NEW INTERNATIONAL

Inside the Stalin-Hitler Deal
Digest of the Secret Documents
by Ricky Saunders

The Documents and the "Russian Question"
by Ernest Erber

WHAT MAKES HENRY RUN?
by R. Fahan

JAMES CONNOLLY ON DEMOCRACY
by James T. Farrell

CHINESE TROTSKYISM IN THE WORLD WAR
by Wang Ming-yuen

THE SECRET LIFE OF JAMES BURNHAM
by Louis Cassel
It wasn't an easy decision, but we made it. ... Beginning next month, the NI will begin the serialization of at least the most important parts of a book which long ago deserved to be made known to the English-reading public: Victor Serge's *The Year One of the Russian Revolution*. ... Published in French in 1930, this work describes what no other book now available even attempts to provide—a factual, detailed, vivid picture of the Bolsheviks in power, and of the problems they faced in the first crucial year of the Soviet regime....

Frankly, it wasn't an easy decision because it means devoting a good slug of space month after month, for over a year, to this purpose.... We felt the material had to be good, and of first-rate importance, to justify that.... Well, it is good.... But we might as well own up in public that how far we go with it will still depend on you and your response....

"Notes of the Month" were crowded out of this issue particularly by the sensational publication of the new Stalin-Nazi Pact documents. ... We're aiming at full coverage of the invaluable historical material uncovered by this falling-out of the imperialist thieves.... In fact, next month's issue will have a supplementary article (continuing the job done in this issue by Saunders and Erber) dealing with the picture that emerges from the documents of the role of Stalin himself in the whole deal, and of the political ideology behind the Moscow-Berlin partnership....

This isn't supposed to be a horn-tooting column, but the truth is the truth.... The NI's new look, sprung upon an unsuspecting public last month, has met with so close to a unanimously favorable response that we can't persuade ourselves to conceal the fact....

There's plenty of room for the NI to grow.... A friend at the University of Chicago writes: "The last two issues (December and January) have been received with nothing but praise from all quarters. Even the U. of C. book store, which never sells more than two of its ten-copy bundle, sold out in two weeks. Not more than thirty copies were sold on campus but they were very well circulated among the politicals." ... We also want to mention particularly the receipt of similar sentiments from the Bay Area (California).... Sales are up all over, certainly wherever our agents have given just a little push.... That constitutes a hint to other agents....

Incidentally, Business Manager Paul Bern is interested at the moment in getting the NI into more libraries and getting more agents on university campuses.... Write to him if you're interested....

Now we have to report a terrible discovery.... It all came about because our business department has compiled and mimeographed a complete list of all issues of the NI published since our first number in July 1934. They also mimeographed an inventory of all single issues and complete volumes, bound and unbound, now in stock.... That was done to permit our readers to check whether they have a complete file and, if they haven't, to complete it. (The lists will be sent you on request.)

The discovery was a by-product of this worthy endeavor.... If you'll look at the column to the left, you'll notice that this issue is down as Whole Number 124, whereas a month ago it was Whole Number 122.... It seems that in the December 1940 issue, a mistake was made on this number and, what is worse, never corrected.... Of course, this did not and does not affect the number of copies sent to our subscribers, but we're keeping the record straight for the sake of all future historians and Marx-Engels-Lenin-Trotsky Institute librarians.

Among our contributors in this issue.... Max Shachtman is, of course, the national chairman of the Workers Party.... Ernest Erber and Ricky Saunders are the New York organization's contribution to this number; they are respectively the organizer and assistant organizer of the WP in the city.... Wang Ming-yuen (the article is signed M. Y. Wang) is one of the leaders of the Internationalist or New Banner Group in China (Fourth International).... Ernest Rice McKinney, the national secretary of the Workers Party, is at work on an article for the NI dealing with the civil-rights issues now before Congress.
The centennial of the Communist Manifesto, the hundredth anniversary of Marxism, has received an amount of attention in the bourgeois press which is amazing for a doctrine so often declared to be "dead" in the very same pages. That is proof enough of its vitality.

That part of the bourgeois press which has given its attention to the anniversary understandably preferred to lay less stress upon the brilliant analysis which the Manifesto makes of the developing chaos of capitalist society and more stress upon the lugubrious unfulfillment of the socialist aim in Russia. We shall deal with the first theme in this article. The second—which our movement alone has scientifically analyzed and often discussed—will be returned to in a subsequent article; it is a theme whose meaning for socialists has been far from exhausted.

Only the Stalinists dealt with the anniversary jubilantly. Not only is capitalism disintegrating, more convulsively than the Manifesto predicted, but socialism is marching victoriously across the face of the earth. We have long ago triumphed in Russia. The flag of socialism has just been raised confidently over half of Europe and much of Asia. The organized partisans of the Manifesto are already, or are becoming, the principal political army of the rest of the world. The final disappearance of capitalism and the establishment of universal socialism is at last plainly in sight. The great vindication is actually at hand. Thus the Stalinists.

Not only would their characterization of capitalism be true, but so also would everything else, if only they could justify their socialist claims about the regime for which present-day Russia sets the pattern and its heralds and horsemen abroad conduct their fight. For these claims there is not and cannot be any justification. If the inevitable fall of the bourgeoisie, which the Manifesto so confidently and rightly forecast, has helped produce the victories of Stalinism, it has not yet been accompanied by the just as confidently forecast victory of the proletariat.

On the contrary, it is precisely in this period of the most shattering earthquakes in the bourgeois social order that the working class movement has suffered such heavy defeats in every critical battle as to make all the preceding defeats of the century seem trivial. A vast pseudo-revolutionary movement has almost everywhere and almost completely replaced the revolutionary movement which draws its inspiration from Marxism, which is authentically socialist, but which is now feeble and divided. It is isolated from the life-giving but disoriented working class; hemmed in by circles of skepticism, doubt, confusion and depression which penetrate to its innermost parts; disrupted either by overanxious opportunism or by that peculiar self-intoxication by which the noble wish often seeks to master the ignoble reality.

In the past, Marxism was abandoned and its validity challenged primarily on the ground of the viability of capitalism. That capitalism is doomed is more widely understood and acknowledged today than ever before! But where, in the past, the doom of capitalism meant only (and, as it were, automatically) the victory of human freedom under socialism—in the literal sense in which the Manifesto speaks of "its fall and the victory of the proletariat [being] equally inevitable"—today this is no longer the case, at least not to the same extent or in the same sense. How greatly times have changed and how they have changed! The desertion from Marxism in our day takes place not so much on the ground that capitalism is viable as that the socialist perspective is not.

"Show me," say, in effect, all those who, abandoning hope, are about to enter or re-enter the camp of bourgeois futility, "prove to me that socialism is inevitable and I remain a Marxist. If that cannot be proved, nothing is left of Marxism."

What is asked here simply cannot be given. Marx could not have been what he was if he held the view that is much too often attributed to him, nor would his socialism be worthy of the name "scientific." The disappearance of capitalism is inevitable, regardless of what is done by this or that person or group, because it bears within itself the seeds of its destruction. The advent of socialism is, as it always was, something else again.

Precisely because it represents a new stage in human history, the leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom, it can be established only by conscious, deliberate, planned efforts. Here, above and beyond all his past efforts, man must make his own history.

A Program of Human Activity

If we can speak of the "inevitability" of socialism, then it is only in a conditional sense. First, in the sense that capitalism creates all the conditions which make the advance to socialism possible; and second, in the sense that the advance to socialism is a necessity for the further progress of society itself—even more, the only way in which to preserve society. "In this sense," wrote Bukharin, along with all those who understand Marxism, "we may also speak of the historical necessity of socialism, since without it human society cannot continue to develop. If society is to continue to develop, socialism will inevitably come. This is the sense in which Marx and Engels spoke of 'social necessity.'"

What is asked for, by those whose intellects and vertebral columns have succumbed to the brutal assaults of our time, is not a scientific demonstration of the "inevitability of socialism" but the consolation and assurance of religion. There is no room for the God-intoxicated man in Marxism, nor for those who seek relief from the present wretchedness in even
the most enlightened form of superstition.

Marxism started with an analysis ("criticism") of capitalist society and, one hundred years ago, it proclaimed the death sentence already passed on capitalism by its internal contradictions. Capitalism never was an alternative in the eyes of Marxism. From the time of the Manifesto, the idea of preserving capitalism was dismissed as utopian nonsense.

Marxism ends with a program of human activity: fail to carry out the program, and mankind sees doomed capitalism followed by a general decline whose vileness and gloominess we can see much more clearly today than did Marx and Engels; carry out the program, and mankind takes the step necessary for that "association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." The choice is not one between capitalism and socialism. The choice must be made between socialism and barbarism.

The character of the final decision does not lie in an exercise in logic or dialectical thought, and certainly not in some reassuring (or tragic) arrangement obligingly provided by an act of providence or a law of nature. It lies in the outcome of the conflict between living human forces, the class struggle. More, much more than this can be found in the treasure chests and armories of Marxism. But anything less than this or different from it is alien to what the authors poured with such compact, dynamic and explosive force into the most significant political document of all time, the Communist Manifesto.

Bourgeois society in all its fundamental aspects continues to exist, to develop chaotically and therefore to decay essentially in the way in which it was analyzed by the Manifesto a century ago. All the attempts to represent present-day capitalism as fundamentally different from the capitalism of Marx's time are due to a misconstruction of Marx's analysis or a misconception of capitalism today. In some circles, not only proletarian but also capitalist speculative abstractionists have made it almost a new fashion to speak of a "new capitalism," a "state capitalism," and even an "organized capitalism" which differs in its foundations from the "old capitalism" or has eliminated it, and is exempted in one way or another from the merciless laws to which the Manifesto and above all, afterward, Capital found it subject. These new theories, derived more from thumb-sucking than from a dissection of society, need not be taken too seriously.

Changes Since the Manifesto

But if the foundations of capitalism remain what they were in the Manifesto, capitalism as a whole has undergone tremendous changes which, while occurring primarily in its economic and political superstructures, have not been without profound effects upon the foundations themselves. To understand these changes as exactly as possible, to distinguish as clearly as possible between what they are and what they very much seem to be but are not, and to be precise about even so second-rate a matter as the terminology to employ with regard to them, is vitally important. In fact, it is so important that a failure here involves the possibility of a fatal mistake in choosing between the doors directly confronting society, one of them opening into socialism and the other into the abyss.

The two outstanding changes developed in capitalism since the Manifesto are the rise of the immense superstructure of imperialist economy upon the classic capitalist economy of free competition; and the rise of totalitarianism (Fascism and kindred political forms) not upon bourgeois democracy but in place of it.

The Manifesto gives only the barest hints of both phenomena. Even if it is assumed that it was at all possible for it to deal extensively with them, the very circumstances under which it was written precluded such treatment. As Trotsky pointed out a decade ago with regard to the absence from the Manifesto of any reference to the colonial problem, the authors expected an imminent social revolution in the principal metropolitan countries and its success would have solved the then still incipient colonial problem in passing, as it were. If that problem has assumed the dimensions and central importance it has today, it is due only to the prolongation of the life of capitalism. On their own plane, the same holds true of present capitalist imperialism and totalitarianism. If Marx's lusty optimism of 1848 had been confirmed, mankind would have been spared these developments.

But the basic tendency of the now declining capitalist world is unmistakable. The rise of monopoly in the economy gives us imperialism; this process is preceded or followed and in any case is always accompanied by (although it is not the sole cause of) the rise of monopoly in politics which gives us totalitarianism.

In two words, imperialism is monopoly capitalism. Capitalism has moved irresistibly from small-scale to large-scale production; from large-scale production, requiring vast concentrations of capital, to vertical and horizontal trusts, syndicates and cartels; at the same time, to fusion of huge industrial enterprises with bank capital; at the same time, to the closest integration of finance capital with the state which, in one way or another, to one degree or another, is directly involved in the process of production, the expansion and protection of the market at home and abroad and the realization of the maximum profit. The centralization of capital into the hands of fewer and fewer monopolists gives them a colossal economic power and, however disguised, an even more colossal political power. "Pluto-democracy" is no mere journalistic catch phrase; it is justly applied to such countries as France, England and the United States.

False Conceptions of Capitalism

Imperialism does not exist universally or in pure form, and there is no reason to believe that it can. If a "pure imperialism" can be conceived of, the basic contradictions peculiar to capitalism would be eliminated, which means that capitalism itself would be eliminated (not without the "pure imperialism" suffering from contradictions of its own).

It is well to note these seeming mere abstractions. No one contributed as much to an analysis and undemeaning of imperialism, "the latest stage of capitalism," as Lenin. Scientifically disciplined and without a trace of ecclesiastical orthodoxy, he rigorously maintained the basic Marxist analysis of capitalism while he developed it, because he found no reason to abandon it. He found it necessary more than once to warn, and sometimes with urgent solicitude, against false conceptions of imperialism.

"Pure imperialism," he said in 1919, and not for the first time, "without the fundamental basis of capitalism, has never existed, nowhere exists, and never will exist. This is a wrong generalization of everything that was said of the syndicates, cartels, trusts and finance capitalism, when finance capitalism was depicted as though it had none of the foundations of the old capitalism under it."

And again: "Nowhere in the world has monopoly capitalism existed in a whole series of branches without free competition, nor will it exist. To write of such a system is to write
of a system which is divorced from reality and false. If Marx said of manufacture that it was a superstructure on mass small production, imperialism and finance capitalism are a superstructure on the old capitalism. If its summit is destroyed, the old capitalism is laid bare. If one holds the point of view that there is such a thing as integral imperialism without the old capitalism, the wish is father to the thought.”

Imperialism, therefore, does not eliminate the contradictions of capitalism; it not only adds to them but in so doing it sharpens all the others and gives them explosive violence.

Lenin flatly rejected any notion of exclusive monopolism, pure imperialism or “ultra-imperialism,” in the same way that Marx, in settling accounts with Proudhon shortly before the Manifesto was written, insisted that if competition generates monopoly, monopoly generates competition. Capitalism cannot free itself of the curse of anarchy and remain capitalism. Even when it extends the anarchy of production and the fierce competitive struggle on the world market, it does not and cannot abolish the competitive struggle for the market at home and the anarchy of production at home. When Bukharin wrote in one of his studies on imperialism, after the Bolshevik revolution, that “finance capital has abolished the anarchy of production within the big capitalist countries,” Lenin emphatically noted on the margin of his copy: “has not abolished.”

Capitalism has extended over the entire world the crises that are peculiar to it without overcoming the problem of crises at home. On the contrary, the crises of the world market reverberate through the home market and accentuate and deepen the shock. Imperialism only widens the dimensions of the crises in breadth and depth and intensity. The gulf between production and the market is bridged for ever shorter intervals; the disproportions in production have become greater and greater because the market itself has become less and less reliable as a regulator of production; the dislocations in the economy are more abrupt and extensive.

**Meaning of “State Capitalism”**

Under these conditions, all talk about the “return to free enterprise” is utopian, and all talk about “that government governs best that governs least” is anachronistic. With the best will for self-effacement, the modern capitalist government cannot confine itself to running the post office and the public toilets.

Every crisis, large or small, demands the intervention of the public power—the state—on a scale never before required. If the economy as a whole collapses in a national crisis, the state must rush in with an effort to restore it, if only to prevent the economic crisis from immediately becoming a social crisis that threatens the foundations of bourgeois rule. If one or another branch of industry collapses, the state must come to its rescue, either in the form of outright subsidy or subsidy concealed behind heavy compensation during the momentary “nationalization” and cheap sale at the time of “reprivatization.”

The state is driven to supplement the market, existing “over it and alongside of it” as a regulator of production, and like the market functioning necessarily as the benefactor of the big monopolies at the expense both of the working class and the small producer. At the same time, the “free” and “natural” development of the monopolies would lead to such savage conflicts at home, not only between the two main classes but in the broad ranks of the bourgeoisie itself, that the state must intervene as a “restraining” influence in the management of the monopolies themselves. On an international scale, the state must appear as the direct agent or at the very least as the open patron of the world-market interests of its bourgeoisie.

The state is irresistibly driven to participate directly, actively and universally in the “purely” economic life of capitalism, a process which is complemented by the direct participation of the monopolists in the political apparatus of the country. There is no reversing this process under capitalism. Centralization and concentration of capital, the growing interdependence of all branches of economy, urgently call for the organization and regularization of production and distribution which is rendered impossible, basically, by capitalism itself; that is, by private property and commodity production and therefore the anarchy of production. Monopolism is an attempt, rising out of capitalism itself, to overcome this anarchy. The mightiest and most “planfully organized” attempts are continually undermined, disrupted and exploded by the foundations upon which capitalism rests and cannot but rest.

That is why the famous “state capitalism”—a misnomer and a dangerously misleading one, which we consider usable “only in a manner of speaking”—never goes beyond what Trotsky, borrowing from the French, rightly described as “Etatism,” or “State-ism” in the capitalist economy.

The capitalist state remains the capitalist state. It intervenes in the economy, be it under Hitler or under Roosevelt, essentially for the purpose of maintaining the crumbling foundations of the so-called “old capitalism,” the “capitalism of Marx’s time”; it intervenes, to borrow an image applied by Radek to fascism, as an iron hoop around the barrel of capitalist economy when the staves are falling apart. The notion that the capitalist state is replacing or will replace the capitalist class—that is, the owners of capital, that is, the private capitalist proprietors, which is the only capitalist class we have known, do know or ever will know—is preposterous. The myth—it is nothing more—was sedulously disseminated by the fascist bureaucracy in its time, and there is no need for others to lend it any credence whatever.

The capitalist state has always been a capitalist owner, but only of those enterprises (post office, railways, telephone systems, etc.) which it requires for its own bureaucratic revenue or which, in specific circumstances, cannot be operated as private capitalist enterprises. The levers of high economic command have always remained where they will always remain under capitalism, whatever its form—in the private hands of capitalists, who have a state at their disposal precisely for the purpose of maintaining their property. All other “nationalizations” undertaken by the capitalist state take place under one of these headings: either to “socialize the losses” (this excellent phrase is Trotsky’s) of the capitalists in a bankrupted enterprise or branch of industry; or, what is tantamount to the same thing, to maintain at public expense an industry which is incurably sick or altogether unprofitable for private capitalist operation; or as the temporary owners of industry which is the immediate object of a revolutionary threat from the people in times of acute social crisis. Otherwise, the capitalist state continues and will continue scrupulously to fulfill its mission as faithful servant and guardian of private property. The expropriation of the capitalist class by the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and exchange still awaits a revolutionary act.
On this score, one final word is not amiss. It may be said: "The assertions are too dogmatic, for after all it can be argued that a state capitalism is eventually possible, that is, the gradual discarding, in one way or another, of the private capitalists and the taking over of industry and finance by the state. Or, the monopolistic tendency persists to the point where there is but one effective owner of the means of production and exchange, the state. In that case, we would have an integral state capitalism, which is the direction in which, short of the socialist revolution, capitalist society is moving."

But even if this were granted, it is hard to understand why it would be called "state capitalism" or capitalism of any kind. Capitalism is a commodity-producing society, or it is nothing. This much surely can be stated categorically. No product is a commodity unless it is produced by private producers, that is by a private individual for private account. Unless that is the case, the product is anything you want—but a commodity it is not; and therefore the society in which it is produced is anything you want except capitalism or even "state capitalism" (unless this is taken to mean a capitalism which is not capitalist, which would make it a fit companion for the "workers' state" which is also a workers' prison.)

Bukharin writes, we note with interest, that "were the commodity character of production to disappear ... we would have an entirely new economic form. This would be capitalism no more, for the production of commodities would have disappeared; still less would it be socialism, for the power of one class over the other would have remained (and even grown stronger). Such an economic structure would most of all resemble a slave-owning economy where the slave market is absent." This brief passage commends itself to the theoreticians of "state capitalism" and even more to those who have made the theoretical error, so to speak, of confusing a slave state with a workers' state.

Theory of War Economy

The rise of imperialism to unparalleled proportions further deepens the crisis of capitalism by precipitating wars whose preparation and prosecution introduce the most far-reaching changes in the economy of capitalism itself, to say nothing of political changes.

The Manifesto, and all Marxist writings following it, emphasized that the conditions of bourgeois property fetter the development of the productive forces of society, they are "too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them." Yet not only did capitalism experience a tremendous development of the productive forces for more than half a century following the appearance of the Manifesto, representing the period of the greatest expansion of capitalism, but even if the opening of the final crisis of capitalism is dated from the beginning of the First World War the last quarter of a century or more has seen what appears to be a still further growth of the productive forces. How is all this to be reconciled?

Theoretical economics recognizes two great divisions, the production of the means of production and the production of the means of consumption. Modern warfare, as we have seen in our own time, makes stupendous demands on the economy. "Germany would put about five million armed men into the field, or ten per cent of the population, the others about four to five per cent, Russia relatively less," Engels wrote to Sorge in 1888, when a European war seemed imminent. "But there would be from ten to fifteen million combatants. I should like to see how they are to be fed; it would be a devastation like the Thirty Years' War." Engels, alive during the Second World War, would have had the opportunity to see how many, many more than fifteen million combatants were fed. The stupendous demands on the economy were met, not only with regard to food but to weapons of such a kind and in such quantities as Engels or any of his contemporaries would hardly dare dream of.

What happens under such circumstances to the two great productive divisions of capitalism?

In The German Ideology, which in spite of Mehring's severe strictures, is invaluable for the fullest understanding of the Manifesto, which it preceded by a couple of years, Marx writes: "These productive forces receive only a one-sided development under private property, become for the most part destructive forces and a mass of such forces cannot even be utilized in private property." And further: "In the development of the productive forces a stage is reached in which forces of production and means of distribution are generated which, under the existing relations, can only inflict harm, which are not longer forces of production but forces of destruction (machinery and money) ..." And still further: "... the productive forces and the forms of distribution have developed so far that they have become, under the rule of private property, destructive forces...." The Manifesto itself points out that the bourgeoisie overcomes its crises "by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces."

Bukharin on the Destructive Forces

Imperialist war, on the scale on which it is now fought, gives a new and more terrible significance—a double significance—to these words. Capitalism develops the productive forces only by turning more and more of them into destructive forces. To an extent which the authors of the Manifesto could not possibly have imagined, capitalism has added the production of the means of destruction to the two great divisions of production set forth by Marx in his later Capital.

Leaving aside for the moment all emotional considerations and moral judgments, the production of the means of destruction must first be considered from the strictly economic standpoint. In a study written by Bukharin after the First World War, that is, before the extensive and intensive "improvements" introduced in the Second World War, is to be found the following striking and valuable observation:

"Let us consider the real reproduction process in so far as the economy as a whole stands under the sign of war, that is, in so far as a redistribution of the productive forces has taken place in the interests of war industry and of work for the army in general. The labor employed for war requirements used to be designated as unproductive labor from the economic standpoint. What does this mean? The specific significance of this labor emerges clearly when we investigate its influence upon the conditions of reproduction. In the "normal" process of production, means of production and means of consumption are created. These are the two most important spheres of the economy as a whole. It is clear that the means of production are each time incorporated into the system of social labor. Their production is a condition for reproduction of means of consumption. These means of consumption in no wise disappear without a trace for the further cycles of the production process. For the process of consumption is at bottom a unique process of the production of labor power. Labor power, however, is an equally necessary condition for the process of reproduction. Consequently, both the production of the means of consumption and the production of means of production supply products which constitute the necessary condition for the reproduction process without which the latter cannot take place. War production has an entirely different significance: a cannon is not transformed into an element of the new production cycle. Powder is shot into the air and appears in no way in a new shell in the succeeding cycle. On the contrary, the economic effect of these elements in action is a purely negative quantity. Nevertheless, it should not be thought that the economic sig-
nificance is here absolutely linked with a definite type of the use value and the objective form of the product. We can consider the sum of consumption with which the army is provided. Here too we witness the same thing. The means of consumption here do not create labor power, for the soldiers do not figure in the production process; they are excluded from it, they are placed outside the production process. So long as the war endures, the means of consumption thus serve in large part not as means of production of labor power, but of means of production of the specific “soldier-power” which plays no role in the production process. Consequently, with the war, the reproduction process takes on a “distorted,” retrogressive, negative character, namely: with every succeeding production cycle the real basis of production becomes ever narrower and narrower, the “development” unfolds not along an expanding but also a constantly contracting spiral.

Still another important circumstance must be emphasized here. The army, which represents an enormous demand, that is, wants to be sustained, gives no labor equivalent. In consequence, it does not produce but rather withdraws; in other words, we get here a doubled falling-out from the “reproduction fund.” This circumstance represents the most important destructive factor. In addition, consideration must be given to the direct war destructions (destroyed roads, burned cities, etc., etc.), as well as a whole series of indirect destructions (of labor power and more of the same). It is thus clear that the real basis of social production narrows down with every circulation of social capital. We have to deal here not with an expanded reproduction, indeed, not even with a simple reproduction; what we have here is an ever-growing underproduction. This process can be designated as expanded negative reproduction. That is war regarded from the economic standpoint.

It is sometimes forgotten that war is as much a part and product of capitalist economy as railroad trains. The development of the productive forces cannot be measured in some abstract way but in the way in which it actually occurs in the real capitalist society, and not just in one favored corner of the capitalist world but throughout that world.

The “tremendous development” of production in fascist imperial Germany, for example, gives us one side of the picture and therefore gives a false picture. The other side is the no less tremendous destruction of productive forces which this development was intended for and which it achieved, in the devastation not just of Polish “cities” but of Poland’s economy, of Russia’s economy and of the productive forces of other lands, including the most important productive force, labor. The United States doubled its productive forces over night during the war and everyone is still awed by this miracle of American capitalism. Only, the miracle has its inseparable counterpart in the outright destruction of productive forces which it made possible in Germany and Japan. One immense factory miraculously completed and put into operation within ten months produced in a short time the means of destroying ten equally huge factories in other lands in ten hours.

**Capitalism in Extremis**

The Manifesto unhesitatingly states the wonders accomplished in its name by the bourgeoisie, “wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals.” Today, capitalism reserves its wonders for the work of destroying everything handed down to us from the Egyptians, the Romans, the Goths or from its own immediate ancestors, and of devastating and razing what it itself builds with the inexorability and ruthlessness which makes the Vandals appear like mere mischievous children.

The aftermath of war differs from the war which is to follow as sowing differs from reaping. Everything is in a state of dislocation. Order prevails nowhere. Security is an unrealized and unrealizable dream. Except for one superpower, it is not so easy to distinguish the victor from the vanquished. All are plagued by an irresolve inflation, product of the universal underproduction caused by the preoccupation (still, in peace time!) with war production, by the need to feed those who cannot produce because of the war destruction (the effects of which have barely begun to wear off in Europe and Asia), and by the vast supply of printing-press money with which the victors helped defray the stupifying multi-millioned costs of the war, a monster burden which oppresses the whole world and the world to be born. Since the war settled no more than it could settle, which was infinitesimal in comparison with the wealth, labor and blood expended upon it, a new war is inevitable and is being prepared and planned in the open.

It is hard for a civilized mind to believe what it sees. The war of unprecedented destruction is barely over (the big peace treaties are not even drawn up yet and may never be!), but with statesmanlike coolness and objectivity the rulers of the world are at work in the sight of all for a war, this time of unbelievable atomic destruction, to be fought in the foreseeable not-too-distant future.

The preliminary skirmish wars are actually being fought already in several parts of the globe. The details of the destruction are discussed by the sportsmen, military and civilian, as if they were preparing for a trap shoot. The two big powers, the only ones capable of fighting a world war, openly jockey for position against each other. Each converts whole countries into rifle-rests and bastions against the other. Cannon fodder is publicly recruited. Armies are demobilized only in order to mobilize new ones. The war industry is not converted to the production of plowshares; it is merely reduced in size with the injunction, “Be prepared!” The merchants of death drool in anticipation of the coming emoluments of patriotism. The chauvinist and his twin, the witch hunter, are given their head. The blood brother of yesterday is baited today as the historical foe; the irreconcilable foe of yesterday, whose neck still has the spiked foreign boot on it, is groomed as the blood brother of tomorrow.

So far has capitalism decayed, so desperate is it in its depravity, that it is compelled to change, if not the reality, then at least the form of its relations to its classical fields of superexploitation: the colonies and semi-colonies it had in the past and the conquered, formerly imperialist lands which were to be converted into colonies.

In preparation for the earth-shaking and perhaps earth-extinguishing battle of the behemoths, the vassal states and lands are given the dubious benefits of imperialism’s peculiar “development of the productive forces.” Global war being what it is today, the big imperialist powers must have arsenals not only within their own reliable frontiers, but also abroad, wherever men live and work, wherever raw materials can be found and most conveniently converted on the spot into engines of death. So the lands that were colonies yesterday and those that were to be turned into backward agricultural hinterlands are being freely “industrialized.”

**Suicide or Execution?**

The conquered enemy, let us note again, is included in the benefactions. The bourgeoisie, wrote the Manifesto, “is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him.” The Manifesto was speaking of the relations between ruler and ruled in the capitalist nation. In its decay, imperialism reproduces these relations between ruler and ruled on an international scale, that is, in the form of
ruling nation and ruled nation, master nation and subject nation. The conquered nations, Germany and Italy, have to be fed by the conqueror instead of feeding him.

There is not a trace of humanitarianism in all this, it goes without saying. Behind all the pious talk of “reconstructing” Europe, of rebuilding its industry and making it “self-reliant,” stand the plans and charts of the organizers of destruction. This time all of Germany—and not Germany alone—must supply Hessians, dragged on and impressed into the coming holocaust for the service of foreign overlords—Hessians and supplementary means of destruction from its “reconstructed” economy.

No matter how disoriented the people, they watch the events unfold with mingled horror, fear and fury. They have felt the cruelty and futility of imperialist war, and they have an ineradicable hatred for it. They cannot be trusted with political freedom in the days ahead. They are not days of the blossoming of capitalist democracy.

The encroaching general barbarism drags along with it the barbaric regimentation of all social and personal life, authoritarian government, dictatorship, totalitarianism, the police state. It rots everything: bourgeois democracy, the classic liberalism, the middle classes, social-democratic reformism, the trade unions, the arts and sciences, and the whole economy.

The foundations of capitalism, along with the supports pushed under it as props, threaten to collapse. At the periphery of world capitalism, in its weaker sections, capitalism has already collapsed or has been collapsed by invading Stalinism, and even in its stronger sections it stands in fear not only of the proletariat but of this self-same Stalinism.

Now indeed is capitalism in its agony. It is no longer available as one of the choices mankind can make. It is almost pitiable to watch the hurryings and scurryings of the multitude of doctors—unwitting quacks—who attend its deathbed. Suppose it lingers on for a while? That will not matter much—a recovery is out of the question. What choice it has is limited to suicide or execution. It is only necessary to see to it that its death does not pull society down into an abyss with it. That is the task of Marxism today.

Max SHACHTMAN

Portrait of James Connolly—III

Connolly's Democratic Views

Writing about Dublin in the early twentieth century in The Reconquest of Ireland, James Connolly declared:

It is, indeed, strange that the people of a nation which has shown indomitable determination in its struggle for possession of the mere machinery of government should exhibit so little capacity to breathe a civic soul into such portions of the machinery as they had already brought under their control.

This quotation is but one of many which could be taken from Connolly's writings in order to suggest the thoroughgoing character of his democratic views. It was Connolly, the socialist, who explained and developed democratic views perhaps more fully than any Irish political figure of his time. A working-class and trade-union leader, Connolly brought democratic ideas of leadership and democratic conceptions of a rank and file into the Irish rebellion.

The difference between the Fenian Brotherhood of the nineteenth century and the Irish Citizen Army would indicate this. The former was organized along the lines of a secret society, and the reins of control were centered in the leadership. When the Fenians were ready to strike a blow the leadership hesitated in making a decision; the Fenians missed their opportunity and disappeared from history.¹

We have already noted that before the Irish Citizen Army went through with the Easter Rebellion, Connolly gave every member an opportunity to decide on whether to go along in the struggle or drop out. The Irish Citizen Army, despite its democracy, disappeared from history as did the Fenians. But it left an addition to the legacy of the Fenians and to the entire tradition of the Irish national rebellion—a legacy of democracy in thought and practice.

At the present time many socialists think of democracy mainly in relationship to a democratic party organization and to the ideal of developing a democratic internal life in left party organizations and movements. This is important. But democratic socialist thinking should require a broader interest, and at the same time it should dictate a concern with those small practical details of organizing life which are now viewed in a routine manner, if not with outright cynicism. Socialism should sponsor ideas of a genuine civic consciousness which is preached but not practiced in our own time. Connolly's remarks in the above quotation reveal his own sense of civic consciousness—of municipal patriotism, if one will.

At the beginning of these articles, I spoke of the recurrent division in the history of the Irish national revolution, a division on the question: Does the political or the social question come first? Connolly, as we know, belonged to the tradition of Irish rebels who stressed the social question. But his stress was not made merely in large and broad terms. He drew conclusions from his social position which he applied in small matters as well as in large ones. His ideas on civic consciousness derived from his social views. They were expressions of his socialist position.

Civic Consciousness and Democracy

Connolly valued all rights and liberties too sincerely to want to see them wasted. He observed that after the Irish had gained democratic rights in municipal affairs, they did not use these rights; they demonstrated a lack of civic consciousness. Wanting national sovereignty, they were badly utilizing the voting rights which they had already gained. And Connolly's discussion and criticism here served as a means for an illuminating socialist discussion of democracy.

Connolly, let me repeat, was most thoroughgoing in his democratic thoughts and ideas. Thus, in writing of "the function of public bodies as a governing factor in Irish municipal politics," Connolly emphasized that these functions of public

¹ See Recollections of an Irish Rebel: The Fenian Movement, by John Devoy (C. F. Young Co., N. Y. , 1929) for an account of the Fenians, their internal life and their organizational character.
bodies should be seen and used not merely as offensive political weapons to be won from an enemy, but also as "effective tools to be used in the upbuilding of a healthier social edifice in which to give effect to the needs of the citizens for associative aids to their individual development and culture." It is a commonplace to remind readers that Marx's real starting point was the ideal of a society which would permit the fullest and freest development of the human personality. Such an ideal was central in the mind of James Connolly. He would use every democratic gain as a means of contributing toward the development and culture of the Irish people. All political action was a means to be used in creating a freer society in which the individual could live and develop in dignity. During the First World War he wrote:

"We believe that in times of peace we should work along the lines of peace to strengthen the nation, and we believe that whatever strengthens and elevates the working class strengthens the nation.

But we also believe that in times of war we should act as in war. We despise, entirely loathe and despise all the mouthings and mouthers about war who infest Ireland in times of peace, just as we despise and loathe all the cantings about caution and restraint to which the same people treat us in times of war.

Connolly did not see violence as an end, nor did he love violence as some rebel spirits seem to love it. Likewise, he did not see power as an end in itself. He visioned a nation, a society, a world in which men and women, living with dignity, would be healthier than they are, better fed, better educated, more cooperative.

Use of the Ballot Box

This vision was neither Utopian nor millennial. He would not compromise with the principles on which this vision, this ultimate aim, was based. But he would not, at the same time, scorn any immediate rights and advantages that could be gained. Immediate democratic gains were means toward greater gains; and they could also become tools for trying to lift the cultural level of the people immediately. In times of peace, he did not scorn means of peace in order to talk of weapons of war which he did not yet possess.

Thus, ideas of civic consciousness and municipal patriotism were no mere platitudes to him. They were integral in his broader social and human attitudes which embodied a clear conception of social responsibility. Thus he wrote that "We require in Ireland to grasp the fact that the act of voting at the ballot box is the one act in which we get the opportunity to give expression to the soul of the race. . . . The ballot box is the vehicle of expression of our social consciousness."

Like almost all, if not all, great revolutionaries, Connolly was an educator. And he saw in the practices of democracy a means of educating the people. In effect, his political teaching on democracy served as a way of preparing the people for the exercise of power. Just as he studied revolutions of the past and wrote articles on these in order to teach Irish workingmen how to prepare for the rising which came in 1916, so at an earlier period he tried to teach the Irish masses how to exercise democratic rights, how to use these rights in order to provide for and improve the conditions of their own welfare.

He knew too well the price of liberty to be cynical about any liberties which had already been won. Thus, he wrote in The Reconquest of Ireland:

"Assuredly it was within the realm of probability that a people suffering under the smart of intolerable conditions caused by a misuse of political power and social privilege should at the first opportunity set itself to the task of sweeping away such conditions by a public-spirited use of their newly-acquired control of municipal powers.

But such did not happen when the Irish gained democratic rights.

. . . if today the cities and towns of Ireland are a reproach to the land and a glaring evidence of the incapacity of the municipal rulers of the country, the responsibility for the failure lies largely with those who in the past had control of the political education of the Irish masses and failed to prepare them for the intelligent exercise of those public powers for which they were taught to clamor.

And need we emphasize that observations of such a character lead to the basic conclusion which Connolly repeated over and over again—labor must take the lead in the Irish struggle.

His Love of the People

In April, 1916, shortly before the Easter Rebellion, he declared:

"The cause of Labor is the cause of Ireland, the cause of Ireland is the cause of labor.

And that cause was one to bring dignity into human life. The general welfare, the dignity of man, this was the cause of socialism. It was at the same time the cause of democracy. The democratic tradition of the French Revolution, which was inherited by predecessors of Connolly, Tone, Emmet, the Young Irelanders of '48, Lalor and Davitt, was absorbed by Connolly.

And no matter what aspect of Connolly's social and political thinking we take, we see how it was always admirably consistent. However, this was not the formal consistency of a sectarian who disdains all struggles for immediate gains on the ground that such gains will not necessarily mean socialism: nor was it the consistency of a critical theoretician who was never forced to act, to take decisions involving the greatest risks. It was the consistency of a dedicated and devoted man who had committed himself to go the long, hard and dangerous road that is demanded of all who want men really to be free.

At the same time we can see, in Connolly's consistency, his love of the people. Connolly's indignation always flared when he learned of injustice, of indignities heaped on the people. And his was an indignation different in quality from that of some contemporary Marxists whose greatest anger seems to come when they discover a theoretical error in the writings of an adversary. Unlike Connolly's, theirs is an indignation of self-love. It has contributed toward poisoning the streams of modern socialist thought. Connolly's consistency is a consistency based on love, on a realization of common identity between himself and the workers whom he led. It is this feeling of common identity which further motivates his conceptions of democracy.

In our next article we will further explore this consistency of Connolly, and we will examine his Catholicism.

JAMES T. FARRELL

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Inside the Stalin-Hitler Deal

The State Department has struck a major blow in its "cold war" against Russia through its publication of the secret documents1 from the German Foreign Office archives, revealing the intimate details of Nazi-Stalin relations immediately prior to and during the period of their partnership. It is unnecessary to decide whether the immediate primary motivation was the international situation or the Democratic administration's desire to embarrass and discredit Wallace's appease-Russia campaign for president, since it neatly achieves both aims; but it is hard to believe that there is a soul in the country who takes seriously the government's claim, "Vallace's Office achieves both aims; but it is hard to believe that there is a Democratic administration's desire to embarrass and discredit major blow in its

1. Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, ed. by H. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddell, pub. by the State Department, 1948, 362 + XXXVII pages, $1.00. Obtained by writing to Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. A commercial hard-cover edition is being brought out by the Didier Pub. Co. at $3.00. All numbers in brackets in the course of this article refer to page numbers in this book.

Political Digest of the Secret Documents

1. Who Took the Initiative?

The documents as selected begin with April but the beginning is traceable earlier. In the October 8, 1938 issue of the Socialist Appeal Trotsky's famous prediction already indicated the starting point:

The collapse of Czechoslovakia is the collapse of Stalin's international policy of the last five years. Moscow's idea of "an alliance of democracies" for a struggle against fascism is a lifeless fiction. ... We may now expect with a certainty Soviet diplomacy to attempt rapprochement with Hitler....

The first step2 was taken by Stalin himself in March 1939 in a speech at the 18th Congress of the Russian Communist Party. Of this speech Max Shachtman wrote at that time:

The democratic front... Stalin has dropped overboard without a splash. In its place... Stalin holds out the olive branch to the fascist powers, to Germany primarily. In actuality he offers an apology for them and their activities. [Socialist Appeal, Mar. 17.]

This was confirmed by Molotov later during the post-midnight toast-drinking that followed the signing of the pact:

Herr Molotov raised his glass to Stalin, remarking that it had been Stalin who—through his speech of March of this year, which had been well understood in Germany—had brought about the reversal in political relations. [Page 76.]

On April 17 the Russian ambassador took the first direct step. Speaking to Weizsäcker about a Russian order for war matériel, he used the occasion to make an open statement summarized by Weizsäcker as follows:

I ideological differences of opinion had hardly influenced the Russian-Italian relationship, and they did not have to prove a stumbling block with regard to Germany either. Soviet Russia had...
not exploited the present friction between Germany and the Western democracies against us, nor did she desire and better. [2]

Then on May 3 Litvinov was dismissed as foreign commissar, "with great fanfare," and "Molotov (no Jew)" appointed in his place "apparently to guarantee that the foreign policy will be continued strictly in accordance with Stalin's ideas" says the wire from the German embassy in Moscow. Two days later the Russian charged in Berlin, Astakhov, visited the foreign office, "touched upon the dismissal of Litvinov and tried without asking direct questions to learn whether this event would cause a change in our position toward the Soviet Union. He stressed very much the great importance of the personality of Molotov...." [3] The German response so far was merely to moderate the anti-Russian tone of their press, like an orchestra.

Molotov took up the game in Moscow on May 20, broadly hinting to Schulenburg that he wanted "better political bases" between the two countries [6-7], but Schulenburg was instructed to "sit tight and wait to see if the Russians will speak more openly." [7] By the end of the month the Nazis "decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union." We will see why later.

The first to bring up the proposal for a non-aggression pact was also Molotov [52] and the Nazis accepted the next day, August 16. At this conference with Schulenburg, Molotov told him that "The Soviet Government all through recent years had been under the impression that the German Government had no desire to bring about an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. . . . As regards the Soviet Government, it had always had a favorable attitude with regard to the question of good relations with Germany and was happy that this was now the case on the German side also." [55]

The day of the People's Front Against Fascism was not only over—it had, you see, been only a misunderstanding. Stalin had made several grabs for Hitler's coat-tails and had finally managed to hang on.

2. Did Stalin Prefer a British Pact?

All of the above was going on while a British-French mission was publicly in Moscow for the purpose of negotiating a projected alliance. After the Hitler-Stalin pact was signed, the Stalinist story was that the British had forced Russia into Hitler's arms by stalling and rejecting their endeavors to come to an agreement. What else could Russia do under those circumstances?—asked the Stalinists.

What emerges from the documents is the fact that British imperialism was indeed anxious to come to an agreement with Stalin, to save its own skin; Russia stalled precisely because what it really wanted was a tie-up with Hitler instead.

As early as May 17 Astakhov confided to Schnurre that "under the present circumstances the result desired by England would hardly be achieved," [5] and later, that Russia "was vacillating between three possibilities, namely the conclusion of the pact with England and France, a further dilatory treatment of the pact negotiations, and a rapprochement with Germany. This last possibility, with which ideological considerations would not have to become involved, was closest to the desires of the Soviet Union." [21]

Schnurre summarized the reason why a pact with Hitler was closer to Stalin's heart:

What could England offer Russia? At best, participation in a European war and the hostility of Germany, but not a single desirable end for Russia. What could we offer, on the other hand? Neutrality and staying out of a possible European conflict and, if Moscow wished, a German-Russian understanding on mutual interests which, just as in former times (i.e., under the Csar and Kaiser—R. S.) would work out to the advantage of both countries. [34]

And so Stalin dragged out the negotiations with the British and French while he angled for his heart's desire. Schulenburg gives a vignette of the process of Russian stalling:

Concerning the political negotiations up to now, we hear that throughout Herr Molotov sat like a bump on a log. He hardly ever opened his mouth, and if he did it was to utter only the brief remark: "Your statements do not appear to me entirely satisfactory. I shall notify my government." The British and the French Ambassadors are both said to be completely exhausted and glad that they now have a breathing spell ahead of them. The Frenchman said to one of my informants: "Thank God that that fellow will not participate in the military negotiations!" [42]

As we shall see, not only was it Stalin that wooed Hitler, but it was Hitler who broke off the affair.

3. Which Was Germany's Enemy No. 1?

Some would-be Marxists and others who are self-hypnotized by a conception of Russia as some kind of "workers' state" deduce from their theory that Hitler must have regarded Russia as his primary foe, even if he first attacked to the West for strategic reasons. For all his anti-Comintern demagogy Hitler himself did not share this opinion. Weizsäcker frankly explains the Nazi orientation to the Japanese ambassador:

It was as clear as day that for Japan England had become Enemy No. 1, just as Germany also was threatened much less by Russian than by English policy. [71]

The phrase "threatened by," of course, is simply diplomatic jargon. What it meant, we shall see, is that Hitler's main aim in the war was to take over Britain's "bankrupt estate"—her empire. This is what made it Enemy No. 1; the antagonisms among the imperialists were more important than the difference in social system between Stalin's form of exploitation and the capitalist form. That Stalin knew this just as well was so much taken for granted by the Nazis that (in the post-midnight toasting already referred to) Ribbentrop and Stalin could exchange quips about it.

The Reich Foreign Minister observed that the Anti-Comintern Pact was basically directed not against the Soviet Union but against the Western democracies. He knew, and was able to infer from the tone of the Russian press, that the Soviet government fully recognized this fact.

Herr Stalin interposed that the Anti-Comintern Pact had in fact frightened principally the City of London and the small British merchants.

The Reich Foreign Minister concurred and remarked jokingly that Herr Stalin was surely less frightened by the Anti-Comintern Pact than the City of London and the small British merchants. What the German people thought of this matter is evident from a joke which had originated with the Berliners, well known for their wit and humor, and which had been going the round for several months, namely, "Stalin will yet join the Anti-Comintern Pact." [76]

The official report in which this scene occurs does not record that the two blades thereupon laughed uproariously and slapped each other on the back.

4. The Partnership Against Poland

The Stalinists in 1939 represented the rape of Poland in the following way: Hitler attacked Poland; Russia became frightened by this act which brought the Nazi army nearer its borders, and therefore marched in its turn to meet the German
“enemy” half-way; this prevented Hitler from taking all of Poland and also erected a buffer for the defense of the Soviet workers’ fatherland. We shall now see not only the truth behind this lie but also how the lie itself was manufactured to specifications.

As far back as July 26 Astakhov, bidding for the pact, offered Danzig and the Corridor on a platter:

As to Poland, he [Astakhov] stated that Danzig would return to the Reich in one way or another and that the Corridor question would have to be solved somehow in favor of the Reich. [34]

The Secret Protocol, which was “an integral part of the Pact,” [66] already disposed of Poland. Its point 2 established the boundary line between “the spheres of influence of Germany and the USSR.” and added:

The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments. In any event both governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement. [79]

This friendly agreement was made on September 25, by Stalin personally with Schu lenburg:

Stalin stated the following: In the final settlement of the Polish question anything that in the future might create friction between Germany and the Soviet Union must be avoided. From this point of view, he considered it wrong to leave an independent Polish rump state. [102-103]

And he made his proposal for the exact demarcation line. Thus it was by the express wish of Stalin that no buffer rump state was left between the German and Russian lines!

The fact that, with respect to Poland, the “Non-Aggression Pact” was a military alliance for aggression is more fully documented than we have space to quote. Not only was the military invasion coordinated and planned: of the two partners it was Hitler who was insistent and anxious that the Russian army march in to take care of its share of Poland. The following exchange took place:

[Ribbentrop to Schu lenburg, Sept. 3] Please discuss this at once with Molotov and see if the Soviet Union does not consider it desirable for Russian forces to move at the proper time against Polish forces in the Russian sphere of interest and, for their part, to occupy this territory. In our estimation this would be not only a relief for us, but also, in the sense of the Moscow agreements, in the Soviet interest as well.

[Molotov to Ribbentrop, Sept. 7] We agree with you that at a suitable time it will be absolutely necessary for us to start concrete action. We are of the view, however, that this time has not yet come.

[Schulenburg, Sept. 10] I explained emphatically to Molotov how crucial speedy action of the Red Army was at this juncture. Molotov repeated that everything possible was being done to expedite matters.

[Ribbentrop, Sept. 15] ... we assume that the Soviet Government will take a hand militarily, and that it intends to begin its operation now. We welcome this. The Soviet Government thus relieves us of the necessity of annihilating the remainder of the Polish Army by pursuing it as far as the Russian boundary. Also the question is disposed of in case a Russian intervention did not take place, of whether in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence a political vacuum might not occur. Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in those areas, apart from what is made necessary by military operations, without such an intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might be the possibility of the construction of new states there.

... we would be gratified if the Soviet Government would set a day and hour on which their army would begin their advance, so that we on our part might govern ourselves accordingly. For the purpose of the necessary coordination of military operations on either side, it is also necessary that a representative of each Government, as well as German and Russian officials on the spot in the area of operations, should have a meeting in order to take the necessary steps, for which meeting we propose to assemble at Bialystok by air.

[Schulenburg, Sept. 17] In future all military matters that come up are to be handled by Lt. Gen. Köstering directly with Voro­shilov [86-96 passim]

5. The Partners Concoct Stalin’s Story

We are now in a position to witness a truly remarkable spectacle—a candid-camera view of the Nazi and Russian bureaucrats putting their heads together to fabricate the propaganda whitewash which the Stalinists would thereupon spread through their world-wide stooges. How were the Stalinists going to justify abroad the joint assault on Poland?

[Schulenburg] Then Molotov came to the political side of the matter and stated that the Soviet Government had intended to take the occasion of the further advance of German troops to declare that Poland was falling apart and that it was necessary for the Soviet Union, in consequence, to come to the aid of the Ukrainians and the White Russians “threatened” by Germany. This argument was to make the intervention of the Soviet Union plausible to the masses and at the same time avoid giving the Soviet Union the appearance of an aggressor.

But, Schulenburg explains, this intention has been embarrased by the press statement of a German general.

The report created the impression that a German-Polish armistice was imminent. If, however, Germany concluded an armistice, the Soviet Union could not start a “new war.” [91]

Ribbentrop informed his ambassador that the point about the German general’s report “was based on a complete misunderstanding: ... There can be no question of imminent conclusion of an armistice with Poland.” Molotov could stop worrying: there would be no bothersome conclusion of peace. After all, how can even a Stalinist hypocrite claim to be protecting the Poles against the Nazis if the Nazis inconspicuously stop their advance?

The next day Molotov wanted some more help from Ribbentrop in order to prepare the story we were going to read in the Daily Worker.

[Schulenburg] For the political motivation of Soviet action (the collapse of Poland and protection of Russian “minorities”) it was of the greatest importance not to take action until the governmental center of Poland, the city of Warsaw, had fallen. Molotov therefore asked that he be informed as nearly as possible as to when the capture of Warsaw could be counted on. [92-93]

But by this time the Nazis had decided that Stalin’s proposed lie was unsuitable. Ribbentrop proposed instead a joint communiqué which referred to “the intolerable political and economic conditions” in Poland as requiring “their joint duty to restore peace and order.” He wired his ambassador:

We assume in proposing such a communiqué that the Soviet Government has already given up the idea ... of taking the threat to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations by Germany as a ground for Soviet action. The assignment of a motive of that sort would be out of the question in practice. [94]

His reason was that he did not wish Germany represented as threatening these populations since they were outside the “well-known German spheres of interest,” and also that he did not want the two partners to appear “before the whole world as enemies.” Meanwhile, on the other hand, Molotov had decided against a joint communiqué of any kind with the Nazis. He so informed the German ambassador, who reported:
The Soviet Government intended to motivate its procedure as follows: the Polish State had collapsed and no longer existed; therefore all agreements concluded with Poland were void; third powers might try to profit by the chaos which had arisen; the Soviet Union considered itself obligated to intervene to protect its Ukrainian and White Russian brothers and make it possible for these unfortunate people to work in peace.

Molotov conceded that the projected argument of the Soviet Government contained a note that was jarring to German sensibilities but asked that in view of the difficult situation of the Soviet Government we not let a trifle like this stand in our way. The Soviet Government unfortunately saw no possibility of any other motivation, since the Soviet Union had thus far not concerned itself about the plight of its minorities in Poland and had to justify abroad, in some way or other, its present intervention. [95]

But, as often happened when Molotov stiffened up, Stalin intervened to reverse him in favor of the Nazis:

[Schulenburg] Stalin read me a note that...contains a justification for the Soviet action. The draft read to me contained three points unacceptable to us. In answer to my objections, Stalin with the utmost readiness so altered the text that the note now seems satisfactory for us. [96]

Stalin also accepted a joint communiqué, but...

Ribbentrop accepted Stalin's draft and it was published. The draft said nothing about protecting anybody against the Nazis. Ribbentrop had won out on that, thanks to Stalin. On the other hand, it also did not have Ribbentrop's "all too frank" wording that "They regard it as their joint duty to restore peace and order in these areas which are naturally of interest to them and to bring about a new order," etc. Its motivation was merely "restore peace and order" and "the collapse of the Polish state."

The originally concocted story about "protecting the minorities against the Germans," rejected from the communiqué, appeared instead in the Daily Worker, L'Humanité and the other organs of Hitler's partner.

6. How the Pact Helped the Nazis

In 1939 we stated that it was the Stalin-Nazi Pact which gave the "green light" to Hitler for his invasion of Poland and the outbreak of the Second World War. It was then a deduction from the situation, denied not only by the Stalinists but also by the Cannon-Trotskyists. The statement, however, was even truer than we thought.

As long before the pact as June, Schulenburg wrote: "...the Reich could take a stronger stand toward France if Poland were kept in check by the Soviet Union, thus relieving our eastern boundary." [18] On August 3 Ribbentrop wrote the ambassador: "In case of provocation [sic] on the part of Poland, we would settle matters with Poland in the space of a week. For this contingency, I dropped a gentle hint at coming to an agreement with Russia on the fate of Poland." [38]

It was, in fact, the expected "provocation" which induced the Nazis to accept Stalin's olive branch, in order to have their flank covered by Russia. And then they were in a hurry to get the pact signed so that they could get to work on the "provocation." On August 16, again on August 18, and a third time later the same day, Ribbentrop wired his ambassador that the attack on Poland was due soon and the pact had to be hurried: "...you must keep in mind the decisive fact that an early outbreak of open German-Polish conflict is probable and that we therefore have the greatest interest in having my visit to Moscow take place immediately." [58, 61, 63] On the 20th, Hitler himself sent an urgent wire to Herr Stalin, including: "The tension between Germany and Poland has become intolerable... In my opinion, it is desirable, in view of the intentions of the two states to enter into a new relation to each other, not to lose any time." [67] Two days after the receipt of this wire, Ribbentrop was in Moscow. Then the Wehrmacht rolled.

Over a year later, on his visit to Berlin, Molotov's conversation with Hitler went back over these golden days of friendship. His remarks are summarized in the Foreign Office minutes:

Upon his departure from Moscow, Stalin had given him exact instructions, and everything that he was about to say was identical with the views of Stalin. He concurred in the opinion of the Führer that both partners had derived substantial benefits from the German-Russian agreement. Germany had received a secure hinterland that, as was generally known, had been of great importance for the further course of events during the year of war. In Poland, too, Germany had gained considerable economic advantages. By the exchange of Lithuania for the Voivodeship of Lublin, all possible friction between Russia and Germany had been avoided. [232]

In a further conversation with Hitler during this same visit to Berlin, Molotov sought to claim credit not only for the successful spoliation of Poland but also for the Nazi victories in the West. The minutes report him as saying that

If he [Molotov] drew up a balance sheet of the situation that resulted after the defeat of France, he would have to state that the German-Russian agreement had not been without influence upon the great German victories. [236]

As a matter of fact, Hitler fully recognized Russia's contribution to his power. Writing to Mussolini two days after the signing of the pact, he stated vigorously:

I believe I may say to you, Duce, that through the negotiations with Soviet Russia a completely new situation in world politics has been produced which must be regarded as the greatest possible gain for the Axis. [81]

Mussolini's reply not only expressed full agreement but added further evidence of the "gain to the Axis":

The Moscow treaty blockades Rumania and can alter the position of Turkey, which accepted the English loan, but which has not yet signed the treaty of alliance. A new attitude on the part of Turkey would upset all the strategic plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean. [82]

Mussolini is here chortling over the gains to his end of the Axis accruing from the pact. In fact, throughout, one subject that Führer, Duce and Vozhd could always agree on was the tremendous aid that the pact meant to the imperialist expansion of all three. In this context the following has only the interest of one item among many:

[Foreign Office to Schulenburg, Sept. 5, 1940] The Navy intends to abandon the base on the Murman Coast, as such are now available in Norway... convey our thanks for valuable assistance. [186]

7. Russia's Economic Aid to Hitler

The economic side of the alliance was no small part of Russia's aid to the Nazi conquests. This side of the pact was often explained away by the Stalinists as "simply a business proposition," or with the claim that Germany never did in fact get much from it, or, more modestly, that at any rate

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL - FEBRUARY 1948

45
Russia got more than Germany. All three of these claims are thoroughly refuted by the documents.

The notion that economic agreements could be “simply a business proposition” under the circumstances of power relations in the midst of war was always an ignorant and naïve fantasy where it was not a deliberate hoax; the whole story of the negotiations leading up to the pact, as unfolded in the documents, reveals around the axiomatic assumption by both parties that any economic agreement depended upon political agreement and that the latter must also involve the former. Schnurre, economic expert of the German Foreign Office, only summed up his actual experience in his note for his own chiefs:

Despite all these difficulties, during the long negotiations [for the commercial agreement of February 11, 1940] the desire of the Soviet Government to help Germany and to consolidate firmly the political understanding in economic matters, too, became more and more evident. [134]

During the very first economic negotiations that followed the pact, Schnurre noted in a memorandum that “these negotiations will be a test of whether and how far Stalin is prepared to draw practical conclusions from the new political course.” And in this same memorandum, headed “Outline for My Conversations in Moscow,” the Nazi official continues:

The raw materials deliveries requested by us can only be carried out, in view of the unsatisfactory supply situation of Russia, at the expense of their own Russian consumption. [120]

The raw materials that went to Hitler to keep him satisfied with the alliance came out of the bellies of the Russian people.

We do not have the space to cite the detailed figures given for the huge quantities of raw materials which flowed into the Nazi war machine from Russia. “It was possible so to arrange these raw-material commitments of the Russians,” notes Schnurre, “that our wishes were largely met.” [84] He adds that it was a question, in particular, of “lumber, cotton, feed grain, oil cake, phosphate, platinum, raw furs, petroleum, and other goods which for us have a more or less gold value.” Suffice it to say that on September 28, 1940, he summed up the balance sheet as follows for the benefit of Ribbentrop:

The supplies from the Russians have heretofore been a very substantial prop to the German war economy. Since the new commercial treaties went into effect, Russia has supplied over 300 million Reichsmarks’ worth of raw materials, roughly 100 million Reichsmarks of which was grain. Russia has thus far received the balance sheet as follows for the benefit of Ribbentrop: [201]

In Schnurre’s very last balance sheet (May 15, 1941, little more than a month before Hitler attacked his generous partner) he not only says that “the status of Soviet raw material deliveries still presents a favorable picture,” but adds that “I am under the impression that we could make economic demands on Moscow which would even go beyond the scope of the treaty of January 10, 1941, demands designed to secure German food and raw material requirements beyond the extent now contracted for. The quantities of raw materials now contracted for are being delivered punctually by the Russians, despite the heavy burden this imposes on them, which is a notable performance.” [340-1]

The reason for the “striking disproportion” was the fact that “the Soviet deliveries, which are to be made within 18 months, will be compensated by German deliveries in turn within 27 months. The most difficult point of the correspondence of September 28, 1939, namely, that the Soviet raw material deliveries are to be compensated by German industrial deliveries over a longer period [emphasis in original], is thereby settled in accordance with our wishes.” [131-132] The result was that, in his last report a month before the break-up, Schnurre shows Russia left holding the bag; “the non-fulfillment of German commitments will only make itself felt after August 1941, since until then Russia is obligated to make deliveries in advance.” [340]

It is very interesting to note at this point that, while the Russian rulers were systematically depriving their people of food in order to feed the Nazi juggernaut, German capitalists were strangling at the lease against the drain of industrial goods required by the deal. In the same report a month before the attack, we read that “German industry...is eager to withdraw from its engagements with Russia and in some cases already refuses to dispatch to Moscow the personnel needed for the execution of the contracts.” [341] These diplomatic documents do not provide any further information about this capitalist pressure on Hitler, but it suggests an important counterbalance to a purely political and diplomatic explanation of why Hitler decided to break.

But the raw-material supply from Russia itself was not the only aid rendered by the alliance.

[Schnurre] In addition, there are other important benefits...the Soviet Union had granted us the right of transit to and from Rumania, Iran and Afghanistan and the countries of the Far East, which is particularly important. The freight rates of the Trans-Siberian Railroad were reduced by 50 per cent for soybeans...Furthermore, the Soviet Union declared her willingness to act as buyer of metals and raw materials in third countries....Stalin himself has repeatedly promised generous help in this respect....The Agreement means a wide open door to the East for us...the effects of the English blockade will be decisively weakened by the incoming raw materials. [132-4, emphasis in original]...Our sole economic connection with Iran, Afghanistan, Manchukuo, Japan and, beyond that, with South America, is the route across Russia, which is being used to an increasing extent....[201]

No wonder Hitler considered the pact “the greatest possible gain for the Axis.”

B. Partners in Plunder

It is unnecessary to add, after all this, that the only question of importance in the negotiations of the partners was: What do I get and what do you get? All of Eastern Europe became a grabbag. We do not deny that people exist on this planet who can read the record and still insist that the term “Russian imperialism” is “un-Marxist,” but then few things are impossible for the human mind.

Certainly the hard-headed bureaucrats of the German Foreign Office had no illusions on that score, nor did the private talks between the partners suffer much from embarrassed euphemistic terminology. The page reference for this statement is to 362. There is, of course, a standard diplomatic jargon for these matters which is regularly employed: “respect the vital Soviet interests in the Baltic,” “settlement of spheres of interest in the Baltic area”; in the middle of the August 23, 1939 parley in Moscow when the pact was signed, Ribbentrop wired home that “it transpired that the decisive point for the final result is the demand of the Russians that we recognize the ports of Libau and Windau as within their sphere of influence,” etc. And up to a certain point, the partners did not lock fingers in the grabbag.

The Secret Protocol [78] had assigned Finland to the then junior partner, and over a year later Molotov agreed with Hit-
ler that “during the Russo-Finnish war Germany had meticulously fulfilled all her obligations in regard to absolutely benevolent neutrality.” [235] On October 9, 1939, the Nazis already let the Finns know they would not intervene to save them. When the Russians invaded, Weizsäcker instructed all German missions abroad to “please avoid any anti-Russian note” but rather to repeat the Russian justification for their attack; and he added: “In conversations, sympathy is to be expressed for the Russian point of view. Please refrain from expressing any sympathy for the Finnish position.” [127-130]

When Russia took over Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the Germans carefully maintained the same benevolent neutrality. When in June 1940 the Rumanian government balked at giving up Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to Russia, Ribbentrop wired them to shut up and come across: “In order to avoid war between Rumania and the Soviet Union, we can only advise the Rumanian Government to yield to the Soviet Government’s demand.” [163]

In the case of Finland, the German missions abroad were instructed that in their conversation “England’s guilt in the Russo-Finnish conflict should be especially emphasized.” This was the formula for both ends of the Berlin-Moscow axis: when Hitler attacked the West through the Low Countries, Schulenburg reported, “Molotov appreciated the news and added that he understood that Germany had to protect herself against Anglo-French attack. He had no doubt of our success.” [142] And at the end of that campaign, “Molotov summoned me this evening to his office and expressed the warmest congratulations of the Soviet Government on the splendid success of the German Armed Forces.” [154] Molotov’s earlier message on the end of the Polish invasion will probably become as famous as the winged words about fascism being a “matter of taste”:

I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the German Reich Government. Molotov. [89]

Were these messages merely diplomatic pleasantries? Wasn’t it rather true that the German military victories inspired Stalin and Molotov with fear and foreboding as Hitler grew stronger? Reasonable as this view might have appeared during the war, the documents show that it was not only a mistaken opinion but that the very opposite was true: Russian friendliness and desire to cooperate with Hitler grew and burgeoned in proportion as Hitler beat down his Western foes! If Hitler’s successive victories led to the break, it was not because of Russian qualms but because of German cockiness.

This Russian reaction is documented in detail in the case of Hitler’s conquest of Norway. As in the above cases Molotov gave the enterprise his blessing, of course:

[Schulenburg] Molotov declared that the Soviet Government understood the measures which were forced upon Germany. The English had certainly gone too far; they had disregarded completely the rights of neutral nations. In conclusion, Molotov said literally: “We wish Germany complete success in her defensive measures.” [138]

But although Schulenburg thought the above information important enough to mark his wire “Very Urgent,” it is not as interesting as his next one:

For some time we have observed in the Soviet Government a distinct shift which was unfavorable to us. In all fields we suddenly came up against obstacles which were, in many cases, completely unnecessary. . . . [A number of petty obstacles are then described.]

We asked ourselves in vain what the reason might be for the sudden change of attitude of the Soviet authorities. After all, nothing at all had “happened”! . . . On the 8th of this month I therefore asked for permission to see Herr Molotov—i.e., before the Scandinavian events. Actually, the visit to Herr Molotov did not take place until the morning of the 9th—i.e., after our Scandinavian operations. During this talk it became apparent that the Soviet Government had again made a complete about-face. [Molotov’s extreme affability and alacrity in removing the aforesaid obstacles are described.] . . . I must honestly say that I was completely amazed at the change.

In my opinion there is only one explanation for this about-face: our Scandinavian operations must have relieved the Soviet Government enormously—removed a great burden of anxiety, so to speak. . . . I suspect the following: The Soviet Government is always extraordinarily well informed. If the English and French intended to occupy Norway and Sweden it may be assumed with certainty that the Soviet Government knew of these plans and was apparently terrified by them. The Soviet Government saw the English and French appearing on the shores of the Baltic Sea, and they saw the Finnish question reopened, as Lord Halifax had announced; finally they dreaded most of all the danger of becoming involved in a war with two Great Powers. Apparently this fear was relieved by us. Only in this way can the completely changed attitude of Herr Molotov be understood. Today’s long and cowritten article in Free Press on our Scandinavian campaign (already sent to you by wire) sounds like one big sigh of relief. [138-140]

Perhaps now we can all understand that when Molotov wished the Nazis complete success, he meant it. Schulenburg never again had occasion to report a Soviet change of attitude—until Hitler attacked.

9. Stalin Woos Japan

Returning to our unlucky Stalinists of 1939 we should remember that another tune they played on their phonograph was the story that the pact was a blow for peace and democracy because “it split Germany from Japan,” broke up the eastern end of the Axis. This fairy tale is particularly interesting because of the grain of truth it overlaid.

Whereas Mussolini was fully as enthusiastic about the alliance with Russia as were the Nazis, Japan was understandably put out at first, fearing that it would permit Russia to put more pressure behind her push to the east. Ribbentrop was aware of this Japanese attitude before he met the Führer. Isn’t it true, then, that the pact “split Germany from Japan”? Again—just as if all Stalinist stories are concocted by the simple procedure of standing the truth on its head—the facts show precisely the reverse!

One of the reasons Germany made the alliance with Stalin was because her relations with Japan were at that time unsatisfactory. The pact was not the cause but the consequence of this state of affairs, and it was then used by Hitler to draw Japan in where he wanted her—closer to Germany.

The day before the pact was signed Weizsäcker informed Ambassador Oshima, who displayed “a certain uneasiness.” In the course of the talk Weizsäcker pointed out to the Japanese that “we had sought tirelessly to improve German-Japanese relations. We had waited for half a year to hear some echo from Japan.” [71] But the wished-for response had not come. (Oshima ascribed that to Western influences at home.) So Germany had turned to Russia.

On a later occasion Ribbentrop went through it again with Oshima, at greater length:

Ambassador Oshima knew how these treaties [with Russia] had come about. Germany, at that time, had the desire to conclude an alliance with Japan. In view of the situation in Japan, it had not been possible to translate this desire into fact. On the other hand, the war clouds in Europe had become more and more threatening. At the Führer’s instruction, the Reich Foreign Minister had
been prepared for the six months preceding to sign the Italio-Japan-
ese-German alliance. This Ambassador Oshima knew. Since the
alliance was unfortunately not possible in that time, Germany, in
view of the coming war, had to resolve on the pact with Russia.
[284]

Not only did the pact not bring about discord between
Germany and Japan but—keeping the Stalinist fairy tale in
mind—the fact is that Russia was indeed anxious that this
should not happen. From the beginning the Moscow gang
exerted themselves to insure a united Axis. In the same breath
in which he first proposed a pact, Molotov also importuned the
German government “to influence Japan for the purpose
of improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations.” [52, 55] and
Ribbentrop graciously consented [58]. When Ribbentrop got
to see the Genial Leader himself, “Stalin considered the assis-
tance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in So-
 viet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Ja-
apane to get the impression that the initiative in this direction
had been taken by the Soviet Union.” [72-73]

This matter did not progress very fast. It was not until
early 1941 that Japan moved toward a tie-up with Russia, ap-
parently as the result of having made up her mind to throw
in completely with Hitler and do what Ribbentrop had been
urging—attack the British in Singapore. On April 13 Foreign
Minister Matsuoka signed that Russo-Japanese Neutrality
Pact in Moscow. The same day he summed up his gains to
Schulenburg:

Matsuoka emphasized that the conclusion of the Neutrality
Pact was of very great importance for Japan. It would make a
powerful impression on Chiang Kai-shek and would appreciably
ease Japanese negotiations with him. Also it would result in an
appreciable strengthening of the position of Japan as over against
America and England. Matsuoka added that the American and
English journalists, who had reported yesterday that his journey
to Moscow had been a complete failure, would be compelled today
to acknowledge that the Japanese policy had achieved a great suc-
cess, which could not fail to have its effect on England and Amer-
ica. [205]

Thus Matsuoka was squeezing the last drop of juice out
of the Russian lemon while Hitler was already blueprinting
Operation Barbarossa.

10. The Division of the Globe

A famous scene in Chaplin's film The Great Dictator
shows Schickelgruber in a symbolic dance with the globe of
the world. The script for this scene is to be found on pages
213 to about 303 of the captured archives: Hitler's plan for
“the historical mission of the Four Powers—the Soviet Union,
Italy, Japan, and Germany” and the “delimitation of their
interests on a world-wide scale.” [Ribbentrop's letter to Stalin,
Oct. 13, 1940, 213.] Stalin replied: “I agree with you that a
further improvement in the relations between our countries
is entirely possible on the permanent basis of a long-range
delimitation of mutual interests.” [216] It was on the basis
of this exchange that Molotov came to Berlin the following
month.

Hitler explained his world plan in detail. The British Em-
pire was a “bankrupt estate” of 40 million square kilometers.
In this windfall there was plenty of loot for Russia. But the
interested countries “would have to stop controversies among
themselves and concern themselves exclusively with the par-
tition of the British Empire. . . . He [Hitler] wanted to create
a world coalition of interested powers which would consist of
Spain, [Vichy] France, Italy, Germany, Soviet Russia, and
Japan.” He had decided that this was feasible if these powers
would “direct the momentum of their Lebensraum expansion
entirely southward.” The Tripartite Pact would be enlarged
to include Russia, the public text to be about the establish-
ment of early peace while the secret protocol would establish
the following world-wide division:

Germany, apart from territorial gains in Europe, would
get Central Africa. Italy, again apart from European grants,
would get North and Northeast Africa. Japan might be satis-
fied with the regions south of the home island and Manchu-
ko. And “The focal points in the territorial aspirations of
the Soviet Union would presumably be centered south of the
territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian
Ocean.” [249-250]

What did this last include, still following Hitler's expo-
sition to Molotov? He said:

Both partners of the German-Russian Pact had together done
some good business. . . . The question now was, whether they could
not continue in the future also to do good business together and
. . . whether in the long run the most advantageous access to the
sea for Russia could not be found in the direction of the Persian
Gulf and the Arabian Sea, and whether at the same time certain
other aspirations of Russia in this part of Asia—in which Ger-
many was completely disinterested—could not also be realized.
[221-2]

Hitler also threw in for Russia “certain privileges” in the
Black Sea area and dominance over the Straits (Dardanelles);
and “An agreement could also be reached on possible Soviet
aspirations in the direction of British India....” [251] In
short—

The Russian empire could develop without in the least prejudic-
ing German interests. (Molotov said this was quite correct.) [229]

Molotov, we recognize, is not among those people claim-
ing to be Marxists who object to the concept of Russian
imperialism.

What was Moscow's reaction to this grandiose plan? The
Kremlin's embarrassed counterblast against the State Depart-
mant publication now claims that they were merely partici-
pating in these conversations in order to pump Hitler, as it
were—feel him out. This is sure to convince everybody who
reads only Russian papers, like Pravda or the Daily Worker.

In actual fact Molotov's response on the spot was in favor
of the New Order, with reservation only with regard to a
more adequate definition of what Russia was to get. The latter
point will concern us in the next section also. The Russian
acceptance of the over-all plan is beyond debate.

Molotov told Hitler immediately that the Russian govern-
ment “would be interested in the New Order in Europe, and
particularly in the tempo and form of this New Order. . . . The
participation of Russia in the Tripartite Pact appeared to him
entirely acceptable in principle, provided that Russia was to
cooperate as a partner and not be merely an object. In that
case he saw no difficulties in the matter of participation of the
Soviet Union in the common effort. But the aim and the sig-
nificance of the Pact must first be more closely defined, par-
ticularly because of the delimitation of the Greater East Asian
Sphere.” [235-4]

The last remark meant that Molotov wanted to know
more about how East Asia was going to be divided up between
Russia and Japan. As for China, the victim of Japanese im-
perialist aggression, Hitler had made its fate clear earlier in the conversation. The Führer had proposed to arrange a deal between Chiang Kai-shek and Japan, diplomatically entitled a “compromise” and less politely known as a sell-out. The minutes had thereupon stated: “Molotov agreed with the remark concerning the advantages of a Sino-Japanese accord . . .” [224] and this point excited no more discussion.

The Nazis prepared a draft of the proposed Four Power Pact and on November 26, 1940, Molotov gave the Russian answer. This frank and unbridled declaration of Russia’s imperial aims is quoted in full among the documents. With this reply the Kremlin raised the ante, threw its chips in the pot—and overplayed its hand:

The Soviet Government is prepared to accept the draft of the Four Power Pact which the Reich Foreign Minister outlined in the conversation of November 13, regarding political collaboration and reciprocal economic support subject to the following conditions:

(1) Provided that the German troops are immediately withdrawn from Finland, which, under the compact of 1939, belongs to the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. At the same time the Soviet Union undertakes . . . to protect German economic interests in Finland (export of lumber and nickel).

(2) Provided that . . . the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria . . . and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease.

(3) Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union.

(4) Provided that Japan renounces her rights to concessions for coal and oil in Northern Sakhalin. . . .

. . . in case Turkey refuses to join the Four Powers [in handing the Straits over to Russia], Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union agree to work out and to carry through the required military and diplomatic measures . . . [258-9].

The next document recorded is Hitler’s plan for Operation Barbarossa, drafted three weeks later, for an attack on Russia. This was Hitler’s reply to the Russian rulers’ bid for a larger cut of the swag.

11. Why Hitler Attacked Russia

Hitler’s letter to Mussolini just before the Wehrmacht rolled into Russia is interesting for many reasons but it is not the document which states the answer to the above question most clearly. The less emotional compositions of the Foreign Office diplomats are more enlightening. Hitler’s letter reverts to conjuring up the pre-pact bogy of Russian “Bolshevism” and (bourgeois historians being what they are) its last paragraph about the Führer’s “mental agonies” is likely to receive more attention than Ribbentrop’s less psychological but many times repeated references to Russia’s “unacceptable conditions.” [284, 301, 304, 304.5, 348] The first instance may be quoted to stand for all:

After Molotov’s visit, during which accession to the Three Power Pact was offered, Russia had made conditions that were unacceptable. They involved the sacrifice of German interests in Finland, the granting of bases on the Dardanelles and a strong influence on conditions in the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria. The Führer had not concurred because he had been of the opinion that Germany could not permanently subscribe to such a Russian policy. Germany needed the Balkan peninsula above all for her own economy and had not been inclined to let it come under Russian domination. [284]

Subsequently Hitler remembered his “mental agonies” and Ribbentrop even threw in general remarks about “Communist sabotage” in Germany—transparent fabrications, in view of the fact that in all the archives there is not a single reference to any such action either among the Nazi bureaucrats themselves or in notes to Moscow, in contrast to the fact that the mere publication of a faintly critical anti-German passage in a newspaper in Russian-controlled Riga had elicited a sharp protest from the Nazis (and an apology by the Kremlin).

So the Germans decided that Russia was getting too ambitious and was reaching out too far. But couldn’t they have merely said No and slapped away the greedy hand? Why was military conquest necessary?

Here Hitler’s letter does give the answer. Now that he appreciated the character of Russia’s intentions, he was afraid that Russia would take advantage of his preoccupation with England to realize her aims through a “strategy of extortion”:

If circumstances should give me cause to employ the German air force against England, there is danger that Russia will then begin its strategy of extortion in the South and North [i.e., in the Balkans and Finland], to which I would have to yield in silence, simply from a feeling of air inferiority. . . . If I do not wish to expose myself to this danger, then perhaps the whole year of 1941 will go by without any change in the general situation. [350]

And so, wisely or unwisely, Hitler decided to cut off the grasping hand on the east before he plucked the juicy plum on the west. At the time it was a common opinion that his main objective was the bread basket of the Ukraine and its food supply; this was not true. In the first place, Hitler’s letter (and no other document) mentions this only in passing as a useful by-product; in the second place, as we have made clear, the Germans were satisfied that Russia was already putting on a “notable performance” in supplying them with grain. The break-up of the partnership was a chemically pure case of a collision over mutually coveted imperialist spoils and nothing else.

At this point, among other reasons to prove conclusively from the Russian side that the Hitler-Stalin break came solely and exclusively by German choice, we should analyze the documentation of Stalin’s humiliating scramble to hang on to the Nazi band wagon in the last period of the alliance. This material, however, will be included in a supplementary article in next month’s New International dealing especially with Stalin’s personal role in the whole affair, and so only its context need be noted here. We conclude this factual presentation on the same note with which the Stalin-Nazi deal ended—a high rising whine from Molotov on the day before the Germans attacked:

[Molotov to the German ambassador] There were a number of indications that the German Government was dissatisfied with the Soviet Government. Rumors were even current that a war was impending between Germany and the Soviet Union . . . The Soviet Government was unable to understand the reasons for Germany’s dissatisfaction. If the Yugoslav question had at the time given rise to such dissatisfaction, he—Molotov—believed that, by means of his earlier communications, he had cleared up this question, which, moreover, was a thing of the past. He would appreciate it if I could tell him what had brought about the present situation in German-Soviet Russian relations.

I replied that I could not answer his question, as I lacked the pertinent information. . . . [355]

Now Molotov knows, and it is to be hoped that others (even some self-styled Marxists) have found out. The answer is: Nazi and Stalinist imperialism.

RICKY SAUNDERS
Flashback on “Russian Question”

The 1939 Dispute in the Light of the New Documents

The captured German archives bearing on German-Russian relations during the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact, published by the U. S. State Department, are of special interest to our movement. The infamous pact and the train of political and military events it set in motion were the immediate cause of the sharp political struggle that split the American Trotskyist movement in 1940 and led to the formation of the Workers Party. The documentary material released by the State Department now permits an instructive re-examination of the two points of view that struggled for dominance in the then united Socialist Workers Party.

The signing of the pact on August 24, 1939, did not catch our movement entirely unawares. Trotsky had already indicated the strong possibility that Stalin would seek an understanding with Hitler after the “collective security” policy had suffered shipwreck at Munich.1

Yet the actual news that a German-Russian pact had been consummated, breaking suddenly and without warning, came as a distinct shock to the party. The party’s reaction revealed that despite Trotsky’s reference to the possibility and many similar references in the party press, neither Trotsky nor the party leadership in this country had given any serious thought to the possible consequences of such a major realignment of Kremlin strategy.

The view prevailed, somewhat vaguely, that a German-Russian pact would not be different in essentials from the Franco-Russian pact of 1935 and that its consequences would be similar. The party was especially concerned to combat any concessions to bourgeois-democratic sentiments which might open the way to favoring the democratic imperialist powers against the fascist imperialist powers. As a consequence, the thoughts of the party were directed toward the similarities between the Franco-Russian pact and a possible German-Russian pact rather than toward the differences. The thought of the party confined itself to the concept that capitalism is capitalism, whether in bourgeois-democratic France or in Nazi Germany; that a pact is a pact: therefore, a pact with Germany in place of a pact with France could not possibly change anything essentially.

The shock which the party experienced by the announcement of the Hitler-Stalin pact was born of the fact that the pact was signed at a time when Hitler was making overt preparations for an attack upon Poland and the pact was obviously part of the diplomatic preparation for the impending military operation. However, it was not clear, during the first days following the pact, just how Russia figured in the deal. The emphasis in our analysis of the pact was upon Stalin’s fear of war. Stalin’s part in the pact was described as a capitulation to Hitler’s demands in a cowardly effort to buy neutrality in the impending war.

This was in line with the traditional views of the Trotsky-

1. The October 8, 1938 issue of the Socialist Appeal headlined: “Trotsky Predicts Stalin Will Seek an Understanding With Hitler.” Trotsky’s article said: “The collapse of Czechoslovakia is the collapse of Stalin’s international policy of the last five years. Moscow’s idea of ‘an alliance of democracies’ for a struggle against fascism is a lifeless fiction…. We may now expect with certainty Soviet diplomacy to attempt rapprochement with Hitler at the cost of new retreats and capitulations which in their turn can only bring nearer the collapse of the Stalinist oligarchy.”
structed to deal with the new events from this "fundamental" position. Should the revolutionary movement declare itself a partisan of the Russian army in the invasion of Poland? All efforts to pry loose from the majority an answer to this question—really the only question that shrieked for an answer—were frustrated by the intransigent determination of the majority not to commit themselves to anything until they heard from Trotsky. Efforts by the minority to commit the party to a condemnation of the invasion were defeated. Even a reference to Stalin's move as "kinsiter" was rejected.

The unwillingness of the majority to take a position on the events in Poland was due to the fact that the "fundamental position," specifically the slogan of "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union," seemed to demand of them a role which their past training as revolutionists and their spontaneous revolutionary reactions caused them to shy away from—namely, the role of Stalin's helpers (no matter with what curses for Stalin) in picking bare the broken body of the Polish nation and (no matter how reluctantly) giving objective aid to the counter-revolutionary blows which the Russian army would strike against the revolutionary movement of the Polish workers and peasants. Does the slogan of "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union" really demand this of us? the majority asked itself. While they wondered and marked time waiting for Trotsky's answer, the minority answered, "Yes, it does, if you really adhere to that slogan. That is why the old position must be revised. Given the evidence of the new stages of degeneration of the bureaucracy as seen in the Hitler-Stalin pact and the division of Poland, we must give up 'unconditional defense' and defend the Russian state only under those conditions which are consistent with the needs of the world revolution."

Outlived Diagnosis

Trotsky's views arrived in the form of his well-known article, "The USSR in War."

Reduced to their bare essentials, Trotsky's views in "The USSR in War" were already presented in his letter to Cannon dated September 12, 1939 (In Defense of Marxism, by Leon Trotsky, p. 1). A reading of the bare points of his argument in this letter, unprotected by his literary and polemical skill, makes it far easier to see the chinks in his structure. It was Trotsky's concept that the workers' state in Russia could only be replaced by the restoration of capitalism, either from within or from without. The proof that capitalism had been restored would be the dissolution of the nationalized property. Therefore, as long as the latter remained, Russia remained a workers' state. As long as Russia remained a workers' state it had to be unconditionally defended in any military conflict with a capitalist state. To conceive of the end of the workers' state, according to Trotsky, with the continuation of nationalized property meant to conceive of a new social order that was neither working-class nor capitalist, i.e., bureaucratic-collectivist. The latter, Trotsky claimed, meant the overturin of the whole Marxist concept of historical development in our epoch. Trotsky's reasoning could be summarized in the formula: nationalized economy equals workers' state equals unconditional defense.

But what if Russia emerged from the war with its social relations unaltered? What if the existing situation was continued into the post-war period? This was inconceivable to Trotsky. The rule by the bureaucracy on the basis of nationalized economy would soon come to an end. Therefore, why meddle with our "fundamental position" on the front by that great war that will resolve everything? So that if Stalin expels the territory of the Soviet Union and nationalizes property in the occupied areas? Even if we did not foresee this, it is of secondary importance. It is a mere episode in the war and not the beginning of a new role of expansionism for the bureaucracy.

Given these views of Trotsky, the majority felt released from the need of making detailed analyses of the Hitler-Stalin pact and the concrete events in Poland. The latter questions were sidestepped by Trotsky through the device of saying that once the Polish territories were added to the Soviet Union our political role in such areas becomes the same as in Russia itself. What our attitude should have been in the minor war which the Russian army waged in invading Poland was not even hinted at.

The minority, on the contrary, occupied themselves closely with the concrete events. Their then position of "defense of the Soviet Union only under certain conditions" made mandatory a constant and detailed analysis of what was taking place. As a result, the polemics between the majority and the minority took a peculiar course. The minority chose to be what they called "fundamental." The minority chose to be concrete.

The actual course of debate revealed, however, how artificial the "fundamentalist" approach was. The party could not dodge the concrete events. It was forced to answer. Likewise, the majority spokesmen in the inner-party debates were forced to descend from the lofty heights of sociological abstractions from time to time and express an opinion on what was going on in the world of everyday affairs. It is only the somewhat sparse record of these latter reluctant excursions into daily events that affords us now the possibility of probing the majority's analysis of the Hitler-Stalin moves in the light of the new documentary evidence.

The minority found it difficult to accept the view that the Russian invasion of Poland was prearranged with Hitler. Though they were equally skeptical of the Stalinist claim that the Russian army was invading Eastern Poland to save the population from the Nazis, they leaned toward the explanation that the invasion had the purpose of defending the Soviet Union against Germany.

Cannon, in his first speech to the party membership on the Polish events, mainly skittered around giving any explanation4 but expressed this concept more or less clearly:

4. The only leader of the SWP who showed any concern for publicly defending the majority line in terms of the actual events was Albert Goldman, who tried to apply the "fundamental position" in his articles on the later invasion of Finland. For example, in the Socialist Appeal of March 23, 1940, Comrade Goldman wrote down what all the majority leaders had been saying: "... anyone who is not blinded by hatred of Stalin can easily see that what he is after primarily is to obtain defensive footholds. It is well-nigh impossible to explain what he has done thus far on the basis of the theory that he has entered into a partnership with Hitler to divide the British Empire or even (some have said it!) the whole world. Of course people do not have to consider facts: they can let their desires and imaginations run away with them. But then these people are not Marxists." We quote Goldman because his remarks have the merit of being a forthright presentation of the SWP line, as well as because he was the only one who sought to defend it regularly and consistently. In this connection, it is significant to us that with the progress of later events it was Comrade Goldman who broke with Cannon and the Cannon line and is now a prominent member of the Workers Party. In a recent article setting forth his present views on Russia and developments abroad, he has written that the position of the minority in 1940 "in the light of events, has proven to be the correct approach." (NI, September, 1947, p. 215.)
For a week or so we had quite a flurry in the party about the invasion of Poland, and demands to change our line on Russia because of it. In this, for the first time, we saw unmistakable signs of the powerful pressure of bourgeois-democratic public opinion on our party. We had to ask ourselves many times: Don't they know that we were not ‘imperialists’ and White Russia never rightfully belonged to Poland? Don't they know that this territory was forthrightly taken from the Soviet Union by Pilsudski with French aid in 1920? [Internal Bulletin of SWP, Vol. II, No. 3, November 14, 1939, p.10.]

At a later point in the same speech he emphasized his view of the Russian invasion of Poland as a defense against Germany with the following analogy:

“Defense” in war also means attack. Do you think we will respect frontiers when we make our revolution? If an enemy army lands troops at Quebec, for example, do you think we will wait placidly at the Canadian border for their attack? [Ibid.]

This aura of revolutionary defense of the Soviet Union was being thrown about the Kremlin's invasion of Poland more than a month after Molotov, we now learn, had telephoned the following message to the German Ambassador at Moscow:

I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations and greetings to the German Reich government. Molotov.

New Pattern of Imperialism

In reply to Cannon's speech from which we have quoted, Max Shachtman put forth the following views for the minority:

Stalin crushed Poland jointly with Hitler. The spoils of their victories are being jointly divided throughout Eastern Europe. But also, in another sense, he is pursuing an “independent” imperialist policy of his own. . . . Like every bureaucracy, the Stalinist is interested in increasing the national income not in order to raise the standard of living of the masses but in order to increase its own power, its own wealth, its own privileges. . . . A policy of expansion, which under Lenin and Trotsky would mean extending the basis of the socialist revolution, means under the Stalinist bureaucracy, degenerated and reactionary to the core, a policy of imperialism. That is, it has an imperialist policy peculiar to the Soviet regime in its present stage of decay. [Ibid., p. 14A.]

How accurately this summary of the Kremlin's motivations was we now learn from the projected Four-Power pact, which was to divide what Hitler called the British bankrupt estate between Germany, Russia, Japan and Italy. Secret protocol No. I in the draft of the pact read:

(4) The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean.

This slice of booty proved unsatisfactory to the Kremlin and it drafted a counter-demand which provided for additional territories. The latter was submitted to the German government on November 26, 1940. On December 18, Hitler ordered his army to begin preparations for an invasion of Russia. He had concluded that the imperialist appetite of the Kremlin was such as to endanger German imperialist ambitions, especially if Germany tackled England first.

The dispute was still raging around the Polish events when items began appearing in the press that indicated a possible Russian move into the Baltic countries. The minority immediately seized upon these new developments to strengthen their thesis that the Russian expansion into Poland was not merely an “accidental” departure from its role of capitation to the world of capitalism, but part of a new pattern of Russian imperialism. The majority answered with denunciations of the “irresponsible speculations” which the minority were introducing into the discussion. The charges of “speculation” were hardly out of the mouth of the majority when, to their dismay, Stalin forced the Baltic states to grant Russia military and naval bases, thereby surrendering their sovereignty. The majority immediately interpreted the Kremlin’s moves as directed against the German advance into Poland. The Socialist Appeal of December 1, 1939, wrote editorially:

At the same time, however, the Kremlin lives in deadly fear of the possibility that despite all its courting of German imperialism, the latter will make peace with Britain and turn on Russia. It is against that dread day that the Kremlin’s moves in the Baltic are calculated. The military and naval outposts secured from the other Baltic countries, plus similar outposts from Finland, would close the defensive circle of the Baltic against Germany.

When, six months later, the Russians dissolved the Baltic governments completely and added their territories to the Soviet Union, the German Foreign Office gave its view in a circular telegram to all German missions abroad which read:

The unrestricted reinforcement of Russian, troops in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and the reorganization of the governments of the Baltic states, sought by the Russian government to bring about more reliable cooperation with the Soviet Union, are the concern of Russia and the Baltic states. Therefore, in view of our unaltered friendly relations with the Soviet Union, there is no reason for nervousness on our part, which some of the foreign press has tried to impute to us in only too transparent a manner.

Not having learned their lesson from the events in Poland, the majority continued to see the Kremlin’s moves in the Baltic states and Finland in terms of defense against Germany. The same issue of the Socialist Appeal which we quoted above commented on the Russian moves against Finland along the traditional lines. “This unmistakable bid [by Chamberlain] to Germany came at a time when Stalin seemed to be readying his grab of Finland, a move that Germany cannot possibly relish, for it would put Soviet Russia astride Germany’s vital northern trade routes.”

As usual, this interpretation, flowing from Trotsky’s “fundamental analysis,” ran counter to the facts. The new documentary evidence is unnecessary to establish this, since the majority was forced to eat crow and write the following in the February, 1940, issue of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL:

That Hitler was highly gratified by Stalin's becoming involved in war with Finland was clearly shown at the time of the invasion by the Berlin press which congratulated Stalin! Stalin's involvement in the war strengthens Hitler's western front, gives him greater bargaining power with the Allies, more thoroughly entangles Stalin in the pact, opens wider channels to the resources of the USSR. . . .

Sidestepping Comes to End

The majority found it possible to say the most contradictory things when dealing with the concrete events, but the “fundamental analysis” remained unquestioned. Why should it be questioned? The “fundamental analysis” was constructed out of materials that had no relationship to daily events. That the latter should serve as a test of the basic theories was denounced as “empiricism.”

The kind of sidestepping which Trotsky did on the question of what tactics the revolutionists should pursue vis-à-vis the Russian troops fighting their way into Poland was impossible in Finland. Here it was necessary to descend completely from the clouds of sociological abstractions and speak in terms of revolutionary tactics. The majority was finally forced to carry the logic of its “unconditional defense” to its full
dimensions by calling upon the Finnish workers to become “Soviet partisans,” i.e., work for the defeat of the Finnish army and the victory of the Russian army.\footnote{8}

Trotsky tried to place this unpalatable solution in the best possible light by stating: “The Soviet-Finnish war is apparently beginning to be supplemented by a civil war in which the Red Army finds itself at the given stage in the same camp as the Finnish petty peasants and the workers, while the Finnish army enjoys the support of the owning classes, the conservative labor bureaucracy and the Anglo-Saxon imperialists.” (In Defense of Marxism, by Leon Trotsky, p. 57.) Trotsky’s reference to it was the first and last news the world was to hear about the “civil war” in Finland. At a later date, information became available that the Finnish population, almost to a man, fled before the advancing Russian army as before a scourge. It was a far cry from Georgia in 1920!

The new documents explode another favorite line of reasoning used by the “fundamentalists.” This was to the effect that the “nub of the strategy” of all the imperialist powers was for a joint attack upon Russia for the purpose of dividing it among themselves. Since the “fundamental” antagonism was between the Soviet Union and the world of capitalism, they reasoned, the war was bound to conform sooner or later to such a line-up.

Wide of the Mark Again

As a consequence, the party press saw evidence of an imminent peace between Germany and England nearly every week. The hysteria on this theme reached its high point with the Russian invasion of Finland. One issue of the Socialist Appeal headlined the Finnish resistance as the beginning of the joint imperialist attack upon Russia. But only the popular press repeated this theme. Typical of their train of thought was the following:

The real military and financial aid of imperialism to Finland, the international political and ideological crusade against the USSR, the diplomatic jockeying, particularly of Britain in relation to Germany, all testify to the inescapable fact that the USSR stands face to face with the danger of a fully developed war of imperialist intervention. That war is already in its first stage. (“Marxist Criteria and the Character of the War,” by Murry Weiss, Internal Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 12, emphasis in original.)

The new documentary material reveals how really wide of the mark the majority was shooting. It is now to be read that Sir Stafford Cripps was sent to Moscow as the British ambassador to win the Kremlin away from Hitler, that Stalin’s rejection of this British wooing was blunt in its defense of Germany and that the whole course of German diplomacy, as revealed in these documents, was directed against a rapprochement with England.

Hitler’s letter to Mussolini now reveals that the decision to attack Russia was born of a distrust of the Kremlin, especially of a fear that Stalin would attack the Germans’ rear if they launched an invasion of England. Yet the party press often dealt with the war during its first year as if it were a “phony war” or a mock war between Franco-British imperialism and German imperialism, the real aim of which was to mobilize their forces for a joint attack upon Russia.

Abstract reasoning from a so-called fundamental analysis and self-imposed blindness to the concrete events never carried a political tendency further afield from the truth than in the case of Trotsky and the majority on this question.

In 1940 one of the minority documents (The Judgment of Events) concluded its attack upon blind adherence to the “fundamental analysis” in the following words:

We have examined herein seven instances of the application of the majority views to the events of the Finnish war. The result in each instance is the same: the theories refuted by the facts. Our selection has not been arbitrary. So far as we can discover, we have included every important case of specific application of the theories to the war—that is, every important case where what was said can be checked by what happened.

We confess that it is hard for us to see how there could be a more conclusive demonstration of the falsity of the theories in question. And this demonstration retains its full force if everything that the majority has written about the social and psychological nature of the opposition, about dialectics and sociology and the auto crisis, is completely true.

At Zion City the followers of Glenn Vollva continue to believe that the earth is flat. They prove their theory, moreover, by ample reference to the Bible, and by the condemnation of all dissenters as heretics; nor has any assemblage of facts ever been able to shake them in their belief.

Are Vollva’s methods to serve as model for the science of Marxism?

This flashback into the disputes of 1939-40 has importance for the discussion of the Russian question now being carried on in the ranks of the Fourth International not merely to vindicate our point of view but also to vindicate the Marxist method of dealing with the concreteness of events as a test of political theory.

ERNST ERBER

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8. The Socialist Appeal of December 9, 1939, carried a Statement of Policy by the Cannonite Political Committee which proclaimed their line to be “Soviet patriotism...Unceasing criticism and exposure of the Stalinist methods of starting and conducting the war, but not the slightest relaxation of material and military support. The Fourth Internationalists in the Soviet Union will be the best soldiers in the Red Army and inspire it to victory over the imperialist bandits and the Stalinist betrayers.” This frank statement of their position was ignored out of them by our insistence on an end to pussy-footing on their part; but actual propaganda for the “defence of the Soviet Union” in the Socialist Appeal continued to play an insignificant role in its pages—after all, it was so unpopular! Even their May Day manifesto in 1941 had barely a scant word on the task of defending Stalinist Russia. In contrast, when Hitler invaded Russia and Stalin switched over to the Allied side, the very next issue of their paper bore the screaming headline “Defend the Soviet Union!” and an appeal to CP members told them: “You set the defence of the Soviet Union as your first task. We do likewise.” Cannon bluntly sent a telegram to Joseph Stalin calling for the release of Trotskyists from the GPU jails so that they might “take their proper place among the defenders of the Soviet Union.” He never explained why this telegram was not sent at the outbreak of the Russian-Finnish war, but only after American capitalism and bourgeois public opinion also became “defenders of the Soviet Union.”

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL - FEBRUARY 1948 53
What Makes Henry Run?

Henry Wallace's most cherished possession is his claim to a political inheritance. In a recent editorial in the *New Republic* (January 19, 1948) he proudly calls the roll of American third parties with an erudition that speaks well for the magazine's research staff. Wallace declares his movement to be in the tradition of the Locomotives, the Greenback Party, the Populist Peoples Party, and the La Follette Progressives. Like anyone else uneasy about his present standing, Wallace itches for a family tree.

Which that happy genealogist of American liberalism, Max Lerner, hurries to provide. In a *PM* editorial (February 1, 1948) he declares:

"Wallace comes, as Bryan and La Follette came, out of the populist tradition of the Middle West. It is the tradition which glorifies rebellion and dissents, and is not fearful of being in a minority. There is an obstinate, hard cast to his jaw. . . . he is, in his basic thinking, as far from the Communists as Bryan was, or La Follette. His thinking is populist—agin' the trusts, agin' imperialism, agin' Wall Street . . . through all his changes he has remained the Great Insurgent, unhappy unless he feels a ferment in his mind and unless he is leading his little band of Gideonites."

It is this claim to an insurgent ancestry which is certain to be a major talking-point in the Wallace campaign and which gains for him a considerable amount of popular support. To place Wallace's candidacy accurately, we must therefore examine his relation to the populist tradition.

For purposes of this discussion, the most important fact to remember about the populist movement is that it was a mass, largely spontaneous outpouring of rural discontent. It arose at a particular juncture in American history, which was not to recur and could not recur: the farmers, not yet completely subjugated by the encroachments of capitalism in agriculture, were able to play a somewhat, though decreasingly, independent role; while the working class loomed in the background, not yet fully cohered or aware of its strength. During this historical moment populism came into its own and blazed its brief, evanescent but not inglorious trail across this nation's history. It was a movement aimed not against capitalism, but against some of its evils. All historians, whatever their bias, agree that populism was an indigenous, spontaneous mass movement. As V. L. Parrington notes:

"Huge meetings gathered of the farmers of a county and day-long they listened to speeches that came straight from the hayfields and the corn-rows, speeches that were an echo of the daily experience of the farmer and the farmer's wife."

In the standard text on populism, John Hicks' *The Populist Revolt*, there is detailed a mass of evidence showing how deeply populism sprang from the needs and experiences of the masses of farmers. Later historical studies have noted the degree of support the movement gained in the South.

Now my purpose in citing this evidence is not primarily to show that the populist movement was proportionately far larger than Wallace's. Small movements sometimes become large. My point is another and more crucial one: populism arose from a pressing social need, the plight of the farmers; it was based on their conjunctural position which allowed them a certain leeway in organizing independently of either capitalist or working class; and it spoke, not without some justification, in the language of America's greatest legend: the frontier.

Bryan or Stalin?

Nothing of the sort can be said about Wallace's movement. The relationship of social classes that made possible agrarian populism in the 1890s simply does not exist today. The farmers cannot play the leading role they did then; and what is more, the present momentary prosperity granted them by war needs and post-war prices attenuates any inclination they might have to support Wallace.

By now populism is so historically untenable that it is not a paradox to suggest that if Wallace's movement really were in the populist tradition it would enjoy far less support than it does, certainly far less in its major centers: New York and California. At present there is no large scale rural rebelliousness in America, no insistent mass "call" from the farms for Wallace to save the day. All the calling has been from the other direction.

Though Wallace's personal roots are in a family deeply committed to the populist tradition, other facts in his life have adulterated his populism to the point where it is largely verbal. In any case, whatever his personal, nostalgic kinship with populism, his movement has no organic connection with it. No doubt, it may succeed in winning to its support the fossil residues of populist sentiment that persist throughout the country, but (Max Lerner notwithstanding) the Wallace movement does have more in common with Stalin than with Bryan.

Proof for this assertion is found in the way the movement was organized. The Progressive Citizens of America hardly exists in rural areas; its sole strength is in metropolitan centers. Ideologically the PCA is committed to what is unquestionably the most important current Stalinist demand: struggle against the Marshall Plan. In chronological development the Wallace candidacy follows from (a) the Stalinists drive to develop a front organization to oppose the Truman administration's foreign policy; (b) the consequent appearance of the PCA and its inability to pressure Truman into a more conciliatory attitude toward Moscow; (c) the initial call for a third party. In this sequence the farcical climax is reached when Wallace broods over whether or not to accept the nomination, and is then impressed by the "Potemkin Village" delegations which the Stalinists, masters at this sort of thing, shuffled up to the *New Republic* office.

Populism, indeed! Would William Jennings Bryan—who, whatever his deficiencies, could attract whole counties to his flaming speeches—have been taken in by delegations from such groups as the New York District Council of the CIO Electrical Workers, the Slovenian section of the Passaic IWO, and the Freiheit Mandolin Society?

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Wallace's Social and Political Role

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In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Wallace movement is the first attempt to build a third party on a foreign-policy plank; all previous third parties have concerned themselves primarily with deeply-felt domestic matters. In an atomic age one cannot of course depreciate concern with foreign policy; but when one remembers that the tradition of American progressivism is linked to internal reform and lacking in any independent stand on foreign affairs, and when one remembers further that the single foreign-policy plank most important to the Stalinists happens to be Wallace's major offering, then the coincidence is more than a little suspicious. Precisely because the Wallace movement is so artificial and synthetic does the "man in the street" think of it as based on a view on how "to get along with Russia." And for once the "man in the street" is right.

The destruction of the myth that the Wallace movement stems from populism—a myth which is ultimately an historical slander—is of first importance in both analyzing and combatting it. Once that is done, however, several other questions remain.

**The Price They Pay**

What strikes one at first glance in the Stalinists' sponsorship of Wallace is how much they stand to lose. For years now they have been doing their very best to infest the labor and liberal movements; and not without success. Now, by steering the Wallace movement into a third party, they lose their advantageous positions in at least four major arenas:

1. **Among the liberals.** A number of prominent leaders of the PCA have already resigned: Bartley Crum, Frank Kingdon, Albert Deutsch. But this is only a portent of what is to come. Robert Kenney, the outstanding non-Stalinist PCA leader on the West Coast, is tettering between support of the Wallace party and loyalty to the Democrats. Others are in a similar position: there are times when political opportunists find it distastefully difficult to decide which course will be most advantageous to themselves. The newspaper *PM*, which has so consistently helped Stalinism, and also the *Nation* have both seized on Wallace's candidacy as an occasion to put a period to their increasingly embarrassing flirtation with Stalinism. By driving the Wallace movement out of the Democratic Party, its Stalinist organizers have given their uneasy liberal "innocents" a convenient pretext for getting out from under. Though the Wallace candidacy may strengthen the Stalinist hold on those liberals who remain captive, the number of such liberals is certain to decrease. The domestic position of the American Stalinists is thus sure to be impaired.

2. **In the American Labor Party.** When the Stalinists announced their support of Wallace, they gave the leaders of those right-wing CIO unions which had cooperated with them in the ALP the long-awaited "legitimate" basis for quitting. As a result, the Stalinists have been left holding each others hand in the ALP, with the value of their most useful political front in their political center considerably cut.

3. **In the CIO.** Here the Stalinist losses may be less immediately perceptible, but ultimately more serious. Their support of Wallace forced Murray into openly chastising them, and made it next to impossible for him to continue his policy of maintaining an uneasy and unequal balance—but still a balance of a sort—between right-wing and Stalinist-controlled unions. In an immediate tactical sense, then, the Stalinists cleared the way for those CIO leaders, like Rieve and Reuther, who want Murray to take a more aggressive stand against the Stalinist CIO leaders. They must have known their support of Wallace would have this result. They must also have known that they risked the ultimate danger of provoking a split in the CIO which would isolate completely those unions they control and expose them to possible destruction. Still they went ahead with the Wallace candidacy.

4. **Among their bourgeois supporters.** One of the least discussed sources of support which the Stalinists have found has been among certain bourgeois politicians: Senators Pepper and Taylor, ex-Ambassador Davies and others. By provoking the Wallace candidacy, the Stalinists forced these bourgeois allies into a position where the latter would either have to break with them or with the Democratic Party. Pepper has chosen the Democratic Party; anything else would, in Florida, mean political suicide. Taylor is, at the time of writing, not yet decided. Davies has not yet been heard from. But in any case, it is clear that this highly important, if numerically tiny, ally is no longer as accessible to the Stalinists as before the Wallace candidacy.

I contend therefore that, no matter how large a vote Wallace gets and no matter how many recruits and sympathizers the CP picks up during the campaign, the eventual result must be a loss of influence for the CP. If the Stalinists controlled the bulk of the labor movement, as in France and Italy, they might then have taken such a course with a certain ease; they would not be isolating themselves. But in the present situation in the U. S., the Stalinists are, appearances to the contrary, cutting themselves off from the sources of their sustenance. And this, too, their hard-headed strategists must have known.

"Neither Recovery Nor Revolution"

Why, then, did they so fervently build up the Wallace candidacy? Why did they not let the Wallace movement remain within the Democratic Party, as it would have done had not the Stalinists steered it to a third-party perspective?

For an answer we must for a moment shift our sights to Europe. The recent policy of the Stalinists in Western Europe has been analyzed in sufficient detail not to require lengthy discussion here. Suffice it to say that the disastrous strikes which the French Stalinists whipped up during the latter part of 1947, though seizing on the legitimate and overdue demands of the workers, were for them a part of the Russian war against the Marshall Plan. At the present all of European imperialist politics revolves around one dimension: *time.* Can American dollars be pumped in fast enough to stop Russia's expansion and perhaps push it back? Can the Stalinist parties so disrupt the economies of France, Italy, Western Germany and Greece that the Marshall Plan will not succeed in bringing even a partial and temporary economic rehabilitation, thereby preventing the organization of a strong western bloc?

That western capitalism will consolidate a hold on some part of Western Europe; that it will effect a certain increase in productivity; that it will help to prop up the wispy bourgeois governments of France and Italy seems well-nigh certain. Russia does not seriously contend for domination of France and Western Germany at present; despite all the threatening gestures of the Italian Stalinists, it is unlikely that the Kremlin will signal an all-out attempt to seize power in Italy. Stalin knows that a successful, and perhaps even an unsuccessful, attempt to seize power in France or Western Germany means a quick war, which he certainly does not want. But at the same time how can he weaken the hold of U. S. imperialism in Western Europe?

The answer has been excellently summarized in a formula.
which the conservative paper Figaro has offered to describe the current Stalinist policy in Western Europe: neither recovery nor revolution. Put into more exact terms: neither an attempt to seize the power, with or without the aid of the Russian army, nor a readiness to allow the bourgeois regimes to enthrone themselves with the aid of the Marshall Plan. This could be repeated to a policy of constant minor upheavals, of constant irritations. Was this not obvious during the recent strikes when they were intent on causing as much economic damage as possible and yet had no policy to carry the strike movement to a climax, certainly no policy of trying to move toward a general strike and a seizure of power?

They thus risked loss of support by many workers disgusted and weary of Stalinist-led adventures, which meant serious sacrifices leading to nothing but futility. Did the French Stalinist leaders know this? Of course. And yet they went ahead. It seems likely that they lost the support of certain sections of the workers.

Yet the Stalinists achieved Moscow's aims. They set back the possibilities of even the most rudimentary economic recovery by several crucial months. For the Kremlin this counted more than any losses the French CP might sustain. As C. L. Sulzberger reported in the New York Times a few months ago, the Kremlin is willing to sacrifice the Stalinist parties of Western Europe in order to achieve this aim. For surely if the French CP continues to engage in such criminal adventures—driving strikes to the point where they go beyond ordinary trade-union actions and tend to challenge the power of the bourgeois state, while yet not actually desiring to upset that power—then it will lose influence among the workers. (And more important, it will exhaust their energies.)

Thus far the French CP has maneuvered rather cleverly; it has done Moscow's bidding (not without some apparent balking) but has not provoked the situation to the extent where the U. S. would decide that de Gaulle is its only resort. For the French CP knows that a de Gaulle regime might very likely mean its illegalization: a prospect its comfortable bourgeois state, while yet not actually desiring to upset that power—then it will lose influence among the workers. (And more important, it will exhaust their energies.)

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In any case, that is the Stalinist policy in Western Europe: neither recovery nor revolution.

What the CP Gains

The extension of this policy to the U. S. takes the form of the Wallace candidacy. Since there is no depression as yet in the U. S. and since there is also, providentially, no possibility of the CP taking power, the formula "neither recovery nor revolution" cannot here be literally applied. But the results of the application of the formula in Europe are matched by those which accrue to Russian Stalinism from the Wallace candidacy.

Though we hardly claim to be privy to the inner workings of the Stalintern, we do feel that if Moscow has not rewarded the present CP leadership with a winning smile for its work in promoting the Wallace candidacy, then it is really quite without gratitude. For even if Wallace were to withdraw tomorrow (say, after an astrological consultation) the mere fact of his announced candidacy has already proven to be of inestimable aid to Russia in its cold war with the U. S. The mere fact that a political leader of Wallace's prominence could announce his candidacy on a platform which, both in fact and in the popular mind, is one of appeasing Russia helps the Stalinists in that

(a) it provides them with a spokesman against the Marshall Plan more prominent than any they could otherwise hope to find;
(b) it contributes a first-rate propaganda point to the Russians who can now point to the division in the U. S. as proof that there are "peace-loving" (i.e., pro-Russian) elements here;
(c) it creates immediate difficulties for the Truman administration's hope of a quick passage of the Marshall Plan by encouraging congressional opponents to weaken and resist it.

From the Russian point of view, can there be the slightest qualms about such an achievement, even if it may isolate the CP—even if, in fact, it were to result in the destruction of the CP?

For such a destruction is now, for the first time since the Palmer raids, not quite out of the question. It is unlikely at present, but it is not out of the question. If, as a result of the Wallace candidacy, the Republicans feel they can win with anyone ("anyone" usually means Taft); and especially if Taft does come to office in a reactionary sweep, then the illegalization of the CP in the U. S. becomes a distinct possibility. That the CP is aware of this cannot be doubted; that it went ahead with the Wallace campaign in any case shows how deeply loyal Foster's leadership is to Moscow. To the Kremlin this possibility of illegalization is a matter of no deep concern when their own higher stakes are in play.

What is important is to see the Wallace candidacy as an extension to the U. S. of the "neither recovery nor revolution" policy of West European Stalinism. Only in those terms can we understand it—as part of the "cold war."

Wallace's Appeal

To place Wallace's candidacy as a part of the "cold war" is not, unfortunately, to dismiss its effects in American life. While there is at present no possible means of predicting what sort of vote he will get, there is reason to believe that it will be, in terms of third-party potentialities, rather large.

For Wallace does appeal to deep-rooted political desires: when he cries "peace," he stirs the hopes of many who look with dread at the overwhelming evidence that a new war is in preparation; when he cries "New Deal," he touches the secret fears of those who, despite the present full employment, still wonder if they will be employed a few years from now. He is the only one of the capitalist party politicians who even talks in terms of reform and change. For that reason, if for no other, Wallace will get votes.

There are at least two other reasons why Wallace is likely to poll a sizable vote. He has behind him one of the best and most efficient political machines in the country: the whole apparatus of Stalinist and semi-Stalinist front organizations. This apparatus is composed of loyal and devoted people who are genuinely enthusiastic about Wallace's candidacy. They will work hard and will get votes.

Finally Wallace is certain to be helped by the monumental stupidity and blindness of the U. S. labor leadership. Every one of the arguments that labor leaders have offered against
Wallace is reactionary; they oppose him exclusively in terms of a continued commitment to capitalist politics. Against him they can offer only . . . Truman, a sad little man who would have been so much better off as a filing clerk. Do they expect the workers to become enthusiastic about Truman? Do Murray and Green expect their followers to vote for the man who broke the railroad strike? No doubt, in this country of conveniently short political memories, many workers will. But it seems just as likely that many will vote for Wallace if only because he stands for something “different,” if only because in some vague way he reminds them of the New Deal which was also something “different.” The tragic failure of the labor movement to provide an alternative that is really politically “different” here rebounds directly in favor of the Stalinist campaign for Wallace.

Whom, or what, does Wallace represent?

He is a strange breed, is he not? He declares himself in favor of capitalism, yet advocates a foreign policy which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered as stemming from any section of the capitalist class. He declares himself in opposition to socialism (which he is), but speaks warmly of Stalinist Russia.1

Does Wallace represent “a section of the capitalist class” which wishes a “soft” foreign policy toward Russia? On the other hand, is he merely a quisling of Stalinism?

Character of Wallace Movement

The view advanced in some quarters that Wallace “represents” some unspecified “section of the capitalist class” which wishes to appease Russia strikes me as nonsense. Wallace is not the descendant and heir of the isolationism of the 1920s and 1930s which did characterize a section of American capitalism; he may feed on remnants of its influence, but that is another matter.

It is obviously not enough to refer (in vaguely pseudo-Marxist language) to “internal cleavages in the capitalist class” which produce the Wallace candidacy. Cleavages between whom? Which section of the American capitalist class does Wallace represent? What are the evidences of this cleavage in capitalism, besides the Wallace movement itself? Specific data and analyses are necessary before the phrases mentioned can be considered anything more than jargon. Does Wallace, perhaps, represent the same “section of the capitalist class” as does Taft?

I do not think any analysis can be made to prop up this view. From the standpoint of any section of the bourgeoisie, Wallace’s program makes no sense at all. The differences in Congress over the Marshall Plan represent differences in the degree of appreciation of the real needs of American imperialism, not differences in direction of policy at all equivalent to the isolation-versus-collective-security split of yesterday.

When Chamberlain appeased Hitler it was for the good and sufficient (capitalist) reason that English imperialism was not yet ready to fight its German rival. Chamberlain, a figure much abused by stupid journalists but no doubt privately appreciated by serious capitalist leaders, played for time while he feverishly built up the armed strength of British imperialism. His appeasement was an act of responsibility to his own class. Can one claim that for Wallace?

Rather, a Marxist analysis of the Wallace movement shows a dual character, as does Wallace himself. On the one hand, Wallace is not merely a Stalinist quisling; he is not a complete Beirut or Del Vayo. First of all, he himself is not that; this indeed constitutes a matter of disquiet for the Stalinists since they cannot be quite sure what Henry is going to do or say next. But more important, Wallace’s program is essentially petty bourgeois, and his appeal is therefore primarily to reform elements among the urban middle classes and labor. His domestic economic program, insofar as he has one, is still oriented in the direction of a revival of small-business competition. On this side, his movement is primarily a capitalist-reform party.

But the decisive reason for existence of the Wallace movement is something else. Regardless of Wallace’s own peculiarities and personal role, the movement he heads is a Stalinist-inspired campaign and exists in actual life only as a Stalinist creature. The crucial proof of this statement may be seen in this fact: if tomorrow Wallace were to shift his line on foreign policy, he would quite suddenly find himself suspended in mid-air, without visible means of support. The organized and articulate basis for his movement, provided by the Stalinists, would evaporate; he would be left with the New Republic editorial staff and a few others of the same breed. Max Lerner, for once, spoke the truth when he called Wallace the “prize victim and trophy” of the Stalinists.

The Wallace movement is, in fact, a bastard formation. To characterize it with painstaking accuracy we would have to say the following: it is a petty-bourgeois capitalist-reform third-party movement primarily of the urban lower classes which has been aborted, sterilized, artificially licked into organizational shape, and run by the CP in the interests of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. As such we reject it, convinced that independent labor action remains the central political need for America in the coming period.

R. FAHAN

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2. I am not troubling here to document these points, since Dwight Macdonald’s articles in Politic, now expanded into a book, did so with damning thoroughness.

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL - FEBRUARY 1948
Chinese Trotskyism in the War

Was China's War Progressive?

We print the following document for the information of our readers and of the international movement on the points of view developed in the Chinese Trotskyist organization on the problems arising out of the Second World War.

As is explained in the accompanying letter by Comrade Yvon Cheng, the Communist League of China split after Pearl Harbor into: a majority—the Struggle Group, so called after the title of its paper, led by Peng Shih-chi; and a minority—the Internationalist Group, which now publishes the New Banner, led by Wang Ming-juan and Yvon Cheng, the former being the signatory to the present document.

Part I, dealing with the problem of war-time policy, is printed in this issue. Part II, dealing with the problem of the attitude toward the Kuomintang-Stalinist struggle and problems of party work, will appear next month. The text, sent to us by the Chinese comrades, was not given here with some stylistic editorial revision. The problems here discussed were also discussed by our own Party in America. Up to recently, however, there was very little information available on what had been going on among the Chinese revolutionists themselves. A document of the majority Struggle Group was published in the Fourth International of July-August 1947; it is referred to below as the Report. The document here given is a reply to that Report and an independent account of the questions, by the minority Internationalist Group whose resolution appeared in our issue of last October.

The position of the Workers Party on the nature of China's participation in the Second World War may be seen in the June 1947 special supplement to The New International, entitled "China In the World War" by Max Shachtman. The position of the Internationalist Group as here presented is obviously quite close to ours, certainly so with regard to its conclusion of non-support to China in the war at least after Pearl Harbor, on the ground that it had become an integral part of the world imperialist struggle.

With due regard to the possibility of a terminological misunderstanding, it would seem that what he expressed is essentially correct. "If the task of the revolutionary conquest of power by the proletariat is put before the world working class in general, then once war breaks out, no matter in what country and no matter what character it may assume, the fundamental attitude toward the war which a revolutionist should take must be one which is nearer to 'defeatism' and farther from 'defensivism.'"

The formulations in this section would seem to apply equally to the Spanish Civil War or to any revolutionary colonial war against imperialism in the future. We trust that it will be possible to clarify this question further in discussion with the Chinese comrades. An editorial footnote also is appended at one point where Comrade Wang refers to what he apparently believes to be the Workers Party point of view; this second matter will be discussed again next month in connection with Part II.

The document is addressed "To the Editorial Board of The Fourth International" in reply to the majority Report—copy to us. A brief introduction to it notes that "The Report aroused no little indignation in our ranks. It is a combination of slanders, distortions, black lies and irresponsible boasts." It adds that "We are surprised and embittered" by the fact that the majorityites should write such a piece and the Cannonites print it. Whether or not the Fourth International carries this reply, we believe the Internationalist Group's voice should be heard in the ranks of our movement.

The Editors

The Struggle With Chen Du-hsui

The Report begins with a description of the struggle carried on between the Chinese Trotskyist organization and Chen Du-hsui. It attempts to describe the relations which existed between the Chinese Old Man and the old revolutionists of the 1925-27 generation. The Report says of Chen Du-hsui: "He turned his back upon our League almost immediately after he left prison and 'declared in a letter to one of our old comrades in Shanghai that he had decided to combat damned Bolshevism to the very end of his life!"

Such a description is oversimplified, therefore incorrect. Chen Du-hsui, "the father of Chinese communism," the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party from its very inception until August 1927, the No. 1 leader of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, who became a Trotskyist after the debacle of the revolution, became one of the founders and leaders of the Chinese Trotskyist movement, served four years in a Kuomintang prison while remaining a staunch Trotskyist — Chen Du-hsui did break with Bolshevism during the Second World War. But this break did not take place "immediately" and it was not final.

During the period from the beginning of the anti-Japanese war down to the outbreak of the Second World War, he held the position that the Chinese Trotskyists could do nothing but support the Kuomintang in its anti-Japanese war unconditionally. In his opinion it was quite out of the question to speak of revolution during the war or of transforming the war into a revolution. But as usual with him, Chen Du-hsui did not present this position as a matter of principle but rather empirically and tactically. He justified his position in the following manner: We must at present support the war; as for this revolution, let's speak of it later. You can see from this that Chen Du-hsui's position was false; but it was neither final nor systematic.

Chen's Break With Movement

In 1939, one year after the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, in order to acquaint himself with the position of the Chinese Old Man, Trotsky asked Comrade Li Fu-jen friend remained our friend politically, although there were some divergences with Du-hsui's revolutionary activity was replete with these possible divergences with necessary precision. . . . However, I consider that what he expressed is essentially correct. (Trotsky's letter to Li Fu-jen, retranslated from the Chinese, March 11, 1939.)

Chen Du-hsui's position moved further away from that of the Trotskyists after the signing of the German-Soviet pact and the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, during the last slaughter of mankind. Needless to say, such a position meant a complete break with Trotskyism.

But, as we have said and as Trotsky had correctly observed, Chen Du-hsui was not a theoretician of Plekhanov's type but a revolutionary à la Lassalle. Lacking profound theoretical training, his actions were always directed by impressions, his opinions were changeable and fallible; but at the same time and for the same reason he was often able to make bold corrections of his mistakes.

The over-thirty-years' history of Chen Du-hsui's revolutionary activity was replete with such conflicts and mistakes. One's defects sometimes become one's merit. It was partially because of this "defect," we believe, that Chen Du-hsui was able to complete his evolution from a democrat to a communist and from a communist in general to a Trotskyist, in the brief period of seven or eight years.

We may speculate whether, if Chen had not died, he would have devoted the remaining years of his life to the cause of the Fourth International. We cannot give a definite answer to this question. That is why
Old Comrades Opposed Chen

What attitude did we, the so-called "old comrades of the 1925-27 generation" take toward Chen's false ideas? Comrade Li Fu-jen gave very good testimony on this point in the August 1942 issue of the Fourth International:

"This polemic, which was carried on by correspondence between the remote Szechwan villages where Chen sheltered and the Central Committee in Shanghai, left Chen in a minority of one. [Our emphasis—M. Y. W.]

"How far the Chinese revolutionary movement has advanced beyond the political level which Chen represented is evidenced most strikingly in the fact that he could not find in the Chinese organization a single supporter for his later political ideas!"

Comrade Li Fu-jen was an old friend of the Chinese Trotskyists. He lived in China during the period from 1935 to 1941. He was a member of the Chinese organization, and more than that, he was elected a member of the provisional Central Committee. Since he is quite conversant with the ideological groupings of Chinese Trotskyism, his testimony, of course, is trustworthy. He reports that the conclusion reached by the Second International, which the Chinese Trotskyists, headed by Comrade Peng Shih-chi, the present leader of the Struggle Group, and the traitor Liu Jen-ching, known in the foreign press as Nielsi. The latter took and the former still takes the position that the democratic and socialist revolutions constitute two different and successive stages, if not two different historical epochs. In their opinion the future Chinese revolution will begin with the former, and that during which the power will be conquered, while the socialist revolution will begin only after the establishment of workers' power.

According to Trotsky's "The Flower in the Looking Glass" as it says: "We preach the elementary ideas of the permanent revolution, as a revolution starting from the democratic struggle to the goal of socialism." (Fourth International, July-August 1927, p. 214.)

Another group of comrades, the present leading elements of the Internationalist Group, opposed this idea from the very beginning. They considered that such an explanation of the idea of permanent revolution has nothing in common with the Trotskyist theory, since the idea of "starting from the democratic struggle to the goal of socialism" is not only by Stalin but also by Leon Blum and Attlee. We hold a different position, one which really follows Trotsky's analysis of the character of China's future revolution.

"Flower in the Looking Glass"

According to Trotsky the character of the future Chinese revolution will be socialist from the very beginning owing to the following considerations: (1) The class struggle, especially the struggle between bourgeois and working class, has become extremely sharp. (2) The agrarian revolution in China is anti-capitalist. (3) The struggle for the expropriation of the factories has become imperative. (See Trotsky's The Third International After Lenin, p. 184, "The Summary and Perspective of the Chinese Revolution.")

In accordance with his ideas we are of the opinion that the democratic and socialist tasks of the Chinese revolution are interdependent with each other, and that they successively follow each other. Thus we hold and still hold that the democratic tasks can only be solved, in passing, by the socialist revolution; thus and that the democratic movement can be widened and deepened into a revolution; and that the revolution can have a perspective of development only when the democratic struggle merges into the socialist revolution, when the democratic struggle is waged as a factor of socialist revolution. If, on the contrary, we make socialism a "goal" and limit ourselves to staying within the circle of "democratic struggle" in the first stages of revolution, then the "goal" would become (as we Chinese put it) the "flower in the looking glass" which will never be reached.

The Constituent Assembly Slogan

There were also two positions opposed to each other from the very beginning on the second question—that is, on the tactical question of our attitude toward the Kuomintang, with the constituent assembly as the central slogan. One group, again headed by Peng Shih-chi and the traitor Liu Jen-ching, saw in the constituent assembly slogan mainly a "capitulation driving force.

They hoped that there would be a parliametary perspective of long duration in China, and that the Chinese proletariat would carry their socialist revolution on to a "higher historical plane."

Starting from this contradictory idea, they always leaned toward maintaining a "united front" with the "democratic" bourgeoisie and toward believing in the possibility of the solution of only two of the ideas of the democratic and national tasks through "democratic means," through the constituent assembly, etc. The traitor Liu Jen-ching expressed his views on this point: "The constituent assembly is the popular formula for the proletarian dictatorship."

This group of comrades, of course, entertained too much hope in the bourgeois "national" and democratic struggles.

A Correction

TO THE EDITOR:

...Today we also received the NI of last October. We were very happy to see our draft resolution on the colonial question in your magazine. We hope that it will become a subject of discussion in our world movement.

But the editorial note prefacing our resolution contains an error. "In reality, the Struggle Group—

which continued the policy of national defenseism in the so-called "war of resistance"—is also an official organization. Apparently you are not acquainted with the history of the split in our Chinese section. To begin with, a year before Pearl Harbor we discussed the question of the Sino-Japanese war. The majority of the Political Bureau (which was the editorial board of Struggle) was won over to and continued advocating critical support of the bourgeois government. But at the national conference of July 1941, following the Marco Polo Bridge resolution of the International Executive Committee (you will find it in the Fourth International for that year), the majority of the conference rejected defeatism. As a result we, the majority of the Political Bureau, became the minority. The split took place after Pearl Harbor."

On the colonial question the Struggle Group today declares its agreement with the leadership of the International; as for us, our position on this question is "at variance with the line of the Fourth International"—this we learn from a letter to us by the International Secretariat.

Our organizationCAN always with asking you to make this little correction in the next number of the NI—

Fraternal and internationalist greetings,

YvON CHENG

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL - FEBRUARY 1948 59
The Permanent Axis

Another group, also represented by the leading comrades of the present Trotskyists, has always taken the position that the importance of the constituent assembly slogan lies mainly in the fact that it is a means of consolidating the proletarian apparatus to the political scene. Starting from this position the attitude of this group on other tactical questions naturally emphasized the problem of stimulating the masses in opposition to the bourgeoisie.

In their essence the many rich discussions within the Chinese Trotskyist movement during the past nineteen years can be reduced to the above-mentioned two questions. They revolved around these two questions as a permanent axis. Chen-Du-hsiu's position on the two fundamental questions coincided with that of Peng Shih-chi & Co. except at the beginning of the thirties, when his ideas on the character of the future Chinese revolution were very close to ours. We are therefore justified in saying that Chen-Du-hsiu's eventual break with Trotskyism was due largely to his position on the fundamental disputed questions with the Chinese Trotskyist organization.

It goes without saying that the two traditional divergences in Chinese Trotskyism reflected different social bases: the "democrats" represent the petty-bourgeois wing of our ranks, while the "socialist revolutionists" represent the proletarian tendency. But we are not ready to resort to this "class analysis" since the causes of our ideological division, we believe, is in no small degree due to infantilism and theoretical backwardness. In the case of only a few of the old leaders, such as Peng Shih-chi, is their opportunism systematic and obstinate.

Issues in the Split of 1942

The Report told you that the internal struggle among the Chinese Trotskyists in 1942 was "the continuation of the struggle in the American party in 1940." This statement was largely made, with the obvious aim of winning your sympathy and support. In reality it was a continuation of the traditional struggle within the Chinese Trotskyists. It was merely the old divergences recast in the new question of the Sino-Japanese war.

Prior to 1940 there were already differences of opinion among the Chinese comrades with respect to China's anti-Japanese war, although these were still of minor and episodic character. Although they could be already considered as divergences of principle, yet all participants in the discussion had not fully developed their arguments on the plane of principle. This fact was mainly due to the weakness of the Chinese organization and, as a result of it, its position did not have the opportunity to be matched against the real development of events.

Among the potential and episodic disputes the following facts are important:

1. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, Comrade Peng Shih-chi insisted on the withdrawal of our central slogan, "Down with the Kuomintang," while, on the other hand, the late Comrade Chen Chi-chang fought with equal persistence to keep the slogan in our program. Peng's position finally won out, when Comrade Yvon Cheng was out of Shanghai and Comrade Peng Ming-yuen was still in a Kuomintang prison; the traditional slogan of Chinese Trotskyism, "Down with the Kuomintang," was thus withdrawn.

Views on the War

2. Comrade Chen Du-hsiu looked upon the anti-Japanese war as a higher development of the national struggle of the Chinese Trotskyists. It was merely the old divergence of opinion among the Chinese Trotskyists during nearly the whole of the Chinese war. Trotskyists of both tendencies naturally emphasized the problem of mobilizing the masses in opposition to the Kuomintang. This fact was not a result of the defeat of the Chinese revolution.

3. The conference which took place in November 1937 under the leadership of Peng-Shih-chi decided that we should center our attack upon the compromising tendencies of the Kuomintang in the anti-Japanese war, and called for a workers' and peasants' upsurge to support the war with the aim of prolonging it. On the other hand, Comrades Chen Chi-chang, Wang Ming-yuen, and Peng Shih-chi took the position of deepening the social basis of the war, above all, of "supporting" the war with agrarian revolution.

4. Comrade Yvon Cheng was of the opinion that the Sino-Japanese war could only be considered as a part of the imperialist war; consequently, he opposed the war itself from the very beginning and wanted to apply the Leninist policy of revolutionary defeatism to the war. His position did not win a single supporter at that time.

If we ignore the tactical side of these questions, there were evidently two opposing fundamental tendencies behind the above-mentioned "episodic" divergences: on the one hand, a tendency which emphasized the meaning of the war itself and consequently considered it the means through which the national tasks of China might be solved; on the other hand, the tendency which looked at the anti-Japanese war from the point of view of proletarian revolution and consequently considered it mainly as a road through which one might or might not achieve the workers' and peasants' revolution.

The Dispute in 1940

The former is a position of pure democratism (socialist revolution is only one of the democratic tasks), while the latter is the position of socialist revolution, namely, the position of permanent revolution. The former was represented by Chen Du-hsiu and Peng Shih-chi, while the latter was represented by the leading comrades of the present Internationalist Group (Comrades Chen Chi-chang, Yvon Cheng, Peng Ming-yuen and others). Such a line-up was not accidental but rather quite faithful to the traditional ideological grouping within the Chinese Trotskyists during nearly the past 20 years.

But the different views on the anti-Japanese war were not fundamentally and finally formulated until 1940 when the war between the imperialists changed. The differences only on the question of the time. This question nearly all Chinese Trotskyists answered in the affirmative. They had some differences only on the question of the time. Peng said: the Sino-Japanese war will become a part of the imperialist war only after the outbreak of the war in the Pacific; while Wang Ming-yuen said: the Sino-Japanese war has already been intertwined with the undeclared and not-yet-shooting war between China and the USA; while Yvon Cheng said: "It was not the imperialist war from the very beginning."

The second question was: Is there any difference in the character of China's anti-Japanese war now that she is fighting as the junior partner of an imperialist power as compared with the time when she was fighting independently? In answering this question Comrade Peng said: The character of China's anti-Japanese war will not be changed in the least regardless of how it is fought. Other comrades—that is, all members of the Political Committee except Peng Shih-chi—were of the opinion that the anti-Japanese war was progressive when fought by China more or less independently but that it was reactionary when fought as a part of the imperialist war. In different cases the character of the same anti-Japanese war was different as well. In the course of discussion, however, Comrade Lui Shih-chi—after it was clear where the winds went over toward Peng Shih-chi's position.

What is Defeatism?

The third question: If the character of the war has changed, should our attitude toward it be changed accordingly? Comrade Wang Ming-yuen, the sponsor of the "changing-character theory," insisted that once the character of the war had changed from progressive to reactionary, our attitude must be changed from defensivism to defeatism. Comrade Yvon Cheng, who had been a defeatist from the very beginning, naturally supported Comrade Wang's position, while on the other hand Comrade Peng, and later on also Lui, fought desperately against the defeatist position.

The fourth question: What is defeatism? Is Trotsky's position on the Chinese war defensivist or defeatist? This question, as you may easily see, is merely a continuation of the third question. We, four out of six of...

1. The leading body of the Communist League of China elected Comrade Wang Ming-yuen to the board of Struggle, corresponding to the Political Committee. All six comrades constituted the board; these were Comrades Chen Chi-chang, Kou Woo, Wang Ming-yuen, Yvon Cheng, Peng Shih-chi and Lui Chia-liang.—M. Y. W.
the then editorial board of Struggle, were of the opinion that especially in the case of China’s anti-Japanese war, the meaning of defeatism should be understood as a policy of prosecuting the class struggle during the war. By taking this position, Peng Shih-chi was arguing against Trotsky’s position into civil war. To take a historical analogue, the “defeatism” of the Chinese Trotskyists may be compared, in a not very exact manner, to the “defeatism” of the Russian Bolshevists after the February revolution when they “supported” Kerensky in the fight against the Germans and Kornilov.

Peng Shih-chi & Co., either out of simple ignorance or intentional distortion, declared that revolutionary defeatism with respect to China’s side of the war meant favoring the victory of Japanese imperialism and, even worse, it meant “sabotage and other destructive activities in the Kuomintang area.” This explanation of defeatism by Peng Shih-chi is in reality as great a distortion as was the prosecutor’s accusation against the SWP leaders in the Minneapolis court!

What position, in fact, did Comrade Trotsky hold on China’s anti-Japanese war? In his letter to Diego Rivera (published in La Lutte Ouvrière, organ of the Belgian PSR, No. 45, October 23, 1937), he repudiated the SWP’s distorted statement and he outlined the following tactical line for us Chinese Trotskyists:

“It is necessary to win influence and prestige in the course of the military struggle against the foreign enemy’s invasion, and in the political struggle against the weakness, failures and betrayals within. At a certain point which we cannot fix in advance, this political opposition can and must be transformed into armed struggle, for civil war like any other war is nothing else than the continuation of politics.”

**Defeatism in China**

To fight against the internal enemy politically—and more than that, to transform this political opposition into armed struggle—is to transform the national war into civil war—is a thoroughly revolutionary policy. In our opinion, the policy to transform the war into civil war is the more necessary the farther we advance, the more the war breaks out, no matter in what country and no matter what character it may assume, the fundamental attitude toward the war which we must take must be one which is nearer to “defeatism” and farther from “defensism.” It cannot be otherwise if the revolutionists wish to seize power during the war. In other words, to transform the war into civil war is the strategic line of “defeatism,” no matter on what tactical basis one puts this line into effect.

**Right Wing Supported Chiang**

On the other hand, Peng Shih-chi and his similars had an opportunist and obstinate attitude on this question. They were not willing to move a single step from their interpretation of “defeatism” on the basis of their ridiculous definition, namely, “to explode bridges for the enemy.” From Trotsky’s position on the Sino-Japanese war, they remembered only the term “defensism.” Its content—that is, “to transform political opposition into armed struggle,” “to overthrow the Kuomintang during the war”—was far from being understood by them completely.

Their essentially compromising attitude toward the Kuomintang thus became clearer as a result of the discussion. They openly declared that “so long as the Kuomintang lasts Chiang Kai-shek’s war can’t be won even by them completely. According to their opinion therefore, it is absurd and false to subordinate the interests of war to that of revolution.”

Thus the Peng Shih-chi group supported Chiang’s war. Before V-J Day they invariably declared that “in spite of the intertwining of the Sino-Japanese and Japanese-American wars, China’s war of resistance will never lose its significance that it is gaining international independence from the hands of Japanese imperialism.” But after the “victory” they had to admit in a resolution, as Trotskyists, that “suddenly on two occasions, that ‘China is going to be a second Philippines!’” They did not even bother to ask themselves the following question: Were not Peng Shih-chi & Co., among those supporters of the second world war, who had obviously implied in Trotsky’s position on China’s anti-Japanese war from the very beginning.

Thus, in the course of the discussion the attitudes of Comrade M. Y. Wang and Comrade V. I. Stalin were not very different from Trotsky’s. The essential difference was that the former also declared that the attitude which we adopted toward the war should be “defeatist” or nearly “defeatist” in essence more or less very beginning, although he still insisted that China’s anti-Japanese war was objectively progressive in its first period.

With the deepening of the questions in dispute, the comrades who later organized the Internationalist Group came to the conclusion that the Leninist defeatist line was less concerned with the character of the war than with the task imposed upon a revolutionary party of conquering power during the war. They believe that if the task of the revolutionary conquest of power by the proletariat is put before the world working class in general, then once war breaks out, no matter in what country and no matter what character it may assume, the fundamental attitude toward the war which we must take must be one which is nearer to “defeatism” and farther from “defensism.” It cannot be otherwise if the revolutionists wish to seize power during the war. In other words, to transform the war into civil war is the strategic line of “defeatism,” no matter on what tactical basis one puts this line into effect.

**Imperialism or Socialism**

The fifth question was on the possibility of an independent bourgeois China. We said and still say that while struggling for the independence of China we must make clear the following truth to ourselves as well as to the advanced classes of the world: At any stage of imperialism there are only two alternatives for China—either an independent socialist China (an integral part of the world socialist revolution) or imperialist China under the control of American imperialism. There is not and cannot be any middle way.

An independent capitalist China is an illusion. Peng and his followers, however, opposed this position of ours with all their strength, declaring that the “imperialism or socialism” formula is false, a sort of “ultra-leftism.” For them a non-capitalist and non-socialist perspective for China is possible. But you know no less than we that outside of the formula “imperialism or socialism” there are only Shachtman’s “socialism or bureaucratic collectivism” or Mao Tse-tung’s “new democracy” left for Peng Shih-chi to support.

The difference on this question clearly reveals the essential difference in our position revolution on the one hand, and on the other, the theory of a purely democratic revolution.

The sixth question is on the meaning of the theory of permanent revolution. This is simply a revival of an old divergence. As we said above, Peng and his followers “preached the elementary ideas of the permanent revolution as a revolutionary struggle starting from the democratic struggle to the goal of socialism.”

Dear comrades, are you satisfied with such an explanation of permanent revolution? What is meant by “to the goal of so-
socialism"? Do not Attlee and Leon Blum also take socialism as their "goal"? Are we not correct in condemning this position as "opportunism"? We said that, to speak more exactly, we only followed Trotsky in saying that the future Chinese revolution will be socialist from the very beginning. This is so, first of all, because we, together with the proletariat, in the future revolution will orient ourselves on the road of struggle for power at the first revolutionary tide, regardless of whether the immediate cause of revolution is democratic or nationalist.

Secondly, because the democratic and nationalist tasks of the Chinese revolution—that is, the agrarian revolution and the anti-imperialist struggle, just as Trotsky analyzed them—themselves have an anti-capitalist character. Therefore, he said, "The third Chinese revolution... will not have a 'democratic' period... But it will be compelled from the very outset to effect the most decisive shake-up and abolition of bourgeois property in city and village." (The Third International After Lenin, pp. 184-185.)

**Back to the Permanent Revolution!**

Is it not clear from this quotation that, according to Trotsky, "socialism" in the future Chinese revolution will be the means of carrying through the revolution, not a "goal" to be reached? If we believe that the third Chinese revolution "will be compelled from the very outset to effect the most decisive shake-up and abolition of bourgeois property in city and village," then we are justified in asserting that the future revolution will be socialist from the very beginning.

In his article entitled "Summary and Perspective," after quoting Ferdinand Lasalle, Trotsky wrote in 1906 that "the future Russian revolution must be declared socialist from the very beginning." The same view must be held by us on the character of the Chinese revolution. Trotsky has dealt with the same question in great detail in his Letters to Preobrazhensky, A Criticism of the Draft Program of the Communist International, Retreat in Disorder, and other documents. His ideas constitute a flat refutation of the theory of "socialism as a goal."

It is our hope, therefore, that international Trotskyism will return to the old fundamental platform, Trotsky's ideas on the character of the Chinese revolution, which as you well know has been one of the few most important questions marking the division between Stalinism and Trotskyism.

M. Y. WANG

November 12, 1947

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**THE SECRET LIFE OF JAMES BURNHAM**

Among the leading American contributions to world culture is a still little-known institution based on a bright idea called New Entertainment Workshop (NEW). If, its founder reasoned, shoes and automobiles can be mass-manufactured to precise specifications, leaving nothing to chance or individual craftsmanship, why cannot novels be turned out in the same way?

Creativity, artistic uniqueness—such phrases are all very well in literary magazines. But how do you know the product will sell?

Should the heroine commit suicide or fall into her beloved's arms? These things cannot be left to the whims of authors or literary critics.

And so the Workshop breaks down submitted novels into their constituent plot values and cog wheels, greases the story transmission, and reconstructs them on the basis of tested audience reactions.

If Proust, for example, had worked with NEW, he would have been able to write a clear, salable story of endurable length and discernible plot, instead of meandering over seven books merely because his mind was upset by a piece of French pastry.

One of the writers whom NEW has recently serviced is James Burnham. Burnham's lubricated story outline is at present being submitted to movie companies and may be overhauled into a novel. It concerns one John West, wealthy young man with a social conscience, who joins the Communist Party and becomes a prominent intellectual front. Heroine is wife Jane West, also troubled, who is troubled by his work for the traitorous Communists. (No locale is given for the home but it might be some modest nook on Sutton Place.)

Joe West's activities for the CP are of heroic proportions. Unlike so many other intellectuals who refuse to sacrifice a comfortable academic status, he really throws himself into the struggle devotedly. At a gigantic anti-Nazi demonstration of 50,000 outside Madison Square Garden in the 30s, he makes a great rabble-rousing speech.

But he also runs into the party witch-hunt trial of a "deviationist" who mysteriously disappears after a veiled threat by a Comintern "rep." This perturbs him. Russia attacks Finland; he wonders. West is assigned to sabotage Oak Ridge; under Jane's persuasion he sees the light and does the patriotic thing for Army Intelligence. Western civilization is saved. Back in New York, at a party mass meeting in Madison Square Garden, he gets up before the 29,000 Stalinists and dramatically, openly, courageously he denounces the CP and proclaims his loyalty to the red, white and blue.

To appreciate this promising young novelist, a bit of biographical data is necessary. NEW's statement that the scenario is based on Burnham's personal experiences is on the loose side. As it happens, Burnham was West-Burnham announced his personal experiences are on the loose side. As it happens, Burnham was an amalgam between known facts about the CP and troubled memories of his own role in the Trotskyists? As NEW remarks, in addition to its political appeal there is a powerful love story threaded through it.

We also resolutely reject as irresponsible cynicism any suggestion, sure to be made by Philistines, that the deep political thinker who made The Managerial Revolution and fought The Struggle for the World is merely grubstaking for a few loose dollars. If nothing else, Burnham-West-Mitty has stature: he is a professor of philosophy, an intellectual aristocrat who formerly edited the learned periodical Symposium, a literary critic of such modern authors as Mann and Kafka, and now—honor heaped on honor—an advisory editor of Partisan Review.

As for the proposed film, one of the first problems that will occur to any movie company is casting. The proper heroic figure should be available for the lead. We make bold to help out.

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**For Books and Pamphlets by LEON TROTSKY**

Write for book list to LABOR ACTION BOOK SERVICE

4 Court Sq., Long Island City 1, N. Y.
You Can’t Live There!

RACE BIAS IN HOUSING, by Charles Abrams. Sponsored by Council on Interracial Cooperation, N.A.A.C.P. and American Council on Race Relations. Distributed by the ACLU. New York, 1947. 31 pp., 15 cents, or $.50 per hundred.

This thirty-one-page pamphlet, written by an expert in the housing field, presents a useful sociological analysis of the problem of segregation in housing. The work is primarily concerned with the Negro but it points out that Jews, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans and even south Europeans suffer from housing segregation. The “ghettos” or minorities are shown to have originated because newly arrived immigrants (and Negroes from the South) tended to live together voluntarily as a result of common cultural and national interests in a new and strange environment.

Prejudice soon made these voluntary minority communities into involuntary prisons. City zoning laws, originally intended to serve more useful purposes, were put to use to enforce segregation. Restrictive covenants, once aimed at glue factories and boiler shops, were pointed now at human beings.

Abrams’ main emphasis is on racial policy in public housing. He points out that the direct entry of the government into housing can serve either as an example di­rected against segregation or a prop for it. So far, it has been a prop.

The following quotation from the official manual of the Federal Housing Authority is illustrative: “If a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes.”

The manual discusses “prevention of infiltration” and warns against “unharmonious groups.” It even contains a model restrictive covenant!

The Home Owners Loan Corporation, in selling repossessioned houses, “respects local racial patterns.” The Public Works Administration of recent memory did the same in their housing projects.

Further material in the pamphlet includes useful statistics, legal information of a general nature, and information on experiences with segregated and unsegregated public housing. It would be of assistance to anyone doing educational, agitational or research work in the housing field.

The weaknesses of the pamphlet reflect the weaknesses of sponsoring organizations. As is typical of the ACLU, there is no class understanding in the analysis. As is typical of the NAACP, the stress is on court and legislative action alone.

A valuable note in the book is an offer by the ACLU Staff Counsel to furnish interested parties with information on court suits, drafts of bills for state legislatures and city councils, and data on communities where segregation has been abolished.

GERALD MCDERMOTT

Negro Struggle in History

FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM, by John Hope Franklin. Knopf, N. Y. 1947. $5.00.

Franklin, a young Negro scholar who is professor of history at Howard University, is concerned primarily with the history of the Negro in the United States; but he has included chapters on the African background, on the Caribbean and Latin American, and on Canadian Negroes. The subject matter is therefore wide-ranging: from slavery and the slave trade, through the abolition movement and the Civil War, to the New Deal and wars of our day. What relation existed between the theoretical notions of the Founding Fathers and the fact of slavery? What was the relation between American slavery and the Industrial Revolution? How did the slave feel about his servitude?

The latter part of the book describes the struggle of the Negro for democratic rights, including a significant discussion of the Civil War.

There is space only for a few details about the Negro's history as a whole. There is insufficient mention of the economic growth of the nation. His book is of interest to scholars, a good polemical or apologetical style. From Slavery to Freedom is the result of genuine historical research; it is not a mere record of “the progress the Negro has made since emancipation.” It is far from adequate, but this subject is usually ignored completely by Negro authors.

GREAT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES by Charles C. Evers. A publication of the Com­mission on Interracial Cooperation “as the agencies of upper-class Negro leaders refused to join hands with them in their efforts to rise.” Many went to the Garvey movement but “‘Negro Zionism’ was doomed to failure. Regardless of how disillusioned Negroes were with conditions in the States they were unwilling to settle in the twenties, as their forebears had been a century earlier, to undertake the uncertain task of redistributing African land in the United States.

On Booker Washington he writes: “The particular type of industrial education which Washington emphasized ... was outmoded at the time he enunciated it. ... He did not seem to grasp fully the effect of the Industrial Revolution ... many of the occupations which Washington was urging Negroes to enter were disappearing almost at once together.” Franklin deals also with the Negro and the Populist Party in the South —far from adequately, but this subject is usually ignored completely by Negro authors.

There is some careless writing in the book. On the Haitian events of 1915 we read (page 348): “As for the part of the United States, it is enough to say that the long period of disorder, and the disorder of parts, led to the occupation of the United States Marines in 1915.” There is ample evidence to demonstrate that this was not the year of disorder, but that the occupation led to the occupation by the United States Marines in 1915.

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