Ruhr for raw materials, it had chemical and light metal industries, iron and steel finishing industries and electrical goods industries. Its total pre-war production was 20 per cent of the German total. Foods grown (in surplus) included rye, wheat, barley, oats and potatoes. There were valuable hard coal resources. Altogether, this zone was rich, productive and well-balanced.

The **British zone** was first in industrial productivity among the four zones, and third in agricultural production. This zone had 30 per cent of total German resources, and gave forth 30 per cent of total industrial production. It was, as is well known, the industrial heart of Germany, as the following testifies:

- Production of mineral ores........ 60% of total
- Production of coal ................ 75% of total
- Production of steel ............... 75% of total

This area had the greatest food deficit of all zones.

The **American zone** was second in agriculture, and a poor third in industry. It produced 20 per cent of the pre-war total, had little heavy industry (virtually no steel or metal fabrication), and was entirely dependent upon the Ruhr for metals and semi-finished goods. Consumers’ and commodity manufacturing (textiles, chinaware, toys, leather goods, novelties, etc.) were the principle manufactures. Agricultural productivity was low and backwards, with an exportable surplus only for dairy products.

The **French zone** was a dismal fourth in both agriculture and industry. To industry, it contributed a bare 10 per cent of the total production. But it had a significant industrial concentration, in the Saar area, and produced 18 per cent of the total steel made, along with 7 per cent of the hard coal mined. In some pre-war years, the Saarland [800,000 population] yielded fifteen million tons of coal. It was second only to the Ruhr and Silesia as a center of industrial production.

To the above we must add the economic loss that Germany has incurred through the forceful seizure of territories by Poland. First, it has meant the expulsion of no less than six or seven million Germans, and their imposition as a pauperized mass upon the other zones. Primarily agricultural in nature, this zone grew 37 per cent of the rye crops, 31 per cent of the potatoes, 29 per cent of the sugar beets, 25 per cent of the barley, 34 per cent of the oats, 20 per cent of the wheat, etc. It had 15 per cent of the cattle and 20 per cent of the hogs. About 25 per cent of German food production was lost when this territory was handed to the Polish Stalinist government.

To this must be added the approaching outright loss of the Saarland by French economic annexation, an event that can safely be presumed during the course of negotiations for a German treaty. In some pre-war years, the Saar Basin yielded fifteen million tons of coal, and it has an estimated nine billion ton coal reserve at present. This area, a 750-square-mile region, ranked third among the Nazi wartime centers of industrial production, and it adjoins the famous Lorraine iron ore fields.

The first essential for Anglo-American imperialism in car-
Trends in the Russian Zone

What are the present trends in the Russian zone? The world is now familiar with the Stalinist technique of plunder, plants came in successive waves, the largest being that of 150,000 bales of raw cotton to textile plants in March, 1946. In March it was reported that 5,500 plants were under operation in the American zone (compared with a January, 1946 low of 1,500), but it must be understood that this figure includes small mills, tiny shops producing luxury-export items (leather goods, chinaware, etc.) and hardly represents a serious economic uplift. The same skepticism must greet the report released (December 3, 1946) by the Director of the Economic Division of the zonal military government which announced that industrial production in the American zone of Germany had doubled in the past twelve months! This gentleman must have studied his statistics in the Stalinist Five-Year Plan reports, where an increase from 2 to 10 is known as a 400 per cent gain in production! The same report admits that the October, 1946, figures must register a gain of 60 per cent still, in order to attain the level agreed upon at the Berlin Central Economic Council for greater Germany. Furthermore, the director announced that, "Although the level of production has risen every month since January (that is, from zero—H. J.) the coming winter months will undoubtedly bring a seasonal decline. This winter will perhaps be more difficult than the last."

The intention of the American RFC to help finance a partial revival of German industry must be clearly understood in the context within which it is placed today. The RFC intends to advance funds for the purchase of raw materials and the products manufactured as a result (china, chemicals, light machinery, cameras, optical goods, toys, etc.) will be exported, as a means of reducing the high occupation costs. At present, it is clear this revival is strictly intended to be limited in character, controlled by America and reduced to bare essentials. There are many factors involved that will determine its extent and duration—political relations with Russia, and the extent to which negotiations for a German treaty advance; the needs of American exporters for revived markets in Germany, etc. Nor can it be assumed that the merger with the British zone will proceed without friction. Will America intervene in the announced British intention to nationalize all heavy industry in their zone? How can the American zone answer the real needs of the British, namely, huge quantities of food for real needs of American exporters for revived markets in Germany, etc.

March, 1946, when 600 plants were shipped to Russia. While production has been higher in the Russian zone than elsewhere (due to the presence of both industry and raw materials), most of what is produced goes to Russia, as "repairs." The three largest plants in the Russian zone (Carl Zeiss works, Buna works and Leuna works) have about 90 per cent of their products shipped to Russia—the bulk of it as reparations that will be paid for in the future German government; that is, reparations in advance. A sensational report (New York Times, December 5, 1946) described in detail the Russian system of organized companies (or combines) for the systematic looting of their zone. The Russian directors and experts were pictured as "men who could not be deceived, who would not let their plans fail, and who would carry out their orders without worrying very much about the effect on the plant and its workers." The program of Russian-instituted nationalizations has been completed and behind this facade (a facade, we regret to say, that seems to have particularly deceived the profound thinkers of the English section of the Fourth International—cf. November and December issues of WIN, their monthly publication), there takes place the open expropriation of the wealth and resources of half of Germany. "The Russians, according to the report, are gaining vast benefits in that they do not credit Germany for any natural resources absorbed by the combines. . . . Thus coal, potash and forests and their number taken from nationalized properties go 100 per cent to Russia. Even stocks of coal and potash already produced are not credited, it was said." (New York Times report, December 5, 1946.) But this fait accompli by Russian imperialism must now face the test of the approaching Moscow conference for negotiation of German economic unity and a treaty with a future German national government. Can the system created by Russia be made to fit into a unified Germany, or will it disintegrate under the more powerful influences of American and British imperialism? This matter will be discussed in our March issue, in connection with the forthcoming Moscow conference.

GERTRUDE BLACKWELL, 
HENRY JUDD.

(A second article follows to complete this study of Germany)

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL - FEBRUARY, 1947
The Traditions of Polish Socialism

Since 1905, Poland and the Baltic countries have been the firmest and most powerful centers of the revolution. In them the Socialist proletariat has played an outstanding role.—Rosa Luxemburg.

The Polish Socialist movement is the oldest in all of Central Europe, including Russia. Born in the shadow of the great Reform of May 1791, it grew, developed and matured within the framework of the bourgeois revolution, whose main phases were the national revolutions of 1831 and 1863 and whose principal object remained—the reconquest of national independence.

After the defeat of 1831, it was among the Polish emigres in France and Great Britain that the first Socialist groups took shape. The exiled soldier-peasants filled the ranks, while the utopian-socialist intellectuals provided the leadership. In 1836 these nuclei formed the organization Polish People, which had a marked utopian-socialist character, and which combatted with fervor the feudai-bourgeois Right. Leaving aside the various revolutionary forays into Poland that were directed by this group and the different peasant uprisings, 1846 marks the outbreak of the democratic revolution proper, led by the utopian-socialist, Dembowski. As we have said before, Marx considered this revolution the historic turning point with which the history of revolutionary "agrarian democracy" in Poland begins.

The leaders of the 1863 revolution were also under the influence of Marx and Western Socialism. It is a well-known fact that the generals of this revolution later directed the defense of the Paris Commune. Walery Wroblewski, a general of the Commune, was a member of the Executive Committee of the First International as a representative of the Polish Socialists.

The first workers' party among the masses, Proletariat (1878-86), based itself on Marxist doctrine and differed from the Russian Narodnik movement, with which it was contemporary, in that it used the tactic of mass action leading the workers in Warsaw's first strikes that frightened the Czarist authorities so much. Although Proletariat fell under the influence of Narodnaya Voia after the death of the party's theoretician, Lukwik Warzynski, the workers' movement turned in a "Western" and Marxist direction once more with the birth of the Social Democracy of Kingdom Poland and Lithuania (SDKPL), which came closer to Austrian and German Socialism, then in full tide of development. This tendency found its personification in no less a person than Rosa Luxemburg, founder and leader of the SDKPL.

Native Characteristics and Contrast with Bolsheviks

As we have seen, Polish Socialism was much older than Russian Socialism. It had its own roots and received its Marxist traditions at first hand, since its leaders developed under the direct and personal influence of Marx and Engels, who gave so much importance to the Polish question. Surely, these are the reasons why Polish Socialism always maintained its own independent personality expressed through independent organizations, the SDKPL and the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), in spite of the fact that Poland constituted part of the Czarist Empire. So too, despite the intransigent internationalism of Rosa Luxemburg, the Lithuanian Social-Democracy, led by Tyszka Jogiches, did not incorporate itself into the Russian Social-Democracy but entered the SDKP, forming the SDKPL. Although the SDKPL considered itself a part of the Russian Social-Democracy by virtue of its internationalist principles, it submitted neither to the leadership of the latter nor to its program, maintaining always its own doctrine, which differed from that of the Bolsheviks. At the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, the SDKPL delegation voted against the program of national self-determination and abandoned the congress, without thereby signifying any intention of breaking with the Bolsheviks.

The political doctrine of the SDKPL was Luxemburgism, not Leninism. Its fundamental theories were set forth in Rosa Luxemburg's Development of Capitalism in Poland, written in German and published in Switzerland at the end of the last century, and in her Accumulation of Capital.

"From the historical point of view, the accumulation of capital constitutes the process of an exchange of values between capitalist and pre-capitalist systems of production." (R. Luxemburg, Die Akkumulation des Kapitals, page 297.) It was on this premise that she based her opinion that the pre-capitalist market of Czarist Russia was indispensable for the capitalist industry of Poland. Hence Rosa's classical phrase, "Poland is bound to Russia with chains of gold." From that same premise was also derived the repudiation of the struggle for national independence. For Rosa Luxemburg, "The national state is only an abstraction ... which does not correspond to the reality." (Przegląd socjaldemokratyczny, theoretical organ of the SDKPL, 1908, page 499.) "Not the national state, but the state of rapine, corresponds to capitalist development." (Op. Cit. No. 6, 1908.)

It was for this reason that Rosa Luxemburg rejected the program of national self-determination, arguing that "it does not provide any practical guide for the daily political struggle of the proletariat, nor any practical solutions to the national problem." As a consequence, Luxemburg counterposed to the slogan of the independent Polish republic put forth by the PPS, the idea of the common struggle of the Russian and Polish proletariat for a Russian democratic republic, in which Poland would have national autonomy.

Lenin skillfully explained the SDKPL point of view by setting it against the proper historical background and traditions. Polish Socialism developed in the shadow of the bourgeois revolution and national uprisings which ended in defeat. In order to break with this past, and at the same time break with the dominant classes of its own nation, the Polish proletariat put the main emphasis on the international struggle. It was not only Rosa Luxemburg, but Warzynski before her who declared, "Our country is the entire world," considering the old struggle for independence as outdated. Lenin considered Rosa's point of view narrow and "Cracowian" (at that time the political émigrés of 1905 were gathered in Cracow, among them the Russians). He explained it as a reaction to the petty-bourgeois nationalism of the PPS (PPS revolutionary fraction, led by Pilsudski.) With biting irony, Lenin wrote, "They say that for the mouse the most terrible of wild beasts is the cat. For Rosa Luxemburg there is no wild beast.
so enormous as the Fraki.” In reality, these divergencies reflected the differences between the completed democratic revolution in the West, and the actuality of this revolution in Russia, as posed in the “in-between” territory of Poland, which through its industrial development and its past belonged to Western Europe but which was politically incorporated into Russia.

The second fundamental question which differentiated the Polish Social-Democrats from the Bolsheviks was the agrarian question. The capitalist development of agriculture was more advanced in Poland than in Russia. After the reform of Alexander II, the peasants had been despoiled of their land and had been compelled to transform themselves into a factory and agricultural proletariat. In this fashion a strong layer of agricultural day-laborers was formed, landless proletariat of the countryside, contracted by the landlords for a year at a time, who received most of their wages in the shape of natural products. This layer of agricultural proletariat was unimportant in Russia, where almost every peasant was a petty proprietor, including the landless ones.

Among this agricultural proletariat, as extensive in numbers as the factory proletariat, the SDKPL had considerable influence and led its daily struggles against the bosses. This too was the basis for the agrarian program of the SDKPL, which established as its central point the problem of the day-laborers, the proletariat of the countryside. It also corresponded to the classic scheme which Kautsky developed in his Agrarian Question. The latter was based on the capitalist development of German agriculture. Lenin, on the other hand, found himself confronted by a reality that was distinctly Russian in its entirety, and was compelled to compromise with the Populist program of the Social-Revolutionaries, due to the feudal and petty-bourgeois reality of Russian agriculture, so different from that prevailing in the West. This was also the reason why Rosa Luxemburg opposed the slogan of “land to the peasants,” and proposed the direct nationalization of the land, and its administration by the state or other organs of Socialist self-government.

The seizure of the landed estates by the peasants according to the short and precise slogan of Lenin—“Go and take the land for yourselves”—simply led to the sudden, chaotic conversion of large feudal and petty-bourgeois reality of Russian agriculture, so different from that prevailing in the West. This was also the reason why Rosa Luxemburg opposed the slogan of “land to the peasants,” and proposed the direct nationalization of the land, and its administration by the state or other organs of Socialist self-government.

The theoretical work harmonized well with the forces in the movement, and through these with the workers movement in Poland. The Polish party based itself directly on the proletarian mass, resting on the illegal organizations of the unions and the factory groups. Thus the SDKPL grew organically from below, from the proletarian mass itself. Although it possessed a well defined doctrine and an excellent nucleus of theoreticians, the latter democratically submitted their concepts to democratic control by the workers. The theoretical work harmonized well with the forces in the party, and through these with the workers movement in general. The SDKPL was, like the Bolshevik Party, illegal, but given the education and political schooling of the Polish proletariat, it could support itself on much broader groups than the closed Bolshevik cells. The illegal unions provided the foundation for the SDKPL and through them the party directed the mass movements. Its structure approached closer to the structure of the German Social-Democratic Party, while at the same time retaining fully its revolutionary and clearly working-class character. In the SDKPL the role of the proletarian base, the direct intervention of the proletarian mass, had the decisive weight.

In addition, the Polish Social-Democracy understood and practiced internal democracy and democratic centralism differently from the Russians. The ideological struggle developed freely within the party, with both groups having official recognition. The majority of the Central Committee was led by Rosa and Warski, the minority the so-called “secessionists” by Radek, Lensky, etc. Fundamental questions were not in-
Struggle Between Leninism and Luxemburgism in the CCP

From the union of the SDKPL and the PPS-Left (not to be confused with the "Frakcja"), in 1919 was born the Communist Party of Poland. But the merger was not organic, and did not proceed from a firm acceptance of the principles of the SDKPL by many militants of the PPS, who still retained many remnants of opportunism. On the other hand, the "Luxemburgists" stubbornly refused to revise the program of the SDKPL on the national, agrarian, and organizational questions, and fought against Lenin's compromise with the Left Social-Revolutionaries. The history of the CPP constitutes a struggle between "Luxemburgism," Leninism, PPS-Leftism and Stalinism. This struggle can be divided into three principal periods: (1) 1919-24, supremacy of the "Luxemburgists" of the SDKPL. (2) 1925-29, supremacy of the PPS-Leftists of the "Majority." (3) 1930-36, the victory of the Stalinists and the degeneration and dissolution of the party.

In the first phase, after a period in which the leadership was shared jointly by both factions (SDKPL and PPS-Left), the SDKPL group, headed by Domski (Henry Kamienski) and Sofia Unschlicht, daughter of the old SDKPL fighter (J. Unschlicht), was victorious. Its principal strategy was based on the rejection of the democratic revolution as the goal of the Polish proletariat, in sustaining firmly the program of a workers-socialist government, and in organizing the workers councils (radzy robotnicze) which sought to take power. For this reason the first elections were boycotted by the CFP, given the strong socialist feeling among the workers. In the second elections, the strategy of the CFP was "the union of the urban proletariat and the day-laborers of the country-side" (Związek proletariatu miast i wsi), that is to say, the proletariat of town and country, without considering the peasantry. This, of course, corresponded to the CFP's opposition to Lenin's program: "land to the peasants." It was because of this opposition on the part of the CFP that the Bolsheviks did not partition the land in occupied Poland in 1920. The "Luxemburgists" resisted recognizing the independence of the country, faithful to the fundamental conception of Rosa Luxemburg. They opposed any Bolshevik intervention in party matters, and also protested against "the revolution brought on the point of the bayonet" (referring to the Russo-Polish war of 1920). Since they held fast to the perspective of socialist revolution and the workers government, the Luxemburgists divorced themselves from the Polish reality, where the bourgeoisie had made its power secure, thanks to the support of the reformists and the peasants. Their previously correct tactic left them hanging in mid-air and degenerated into ultra-leftist actions, and culminated in the uprising of Cracow in 1923, which the bourgeoisie crushed. Clearly, this deviation was due in large part to the intervention of Zinoviev, and was analogous to the "strategy" adopted in Germany. There are no documents at hand to confirm this thesis, nevertheless the development of the Domski group toward "Trotskyism," its support of Trotsky, and its seizure in Russia support this thesis. Domski and Sophia Unschlicht, ousted from the central committee of the CPP, were never able to return to Poland, and from 1924 on lived in Russian prisons and Siberian exile. They disappeared in the great purges of later years.

The second period is characterized by the victory of the PPS-Left opposition, led by Koszutska, Walecki, Wroblewski and Warski. The latter was an ex-member of the SDKPL, one of its founders and a loyal friend of Rosa Luxemburg. This phase corresponded to the period of the Bucharin-Stalin coalition against Trotskyism and Luxemburgism. Its principal advance was the definitive recognition of the Bolshevik program on the national and agrarian questions. The old controversy had ended in the defeat of the Luxemburgists. The content of this revision, however, deviated from the classic Leninist content of 1918, adapting itself to the new reality and approached the Right Wing Bucharinist concept. Hence there was introduced the famous theory of "two stages" of the revolution, a theory long outgrown by the Polish reality. This theory served as the theoretical basis for the support of Pilsudski in 1926, describing the Pilsudski coup d'etat as a "petty-bourgeois" revolution, a "Polish Kerenskiad." It was, however, not a "Polish Kerenskiad" but a reactionary Bonapartism. The party's strategy tended to support the reformists and populists, expressing itself in the slogan of a "Workers-Peasants Bloc" (not a union of the urban and country proletariat as before), whose object was to achieve a "democratic" worker-peasant government—that is to say—to realize the bourgeois-democratic revolution. In spite of these errors, the CPP made much progress among the workers, the peasants, and the national minorities.

Stalinist Intervention

This group supported the Bucharin-Stalin coalition against Trotsky, and shared the fate of this coalition. The Russians took advantage of the defeat of the Luxemburgists in order to strengthen their intervention in the CPP and little by little introduced "Bolshevik monolithism." The existence of the "Minorityites" headed by Lenski, Rying, Spis, Rval, old members of the SDKPL, who criticized the theory of the "two stages" was used to disorganize the CPP. The struggle between the two fractions was "balanced" by a Russian representative on the CC, who at times voted in favor of one, and at times in favor of the other fraction in accordance with instructions. On crushing Bucharin, Stalin decided to crush his Polish allies and installed the Lenski group in power.

With this begins the era of Stalinist domination in the CPP. The return of the "Luxemburgists" was no return to the old Marxist tradition, but a frightful caricature which took a Stalinist form. Although the criticism of the "two stages" was correct, it took the grotesque and degenerated form of the theory of "Social-Fascism." The CPP fought the "Centerole" (concentration of PPS and peasants against Pilsudski), supporting in this fashion the growth of dictatorship in Poland, just as Thaelman supported Hitler against the Social-Democrats in Germany. In separating itself categorically from Trotskyism and lending itself to servile support of Stalin, the group lost all ideological independence and succumbed completely to Stalinism. The leaders of the "Minority" entered into a servile competition for Stalin's favor, proclaiming the theory of a Polish "imperialism" which "threatened" Russia, and proclaiming the Poles of Silesia and Pomerania "independent nationalities." Hitler's rise to power in 1933 did not awaken any reaction on the part of the "Minority" leadership. Henrykowski and the others praised Thaelman and Neuman, affirming that Hitler's conquest of power brought nearer the victory of the proletariat. The party had speedily and completely decayed at the top.

But at the bottom there was a strong critical reaction. The Trotskyist opposition grew from these foundations, forming notable groups in Warsaw, Lodz and Dombrowa, old fortresses...
of the SDKPL. Its weakness lay in the fact that it did not divorce itself decisively from the degenerated CPP, and did not declare itself in favor of an open and frank struggle. The old “Majorityites” were also in opposition. Although the leaders had handed the party over to the Comintern, the rank and file were opposed to Stalinism. Some sectors of this opposition came close to the Trotskyists. But the oppositionists were ruthlessly expelled. Denounced and isolated, they had no great influence on the course of the official policy and could not save the CPP. Since the entire apparatus was illegal and dependent for funds on Moscow, the Stalinists were victorious all along the line.

The Annihilation of the CPP

The party died gradually, degenerating like a useless organ that is inherited from the past and is quite outlived by the present reality. Under the pretext of “police connections,” entire organizations and militants of proven worth and great merit were isolated. The militants who came from the prisons were isolated and spied upon by the party’s GPU. In these same prisons, under the pretext of Communist organization, the thinking of the political prisoners was controlled by the party whips. Those who resisted were subjected to a boycott and were denied aid in the way of food, money, and reading-matter, which was provided by the “communal” organization in the jail.

In addition to the official delegates of the Comintern, officials of the GPU were introduced into the Central Committee of the Party. These GPU officials were at times Poles who had long ago lost contact with the country, and with the workers movement in both Poland and Russia. It was at this time that Bierut, now President of Poland by grace of Stalin, began his career. Bierut was sent into the CPP by the Polish section of the GPU to purge all those suspected of opposition. Also employed for this purpose was Gomulka-Wieslaw, a relatively young militant of inferior status, without any theoretical ability, who had played no role in the previous struggles. His sole virtue was his absolute loyalty to Stalin and Bienkowski (Bierut). The GPU prepared “provocations,” complete frame-ups, in order to demoralize not only the CPP but also the PPS. Denounced by the GPU were old and well-known militants: Wroblewski, editor of the party organ; Winiarski, leader of the KPZU (Party of the Western Ukraine, autonomous section of the CPP); Dombal, famous leader and founder of the Red Peasant International and former deputy in the Polish Diet, who enjoyed a considerable reputation throughout the country; Wojewodzki, former deputy in the diet for White Russia; Tarski, former deputy for Warsaw, and many others. The other leaders were deported to Siberia where they were isolated and watched so that they could not transmit any messages to Poland. The prominent leaders of the PPS were also accused of serving as agents of the Polish Police, as was, for instance, Zaremba, leader of the left wing of the PPS. But the PPS knew how to resist these barefaced slanders. The CPP, however, caught between two fires, persecuted by the Polish Police and the GPU, was unable to defend itself. To use a phrase of Rosa Luxemburg’s, it was a “rotting corpse.”

The last murderous blow came in 1937 with the turn toward the right that prepared for open collaboration with the bourgeoisie through the Popular Fronts. In the abused, degenerated, GPU-controlled CPP, faint echoes of old traditions were heard in the whispered opposition to the Popular Front. Since the party was isolated from the masses, and its leaders were paid employees of Stalin living in Russia, the final blow was easy. It was simply a matter of officially proclaiming the death of a party that for some time now had been a corpse. The burial was accompanied by the sound of the assassin’s gun in the dungeons of the GPU. The principal victim was the secretary-general, Lenski, Stalin’s man of confidence in 1930, “purger” of the party, now accused of being a spy for Pilsudski during the entire period of his militancy. Many of his collaborators followed him.

With the dissolution of the CPP, the GPU officially took over the leadership of the Communist part of the Polish workers movement, preparing adequate cadres for new infamies and betrayals. The loyal Stalinists were sent into the unions, the PPS, the legal workers’ organizations, in order to penetrate and demoralize the entire workers and peasants movement as well as the Marxist intellectuals. The GPU operated now in the peripheries of the PPS, the unions, the Socialist workers youth, the university groups; penetrated the peasant organizations, the middle-class, the intellectual circles, the literary periodicals, forming everywhere nucleus of decomposition and demoralization. It succeeded in creating a pro-Stalinist wing in the PPS, headed by Szczurek; it succeeded in grouping the leftist intellectuals who had no political traditions around the literary congress of Lvov, headed by Wasilewska and Jedrychowski, who from morning until night wallowed in self-anointed glory as the “workers leaders.” The GPU strove at all costs to create a Popular Front, flattering even Pilsudski and Rydz-Smigly, forming “democratic clubs,” deceiving the innocent and naive old professors. The new reformist tactic attracted many opportunists, job-seekers, careerists and downright scoundrels to Stalinism, forming a vast Fifth Column that was later to play an infamous role in the service of the Kremlin against the interests of the workers and the country as a whole. Thus Stalin prepared years in advance the annihilation of the CPP in order to forestall any protest from the proletariat and have a free hand for his infamous imperialist policy.

Annihilation of the PPS, the Unions and the Underground

With the dissolution of the CPP, that section of the Comintern most dangerous to Stalin had been wiped out and the way lay open for his imperialist program in Poland. But there still remained the PPS, the unions, and the peasant left, all of which represented a danger. When the Russian troops, together with the Nazis, ravaged Poland in 1939, they proceeded to deport Poles, Ukrainians, White-Russians, Jews, and Lithuanians: the total number of victims reaching between a million and a half and two million. The GPU, which had been securely established in Poland long before this, jailed and deported above all the Communist and Socialist workers and intellectuals and their sympathizers. Only those elements the GPU trusted remained free in the annexed territories, to consolidate the occupation and serve as deputies to the Soviets in the new territories. The PPS, the Jewish Bund, and ex-Communists were persecuted savagely. It is sufficient to record the declarations of Lucien Blit, a Bundist militant, according to which political prisoners for months on end could not go into the prison yard for a breath of fresh air; were subjected to hermetic isolation without books and letters from their families; were unable to receive any relief in the way of clothing or food; and were punished cruelly with tortures that utilized water and electric lights; were mistreated physically without mercy, and finally condemned by the GPU to forced labor or death. (see Koestler—Yogi and the Commissar.) Lucien Blit was saved thanks to the agreement between Stalin and Sikorski, but this was not the case with the prominent leaders of Bund, Erlich
and Alter, assassinated by the GPU without any explanation despite the insistent requests for the latter by the Polish government. Those leaders of the PPS discovered by the GPU were jailed and deported. C. Puzak and Kwapinski, old prisoners of the Czar, visited Siberia once more and had to be rescued by the Polish government in 1941. (Puzak was put on trial again in Moscow in 1945 and is now again a prisoner after having completed his first sentence.)

The GPU which compelled the Communists to support the Nazi occupiers in 1939-41, began to infiltrate the workers and peasants underground in 1941 in order to demoralize it. Unlike the tactic in Western Europe, where the Stalinists supported the Resistance, they never became part of the "National Unity" in Poland, and fought the government and the leadership of the underground with all the means at their disposal. It is enough to record the fact that after the death of Sikorski, the leadership of the Resistance passed to the Populists and Socialists. The Communists hardly participated in the AK (home army), but formed their own unimportant groupings which attempted to provoke premature uprisings in order to unleash the Nazi terror, and thus annihilate the powerful underground. The Moscow radio continually called for the uprising in Warsaw, Stalin having personally promised all aid to Mikolajczyk in Moscow. But when the insurrection of Warsaw broke out, Stalin decided to settle his accounts with the underground by permitting its liquidation by the Nazis. The AK (home army) was dissolved in the Russian occupied territories, its members seized en masse, and the most "dangerous" ones assassinated, in spite of the fact that the AK had valiantly aided the Russians by engaging the Nazis in rearguard actions. The bulk of the underground was annihilated at Warsaw, with the "Red" army collaborating tacitly with the Nazis in exterminating the resisting Poles. Enough to record the fact that the PPS, the unions, Trotskyists and rank and file Communists had constituted the backbone of the Warsaw insurrection. When Warsaw had been crushed by the Nazis, the Russians continued to strike out mercilessly at the Polish underground.

With the Red armies came the GPU detachments of “bloodhounds” to seek out and seize the workers, peasants and intellectuals of the Resistance, first of all, fastening on the Leftists of all shades. Those put on trial in Moscow were headed by the Socialists (Puzak) and Populists (Baginski), but the GPU gave major importance to the military figures of minor rank (Okulicki) in order to confuse the masses.

With the Lublin committee entered the hangmen of the GPU, specialists in purges and liquidations en masse. To meet the problem of ruling a conquered country, the Polish Workers Party (PPR) was created, absolutely subject to Moscow, without tested leaders, and ruled by the agents of the GPU (Bierut). The Polish "Underground Labor Movement" in which the Socialists and opposition communists were grouped, was exterminated. With elements who had succeeded in infiltrating, a new pro-Stalinist PPS was formed, led by Stalin's creatures (Osobka, Matuszewski, Szwalbe). Not one of them had played any previous role in the PPS. Some, like Szwalbe, had been adherents of Pilсудski and had never belonged to the PPS. The old leaders of the PPS had been assassinated in part by the Nazis (Niedzialkowski, Czapinski, Barlicki), while others (like Kwapinski, Prager, Ciolkosz) emigrated to London; the rest formed an opposition inside the PPS in Poland. The GPU roundly rejected Zulawski's request to form an independent Socialist party. Thus the GPU annihilated all the old workers' parties in Poland, first the PPS, then the PPS and the Bund.

The unions which existed illegally under the Nazi occupation were now in the name of legalization transformed into state organizations after the Soviet fashion, organizations designed to exploit and oppress the working class. The old union leaders (Zulawski, Puzak, Stanczyk) were pushed aside, and agents named by the GPU took their places. GPU detachments were used against these Polish workers who had no desire to renounce the right to strike. The tribunals condemned striking workers to decades in jail. Yet in spite of all their totalitarian power, the Polish Stalinists did not succeed until the very end in defeating the Polish workers' movement in the Russian manner. This is explained by the independent traditions of Socialism in Poland, and the enormous capacity of resistance inherent in the workers movement, demonstrated so many times against the Czar, against the Polish "Colonels", and against the Nazis. The Peasant party of Mikolajczyk also constitutes a barricade against Stalinist totalitarianism. Behind it, the workers opposition is regrouping itself once again, led by Zulawski, Drobnier and others. True, it is a vacillating opposition, in part reformist, in part centrist, but its existence demonstrates the evident resistance of the Polish workers at the present time.

Some Conclusions

The native traditions of the Polish labor movement, as much in the sphere of theory as in that of organization, constitute a permanent threat to Stalin. The role of the CPP in the life of the Comintern in Lenin's day was very important. By virtue of personal ties and revolutionary orientation, the Polish Marxists belonged to the intimate circle of Lenin's co-workers and old Bolsheviks. It suffices to mention the role of Dzierzynsky, Unschlicht, Radek, Kohn, Marchlewski, Mienzykni, in order to confirm this assertion. Outside of the Russian Bolshevik party, the KPD (Communist party of Germany) and the CPP were considered the most important in the Comintern: the first being called the "biggest," the latter being called the "best." (Die Deutsche, die Groesste, die Polnische, die beste.) Stalin always feared a renewed opposition within the CPP. That is why the annihilation of the CPP was the first to place in the Comintern, parallelling the annihilation of the old Bolsheviks. For this reason, too, the dissolution of the CPP presaged the dissolution of the cadaverous Comintern.

Despite all this, in Poland more than in any other country occupied by the Russians, we note a spontaneous workers opposition. There too, we see the attempts to organize this opposition politically. Although it is the reformists and vacillating centrists who are engaged in these attempts at the moment, it is our task to support them, to give a greater programatic consistency and revolutionary firmness to this opposition. The theoretical study of the heritage of Polish Marxism can aid greatly in reviving the Polish revolutionary and international movement. The Stalinists popularize vulgar notions on the differences between Leninism and Luxemburgism and reduce this problem, so highly important for Marxism, to a mechanical and vulgar negation of "Luxemburgism" as an Ultra-leftist "deviation."

In reality, these differences reflected the very real contradictions between the tasks of Western and Russian Socialism. They constituted, also, a reflection of the different stages in the development of world socialism, since the "Western" Socialists were intent on realizing the Socialist revolution, the Russians on realizing the democratic revolution. Only by taking into account these differences in their process of historic develop-
The Marxist Movement in Ceylon

Appendix to Program of Bolshevik-Leninist Party of India

Recognizing the unity of the revolutionary struggle in India and Ceylon, and the need to build a single revolutionary party on a continental scale, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party entered the Bolshevik-Leninist Party of India as a constituent unit at the inauguration of the latter in 1942. By this act, the LSSP ceased to exist as an independent party, and its members adopted as their own the program of action of the new party. But this program, drafted necessarily as a guide to the All-Indian Party as a whole, does not (especially in its transitional sections) pay attention to the specific problems of the revolutionary movement in Ceylon, where the political setting and the relations of class forces among the native population are in significant respects different from those obtaining on the continent of India. The old (1941) program of the LSSP is at the same time unsatisfactory in its theoretical aspects, chiefly because it adumbrates a "national" revolution in Ceylon, which is a false perspective. Hence arises the need for the present appendix to the program of the BLPI.

1. The Unity of the Revolution in India and Ceylon

The overthrow of British imperialism is the indispensable condition for the liberation of Ceylon from its backwardness, and of its people from their present misery and economic slavery. At the same time, the revolutionary struggle in Ceylon cannot proceed in isolation, and with its own independent forces, to the stage of the overthrow of the imperialist regime. Even at its highest point of mobilization, the revolutionary mass movement in this island alone could not, unassisted from outside, generate the energies required to overcome the forces which the imperialists would muster in defense of their power in Ceylon, which is for them not only a field for economic exploitation, but a strategic outpost for the defense of the Empire as a whole. It does not follow from this, however, that the revolutionary emancipation of Ceylon is postponed indefinitely, or until British imperialism as a world-wide system is destroyed by other agencies. For, the destruction of British imperialism is posed as an immediate and practical task in India, where history has already mobilized the forces required for its achievement.

The geographic proximity of India and Ceylon, the close economic and cultural ties which bind their peoples together (among which we must include the presence in Ceylon of a proletarian population of more than seven lakhs—700,000), and, above all, the common enslavement of India and Ceylon by British imperialism, make it certain that the masses of Ceylon will have the opportunity, by participating fully in the Indian revolution, to throw off the British yoke and with it the whole exploitative social order maintained by imperialism. On the other hand, the complete emancipation of India itself is unthinkable while Ceylon is maintained as a solid bastion of British power in the East. From this point of view, we may say that the revolutionary struggle in Ceylon will be bound up with that on the continent in all its stages, and will bear a provincial aspect in relation to the Indian revolution as a whole.

It would be entirely wrong to conclude from the unity of the revolution in India and Ceylon that the right of the Ceylonese people to self-determination has to be surrendered, or that their interests must in any way be subordinated to those of the Indians. Ceylon's right of self-determination, on the other hand, can only be exercised after the destruction of the imperialist régime by the Indian revolution. Thereafter the Ceylonese people, and they alone, will decide the political future of Ceylon, i.e., whether Ceylon will enter an Indian federation or, having entered such a federation, whether she will at any time secede therefrom. To fail to recognize and emphasize this right of independence of the Ceylonese nation would in effect hinder the masses of Ceylon from uniting with those of India against British imperialism and make it easier for the latter to utilize Ceylon as a base of support against the growing revolutionary movement in India and South Asia.

2. The British Conquest and Capitalist Development of Ceylon

The British completed in 1815 the conquest of Ceylon they began in 1795. The primary aim of this conquest was to win a strategic base for the defense and expansion of their Eastern empire, but the British sought also the rich profits of the island's trade.

Before the advent of the British, the economy of the coastal districts and parts of the interior which had passed under European rule had already lost a great extent its old localized and self-sufficient character, and had become linked through extensive external trade with European commercial capital. Correspondingly, the old social order had in great measure broken down in the Low Country areas. The sole bulwark of the old order remained in the feudal aristocracy of the Kandyan Kingdom. After the British conquest of Kandy, in their reprisals against the 1818 rebellion, they broke decisively their short alliance with the Kandyans aristocracy, and destroyed their power. The history of this class was thereafter one of degradation and decay. They played no part in the revolt of 1848 and settled down in the end to carry out, in their districts, the more menial tasks of the imperialist administration through the "headmen" system. In this rôle they distinguished themselves by their corruption and by their unbridled gangsterism at the expense of a helpless peasantry. The relics of the feudal classes occupy an utterly insignificant position in the country today and only the most immaterial vestigial traces remain in Ceylon of its old economy.

By 1834, the British had built up a modern administrative and legal system which cleared the way for the systematic capitalist development of the country. This was begun through the opening of coffee plantations in the up-country. For this purpose and for the building of roads, etc., in opening up the
country, the British found it necessary to import very large numbers of workers from South India, where a supply of free labor had been created by the drastic expropriation of the peasantry and the destruction of handicrafts in the preceding period. The development of the plantations system by British capital investment and the exploitation of imported labor from South India continued without intermission down to the present period, when this system has become the center and basis of the entire Ceylonese economy, accounting for the great bulk of the island's production. With the exportation of plantation products for the world market, Ceylon became bound up inextricably with the imperialist economy of Britain and ended once for all her isolation as an island.

To pave the way for the development of coffee, tea and rubber plantations in the up-country and of rubber and coconut plantations in the low-country, the expropriation of peasant lands was carried out in repeated stages throughout the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This was accomplished under cover of legal forms (e.g., the Waste Land Ordinance) as well as by more direct and open means. This process as well as continuance of the neglect of artificial irrigation by the government and its indifference to the needs of peasant agriculture, spelled the ruin of the peasantry. The British did not, in Ceylon, introduce institutions analogous to that of Indian semi-feudal landlordism, but left the peasantry without any defense in the face of capitalist expansion. The consequence was that this class, through the ages the solid foundation of the whole national economy, perished miserably in the struggle for bourgeois existence, and rapidly lost its significance in the economic life of the island. The peasantry appears today as a class of paupers, either the proprietors of wholly uneconomic plots of land, or sharecroppers for absentee landowners. In the majority of these cases they are compelled to work part time as hired laborers on the plantations and elsewhere. The peasantry together with semi-proletarian elements engaged in peasant agriculture, still number about two-thirds of the population in Ceylon, but they produce only one-third of the island's food supply, and the total area under peasant cultivation is far less than that occupied by the plantations. The peasantry faces only greater ruin and pauperism under imperialism. Its sole future lies not in the schemes of agrarian reform concocted by the big native bourgeoisie in order to win share of the proceeds of exploitation, but in the struggle to free itself from capitalist domination. The peasantry is daily taking upon itself greater responsibility for the imperialists dooms it to servitude in politics as well. It has replaced the remnants of the feudal classes in the administration of the country, and in politics seeks only to entrench itself firmly within the imperialist system.

3. The Political Setting: The Bourgeoisie Parties

Ceylon has always been administered as a Crown Colony by the British. Since the period of the Great War they have sought to build up a façade of democratic institutions in the island, with the establishment of elected legislatures, and the Ceylonisation to a high degree of the administrative and judicial services, etc. At the same time, of course, the British continued to hold in their hands the whole substance of real power. Their policy in this respect was rendered easier by the loyal co-operation from the beginning of the native bourgeoisie, which has never shown more than the tamest constitutional aspirations. The highest point in the pseudo-democratic development referred to was reached in 1931, when universal franchise was granted. But the difficulty of accommodating the régime to the resulting mass pressure on legislation and administration, especially in a period of rising mass consciousness and action, had led the imperialists to a reconsideration of policy. In the projected new constitution to be imposed on Ceylon, they have substituted for progressive "democratic" development a very close alliance with the native bourgeoisie against the masses, whose influence on government, through the universal franchise is to be undermined by establishing a Cabinet system and second Chamber. The native bourgeoisie is daily taking upon itself greater responsibility for the imperialist administration of Ceylon and can be said to have entrenched itself politically within the imperialist system.

An era of counter-reforms, however, has dawned so far as the masses are concerned and they are bound to recognize with increasing acuteness the fact that while further constitutional developments may satisfy the needs of the bourgeoisie, they

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*Arrack and toddy are cheap, popular alcoholic drinks, distilled from palm grown on plantations.
they themselves can find no way out of their present plight except by the revolutionary road. It is unnecessary to argue to show that in the coming revolution the Ceylonese bourgeoisie will play a wholly counter-revolutionary part. It has taken up its positions in the imperialist camp already.

The rebellion of 1818 against British rule was led by the feudal aristocracy of the Kandy districts. It was defeated, and the strength of feudalists destroyed forever. The revolt of 1848 saw the peasantry entirely without leadership from any class capable of coordinating its struggle on a wide or national scale. It was therefore a revolt of despair only. Between 1848 and the present day there has occurred no serious open challenge to British rule, since the riots of 1915 never developed the dimensions of a revolt. The long continued civil peace in Ceylon does not imply an absence of discontent among the people at all times, but only the hopelessness of this discontent. With the transformation of the country under imperialism, an entirely new setting for the political movement was created. The dissolution of the feudal classes, the smallness and political tameness of the new bourgeoisie and, above all, the relative insignificance in the country of the petty bourgeoisie (especially the peasantry) place on the proletariat the chief burden of the anti-imperialist struggle in Ceylon. This fact is borne out negatively by the recent political history of the island.

After a long period of passivity, the first stirrings of national revivalism in 1912-14 proclaimed that the native bourgeoisie had emerged as a political force. The distorted and infantile character of the revival itself, which never even approached the heights it reached in India, and the incapacity of the bourgeoisie to pose for itself higher aims than that of gradual constitutional progress won by begging nicely at Whitehall, testified to the essential weakness of native capitalism. The bourgeoisie was then, as now, fundamentally loyal to British imperialism but dared at least to be openly critical of the administration and to seek a measure of broad mass support for its pleas for constitutional advance. But even this rôle of oppositional criticism played by the bourgeoisie dwindled progressively with the rise of the working class movement in the twenties and still more afterward. The march of events since 1918 illustrates the growing withdrawal of the bourgeoisie from oppositional and even mass politics itself, in favor of harmonious co-operation, over the heads of the masses, with the imperialists. Their willing acquiescence during the war in the administration of the repressive defense regulations régime decisively indicated the road they chose to follow. Today, with growing consciousness of their rôle, they act as the junior partners of the firm of British Imperialism & Co., taking practically full responsibility for the administration, though without any real power in their hands.

It is natural that the native bourgeoisie has not built a mass party or even sought to promote its interests by means of an active mass movement. This is entirely consonant with its character as a small, non-industrial bourgeoisie, whose economic interests do not bring it into serious conflict with the imperialists. The National Congress (1918) came nearest to becoming the national bourgeoisie party, but with the turn of bourgeois politics in the thirties, this organization rapidly lost importance. Today, apart from the temporary exigencies of elections, etc., the bourgeoisie is content to secure its interests by means of behind-the-scenes bargaining with the British. The National Congress has accordingly been deserted by its most important old leaders and is only an empty shell, despite the attempt of the Stalinists to convert it into the arena of the "National United Front" which they aim at building. The liberal and petty bourgeois elements which are temporarily in charge of the Congress exist only to show their impotence in the face of the big bourgeoisie leaders, as was recently demonstrated when, after much fistic-kicking, they capitulated to support the Soulbury counter-reforms at the behest of the Senanayake clique.

The insignificance politically of the Ceylonese petty bourgeoisie is reflected in the absence of wide mass movements bearing their stamp, as have repeatedly occurred in India. There are no political parties which really draw their inspiration from the peasantry or the petty bourgeoisie and such bourgeois parties as go among these elements for support tend to do so on communal or other sectional grounds, rather than on basic social and political issues.

The Sinhala Maha Sabha is a communal organization which draws its chief support from the petty bourgeoisie, chiefly from small traders, school teachers, government servants, etc., who place their faith and their hope of survival in the benevolence toward them of their communal bourgeois leaders. The latter, however, are adherents of the purest political opportunism and have never dared to challenge the position or contest the policies of the Senanayake clique which attends to the affairs of the native bourgeoisie.

The Jaffna Youth Congress was the product of radical tendencies among the intelligentsia, but is a body whose influence is on the wane. It has never given a hint of struggle to achieve its aim which is stated to be national independence, nor does it show the slightest comprehension of the class issues involved in such a struggle.

The All Ceylon Tamil Congress was formed in 1944, ostensibly to command the adherence of all the Tamils,* as such, in the island, and to advance their common interests. It was really the product of the temporary collaboration of widely different elements (Indian and Ceylonese) in the attempt to cash in on the visit of the Soulbury Commission for their various sectional interests. With the first acid test that was applied, however, in the publication of the Soulbury Report, which was unfavorable to the communal demands they had supported, the Tamil Congress tended to break up into its constitutional elements. There is no evidence that the Tamil Congress will long survive the defection of so many of its leaders in accepting the new Constitution. What is certain is that no ties exist among the Tamils as a community which are capable of standing the strain of the class divisions that exist among them.

In recent years, sections of the Indian capitalists in Ceylon became aware of the possibility of utilizing to their own political advantage the civic disabilities and economic grievances of the Indian "immigrant" workers. For this purpose they set up the Ceylon Indian Congress Trade Union. The pressure of the workers on these organizations was exercised strongly from the beginning, and reflected in the repeated struggles for leadership which took place within them. In 1941-42, the big bourgeoisie leaders were temporarily defeated by the section having the support of the trade union officials, etc., led by Azeez, and some of these bourgeois leaders withdrew from playing an active part in the Indian Congress. Today, however, the capitalist elements, through Thondaman and others, are again making a bid for full control of the Congress. It is not certain whether, in view of the conflicts that have arisen,

* Tamils are the immigrant workers from South India, now settled in Ceylon.—Ed.
the bourgeois elements will succeed in consolidating the Indian Congress as their political instrument. The Congress Labor Union has become to a great extent a bureaucratic and reformist trade union, basing itself on the kanganis and other intermediate strata among the plantation population, and these elements continue to exercise pressure on Congress as a whole.

If the political parties above described are insignificant and formless, this applies all the more to the other groupings that have a shadowy existence in the backwaters of politics. It is not an accident that in Ceylon the only political parties which show growing mass influence and a capacity for organization are those which work among the proletariat.

4. The Working Class Movement and the Political Parties Among the Workers

With the big transport strikes of the twenties the proletariat of Ceylon commenced its history of militant struggle. The first organized centers of the workers' movement were the Ceylon Trade Union Congress (1928) and the Labor Party, formed as the political wing of the TUC in 1929. Under this leadership the working class played a leading part in the agitation for universal franchise, which was won in 1931, in the teeth of the opposition of bourgeois parties. The Labor Party and the TUC were alike under the personal control of A. E. Goonesinghe, and when he, from a strike leader turned into a strike breaker and labor agent of the big employers, these organizations followed consistently reactionary policies. The TUC since 1929-30 has opposed almost every workers' strike and has been turned into a union of the privileged section among Sinhalese workers, giving open support to racial agitation against Indian workers and maintaining very friendly relations with the employers. The Labor Party, likewise, is today a loyal supporter of the imperialist system.

During the thirties, ideas of revolutionary socialism spread widely among the workers, chiefly due to the propaganda of the Lanka Samasamaja Party (1935). The end of this decade was marked by the militant uprising, for the first time in their history, of the plantation workers. Huge strikes in which lakhs (hundreds of thousands) of workers were involved took place, especially on the tea plantations, in 1939 and 1940. This upsurge was followed by a new wave of struggle among the urban workers culminating in the widespread strikes of 1941-42. The workers' movement subsided only with the stringent enforcement of Defense Regulations, under which strikers and militant workers' leaders were prosecuted or detained without trial, and the entire working class regimented under a system of martial fascist regulations. The end of the imperialist war in 1945 saw a new upswing of the workers' economic struggles, in the repeated strikes of Urban workers. This upswing has by no means reached its culmination, and the post-war years are sure to see bigger struggles than ever before in the history of the Ceylon workers.

A feature of the period after 1938 was the spread of trade unions among hitherto unorganized workers. During the war, however, only those trade union organizations whose leaders could be relied on not to impede the war effort in any way were permitted to work unexecuted, and after 1942 such unions as the Industrial and General Workers' Union and the Estate Workers' Union which followed uncompromisingly militant policies, were deliberately smashed by the arrest and detention without trial of their leaders. A consequence of this is that the trade union movement in Ceylon emerges at the end of the war under the leadership of reformists of various shades, whose position, however, is rendered insecure by the certainty of big working class struggles in the near future.

The chief centers of the Trade Union Movement today are: The Ceylon Indian Congress Labor Union (51,000 members); The Trade Union Congress of Mr. Goonesinghe (16,000 members); The Ceylon Trade Union Federation (15,000 members); and the Industrial and Estate Workers' Union (12,000 members).

Apart from the Labor Party of Mr. Goonesinghe, which is only an appendage of the T.U.C., and does little more in politics than contesting municipal elections for Mr. Goonesinghe's personal supporters, there are three main parties working among the proletariat. These parties represent different trends which were originally accommodated within the Lanka Sama­samaja Party.

The L.S.S.P. was formed in 1935 as a radical mass party with an anti-imperialist and socialist programme, which was, however, vague in character. The main section of the leadership of the L.S.S.P. became increasingly aware of the need to transform it into a proletarian party with a clear revolutionary programme of action. This aim was in the end realized, though repeated crises split the party in the meantime.

Early in 1940, all the adherents of Stalinism in the L.S.S.P. were expelled, and later formed the United Socialist Party. This party in turn divided into various groupings, of which the most important is the Communist Party of Ceylon, the official exponent of Stalinism in Ceylon. The more general description given of the Communist Party of India in the main body of the programme applies equally to the C.P. of Ceylon. Specific features of Stalinist reactionism which must be mentioned regarding the Ceylon C.P. are: (1) Its support of, and entry into the National Congress, and its aim of making this impotent body the arena of a "national united front." (2) Its abandonment of all revolutionary propaganda against imperialism in favor of innocuous pleas for independence, and all sorts of constitutional panaceas for the social evils of the country. (3) Its adaptation to petty bourgeois pressure and a vulgar trade union outlook in the support of governmental restrictions on Indian immigration.

The chief strength of the C.P. of Ceylon lies in its control of the Ceylon Trade Union Federation, in which are organized a substantial number of urban workers in light industries.

The reorganization of the L.S.S.P. on proper (i.e., Bolshevik) lines aimed at by a majority of its leadership was begun in 1940, and steadily carried on in the years of war. The 1941 Conference of the L.S.S.P. authorized this development. This conference also adopted a proletarian-revolutionary programme, though this programme showed the limitations earlier referred to. The conference finally decided unanimously to proceed with the steps taken toward the formation of the Bolshevik-Leninist Party, in association with various Indian groupings of Fourth Internationalists. The L.S.S.P. consequently entered the Bolshevik-Leninist Party at its inauguration in 1942, with the unanimous consent of its membership.

A new party, falsely calling itself the "L.S.S.P.," was formed in 1945 by a grouping of members which split from the B.L.P.I. for no principled reasons, together with other elements who were not members of the B.L.P.I. Although the differences of those who split away from the party were mainly organizational, there is no doubt that the continued existence of the new "L.S.S.P." will lead to its adoption of policies of a petty bourgeois character, and the consequent growth of a party resembling the L.S.S.P. at its formation in 1935. The way for
this is paved by the organizational Menshevisim of this party. It is not possible, however, at this stage to make a stable characterization of this party which has not yet settled down to well defined policies, or clearly deviated in political line from the program of the B.L.P.

5. The Transitional Program: Special Features in Ceylon

In mobilizing the revolutionary forces in Ceylon, the following peculiarities of the national setting have to be emphasized.

(1) The political separation of Ceylon from India; the economic conflicts that exist between the Ceylonese bourgeoisie and sections of the petty bourgeoisie, on the one hand, and their Indian rivals on the other; and the whole national cultural heritage of Ceylon are the basis of strong nationalist and anti-Indian sentiments which have been repeatedly transmitted to the working class as well. It is necessary for the party to fight unrelentingly against chauvinism in all its forms, in order to point out the unity of the revolutionary struggle in India and Ceylon, against British imperialism. At the same time, it is the duty of the Bolshevik-Leninists to uphold the right of self-determination of the Ceylonese people. Accordingly, a central agitational slogan of the party must at all times be: “Complete Independence Through the Overthrow of Imperialism in India and Ceylon.”

(2) Even in the transitional period, the class (i.e., anti-capitalist) character of the political struggle of the working class must come more into the open in Ceylon than in India. This is due (a) to the close and harmonious cooperation of the native bourgeoisie with the imperialists, and their increasing sense of responsibility for the existing régime. (b) To the low specific gravity of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie in general in politics, and (c) to the lesser weight of the purely democratic demands of the transitional demands in Ceylon, where there is greater political freedom in normal times, and where no feudal forms of oppression persist.

It is clear that as the post-war crisis in Ceylon assumes full proportions, the chief slogans upon which the workers will mobilize in their struggles will be the demands for (a) Minimum wage fixed by law, (b) Statutory 8-hour day, (c) Work or Maintenance. The party will place these slogans in the forefront of its propaganda and agitation among the working class, particularly because these demands serve to bring to the workers directly into political struggle against the government.

Among the plantation workers, the following demands will be placed by the party in the forefront of its work, in addition to those given above:

Full Trade Union Rights, including right of access to Estate for Union Representatives.
Abolition of present system of eviction of workers by means of criminal procedure.
Abolition of Kangany System—transfer of all workers to Estate gangs.
Weekly payments of wages.
Right to hold meetings within plantations.
Full ownership by workers of lines and demarcated areas around them.
Twenty-six days work minimum for all workers willing to work.
Full implementation of Labor Regulations regarding half-names, etc.

The B.L.P.I. (Ceylon Unit) puts forward the following immediate demands on behalf of the Ceylonese peasantry.

No tariffs and taxes on necessities.
Abolition of irrigation rates.
Free pasture lands.
Crown lands to the peasants.

Apart from these special slogans and demands and the qualifications noted above, the transitional program of the B.L.P.I. is an adequate guide to the work of the Ceylon Unit of the party in the transitional period.

The Role of Centrism in France—1

One of the most illuminating and significant differences between the political situation of the French proletariat as it emerged from underground and before the Second World War was the complete absence after the war of any substantial organized centrist tendencies among the political movements of the working class. By centrism we refer here, of course, not to the Catholic parties of the “center” throughout Europe, but to any working class movement which vacillates between social reformism and the policies of revolutionary Marxism.

Are there then, today, no French workers with such a general political tendency? No; on the contrary there must be tens of thousands of them, since it is this group of workers that is most receptive to the small Trotskyist (Parti Communiste Internationaliste) organization’s propaganda and activity and furnishes it with new adherents as it is won over by revolutionary ideas. In fact, the most striking aspect of the PCI’s activity in recent months has been its ability to hold meetings in city after city with an attendance that is gigantic in relation to the size of the party. This has undoubtedly been due not only to the ceaseless activities of the PCI, but to the fact that there was no other organization that even seemed to these workers to stand for the socialist revolution. There was no organized halfway house to block the path to the revolutionary party. Instead there were only the giant class collaborationist, patriotic Socialist and Stalinist movements on the one hand, and the revolutionary party of the Fourth International on the other, with a tremendous abyss between.

Let us compare this situation with that of pre-war times, trace the development of the centrist tendencies that existed, and see what finally became of them. To do this, we must first, however briefly, paint in the general background of French capitalism.

French capitalism until the 1930’s was far more stable than that of the rest of Europe. The great French Revolution had created a numerous class of small independent peasant proprietors, who, together with the rentiers and shopkeepers of the cities, actually constituted the majority of the population. Thus the social composition of France’s population was markedly different from countries like England and Germany,
where the workers were in the majority and where the land
was largely in the hands of big landowners.

The epoch of capitalist decline, setting in with the First
World War, saw no revolutionary struggles in France com-
parable to those which took place in Germany, Austria, Hun-
gary and Italy in the first years after the Russian Revolution.
Nor did any actions fought with possible revolutionary sig-
nificance, such as the British General Strike of 1926, take
place in France. The working class, while by no means pros-
perous, was not confronted with any crisis as desperate as that
of the inflation in Germany in 1922-23, and was not plagued
by unemployment to the extent of the German workers after
1929 or the "distressed areas" of Great Britain.

Nevertheless, the war and the Russian Revolution did
have their effect on France by producing a mass Communist
movement. This movement emerged from two sources—the
left wing of the social democracy and the revolutionary syn-
dicalists in the CGT. Together with the revolutionary syn-
dicalists, the Communists set up the CGTU (the "Unitary"
CGT). Communist strength quickly receded from the peak it
reached in the original groundswell of 1920-21, as many Com-
munists of recent persuasion reverted to their previous reform-
ist and syndicalist ideas, but the party was relatively stabilized
by the middle twenties and found itself a little over half the
size of the Socialist movement in membership and electoral
support. In 1930, the Communists received 750,000 votes to a
Socialist vote of 1,750,000.

It must be remembered that this Communist movement
was not the wretched Stalinist movement of today, but a move-
ment of revolutionists, regardless of the incompetence of its
successive leaderships. Many of the leaders of the French
Communists were hopeless opportunists who had spent their
whole political lives up to 1920 as reformist leaders. Their
outlook was perfectly suited to fall in with the process of
Stalinization. At the same time, this party was committed to
a revolutionary program, had been built up in large part by
real revolutionists, and was composed, in the main, of revolu-
tionary workers. For this reason, it constituted a real pole of
attraction to workers moving in the direction of a revolution-
ary policy, and as long as it remained such there was no sub-
stantial centrist tendency built up. The field was fully occu-
pied, so to speak, by the classical Social Democracy, on the one
hand (with minor opposition groups in it, of course) and the
revolutionary movement, the Communists, on the other.

**Effect of the Crisis**

This situation of relative political stability ended when
the world depression, starting in the United States in 1929,
finally reached France three years later. The world market for
the products of the famous French luxury industries disap-
peared and for the first time in over a generation substantial
unemployment appeared. As the government sought to solve
the economic crisis at the expense of the workers, resistance
grew and there was a slow, steady rise of labor struggles in the
years before the great working class struggles of May-June,
1936.

The same period was marked by the victory of fascism in
Germany in 1933 and in Austria in February, 1934, and by a
whole series of struggles in Spain, from the bloodless Republic-
ian Revolution of 1931 to the bloody suppression of the work-
ing class uprising of October, 1934. These defeats of the
workers' movement brought sharply home to a large section
of the Social Democracy in France and other countries the
inadequacy of their traditional ideas, and strong currents
moving in the direction of revolutionary Marxism began to
manifest themselves.

However, the same period saw a speeding up in the Stalin-
ist degeneration of the Communist movement. Between 1927
and 1934 one group after another was expelled, almost the
entire leadership was affected by the turnover, and the party
emerged thoroughly housebroken and ready to execute rapidly
whatever turn was required by the Kremlin's foreign policy.
The turn required in 1934-36 was a sharp turn to the right
to help Stalin woo the "democracies."

Thus it happened that precisely when historical experi-
ences were giving rise to substantial leftward movements in the
Social Democracy, those movements met a Stalinist move-
ment going headlong to the right. The result was of course
terrible disorientation of the nascent left wing movements.
Since at the same time the Trotskyists had finally abandoned
any hope of reforming the Communist International, they
reoriented themselves to these left-wing socialist tendencies
as constituting the forces from which basic revolutionary
cadres in the mass movement could be built up.

We now have a picture that makes evident the basis for
a large centrist tendency, namely, the hopeless reformism of
the Social Democrats, the degeneration of the Stalinists and
the smallness of the Trotskyists at a time when large-scale
historical events are pushing substantial elements of the so-
cialist working class to the left. Having no place else to go,
the centrists mobilized as large opposition groups within the
Socialist Party.

The first great success of the rebellious rank and file in
the Socialist Party was evidenced by the steps taken to appease
it. At the party congress in 1938, the Leon Blum-Paul Faure
leadership had to expel the extreme right wing in the party,
led by Frossard, Deat and Marquet. At the same time a for-
mally organized opposition group, called the **Bataille So-
cialiste**, led by Jean Zyromski and Marceau Pivert, was organ-
ized. This group held meetings of its own and published its
own weekly paper. Almost immediately it gained the majority
in the Paris region, always the most left section in the French
Socialist Party.

Let us now see what political positions characterized this
group, and the Blum-Faure leadership that it criticized. First,
it must be made clear that so great has been the degenera-
tion of the socialist movement since 1934 that the Leon Blum of
that year sounds almost like a revolutionist when compared to
the Socialist Party leader of the present day. The Blum of
1934 came out at the Socialist congress for the dictatorship of
the proletariat, reaffirmed his party's opposition to the
extension of compulsory military training to two years, and was
opposed to participating in any coalition government with
bourgeois parties. Indeed, this had been the party's traditional
stand, and French politics was studded with the names of fa-
mous bourgeois politicians whose political efforts for the bour-
goisie began with their expulsion from the Socialist Party
for accepting cabinet posts.

Nevertheless, in spite of verbal radicalism, the Blum lead-
ership was, by all real standards, reformist. It proposed no
activity for the party other than normal electoral activity, it
was opposed to any organized activity by party members in
the CGT, it was opposed to united front action with the Com-
munists. The vague statements about "dictatorship of the
proletariat" were unaccompanied by any concept of the revo-
lutionary role of workers' committees or the necessity for a
vanguard revolutionary party organized democratically but
with discipline in action. The majority of local party organizations were machines of local jobholders in the municipal councils or of deputies in the French Chamber.

The Pivertist Tendency

Against this leadership, the Bataille Socialiste group emerged first and foremost as the advocates of united front action. In this policy they were opposing not only the reformists but also the Stalinists, who at the beginning of 1934 were still in their ultra-left “third” period and were opposed to the united front. The tremendous appeal of united action in the face of the threat posed by the French fascist organizations brought the emerging left wing wide support.

On the question of the road to power, the Bataille Socialiste repudiated the traditional non-violent attitude of the reformists, but was extremely hazy as to the role of the Soviets. It shared with Blum the idea of an undisciplined, all-inclusive party. But most of all, confusion reigned on its analysis of the working class. The patriotic position by the Stalinists led to a new political crisis in the actual class struggle.

The headlong rush of the Stalinist policy to the right from 1934-36 sufficed to do this. Each new adoption of a socialist-patriotic position by the Stalinists led to a new political crisis in the ranks of the centrist faction, until finally by the fall of 1935 the group had crystallized out into a clearly all-inclusive party when it came to including revolutionists. The Stalinist group on the one hand, led by Jean Zyromski, and a left centrist grouping, whose ranks were strongly influenced by the Trotskyists, and who were led by Marceau Pivert. This latter group, splitting away from Bataille Socialiste, formed the Gauche Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Left) faction.

The Stalin-Laval pact of 1935 was followed in a few months by the Dan-Bauer-Zyromski theses, in which Zyromski presented his excuses as to why the workers would have to support the “democracies” in a war against fascism. The extension of the recently formed united front to a Peoples Front that included the bourgeois Radical Party was likewise welcomed by Zyromski. This espousal of bourgeois coalitionism was accompanied by a little window dressing in the form of a demand for a “fighting” Peoples Front. Thus, the rightward turn of the Stalinists had such an effect on this politically unstable grouping that it supported by the end of 1935 policies which even the Blum Socialist leadership had been unable to espouse only a short year before. So ended half of the Socialist “left wing” in a Stalinist swamp.

Role of Socialist Youth

While Zyromski moved with the Stalinists to the right, the Revolutionary Left developed closer to a revolutionary Marxist position. In the Socialist Youth of the Seine (the Paris region), the Left was entirely in the leadership, and an Entente was set up which included both Pivertists and Trotskyists. Throughout 1935 the Entente of the Socialist Youth of the Seine took the lead in revolutionary agitation. Its militant paper, Revolution, grew immensely in circulation. Revolu-
25 per cent of the delegates, representing 50,000 members, and including an absolute majority of the Paris region.

At last the centrists were faced with the task of building their own party. Immediately they showed themselves incapable of grappling with their problems. The differences which had seemed so trivial when they were all “happy” in the Socialist Party, now arose to plague them. Their few members in the Chamber of Deputies, afraid to face the next elections as members of the newly formed party, the PSOP (Socialist Workers and Peasants Party), went back to the Socialist Party. A battle broke out in the new party between the pro-Free Masonry and anti-Masonic factions. The bulk of the party leaders, including Pivert, saw no contradiction between revolutionary politics and membership in a secret society that leaders, including Pivert, saw no contradiction between revolutionary Marxism, and Marcel Beaufrere, a Trotskyist, saw no less than four distinct resolutions presented on the revolutionary minority of the rank and file, the Trotskyists, set up the Committees for the Anti-War Action. The March issue of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL will carry an important article by Max Shachtman on “The Stalinist Parties,” an exposition of the viewpoint of the Workers Party and a critical evaluation of the ideas of the Socialist Workers Party on this vital problem.

The War Crisis as Test

Then in September, 1938, the Munich crisis hit. Since the majority of the rank and file of the new party took a revolutionary stand, those PSOP leaders who were social-patriots or pacifists returned to the Socialist Party. Yet the remaining leadership did not adopt a clear line to serve as a rallying point for the revolutionary elements in the working class. At this time, in the aftermath of the Munich crisis, the issue of war had become the primary political issue for the nation. Every variety of reformist politician could see a way out of the war crisis only in terms of what foreign policy “their” nation and “their” government should adopt towards Hitler and Stalin. Thus they all chose appeasement of Hitler and new and better Munichs, or, on the other hand, support of the war preparations of the same Daladier government whose anti-labor policies were demoralizing the workers and weakening the labor organizations. The Socialist Party, disembarrassed of its left wing, now divided not on internal policies but on “pacifism,” espoused by Paul Faure, the party secretary, as against “belligerence,” espoused by Blum and Zyromski.

What could a non-internationalist pacifist policy be but the preparation for collaboration with a conquering Germany? Faure was thus acting politically as the agent for the Nazis as surely as Blum was for the “democracies.” And consistently enough, when the conquest came, it was the Faure half of the Socialist Party, together with the extreme right wing “neo-socialist” party of Deat and Marquet, and a group of CGT leaders associated with them that went into the Vichy government or even into direct collaboration with the Nazis in occupied France.

Their attitude toward this appeasement group was therefore the main political test that the PSOP leaders had to face. They failed miserably. When Belin and Dumoulin, powerful right wing leaders of the CGT, organized the “Workers Center for Anti-War Action” on a program totally devoid of internationalism, the PSOP leaders pushed their shop units into it and propagated in their press for support of this “Anti-War Center.” The left wing workers knew that these same CGT leaders had been the most conservative force in the labor movement. Indeed, the revolutionary minority of the CGT, organized in a caucus called the “Class Struggle Trade Union Circles,” including in its ranks Trotskyists, Pivertists and revolutionary syndicalists, had had to direct its main fire in the unions against this leadership. The only reaction among the rank and file Pivertists to this policy of cooperation with the appeasers was one of complete bewildement. These workers, let us remember, were left wing, revolutionary workers. They were international-minded. Their party had been throughout the Spanish Civil War the party that supported and befriended the POUM, the nearest approach to a revolutionary party of the masses in that struggle. The same issues of the PSOP paper (called Juin ’36, after the date of the historic strike movement) that called for the support of the appeasers carried calls for solidarity and financial aid for the thousands of POUM members pouring over the Spanish border into exile in France. The only policy that could reconcile their support of the Spanish anti-fascist struggle with opposition to war was one of revolutionary internationalist opposition. But to what international force could the PSOP point? They were opposed, like all centrist parties, to real internationalism in the form of a world party. Instead they were affiliated to an information bureau in London, made up of centrist parties that had every conceivable position on war and that made no pretense of a common international policy except in the vaguest terms. Thus the PSOP leaders, after adopting revolutionary sounding resolutions for so many years, were indistinguishable from the bourgeois and reformist pacifists when the war really loomed.

Disintegration of PSOP

Their disintegration proceeded apace. Starting out in July, 1938, with over 20,000 charter members, Pivert, the great realist, had to report four months later, in November, only 5,000 members left. The membership was to decline gradually to 5,000 in the next few months. Even among these the battle over Free Masonry continued to be fought, and this struggle was accompanied by disputes over every other political question facing the new party. The 1939 party congress saw no less than four distinct resolutions presented on the fight against war, ranging from outright pacifism at one end to revolutionary defeatism at the other. Meanwhile the Pivertist youth had already completed their development to revolutionary Marxism, and Marcel Beaufre, a Trotskyist, became their national secretary. The left wing of the PSOP, led by Daniel Guerin and Lucien Weitz, approached more and more closely to the Trotskyists.

The dénouement came with the outbreak of the Second World War in September, 1939. Pivert's PSOP, spineless, politically confused, torn by incompatible factions, was incapable of functioning under conditions of illegality. Its left wing, including the Trotskyists, set up the Committees for the Fourth International to function illegally. The right wing ceased completely to function. In a year and one-half a movement of 50,000 members had ceased to exist! What a telling commentary on its political caliber!

SAUL BERG.

(A second article by Berg, analysing developments within the French Socialist Party since the end of the war, will appear in a forthcoming issue.—Editors.)

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KOESTLER AND JEWISH FASCISM

A Review of 'Thieves in the Night'

Arthur Koestler mirrors and influences considerably the contemporary intelligentsia. His followers form something close to a political school. A new book by him is an event. His strong point has always been to raise timely questions of the highest importance. His weak point has been to state them incorrectly and to answer them falsely. He has performed this job with the most elaborate literary skill and great success; success not only in the sense in which this word is understood in Hollywood but also with respect to some kind of political leadership. As a result of the latter the Stalinist position has been weakened—not where it is in power, to be sure, but in countries like the United States and England. But the main result of Koestler's literary activity has been that he provided his liberal, "socialist" followers with a good conscience, arrived at through those intricate arguments and refined mental reservations which complicated organisms need in order to find certainty when howling with the pack—as for instance when they deserted their internationalism in order to support the last imperialist slaughter.

Koestler's Darkness at Noon was a masterpiece of artfulness. After all, to write a novel on the Moscow trials, which omits even the slightest trace of the figure of Leon Trotsky, the chief defendant, and yet hold his readers at a breathless tension and skilfully obscure from his severest critics the omission of just the decisive elements—this is undoubtedly an art!* Unfortunately, this art has been too seriously, even in this magazine.

In Thieves in the Night, Koestler loses his level. We miss his refinement and find a rather crude political propaganda; war (or civil war) propaganda if you will. This, by itself, would not matter. What matters, however, is the content of this propaganda. There is an inseparable dialectical connection between the political and esthetic qualities of a true work of art. Where one is concerned with a real literary effort this interrelation cannot serve as a guide for the critic. For, as a rule, the political trends are either subtly hidden or, at least, do not constantly intrude into every thought and situation; the political views and the art-form are interwoven into an indivisible unit. However, Koestler's new book, which is really primitive in comparison with his other novels, permits us to examine its political content and propaganda techniques as a means of revealing also its thin literary veneer.

As in Koestler's other writings, the chief difficulty in evaluating Thieves in the Night arises from his use of the novel form to set forth his views of the Palestine question instead of writing a political tract. In Thieves in the Night the author once more abuses thoroughly his sovereign right to have his characters say what he pleases. Koestler puts both his and his adversaries' political views into the mouths of various characters and, technically, the responsibility rests with the latter. The political meaning of the book manifests itself chiefly in the distribution of accents, in the place suffered by the texts and in a synthesis of implications. Koestler's method, however, is amazingly crude and his plot and dialogues read like a clumsily contrived GPU "confession" in which each participant only plays the role which the political line demands, but loses identity as a personality and becomes a clear-cut political symbol in the most exaggerated sense.

The background of the book is the plight of the Jews in Nazi-Europe, the Arab revolt against Jewish colonization of Palestine, and the British blockade of immigration and the Jewish terror against the British. Koestler's heroes are, in the main, occupied by the latter activity. They belong to the Jewish underground organizations like Haganah and Irgun Zabi Leumi.

The Haganah, "socialist in outlook," is a tolerated military organization which obeys the official Jewish authorities. It renders valuable assistance to the British in the "crushing of the Arab rebellion." Koestler estimates that only 1,500 men participated actively in the Arab uprising. The book itself gives some data on therather high losses and miners signs being Arab and Jews. These figures are not quite comparable with mere 1,500 participants on one side. The British put down the revolt by their habitual colonial methods to which belongs the blowing-up of houses in suspicious villages.

The Irgun Zabi Leumi; it is extremely nationalist and is "denounced as fascist," as Koestler puts it. It carries on "punitive actions... as a warning to Arab terrorists who committed atrocities... against the Hebrew community."

The Irgun enjoys Koestler's full sympathy.

The story revolves around a rural community founded by twenty-five Jewish settlers, as a fulfillment of their national and socialist aspirations. They build it near an ancient Arab village on land that had not been used for the last 1,000 years except as an occasional pasture for some Bedouin tribe. It was bought from an absentee Arab land-owner. A strip of the land had been tilled before by village tenants who received compensations that enabled them to buy better plots nearby. All the villagers had to be paid and "the heads of their clans to be bribed" for some piece of allegedly former communal village land, incorporated into the settlement. Two previous attempts of Jewish settlers to take possession of the land failed due to Arab opposition. The book starts with the third successful attempt.

The settlement is organized after the pattern of the older communes, "whose founders had studied the Bible, Marx and Herzl." Their economic principle is to share the work and the produce according to the ability and the needs of their mem-

*In this novel Koestler had an ex-commissar, an old professional revolutionary, participant in the civil war and alleged Bolshevik, analyze thoroughly the thoughts and deeds of his life. The hero had served in the most responsible functions from the early '20s to 1936. His life and politics had been one. Hesubjects his past—ideas, emotions and persons of relevance—to all-day and all-night discussions. But Leon Trotsky's personality and ideas, the symbol around which Russian politics had gravitated during the critical period, fail to enter these discussions. The examination magnifies, states attorney and judges refrain—in this novel—from their notorious practice of entertaining "confessions" which involve Trotsky in the alleged crimes of his victims. The main defendant of the historical process is missing. Why these deviations from history? Why this strange censorship by the author on the memory and mind of his hero? We cannot answer these questions here. It must suffice to point out that these distortions not only mayly history but also involve a further distortion: that of the hero's psychology. Both the history and the psychology are untrue here. In this historical and psychological novel. What remains is the deft literary skill of the author which prevents the reader from discovering these untruths.

THIEVES IN THE NIGHT, by Arthur Koestler. Macmillan. $3.75.
neither hired labor nor the use of money is permitted "except in dealings with the outside world." To those dealings belongs, e.g., the lending of tractors for money to Arab villagers. The title to the land is now vested in the Jewish National Fund which rent it to the commune for 99 years. Rent is collected "after the land bears fruit." The Fund also loans the money for the buildings, machines, live stock, etc. "The funds of the National Fund came from the blue collecting boxes in the synagogues ... and from private donors." (There is no comment in the book on the social stratification of those donors and collectors.) According to the settlements' constitution "the society has no capital" and the settlers honestly believe that. By means of modern methods and machinery, agriculture is developed to permit an eight-hour working day and a human-like life. The colonists are not religious but engage in religious marriages in order to legitimatize their children. The latter are brought up in a separate house and join their parents on the Sabbath. The settlers speak only Hebrew among themselves, keep a high cultural standard, translate Rilke, etc.

After their arrival the settlers, reinforced by 120 helpers, fortify their land. The Arabs raid it but are repulsed with a loss of thirty dead. The Jews lose one man. He was an unsympathetic coward who jumped out of cover for reasons of his neurasthenia. He is further characterized by a squint and the fact that he recommended the acceptance of the Arabs into the Unions, their political education and, generally, an understanding with them. Such amalgams of personal characteristics and political views are a typical device in the author's system of implications. Other samples will follow.

The Arab village is filthy; ridden by trachoma and poverty. The illiterate villagers use wooden ploughs and are exploited by their landlords and Mukhdars. They have a decrepit school for boys up to their twelfth year. Somebody states somewhere in the novel that the government would gladly pay-out of Jewish "taxpayers" money—for both boys and girls schools up to the fourteenth year. Whether this statement is true is less important than its implications. We will try to relate them down with similar implications of another statement. Somebody states that the village Mukhdar papered a room with pound notes on the occasion of a wedding; a square foot of that paper would have been enough to provide the village with fertilizer and a tractor. Implications: a) such behavior is typical of the Arab people; b) they are rich enough to compete with the National Fund but too "uncivilized." If one doubted this financial strength, but admitted it hypothetically and while objecting that it would be owned by the feudal lords, one would hear the full logic of Koestler's implications: This is not our (Jewish) business; besides, the Arabs are collectively responsible for their social order. This latter concept is derived from the whole book.

There is also a love story. Joseph, the main figure of the novel, is the son of an English mother and a Jewish father, who are divorced at the time the novel opens. Joseph grew up in a gentle atmosphere and was educated in a college. He had an affair with an English girl, accidentally a Mosley-fascist and a wild anti-Semite, who discovered that he is circumcised and threw him out. This incident revealed to him the curse and the mystery of anti-Semitism; it changed his life completely. (Implications: race-mixing and assimilation are undesirable and the latter, besides, impossible.) He decided to live as a Jew, emigrated to Palestine and joined the settlement. For reasons of internal commune policy he has to marry a woman whom he does not love. He is a highly intellectual but unruly personality. Half of the novel consists of his diary. He finally joins the Irgun Z'vai Le'umi.

His wife, Dina, came from Germany, and had been brutally treated by the Nazis. As a result she has suffered since from a neurosis. The latter prevents the fulfillment of the romance, since her body revolts convulsively whenever anybody touches it. The son of the mighty village Mukhdar waylays, rapes and murders her. Joseph avenges her by initiating the killing of the Mukhdar by the underground terrorists. This murder is conceived as a political act in the form of a blood feud. Later the villagers consider it a private affair between the settlers and the Mukhdar's clan and the murder is shown to be an effective means of putting the Arabs in their place. (Implications: Strong-arm methods against the Arabs are indicated; besides, they have no national consciousness and they resist Jewish colonization only when, and so far as, they are "instigated" by their feudal bosses.)

The settlers have the firm belief that Palestine is "theirs" and the Arabs are, therefore, intruders. If an Arab states "this land has belonged to our fathers' fathers," the settlers (and Koestler) answer with the best conscience: "before, it belonged to our fathers' fathers." If an Arab claims the right of every nation to live after its own fashion, the answer is a mere threat which they, later among themselves, explain satisfactorily by the aphorism: "we cannot afford to see the other peoples point." The settlers' sentimental connection to "their" country would be best characterized by the Nazi slogan Blut and Boden (blood and soil), the mystical interconnection between the country and its inhabitants. The Jewish colonists indulge in historical reminiscences and, as it seems, listen continuously to the voice of their blood;* Their heart swells if they see some ancient columns built in the wall of an Arab hut—for those columns were broken by their ancestors, the Macca­bees. Koestler himself remarks on some alleged Maccabean necropolis: "but the hollowed side was now named after some obscure Moslem saint."

The political discussions, abundant throughout the book, are characterized by a primitive black-and-white technique. All Jewish advocates of a brute-force conquest of "their" country are noble characters, whereas people of different opinion—Jews or non-Jews—are characterized as social-democratic morons, feudal village despots, corrupt journalists, land speculators, Mussolini adepts, British colonial petty satraps and as rascals of all kinds. There is not one sympathetic Arab, especially not an intellectual one, in the book. We find, once in a while, good arguments for the Arab cause. They are not answered except by arguments ad hominem: whoever sides with the Arabs is either an idiot or a villain. To make the mess worse, the arguments for the Jewish chauvinist solution are thoroughly amalgamated with incontestably correct ones against the criminal imperialism of Britain and for the right of asylum for the hunted victims of Hitler.

Statements presenting the Arab cause are not debated in the novel and are not refuted directly but merely by the mentioned arguments ad hominem. Arab arguments: "The White Paper is the first fair move of the British ... since they so generously promised our country to the Jews without asking us..." "All Arab states have their Parliament—we are denied it because it would give us a majority over the Jews. "We want no foreign benefactors—we want to be left alone." "The Arabs are opposed to Jewish immigration, regardless of any

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*This phrase was coined by the Zionist writer, Martin Buber, and is not original with the Nazi philosopher, Rosenberg.
material benefits—nationalism is irrational...." (This irrationality of nationalism is not contested by Koestler.)

And here are some selected aphorisms, presenting the counter-arguments of the Jewish-extremists, being Koestler's real views: "The Arab birth rate is twice as high as the Jewish. If emigration is stopped we are a minority, we will be... wiped out finally." "A race which remains objective when its life is at stake will lose it." We have had "enough of being reasonable for 2,000 years while the others were not." The Arabs "are a relic of the middle ages...if treated with authority they keep quiet." "Social life is based on the implicit assumption of collective responsibility for individual deeds," which statement is exemplified by the responsibility of "the French" for the Rights of Man and of "the Germans" for the concentration camps, etc. "The Arabs wage intermittent tribal war against us: if we want to survive we have to retaliate." "I don't hate the English...we need them because this country is under their control. They need us because the Arabs naturally want their independence....A Jewish state tied to..."—what he calls "the bureaucracy"—and has forced me, in this brief rejoinder, to plunge in after him into the depths of historiography.

1) In and Out of Context—How to Approach the Past

Erber takes me to task for writing that one can examine an historical work by attempting a "placement of oneself in the context in which it was written"; and that one can also examine the past with a full consciousness that the examination is colored by subsequently acquired experiences and knowledge. He finds it "amazing" that I should call the effort to "move backwards in time and imagine ourselves in a situation of the past" both "never successful" and "self-contradictory." He is unwilling to admit to legitimacy any method which does not squarely place itself "in the context" of the period under study and he has himself a bit of fun with queries as to when one approaches a period of history "in" or "out" of context; whether there is any value from my point of view to a method admittedly self-contradictory, etc.

I think Erber's complaint misaddressed; he should rail against the practise of history in general rather than my attempt at it. For the two methods of which I speak are merely variants of emphasis—degrees of recognition of distance—in any historical examination conducted some time later than the period under study. One may and should attempt to "place oneself in the context of the period under study, to imagine one's attitudes if in So-and-So's shoes; but that attempt can never be quite successful, for it is impossible to eradicate ideas and experiences absorbed from events that took place after the period under study. But suppose such an attempt were possible, suppose one could step into the attitudes, opinions and limitations of a figure of the past. How could one learn anything that way? All one would know would be what that person knew then. To draw lessons from his experience, the use of subsequently acquired data is essential. For it is not only the past which helps illuminate the present; it is also the present which illuminates the past. Erber's apparent failure to take the latter half of this reciprocal relationship into consideration is the major cause of most of his objections to my methodology.

In any historical study one admits the unavoidable fact of hindsight, second-guessing and subsequently accrued knowledge and opinions. This recognition is legitimate so long as it doesn't result in moralistic judgments where the belief in present superior conceptions is based on knowledge that was unavailable to those judged.

When Erber therefore asks: "If it (the attempt to view in context) cannot be done successfully and if the effort is self-contradictory, of what value is it?" he is really questioning not my statement of the limitations of the "in context" approach, but rather the efficacy of historical criticism in general. For it is obvious that I couldn't have and didn't question the need of trying to "imagine ourselves in a situation of the past." Were that attempt not made, historical criticism...
would literally be impossible. I was rather suggesting the limits of that attempt and therefore the need frankly to take those limits into account as part of the data of one's historical examination, as well as to acknowledge that sometimes such recognition of limits is a positive advantage. (This recognition is common to all scientific methodology, especially in the social sciences, and is sometimes called the inclusion of the experimenter in the experiment.) As for the problem of which emphasis to underscore at a given time, that depends on the purpose of the investigation: a study of the possible alternatives facing Trotsky in his struggle must attempt to confine itself to the then available data, but a study of the lessons that struggle has for us today can range beyond the context of the then experiences and take into account subsequently developed knowledge and ideas. That somewhat variant results would necessarily follow from either emphasis is as obvious in the field of historiography as is the fact that the position—both spatial and ideological—of an astronomer has a bearing on the data and results of his experiment.

That Erber should find these quite obvious notions on historical method "amazing" is itself... amazing.

2) The Strange Appearance of Thomas Carlyle

The main purpose of my article was to try to note—through an examination of his The New Course where they appear in incipient but clear form—what seem certain errors in Trotsky's approach to the struggle of the Left Opposition against Stalinism. These errors which manifested themselves in an underestimation of the need to propagate the idea of soviet democracy, later formed the basis of his untenable views in favor of defending Stalinist totalitarianism in its imperialist war and labeling it a "workers' state." These boiled down to a determination of consequences involves no "amazing" statement. That Erber should find these quite obvious notions on historical method "amazing" is itself... amazing.

a) It was physically and historically possible for Trotsky to have foreseen the possibility of an indigenous bureaucratic totalitarianism maintaining nationalized property. That is why his charge that I was urging the use of "tanks at Waterloo" is invalid. It was literally impossible under the then social and scientific conditions to use tanks at Waterloo; but it was not analogously impossible for Trotsky to have had a more valid conception in the period from the opening of the struggle until Stalin's consolidation of power.

b) The question of whether Trotsky "should have foreseen the possibility of bureaucratic collectivism" was not raised by me with an eye to passing a moralistic judgment. I tried to establish the possibility of such foresight by Trotsky in order to examine the consequences of his not foreseeing. This is not a "should" statement.

In any case Erber's venture in historiography in describing my views as Carlylian is inaccurate. My views may be wrong but they are not Carlylian. For Carlyle would have declared that Trotsky, if a "great" enough man, would have pushed through to triumph. Carlyle virtually denied social limitations on individuals and insisted on the history-making powers of great men. I considered, rather, Trotsky's understanding of the situation, but never said that no matter how perfect his understanding, he could have surmounted the historical limitations of his situation in Russia.

3) Democracy and Revolution—The Central Question

Wherever Erber drops his adumbrations on historical method, he says a few words about the problems I raised, but in a manner that can only be described as skittish. From the context of his article one suspects that he too feels that these problems require consideration and that some of the comparatively simple answers with which we contented ourselves in the past no longer suffice; and so he fulfills his task as defender of orthodoxy with more relish when he can wander in the mazes of historiography than when he turns to the Russian experience itself. However, a few of his remarks on the latter are of interest:

a) Erber charges that I didn't sufficiently consider that not only bureaucratic degeneration, but also capitalist restoration, was a danger. "Howe's method," he writes, "leads to an indiscriminate rejection of everything that proved of value to Stalin in his fight for power. Implicit in this is the danger that the indiscriminate attempt to avoid the risk of bureaucratic degeneration can lead to disarming the revolution in the face of the bourgeoisie." Exactly what "an indiscriminate rejection of everything that proved of value to Stalin" means I do not know; nor, I suspect, does anyone else; it is, however, an "impressive" statement. Disciplined organization, for example, proved of value to Stalin; by what process of ratiocination can Erber prove that my remarks led to a rejection of disciplined organization. Such emotively charged but difficult-to-prove charges do not add light to the polemic.

But, more important, I wish to challenge Erber's implication—his central implication—that the emphasis on a democratic struggle to prevent bureaucratic degeneration would have led to "disarming the revolution in the face of the bourgeoisie." For it seems to me that every democratic measure calculated to oppose bureaucratic degeneration would have simultaneously strengthened the resistance of the most advanced and conscious revolutionary elements to the danger of capitalist restoration.

b) Erber is willing to grant that mistakes were made by Trotsky, but he insists that, if an examination of them is to have any value, they must be "traced back to flaws in Trotsky's theoretical conceptions." So he suggests that if we decide Trotsky underestimated the danger of prohibiting factions in 1920 and that this error flowed from "his conception of the relationship of democracy to centralism," then "we must proceed to rectify our conception of this problem...." By all means... but not enough. For errors flow not only from great, or imply that I suggested, that geniuses never make mistakes. Can't Erber's strictures against me serve as just as well be used against him for criticizing Trotsky for maintaining the "workers' state" theory, and have not the Cannonites done so?

Be it noted that Erber assigns the word "should" to me; it is not so used in my article.
theoretical conceptions; such an opinion betrays a far too formalized and rationalistic conception of history. Errors flow concretely from the emergence of current contingencies to which theoretical conceptions may be inappropriately applied or may no longer be relevant and often from the fact that new theoretical conceptions cannot be evolved in sufficient time. Which is why I, for one, would be far less interested in any revision of the formal conception of the relation of democracy to centralism ("the rules") than in the open, frank admission of past mistakes and the real emphasis and orientation of our present thinking.

c) Erber questions my suggestion of a possible bloc between the Trotskyists and the Bukharin Right Opposition after the latter became the target of Stalinist suppression. He offers three arguments:

Such a bloc would have been legitimate only if "bureaucratic collectivism was inevitable" and "capitalist restoration could never be realized." Ergo, my argument means that bureaucratic collectivism was inevitable. But nothing of the kind is true. The possibility of such a bloc—leaving aside tactical considerations irrelevant to this discussion—was justified not because bureaucratic collectivism was "inevitable" but because by 1930 it was much more of a danger than capitalist restoration, which became, after a while, a Stalinist-inflated bogeyman to inhibit all oppositions.

Such a bloc Erber sees as "fantastic" because the Rights were "the most rabid anti-Trotskyists in the party." But so were Zinoviev and Kamenev rabid anti-Trotskyists and Trotsky didn't hesitate to consummate a bloc with them after their break with Stalin. A bloc is not an ideological agreement; it is an agreement for certain specific objectives, in this case first and foremost the joint defense against Stalinist repression.

Finally, Erber trots out what seems to me by now the old chestnut about the Right Opposition being "capitalist restorationist." What does that characterization mean? If seriously and literally applied, it means that a victory for the Right Opposition would have led to a capitalist restoration. Is that view now tenable? If so, Erber would have been logically required to support Stalin's expulsion of Bukharin from the Russian Communist Party, even if disapproving Stalin's methods. And Erber should have himself an interesting time explaining what Trotsky meant when he wrote in 1938 that "the Right group of the old Bolshevik Party, seen from the viewpoint of the bureaucracy's interests and tendencies, represented a Left danger." But if Erber means merely that a Right Opposition victory might have increased the danger of capitalist restoration, he has still to explain why a bloc for the joint defense against the encroaching Stalinist terror and for at least a return to internal party democracy, would have favored the Right as against the Trotskyists.

d) One of my central points was that the problem of democracy can now be seen to have been the pivotal question of the Russian experience. Erber then asks me: why were not the "anarchists, Left Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks correct on this question as against Trotsky? . . . Even if we assume that their program would not have led to Stalinism, was it preferable to risk a bourgeois counter-revolution? Would a Russian Gallifet (a Russian Himmler was more likely) have been preferable to a Yagoda?"

No, neither a Gallifet nor a Himmler was preferable to a Yagoda; but neither was a Yagoda preferable to a Gallifet or a Himmler. Why does Erber insist on this choice? Why does he assume that when one believes soviet democracy to have been the "burning question" and Trotsky, even though its great historical defender, to have made certain mistakes, that such an opinion has anything in common with the belief that the anarchists, SR's and Mensheviks were right "as against Trotsky" . . . especially when my article specifically indicated that I believed them wrong. For these groups went beyond the bounds of soviet democracy; they took up arms against the soviet state—that has always been the traditional Bolshevik answer to the criticism against their suppression, with which my article registered agreement. Why does a belief that Trotsky made certain errors mean support of the Mensheviks?

It is true that, as Erber says, one cannot draw up in advance statutes of limitations. But the recognition of the errors of the past, even while defending the general historical legitimacy of Trotskyism, does serve to orient us for the future, even if it gives us no "statutes." It reinforces us that democracy is an inalienable aspect of a workers' state, that the preservation of democracy is a central task of the revolutionary vanguard in such a state, that no parties basically loyal to a workers' state should be suppressed no matter how harsh their criticism, and that for proper workers' democracy all workers' parties must be subordinate and responsible to the Soviet or Council which is the supreme organ of workers' rule. To say this is not yet to say what is going to happen; but it is to make a statement of what we want to do.

I do not believe that my article was a definitive statement on the problem or that it was even a sufficient beginning. It was rather an expression of concern with some of the things in Trotsky's book, The New Course, as reflections of his historical role. Since my piece was in the nature of a "flyer," it was necessarily speculative. Erber, who has assumed the mantle of the more traditional point of view, agrees however that, even if I am guilty of all the "errors" he has enumerated, a serious consideration of the problem is necessary. Very well, then. At least he sees the problem. I hope that he will therefore not content himself merely with exposing my methodological "errors"—a task comparable to Sisyphus' burden—but will himself directly approach the problem.

IRVING HOWE.
Once Again Setting the Record Straight

A Reply to M. S.

In the August issue of Workers International News an article was published on the nature of the régimes in Europe. In dealing with the arguments of Comrade Pierre Frank as to whether bourgeois democratic or Bonapartist régimes had been established in Western Europe, the following point was made:

Comrade Frank says the existence of democratic liberties does not suffice to make a democratic régime. A profound observation! What follows? The existence of bonapartist measures does not make a régime bonapartist either, Comrade Frank! This argument is about as profound as those of the "bureaucratic collectivists" who argued that we had the intervention of the state in economy in Germany under Hitler, in France under Blum, in America under Roosevelt (NRA), in Russia under Stalin...consequently all those régimes were the same. It is not the points of similarity only—all human sociéties have points of similarity, particularly different types of capitalist sociéties—it is the decisive traits which determine our definition of régimes. (My emphasis—E. G.)

To anyone reading the article conscientiously, it should be clear that this analogy is there to elucidate the point that repressive measures do not necessarily convert a régime into a Bonapartist dictatorship. However, The New International of October, 1946, contains an article by M. S. which asserts that this point was introduced for the sinister purpose of distorting the views of that school of "bureaucratic collectivists" gathered around Max Shachtman. M. S. writes:

By "bureaucratic collectivists" Grant can but have in mind the comrades of the Workers Party and "The New International" who have put forward and defended the theory that Stalinist Russia represents what we call a "bureaucratic collectivist state."

...According to Grant, the "bureaucratic collectivists" argue (where they do this arguing remains a secret not only to us but also to Grant) that the Roosevelt, Hitler, Blum and Stalin régimes are all the same; but again according to Grant—and this time with a sarcasm guaranteed, as the English say, to hit us for six—this argument is not very profound. (My emphasis—E. G.)

We call your readers' attention to the quotation of M. S. in the second paragraph. He has changed the tense. The article reads: "those of the bureaucratic collectivists who argued"; Shachtman changes it to "the bureaucratic collectivists argue."

If we used the polemical method of Shachtman we would ask him, in his own language, which category of readers does he fall into: those who read and misrepresent or those who read and do not understand?

The significance of this change will be apparent in a moment. It should be noted that the article in dispute referred to "those of the bureaucratic collectivists," not specifically to all the bureaucratic collectivists, of which there are varying schools. M. S. has thus not only changed the tense, but the very essence of the sentence. It is rather a curious method for one so righteous in his plea for scrupulousness in criticism and polemic.

Shachtman imagines that he is the only minnow in the pond. He forgets that there were many forerunners. We will let him into the "secret" as to which of the bureaucratic collectivists we referring to.

In the discussion which Trotsky had with Burnham in 1940, long before M. S. had branched out on his own version of "bureaucratic collectivism," Trotsky wrote:

Recently, an Italian "left communist," Bruno R., who formerly adhered to the Fourth International, came to the conclusion that "bureaucratic collectivism" was about to replace capitalism... Bruno R. bracketed together planned economy in the USSR, fascism, National Socialism, and Roosevelt's "New Deal." All these régimes undoubtedly possess common traits, which in the last analysis are determined by the collectivist tendencies of modern economy. ... The traits of centralisation and collectivisation determine both the politics of revolution and the politics of counter-revolution; but this by no means signifies that it is possible to equate revolution, Thermidor, fascism and American "reformism."

If we decide to discuss Shachtman's particular "bureaucratic collectivist" tendency, we will discuss it for the ideas it represents, and not other ideas. If it will give solace to M. S., we hereby declare that his particular tendency was not referred to in the above reference. Had he read the passage scrupulously, this would have been clear to him before he embarked on his irresponsible outburst in "Setting the Record Straight."

Ted Grant.

REPLY TO GRANT

Comrade Grant charges me with a failure to read his article conscientiously, with changing not only the tense but the very essence of an important sentence in his article and with an irresponsible outburst. In reply, I hasten to plead guilty to the charge of changing the tense—but to no other. I think, however, there is ground for a very meritorious sentence. Grant spoke of the bureaucratic collectivists who "argued." Paraphrasing him, I spoke of bureaucratic collectivists who "argued." I would put my neck under the knife—reluctantly, of course, but with the knowledge that I was getting no less than my due—only if it could be pointed out that by having changed the tense I somehow did violence to "the very essence of the sentence. To point this out it is only necessary for Grant to do one thing: to show that the "bureaucratic collectivists"—no matter who they are, no matter what "school" they belong to, no matter which minnow Grant had in mind—used to have the views that Grant rejects but no longer have them today, that is, who "argued" but no longer "argue." I doubt very much if Grant will be able to find any such bureaucratic collectivist minnow. In any case, I have never seen one and I do not know of its existence.

Grant says that the word "those" in the sentence in dispute referred not to the word "argument" but to the term "bureaucratic collectivists." As I read it then and as I read it now, "those" refers to the kind of arguments made by the bureaucratic collectivists. It appears that I am in error; I cheerfully acknowledge it. According to Comrade Grant, the sentence should be construed as meaning the argument made, so to speak, by those particular bureaucratic collectivists who argue (pardon, argued) that "all those régimes were the same." I do not want to lose myself in a discussion over syntax, which is a field in which I readily yield to Grant. But in spite of what he writes, I am compelled again to ask the question: In referring to "bureaucratic collectivists," to whom could Grant possibly have referred if not to the comrades of the Workers Party?

Perhaps to Burnham and his follow-
ers? But Burnham does not even speak of bureaucratic collectivism and, so far as we understand his viewpoint, he does not contend that the régimes of Hitlerite Germany, Blum's France, Roosevelt's America and Stalinist Russia are (were) "the same."

Perhaps to MacDonald and those who agree with him, since they do use the term bureaucratic collectivism? But if we understand MacDonald's view in this question (or in any other) he "argued" very emphatically that while the Stalinist and Hitlerite régimes "were the same," they were, by virtue of their non-capitalist and anti-capitalist nature, fundamentally different from those of Roosevelt and Blum.

It is then neither the Burnhamite nor the MacDonaldite who could be meant. And in order to give solace to M. S., Grant declares that our "particular tendency was not referred to" either.

The Mysterious Bruno R.

Who, then? He lets us into the "secret" without hesitation. He was referring—it is perfectly plain to see—to Bruno R. The unfindable, quotable, more or less incorporeal and altogether mysterious Bruno R. is materialized before our very eyes as "those of the bureaucratic collectivists." Good. I will not say another word about Bruno's pluralization (def.), the act of pluralizing; the attributing of plurality to a person by the use of a plural pronoun. Webster. But if we do not have to defend ourselves because we were not meant, our unknown and unfindable fellow minnow ought to get at least some defense.

Whether Bruno believed that "consequently all those régimes were the same" or believed something quite different, we do not begin to profess to know. But our ignorance on this point is no greater than Grant's, or than the ignorance of anyone else we know of, except for Trotsky himself. With that exception, no one we know of has read Bruno's work; no one has quoted one single sentence from it; no one has so much as seen a copy of the book (if it is a book and not an unpublished manuscript, as is possible). All that Grant or we or anyone we ever heard of knows about the views of Bruno R. is what Trotsky wrote about him in 1939 in In Defense of Marxism. But not even Trotsky's paraphrase of Bruno's views gives one the right to attribute to this mysterious writer the opinion that the régimes in the four countries mentioned "were the same." Trotsky writes, for example, that Bruno R. places both the Soviet and fascist régimes under the category of 'bureaucratic collectivism,' because the USSR, Italy and Germany are all ruled by bureaucracies..." (op. cit., p. 52). He writes that Bruno "came to the conclusion that 'bureaucratic collectivism' was about to replace capitalism" (op. cit., p. 10. My emphasis) and that Bruno "features together planned economy in the USSR, fascism, National Socialism and Roosevelt's 'New Deal.'" (same page). But while these rather skimpy descriptions may permit all sorts of conclusions as to Bruno's views as he actually elaborated them in his work, they give us, I repeat, no right to conclude that Bruno held all these régimes to be the same.

In general, people concerned with scrupulousness and conscientiousness and methods which are not curious, might do well in theoretical and political discussion to refrain from categorical expressions of opinions about views which they have not read, which they cannot read, which are not available to anyone for examination and verification. The observance of this rule will help us all confine our offenses to harmless tense changing, and nothing worse than that.

Comrade Grant notifies us that "if we decide to discuss Shachtman's particular 'bureaucratic collectivist' tendency, we would discuss it for the ideas it represents and not other ideas." I will not add to my already numerous offenses by asking why it has taken so long to "decide" or what stands in the way of this decision. In the ranks of the Fourth International the supporters of bureaucratic collectivism are, to our knowledge, confined to those who agree substantially with the viewpoint of the Workers Party. Whatever pond the other minnows may swim in, it is not in the ranks of the Fourth International. With appropriate modesty we suggest that it is time to decide in favor of an open discussion of our views on the "Russian question." Along with Grant, we suggest that "if" it is decided to discuss our position, it will be discussed "for the ideas it represents and not other ideas." Up to now, we have not had very much luck in this respect. Comrade Grant's promise encourages us to hope for the best.

M. S.

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**Book Reviews...**

**SOVIET POLITICS,** by F. L. Schuman. 663 pp. $4.00. Alfred Knopf. 1946.

Mr. Schuman's most recent book, Soviet Politics, maintains, the same high level of inipetitude that the admirers of his early work were led to expect. I am not interested in reviewing his book in detail. I suppose somebody must undertake that tedious task, but I shall leave the job to a stouter heart. I am concerned to deal with the concepts Mr. Schuman employs and to analyze some peripheral matters that his book suggests. His evaluation of Trotsky merits quotation: "Repressed insecurities and contradictions drove Trotsky to seek domination, to resent rivals, and at the same time to turn against whatever might have led him to his goal. In his response to Lenin as a father-image, love predominated over hatred in the later years of their relationship. In his response to Stalin, emerging as a new father-image, hatred predominated over love....Suddenly, he perceived that he himself was the victim of a plot....Deusions of grandeur, even when indulged in by the greatest of leaders, make for political ineffectiveness and delay."

This evaluation is interesting because it is in accord with the contemporary trend to apply psychoanalysis to every political, social and literary problem. Yet, it is as unthinkable for a layman to set himself up as a psychoanalyst as it is for him to proclaim himself a surgeon or a medical practitioner.

What are Schuman's professional qualifications to psychoanalyze Trotsky or anybody else? Where did he acquire the professional background qualifying him to diagnose Trotsky as a paranoid and Stalin as normal? Where did he obtain the intimate personal contact with these men that is necessary for such a diagnosis? But granting that Schuman is a qualified psychoanalyst, or that his judgment was obtained from a brilliant psychoanalyst who did have such contact with these men, we must ask the following questions:

1. You say Trotsky was suffering from delusions of grandeur. Was Trotsky under a delusion that he was a figure of outstanding historical importance who had played an important role in the Russian Revolution and in the period after the revolution? If the man was under a delusion, then he was not important. Why, then, do you devote so much space to him?

2. Assuming that Trotsky was neurotic or even psychotic, that he was suffering from delusions of grandeur and from a per­ secution complex, is it not necessary for you to evaluate his position from a political point of view? Was Trotsky's political position valid or was it not?

Psychoanalysis is a two-edged weapon, and Schuman's work itself can be explained in psychoanalytic terms. But I am not interested in Schuman's childhood, and I see no point in speculating about his father images, complexes, insecurities and neuro-
II.

There are certain curious inconsistencies and contradictions that the book leaves unexplained. Trotsky suffers from delusions of grandeur, yet it is Stalin who is defied and whom permits his deification. Schuman admits that "the systematic heroization of Stalin has garbed an able manager and bureaucrat in the less prosaic vestments of a man of the people, an all-wise father, an intellectual giant and a vivid incarnation of all the values and purposes worth living by and for." Moreover, in Stalin's case such heroization is historically necessary, it is not paranoid.

Observe, if you will, this curious fact: it is not Trotsky and his followers who are being plotted against, but they are the plotters. If Trotsky is assasinated, many of his followers are murdered, and Stalin and his fellows remain unscathed.

Observe this additional fact: Trotsky and his fellows plotted with Hitler against the Stalinist régime. But it was the Stalin régime that concluded the pact with Hitler that served as the necessary condition and immediate prelude to the war. But, of course, in Stalin's case, this was historically necessary. No amount of rationalization can eradicate the scabrous fact: it was Stalin who concluded the pact with fascism.

Curious world, is it not, in which the plotters are assasinated, in which defied dictators are normal, and their opponents are paranoid, in which the men who denounce their adversaries as fascist collaborators conclude pacts with fascism. It is a world in which the political is commonplace, in which it is taken for granted that the prosecutor is guilty of the crimes charged against the defendant.

III.

The technique employed by Schuman and other so-called liberals in defending the barbarities of the Russian régime is something like this: Yes, we grant, to our sorrow, that Russia has no civil liberties. We are first in our request that she give civil liberties as soon as possible, but, you must understand her difficult position, ringed by enemies, denying her the opportunity to institute regrettably harsh measures to advance in the industrial race so that she would be in a position to defend herself, etc., etc. This is the admission of criticisms as valid but their dismissal as inconsequential. It differs in this sense from the defense offered by the ordinary Stalinist apologist who denies the truth of the criticisms and assembles all his civil liberties. Schuman and his fellows admit the criticisms but achieve the same result as their coarser Stalinist brethren. They're in fact in a position morally inferior to the outright Stalinist apologist's; for the avowed Stalinist, by denying the truth of the criticisms, grants their seriousness and admits the importance of civil liberties. But these so-called liberals of the Stalinist variety, actually deny the value of civil liberties. In doing so, they deny their own definition and discard their liberal cloak.

Such books as Schuman's are another technique of Stalinism. Stalinism must be considered as a culture, employing diverse forms, techniques and agencies to achieve its purposes. It cannot be considered merely as a political party or as a political régime, using only one kind of political technique. It is a culture employing diverse arguments and instruments, appealing to different social strata, speaking in different languages through different men. The ordinary Stalinist apologist may be able simply to deny criticisms because the masses who are his audience are uncritical or poorly informed. But Schuman, appealing as he does to a more sophisticated audience, cannot casually dismiss, in his case, the facts that the readers know are facts. He must use a more sophisticated approach, conceding the facts but denying their relevance.

In a recent issue of the New Republic, in which Schuman was criticized by some readers for his unfair review of Kravchenko's I Chose Freedom, he referred his critics to Soviet Politics. He attempted to disarm them by saying that lest they "assume that this is a 'party-line' apologia, it should be noted that the New Masses has characterized much of the work as 'unmitigated nonsense' and 'rubbish.'" Let Mr. Schuman take biblical comfort: "In my Father's house are many mansions." Stalinism is wider than the New Masses, it embraces the editors of that magazine and Mr. Schuman as well. The editors of the New Masses and Mr. Schuman are tilling different vineyards, but the grapes are the same and just as sour.

RICHARD STOKER

FIRST ENCOUNTER, by John Dos Passos. Philosophical Library. $2.00

John Dos Passos was at his best as a reporter of the First World War. His mediums were a departure from the usual—the Camera Eye, the short biographical sketch; the bit of verse and the middle class characters who experienced a First World War and emerged into the era of the Big Money. His mood was that of the disillusioned intellectual, the participant in a war which was glorified by the patriots and turned out to be a war for profits. Then followed a post-war era in which the capitalist world was determined to realize its profits. All these things Dos Passos portrays with a kind of keen journalism which rose above most previous levels for reporting.

This reporting was done with the attitude of the post-war student generation... it was the disillusionment of a young democrat who suffered with the Left from outdated ideals gleaned from the Jeffersonian tradition. And it was expressed best in the trilogy U. S. A.

Philosophical Library has issued a previous and very early bit of Dos Passos reporting entitled First Encounter which presents in all of its stark madness the panorama of the battlefield, death and cynicism, fatigue, and agony and whiskey and sex. These are the first impressions of a sensitive Harvard student with a dream to drive an ambulance and gain an experience.

First Encounter does not have the quality of U. S. A., the sharpness of contrast between patriotic ballyhoo and bitter reality. It does not have the well developed irony, the contrast of character and development of motive which made it possible for U. S. A. to have such an impact upon the pacifist generation in the late thirties. First Encounter does not even possess the refinements of Three Soldiers, such as they were.

But First Encounter is nevertheless an honest and graphic account of circumstances which cannot be too carefully recorded for the young people of a world which has been subjected to imperialist wars twice in a quarter of a century. It is a good reaction and no writer should be at all apologetic about having written it. The style may have been sparse; but the reaction was direct and straightforward.

It is, therefore, with some concern that the reader will detect a strong apology in the preface written by Dos Passos in 1945. This preface was written toward the close of a second imperialist war. Dos Passos' reporting of the Second World War was neither as direct nor real as it was in U. S. A. He came to the battlefront again, to be sure. This time he came as a reporter for Life and Time. And he saw less that was real and less that was ugly. It was all there for him to see; but he failed to discern it.

But having failed in 1944 and 1945 why should the decrepit Jeffersonian apologize for the freshness of his approach in 1918? Why should he adopt the cliché of all aged ex-radicals that the reactions of youth to the horrors of an imperialist war are part of the illusions of a generation which disappear with maturity?

What Dos Passos calls the "enthusiasms and some of the hopes of young men already marked for slaughter in that year of enthusiasms and hopes beyond other years, the year of the October Revolution" is far better than "the young men out in the Pacific" whom Dos Passos talked to in 1945 and who "just hoped that what was left of the U. S. A. after the war would not be worse that what they had left." This was not merely an absence of illusion as Dos Passos so naively thinks. This was blank and utter despair.

Dos Passos' apology notwithstanding, First Encounter is an honest and forthright reporting. It suffers from the loose and looseness of style and composition. But it is good and true. Would that the same could be said of what Dos Passos has written lately.

LEW VICTOR
POLITICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING CLASS

From an Irish comrade, living in Dublin, we have received the following account of the struggles of the revolutionists of that country. We print below extracts from his interesting letter:

Outside of international considerations and the objective immaturity of the historical process, tremendous difficulties are encountered in building the Irish section. The entrenchment of the radical bourgeoisie as the counter-revolutionary ruling class, confuses and disorients the broadest masses, who devoted a lifetime of struggle, deprivation and sacrifice to the ending of imperialist hegemony. Further, the integration of the embryonic organizations of the workers into the national liberation movement - without, however, preserving their autonomy and ideological independence - has led to the nullification of the movement. Out of this has grown a national capitulationist faction seeking to substitute the ghost of the national struggle for the betrayal of the class struggle by a trade union and labor party bureaucracy, who seek to replace the ghost of the national struggle of three decades ago for the reality of the present class struggle. This, pursuing its logical conclusions, leads - and has led - to the betrayal of the class struggle by a trade union and labor leadership born of a national revolutionary struggle, and who endeavor to solve the concrete tasks of today by resurrecting the corpse of yesterday's "republican" abstractions. It was precisely this stupid [but very convenient, maneuver utilized to split the TUC by the national bourgeoisie capitalists] policy that has led to the present duality in the labor movement - both industrially and politically. Rather than posing an internationalist solution to the problem of the TUC; the anti-captialist faction try to find a middle road between the pre-liberationist concept of a "republic" and the existing reality. Unable to find this middle road, some of them have moved toward the position of "displaced nationalist orphans" seeking imperialist succor, from the British TUC. Again and again, the national question is the stumbling block of the progress of the working class. In the north - which is a puppet imperialist state - the national question is predominant. To a greater extent in the south all political issues are decided in the last analysis on partition. The Unionists of the north, with their police state, are determined to hang on to the prerequisites they receive under imperial preference. The ending of the border would mean for the north an ending of its denationalism. Deproved of their political hegemony and the system of imperial preference the specific weight of capitalist relations would pass into the hands of the southern capitalists. Consequently, the political manipulators in the north base themselves on sectarian bigotry, police terror, and a host of other subterfuges, including rigged elections. Against this backdrop the politicalization of the workers and the middle classes will grow apace. The emergence of a strong labor party, farmers and other petty bourgeois groupings will decisively draw the class lines. Until this relationship of class forces materializes we believe that the foundation of a revolutionary socialist party will be restricted to theoretical entrenchment and the building of a cadre organization, with an orientation toward entering the bigger workers' parties.

Stalinist influence is strictly undercover. What semblance of open Stalinist activity did exist was driven underground by the Anglo-Russian alliance, in 1941. The Irish masses, steeped in anti-imperialist prejudices, are in no frame of mind to respond to the support of Britain's war effort. Although large masses of Irish workers were forced to emigrate to the British forces and war factories, out of purely economic reasons, Stalinist infiltration into the Labor Party provided a new field of activity for the activists. On the other hand, it became an institution of retreat for the soul-sick, before their ultimate demoralization. In 1943 the LP bureaucracy, under pressure from bourgeois-catholic opinion forced the expulsion of Jews. A further blow to the Stalinist party. However, there still exists a fraction inside the LP and an outside nucleus which publishes a monthly called Review. The Irish-Soviet Friendship Society is also used as a vehicle of Stalinist politics and symptomatic of the degeneration of even the Irish CP "all" the members and patrons of the SFS are petty-bourgeois diletantes and fellow-travellers of this unstable human species. Not one genuine worker has entered the ranks of the Stalinists since the "party" was liquidated in 1941. Prior to this the Stalinists had a good proletarian base in the trade unions; but demoralization of their best militants, flowing from the opportunistic policy of the leadership, has led in every instance to capitulation to the bureaucracy and apodictic dogmatism.

Catholic consciousness is a terrific factor in relation to the growth of the socialist movement in Ireland. In this respect the Stalinist policy is treated with the greatest hostility by the ecclesiastics. This is facilitated by the role that the church plays in relation to the state. Catholicism in Ireland is the established religion, enjoying, as all state-integrated religions enjoy, the privilege of being the ideological watchdog of capitalism. The cowardly labor leadership panders to the caprices of the ecclesiastics, and the religious prejudices of the masses. Church intervention in labor disputes on the side of the bosses is the 'rule, regardless of the degree of justification for a determined stand on behalf of the workers. State education is entrusted to the clergy who operate the schools, both clerical and lay. Catholic obscurantism added to the bi-lingual method of tuition produces an almost illiterate worker, who is highly susceptible to pogrom indoctrination by fascists, clericalism, and sectarian nationalism. Whilst, on the other hand, the colossal arrogance and apparent impregnability of the church, and the unchristian behavior of its ministers will lead to anti-clerical excesses experienced in Spain, when the situation is pre-revolutionary.

Correspondence . . .

Shirley Lawrence, in an otherwise acute analysis of psychiatric concepts as applied to mass reactions, injects a parenthetical assertion which cannot pass unchallenged. (THE NEW INTERNATIONAL, Nov. '46, p. 276.)

In discussing Fromm's description of the psychological basis of Nazism she states: "The essence of the authoritarian structure is described as the simultaneous presence of sadistic and masochistic drives, the craving for power over men and the longing for submission. Everyone thus has somebody above him to submit to and somebody beneath him to dominate. (This is somewhat akin to the anti-Semitism of some Negroes.)"

At the outset it must be admitted that some Negroes are anti-Semitic. Gunnar Myrdal observes that anti-Semitism in this country generally just prior to the 2nd World War was "probably somewhat stronger than in Germany before the Nazi régime." Negroes contribute their share of this dislike. Can their reaction be distinguished from that of other Americans?

Negroes in Harlem know Jews as their rent collectors, as their pawn brokers, as the clothing merchant selling the shoddy goods of today. Odette Harper Hines, whose story of police brutality appeared in the press last year, tells of other experiences in Alexandria, La., which are instructive on the attitude of the Southern Negro. The largest department store in that town is "Ginsburg's." Like other exclusive establishments in the deep South "Ginsburg's" does not permit Negroes to darken its doors. However, "Ginsburg's" employs white runners to intercept Negro women shoppers and offer to buy for them the articles in the store. When she declines such an offer, she is cursed volubly. The Jews who conform to the Southern pattern in order to ply their trades tend to stir up even more antagonism than is exhibited against other whites. It is as if the Negroes felt that the Jew was responsible for all conditions against Negroes that he protested about when visited on Jews. Again Myrdal notes the real basis of the anti-Jewish feeling. "I have observed in the
big cities a certain amount of anti-Semitism among Negroes, which is rather natural as Jews in general are in that situation, and real estate owners are frequently the ones among the whites who are in closest contact with the Negro and are thus likely to be identified as members of the Negro people..." It might be added that the Jews as newcomers among employers have a position less secure than "Aryan" bosses and so have the reputation of driving their workers more.

Hitherto, it has always been concluded by serious investigators that the Negroes were at the very bottom of the scale in our society—below the European national minorities, Chinese, Japanese, Jews, and even the Mexicans. (See, Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 83.) But Shirley Lawrence evidently thinks that anti-Semitic Negroes conceive themselves as superior to Jews. She thereby assumes a mass paranoia completely unsupported in fact.

CONRAD LYNN.

(Limitations of space have made it necessary for the following communication. Its author, W. H. Emmett, is well known for his Economic Handbook of Marxism and for previous contributions to these pages.—Editors.)

Editor:

I wish to make some commentary upon the discussion of "Luxemburg's Theory of Accumulation" by F. Forest in the April and May issues of The New International. Especially, I would refer to the general bearing as to the cause of modern commercial crises.

A persistent and engaging question of the discussion in The New International seems to be: What exactly does Marx mean by "Capitalist Accumulation"? More definitely and substantially it seems to be: Does Marx refer to the capital of a single capitalist, or to that of a number of nations, or, say, all the nations of Europe, or to the capital of the whole capitalist world? Before venturing an answer to this evident question, let us briefly contemplate a rather simple analogy.

Whenever we meet with anthropological work about the attributes or characteristics of human nature, we can easily understand it that matters not whence the examples of human nature may come—from a special part of the world, or any number of parts, or from all parts of the habitable globe. Wherever they may be found, humanity's physique or make-up, speech, general activities and character, will always effectively differentiate mankind from all the rest of the animal kingdom. The essential distinctiveness of that human nature is quite independent of any particular race of mankind, and independent, too, of any countries to which they may happen to belong.

Similarly with the capital of Marx's "Capitalist Accumulation." The phenomenon of accumulating capital is quite independent of a "closed society" and quite independent of any pre-capitalist or "non-capitalist surroundings."

Despite her research, Forest's two articles will not withstand much economic probing or analysis. The question as to which or what capital or where? should never arise. The formula or label, c+v+s, definitely and quite sufficiently marks off the capital under discussion as industrial capital, otherwise standard capital. And it does not matter where or how much one may have of it. Once found, humanity's physique or make-up, from the very bottom of the scale in our society-below the European national minorities, Chinese, Japanese, Jews, and even the Mexicans (See, Myrdal, American Dilemma, p. 83.) But Shirley Lawrence evidently thinks that anti-Semitic Negroes conceive themselves as superior to Jews. She thereby assumes a mass paranoia completely unsupported in fact.

The "closed society" idea might be correct in some sense or other, and it may possibly help study in some way. Such hypothetical distinctions might then be very well—where it may be appropriate. But in the matter of Capitalist Accumulation it does not seem capable of any proper application. The accumulating capital depicted by Marx in Part III of Vol. II just means the increasing capital output of any employer at all, or any industrial capital in general. Marx's description of "capitalist accumulation" applies to any c+v+s capital whatever, in any part of the world, or if you will, in many parts or even in all parts of the globe.

Forest's reference (p. 107) to the exclusion of foreign trade as having nothing to do with industrial capital seems rather forced. I do not see that Marx, in either of the quoted pages, in Vol. II and Vol. III,II any way refers to any "class conflict," or to any of its fundamental relationships.

In the case of Vol. II, Marx excludes consideration of foreign trade at certain points, not because of its non-relation to class conflicts, but because such secondary topic would only result in confusion. For instance, on pages 647-8, when we seek to understand reproduction on a given scale, or when we wish to comprehend the gold reproduction, "we transfer the gold mines [mentally of course] into the country with capitalist production whose annual reproduction we are analyzing," so to leave aside the irrelevant activities of foreign commerce. But very certainly, this is not because of foreign commerce's non-relation to the class conflict.

In Vol. III, too, the matter of "exclusion" would render another kind of conflict, "industrial," in any case of any conflict, viz., that conflict between "capital" and "labor" in "foreign trade"? But if foreign trade is to be "excluded," how comes it that (against the falling tendency of the rate of profit the fifth, or No. 5, of the "counteracting," "or "counterbalancing," causes, is this very same "foreign trade"? How is it that under this heading the subject is of sufficient importance to occupy about four pages of Marx's Vol. III? Not only did Marx sometimes "exclude" consideration of foreign trade. But sometimes he also avoided any entanglement with "fixed capital." He writes in one place "...we must for the present leave out of consideration for the moment the exchange which is transferred from the fixed capital to the annual product by wear and tear, unless this fixed capital is reproduced... during the year" (Vol. II, p. 458).

From his three "vantage points," he paves the way for the process of Capitalist Circulation in its various threads up to the stage of Simple Reproduction; and he showed that in the absence of any upset by, or concern about, fixed capital (in short, "excluding" the fixed capital), the surplus value can all be "realized" and distributed without leaving any remainder to cause any trouble, for example, anything like the commodity crises. He shows the exchanges which dispose of the surplus value when the process is not blocked by the circulation of fixed capital. Not only so, but he also shows that the surplus value is divisible into necessities and luxuries, and he shows the distribution of these sub-divided parts of surplus value as fair or equal, shares for the capitalists in both Division I and Division II.

In Division I, the surplus value, assumed as 1,000, or 0.00, is realized, that is the newly produced value, is "realized" by the capital.
ists of this Division. It is distributed amongst them in proportionate shares (arbitrarily, of course) consisting of three-fifths as life's necessaries and two-fifths as luxuries, that is, 600 as necessaries and 400 as luxuries, which together equal the surplus value of 1000. The details of which distribution (if one wishes the pleasure of looking them up) are given by Marx on page 471.

In Division II there is the same assumption of 50 per cent of the new value product being the surplus value, viz. 500. And it is "realized" by the capitalists in this Division II. It is proportionately shared out amongst them (again arbitrarily, of course), three parts as necessary and two parts luxuries, that is: 500 and 200, equal to the 600 of surplus value. (See Vol. II, pp. 488-70.)

It seems necessary to notice that "Accumulation" is not any direct cause of the crises. So far from "Accumulation" being directly the "cause" of crises, the subject, "Accumulation," etc., is broached by Marx in his Vol. II, only well after he had already demonstrated: the non-conflicting and unruly fixed-capital was causing the crises. That is to say, in his Vol. II Marx commenced work on the subject of "Accumulation in Division I," etc., only about thirty pages after having already traced out the direct and inevitable cause of the commercial crises.

W. H. Emmett.

We are printing below the significant sections of the letter written by one of our contributors—a letter we believe our readers will find of interest. The writer is a young woman, a German student and intellectual who came to maturity during the period of Nazi power and its decline. It went without saying that THE NEW INTERNATIONAL is in disagreement with many of the conceptions expressed, conceptions which reveal a strong "hate" of Nazi indoctrination against the "Slavic races," as well as confused and illusory conceptions regarding the role of America in Europe. But it is precisely this confusion that has value in revealing the nature of the nationalist sentiments that are making headway among the broad layers of the German people. Finally, as a passionate portrayal of what the conquest and humiliation of Germany has meant to its people this letter has a value and authenticity of its own.—Editor.

Germany
November 29, 1948

Dear Friend:

Please do not be angry with me for starting this letter with "dear friend." But ever since I read Henry Judd's article I know that you understand Europe and Germany in all its misery—and therefore, I regard you as one of my friends!

For you see, S.: when you left in October, 1945, Germany was not as hopeless by far as it is today, and Germany's population was not as disappointed and filled with hate as it is today!

To be sure: you will find even in Germany Negroes with whom you can have pleasant conversations—you will meet people who are decent and who have principles. But as soon as you say that you're an American, these people will expect something from you—cigarettes, food, clothes, things like that. For it is this that is so horrible: the foreigner is regarded as a human being, but rather as a sort of Santa Claus, who simply has to bring presents. And perhaps you will also meet people who will approach you scornfully at first. It will seem that you are the only foreigner with whom I can discuss today's problems with complete frankness.

I was surprised, above all, that in America the newspapers speak about the difficult political situation so fearlessly. I appreciated very much the twelve American papers you sent. Yes,—they seem to understand the unhappy European situation in America. But the tragedy lies in the fact that America must share responsibility for this state of affairs.

The good the weapons of the American soldiers could have brought was completely destroyed by the politicians who followed. It would have been possible for America, through her power and her superiority, to liberate all of Europe from the pest of Nazism. But what, today, has happened to this "liberation"? America's politicians behaved themselves like unrestrained children: they indiscriminately gave away the treasures they had won, and, like little boys, were overjoyed when people said "thank you" to them. How, again, did the American "Volksstempel" put it: "Breslau and Silesia Polish? Of that not even the craziest among the crazy Polish chauvinists had ever dared to dream..." And yet, that has come about! Let us never forget that America won the war for Europe: America, all alone, defeated Nazism for the Western states. For England, France, Norway, Holland—I do not believe that these states could have won the war without the mighty help of America. But when the Americans went to Europe to end and if America now withdraws, then-European history. And if America now withdraws because she can no longer control the situation (which, after all, she herself has created with her policies), that will certainly not have fulfilled her mission!—Let's not talk about this any further. I just wanted to tell you honestly what is going on in Europe because I don't want to feel obliged to lie to you about it.

I myself am not as depressed and hopeless as the others are. I'll get through somehow—I have my profession, and, in the end, it always depends on the person himself, on the attitude he takes toward things. And I'm not afraid—there'll always be a way for the individual. Some day, possibly, I may go abroad. Who knows? I may yet be successful and get out of Germany. I read quite a bit, and I try to gain enough knowledge so that even abroad they'll have to recognize me. That is all.

Don't be angry, dear friend, that I have written so frankly about Europe. It's not a country that is guilty. What is to be held responsible, rather, are its current policies—and these policies are not eternal. My very best to you, S. Will you write? In gratitude.

Yours,
H.