

The

NEW

INTERNATIONAL

NEW LIGHT ON PEARL HARBOR

**ROOSEVELT'S
SECRET WAR**

by Theodore Enright

TITO vs. THE KREMLIN

Beginning of the End of Stalinism

by Max Shachtman

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**TWO CONVENTIONS: Challenge to Labor
Notes of the Month**

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**RUMANIA: "Russification" of Economy
by Valentin Toma**

**UKRAINE: Post-War Resistance
by Andrzej Rudzienski**

AUGUST 1948

TWENTY-FIVE CENTS

**1918: Dissolution of Constituent Assembly
by Victor Serge**

MEMO

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THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

Vol. VIX, No. 6 AUGUST 1948 Whole No. 128

Published monthly, except May and June, by the New International Publishing Co. at 114 West 14th Street, New York 11, N. Y. Re-entered as second-class matter June 30, 1947, at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Subscription rates: \$2.00 per year; bundles, 15c each for five copies and up. Foreign, \$2.25 per year; bundles, 20c each for five and up.

Address all editorial and business communications to The New International, 4 Court Square, Long Island City 1, N. Y. Telephone: IRonsides 6-5117.

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The lead article by Max Shachtman in this issue represents a switch in plans on our part. . . . We were intending to run his speech of June 25 giving a report on the situation in Western Europe, based on his recent four-month stay there; but Tito changed our mind. . . . The latter speech has been published in *Labor Action* instead. . . .

Comrade Shachtman, however, is also due to work up for the *NI* an important article discussing another aspect of his European trip: a review of the smaller independent Marxist and socialist groups in the European countries such as the French RDR (Revolutionary Democratic Front), the Spanish POUM, etc., as well as the present status of the Fourth International organizations and its recent world conference. . . . As soon as possible . . .

We do, however, want to give still another part of his European report right in this column. . . . Comrade Shachtman memoes:

"In telling you about the role that the *NI* plays among the European Marxists, it is difficult to avoid sounding simply like an advertising blurb. I can only insist that it is equally difficult for the comrades here to appreciate fully what the magazine means to comrades abroad who, during the difficult years of the wars, were often isolated from each other as well as from the international movement while simultaneously beset by new problems and developments.

"I weigh the words carefully, to avoid the slightest exaggeration: Not only within the Fourth International groups but in all the other Marxist groupings independent of the Stalinists and the reformist Social-Democrats (since the end of war when the *NI* began going to Europe once more) practically everyone at all concerned with the problems of Marxist politics and theory finds the magazine absolutely indispensable. Every copy is read by two, five or more people. It is the *only* American Marxist periodical which is read abroad with interest, real attention and respect, regardless of disagreements with its point of view. Not only in the British Isles—on the Continent practically everyone who can even stumble through English reads the *NI*, as the only periodical that attempts to grapple in a serious way with the living problems of our day from the Marxist point of view, without merely repeating stock phrases, orthodox clichés and consecrated quotations.

"Other Marxist or self-styled Trotskyist publications from this side are leafed through and glanced over; they are not read. Even to comrades who express greater political agreement with them than with us, their dull unstimulating pages seem other-worldly and uninspired. Anything we here can do to get more copies of the *NI* to Europe will be a real contribution."

Readers who are moved to do so can help get more *NI*s to Europe by sending in subs earmarked for the purpose. . . .

You are undoubtedly going to read more from our new contributor, Valentin Toma. . . . Toma is, frankly, a pen name for a well-known Rumanian militant, now abroad, who not only knows the situation in Rumania where he has been prominent in the revolutionary movement but also had the opportunity to study at first hand the political situation throughout the Balkan countries. . . .

The piece on "The Mysterious Bruno R.," marked *Coming* last month, ought to be coming along for the September or October issue. . . . James T. Farrell promises his next article on James Connolly for the September issue. . . . Which issue will also present Henry Judd on the Marshall Plan. . . .

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

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VOL. XIV

AUGUST 1948

NO. 6

NOTES OF THE MONTH

Two Conventions: Challenge to Labor

Perhaps the simplest and least controversial index to the political maturity of the American people is the degree of strictly non-partisan disgust that has been aroused by the spectacle of the two party conventions that were held in July at Philadelphia. We are referring to the shows put on by the Democratic and Republican Parties, the Wallace convention not yet having been held as this is written.

The disgust index does not register very high, to be sure—in spite of television's help in promoting it. But it may be more than merely optimism if we believe that some progress has been indicated. Naturally, the greater burden of the reaction falls upon the GOP, since on one point at least the Democrats provided a reasonable facsimile of a discussion over ideas.

The United States is probably the only country left on the planet where, in the midst of a world that is visibly falling apart at the seams, major parties girding for a conflict over leadership of a great nation could convene such empty political farces in the year 1948.

The clump-clump of World War III can be heard in the wings; but on the stage at Philadelphia the entertainers at Dewey's headquarters made better copy for the newspapers than the platform oratory. Czechoslovakia falls and Tito rises—but the fashion show put on by one Republican aspirant to "the biggest job in the world" had just a bit more to do with his chances for the presidency than the nomination speech made on his behalf. It was perhaps through a concession to dignity that refrigerators and washing machines were not given away with each vote cast by the delegates, but it would have been equally enlightening if the Republicans had chosen their man by a contest to guess "Mr. Hush."

The scene of hoopla and smoke-filled candidates can be viewed best through foreign eyes: a French observer, for example, was widely quoted as wondering, with startled innocence, how "a Lincoln or a Roosevelt" had ever emerged from such shindigs. While justified insofar as it reflects astonishment at the puerility of the proceedings, the reference to Lincoln and Roosevelt in particular shows a misunderstanding of what makes the old-party conventions the wellnigh meaningless comedies they are.

In 1860 and in 1932, the conventions that nominated Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt met in the midst of political and social upheavals that were shaking society to its depths—the Inevitable Conflict and the Great Depression. Class conflicts were at a high point and class issues had to be fought out. It is times of great conflict that produce "great men"—or if not great men, then at least more or less able and intelligent representatives of capitalism instead of Deweys and Trumans. The heat of the social conflicts, generated by the stirrings of masses in motion, is enabled to penetrate even into the remote regions where the political machines grind on in their parasitic existence.

In 1948 the masses of people—which, in today's America, means primarily *labor*—are still politically passive. This July (unlike both 1860 and 1932) there was no challenge to capitalism yet manifest on the social scene. The politicians could afford to concentrate on what is the normal way of life for their species—machine power politics and its accompanying range of maneuvers. Symptomatically, labor's role at Philadelphia was almost nil. The politicians had little to worry about outside of their ordinary occupational hazards—loss of patronage, etc.; and insofar as this was not so (the threat of the Wallace vote to the Northern city bosses) there was produced the only sign of life, the scrap over civil rights at the Democratic convention.

•

But the highlight of the Democratic convention was not the walkout staged by the Southern Dixiecrats—if by "highlight" is meant, not necessarily the most dramatic event, but literally that which highlighted the main character of the gathering. This was rather a little-noticed strange interlude provided by an obscure rank-and-file delegate from Florida, Byrd Sims by name.

By the time the rollcall for nominations had started, it will be remembered, the anti-Truman bubble had collapsed; Eisenhower, Douglas and the short-lived Pepper were out of the picture and only Russell of Georgia remained in the running as the Jim Crow (beg pardon, *states'-rights*) candidate. And Mr. Sims was not satisfied.

Maybe his delegation chairman or friends had tried to soothe him: *After all, Byrd, none of us like it but there's nothing we can do, see, the big boys got it all fixed up, and you can't buck 'em, so just remember you're a nobody from Florida and jump on the bandwagon and maybe you'll get a new post office at home, huh, so be reasonable for heaven's sake, will you?*

But all Mr. Sims knew was that he was an American citizen, wore a delegate's badge, and wasn't satisfied.

The program was cut-and-dried; the speeches were uncut and drier; the rollcall trundled up to Florida and Mr. Sims got the floor; he informed the chairman that he, Sims, wanted to make a nomination for the presidency. The strange statement simply did not register on that gentleman. "You have five minutes," the chairman intoned before it dawned on him that the little man had actually said "*nomination for the presidency.*" Mr. Sims got all of twenty minutes, because he was an American citizen, wore a delegate's badge, wasn't satisfied, and wanted to nominate a president.

To be sure, Mr. Sim's nomination speech, unrehearsed and unpolished, was an amateur performance, almost painfully embarrassing; he repeated himself over and over, as a man has a right to do in speaking over a cracker barrel to his fellows. Paraphrased and stripped down, it went somewhat as follows:

I'm from the great state of Florida and I am happy to have this opportunity to get up before you, the delegates to this great convention of the Democratic Party and have the privilege to speak my mind. That is possible because we live in a great democracy, where I, just another delegate from the great state of Florida, can nominate my choice for the presidency of the great United States of America just like anyone else. We ought to be thankful we live in such a great democracy, and I want to see how much chance a man like me has to get somewhere without a machine. And so I want to nominate that great American, Paul V. McNutt.

Then the gears, halted for a moment, clashed again and whirled on. . . . We do not intend to scoff, least of all to belittle Mr. Sims. The scene is pathetic, naive and appealing. Our sympathies are all with Byrd, honest and courageous soul that he is in his own way. He *thought* he had flesh-and-blood ears to speak to, like those of his neighbors in the club back home, where a man can get off what he has on his chest.

He obviously did not know he was speaking to a machine.

The truth—to be seen clearly enough in a year when both major parties nominate men forced down their throat by the machines in back of them—is that the American party system has as much resemblance

to democracy as a robot has to a human being. There are few regimes in the world, outside of the open dictatorships, which are as divorced from the people and from the play of social influence.

Not a hundred Mr. Simses from the grass roots can shout loud enough to have their voices heard at its summits. Politics—the business of fulfilling the democratic rituals—is a big business like everything else of importance in capitalist America; and the little dissatisfied man is a grain of sand in the gears.

American labor, however, is not a little dissatisfied man. It is the mightiest social force in the country, without exception. To it alone belongs a voice that can shake even the tops, and that has shaken them. *And the most pathetic spectacle of all is the fact that, still in 1948, this giant stands before the politicians' conventions like Mr. Sims. . . .*

We will see how long.

●

There was another act of courage at the Democratic convention, in this case courage born not of political naivete but of conviction and principle.

That was the split-away by the intransigent wing of the Southern white-supremacy shouters, led by the delegation from the slum area of the nation, the state of Mississippi.

The word "courage" in this connection may strike strangely on our readers' ears: it usually connotes commendation. And there is certainly no doubt that this ante-bellum band of unreconstructed race-haters represented the most reactionary assemblage of troglodytes in both parties, bar none. (The fascist Gerald Smith and the anti-Semitic agitator "Reverend" Perkins flocked to their rump convention like jackals to carrion.)

Nevertheless, we point them out to labor as a model to pattern after, in one decisive respect. They risk the loss of patronage, even excommunication by their fellow Jim Crow Democrats who are sticking with the machine. But they have principles by which to live and they propose to live by them, as unashamed reactionaries.

Look at the difference! Truman has, only yesterday, broken three great strikes with open viciousness scarcely paralleled for decades; Truman has brought back the rule of government strikebreaking by injunction; Truman has kicked labor in the face and given it nothing—yet labor crawls after his presidential chariot. But so soon as the Democratic convention as much as inserts a passage in its manual of campaign promises (called a platform) in favor of anti-racist laws *on paper*, so soon these principled reactionaries rise up on their hind legs and kick back.

No doubt they are hotheads. After all, they should realize that a platform promise (especially one as delicately worded as this one is) means as much to Truman as it does to the next wardheeler—and doubly

so when it was inserted in the platform over the opposition of the Truman forces themselves. No one need tell them there is a vast gulf between the pledge and the performance, especially since Truman (who himself originally made these proposals) has never lifted a finger to effectuate even those parts of his civil-rights program which can be put into practice by executive order without congressional action.

But there is method in their hotheadedness. *Their action in splitting, far more than any rebel yells at the convention, represents the most effective way of exerting pressure on Truman to ditch any ACTION on civil rights.*

Truman will be in a dilemma during the special session which he has called, presumably to put the GOP on the spot. It may be easy enough for him to go as far as dangling a civil-rights bill before Congress in the full expectation that it will be voted down. This may even be enough to stuff the mouths of the liberal cretins who are even now timidly suggesting that Truman isn't such a bad guy after all. But the inconvenient fact is that Jim Crow in the armed forces, among other things, can be abolished by executive decree, on the president's say-so alone.

The Southern splitters are more concerned that *this "catastrophe"* not come to pass than they are to form a lily-white party. And they have chosen the most effective way to counter the pressure that will be put on Truman from the North—pressure to carry out the promises, to carry them out mangled on a stretcher, it may be, but to carry them out in some way.

Like symmetrical weights on a balance scale, the counter-pressure in favor of civil-rights action likewise does not come from a point within the Democratic Party. It comes at this moment essentially from the existence of the Wallace movement. We, like most of labor, oppose the Wallace-Stalinist party as the cat's-paw of the Kremlin, but it will do no one any good to blink away this fact.

If Truman is forced to put any teeth into the civil-rights plank, if he is forced merely to make a pretense of doing so, the decisive reason will be the fact of the Wallace threat.

The remnants of the non-Stalinist wing of the New Deal coalition (organized at the Democratic convention under the egis of Americans for Democratic Action) are busily claiming the civil-rights plank as their own victory for liberalism. This is pathetic puff.

Their forces at the convention numbered less than ten per cent of the total, and their people had the assignment of making the speeches—all to the good, of course. But the decisive reason why the plank was even put on paper was the support from the Democratic city machines of Hague, Arvey, et al.—and *these* noble allies were not at all concerned with either liberalism, racial democracy or "the tradition of

FDR" (who, lord knows, was the very *first* president of the United States to put the official stamp of White House approval on army Jim Crow!). The city bosses were concerned with the threat of Wallace, his threat not to Truman but to the chances of salvaging Democratic victories in local contests in their own bailiwicks.

And so the Democrats are pulled between the forces organized independently, outside the machine, while the labor leaders pule about being "practical" . . . and stay within the pale, impotent.

There is still another lesson to be drawn from the civil-rights fight, to cast a sidelight on the uncanny blindness of the CIO-AFL heads in opposing the independent organization of labor's strength in the form of a labor party.

It is obvious that the liberals' "victory" has put yet another crimp in Truman's dim chances for beating Dewey. Just how serious the Southern split will be remains to be seen, but (1) it certainly has not helped, and (2) as we have indicated, in proportion as Truman takes the civil-rights plank off paper, the white-supremacy revolt is bound to grow in size and effect.

Now the liberals do not express chagrin over this by-product of their famous victory—nor can they very well do so at the same time that they publicly chortle over it. Yet, according to their own lights, they should be kicking themselves around.

The big "practical" argument against a break with the Democrats has always been: *As long as the Democrats are the lesser evil, we don't want to ensure the victory of the more reactionary Republicans.* But if this makes good sense as an argument against labor's splitting with the donkey, it makes equally good sense against forcing the split of the right wing. The latter helps a Dewey victory just as effectively.

There is, however, a big difference between the two kinds of splits. If labor takes the initiative in the break and forms its own party, *then it has something, something to build, something that will be stronger the following year and is bound to keep on growing in strength.* But if the extreme right wing is forced out by liberal half-victories within the party, then the labor strategy falls between two stools. The Democratic "lesser evil" is weakened, to be sure, but labor is left holding on tightly to nothing but a disintegrating shell!

The theory on which the lib-lab coalition in the Democratic Party has been working is patently bankrupt. This has been the aforementioned theory of the lesser evil.

Let us be clear about this lesser-evil business. There is, of course, nothing wrong with choosing the lesser of two evils *if these two are really, actually, the only choices before us.*

But where (1) the lesser evil inevitably degener-

ates toward the greater evil, and (2) there *is* a third choice, waiting to be grasped, which alone points onward and not backward—then it becomes true that the lesser evil is not the road of hard-headed political practicality but only the substitution of shortsightedness for realism.

That is what the 1948 election campaign is making clear. The labor politicians are proving to Truman that they fall easy, they do not have to be wooed even with a chocolate bar. They have nowhere else to go, because—being such terribly practical people—they refuse to open the one door which is unlocked: *the formation by labor's millions of its own party, a labor party, separate from and independent of the old parties, based on the mass trade unions, a party that belongs to it and is run by it.*

What, then, is more practical than the proposal for immediate action put forward by the National Committee of the Workers Party, in the course of its statement on the presidential election?

“There *is* something to be done, and most especially *right now.*”

“Walter Reuther, president of the Auto Workers Union, has come out for the formation of a new party also—only he adds: as soon as the elections are over.

“To be sure, it is no longer possible for labor to participate in this presidential campaign for a candidate of its own. The presidential campaign is already lost for labor, no matter who wins. Nor, probably, is it possible at this late date to form a labor party to participate in the congressional elections.

“But why wait till after the elections to take the **FIRST STEPS?**”

“What we propose is that now—not after the elections—the trade unions call a nation-wide conference to take the first steps toward the creation of labor's own party.

“NOW—while the lesson is fresh and rankling.

“NOW—while it is clear that the old policy is washed up, and before anyone has a chance to forget it.

“NOW—while everyone is going through the quadrennial spurt of interest in political issues and problems, not after the November decision when political interest generally lets down.

“NOW is the proper **PRACTICAL** time to call a conference of **ALL** trade unions, CIO, AFL, railroad brotherhoods and independents, to set up the machinery to put labor into the political picture, to dig the foundation.

“There is no better way than this to say to the old parties, in the course of the campaign itself: We mean business! Watch your step! We are no longer tame dogs to be patted on the head every four years! We're breaking loose on our own!

“You want to use labor's strength to put pressure on the politicians in the campaign? There is no bet-

ter way to mobilize such pressure than this. **NOW**—while the politicians are busy making promises.

“Labor has been taking a beating on the political field. **NOW**—serve notice that we are going on the offensive.

“This is the most important way in which labor can participate in the 1948 election campaign.”

●

But even such an important step will not provide anyone for whom class-conscious workers can vote in November. There is no candidate of the labor movement. In this situation, our proposal is:

*Cast a protest vote—not a pro-Stalinist protest vote for the Wallacite creature of the CP, but a **SOCIALIST** protest vote!*

There will be three socialist candidates on the ballot in various states, put up by three small socialist groups—Norman Thomas for the Socialist Party, Farrell Dobbs for the Socialist Workers Party, and Edward Teichert for the Socialist Labor Party.

We agree with the particular *programs* of none of these groups. We do not ask our readers to support any of these *parties* as such. On the contrary, we have the severest criticism of each, from our own point of view. But we cannot and do not put them on the same footing as our disagreements with Truman, Dewey and Wallace.

The total vote which will be registered for all three socialist candidates combined—comparatively small as it may be, given the weakness of the socialist movement in the United States—will be the register of the *socialist* protest vote in this election. We do not believe that the bulk of the votes which will be cast for Norman Thomas can be considered as ballots in favor of Thomas's pink, “respectable,” socialistic liberalism *us against* the militant Marxist movement. That is not what is at issue. Similarly, the count for Farrell Dobbs will not be a register of those who are voting for his party's disastrous position of “defending the Soviet Union” as a “workers' state” against capitalist encirclement. And the same goes for Teichert as the representative of the SLP's fossilized sectarianism, its opposition to any and all immediate demands, and its substitution of “the unconditional surrender of capitalism” for a struggle inside the mass trade unions against the conservative labor lieutenants of capitalism.

We propose that workers cast the only possible vote which can be counted against Truman, Dewey and Wallace, and for a workers' world—by voting for one of these socialist candidates.

There is no political preference as among the three, as far as we are concerned. We can find no political reason for putting any one of them on a more advantageous footing than the other.

If Norman Thomas has adopted the role of “left” critical support of American imperialism, it is equally

true that the SWP stands programmatically on the basis of critical support to Russian imperialism. If the SLP preaches "straight socialism" and opposition to both Washington and Moscow, it is also true that its sectarian attitude toward the bona-fide trade unions practically puts it outside the real labor movement.

But on the narrow and exceedingly limited question of how to mark the ballot in November, we are interested in only one thing: *Vote for a socialist candidate, against Truman-Dewey-Wallace! Vote Socialist!*

•

Whoever wins, we said, the presidential race is already lost for labor. But that has been true for a very long time—the only difference this year is that even the labor leaders (not to speak of the bulk of militant workers) are aware of this fact now, even those who will hypocritically sprinkle holy water over Truman.

And so the "defeat" which will be lamented by the labor-liberals—if Dewey wins, as seems probable—will be no defeat at all, certainly not in the sense which they will ascribe. *On the contrary, it can be an eye-opener and the threshold of a great opportunity.*

This may well be the lasting significance of the

1948 election: For the first time in sixteen years, labor will be out of the unofficial government coalition; there will be a break between labor's house and the White House; the labor movement will no longer have the illusory feeling that the government power in Washington is friendly.

And this will be almost as true even if the miracle takes place and Truman succeeds himself.

This means that, after November, the problem of political action will be posed all over again before the labor movement—and the old answers can no longer be given. The last decade has pretty nearly devastated the notion that the trade unions can stick to their economic last and ignore politics. And now they will be forced to find new channels in which to exert labor's potential political power.

In the next two years at the most, labor has a job to do—a revolution in its political thinking! Circumstances and social forces push it inexorably in that direction. It can drag its feet, or else it can go forward enthusiastically, aware of what is happening, grasping time by the forelock.

The road ahead is wide open, and the signpost reads: *To labor's own party — to real independent political action by the massed millions of the working class for the first time in American labor's history!*

Roosevelt's Secret War

Professor Beard Reveals the Road to Pearl Harbor

Franklin D. Roosevelt deliberately set out to engineer the entrance of the United States into the Second World War. He deliberately set out to provoke a "sneak attack" by Japan. He did this behind the backs of the people and in the face of his own hypocritical peace promises.

When socialists made this accusation from the left, the victims of the Roosevelt myth felt free to shrug it off as calumny. When anti-Roosevelt hate-mongers like the *Chicago Tribune* or John T. Flynn made the same accusation from the right for their own purposes, the Roosevelt worshipers were content to point to the shady connections of these characters with the fascist underworld.

Such *ad hominem* refutations will no longer do. The indictment has been drawn up, the evidence marshaled, and the case proved by no less eminent a scholar than "the dean of American historians," Professor Charles A. Beard.

Beard's recent book¹ collects and evaluates all the information available relating to the pre-war diplo-

macy of the U.S. It is a work of enduring value for the student of foreign affairs and the serious analyst of imperialist politics. Beard has dealt a devastating blow to the propagandists of platitudes about the "peace-loving democracies" and "aggressor nations," to all those who prattle: "We didn't choose to fight—we were attacked."

Beard, in fact, accomplished even more than he intended. For this work is not merely a revelation of Roosevelt's political methods—not merely "muckraking." It is in its effect a scholarly, documented and closely reasoned support of the socialist thesis that the last war was an imperialist struggle for empire, resources and power; fought without an atom of concern for the miserable humanity of the earth whose bodies it trampled and whose blood it poured so generously.

Beard's method guarantees the accuracy of every fact presented. It is the most painstaking presentation of revealed fact covering any pre-war period. He began collecting material for this book the day war was declared. It was a task that continued throughout the war and its aftermath. Even now the record is

1. Charles A. Beard: *President Roosevelt and the Coming of War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities*. Yale University Press, 1948, 614 pp., \$5.00.

incomplete but enough is established to make this a work of monumental importance.

There is a special and peculiar relationship between propaganda and the real politics of war. In an earlier and almost forgotten decade, liberals and revolutionaries were united in the belief that the peoples of the world were fundamentally peaceful. Wars, it was felt, were waged by governments against the people's will. If the latter understood the reasons for war, if they knew the real facts and motivations behind a war, they could not be induced to fight. This principle was accepted and proclaimed by such men as both Randolph Bourne and Lenin.

Lenin, writing in 1917, said:

It is argued that in America there is democracy, that there is a "White House" there. I say: slavery was abolished half a century ago; since then billionaires have sprung up. They hold the whole of America in their financial grip . . . and will inevitably go to war with Japan over the partition of the Pacific. Preparations for this war have been going on for several decades already. A heap of books have been written on the subject. And America's real object in entering this war is to prepare for war with Japan. The American people enjoy considerable freedom, and it is difficult to believe that they will tolerate conscription and the creation of an army for aims of conquest, for a struggle against Japan, for example. The Americans can see from the example of Europe what this leads to. . . .

Beard has substantiated Lenin's thesis in the deeds and documents of Roosevelt and his cabinet.

"Except in Case of Attack"

Roosevelt was committed to a war policy, and had made this perfectly clear in his "quarantine the aggressor" speech of 1937. In effect, this policy had as its primary aim the defeat of any power capable of challenging the might of the U.S. Hence, for example, his "neutrality" on Spain. Allies would be taken wherever they could be found, and in the fluid situation prior to the actual outbreak of war, it was at times difficult to know who would be an ally and who an enemy. One thing, however, was clear. No continental power or Asiatic power would be permitted to gain dominance without a struggle.

While this was the real policy of Roosevelt, he was at the same time the leader of that party which was most committed to a peace policy. Throughout the '30s and in the 1940 campaign platform Roosevelt insisted he was following the road to peace. The great majority of Americans were opposed to entry into foreign wars. This attitude to war ranged far beyond our own socialist opposition, including isolationism, pacifism, the student peace movements and simple provincialism.

It was so powerful a sentiment that it was officially recognized in the Democratic campaign platform of 1940: "We will not participate in foreign wars"—and to this was added on Roosevelt's insist-

ence the five fateful words: "except in case of attack."

That clause then became the key to Roosevelt's diplomacy: so to maneuver that we would be attacked. Throughout 1941 Roosevelt acted secretly in various theaters of war, seeking an attack. It was almost a trial-and-error method, for his haste was feverish; an attack had to be found, no matter what the cost or the consequences.

The passage of the Lend-Lease Act took this country a long way into war, but it was not presented as such to the American people. It was a policy of defense. To make this clear there was written into the act certain clauses forbidding the convoying of ships: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United States."

Beard proves that immediately after this act was passed, Roosevelt secretly ordered convoys for the supplies going to Britain. He further ordered the navy to hunt out and destroy German submarines found in the vaguely defined patrolling zone of the Atlantic. Nor would Roosevelt permit anyone to delimit this patrolling zone. It could be any area, extending if necessary to the shores of Europe.

Roosevelt's First Try

While secretly engaged in war, Roosevelt and his cabinet members asserted the contrary—their activity in the Atlantic was completely proper, gentlemanly and constitutional. Navy Secretary Knox was bitterly indignant in denying newspaper stories that naval vessels were depth-bombing German submarines. Finally, badly pressed by a congressional committee, he admitted "that depth-bombing had taken place," but there was "no other evidence a German submarine was there. The equipment echo might have been received from a whale or a large fish, or a cold current, instead of a submarine."

Thus while the American navy on Roosevelt's orders was busily engaged depth-bombing whales, large fish and cold currents, the intended effect of this policy was achieved. Two navy ships were counterattacked. In both instances these ships had hunted submarines, broadcasting their position to nearby British ships and planes, and depth-bombed. Announcing these attacks, Roosevelt asserted that we had been attacked, and that the Germans "fired first."

Note the words—a hypocritical and pious refrain framed to fit the theme song of the 1940 campaign platform: "except in case of attack."

When Roosevelt announced the news of the attack upon the destroyer Kearny (September 1941), he said: "*History has recorded who fired the first shot.* In the long run, however, all that will matter is who fired the last shot. The U.S.S. Kearny is not just a navy ship. She belongs to every man, woman and child in this nation."

In his own opinion, he was now ready to ask for a declaration of war. But congressional investigations and newspaper reports on these attacks had put them in so dubious a light that Congress, if it had granted his request, would have taken this country into war angry and divided. The tragic comedy had to continue.

The Real Atlantic Charter

In August 1941 there took place the famous and infamous Atlantic Conference between Roosevelt and Churchill. Like the notorious Atlantic Charter, which was first broadcast joyfully to suffering humanity and later revealed to be a diplomatic fiction (there was no such document), much took place at this conference which was concealed from Congress and the people.

Returning from this conference, Roosevelt felt witty and uncommunicative. No new commitments had been made, he assured Congress and the people. As the *New York Times* reported after the press conference, Roosevelt said that he and Churchill "had discussed the situation on every continent. Every continent you ever heard of, he added facetiously."

This little joke and the non-existent charter were all he reported. The full facts later disclosed by years of congressional probing are astonishing. No other American statesman had dared until that time to go as far as Roosevelt in making secret military agreements.

First, a reorientation of American policy with respect to Japan: "Parallel and ultimative action in respect to Japan" (Beard summarizing Sumner Welles' memoranda).

Second, "an agreement as to the occupation of the Azores by the armed forces of the United States in cooperation with British armed forces."

The agreement on the occupation of the Azores was a military maneuver to launch this country into war, since it was understood by both Roosevelt and Churchill that such a move would provoke German attack. In that event Churchill agreed that British forces would act as a screen for the American army. While the Azores agreement never became a reality, extensive military preparations were undertaken in that direction.

The agreement on Japan was to have fateful consequences. It was a turning point in American policy. Since 1932 the United States had had at various times the opportunity to change its policy to that associated with the name of Secretary Stimson. The Stimson Doctrine was a simple one: Stop Japanese expansion by embargoes, by curtailing credit and by drawing a line across the face of the globe and stating that if Japan went beyond this line the United States would fight. This idea, when presented to Herbert Hoover, was rejected and continued unused for almost a decade.

Yet at the Atlantic Conference Roosevelt decided to draw the line in the Pacific. The understanding was reached that the United States would fight not only if American possessions were touched but if any of the colonial possessions of the other friendly powers were in danger. Roosevelt's fever to get into the war brought the Stimson Doctrine to life; and when the Japanese ambassador was handed a diplomatic note, he also reached the same conclusion, although the note avoided the word "war."

Ultimatum to Japan

There was a double criminality in the application of the Stimson Doctrine in 1941. In the first place, there was the *secrecy* of the warning to the Japanese government that if it moved into the southwestern Pacific against any of the assorted colonial possessions of the various powers, the United States would consider its interests at stake. This was a clear war ultimatum which, were it known to the public, would hardly get sufficient support to justify the threat it contained. On the surface nothing was happening, but relations with Japan got progressively worse immediately following the Atlantic Conference. So it must have seemed to the man in the street, who knew only what he read in the newspapers and never suspected that Japan had received an ultimatum.

In the second place, this change in policy occurred precisely at the moment when there is now every reason to believe that war with Japan might have been delayed for a considerable length of time. While it remains true that, so long as a capitalist America and Japan existed, such a war was ultimately inevitable, the possibility of a considerable delay is more than a trifling matter—not only to the men who met their bullet sooner rather than later, but also to socialists who looked forward to the intervention of the people's third camp against the war makers.

For it is a fact, now established beyond possibility of dispute, that Prince Konoye, premier of Japan in 1941, was anxious to avoid war with the United States. He was more than willing, in the interests of Japanese imperialism to be sure, to make the necessary concessions which would have avoided war.

This is proved by Ambassador Grew's letters to Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull. While Konoye appealed for a conference in the Pacific, similar to the Atlantic Conference, Roosevelt deliberately stalled and made new demands. First he asked for agreement on general principles prior to the conference, and when this was secured demanded prior agreement on specific detail.

Roosevelt Gives Tojo to Japan

Since Konoye was surrounded by a suspicious and hostile military clique (called by one American correspondent "a government by assassination") such specific agreements could not be given in writing

prior to the conference. But there is every reason to believe that such specific agreements could have been reached. Beard writes: "Grew solicitously advised President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to accept the offers of the Japanese premier to discuss the situation directly, especially since the premier had taken steps in showing evidence of good faith."

Aware that in negotiations with the Japanese ambassador in Washington, President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were insisting upon further explorations of the Japanese proposal and that more than a month had passed in these "exploratory" operations, Mr. Grew warned them against this procedure. He told them that if the United States expected or awaited "clear-cut commitments" which would satisfy the United States "both as to principle and as to concrete detail," the conversations would be drawn out indefinitely and unproductively "until the Konoye cabinet and its supporting elements desiring rapprochement with the United States would come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States is only playing for time." In this case, the ambassador continued, the Konoye government would be discredited. "*The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head on with the United States.*"

If Premier Konoye was sincere in his intentions, why could he not give President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull clear-cut commitments as to details before the conference? To this central question Ambassador Grew gave serious attention and provided for the president and the secretary an answer based on his knowledge of the critical situation in Tokyo. Mr. Grew knew that a liberal government in Japan, or indeed any government inclined to keep peace with the United States, was beset by the militarist and chauvinist press, always engaged in frightening and inflaming the Japanese public by war-mongering. He knew also, what had recently been demonstrated many times, that the head and members of any such government were likely to be assassinated in cold blood by desperate agents of the "patriotic" societies. He (Grew) knew and so did Prince Konoye that Axis secret agents and Japanese enemies of peace with the United States were boring within the Konoye government and watching with Argus eyes every message or communication sent from Tokyo to Washington. In other words, Prince Konoye could not be sure that any note he dispatched to Washington, no matter how guardedly, would escape the vigilance of his enemies on every side in Japan.

All this has a tragic import in view of the documented evidence that Roosevelt was working to "maneuver the Japanese into firing the first shot." It must have set him only more firmly in his course, since unlike the Atlantic war this one promised a quick harvest.

Grew's predictions were correct to the last punctuation mark. The Konoye government collapsed and was replaced by Tojo. The aggressive and military expansionist appetites of the new government were apparent.

Roosevelt knew that war was imminent, and so did his cabinet members and military advisers. Early in November this was clear to all of them. But they found themselves in an embarrassing position, in this the very moment of their triumph. It was dangerous to sit back and quietly await attack. Where would it come, and with what force?

Even more, there was the question of their military responsibility to so advise the military machine and the people. But if extensive preparations were undertaken, if the population in the dangerously situated areas was forewarned, the immediate effect would be a storm of criticism and a deluge of questioning. Worse, the idea of a "sneak" attack would seem idiotic.

"Sneak Attack" Myth

Roosevelt deliberately chose silence, despite the risks it entailed, plus some warnings to the military sufficiently ambiguous to quiet the criticism he anticipated. Above all, these warnings had to be so worded that the military machine would continue in its routine without alarm.

The military warning of November 27 to General Short contained the following peculiar wording:

Negotiations with the Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided *the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act.* . . . Prior to Japanese hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary *but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civilian population or disclose intent.* Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

One must sympathize with the painful predicament of General Short during those trying days. Make preparations, he was told, but don't tell the officers. Get ready for war but don't alarm anybody. Let Japan get the first shot, but be careful.

Little wonder, then, that General Short slept late and soundly that Sunday morning of December 7. Sleep, the psychologists say, is a way out of an impossible situation. Nor are there many human beings who have had an entire government and all its resources working to make the situation impossible for them.

The best explanation for the extent of the disaster at Pearl Harbor can be found in the text of the warning to Admiral Kimmel: ". . . Japan is expected to make aggressive move within next few days. An amphibious expedition *against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo* is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces."

The price of maneuvering the Japanese into firing the first shot was a costly one. But the thesis that it was a "sneak attack" upon an innocent victim is utterly demolished. A more objective description is that two imperialist powers collaborated in spilling some blood.

The reception of Beard's book underlines its importance, but from the negative side. Almost uni-

versally it has been condemned or ignored. Arthur Schlesinger, in a New York *Times* book review, *unable to dispute the correctness of a single fact in the entire book*, is driven to an attack upon Beard's integrity. Schlesinger maliciously informs his readers that Beard nowhere mentions the fact that he (Beard) testified against the Lend-Lease bill! Truly, it is a monstrous crime to testify publicly against a bill, and it is a felony thrice compounded to suppress an irrelevant fact.

Machiavellian Liberal

Elsewhere he reads Beard a lesson in ward politics. He paraphrases Wendell Willkie, paragon of virtue, to the effect that campaign oratory is after all only campaign oratory. Roosevelt's dishonest mouthings about peace cannot be considered hypocritical because, after all, no intelligent man believes a politician. This cheap Machiavellism comes strangely from Schlesinger only because—believe it or not—it is put forward in *defense* of Roosevelt's integrity! The lowest point of the low regions hitherto reached by degenerate "liberalism" is thus attained.

Schlesinger's dilemma is a painful one. By indirection he admits the validity of Beard's case and reacts as violently as if he personally were under fire. In this he is completely correct. The Schlesingers fall like fleas before the same flyswatter.

There is, however, one merit in Schlesinger's article. He asks for an alternative to Roosevelt's policy: "If Roosevelt's policy was wrong, it can only be because there was another policy which would have more successfully protected the interests of American democracy."

For there is a defect in Beard's thinking, a defect indirectly touched upon in Schlesinger's demand for an alternative. Beard thinks like a man of the year 1791. His standpoint is the Constitution and his politics are of the simpler, uncomplicated age of an agrarian democracy. But though it is a defect today, it has also its virtues. For he can write an indictment of Rooseveltian politics such as Jefferson or Franklin might write if they could come back and observe the decay littering their beloved Constitution.

They too would utter the same cry of alarm and indignation "that the American republic stands defenseless before Caesar." And their brief against Roosevelt would include the same bill of particulars. For it is true that they designed a constitution which they hoped would be foolproof against the manipulations of an unscrupulous executive power, that they vested the treaty-making power in the Senate, that they opposed secret military agreements which would involve this country in foreign wars.

But a great change has taken place, a change which has altered the dynamics of American democracy. It is obvious that when the Constitution was written the institutions it created, generally speaking,

had the support of the then governing classes. The new industrial capitalism which arose on the ashes of the old agrarian democracy, replacing it by force of wealth and power, has subjected the Constitution to unanticipated pressures. And before these pressures the institutions of American democracy have bent like saplings in the wind. In Lenin's phrase, previously quoted, "Billionaires have sprung up."

Beard sees that the politics of today bears little resemblance to the politics of 1791. Beard does not recognize, no more than does Schlesinger, that the new politics of capitalism—secretive and conniving—stems directly from the undemocratic character of the governing class, whose will Roosevelt expressed in his war leadership. If Beard could call to arms the dead agrarian democrats of a century ago, he could provide an alternative to Roosevelt's policy. But agrarian democracy is dead beyond recall.

Capitalism, however, has produced another class, the modern working class, which is fundamentally democratic and anti-imperialist. Whoever calls this class into action at the same time provides an alternative to Roosevelt, to Schlesinger and to Beard.

Roosevelt served the needs of capitalism, and in the final analysis acted exactly as Lenin predicted the representative of capitalism must act. He declared the New Deal dead and increasingly became the advocate of the Right, thereby plumbing the lowest depths of deception and duplicity. Is it not inescapable that these acts are inseparably connected with the character of decaying and anti-democratic capitalism?

Beard's book is an object lesson in the need for intelligent skepticism. We no longer live in an age when the American government is tied down by the same cumbrous constitutional procedures. The methods of Roosevelt can be learned by Truman or Tom Dewey. Whoever will be up there in the White House will have the task of selling the First Atomic War to the people, of preparing the clandestine collaboration to fire the first shot, of starting the third war of conquest and imperialism behind the backs of the people.

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Tito Versus Stalin

The Beginning of the End of the Russian Empire

Following is a somewhat condensed version of the speech by Max Shachtman, national chairman of the Workers Party, at Labor Temple in New York on July 9.—Ed.

•

Our epoch is rich in sensational events, richer than any other epoch in history.

At bottom, this fact expresses the conflict between two powerful forces: an unprecedented need and possibility of social peace and order, on the one hand; and on the other, an equally unprecedented social chaos and social uncertainty. Every time these forces collide violently, the world is taken by surprise.

The statesmen, editorial commentators, and bourgeois analysts are bewildered. Proceeding without scientific method, the best they can hope for is an educated guess stimulated by shrewd political intuition; what we get more frequently are wild speculations, tossed off in the hope that one of them may end by making sense.

Lacking scientific understanding and analysis, these commentators are also unable to distinguish between sensational events, between those only of temporary or superficial significance and events which, however brief their duration, have a profound symptomatic significance.

For example: the signing of the Stalin-Hitler pact in 1939 was an event of great importance which threw the entire world into stupefaction. While some observers underrated it, most of them overrated it enormously. Articles, pamphlets and even books were written to claim that the pact proved that Stalinism and fascism were exactly the same thing; that the alliance between the two was politically and socially "natural," inevitable and unbreakable; and even that the war victory was absolutely guaranteed to these allies. When the pact was shot to bits in the war storm that broke out between these very same allies, the articles, pamphlets and books quickly disappeared from circulation. What proved to be of decisive historical importance was not the fact that Stalin had allied himself with Hitler rather than "democratic" capitalism, but the fact that the phenomenon of Stalinist imperialism had blossomed into the full light of day.

An example of a different kind was the outbreak of the struggle in the revolutionary Russia of 1922-24 between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Trotskyist opposition. The break between Trotsky and the Russian party leadership was the sensation of its day. Apart from Trotsky and a few of his comrades, the entire political world failed to understand the deep, lasting historical significance of the break. It

is hard to believe, when we reread some of the writings of the time, that there were serious political persons who disposed of the question by describing it as a mere struggle for power among party leaders—something like a falling out between Roosevelt and Farley, for example. It is, or it certainly should be, clear now that the sensational news of that time signaled nothing less than the beginning of the end of the Russian socialist revolution.

It is this kind of sensational news that we have been reading about since the announcement of the break between Stalinist Russia and Tito's Yugoslavia.

Regardless of the *immediate* outcome of the conflict between these two forces, the break has deep and lasting historical significance. Without awaiting any further developments, it is already possible to say with assurance that its symptomatic importance far exceeds its immediate political importance; it is hard to stress too heavily the importance of this spectacular breach that Stalinism has been compelled to drive into its own front.

It signals nothing less than the beginning of the end of Stalinism, Russian Stalinism first of all.

•

Up to only yesterday, Tito's Yugoslavia was all but universally regarded as an integral and inseparable part of the world behind the Iron Curtain. Next to the Russians themselves, Tito was lauded by the international Stalinist press as its outstanding leader. Yugoslavia was the model of the new "people's democracies."

A shuttle service was organized between Belgrade and other world capitals for ten-day sightseeing tours by pastors, journalists, politicians and all sorts of Stalinoids, crypto-Stalinists and real innocents abroad—to bring back the joyous tidings that Yugoslavia was everything men wished: free, happy, on the road to prosperity and, above all, democratic; and that Tito himself was (for American consumption) a compressed Yugoslav edition of Washington, Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt. On the other hand, the reactionary capitalist press had not a kind word to say for this paragon of Stalinist virtue.

On June 28, seemingly out of a clear sky, all this was shattered by the bombshell of the Cominform denunciation. The leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party was excommunicated with an uncompromising violence unknown in the ranks of the Stalinist hierarchy. Parallels to this document can be found only in the Stalinist attacks upon Trotsky or Bukharin—and then only long after their opposition to

the official bureaucracy had been publicly established. A parallel *inside* the official leadership does not exist.

The statement of the Cominform was, of course, conceived and written in the Kremlin by the highest, most authoritative and most responsible Russian Stalinist leadership. It is entirely typical: that is, it is coarse and brutal, crude and disloyal, vicious and unprincipled—an authentic product of the Stalinist police literature with which we are so nauseatingly familiar. Every single charge leveled against Tito & Co. is essentially fraudulent, but of that special kind of Stalinist fraud which contains a kernel of truth in every point.

Kernels of Truth

A few interesting examples:

The Yugoslavs are accused of being tolerant toward the capitalistic elements on the countryside, the kulaks, the well-to-do individual peasants, etc. It is entirely possible and even likely that Tito followed such a policy. That is the kernel of truth in the accusation.

What is fraudulent is the concealment of the fact that Stalin and his own bureaucracy in Russia followed exactly the same policy in their time, that they followed it for years in the face of attacks by the Trotskyist opposition, and that they followed it under conditions which, if anything, were ten times less justifiable than in Tito's Yugoslavia. In order to consolidate himself over the working class, in order to starve or intimidate or crush it into submission, the Russian Stalinists did not hesitate for years to rely upon (indeed, to ally themselves with) the most reactionary elements in the country, above all with the reactionary agrarian elements. Even on the face of it, Tito has done no more than that.

The Yugoslavs are then accused of having made an adventuristic turn to forced collectivization, to liquidation of the kulaks as a class, to overrapid and overheavy grain taxation of the peasants, to hasty and unprepared nationalization of small enterprises, factories and retail shops. There is undoubtedly a kernel of truth in this accusation too.

What is fraudulent, again, is the concealment of the fact that the Russian bureaucracy in its own development set Tito a model on this score which he has apparently been following without deviation. Modern history records no more disastrous and adventuristic economic policy than that followed by Stalin & Co. in the period of forced collectivization, in the period of the overnight liquidation of the kulaks as a class, the period of the early '30s.

It is an essential part of the history and social nature of the Stalinist bureaucracy that, once it has consolidated its power over the working class with the aid of capitalist and semi-capitalist forces, it turns sooner or later against these forces and proceeds to destroy them politically, economically and

physically. It is an essential part of the social nature of this bureaucracy that it shares power with other classes only when they are strong enough to impose this partnership upon it, but that it drives incessantly and inexorably to deprive other classes of any and all kinds of power. It cannot share power with any other social layer.

That was and is the course of Stalinism in Russia and in the other countries where they have power. It is the course of the Stalinists in Yugoslavia as well.

The Cominform's Camouflage

If the Kremlin now emphasizes these points in its Cominform declaration, it has three purposes in doing so:

(1) to appear to have a bigger case against Tito from the standpoint of Marxist theory;

(2) to appeal with customary demagogy, at one and the same time, to the rank-and-file Stalinist worker who may have wanted a more active policy against the peasant owners *and* to the peasant owner who certainly considers Tito's new course to be "hasty" and "bureaucratic"; and

(3) to minimize the proportions of and thereby obscure the real reasons for the denunciation and the break.

No one in his senses who has the vaguest notion about the Stalinist movement can even entertain the idea that the Kremlin launched this attack upon its Yugoslav brethren because of their theoretical or even practical errors with respect to the peasant question. If Tito persisted in such errors and crimes for another ten years, he would still run far behind the Russian Stalinists in this field.

The same holds true with regard to the Cominform attacks on Tito for his police regime, bureaucratic domination of his party, intolerance of criticism, etc. Monstrous as the totalitarian regime in Yugoslavia incontestably is, and true as all these charges are, Tito's real crime here is that he has only emulated the Russian party and governmental regime to the best of his ability. Here too he would need another ten years to catch up with the Russians' record in infamy, terror and tyranny.

The real reasons for the attack—insofar as this hypocritical document gives real reasons—are contained in the very beginning and at the very end of the Cominform statement:

[The] Yugoslav leaders began identifying the foreign policy of the USSR with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers, and have behaved toward the USSR in the same manner as toward bourgeois states.

They circulated propaganda and gossip

borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, such as "the degeneration of the Communist Party of the USSR," and "the degeneration of the Soviet Union," etc.

They permitted

an undignified policy . . . of ridiculing Soviet military specialists and discrediting the Soviet army. Soviet civilian specialists in Yugoslavia have been subjected to a special system of being watched, and have been followed about by organs of the state police.

The Russians insist on their exclusive monopolistic rights in this sphere, and they will not tolerate having their own police spies watched and followed by other police spies, especially not by the police spies of a country which is supposed to behave like a Russian vassal and no more!

Furthermore, the Yugoslavs

greatly overestimated the national strength and possibilities of Yugoslavia. They imagine they can secure Yugoslav independence as well as develop socialism without the help of the Communist Parties of other countries, without the help of the people's democracies, and [this is the rub] without the support of the Soviet Union.

And they

think that by making a number of concessions toward the imperialist states they can secure their favor and negotiate with them over the independence of Yugoslavia, and gradually orient the Yugoslav nation toward these states—that is, toward capitalism.

It is on the basis of these accusations, even though they are couched in demagogical and obscurantist phraseology, that we can understand what has happened and why.



In the course of the war the Russian bureaucracy abandoned all pretense of adhering to the theory of "socialism in one country," that is, of Stalinism in one country—that is, once again, of the ideology and even the practice of *autarchy*, national self-sufficiency, which had been a necessary preliminary step toward its expansion. Understanding far better than the world bourgeoisie the irreconcilable nature of the conflict, it proceeded (wherever politically and militarily possible) to extend its power abroad in order to preserve its power at home.

Why the Stalinists Mushroomed

It was able to do this for the following five reasons, primarily:

(1) Because of the conflict between the Axis powers and the Anglo-American powers;

(2) Because the countries which it was able to take over had a bourgeoisie which was either very primitive, weak and tiny, or very heavily discredited by collaboration with fascism—therefore comparatively easy game for the Russians and their agents to dominate and destroy;

(3) Because these countries had a working class which was either exhausted in bloody battles or demoralized and atomized by heavy defeats; and so distorted in its political consciousness that it saw in the

Stalinist army a sort of representative of socialism, or at least of a progressive anti-capitalist force;

(4) Because these countries had a peasantry which had suffered so long under semi-feudal conditions that it could be attracted to an agrarian reform that seemed progressive, through the apparent distribution of the large feudal and semi-feudal estates among the peasants;

(5) Because these countries had a native Stalinist bureaucracy, or one could be developed, which could be relied upon to administer the government for the benefit of the Kremlin.

Almost overnight, this gave Stalinism a power in Europe which appeared overwhelming to many, which astounded all, and which brought into the working-class and revolutionary movements a degree of pessimism, demoralization, disorientation and doubt of the possibilities of proletarian action from which they are still suffering.

It is important to note, therefore, that the reasons for the successful imperialist expansion of Stalinism in Europe are now beginning to disappear one by one; or else are beginning to be transformed into reasons for a crisis in Stalinism that can end only in its destruction. These transformations are different in kind and political weight, but all of them have their unmistakable effect.

Stalinism on the Decline

In the first place, the division in the capitalist camp is, to all practical intents, at an end. In any case, there is nothing like the division that existed from 1939 onward and which gave Stalinist Russia such tremendous room for maneuvering. In spite of all the differences that still exist among them, the capitalist world under American imperialist leadership and drive is developing an increasingly solid front against Russian imperialism.

Secondly: The Stalinists have effectively succeeded in wiping out the bourgeoisie as a class, as any kind of serious power, in all the countries they have taken over—at least of wiping them out to the point where all that remains, so to speak, is a "lumpen-bourgeoisie." This removes a social force which complicated the political picture for the working class in those countries. And above all it bares the Stalinist bureaucracy as the only class that exploits and oppresses the masses, the only class that can be held responsible for the situation in the country, the only class against which the struggle of the masses for freedom can be directed. Fewer and fewer people in these countries think of going back to capitalist private property and capitalist class rule; more and more think of going forward from Stalinism.

Thirdly: The illusions that existed among the workers about the progressive or revolutionary character of the Stalinist parties are being dissipated not only outside the occupied countries but also inside

these countries. We have seen this directly in the decline of the Stalinist parties in Italy, Germany, Finland, Holland, Austria and other countries. We have seen this indirectly in the desperation with which the Stalinists drove toward totalitarian control in Czechoslovakia rather than risk the test of even a semi-free election. We have seen this indirectly in the hesitation of the Stalinists to take totalitarian control in Poland and totalitarian action against the working-class opposition which exists inside the collaborationist Socialist Party.

Fourthly: Reports on the situation of the peasantry are not voluminous or very clear, but it is becoming evident that many of the peasants who at first welcomed the fraudulent "agrarian reforms" of the Stalinists in the Iron Curtain countries are now turning in the direction of opposition. They are beginning to realize that the so-called reforms have meant nothing more than the replacement of the feudal lords by a tyrannical state-police regimentation on the land which yields them neither the benefits of private ownership nor the vaster benefits and real freedom of a socialist reorganization of agriculture.

And now, fifthly and finally, the situation has changed with regard to the native Stalinist bureaucracy of the conquered countries. The contradictions of the Stalinist empire, inherent and potential up to now, the conflicts between the national sections of the Stalinist bureaucracy, are beginning to manifest themselves in a most significant and welcome way.

Nature of the CP Bureaucracy

There is nothing idealistic about the Stalinist bureaucracy in any country. The Russian Stalinists do not reward the Polish Stalinists with office and power in Poland because they both believe in the same principles or theories. The Stalinist bureaucracy in Russia is concerned—first, last and always—with the preservation and extension of its own power.

It is a commonplace that an imperialist power can rule over another nation more easily by means of servile nationals of that country than by means of its own national agents. The former system is preferable from every point of view, and every imperialist power from the earliest down to Hitler and Stalin has been aware of it.

Russian imperialism has found in the Stalinist bureaucracies of the conquered countries a more or less reliable and servile agent through which to rule. Up to now it appeared to work smoothly—so smoothly that the very same people who scoffed at Hitler's dreams of a thousand-year Reich began themselves to have the gloomiest nightmares of a thousand-year empire of Stalinism.

But if the Russian Stalinist bureaucracy is not animated by idealistic considerations, neither are the Stalinist bureaucracies in the countries where the

Russians have installed them in power. The latter have their independent aims.

Our Workers Party made this point some time ago, and it is a point of fundamental and decisive importance. To this day it has not even been understood by the so-called "orthodox Trotskyists"—that is, those people who believe that, having labeled themselves "Trotskyists," they have thereby acquired a lifetime dispensation from the burden of using their heads for the purpose of thinking.

More than two years ago, we pointed out that the Stalinist bureaucracy is not a tool of capitalism either in Russia or in the capitalist countries. In the capitalist countries the Stalinists remain agents of the Russian bureaucracy, loyal to that bureaucracy and in no sense a capitalist party—in fact, no more a capitalist party than they are a working-class party. Where they do the dirty work of the capitalist class, it is only because such suits the needs and interests of the Russian Stalinist bureaucracy—the only one with the commanding authority which comes with possession of state power.

In other words, in the capitalist countries *the Stalinist parties are for hire to the capitalist class but not for sale to that class*. And the hiring hall is not in New York or London or Paris or Berlin, but only in Moscow.

Not Merely Agents of Moscow

But, we pointed out in addition, the Stalinist parties of the capitalist countries are not *merely* agents of Moscow, of the Russian bureaucracy. They are agents only up to the point where they are themselves established in their respective countries as powers that can play, or hope to play, an independent role—*independent of the capitalist class, which they proceed to eliminate; independent of the Moscow bureaucracy insofar as they acquire the power to permit such a role.*

This means that the bureaucracy outside of Russia does not have as its aim in life the support of the Russian Stalinist bureaucracy. The former supports Russia only insofar as that support makes possible the realization of its own ambitions at home—power in its own name and in its own country. That is the great if not very elevating dream of every aspiring Stalinist bureaucrat throughout the world: *Some day my friends and I shall enjoy the same power in our own country that my Russian comrades now enjoy in Russia. . . .*

What else could the social-political psychology, the social ambition, of the Stalinist bureaucrats be? Every agent dreams of becoming the principal, even if it is not every agent to whom it is vouchsafed ever to become a principal. If the dreams of the William Z. Fosters and Eugene Dennises are pretty remote as yet, the dreams of the Ana Paukers in Rumania

and the Mathias Rakosis in Hungary are much less remote, at least in their own minds.

Why indeed should they content themselves with remaining forever the mere parrots of Moscow, vassals and tools? Why, even more concretely, should they be content with accepting and carrying out the orders from the Moscow bureaucracy which provide for such an organization of the economies of their own countries as plunders them for the benefit of the Russian ruling class alone? They are not starry-eyed idealists, and they are certainly not Russian idealists!

They are with Russia insofar as it is necessary to present a common front against their class enemies—the working class at home and the capitalist nations abroad. But in the long run they must strive for a greater and ever greater degree of independence from their Russian masters, in fundamentally the same way that the rising bourgeoisie of the colonial countries seek increasing independence from the big capitalist nations that rule them.

The proof of this inexorable tendency is given by the Tito split, and it is this tendency which gives the event its supreme significance.

When Tito is accused of behaving toward Russia “in the same manner as toward the bourgeois states,” the Russian Stalinists are speaking of nothing but this tendency we have analyzed. When Tito is accused of greatly overestimating the national strength of Yugoslavia, of trying to achieve “socialism” (that is, the consolidation of the Yugoslav bureaucracy) “without the support of the Soviet Union,” when the other denunciations we have cited are hurled, the Russian Stalinists are saying the same thing in different ways: *You are exaggerating your own strength and underestimating ours! Don't get any grandiose notions into your head! Be content with the role of your fellow vassals in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. . . .*

Tito's Drives

Why did the break come with Yugoslavia and not with any of the other satellites? Why did Tito dare what the others only dream behind closed doors?

Stalinism in Yugoslavia differs from Stalinism in the other “people's democracies” only in that it is in a more favorable and more advanced position.

Of all the countries conquered by Russia, Yugoslavia is the only one where the Stalinist bureaucracy came to power without the direct aid of the Russian army. While the leading Stalinist cadres in the other countries were brought to power riding on the gun carriages of Russian troops, Tito and his cadre fought their way to power in the course of a great national struggle on Yugoslav soil. They are thus not only less obligated to Moscow but they have a far greater feeling of self-confidence, as well as a mass base which follows them not merely because they appear as rep-

resentatives of Moscow but because of their own achievements. It is obvious from the Cominform charges that Tito has stressed in Yugoslavia that the country was not freed by Russia, not even by “our great comrade, Stalin,” but by Tito.

There is evidently another reason for the stiff attitude of Tito toward Moscow. Yugoslavia is the Stalinist country which is furthest west from Russia and nearest the Western powers. The government has special interest in maintaining less hostile relations with them. Yugoslavia would be a victim of the war a long time before Moscow; it would be one of the first to be overrun by the capitalist armies—if these do any overrunning at all—whereas Moscow would be one of the last of the Stalinist strongholds to suffer.

Like all the European countries, Yugoslavia is extremely weak from the devastation of the war. It is, to be sure, not as poor as others but in any case it urgently requires aid. Where can aid be obtained? From Russia? Russia takes from its satellites and gives little or nothing in return.

Yugoslavia can think of emerging from its misery only by strengthening its economic position. The bureaucracy, typically Stalinist, has gone some distance in this respect, primarily by statifying production, eliminating the bourgeoisie as an economic force and by super-exploitation of forced labor. But this has not brought the country or the bureaucracy very far—certainly not far enough.

A next step is an old Southeast European dream: a Balkan federation which would pool the resources of all the Balkan lands. Such a Stalinist Balkan federation would be dominated by the Tito bureaucracy as the representative of the most important and advanced Balkan state. There is no possibility of doubting that Tito (and not Tito alone) has been working toward this objective for some time.

Moscow Vetoes

It will be remembered that as recently as January of this year Dimitrov, the Bulgarian Stalinist boss, put out a trial balloon in his proposal for a Balkan federation. *Pravda*, the chief Stalinist paper in Russia, issued an exceptionally violent denunciation of the proposal; Dimitrov got the point, and pulled in his horns. What was immediately clear was the ambitions of the newly crowned Stalinists on the one hand, and on the other the impossibility of the Russians ever tolerating any confederation which would link their vassals into a bigger power that might acquire the strength to cease being vassals. Dimitrov was simply in a much less favorable position to pursue his proposal than is Tito.

Another next step, in the minds of the Yugoslav Stalinists, was undoubtedly the idea of tapping the possibilities of Marshall Plan aid for a Stalinist state which appeared to be somewhat less dependent upon Moscow than the others. This is almost explicitly

stated in the Cominform's charges. In other words, Tito played with the idea of maneuvering with American imperialism in much the same way as Stalin's Russia has done on previous occasions—not in order to "sell out" to American imperialism, not in order to "capitulate" to it, but to gain the maximum benefits for the Yugoslav bureaucracy.

Here too Moscow stepped in with an iron-gloved veto. Its imposing political front in Europe would have been broken at one point, and an important one, thus opening up the possibility of its being broken at other points and in any case weakening the international position of Russia. It will be remembered that Stalin interposed a brutal veto several months ago against the Czechs' even sending a delegate to the Marshall Plan conference.

The totalitarian Stalinist regime can no more tolerate the slightest measure of independence in its foreign empire than it can at home. The smallest crevice that is opened can become a gulf with amazing rapidity. The risk is intolerable. The attempt to keep the new Stalinist empire in a vise cannot succeed for long. As in Hitler's case, the vise will give, then crack, then fall to pieces.

And this will be all the more true the tighter Stalin tries to turn the vise. It will be truer the more countries and peoples Stalin tries to hold in the vise. Stalinist imperialism is proving to be no stronger, in any fundamental sense, than the more familiar capitalist imperialism of our time.

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It is important to note that not only have Tito and his gang refused to knuckle under and "confess" before the Cominform blast but that they have indeed openly and aggressively defied it—that is, defied Russia. Toward the smaller satellites of Russia like Albania, they have adopted an even more aggressive and (by the way) equally imperialistic and tyrannical attitude. It is obvious that, while far from secure, Tito is neither terrified nor without hope and perspective.

In the first place, *as against Russian domination*, he appears to have the support of virtually the entire population of the country. Given even a partial opportunity, the people have left no doubt as to what they think of the Kremlin tyranny and brutality, where up to yesterday we were allowed to hear only hosannas.

Tito also undoubtedly counts on being able to exploit the conflict between Washington and Moscow. More important, he also counts unquestionably on a growing sympathy from his brethren in the occupied countries. He is saying, in effect, to the Polish, Rumanian, Bulgarian and other Stalinist bureaucrats: "United among ourselves, we can be a more or less independent force, allied with Russia, to be sure, but not her vassals; pursuing a course which will be a

hundred times more favorable to us than the present one. If you allow Moscow to crush *me* today, you will remain crushed yourselves, or you will be crushed tomorrow." And his listeners do not need to review or even read the documents to know what is at stake; they need only look into their own hearts and minds.

The "Hards" and the "Softs"

In the very nature of the situation, such an appeal must find a favorable echo among these Stalinist bureaucracies, even if their political and military situation at the moment does not make it easy to voice it openly. Whatever the fate of this appeal in the immediate future, whatever the fate of Tito himself indeed, the echo will continue to resound.

And the Yugoslavs undoubtedly count upon the possibility of a rift in the ranks of the Russian bureaucracy itself. That is the only possible meaning of Tito's direct appeal to Stalin.

Not, of course, that Tito is under the impression that Stalin himself was other than directly responsible for the Cominform break. He must surely know that his appeal is not calculated to get Stalin to disown the Cominform action. It was directed toward other goals. If Stalin is silent or directly endorses the statement, it will be easier to discredit him and his authority inside Yugoslavia and to a certain extent in the other occupied countries, and enhance Tito's new role of "protector" of the independence of Yugoslavia and the other non-Russian Stalinist countries.

In addition, the appeal is directed at the "soft" sections of the Russian bureaucracy. An intelligent bureaucrat himself, Tito understands the mechanism of bureaucracy and is aware of the basic trends in the Russian apparatus.

What is involved here holds especially for a totalitarian bureaucracy. This most imposing of mechanisms, which looks so solid, is solid only in "normal" times. At every critical moment, whenever faced with a critical decision, it *must* by its very nature reveal a "hard" wing and a "soft" wing—those who are in favor of reaching the goal immediately by driving through full steam ahead, and those who are in favor

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of reaching the goal a little later, by indirection, by seeking a breathing spell.

It is this inevitable division in the ranks of every tyrannical bureaucracy that opens up, at every critical moment, the possibility of its disintegration and collapse. We have observed this throughout modern history, from the last days of the czar to the last days of Hitler. We will undoubtedly see it in the last days of Stalinism. A division of this kind, once it becomes serious, impels one or the other wing to seek support outside the ruling circles. And that means opening a rift through which up-to-then dormant masses may pour and inundate the bureaucracy as a whole.

Tito's appeal to Moscow is an attempt to open or deepen a rift in Moscow—to pit those who are for holding the front by making concessions to Tito, against those who are for holding the front by crushing Tito instantaneously and ruthlessly.

The Beginning of the End

Immediately, any one of many outcomes is possible. The situation is at its beginning and not at its end. I would exclude one variant out of hand: any possibility that Tito will make peace with Western capitalism by capitulation to the extent of liquidating the bureaucratic-collectivist state established in the image of the Russian regime, by moving toward the restoration of capitalism. That is excluded because it is the conscious road to suicide for the bureaucracy, which has nothing whatsoever to gain by restoring economic and therefore political power to the capitalist class—a foreign capitalist class at that, since there is nothing left of Yugoslav capitalism except the insignificant lumpenbourgeoisie.

What measures and pressures Stalin can apply on Yugoslavia are yet to be seen. Certainly Stalin cannot possibly allow the status quo to continue there except through impotence. Tito's example is infectious, and if he survives after his defiance the whole process of disintegration within the Stalinist empire will only be speeded up. Moscow must try to cut him down.

The biggest crisis in its history is now faced by Stalinism. The mutiny of Tito has become a sort of symbol of rebellion against Russian slavery on the part of millions of people who do not necessarily have any illusions about the character of Tito's own totalitarianism. It is enough to record the upsurge of enthusiasm for the mutiny on the part of the Yugoslav people. It is enough to mention the defiant demonstration of tens of thousands of Czechs which took place in connection with the Sokol parade in Prague—marching men and women who, though having nothing in common with Tito's Stalinism, yet shouted his name as a challenge to the Gottwalds, Slanskys and Zapotockys, the quislings who usurped power in their land. It is enough to add the rout of the Stalinists in the Finnish and Dutch elections which followed on the heels of the Yugoslav events and which were undoubtedly heavily influenced by them.

We do not know, I repeat, what the immediate outcome of this particular conflict will be. But we can already say with utmost confidence: the road to the consolidation of Stalinism is beset with obstacles which are *insurmountable!*

The wider the spread of Stalinism the closer it has come to convulsing crises which bring down upon it not only greater discredit but also the sharp edges of the sword that has always dangled over its bloody head. The yearning of the peoples for freedom, for independence, for self-government—which are, in the last analysis, their yearning for socialist liberty—is incompatible with Stalinist tyranny and will come into ever more deadly conflict with it.

In the darkest days of Stalinist power, as in the darkest days of Hitlerite rule, we insisted that this is not the era for the consolidation of a new slave empire, that it will not be able to immunize itself against upheavals and crises, that it will not be able to withstand the murderous process of the development of its own contradictions.

Now this seemingly monolithic bureaucracy has broken wide open, and the people once again have the opportunity to move. To both sides of the rival tyrants we say:

Go to it, bandits! Deepen the rift between you! The people will surge through the opening which you create because you have to create it. And when they do, your knell will have sounded—the knell of all of you—and the hour of the people will begin to strike its challenging, liberating note!

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Resistance in the Ukraine

Post-War Nationalist Movement and Marxist Policy

Comrade Rudzienski's study of The Ukrainian Problem—Past and Present in last month's issue brought the question up to the period of Stalinist counter-revolution and domination. In this concluding section, the author continues with the eve of World War II.—Ed.

Stalin's reactionary policy in the Soviet Ukraine prepared the ground for the fascist reaction of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie in Poland. The nationalists, led by Colonel Konovalec and supported by the Communist Party, finally surrendered to Hitler, becoming the Nazi vanguard in the Polish Ukraine. "Without Stalin," said Trotsky (that is, without the Comintern's criminal policy in Germany), "there would have been no Hitler; without the Stalinist repressions in the Soviet Ukraine there would not have been any Hitler Ukrainian policy." (*On the Question of the Ukraine.*)

Caught between two fires, between the oppression of the Polish bourgeoisie and the Stalinist terror, the proletarian and peasant masses lost their political balance, their revolutionary momentum, making possible the advance of the fascist reaction, headed by Konovalec and his clique. To unleash a war against Russia and deprive it of a military base and a rich source of grain, Hitler raised the slogan of a "Greater Ukraine," that is, of a fascist Ukraine, a colony of the "Greater German Reich." The Ukrainian bourgeoisie accepted this program and the role of lackey to Nazi Germany, hangman of its own people and betrayer of its nation.

But for Hitler as for Stalin, the Ukrainian question was simply "small change" in the imperialist war market. When Hitler occupied part of Czechoslovakia in 1939, he gave Transcarpatho-Ukraine to the Hungarian barons, without thinking that a "Ukrainian Piedmont" was thereby created for the Konovalec clique. Stalin interpreted Hitler's act against the Ukrainian people as an evident gesture of peace, as a common alliance of tyrants and totalitarian hangmen against the oppressed peoples. The best proof of this statement is provided by the consequent Stalin-Hitler pact.

But the toilers of the Ukraine drew their own conclusion from these acts. They understood that the Nazi program of a "Greater Ukraine" was as much a cynical fraud as Stalin's position. Perhaps for this reason the Ukrainian regiments fought loyally beside the Poles against Hitler, in spite of the Polish

pacifications. There was hardly any great enthusiasm in the Polish Ukraine for the Russian invasion in 1939. In Stalin's totalitarian plebiscite almost fifty per cent of the population in the countryside and twenty-five per cent in the cities abstained from voting, that is, from voting in favor of Russian annexation. Almost ten per cent of the population voted openly against the occupation.

It is hardly strange that Stalin answered with terror and reprisals, not only against the Polish population in these territories but first of all against the Ukrainian population. All the politically active elements in the Ukraine were summarily deported, jailed and assassinated by the GPU. The terror was directed primarily against the leftist intellectuals, workers and peasants, whether they were ex-Communists or Social-Democrats under suspicion for their independence. It was also directed against the bourgeois politicians who had collaborated with Poland, and against the nationalists who in past years had been protected and praised by the CP.

Out of almost two million people deported from the Polish Ukraine, thirty to forty per cent were Ukrainians. In spite of the Soviet restrictions, forty per cent of General Anders' Polish army consisted of Ukrainians who came from Russia in order to struggle against Hitler. Now these Ukrainian soldiers have no desire to return to a Polish Ukraine dominated by Russia. The Polish bureaucracy was replaced by a Russian Stalinist bureaucracy. Lwow, capital of Galicia, was scoured clean of its Polish majority and its Ukrainian minority and was repopulated with Russians.

This policy prepared the action of the Ukrainian fascists when the Nazi invasion of Russia began in 1941. This policy created the conditions that led hundreds of thousands of Soviet Ukraine soldiers to surrender to Hitler.

Later, the Nazi terror in the Ukraine impelled them to struggle once again. This policy created the Ukrainian quisling, General Vlasov, a Soviet militarist, who went over to Hitler and formed a Ukrainian army which fought against Russia. The Stalinist occupation of Galicia and Volhynia in 1939-41 also created Ukrainian collaborationism with Hitler, the Ukrainian police who assassinated Poles and Jews, the collaborationist periodicals, and the puppet authorities in Galicia. It is clear that this collaboration did not have the popular support of the laboring masses or the peasants.

Hitler's Ukrainian policy very quickly

dissipated the illusions of the Ukrainian fascists. In spite of having occupied almost all of the Ukraine territories, Hitler did not even think of creating a puppet "Greater Ukraine." Only Galicia had a puppet "Ukrainian" administration in part, controlled by the Germans, while the whole of the Soviet Ukraine formed the district of the "East" administered by a military governor. The Galician administration never took on the aspect of an autonomous or independent organism. The Ukrainian Nazis were used simply as executioners of the Poles, Jews and Russian prisoners.

Hitler's "Greater Ukraine" turned out to be a fraud like so many others. The disciples of Konovalec, the Nationalists and fascists, the Germanophiles, divided into two groups, one of which continued to collaborate with Hitler and another (headed by Bandera) which took an anti-German position. The policy of Nazi imperialism was the most potent factor in disorienting Ukrainian fascism and demonstrating the impotence and the defeat of the Ukrainian bourgeoisie which had turned toward Berlin.

The Second Stalinist Invasion

To some (perhaps to many) Marxists and liberals it may seem that the Curzon line is, in spite of everything, an act of historic justice toward the Ukrainian people because it unites the Ukrainian territories which have been divided for centuries. Besides, it may seem that this program—even though realized by Stalin—"corresponds" to the old Bolshevik program of self-determination, the union of all the Ukrainian territories with the Soviet Ukraine. But everything depends on who performs the task: whether it is carried out by the socialist revolution or the Stalinist counter-revolution. In the first case it is a progressive work, an act of justice toward the Ukrainian people, because it signifies its free self-determination, its social and national emancipation. In the second case it is totalitarian oppression under Stalin's boot.

From this point of view, the partitioning of the Ukrainian territories between Poland, Russia and Czechoslovakia gave the Ukrainian people a greater possibility of struggling for its emancipation, since Stalin favored the Ukrainian opposition against Poland and Czechoslovakia, and on the other hand, Poland favored the anti-Stalinist irredenta in the Soviet Ukraine. The Ukrainian Nationalists considered it a "Ukrainian Piedmont." The Communists and revolutionaries had a greater possibility of devel-

oping their political struggle against Stalin in Poland than they have now in a Ukraine dominated by the hangman of the peoples.

The Stalinists argue that they have "solved" the Ukrainian national problem by uniting all the Ukrainian territories under Stalin's sway. The partition of Poland and the annexation of Galicia and Volhynia is for them the final stage of the democratic revolution from the national point of view, the completion of the program of the Russian Revolution. They adduce the fact that they have liquidated Polish feudalism, distributed the land and nationalized the industries. In another place (in an article on Poland) we have demonstrated that Stalinist nationalization of industry and Stalinist agrarian reform do not signify the socialization of the means of production nor the emancipation of the peasantry, but the victorious march of the Stalinist counter-revolution.

Now we must examine the "realization of the national program" in the territories behind the Curzon line. The Stalinist invasion in 1939 began with the deportations en masse to Russia. The Stalinist invasion in 1944 began with the deportation of millions of Poles, native to the region, to the west. Since the Poles comprised an urban population of workers, professionals, bureaucrats and a thin layer of landlords exempted from previous deportations, this meant stripping the region of the best productive and social forces, rooted there for centuries.

Almost the whole of the industrial proletariat in these territories was Polish. These masses of the population were sent to Silesia and Pomerania in order to replace the German industrial population. That is to say, this movement of the peoples of the East toward the west is not only reactionary from the national point of view but reactionary as well from the productive and social point of view, reactionary from the point of view of the interests of the proletariat and the socialist revolution. This does not mean to say that the Polish population is less cultured than the German, but undeniably the German industrial worker is more efficient and has more experience and industrial tradition than the Polish.

No bourgeois revolution ever created such an emigration of the peoples as did Stalinist "national" policy. No settlement of the national question until now ever required drastic measures of such a reactionary nature. These measures are the conclusive proof that in Eastern Europe there took place not a Stalinist "democratic" revolution but an imperialist and totalitarian counter-revolution.

The Ukraine suffers under the weight of this counter-revolution in a far more tragic manner than does Poland, because Poland possesses political leadership in the camp of the bourgeoisie as well as in

the camp of the workers and peasants. This political leadership is old, experienced in the struggle, and has the firm support not only of certain sectors of the proletariat but the "conjunctural" support of a sector of imperialism. The Polish question for more than a century was the touchstone which divided the forces of reaction from those of democracy in Europe, and which now divides the imperialist forces from those of revolutionary socialism. The Ukraine is isolated and abandoned to its own fate.

To wind up his crime, Stalin proceeded to deportations en masse of the Ukrainians native to Western and Central Poland since the world began, that is to say, who had lived there century on century, loyal to the Polish state and in harmony with the Polish majority. Now hundreds of thousands of these Polish-Ukrainians had to abandon the homes of their fathers and grandfathers to be deported behind the Curzon line.

What was Stalin's intent in pursuing such a policy? To sow hate among the Poles and Ukrainians because the deportations were carried out by the Warsaw puppet government; to isolate the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, not permitting the Ukrainians who were filled with hatred against Stalin to be infected by the rebellious Poles. Not even a small portion of the Ukrainian population was able to escape from Stalin's clutches. There was to be no "Piedmont," no isle of relative liberty for the Ukrainians that might threaten the security of the Stalinist autocracy. The districts of Sanok, Przemyśl, the Carpathian regions near Cracow were "cleaned out" of Ukrainians to the last soul.

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement

If the Stalinist Thermidor speeded the growth of Ukrainian nationalism and fascism, the second totalitarian and imperialist Stalinist reaction impelled the Ukrainian masses in the direction of revolution. Hitler's defeat and the defeat of Germanophile Ukrainian fascism, the degeneration of the bands led by Konowalec and General Vlasov inexorably pushed the people towards a social struggle. In the last stage of the German occupation, Ukrainian detachments were created which struggled against the Nazis. The Stalinist invasion of Eastern Poland, of the territories with a Ukrainian majority, did not cause great joy among the Ukrainians; the underground did not disperse but instead consolidated its forces. When the deportations of Ukrainian peasants to the east began, the Ukrainian resistance movement took on broader, almost gigantic forms. The armed Ukrainian detachments were so strong that they could face not only the police but the regular Polish and Russian armies. The danger was of such a nature that the Russians asked collaboration of the Polish and Czech armies.

The strangest thing is that the Ukrainian resistance, in spite of struggling against the Poles, *could count on the support and solidarity of the native Poles*, who sheltered their Ukrainian neighbors threatened with deportation, even though they were scheduled to receive the abandoned lands of the Ukrainians. In the southern part of Poland, the Warsaw government had to mobilize several divisions of the Polish army and local militias in order to combat the Ukrainian bands who were protected by the solidarity of the Polish-speaking population. The government engaged in reprisals against the Polish population, deporting it to Eastern Prussia and Western Pomerania. The war of the Warsaw government against the Ukrainian population and the native Polish population which solidarized itself with the former acquired alarming proportions after the death of the Stalinist general, Swierczewski, assassinated by the Ukrainians.

Never did Pilsudski's government or the government of the Colonels send a regular army so armed to the teeth against the Ukrainians as did the Stalinist Warsaw government. The Ukrainian people will never forget this when the hour of settlement and vengeance arrives. Nor will they forget the solidarity and protection given by the Polish working-class and peasant population to the persecuted Ukrainians.

The Russian and Polish Stalinists justify these punitive persecutions on the grounds of the "fascist" character of the Ukrainian bands. As we have already said, it is certain that there was a Germanophile, pro-Hitlerite orientation among the Ukrainian nationalists of the Konowalec group. But it is also certain that a sector of the resistance fought against Hitler before his defeat. Not receiving the illegal Ukrainian press from Poland, we lack concrete data, but the problem is not as simple as the Stalinists would paint it.

In the first place, it is a fact that there is peasant resistance to the deportations, a resistance which merits the support of all socialists and all those who struggle against barbarism and injustice.

In the second place, the Ukrainian movement is supported by important sectors of the Polish population, in spite of the fact that the communiqués of the official press assert that the Ukrainians struggle against the Polish population.

In the third place, we know that the Polish underground entered into contact with the Ukrainian resistance movement, and that they are collaborating in the struggle against the Russian and Polish Stalinist military detachments. This fact explains more to us than all the Stalinist theoretical "theses" on self-determination. The Polish underground is not at all anxious to support Ukrainian fascists who devastate Polish communities.

In the fourth place, the underground cannot all be cut from the same cloth; of necessity it has a varied character and takes in all political positions, from that of the Nationalists to that of the peasants and workers. But its substantial character is that of national resistance to the policy of deportations en masse, to the plundering of the Ukrainian population, an armed resistance to the terror and oppression of Stalinist imperialism.

Road to Ukrainian Freedom

In his authoritative 1939 article, Trotsky had already said, "The Fourth International has the obligation of clearly understanding the enormous importance of the Ukrainian problem, not only for the destinies of Southeastern and Eastern Europe, but also for all of Europe. It is a question of a nation which has demonstrated vital strength, equal in numbers to the population of France, which occupies an exceptionally rich territory, extremely important besides from the strategic point of view. The question of the destiny of the Ukraine is posed in all its force. A clear slogan is necessary. . . . A Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Ukraine, united, free and independent."

The separation of the Ukraine from Stalinist Russia has much greater importance and actuality today than at the time when Trotsky wrote these lines. It is as fundamental to the socialist revolution as is the independence of Poland. For this reason we must define our position toward the Ukrainian revolution, the underground, and the national resistance to Stalin. If deportations en masse and the national oppression of the Ukraine are the characteristics of a "democratic revolution" even though "degenerated," then we must support Stalinism against the "reactionary" resistance movement. If, on the other hand, we have a Stalinist counter-revolution and imperialist oppression in the Ukraine, then we must support all progressive forces and not just the socialists; that is, we must support also the peasants and the democratic petty bourgeoisie against Stalin. This seems to me to be the correct Marxist position.

The only remedy for the Stalinist counter-revolution is, and will continue to be, the socialist revolution; the road to it passes through the complex struggle of the popular masses, the national resistance of the Ukrainians to Stalinism. We not only do not wish to give support to the fascist elements but wish to isolate and fight them in the course of the struggle against Stalinism. Neither do we desire to give support to capitalist imperialism which dreams of using the Ukrainian question as "small change" in the manner of Stalin and Hitler. The Ukrainian bourgeoisie, decimated and defeated, may perhaps offer its services to this imperialism. But the Ukrainian

bourgeoisie is very weak, without political importance, without a tradition of struggle, and lacks the confidence of the masses.

The Ukrainian proletariat is strong, although leaderless and quiescent. The Ukrainian proletariat is our hope, the hope of the socialist revolution and of the unhappy Ukrainian nation. Its program is the socialist program, the program of Leon Trotsky for the Ukraine: *a Workers' and Peasants' Ukraine, united, free, and separated from Russia. The separation of the Ukraine from Russia means the destruction of a fundamental stone in the structure of the Stalinist tyranny.* But this will not be effected in the process of capitalist restoration or of North American intervention. *"The program of the independence of the Ukraine in the epoch of imperialism is directly and indissolubly linked with the program of the proletarian revolution."* (Trotsky)

"This program," said Trotsky, "will not leave one stone on another in the repugnant edifice of Stalinist Bonapartism." This program signifies the destruction of Stalinist Russia and the construction of the Socialist United States of Europe. This program signifies the fraternal alliance of the Ukrainian and Po-

lish proletariat, of the Ukrainian and Polish peoples, in their struggle against the Stalinist tyranny.

To bring about the Socialist United States of Europe it is necessary not only to have destroyed German imperialism, but also to destroy Stalinist imperialism which inherited the historic mission of being the prison of the peoples. The separation of the Ukraine from Russia is the condition *sine qua non* of this program. The alliance of the peoples oppressed by the Stalinist tyranny, in the first place the Poles and Ukrainians, is a powerful weapon in opening the road of the socialist revolution in Europe.

For this reason we applaud the collaboration of the Polish resistance with the Ukrainian resistance movement. We applaud and support the protection given by the Polish population to the Ukrainian resistance and the deported Ukrainian peasants. We are not frightened by Stalinist denunciations about supporting Ukrainian "fascists."

Long live a free, independent, workers' and peasants' Ukraine, separated from Russia! Long live the Socialist United States of Europe! Down with the pestilential corpse of Stalinist reaction!

ANDRZEJ RUDZIENSKI

October 1947 (Translated by Abe Stein)

TROTSKY ON THE UKRAINIAN PROBLEM

From "The Problem of the Ukraine," *Soc. Appeal*, May 9, 1939:

The Fourth International must clearly understand the enormous importance of the Ukrainian question in the fate not only of Southeastern and Eastern Europe but also of Europe as a whole. We are dealing with a people that has proved its viability, that is numerically equal to the population of France and occupies an exceptionally rich territory which, moreover, is of the highest strategical importance. The question of the fate of the Ukraine has been posed in its full scope.

A clear and definite slogan is necessary that corresponds to the new situation. In my opinion there can be at the present time only one such slogan: A united, free and independent workers' and peasants' Soviet Ukraine. . . .

But the independence of a United Ukraine would mean the separation of Soviet Ukraine from the USSR, the "friends" of the Kremlin will exclaim in chorus. What is so terrible about that? we reply. The fervid worship of state boundaries is alien to us.

We do not hold the position of a "united and indivisible" whole. After all, even the constitution of the USSR acknowledges the right of its component federated peoples to self-determination, that is, to separation.

Thus, not even the incumbent Kremlin oligarchy dares to deny this principle. To be sure, it remains only on paper. The slightest attempt to raise the question of an independent Ukraine openly would mean immediate execution on the charge of treason. But it is precisely this despicable equivocation, it is precisely this ruthless hounding of all free national thought that has led the toiling masses of the Ukraine, to an even greater degree than the masses of Great Russia, to look upon the role of the Kremlin as monstrously oppressive.

In the face of such an internal situation it is naturally impossible even to talk of Western Ukraine voluntarily joining the USSR as it is at present constituted. Consequently, the unification of the Ukraine presupposes freeing the so-called Soviet Ukraine from the Stalinist boot. In this matter, too, the Bonapartist clique will reap what it has sown.

LEON TROTSKY

The Nature of the Czech Coup

Critique of the Erber-Garrett-Judd Resolution

The following discussion article refers to the resolution "On the Czechoslovakian Coup—Theses on the Nature of the Stalinist Revolution," by Ernest Erber, Emanuel Garrett and Henry Judd, published last month.—Ed.

The resolution "On the Czech Coup" signed by Comrades Erber, Garrett and Judd is an oddity. It is, indeed, not a resolution at all if by that term we understand a document which endeavors to summarize a clear point of view as a guide for action.

Not only are its formulations unclear, imprecise, self-contradictory and one-sided, but (1) the authors have not even decided for themselves what are the questions they are trying to answer, and (2) insofar as they attempt to give answers to the unformulated questions in their minds, they patently present the picture of people who have lost any firm grip on their accustomed ideological mooring posts and have not yet found any other in the course of their groping.

What is odd is that they have written their gropings down in resolution form.

The kind of resolution that results is not unfamiliar to us from past experience: using rough figures, 50 per cent of the sentences they have written down we can agree with; another 35 per cent are such that one cannot quite disagree with them but would somehow never have written them down in just that way; and perhaps only 15 per cent are dead wrong. It is the second category which gives the resolution its tone, and the third which gives it whatever political tendency it bears.

At the outset (in Point 1) the resolution raises a key question:

"The evidence presented by the Czech events strengthens the view that under favorable international conditions, the Stalinists are capable of overthrowing a capitalist state (as Italy or France) and establishing their party dictatorship by means of an insurrection that bases itself upon the proletarian masses, in the same manner as fascism bases itself upon the petty-bourgeois masses."

We do not exclude the possibility that Stalinism may employ that method in given conditions. But why did the February events in Czechoslovakia especially "strengthen" that view? Because, presumably, an "insurrection" based upon "the proletarian masses" took place only in Czechoslovakia according to "the evi-

dence," and not in Yugoslavia, Poland, Bulgaria, etc.

Yet, in Point 3, the same resolution tells us that, far from there having been an insurrection, there was not even a revolution in February: "In the February events in Czechoslovakia, the state power was not overthrown and replaced by a new one since the essentials of state power were already in the hands of the Stalinists." And in the next point, the very same resolution adds: "The real Stalinist revolution took place during the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the advancing Russian army and the uprising of the resistance in Prague. These events placed the Stalinists in control of the police and the army—the essence of state power."

It is only in this last passage that any mention at all is made of the relation between the Czech coup and Russia. For the rest of the resolution this fact does not exist and plays no role, incredible as that seems. Erber's own excellent review of *The Stalinist Road to Power in Czechoslovakia* (March NI) would seem to have been struck off in some distant time and place. In that respect, Hal Draper's article (*The Triangle of Forces*, April NI), with which I generally concur, bore an intimate relationship to the factual basis of this discussion.

All-Pervading Contradiction

But if the Czech CP came to power—the essence of state power—as long ago as 1945, what earthly sense does Point 1 of the resolution make? What then invested the February events with such mind-shaking significance? As a matter of fact, the whole of Eastern Europe was already written off to the Stalinist empire by all responsible observers, and no one (certainly no one in our movement) considered Czechoslovakia as anything but a semi-Stalinist state completely subservient to the Kremlin prior to February. This was already evident when the feeble Benes regime tried to sneak under the Marshall Plan umbrella. One crack of Stalin's whip brought them tottering into line again.

So, then, there was no revolution in February, and no one can imagine why the Stalinists needed an "insurrection" if they did not even need to make a revolution—possessing as they already did "the essence of state power."

Riding roughshod—or rather groping blindly—in the teeth of this all-pervading contradiction, the resolution insists that the Stalinists could take power as they did because they had the total sup-

port of the masses, in particular the mass of the proletariat:

"The ability of the Stalinists to dominate the state apparatus after the Russian armies were withdrawn was made possible by their considerable mass base, predominantly composed of the industrial proletariat."

But here again the resolution overlooks the more cogent reason it gave earlier for "the ability of the Stalinists to dominate the state apparatus": the Russian army placed the CP in control of the police and the army (not to speak of the propaganda ministry and a host of other key posts), "the essence of state power." Once given this, the Stalinists will bear on their way whether they have the support of the masses or no, with them or against them.

Are the authors claiming that the CP would have been incapable of maintaining state power if the great mass of workers had not been for them or had merely tolerated them? All evidence speaks against this notion. It would have been more interesting to see what might have happened in Czechoslovakia if the native Stalinists had not been kindly supplied with "the essence of state power" by the Russian army and GPU, and were forced to fight their way to power in equal competition with other parties and movements. On such a basis it is at least just as possible that the CP would have suffered a severe defeat.

At least, that is what the experience of Hungary indicates. Despite the physical presence of the Russian army there and their control of key government posts, the Stalinists were trounced in the Hungarian elections. Even in Czechoslovakia the CP had suffered a telling defeat within the Social-Democratic Party, and there too despite their control of "the essence of state power."

One of the reasons why the Czech government parties forced the February coup by their resignations from the cabinet was that (rightly or wrongly) they were confident that the Stalinists would be defeated at the polls. The Stalinists themselves apparently were afraid of that too—else they would never have jumped so quickly to destroy even the miserable remnants of the former democratic state. But this singular fact which precipitated the Stalinist coup is not even mentioned in the resolution.

There is no dispute about the fact that the Stalinists had the support of large masses of people and perhaps the majority of the working class. Given the bankruptcy of capitalism, the pro-Rus-

sian orientation of the Czech bourgeoisie, the anti-capitalist character of the Stalinist movement, there is nothing surprising about this fact.

But the fact that the Stalinists had this support did not necessarily produce the coup! The Italian CP has an even greater proletarian mass support than the Czech CP and at one time wielded an even greater influence in the country at large. Yet it could not and did not even attempt a coup. Why? Because it did not have the police powers in its hands and it did not have the favorable proximity to the Russian state—in addition to the international factors (possibility of U. S. intervention) which militated against such action.

Confusions and Tendencies

The resolution tries in other ways to perform the impossible feat of suggesting (on the one hand) that what took place was something like a proletarian insurrection while (on the other hand) admitting that there was no revolution at all. In Point 6 we read that:

“... the Stalinists brought the pressure of the masses to bear through techniques traditionally associated with the proletarian struggle for power—street demonstrations, workers’ militia, and extralegal seizure of key points by the Action Committees.”¹

The key word here is “techniques”: three of the four techniques cited are characteristic generally, not of any specific proletarian methods, but of any class’s methods of seizing power—demonstrations, armed militia, seizure of key points; and the fourth (strikes) are possible pressure instruments for the Stalinists for the familiar reason that the Stalinists’ mass support is based on the working class. But it is one thing to say that the Stalinists’ mass support does as a matter of fact come from the working class, and quite a different thing to claim that *the Stalinists’ road to power* is based on their use of this mass support—especially when one has already conceded that they had “the essence of state power”!

In the next point, the resolution adds: “The fact that the masses participated in the events in a restrained, orderly and disciplined manner was the result, not

of their disinterest or apathy,² but of the absence of serious opposition.”

In the first place, it is to be doubted whether the authors have any grounds for claiming to know the subjective relations of the social groupings. In any case, the description contained in Erber’s account of the Stalinist road to power does not square with this view of the resolution. The working class evidently was quite passive. So were the organizations in which the workers were corralled by the Stalinist apparatus. The Stalinist gangs were active and mobile. And if anyone has had any experience with Stalinist-controlled organizations, he knows almost instinctively how such events are carried off.

In its effort to ride all horses in all directions, the resolution hastily adds:

“To see a ‘fear of the masses’ on the part of the Stalinists in the Czech events is to conceive of the revolutionary action of the proletariat in terms of spontaneity and to discard our traditional view on the role of the party. Especially is this true where the Stalinists lead the masses in a struggle against the bourgeoisie.”

Now no one (except the Cannonite Socialist Workers Party, and we assume the resolution is not directing itself against them) has argued that the Stalinists failed to unleash the “revolution” because of a “fear of the masses”—whom they obviously controlled by their police powers in any case. What the resolution is denying is that a mass revolution of the workers and other classes does have—in all previous historical experience has had—a spontaneous character.

To see the element of spontaneity in a mass revolutionary uprising that springs from the depths of proletarian class struggle is not to “discard our traditional view of the role of the party.” The authors are misguided in raising this point and are suffering from semantic inertia in trying to tie their “new” gropings to “our traditional view.”

The “traditional view of the role of the party” does not exclude the element of spontaneity in working-class struggles. On the contrary, it was in recognition of this element of spontaneity and its limitations that the conception of the revolutionary party was developed by Lenin. Our “traditional” conception is that, while the spontaneity of the masses is an active element of the mass

revolutionary event, spontaneity *alone* cannot resolve the class struggle into a successful proletarian revolution. The polemic of the resolution makes no sense, unless it is arguing that the “orderly and restrained” rebellion was a mass proletarian revolution precisely because the element of spontaneity was completely lacking.

The authors of the resolution are too glib in dismissing what Trotsky once called Stalin’s “fear of the masses.” In the long-term sense of our historical struggle against Stalinism, the latter’s fear of the masses in its integral meaning will be one of the most important factors in our struggle for socialism. What the resolution does, as we shall see, is in reality to write off the working class as the decisive element in the struggle for socialism, while at the same time it pays a gratuitous compliment to it by saying that “the proletariat remains for us the only class which can overturn the rule of the bourgeoisie.”³

To lend a further air of credibility to its view that the Czech events were primarily the product of internal class-struggle conditions, the resolution says: “A majority of the industrial workers of Czechoslovakia have followed the Communist Party almost continuously since 1920.”

This is intended to indicate that the current size and power of the Czech Stalinist party is *not* closely connected with the fact that it has had “the essence of state power” since 1945. The claim, however, just happens not to be true!

The Czech CP, at its height in 1924, never had more than 140,000 members. From that point on, it declined steadily for almost fifteen years and reached a low point in 1939 with only 70,000 members. In all the years from 1920 on, the Social-Democracy was a vastly larger and more influential movement. Only after the war, as a result of the resistance struggle and the influence of the Russian army and GPU did the CP reach its present proportions.

Why, then, did the resolution find it necessary to make this erroneous observation? I believe that we begin to get closest to the political heart of the author’s thinking in the following passage:

“This experience once more under-

1. Incidentally, this flatly contradicts the later statement in Point 14 of the resolution which puts this idea in the future conditional tense: “. . . had a mass struggle broken out, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Stalinists **would not have utilized** measures associated with revolutionary proletarian warfare to achieve their victory.” This implies that such measures were not actually utilized in February since they were not necessary. I do not think the authors know which of the two they mean.

2. The words “disinterēst” and “apathy” are introduced by the authors as straw men. I (and Comrade Draper in his article) do not put forward the view that the Czech workers were either disinterested, uninterested or apathetic. We state that the facts show that the role of the Czech workers was essentially a **passive** one in the coup. The one is a subjective estimate of their state of mind, the other is an objective description of their behavior, to be explained by their political impasse and lack of an alternative to the CP.

3. Even when the authors seek to pay a compliment to the proletariat, they cannot get it straight. It is NOT true that “The proletariat remains for us the only class which can overturn the rule of the bourgeoisie.” This feat has already been performed in Poland and the other Russian satellites by an alien class, the Russian bureaucracy. What IS true is that the proletariat remains for us the only class that can bring about socialism. The resolution, in fact, carries this correct formulation in the very next sentence after the incorrect one, just as if the two were interchangeable. The observation is worth a footnote only to underline the unutterably confused character of the document.

scores the fact that wherever Stalinism is a mass movement that is waging a struggle against capitalism, the proletariat, as such, is incapable of playing an independent role, except where there is a sizable anti-Stalinist, revolutionary socialist party to give the workers a program." (Point 15)

Because of the qualification at the end, this sentence has an air of familiarity: we have always insisted that "except where there is a . . . revolutionary socialist party" the proletariat cannot carry its class struggle to a victorious revolutionary conclusion. But this is precisely what the resolution does not say! Its view is that, in the circumstances described, *the proletariat as such is incapable of playing an independent role*. The difference is enormous. It is sufficient to ask: "If without a revolutionary socialist party the proletariat can play no independent role, then how will it ever be possible for a revolutionary socialist party to be built?"

This line of thought is reinforced by the preceding point:

"Had the relation of forces been less one-sided and had a mass struggle broken out, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the Stalinists would not have utilized measures associated with revolutionary proletarian warfare to achieve their victory. The complete domination of the mass movement by the Stalinists under conditions of military conflict does not become less but greater as a consequence of military rule on both sides."

The conclusion is inescapable: Given the running start that the Stalinists have in all countries, a revolutionary socialist defeat of Stalinism is impossible in the sequence of events. *The working class is doomed to be sucked in by the anti-capitalist revolution of the Stalinists.*

How then can Stalinism be defeated if (in the absence of a revolutionary socialist party where the Stalinists are waging an anti-capitalist struggle) the proletariat as such is incapable of playing an independent role? The resolution tells us in brief:

"Such a counter-offensive [against the Stalinists] can be successful only if (a) Western Europe experiences a period of economic revival which eases the most pressing problems of the masses and (b) a socialist regroupment takes place which produces strong anti-Stalinist, anti-reformist parties." (Point 19.)

Now the authors of the resolution before us are the very same comrades who, in the discussion on the Marshall Plan in *Labor Action*, have made clear their belief that in the above (b) depends on (a), and that both depend on the success of the Marshall Plan. In his own discussion article on the Marshall Plan which appeared in the June 14 issue of *Labor Action*, these views were put most direct-

ly by Erber. It is a pity then, that they were not incorporated in the resolution on the Czech coup, where one might come to grips with some concrete ideas rather than misty declarations.

The working class cannot play an independent role in the face of the Stalinists' anti-capitalist struggle for their own power; the only hope for a defeat of Stalinism depends upon the camp of bourgeois imperialism, in particular American imperialism, which alone has the power to reverse this trend of doom. . . . If the resolution does not have this meaning, it has no meaning whatsoever.

I should like to summarize briefly what in my opinion the Czech events did show, in order to illustrate how different they appear in fact from the views presented by the Erber-Garrett-Judd resolution.

(1) The Stalinist coup in Czechoslovakia was the product of the deterioration of international relations, expressed principally in the struggle over Europe between the U. S. and Russia. Given Stalinist control of the police powers of the state, the Czech CP could have taken full power whenever it so desired.

Prior to the organization of the Western bloc under the Marshall Plan, the Stalinists required the "democratic façade" it had erected in Czechoslovakia under the Benes presidency. From the moment the Benes government made the mistake of seeking membership in the Marshall Plan club, the Kremlin decided to bring to an end the ambiguous political conditions it had created. Perhaps Stalin sensed the coming defeat in the Italian election. The situation in France was also not then favorable to him.

It was necessary, under these circumstances, to finish with the remnants of the old regime and take complete control of the country. Thus, the decision to take undivided power in Czechoslovakia was adopted by Stalin in the Kremlin and not by Gottwald in his Prague offices.

(2) The Stalinist coup was not the product of an intense and running national struggle between the classes. The country was in a general state of quiet for many months prior to February. What did happen is that the Stalinists deliberately created a state of hostility and tension. It put into motion its controlled organizations, its armed mercenaries and professional organizers, joined with the secret police and the reorganized armed forces.

Manipulating the mass organizations of the workers, it created the illusion of a mounting rebellion, although the working class was not actually in rebellious motion. Whatever the concrete methods employed, we did not see a working-class insurrection (as the resolution intimates) similar in character to the Russian Revolution of 1917. The distinction is important and has nothing to do with the question whether the Stalinists could

or might employ such methods of taking power.

In any case it is abundantly clear from the events of the past several years that the primary factor in a Stalinist seizure of power is the manipulation of the mass movement with the aid of their mercenaries, thoroughly organized by Stalin's trained agents.

Stalinism does not and cannot permit the mass movements to have the freedom of action and motion such as is characteristic of all mass rebellions. This remains true even when the Stalinists try to portray their coups as spontaneous and elemental class movements.

(3) The failure of any resistance to the Stalinist coup can be attributed to a variety of factors, but one of the principal ones was the pro-Russian orientation of the Czech bourgeoisie. It is evident that in this case their pacific course arose out of a feeling of hopelessness and their perspective of eventually returning to power after a military defeat of Russia by the Western bloc.

Benes and his government had considerable support in the country at large. But even though the Russian army was not physically on the country's soil, a vigorous resistance to the Stalinist coup would have invited direct or indirect Russian intervention. If the geographic position of Czechoslovakia were closer to the Atlantic or within the Western orbit, this coup could not have taken place in the way it did.

(4) The resolution, however, views this advance of Stalinism as further evidence of its invincibility. That is why it poses the future struggle against Stalinism along non-socialist lines, since the proletariat is incapable of carrying out this necessary battle to any successful conclusion.

Naturally, we cannot claim that the authors state this in a clear-cut way, since we have already stressed that they state nothing—absolutely nothing—in clear-cut, unambiguous terms.

This is further evidenced in the way the resolution regards Stalinism as an invincible power, developing greater and greater strength without disruptive contradictions. We have already seen a few developments which give color to the view that Stalinism cannot expand into Europe without creating conditions for the growth of its internal contradictions and forcing into existence a new wave of national struggle by peoples under the heel of Stalinist imperialism.

In brief, the Erber-Garrett-Judd resolution projects a postponement of the struggle for socialism in favor of a "new" type of struggle against Stalinism based on the Western bourgeoisie, which alone is viewed as capable of defeating it.

Through the maze of its contradictions and ambiguities, this at least is the direction in which the authors are groping.

ALBERT GATES

Rumania: The 'Russification' of Economy

Meeting on June 11 in extraordinary session, the Rumanian Grand National Assembly "requested the government to proceed with the briefest possible delay to the general nationalization of all industries—mines, banks, insurance companies and transportation companies." The next day it was whispered around that this "historic" session had taken place behind locked doors. It is certainly true that it lasted only two hours—in other words, just long enough to take a vote on the decisions published. They do not waste any time in the young Rumanian "popular republic," all the more so since the stakes were quite substantial.

These nationalizations strike a blow at all the enterprises in which Western capital was invested. For example: the Romano - Americano oil companies (Standard Oil of New Jersey), Socony-Vacuum (Standard Oil of New York), the telephone corporation, which is an affiliate of International Telephone and Telegraph, New York. England will lose the branch of Royal Dutch Shell, Astra Romana, and the branch of the Anglo-Iranian company Steana Romana. Columbia, which worked with French capital, and the Rumanian-Belgian Oil Company, which used Belgian capital, are already down on the list of enterprises which are scheduled to be nationalized.

Rumania's Black Gold

Situated as it is at the geographic crossroads on the still fluid frontier which separates Eastern Europe from Western Europe, Rumania and its people have perforce lived through an exceedingly racking national history. Its short period of existence as an independent state was preceded by long centuries marked by barbarian invasions and Turkish rule.

The discovery of its oil resources brought about a mad race for the black gold. Like clouds of locusts, a swarm of adventurers, disguised as businessmen, rushed to grab the lands.

The Germans have always boasted that it was they who inaugurated the race for Rumanian oil. But at the beginning of the twentieth century there took place a fierce struggle between rival foreign capitalist companies to seize this richest of Rumanian resources. English, Dutch, French, Americans, Belgians, Germans, Italians and Swiss—all participated equally in this silent war.

The First World War, which resulted in the independence of all the territories inhabited by Rumanians, was only one of the phases of this struggle for the oil. Defeated in the first round, France's Rumanian ally was forced to sign an ar-

mistice with the kaiser's Germany. Then the fortunes of war changed, and Rumania found itself among the victor nations. It was then that its oil became an integral part of the heritage of Allied capital.

Also entering the picture was the revolt of Rumanian national capital, represented by the liberal party of Bratianu. These elements, launching the slogan "By ourselves!," in reality were merely asking for a larger share of the profits to be gained from exploiting this wealth. The constitution and mine law of June, 1924, which made the subsoil resources the property of the national state, signaled their laudable effort to transfer a share of the oil industry into the hands of native capitalism.

This raid on the entrenched power of foreign big capital was camouflaged under an aura of patriotism thrown up by the liberal theoreticians of the Bratianu regime. If this so-called "nationalization of capital"—foreign capital—garnered nothing for the nation as such, it did ensure imposing profits for the liberal group around the old kingdom; meanwhile the debts contracted by the state mounted daily. But the Western creditors never again saw the color of their money.

Pursuing its policy of economically enslaving the countries of Eastern Europe, Hitler Germany paid special attention to Rumania's oil and grain. Oil production was boosted by every available means. The war and the regime of Antonesco, the real Rumanian quisling, assured the Germans a complete economic monopoly. And it is well known that Rumanian oil played a far from negligible role in supporting the Nazis' war machine. Between 1940 and 1944 the Prahova valley annually furnished the Wehrmacht with an average of five and a half million barrels of this precious strategic material.

Russians Move In

After the Russian army chased out the Nazis, the Antonesco regime was replaced by a series of governments which were obliged to bend to the needs of the conqueror. The Russians took possession of the Germans' property as spoils of war. That is, they inherited what the latter had stolen—entirely at the expense of the victims.

The Russians were not at all modest in their demands. The Rumanian oil industry was subjected to fierce exploitation to make up for Russia's deficiencies. Rumanian oil was utilized to the limit to ensure agricultural and industrial development and mechanization.

In statistics published several months ago on the distribution of foreign capital in the Rumanian oil industry, we read:

Rumanian	27.35%
British	22.08
Russian	12.53
American	12.30
French	10.65
Others	15.09

In reality, however, these figures are meaningless, since the truth is quite different. Oil production has been put almost wholly at the disposal of Russia alone. Foreign capital has suffered heavy losses, since all the drilling equipment which legally belonged to it was declared to be spoils of war, and the Russians transported it out of the country without due process or any other procedure.

Rumanian oil is paying for Russia's war expenditures, while Rumanian industry is forced to use gas. Oil used to be at the top of the list of fuels most widely used in the country (40 per cent as against 25 per cent for gas and 25 for coal) but now it has gone down to the bottom of the list. Now—together with wood—it is the material which figures most largely in Russian export.

Indeed, in order to free bigger quantities of oil for export, vast plans have been elaborated for electrification. Drilling has been stepped up. It now stands at 200,000 meters more than the minimum necessary to keep production at a constant level (319,000 meters in 1948 as against 163,000 in 1947 and 288,000 in 1938).

With the aid and on the proposal of the Russians, drilling is now being pushed to depths previously unknown in Rumania. Exploitation of new areas in Moldavia, Transylvania and Banat is under way. The export of petroleum products to Russia is being raised to its maximum.

Outside of the regular exports registered as such in the statistical figures, there is still another sector which is much more important and which is not controllable. In 1947—a year marked by a serious fall in production—1,976,000 barrels left the country by the sea route. The official statistics show that in 1946, out of the 2,255,000 barrels of petroleum products exports, only 95,000 went to countries outside of the Russian sphere. This is the result of the Russo-Rumanian agreement of May 8, 1945—extended and broadened in 1947—which ensured the Russian monopoly over Rumania's economy, its wealth and its principal industries.

The nationalization recently decreed

legalizes the existing state of affairs. Except for the mixed Russian-Rumanian companies, all the other oil companies have long been subjected to strict production controls—restrictions on exports and restrictions on the import of materials necessary for maintaining the level of production. The process of squeezing out the old owners began with the imposition of heavy obligations by administrative decrees, changes in technical personnel required by governmental order, and finally by the confiscation of the two main companies belonging to Royal Dutch Shell.

Who will profit from the recent nationalizations? The answer is very easy. Finance Minister Vasile Luca, on returning from Moscow after signing a new treaty with Russia, frankly declared: on the basis of the 1945 agreement which provided for the formation of Russian-Rumanian companies, new industries are going to be built up.

The new agreement provides for the collaboration of Russian technicians and the formation of mixed commissions with discretionary powers in their respective branches of industry. This monopoly, combined with its monopoly over the import and export of all material needed for production, ensures Russia complete domination over Rumania's oil and over its entire economy.

The specialists of the new Rumanian Stalinist juridical school have found the necessary formula to legalize the Russian seizure of all of Rumania's wealth. The draft of the law presented to the National Assembly provides that state-owned capital of a country belonging to the UN will not be nationalized. But the only foreign state which has its own capital (not private capital) invested in Rumania is Russia.

Russia now enjoys a monopoly over oil and over sea and air transportation; a considerable share of control over the automobile road network; quasi-monopolistic control over the exploitation of lumber and iron resources, mines and metal working; a large share of control over the banks, insurance and textiles.

A few figures will be enough to give an idea: the Keshitza works, which are today 30 per cent Russian-controlled, represent almost half of the Rumanian metal-working industry; and 65 per cent of the coal plants of the Jin valley, main section of this industry, are in the hands of the Russian state, which has now become the sole heir of the former Hungarian capitalists. And these are only two examples.

War on foreign capital? Yes, this has indeed been waged. But not for the benefit of the Rumanian people: it has been waged for the interests of the Russian state. That is the truth about the "nationalization" of economy in Rumania.

VALENTIN TOMA

At the Munich Conference

The documents from the German Foreign Office recently published by the Russian government,¹ dealing with the Munich Conference of 1938, permit a brief vignette of what went on as the four statesmen talked over the corpse of the Czech republic. Hitler and Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier — what did they have to say, face to face behind closed doors?

The minutes of the actual discussions, taken down for the German foreign ministry, recreate the same unmistakable impression that all men have today: the "democratic" leaders cringing and scraping before the dictators like a couple of butlers who would like very much to make a point but are afraid of arousing the temper of their choleric master.

Hitler opened the conference without mincing words. "The problem" had to be "settled within a few days." At the "request" of Mussolini, "he, the Führer, had expressed his willingness to postpone mobilization in Germany for twenty-four hours." His remarks continue (reported in the third person like all the rest):

"He had declared in his speech in the Sportpalast that on the first of October he would march in whatever happened. To this it was replied that such procedure would bear the character of an act of violence. The task, consequently, was to deprive the act of this character."

He was being gracious enough, therefore, to let the democratic butlers deprive the act of its violent character by . . . blessing it themselves. The role of Chamberlain and Daladier was to guarantee acceptance of this now "peaceful" act by the Czechs.

This raised the only point at which the butlers coughed discreetly. "As to the guarantee which was being asked of Britain, he [Chamberlain] would be glad if a representative of the Czech government were present," to give assurances. Hitler's reply was brutal:

"The Führer replied to this that he was not interested in assurances from the Czech government, for it was precisely this government that was doing the destruction."

Daladier hastened to assure him that "the French government would under no circumstances tolerate dilatory conduct on the part of the Czech government," but still "he was of the opinion that the presence of a Czech representative who could be consulted if necessary would be useful." Hitler thereupon spat out another expression of disinterest in Czech assurances of capitulation.

Chamberlain then lowered his sights:

he would "welcome it if a representative of the Prague government were present in the next room from whom he could receive assurances." No use. Hitler merely ranted about the Czechs destroying 247 bridges, Mussolini pointed out their "moral duty," and Daladier torpedoed Chamberlain's ludicrous last stand by declaring that he "had already taken upon himself the responsibility in London, when, without asking the Czech government, he had given his consent in principle to the cession of the German areas [of Czechoslovakia]. He had taken this stand even though France had a treaty of alliance with Czechoslovakia." *Finis.*

The rest of the conference was spent in drawing lines on maps, except for a "lengthy discussion of the different meanings of the word 'guarantee' in England and on the continent."

Thus the old world ended, without even a Czech in the next room. A couple of Czech delegates flew in later that evening, while the parleys were still going on. Hubert Masaryk's report to Prague, published in 1939, is included in the documents before us, even though it has been public for nine years. He describes how he and Mastny were informed of the decision:

"At 1:30 a.m. we were taken into the hall where the conference had been held. [Only the British and French were there.] . . . The atmosphere was oppressive; sentence was about to be passed. The French, obviously embarrassed, appeared to be aware of the consequences for French prestige. Mr. Chamberlain, in a short introduction, referred to the agreement which had just been concluded and gave the text to Dr. Mastny to read out. . . .

"While M. Mastny was speaking with Mr. Chamberlain about matters of perhaps secondary importance (Mr. Chamberlain yawned without ceasing and with no show of embarrassment), I asked M. Daladier and Léger whether they expected a declaration or answer to the agreement from our government. M. Daladier, obviously embarrassed, did not reply. M. Léger replied that the four statesmen had not much time. . . . The atmosphere was becoming oppressive for everyone present. . . .

"Mr. Chamberlain did not conceal his fatigue. After the text had been read, we were given a second slightly corrected map. We said good-by and left."

Good-by to Munich? Not quite. After an interlude called a "war for democracy," there was . . . Yalta. But that is another story about a couple of other "democratic" statesmen.

1. See last month's NI, page 154.

PHILIP COBEN

The Year One of the Russian Revolution

IV—Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly

The elections to the Constituent Assembly so long delayed by the Provisional Government, under pressure from the bourgeoisie, took place in the middle of November.

Every class and every party took part, but with widely differing sentiments. The big bourgeoisie found little hope in the future of the Assembly. Numerous witnesses show us the bourgeoisie in profound disorder at that time; as a class it was without leaders, without a program, and without purpose. The volunteer army of General Alexeyev received ridiculously small subsidies from commercial and industrial capitalists; the military leaders were not supported, as the selfishness of individual capitalists got the better of their class spirit.

The armed resistance to the revolution was the work of the reactionary generals and the military caste, which had grown large during the war. Among the career officers, the bourgeoisie and the nobility predominated; among the more numerous reserve officers, the intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie. The former were the active and virile elements of the counter-revolution. They were contemptuous of the Constituent Assembly. They wanted to form a new governmental center and an army of trustworthy regiments, to re-establish law and order the same way that they fought wars—without sparing ammunition.

The Constituent Assembly was awaited with almost mystical faith by the S-R Party. Having renounced its revolutionary traditions, this party had lived in a democratic haze for months. Powerful in the support of the peasant millions, the intellectuals, and even of some radical elements of the bourgeoisie, encouraged by the Socialist International and the Allied governments, the S-R Party, sure of a majority in the coming Constituent Assembly—which would doubtless be followed by a legislative assembly!—believed itself the great parliamentary and governing party of tomorrow. Could it be otherwise?

The certainty of an S-R electoral victory embarrassed the Bolsheviks. Lenin wanted to modify the electoral laws to give the vote to all citizens over eighteen years of age, to legalize the recall of candidates and delegates, and to refuse the vote to the Cadets and other counter-revolutionary parties. But the Bolsheviks themselves had demanded the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which would have been a step in advance under the Provincial Government. Besides, the Assembly was anxiously awaited by the provinces.

"Will there be any progress if the As-

sembly is composed of Cadets, S-Rs, and Mensheviks?" Lenin asked. "We shall be stronger on the day such an Assembly meets than we are today," he was answered. Lenin gave way to the majority, but not without vowing: "This mistake shall not cost us the revolution."¹

Lenin's Views

He expanded his views on the Constituent Assembly in an article published in *Pravda* the end of December. To summarize:

The Constituent Assembly provided the widest democracy possible under a bourgeois republic, and therefore once had a legitimate place in the Bolshevik program. However, the Soviets provided a superior form of democracy which led more rapidly to socialism. The vote for the Constituent Assembly was deceptive, because it was based on electoral lists drawn up before the great changes wrought by the revolution. The most popular peasant party, the S-Rs, presented only one list of candidates, although it was really split into several parties.² The majority of the people had not yet had time to take account of the revolution. The recent elections to the Army Committee, the committees in the provinces, etc., showed that a political regroupment was under way. By embarking on civil war in Finland and in the South, the counter-revolutionists "have made it impossible to settle vital questions by formal democratic methods."

Such questions could be solved, Lenin said, only by the complete victory of the workers and peasants, "by the pitiless repression of the slavedrivers' rebellion." To consider the Constituent Assembly as above the class struggle and the civil war was to adopt a bourgeois point of view. "If the Constituent Assembly opposes Soviet power it is condemned to inevitable political death." "The interests of the revolution take precedence over the formal rights of the Constituent Assembly."

What must be done to resolve the crisis? Lenin asked: The people should use their right to re-elect members of the Assembly; these new members should be for the Soviets and against the counter-revolution. "Otherwise the crisis can be solved only by reactionary measures."

1. See Trotsky, *Lenin*, Chapter IV.—V. S.

2. This grave and characteristic error of the Left S-Rs is worthy of notice. Separated from the Right S-Rs by an unbridgeable gulf but bound by a common tradition and old illusions on majority rule, the Left S-Rs presented a single ticket in the name of the old party. Their popularity thus benefited the counter-revolutionary S-Rs.—V. S.

The late November elections gave the following results: by December 30, 520 deputies had been returned: 161 Bolsheviks, 267 S-Rs, 41 Ukrainian S-Rs and Mensheviks, 15 Cadets, 3 Mensheviks, 33 deputies (mostly S-R) from national minorities and small parties.³ The votes of 36,262,560 electors were divided as follows:

Bourgeois parties (Cadets, etc.)	4,600,000	about 13%
S-Rs	20,900,000	about 58%
Mensheviks	1,700,000	about 4%
Bolsheviks	9,023,000	about 25%

The Mensheviks and the S-Rs combined amounted to 22,600,000 votes, about 62 per cent of the total. These figures from the S-R, N. V. Svyatitsky, were commented on by Lenin in 1919 in a remarkable study entitled "The Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat."

Analyzing the Vote

The figures had their meaning, he said, if one knew how to read them. The country voted for the S-Rs, the cities for the Bolsheviks. The immense majority of the proletariat voted for the latter. The relatively imposing vote for the Mensheviks was misleading, as they obtained 800,000 votes from the non-proletarian Caucasus. For the two capitals, Moscow and Petrograd, the figures were:

Cadets	515,000
S-Rs	218,000
Bolsheviks	837,000
Total	1,765,000

In the army and the navy the division was no less significant:

S-Rs	1,885,000
Cadets	51,000
National minorities	756,000
Bolsheviks	1,791,000

"Half the army was for the Bolsheviks," Lenin concluded. "Otherwise we could not have conquered." Besides, the fronts which were nearest the capitals and therefore best informed and most important gave the Bolsheviks an overwhelming majority of 1,000,000 to 420,000 for the S-Rs (western and northern fronts).

Although they had only one fourth of the votes, the Bolsheviks were certain of victory because they controlled the critical points.

"Have a crushing majority at the critical point at the decisive moment—"

3. There were actually more than 600 elected but more than 150 did not have time to reach Petrograd.—V. S.

this law for military success is also a law for political success, especially during the bitter class struggle of the revolution."

"In every capitalist country, the forces of the proletariat are much greater than its normal strength in relation to the total population. The proletariat dominates the centers and the nerve system of capitalist economy."

As for the peasant masses, Lenin said, the proletariat can only win their support after the seizure of power:

"Political power in the hands of the proletariat can and should become the means of bringing the non-proletarian toiling masses to its side, the means of wresting these masses away from the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois parties."

Lenin did not draw these conclusions until a year after the Constituent Assembly. On the eve of its convocation, the Bolsheviks felt sure of themselves, but took every precaution against any possible resistance on the part of the S-R "democracy."

Our mistake is plain, said Lenin. We have seized power, and now we are put in the position of being forced to seize it again.

He mistrusted some of the peasant regiments in Petrograd.

The Defense of the Constituent Assembly

Nothing could have shown up the weakness of the petty bourgeoisie more completely than did the Constituent Assembly.

We owe to a member of the S-R Party a detailed account of the preparations for the defense and the extension of the Constituent Assembly.

Boris Sokolov said the Constituent Assembly was the ideal of the democratic S-R Party; but it was not the ideal of the people, who understood and preferred the Soviets. "The Soviets belong to us." The peasants voted willingly for "their" S-R Party because they wanted the land; but they did not understand the Constituent Assembly which they regarded as a means rather than an end.

The S-R majority of the Assembly was sure to come into conflict with the "Bolshevik usurpers." There had to be some plan of armed defense. A Committee for the Defense of the Constituent Assembly was set up in broad daylight in the most frequented part of the city. According to Sokolov, it was nothing more than a committee of intellectuals without contact with the workers or the garrison.

The military organization of the S-R Party was a much more considerable power. It had a controlling influence on two of the garrison regiments, the Semenovskiy and the Preobrazhenskiy, where it had more than six hundred party members. It could count on the armored-car division. It published an anti-Bolshevik newspaper (*Seraya Shinel*). Several dozen S-R soldiers, recalled from the

front, were organized under cover of a People's Soldiers' University. And there was also the Combat Organization (terrorists) of the party, led by a certain Onipko and comprising some thirty courageous men.

These were real forces. Had they been properly managed they would have given the Bolsheviks a run for their money. But inaction finally demoralized and dispersed them.

Parliamentary Psychosis

Dominated by a sort of parliamentary psychosis hard to parallel in history, the S-R leaders seemed to lose all contact with reality. Sokolov's story is more comic than tragic. The S-R fraction of the Constituent Assembly set up an office not far from the Tauride Palace and devoted itself to great works of preparation under the guiding inspiration of the party oracles, Chernov and Avksentiev. Commissions, sub-commissions, and bureaus deliberated far into the night, elaborating volumes of law, studying the future democratic constitution. The S-Rs were preparing to legislate and govern with a fine show of parliamentary ceremonial.

Absorbed in this parliamentary game, the S-Rs would hear nothing of resistance to possible violence on the part of the Bolsheviks. Their offices were open to all. They did not suspect the tapping of their telephones. Bound up in their labors, they did not set foot in the barracks or the factories—where their Bolshevik colleagues were daily gaining strength.

The Federation of Officials and Employees offered to support the S-R Constituents with a general strike. They declined the offer. They were urged to defend themselves: "Defend ourselves? Aren't we the representatives of the sovereign people?" they answered. "They believed that some mysterious power protected the Constituent Assembly; that the Russian people would not allow the ideal of the revolution to be profaned . . ." said Sokolov. They never stopped mouthing words, which they mistook for ideas.

The leaders of the S-R Party, especially Chernov, shared this parliamentary psychosis, which was doubtless reinforced by a clear enough realization of their impotence. "The Bolsheviks dare not," was their consolation.

Gotz seems to have been a little more clear-headed. He took an active part in preparing the "peaceful" demonstration for January 5, which was intended to capture the support of the populace for the Assembly on the day of its opening. Peaceful? The S-R Central Committee decided this only at the last moment. Everything had been prepared to transform the demonstration into an insurrection. Thirteen armored cars were to advance on Smolny; the S-R regiments were to support this move. But at the

last moment the Constituent fraction condemned the idea.

The S-R terrorist group under the command of Onipko successfully prepared the kidnapping—or the assassination—of Lenin and Trotsky. The terrorists had successfully gained entrance to Smolny; one terrorist had become Lenin's chauffeur, the other the janitor of a house frequently visited by Lenin. A like net had spread around Trotsky.

Once more, at the last moment, the S-R Central Committee refused to authorize these attempts. Motive: the two leaders of the revolution were too popular; their disappearance would provoke terrible reprisals; besides, the time for terrorism was past: a curious mixture of feebleness and good political sense. Two of the terrorists nevertheless tried to kill Lenin, whose automobile was attacked in the middle of the city on January 2.

In the factories under their influence, the S-Rs who came to stir up the fight against the Bolsheviks were roughly received. They were asked if they "couldn't come to some agreement with the Bolsheviks, who are devoted to the cause of the people." Under constant pressure from Bolshevik agitators, the committees of the Semenovskiy and Preobrazhenskiy regiments finally gave way.

S-R Insurrection Misfires

The demonstration on January 5 was large—and pitiful.⁴ The petty-bourgeois citizenry turned out en masse. They jammed the main streets of the city. A few scattered rifle shots from the sailors dispersed the powerless mob, abandoned and disarmed by its own irresolute leaders. "It was ridiculous and absurd," said Sokolov. He thought that the Bolsheviks would not be able to withstand an energetic and well-armed demonstration. He was wrong, very wrong. But the nervous reaction that follows a great effort often makes it difficult to rally the masses for a time. The lassitude of the Petrograd proletariat might have left the situation in the balance for a day or two.

Meeting in the atmosphere of a defeated insurrection, the Constituent Assembly felt itself condemned from the start. Nothing remained of the grandiose illusions but a mixture of fear, civic resignation, and pose. The Constituent Assembly had but to die beautifully; to act for history; to make memorable speeches. And indeed that was the main occupation of this first parliament of the Rus-

4. Boris Sokolov confesses that the majority of the demonstrators belonged to bourgeois and middle-class sections of the population and were more inspired by their hatred for Bolshevism than by any desire for the Constituent Assembly. These reactionary elements had already come together by instinct behind the S-Rs and the Constituent Assembly before the first important battles of the civil war had occurred. This is worth remembering.—V. S.

sian petty bourgeoisie, the most pitiful of all parliaments. "A number of deputies asked our leaders: 'If the Bolsheviks employ violence, arrest us, or even kill us, what shall we do?' And the clear answer perfectly reflected the spirit of our fraction: 'Remember that we are the people's representatives . . . and must be ready to sacrifice our lives.'" The S-R deputies decided not to separate, so as to be ready to face any tragedy together—and they ordered sandwiches and candles, in case the Bolsheviks turned off the current and cut off supplies.

In short, on the day of the decisive historical battle of the Constituent Assembly, the S-R Party collapsed. The bloody defeat of the enemies of the workers' insurrection in Moscow, of the armed uprising of the Junkers, and of the resistance of the Stavka [General Staff] had their effect. The politicians of the democratic counter-revolution trembled before the masses.

Constituent Assembly Meets

The Bolshevik president of the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee, J. M. Sverdlov, opened the Constituent Assembly. A tall and broad-shouldered man with abundant hair, fine and clear features, a steely glance and a sharply pointed beard, he was one of the best organizers of the Bolshevik Party. He found no difficulty in mastering the confused tumult of the opening minutes. The vast hall of the Tauride Palace which had been renovated for the occasion had an almost gala appearance. With red ribbons in their buttonholes, the well-dressed deputies of the S-R majority filled the benches of the right and the center. The less numerous left had the outspoken support of the people, the soldiers, sailors, and workers, who cheered them from the galleries.

Sverdlov urged the Assembly to endorse the Rights of the Exploited and Toiling Masses, a categorical document drawn up by Lenin and promulgated by the *Vitsik* [All-Russian Soviet Executive]. It proclaimed Russia a Federation of Soviet Republics, "a free union of free nations." It endorsed the socialist revolution; the nationalization of land; the Soviet laws on workers' control of production; the formation of the Supreme Economic Council "to ensure the power of the workers over their exploiters, and a first step toward the complete expropriation of the means of production and transportation"; the nationalization of the banks; the universal obligation to work; the formation of the Red Socialist Army; the complete disarmament of the owning classes; the principle of a democratic peace without indemnity or annexations; the annulment of the debts to the landowners, the bourgeoisie and the czar, "as the first blow at international finance capital." It condemned the colonial policy of the bourgeoisie; barred all exploiters of labor from holding gov-

ernment positions; and declared the functions of the Constituent Assembly to be "the general elaboration of the fundamental principles for the transformation to the socialist society."

The Talking-Shop

The majority rejected this document. When Sverdlov finished his speech they found that they were "wasting time," and without further discussion went on to the election of a president. The left wing composed of the Bolsheviks and the Left S-Rs nominated the S-R leader, Maria Spiridonova, a former terrorist whose excellent record and devotion to the cause of socialism were known to everyone. The majority nominated V. M. Chernov, the official and most discredited leader of the S-Rs, respected neither in his own nor in any other party; in fact, a man whom no one really wanted. Believing that a Jew could not play a leading role in their "People's Republic," the S-R majority failed to nominate Abraham Gotz for the presidency, although he was the real and respected leader of the party. Chernov was elected by 244 votes to 153 for Spiridonova.

He immediately mounted the platform to deliver a long and dull inaugural address, much like any other ministerial speech. It was a masterpiece of conciliation and equivocation.

The speaker invoked the Zimmerwald Peace Conference, and then upheld the idea of a general peace as opposed to a separate peace, thus cloaking his fidelity to the Allies under a cloud of socialist phrases. He mentioned a "socialist army" to be organized. He outlined a complicated constitution providing for collaboration of the Constituent Assembly with the soviets and the various national constituent assemblies. He proclaimed the liberation of the Ukraine and of the Mohammedans in Russia, proclaimed Russia a Federation of People's Republics, and returned several times to the nation's "will for socialism." "The revolution has just begun," he said. "The people want action, not words . . . socialism is not equality in poverty . . . we want planned socialist construction . . . we shall pass from control of industry to a workers' republic." Finally he gave his approval to the nationalization of the land without indemnity. When he made the mistake of invoking the heroes who had died for the nation during the war, he was interrupted by shouts from the benches of the left:

"Killed by Rudenev, Chernov, and Kerensky!"

This loud and empty election eloquence, remarkable mainly for its vagueness, no longer fooled anyone. Bukharin refuted his palaver in a concise speech, as brutal and frank as Chernov's had been unctuous and pleasant. "We can talk of the will for socialism," he said, "and still be the murderers of socialism." Was Chernov talking of socialism in two hundred

years? Where did Chernov stand? With Kaledin and the bourgeoisie, or with the workers, soldiers, and peasants? Who was to have power now? "Are you working for a miserable little bourgeois parliamentary republic? We have declared war to the death on such a government in the name of the Great Soviet Republic of labor." Bukharin concluded, "May the ruling classes and their lackeys tremble before the communist revolution. The workers have nothing to lose but their chains."

Collapse and Dissolution

Tseretelli, the only Menshevik present, advanced the theses of his party with dignity and resolution: "He is not a socialist who encourages the proletariat to strike for its ultimate goal before it has passed through the democratic stage which enables it to become strong." You have taken over production. Have you succeeded in organizing it? he asked the Bolsheviks. The land which is supposed to be taken by the peasants will actually be taken by the rich peasants, the kulaks, who have the equipment. Your peace negotiations risk the future of Russian democracy and socialism on the chance of a European revolution. You deride the bourgeois democracy for which we are willing to go to the gallows. The revolution is in danger of collapsing under its own weight. My party does not fear unpopularity, he said. We shall guard the torch of the working class for the future.

He concluded with an appeal for conciliation between the various parties in the Constituent Assembly. No dictatorship of the minority, or anarchy would follow on reaction! He was for a democratic republic; universal suffrage; expropriation of the landowners; rehabilitation, control, and regulation of industry by the state; eight-hour day and social insurance for the workers; re-establishment of democratic liberties; the right of national minorities; the struggle for peace—

The confused and cloudy debates went on and on without adding anything to the first speeches. Then with the applause of the Left and the boing of the majority, Raskolnikov read a declaration drawn up by Lenin: "Not wishing to hide the crimes committed by the enemies of the people for one moment, we declare that we are withdrawing from the Constituent Assembly, trusting in the Soviet to decide what attitude we must adopt toward the counter-revolutionary majority."

After a moment of surprised silence, the Assembly passed on down the agenda. Imperturbably riveted to the presidential chair, Chernov leaned his gray head and his Second Empire beard over the papers before him; an endless procession of speeches and declarations evaporated into the air. An angry crowd looked down from the galleries. At about four o'clock in the morning, after the

Left S-Rs had withdrawn with a declaration similar to the Bolsheviks', as Chernov was reading off the ten articles of "the projected basic land law" the anarchist sailor, Zhelezniak, came forward from the guard to the platform.

"The hall was silent as the sailor leaned forward and said something which could not be heard. Indignant and worried, Chernov slouched back in his elegant chair:

"The members of the Constituent Assembly are also tired,' he said. 'But no weariness can interrupt the reading of this agrarian law which is awaited by all Russia.'

"This time the sailor's voice was heard by all; it was ironic and calm, without the slightest threat:

"The guard is tired. Please leave the hall."

Chernov looked out over the dejected Assembly and said: "It has been proposed to close this session after adopting the text of the land laws without further debate." The words, "it has been proposed," brought a laugh from the galleries. In the hasty voting that followed, solemn laws were passed with feverish speed, as a menacing voice from the guard punctuated the procedure with: "Enough! Enough!"

Fatigue, added to exasperation with

this legislative comedy, drove the sailors into a cold fury. The cocking of rifles echoed through the hall. The comedy was becoming tragic. Then the bearded president Chernov rose, and the session was closed.

The decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly was not passed until the following night. "The toiling masses have been convinced by their experiences that bourgeois parliamentarism is outworn; that it is incompatible with the construction of socialism; for national instruments cannot take the place of class instruments in breaking the resistance of the owning classes and laying the foundations of socialism." Lenin spoke for this motion before the *Vitsik*, saying in part:

"While parliaments never give the slightest support to the revolutionary movement, the Soviets breathe fire into the revolution and cry to the masses: 'Fight for yourselves, take for yourselves, organize for yourselves. . . .' No one is astonished that revolutionary movements are always accompanied by chaos, ruin, and temporary disorganization. . . . But bourgeois society also exists by warfare and slaughter."

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was a sensation in other countries. In Russia it passed almost unnoticed.

WORKERS' CONTROL AND NATIONALIZATION

The economic program of the Bolsheviks called for workers' control of industry and the nationalization of the banks. The decree on workers' control was passed on November 14. It legalized the introduction of workers into the control of business, made the decisions of the control commissions binding, and abolished trade secrets.⁵ The leaders of the revolution had no idea of going any farther. By exercising control, the working class would learn to direct. By the nationalization of the banking establish-

ments and credit institutions, the working class would recover through the state a part of the profits levied on their work by capital, and thus their exploitation would be diminished.

This measure was calculated to put the working class on the road to complete expropriation, as was stated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited Masses. Such a rational and planned advance toward socialism could hardly meet with the approval of the owners, who were still confident of their own strength and still believed the proletariat incapable of holding power. The innumerable economic struggles that had gone on before redoubled after the revolution and were all the more violent. The first measures of complete expropriation came from the masses and not from the governments. They were determined by the course of the struggle rather than by any socialist plan. The government did not adopt complete nationalization until eight months later, in June 1918, under the pressure of the foreign intervention. In April 1919, the Bolsheviks were still planning on mixed companies in which Russian and foreign capital would share with the Soviet state.

The disappearance of the political defenses of capitalist exploitation gave birth to a movement among the workers to take over the means of production. It was possible to take over the factories

and shops, so why not take them over? The sabotage practiced by the owners brought on expropriation as a retaliatory measure. When the owner closed his factory, the workers reopened it on their own account. There was also the problem of depriving the counter-revolution of its economic base, its wealth.

Nationalization Becomes Necessary

The Council of People's Commissars decreed the nationalization of the Russo-Belgian Metal Company, the Putilov factories, the Smirnov spinning mills, and the 1886 Electric Company. Shliapnikov remarked that the directors of some of the larger works, notably the Franco-Russian works in Petrograd, insisted that their factories be nationalized. They wanted to escape the frightful task of reorganization. Belgian, Swedish, and French owners made the same plea. They received a categorical refusal! Some of the directors simply wanted to avoid responsibility to their stockholders for the increasingly difficult management of the factories.

The war had brought in a regime of rationing and requisition. There was nothing else for the government but to continue this regime on a different class basis. The Soviet authorities undertook the requisitioning of food from wholesale houses, and of warm clothing, shoes, and bedding from the wealthy. House-to-house visits were made. Taxes were in arrears; local authorities imposed taxes on the wealthy; but always on their own initiative and for their own use.

The following examples were characteristic of the acts of nationalization: At Ivanovo-Voznesensk, the workers nationalized two textile factories in answer to the owners' sabotage. In the province of Nizhni-Novgorod, several factories were nationalized when their owners indicated that they no longer wished to run them. In the province of Kursk, the sugar refineries, the streetcar lines, a leather factory and several metal works passed into the workers' hands for practically the same reasons. In the Don Basin, the directors of the mines joined forces with the Whites, and the workers of seventy-two mines set up an Economic Council which took over their functions. At Romanovo-Borisoglebsk, the mills and oil refineries were nationalized after a lock-out.

On December 5, the Supreme National Economic Council was formed to coordinate all the activities of the local and central authorities that were managing and controlling production, including the economic Commissariats for Industry, Supply, Agriculture, Finance, and Transport. These commissariats were not, however, subordinated to the council, and it acquired its powers only little by little during months of work. At that time the local authorities were the only ones that really counted.

The trade unions, which would seem

5. "Art. 2: Control shall be exercised by all the workers concerned in the enterprise through their elected organs (Factory Committees, etc.) . . . the employees and technical staff shall also be represented in these organs. Art. 7: All business correspondence is to be submitted to the controlling organs . . . trade secrets are abolished. The proprietors are ordered to present all the books and reports of the current as well as of past years to the control organs. Art. 8: The decisions of the control organs are obligatory for the proprietors and can be abrogated only by higher control organs. Art 10: The managers and the representatives elected by the workers and employees to exercise the control are responsible to the state. . . ." The owners had three days' grace to appeal from the decisions of the lower workers' control organs to the higher. Local councils of workers' control were formed and ordered to call an All-Russian Congress; an All-Russian Council for workers' control was to centralize their activity.—V. S.

designed to play an important role during such a period, were far outdistanced by events. Too often they were led by Mensheviks, S-Rs, or pure-and-simple trade-unionists. The factional struggle paralyzed the national trade-union center. The leaders of the railway and government workers' trade unions were anti-Bolsheviks. Other unions spent more time looking out for their own welfare than trying to serve the working class as a whole.

The backwardness of many of the workers played a part. Sometimes the trade unions started up cooperatives and carried on a business that bordered dangerously on famine speculation. At times severe struggles broke out over immediate demands that reflected nothing but extreme trade-union patriotism. "The revolution is over, double the wages! The hour of luxury for us has sounded. . . ." Even in the field of requisitions and nationalization, anarchistic tendencies were manifested in attempts to use the factories for the sole benefit of the workers involved, or in high-handed confiscation of supply trains passing through the nearest railway station.

Menshevik Demagogy

The counter-revolutionists were well aware of this backwardness of some of the workers, and they exploited it for all it was worth. Manufacturers who were working for the state frequently raised wages to impossible heights. When factories closed down, the Mensheviks in the trade unions demanded the payment of future wages. The Mensheviks in the Petrograd chemical workers' union demanded tremendous wages and salaries on the ground that they controlled large stores of explosives. In the very heat of the Moscow street battle, the city ran out of bread and the flour-mill workers, indifferent to the fate of the revolution, went out on strike for a raise in wages.

The nationalization of the banks, which was forced on the government by the financiers' resistance to control, by their refusal to collaborate with the workers and by their leading part in the sabotage, was one of the most important steps taken before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The decree making the banks a state monopoly was issued on December 14.

All private banks were merged with the state bank. The holdings of small depositors were guaranteed. A second decree ordered an inventory of all individual safe-deposit boxes under penalty of confiscation. Coined gold and bullion was requisitioned and placed in the current accounts of the state bank. The Red Guard occupied the banks; recalcitrant directors were jailed. In several banks the staffs went on strike against the violence of the Bolsheviks.

On the day the banks were nationalized, there was a debate on the question

Books in Review

Folklore of Fordism

THE LEGEND OF HENRY FORD, by Keith Sward. Rinehart & Company, N. Y., 1948, 550 pp., \$5.00.

An excellent, authoritative and devastating exposé of the legend of Henry Ford, billionaire auto manufacturer, has been written by Keith Sward, college professor, clinical psychologist and CIO journalist. It is the kind of work that one adds to a library collection alongside Ferdinand Lundberg's *America's Sixty Families* and other comprehensive studies dissecting American capitalism and its capitalists.

Sward has put together a truly fascinating study of Ford. What was the real story of Ford's anti-Semitism? Sward presents it so fully, with so many authoritative quotations, facts and evidence, that we doubt if the Ford Motor Company will venture an answer. How many people have forgotten that for years one of America's wealthiest and most influential capitalists poured out thousands of dollars and utilized the power of his great industrial empire to agitate for Jew-baiting? Sward's book is a good refresher course. It helps explain the deep roots that anti-Semitism has acquired in Detroit, for example.

Was Henry Ford an industrial genius? Yes and no. Sward presents the real story of the growth of the Ford Company, the part played by many brilliant engineers and the limitations of the mechanic from the backwoods of Michigan.

Although it is difficult to single out any single "robber baron" as a villain par excellence, Ford certainly is a contender for top honors. How he acquired the Lincoln Motor Corporation, for ex-

ample, compares with anything any other robber baron pulled in the lusty days of capitalism. Sward has the facts.

Has the reader heard of the sinister organization known as the Ford Service Department, directed by Harry Bennett? Of the tie-up between Detroit's tough gangsters of the '20s and the auto industry? Of the brutal violence against any signs of revolt in the Ford empire? Of the murderous campaign against UAW-CIO attempts to organize in the late '30s? Well, it is all told in exact detail by Sward. What an indictment of a "great capitalist" and his beloved system!

Surely this foretaste of the book should attract some reader attention. Here is a book that every UAW-CIO militant should read and understand. For Marxist scholars it is an invaluable contribution to a clinical analysis of American capitalism. This book destroys the myth of the five-dollar-a-day wage and the paternalism of Ford; it portrays the life of the auto workers in harsh terms of reality such as only Upton Sinclair achieved in his pamphlet *The Flivver King*.

Perhaps the only serious weakness of the book is its failure to explain the reason why the myth of Henry Ford grew and developed into a powerful tradition in the era of Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, and the shameless role that the bourgeois press (including the *New York Times*) played in perpetuating the legend. The America of the 1920s, challenged by a revolutionary Russia transformed into a workers' state by the October Revolution, needed myths of its rich to deceive the American workingman. "Every man a president or a Ford! Anybody can get rich in Amer-

in the *Vitsik* between Lenin and a Menshevik Internationalist named Avilov. The latter was in agreement on "principles" but emphasized the gravity and complexity of financial matters. "We must do nothing," he said, "without the greatest caution, profound investigation, and the assistance of the staffs. By violence we shall only succeed in driving down the ruble." Lenin's answer was no less typical than this timorous argument:

"You tell us," Lenin said, "of the complexity of the problem, and that we all recognize. But if you use this complexity to block our efforts at socialization, then you are nothing but a demagogue, and a shameless demagogue.

"You accept the dictatorship of the proletariat in principle, but when we call

it by its proper name in Russian, a *mailed fist*, you begin to talk of the fragility and complexity of things.

"You refuse to see that this mailed fist creates as it destroys. If we pass on from an abstract principle to its practical application, that is all to our credit.

"We understand that the proposed measure is complex. But none of us is going to try to administer it, not even those who possess an economic education. We shall call in financial experts. Once we have the keys in our hands, we know how we can get all the advice we need from the former millionaires. Whoever wants to work is welcome—on the condition that he does not try to reduce every revolutionary initiative to a dead letter."

VICTOR SERGE

ica." This folklore had its purpose. If Ford didn't exist, he would have had to be created.

Nevertheless, this and other lacks aside, Sward has contributed greatly to a genuine need in the field of social study. Fortunately also, his personal politics, which smack of Stalinism in the discussion of World War II, are at an absolute minimum and do not detract from the worth of this outstanding work.

Finally: Detroit's newspapers have not yet seen fit to review the book—a good recommendation in itself!

WALTER JASON

Yugoslavia Under Tito

TITO'S IMPERIAL COMMUNISM, by R. H. Markham. Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1947, 292 pp.

This book on the Stalinist conquest of power in Yugoslavia is as much a patriotic propaganda tract for American capitalism as an analysis of Stalinism in the Balkans.

R. H. Markham has lived in the Balkans for more than thirty years—first as a Protestant missionary, for the most part as correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*. His knowledge of the culture and politics of this region is perhaps unequalled among American correspondents. Unfortunately, however, his bitter hatred for and abysmal ignorance of Marxism leads him into such confusion in his analysis of Stalinism that what he has to say loses much of its potential value.

Markham's description of how the Stalinists gained and held power fits into the well-worn pattern of events in Stalin's satellite states of Eastern Europe. A totalitarian Stalinist clique gains power by means of terrorism via typical GPU methods. All opponents of the clique are either murdered or discredited as "fascists." A "popular front" government is formed by means of splitting all non-Stalinist parties and accepting only the completely subservient factions led by subservient leaders into the ruling "coalition." Industry is nationalized (90 per cent) under complete control of the new bureaucracy. The whole nation is "organized" into police-controlled bodies on the Russian pattern.

Markham does not much concern himself with describing specific economic and social measures introduced by the Stalinist regime. He confines himself mainly to proving beyond a shadow of a doubt that all controlling positions in the political, economic and social life of the country are held by Communist Party members, backed by the ubiquitous secret police, and that all opposition is ruthlessly crushed. He insists repeatedly that the regime is not supported by any but the smallest minority of workers,

peasants and intellectuals. He does not even discuss whether or not the population at large, or certain select sections of it, are better or worse off from the material point of view.

Of special interest may be Markham's description of how the American and British governments were led to throw their support to Tito and withdraw it from Mikhailovich during the war; of the way in which the Yalta agreement was circumvented by Tito, etc. Also, for those unfamiliar with this subject, Markham gives a good description of the adherence to Stalinist ranks (and the elevation to high office) of notorious fascist and reactionary leaders and supporters. These include notably: Franz Piertz, former head of Milan Neditch's air force; Marko Mesitch, who led a Ustachi band to the gates of Stalingrad as part of Hitler's army; Sulejman Filipovitch, who headed one of the most ferocious Ustachi bands in exterminating the Serbian population of Croatia. Similarly he gives a good description of the typical Stalinist buildup of the hero-cult, aided by writers, poets and artists who had distinguished themselves for sycophantic adulation of every previous ruler of Yugoslavia.

GORDON HASKELL

South African Story

CRY, THE BELOVED COUNTRY, by Alan Paton. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948, \$3.00.

Paton's novel of South Africa has received uniformly high praise for its artistic excellence. This it deserves, and the reason lies in the skillful translation—without the use of dialect and with no debasement of the English—of the native speech into language of haunting beauty.

"The great red hills stand desolate, and the earth has torn away like flesh. The lightning flashes over them, the clouds pour down upon them, the dead streams come to life, full of the red blood of the earth. Down in the valleys women scratch the soil that is left, and the maize hardly reaches the height of a man. They are valleys of old men and old women, of mothers and children. The men are away, the young men and the girls are away. The soil cannot keep them any more." To achieve this is good; to sustain it required a high degree of craftsmanship.

The author, head of a boys' reformatory in Johannesburg, has written on the race question from a liberal point of view in such places as *Race Relations*, a quarterly published by the South African Institute of Race Relations.

Although *Cry, The Beloved Country* is a strong picture of the people and

their problem, it is not the South African *Fontamara*. This is partly so because of the story. The hero of the novel, the Reverend Stephen Kumalo, is an old Zulu minister of the Anglican church in the rural district of Ndotshéni, Natal, who stands up under Job-like afflictions. Among them is his son's murder of Arthur Jarvis, the son of the white landowner in Ndotshéni, during an attempted robbery. Arthur Jarvis was known as a *kafferboetie*, that is, one who works for the welfare of the non-European, and his ideas had been alien to his father. The high point of the plot is the coming to an understanding of these two men, the father of the murderer and the father of the slain man. Together they begin work for the restoration of the valley. It is the farm demonstrator who formulates the question: "When the children grow up, there will again be too many. Some will have to go still."

The breaking of the tribal system, the erosion of the soil—all roads lead to Johannesburg. "We set aside one tenth of the lands for four-fifths of the people. Thus we made it inevitable, and some say we did it knowingly, that labor would come to the towns."

The novel's lack is not the omission of a description of the life as it must be lived. The city is seen and well described as Rev. Kumalo hunts his son. Shanty Town, result of the horrible housing shortage; the boycott with white people lending their cars to transport the native workers; the mine strike when gold is found at Odendaalsrust—all are here as if seen by a more tender Zola. And the fear is here also: "We shall live from day to day, and put more locks on the doors, and get a fine fierce dog when the fine fierce bitch next door has pups. . . . We shall be careful, and knock this off our lives, and knock that off our lives, and hedge ourselves about with safety and precaution. And our lives will shrink, but they shall be the lives of superior beings."

But if message there is, it is contained in these words of Msimangu, the preacher: "I have one great fear in my heart, that one day when they turn to loving they will find we are turned to hating." The heightening of the struggle is lost.

KATE LEONARD

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