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Purges in Bulgaria

A correspondent of The Economist (London) writes in its issue of November 6, 1949:

The purges in the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party are assuming enormous and surprising proportions. They amount, indeed, to a total and violent change of the leadership of the party and the state machine. The axe has so far struck down the following:

The acting Prime Minister and Secretary-General of the party (Kostov); the Finance Minister (Stefanov); the Minister of Industry (Kunin), who was also Minister of Finance for two months after the arrest of Stefanov; the Governor of the National Bank (Tsonchev); the Minister of Public Works (Gekezarov); the Minister of Transport (Tonchev); the deputy Foreign Minister and Director of the Communist Propaganda Services (Topencharov); the Foreign Under-Secretary (Andreychin); the Chief of the General Staff (General Kinov); the Chief of the Army Political Department (General Balgaranov); the chairman of the Control Commission of the Communist Central Committee (Pavllov).

Apart from these prominent figures, nearly a dozen other ministers, under-secretaries and generals, the whole railway directorate and a great number of provincial party secretaries, local army chiefs, police chiefs and inspectors have been involved. Moreover, the all-powerful deputy premier, Anton Yugov, for five years Interior (Police) Minister, has also completely disappeared from the Sofia scene in the last three weeks. This is presumably the first sign of his impending downfall.

Impeachment of Ministers

Ten days ago the National Assembly, which had been disbanded in September, was quickly summoned for a short half an hour session to vote a new law which is certainly unique in the world: it is a special law for the trial of Cabinet Ministers and members of the Government. A new "Supreme People's Court" is created which has to try the accused not later than one week after the publication of the indictment. There is, of course, no appeal, and Ministers and members of parliament can be arrested "without the prior removal of their parliamentary immunity."

The purged men are now accused of "Kostovism," which—to quote the present Communist dictator in Bulgaria, Valko Chervenkov—is "nothing but Titosism on Bulgarian soil and just like Titosism, it grows on treason and espionage." As for Kostov himself, his "immediate trial," announced last August, has again been postponed, a fact which shows his remarkable endurance (he was arrested in March) and which has undoubtedly raised his prestige within the Communist rank and file. Kostov was not, like Rajk, just one of the leaders of the Communist Party; he was the universally accepted leader after Dimitrov. A member of the Central Committee since 1924, a member of the Politburo since 1935, secretary of the Central Committee since 1940, and Secretary-General of the whole party since 1944, Kostov was, above all, responsible for the building up of the party machine. All party secretaries, inspectors and functionaries were his men. At the last party congress in December, 1948, he presented the party political programme, which presumably is still in force. As chairman of the cabinet committee co-ordinating all economic ministries, he was the virtual economic dictator of the country, the author and supreme chief of the five-year plan. On his fiftieth birthday, in 1947, the Central Committee sang his praises in the following manner:

"Great are your achievements, Comrade Kostov, as the builder of the party, as the teacher and instructor of the party members. Under your leadership and inspired by your heroic life, thousands of Communists were educated into unquestionable loyalty to the party."

Titosism in the Villages

Inefficiency and opposition in the country are obviously part of the background of the present political transformation. Official Communist figures published in the last

(Continued on page 24)
A Turning Point for the CIO

What Was Done and Not Done at the Cleveland Convention

No gathering in the history of the American labor movement attracted anywhere near the attention given the 11th annual convention of the Congress of Industrial Organizations in Cleveland, Ohio, during the first week of November 1949. More than 250 reporters, journalists, radio commentators and other writers covered this convention whose five days of sessions were broadcast throughout the world on the Voice of America programs and whose deliberations provided sensational daily headlines in the American press. Nor was this world-wide attention amiss. For it was a turning point in the history of the American labor movement, because for the first time since its birth and growth in 1937 the CIO as a decisive sector of the American labor movement was considering openly and unambiguously the problem of Stalinism both within the CIO and as a political force on the world scale.

A Convention of the Bureaucracy

Who confronted this problem at this convention? Primarily the CIO bureaucracy with nearly 613 delegates, most of whom were leaders of international unions which constitute the CIO. It was, so to speak, a pork choppers' convention. There were no rank and fileers present. This then was the new labor aristocracy which had arisen in the past 10 years, and which had arrived at a breaking point in its past and not so complex relations with the Stalinist machine. Many of the CIO leaders had worked closely in alliance with the Stalinists over a period of years. Others were almost indistinguishable in their conduct from the Stalinists, leaders like Michael Quill of the Transport Workers Union and Joseph Curran of the National Maritime Union. This convention represented an irremediable break between the national trade-union bureaucracy rooted in the American labor movement and the Stalinist totalitarians desperately seeking to retain some organizational and political influence in the industrial union movement of America. The clash between these two forces was and is an uncompromising struggle for domination and control of the key industrial union movement of America, which has a membership of around five million and whose loyalties are largely with the CIO bureaucracy. It is unlikely that the Stalinist-controlled unions have more than 600,000 actual members.

The personification and symbol of the CIO bureaucracy was, of course, Philip Murray, president of the CIO, a man who rose to national prominence as a loyal lieutenant of John L. Lewis, founder of the CIO, and whose 35-odd-year career in the labor movement is marked by an unbroken record of bureaucratic domination, methods and outlook. (It seems like only yesterday, although it was three years ago, that Murray was still working closely with the Stalinists against progressive anti-Stalinist movements from below such as were symbolized by Walter Reuther of the United Automobile Workers Union.)

The outstanding Stalinist apologist at the CIO convention was Harry Bridges, president of the International Longshoremen's Union, who earned nationwide prominence as a labor leader during the 1934 San Francisco general strike, and who has since then destroyed his militant past record by becoming acknowledged as the most capable, shrewd and undeviating Stalinist party liner in the CIO.

The Reasons for the Conflict

What were the sources of the open rupture or, more exactly, the amputation of the Stalinist bureaucrats from the CIO bureaucracy? Fundamentally there are two causes. First, within the framework of trade-union organization and policies the Stalinists have built up an unparalleled and terrible record of misleadership which included such items as (1) strike breaking, as, for example, in the Montgomery Ward strike during World War II, (2) totalitarian rule or ruin tactics against all opposition and critics, (3) advocacy of totally reactionary not to speak of anti-union policies, as, for example, agitation for piecework and incentive pay during the last war, and (4) total irresponsibility toward the union movement.

Such a criminal record would have long ago boomeranged and caused the Stalinists to be ousted from all strategic positions in the CIO except for the fact, which must not be forgotten, that during this period they were in an alliance with the CIO top leadership, including Philip Murray. Whatever strength they retain in such unions as the United Electrical Workers,
against this purge, which was conducted in an extremely hostile and bitter atmosphere, neither Harry Bridges nor any other Stalinist spokesman made or could have made effective or important counter-attacks for the very simple reason that there was no bureaucratic action, no political abuse and no fiery and emotional statement hurled at them at this convention by the CIO bureaucrats which had not been outdone 100 times over by the Stalinists in their 11-year history in the CIO.

When Bridges cried for "democracy" or international union autonomy, the CIO leaders replied by exposing his own nefarious record of bureaucratic machinations. It was not accidental that the hatchet man for the CIO leaders was none other than Joseph Curran, who for 10 years was Bridges' closest ally in the CIO and who was trained in the Stalinist school of falsification, slander and bureaucratic bludgeoning.

Often at this convention, in terms of the democratic rights involved—and these are important considerations—the debate took the form of the kettle calling the pot black. But this should not conceal the important and decisive distinction between the CIO bureaucracy with all its limitations, and the Stalinist totalitarians. For the CIO bureaucrats do in their own miserable and faint-hearted fashion represent and seek to represent the interests of the American industrial workers organized into the CIO. Their actions do reflect a pressure of the rank and file, and their timid, half-hearted struggles for pensions, social security and other bread-and-butter demands do indicate at least an elementary self-interest. As for the Stalinists, their record in the CIO, as exposed quite ably and devastatingly by such speakers as Walter Reuther, is one of functioning solely and exclusively as colonial agents of a totalitarian power, namely, Stalinist Russia.

Fundamentally the very sources of the split between the CIO bureaucracy and the Stalinists are the reason why the overwhelming bulk of industrial union workers will support the CIO bureaucracy no matter how poorly conducted, how bureaucratic or how pitifully inadequate their struggle against Stalinism may turn out to be. This is doubly true today precisely because there is lacking a third genuine alternative to the contending factions. There is no significant socialist cadre or socialist-dominated union with power to intervene effectively and on a consistently progressive basis in the struggle against Stalinism. Those unions like the powerful UAW-CIO which are the genuine left wing of the CIO lack a sufficiently courageous and progressive leadership to serve as that kind of rallying center for all liberal and labor forces who want to conduct the best and most successful kind of struggle against Stalinism.

The Issue of Foreign Policy

While the differences on a trade-union level between the CIO bureaucracy and the Stalinists are clear, and one can support without a moment's hesitation the CIO's fight to retain all the unions from the Stalinists, the problem is far more complex and the issues greatly blurred when it comes to the basic and broad political questions involved. No thinking work-
er will be fooled by the repetition of the hard-and-fast line of the Cominform which the Stalinists like Bridges, Ben Gold of the Fur Workers or others presented on foreign policy questions.

The CIO leaders with few exceptions had no program apart from that of the American State Department to counterpose to the Stalinist views. To be sure, one prominent CIO spokesman, George Baldanzi, said that he and the CIO were against American imperialism as well as Russian imperialism, and he pointed out that no Stalinist spokesman dared to utter as much as one word in criticism of Russian imperialism. But the fact is, as a shrewd Stalinist pointed out, the CIO resolution on foreign policy did not contain the slightest criticism of American foreign policy; on the contrary, it rejected vigorously all charges and claims of war-mongering on the part of Washington. The most telling part of this aspect of the convention was not, however, the inability of the CIO leaders to reply to the demagogy of the Stalinists, but rather the alarming as well as truly unprecedented fact that the real reply to the Stalinists was made by none other than three of the outstanding figures responsible for implementing America's imperialist policies.

The CIO convention heard Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Omar Bradley and Secretary of State Dean Acheson, as well as Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin virtually dictate the policies of the CIO on the all-important foreign policy problems. Their appearance at this convention could only signify one thing to Stalin and the Politburo in Moscow. This was the CIO's reply to the cold war—100 per cent support in the struggle between Washington and Moscow. Unquestionably this aspect of the CIO convention could only have a very negative effect on the European labor movement and above all its conscious politically thinking elements who are searching fervently for signs in the American labor movement that it might be a real as well as potential third force counterposing itself both to Russian imperialism and Wall Street's atomic war perspectives.

Stagnation in Political Action

The primary if not total preoccupation of the CIO convention with the problem of Stalinism inevitably aggravated another weakness of the CIO movement. Labor lives today in an epoch in which it is threatened with strangulation by Taft-Hartleyism. It feels keenly the defeat of the coal miners' union. It is disturbed by the small and very inadequate gains it wins only after great strike struggles like the steel walkout. It is puzzled by the defeat of important strikes like the Singer and Bell Aircraft walkouts. It is haunted by the fear of growing unemployment. Yet the attention paid to these burning and living problems was at best perfunctory. As a matter of fact, the behind-the-scenes deal which caused the Bethlehem Steel Corporation's settlement with the Steel Workers Union was timed to coincide with the opening of the convention and to facilitate an evasion of these acute problems on the domestic front. The political discussion was desultory and very routine. After one or two brief speeches, the convention simply reaffirmed the policy of supporting liberal candidates of both capitalist parties and explicitly rejected any third party political realignment such as the Reuther leadership in the UAW has been timidly suggesting off and on during the past three years. We do not doubt that a continuation of the present capitalist "prosperity" will give the CIO leaders a sufficient breathing spell to stumble along for a while without suffering too painful defeats and making themselves easy targets of Stalinist criticisms. But in the event of a depression, the lack of vision and lack of perspective in the CIO political program will turn out to be more than an Achilles heel. It will constitute a house built upon sand.

Not until the last day of the convention did the delegates bother to discuss even the vast difficulties which arise in the organizational struggle for the domination of the eleven unions which are being or have been expelled from the CIO. At this point Philip Murray felt it necessary to warn the delegates of some of the tribulations that lie ahead, for every unionist knows it is one thing to pass a set of resolutions at a cut-and-dried convention where one has an overwhelming majority, but it is an altogether different and more difficult task to carry them out in practice. Already the disputes, the court fights, the injunctions and the free-for-alls between the Stalinist machine and the loyal CIO members in the UE suggest that the inadequacy of the CIO program will make doubly difficult the organizational success of the CIO against the Stalinists. (When one reads that the IEU-CIO organizational conference in Philadelphia on the weekend of November 27 had among its featured speakers Secretary of Navy Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of Air W. Stewart Symington and Secretary of Labor Maurice J. Tobin, it becomes increasingly clear that the CIO leaders are more concerned with the political consequences in terms of the Moscow-Washington war than with the day-to-day union problems to which this convention should have been devoted if the Stalinists are to be smashed in the electrical industry field.)

In one of his early speeches Philip Murray bewailed the fact that "decent American labor is caught between dictatorships and totalitarianism, like Wall Street and the Communist Party." Although Murray denounced both of them, his strongest language was reserved for the "diabolical, subversive Communists." The whole tone of the convention was that of a crusade or "holy war" against Communism.

At best the CIO convention gave a very, very inadequate answer to this problem of the dictatorship of Wall Street or the totalitarianism of the Communist Party. This is true in spite of the fact that the CIO, assisted by the American state, that is, the Truman
administration, the courts, the FBI, etc., may and probably will defeat and destroy the Stalinist influence in the CIO. But if the cost continues to be the brutal violation of all democratic rights, the complete hardening of the arteries of the CIO bureaucracy and its transformation into a bureaucratic machine dominated by conservative leaders like Philip Murray, then certainly the rank-and-file unionists throughout the country are entirely justified in the grave concern with which they view the coming period of the CIO.

**Need of a Balance Sheet**

Only by drawing up carefully a balance sheet can the militants in the American labor movement begin to prepare themselves for the difficult tasks ahead. What are the costs of the struggle against Stalinism as it is being conducted today in this social milieu? On the trade-union level the war between the Stalinists and the CIO bureaucracy has as its first victim the Southern drive, the so-called Operation Dixie of the CIO. The postwar organizational campaign of the CIO to carry out a very necessary task of organizing the open-shop South had already bogged down. The CIO has neither the energies, talents nor the ability to carry this on and to struggle with the Stalinists simultaneously.

There are many indications that the AFL will gain because of the fight. The disillusionment with the CIO ("It's too damned factional") and the bewilderment of many of the rank and file by the complex issues are something that the AFL will not lose an opportunity to take advantage of. Of course, the appeal of both sides to provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law to help them win the struggle, and the fact that the rule rather than the exception is to take the intra-union struggle into a capitalist court, signify a growing dependence on the part of the union movement to the bourgeois state. It is a step away from labor's organizational as well as political independence. This development, coincident with the greater and greater dependence of the CIO leadership on the national administration through techniques like fact-finding boards, signifies a very disturbing dissipation of organizational power and independence. In terms of trade-union structure and democratic rights, the newly adopted constitution of the CIO tends to transform this trade-union movement which should be a free association of individuals united on primarily economic questions, into a sort of hybrid political party in which membership depends as much on political views as it does on an economic united front.

Such important democratic manifestations as the power of the city, county and state councils of the CIO to express their own views on problems of the day are a thing of the past. These organizations have been transformed into mere agencies for carrying out the "line" of the national organization. The genuine autonomy of international unions no longer exists, since all unions must carry out national CIO policy, something which not even the hidebound AFL bureaucracy demands, at least at present, of its affiliated unions. Concomitant with these bureaucratic changes comes the hardening of the bureaucratic arteries, for the whole national CIO becomes a powerful, cohesive bureaucracy patterned largely after the machine that Philip Murray has used to solidify his complete control of the Steel Workers Union.

**The Danger of Witch-Hunting**

The virulence of the speeches against the Stalinists and the "anything goes" policies have a special significance in this epoch in which reactionary hysteria and witch-hunting are dominant features of American political life. Outside of the restraints of the national convention where the entire CIO is, so to speak, parading before the public eye, the struggle against Stalinists in the shops and in the local unions will take on a much more brutal and vigorous form. The protestations of the CIO bureaucrats that they are democrats and believe in "honest differences of opinion" are a little too much when one views the outrageous actions of Curran of the NMU against a clearly non-Stalinist opposition in his union. We do not think that this will be an isolated incident, but rather reflects the hardening of the CIO structure on a nationwide basis throughout all the unions. In passing, we might point out that both the UAW and the United Rubber Workers will feel more and more the pressure of the CIO to transform themselves into images of the bureaucratized Steel Workers Union.

In the struggle against Stalinism the CIO bureaucracy at this convention gave every indication that it was tied—lock, stock and barrel—to the war machine. There was not one ounce of the traditional anti-militarist or anti-war sentiment at this convention.

As against all these negative features, there was and remains only one positive accomplishment. The Stalinists no longer have the cover of the CIO to carry out their nefarious activities as agents of a totalitarian power. Last and by no means least, no report or analysis of this convention would be valid unless it stated truthfully that the most glaring and fatal feature at this turbulent gathering was the lack of a single socialist voice to counterpose the real workers' struggle for freedom, peace and security against the impending days of doom and the Third World War.

The reconstitution, or more exactly, the building up of a socialist cadre in the American labor movement whose sole and exclusive right and claim to existence is its devotion to the cause of emancipation of the American working class, is a task that today has ten times more acute importance than it had yesteryear. Without it the American labor movement will retreat and suffer more and more defeats as it gets caught in the squeeze between Wall Street and Moscow. With it there is a world to win.

WALTER JASON
The unusually interesting discussion on whether Communists should be allowed to teach in American colleges, seems now to be reaching an end. It is therefore convenient to venture an estimate of this discussion, particularly of some of its neglected political connotations. By way of introduction, I might say that while opposed to restrictive legislation or procedures that would prevent Stalinists from teaching in the schools, I do not consider the question quite so open-and-shut as the civil libertarians seem to think it. No problem involving the Stalinists can be viewed in the traditional categories, for the Stalinist movement is a new, unprecedented factor in political life. But of that, more later.

The Position of Sidney Hook

The point of view of those who would prevent CP members from teaching in the schools has been most forcefully presented by Professor Sidney Hook, a teacher of philosophy at New York University, in his articles in the New York Times of February 27, 1949, the Saturday Evening Post of September 10, 1949 and Commentary of October, 1949. For a fruitful discussion, it will be necessary to summarize Hook's view in some detail.

The discussion by Hook and others was originally provoked by the now-famous incident at the University of Washington, in which three professors were discharged and three placed on probation because of alleged membership in the CP. Commenting on this incident, Hook rightly observes that for the first time teachers rather than universities are being accused of violations of academic liberty. The charge against these teachers is that, by virtue of membership in a political party which insists on an unbreached intellectual discipline, they are unable to function freely and honestly in the classroom; they express, not their immediate opinion, but whatever the CP line happens to be. For, he writes, "any doctrinal impositions, no matter what their sources, which set up limits beyond which the professor cannot go, affect him as a scholar and a teacher." Such a teacher, held in leash by an external discipline, is unable honestly to consider ideas contrary to his own. He is obliged automatically to reject alternative ideas as "bourgeois," "Trotskyist," "Titoist" or whatever the momentary label of opprobrium may be.

To support these assertions Hook quotes from The Communist, official CP magazine, of May, 1937: "Marxist-Leninist analysis must be injected into every class." And, says, Hook, this "party line is laid down in every area of thought from art to zoology." Thus, when the CP calls Roosevelt a social-fascist one year and a progressive the next, the Stalinist history professor will obediently "instruct" his student accordingly. These designations, however absurd, would be tolerable if they came from the professor's own mind, but they do not; they are simply the consequence of party need and imposition.

Stalinist teachers, continues Hook, do not establish honest intellectual relations with their colleagues or students: "Communist party teachers are fearful of exposure and quite aware that their practices violate accepted notions of academic freedom." They hold secret fraction meeting at which decisions are made—or more often, conveyed—on how to influence the thought of students, capture control of university institutions, shape the curriculum, etc.

While not in favor of the expulsion of Stalinist teachers under all circumstances, Hook believes that such expulsions are justified in principle. He rejects the argument that to expel CP teachers is to hold them guilty by association, for, he says, when a teacher joins the CP he is committing a specific act which destroys his ability to function as a free intellectual. To propose, as do some people, that Stalinists be expelled from faculties only if found guilty of specific violations of their academic obligations is, says Hook, dangerous because it must lead to a system of spying on teachers and difficult because there may be no clear line of demarcation between the behavior of a fellow-traveller and that of a CP member. (Hook is against the expulsion of fellow-travellers.) Finally, he proposes that any action taken against Stalinist teachers be decided by the faculties, rather than administrations or boards of trustees.

I hope the above adequately summarizes Hook's views; he has counter-arguments which I shall discuss in the course of my rebuttal below.

The Social Context of the Question

It is important to note, at the outset, the manner in which the question is posed in Hook's articles: "Shall Communists Be Allowed to Teach?" is the title of his first article. To put the matter this way is implicitly to assume that there is some general community, some "we" faced with the problem. But that is highly doubtful. The problem, if such it is, is faced only by those who, in or out of the universities, enjoy social power—i.e., the generally reactionary or conservative forces which dominate American educational institutions. For liberal or radical teachers, it is usually a problem of what to propose or counterpose or advise. To put the question as Hook does is, in effect, to deny it its actual social context, to ignore what must in discussion of public policy always be a central
question: who employs social power? Nor is this an academic point, for from it flows a whole series of consequences: why do trustees want to expel Stalinists? is it in the interest of anti-Stalinist teachers to align themselves in any way with such trustees? what possibly disastrous results may follow from such expulsions?

What may seem abstract in the previous paragraph becomes decidedly concrete in light of the events at the University of Washington. It is quite significant that in all his articles Hook avoids taking a position with regard to the expulsions at that University. In fact, he conspicuously avoids discussing the question in the concrete, i.e., in terms of the one major incident in which his position may be tested. But the actual events at Washington are of great importance, helping us to place our discussion in a here-and-now context.

The University of Washington Cases

Six faculty members at the University of Washington, some of whom had taught there more than 20 years, were brought up on charges: Professors Butterworth, Phillips, Grundlach, Ely, Ethel and Jacobs. The charges, heard before the Faculty Committee on Tenure and Academic Freedom, fell into two groups: 1) that the six were CP members, and 2) that they had violated faculty rules of behavior. After a time, it is important to note, the second group of charges was completely dropped—with the exception of Grundlach, whose expulsion was recommended on grounds irrelevant to this discussion. Against the other five, the only charge was membership in the CP. The Faculty Committee split into several fractions in its recommendations, but a majority opposed the expulsion of the five, while a differently constituted majority proposed a change in faculty rules which would make such expulsion possible in the future.

However, the Board of Regents chose to ignore the Faculty Committee's recommendations, and discharged Grundlach, Butterworth and Phillips, the latter two self-admitted CP members since the mid-1930's. The other three teachers who admitted to previous but lapsed CP membership and who refused to identify publicly members of the CP, were placed on "probation."

Nor did these events occur in a social vacuum. They followed a one-and-a-half-year inquiry conducted by a state legislative committee which, in the words of Robert Lampman, a liberal member of the University's Economics Department, "was a roadshow company version of a Martin Dies production." (The Progressive, May, 1949.) In other words, the action taken against these six professors was the consequence, at least in part and very probably in full, of a reactionary drive by a small-minded legislative committee which created an atmosphere of fear and hysteria.

When these facts are borne in mind, several questions arise with regard to Hook's argument:

—Why, in all of his articles on this subject (which must total 15,000 words), has he quite failed to portray the social context, the immediate situation in which the problem was first raised—i.e., the atmosphere created by the Legislative Committee at the time the six professors were punished? Surely a philosopher so committed to the concretely-placed and the actually-limited investigation, must realize the great relevance of such facts.

—What position does Hook now take toward the firing of the three professors? Since he has stated that faculties should have decisive power in such matters, he must presumably oppose the firing. If so, has he publicly made that clear? If, on the other hand, he believes the discharge of the three valid, then he must face the accusation that he would have faculty decide such questions only when he agreed with its decision.

—What is Hook's view on the punishment of the other three teachers? Is past membership in the CP grounds for punishment? Is a refusal to "finger" members of the CP who might thereby be deprived of their livelihood grounds for punishment? Will Hook write a fourth article on these aspects of the problem of Stalinist teachers?

Hook, of course, is quite right in saying that doctrinal impositions, whatever their source, affect adversely the work of a teacher. But then we must notice that doctrinal impositions are the work not only of Stalinist teachers but of a great variety of other teachers: Catholico, N AM economics teachers, etc. Hook counters this view by saying that there is "no evidence whatsoever of the operation of Catholic cells in non-sectarian universities," as there is of CP cells. Hook's statement is true but irrelevant, for doctrinal imposition is not contingent on the existence of party cells: one can exist without the other.

*Hook's only remark that might be construed as such a reference is curious. In his Commentary article he violently attacks Professor Helen Lynd, who, in the Spring, 1949, American Scholar, wrote that she had private information from several people who attended the Washington Legislative Committee's hearings that Representative Albert Canwell, head of the Committee, had stated: "if anyone instates there is discrimination against Negroes in this country, or that there is inequality of wealth, there is every reason to believe that person is a Communist." Hook quotes from a letter from Canwell denying that he ever made such a statement. How, asks Hook, can a reputable social scientist like Helen Lynd make such serious charges against Canwell merely on the basis of hearsay, and why did not Lynd ask Canwell directly if he had made the alleged statement?

We may grant that Helen Lynd should have checked her information with Canwell, though Canwell's denial does not necessarily mean that he actually did not make the statement. In fact, if Canwell's denial is conclusive, why has he not sued Helen Lynd for character misrepresentation? Why was his denial contingent, as it apparently was, on a request from Hook that he speak up? There is no more reason to credit or discredit Canwell's denial than the charges of Helen Lynd's unnamed informants. No stenographic record of the hearings was kept, and in the absence of such a record there are obvious reasons why either side should wish to distort the facts. But even if Canwell did not make such a hair-raising statement, the atmosphere created in Washington was not one conducive to fair treatment of the accused. The sheer fact that such a legislative committee held hearings points to the presence of intimations. Nor is it intimidation the very raison d'être of such committees?

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It is true that the Catholics have no cells in the universities; they long ago abandoned such crude methods of operation. (I suppose, however, one could maintain that their cells meet regularly every Sunday morning.) The Catholic teachers generally don’t need the spur of cells, their intellectual discipline and coherence being products of centuries-long tradition and training. This intellectual discipline—or more accurately, as Hook puts it, doctrinal imposition—is often as extensive and severe as that of the Stalinist movement. (I speak of the genuine believers, not the fellow-travelling “sleepers” of the faith.) And this doctrinal imposition is no less real because Catholic teachers in any given university never hold “fraction” meetings.

**Catholics and Stalinists**

Surely, Hook must know that a Catholic teaching French history is no more likely to be objective about Voltaire than a Stalinist teaching Russian history will be about Trotsky. Surely he knows that a Catholic historian is no more likely to be objective about the role of the Vatican in modern politics, birth control, companionate marriage, contraceptives and Marxism than a Stalinist about Titoism. And is it likely that a Catholic teacher known to be intellectually fair to Voltaire, than a Stalinist teaching Russian history to Trotsky? Surely, Hook must know that a Catholic teaching French history is no more likely to be objective about Voltaire than a Stalinist teaching Russian history will be about Trotsky. Surely he knows that a Catholic historian is no more likely to be objective about the role of the Vatican in modern politics, birth control, companionate marriage, contraceptives and Marxism than a Stalinist about Titoism. And is it likely that a Catholic philosopher will be more objective about “atheistic materialism” than a Stalinist about pragmatism? Of course, in practise, there are probably quite a few Catholic teachers who do discuss Voltaire, birth control and materialism with at least enough objectivity to give their students a reasonably accurate notion of the views with which they disagree (more than that one cannot ask of any teacher). But in practise there are also some Stalinist teachers of whom this can be said. In fact, so long as there is even one CP teacher known to be intellectually fair to opposing ideas in his classroom, then any proposal for the outright expulsion of all CP teachers invokes guilt by association.

Hook must decide which it is he objects to: doctrinal imposition or party cells. If the former, then many non-Stalinist teachers can be shown to be as guilty as Stalinists; if the former, then Hook faces the obligation of drawing a usable line of distinction between doctrinal imposition and the sincere and vigorous expression of an opinion. But if he objects to party cells, then Hook is raising another question, namely: do teachers have the right to form branches of a political organization on the campus? Hook would undoubtedly reply that they do, but that he objects to conspiratorial organizations, a point which I shall discuss shortly. One thing should be clear: there is no necessary connection between doctrinal imposition and party cells; a fellow-traveller or CP member not functioning in a cell may express the party-line more faithfully than a CP member in a cell.

Consequently: non-CP members may be as guilty of doctrinal imposition as CP members and if Hook is to propose the expulsion of any teacher for such imposition he must, in fairness, propose the expulsion of all teachers, in or out of the CP, guilty of such behavior. Such a proposal, if carried out, would create a serious unemployment problem in the academic profession.

In actual life, it is impossible to prevent such imposition by teachers, and one may doubt whether it would be advisable to do so even if it were possible. If the university is to be a genuine intellectual center, it must confront the student with a variety of opinions, more or less reflecting those he will later meet in the outer world. The student must be taught to evaluate opinions, but he should not be insulated from any, even those of CP members.

In practise, what is the status of the Stalinist teacher? Here we reach the heart of the problem, and here Hook almost makes a convincing case.

If intellectual freedom involves the right to investigate and hold ideas without inhibition, then it must involve the right to act on those ideas; consequently, it is a violation of academic freedom to expel any teacher merely for belonging to a political party, no matter which. Difficult though it may be for Hook, or me, to understand how an adult intelligence trained in serious methods of inquiry can become a Stalinist, "we must acknowledge not only the possibility that such may happen but the fact that it has. And, if I understand Hook correctly, he is saying that the mere fact that a teacher reaches Stalinist opinions, believes, say, that Stalin is fighting to save the world peace or to build socialism in Russia, is no reason to take punitive measures against him.

But then Hook makes another point which is important: namely, that when a teacher joins the CP, even if as a consequence of sincere and serious investigation of political possibilities, he surrenders his right and ability to think and speak freely in or out of the classroom. In this, Hook is partly right. And it is important to be clear as to just where he is right and wrong.

**The Concealment of Affiliation**

He is wrong when he says that Stalinist teachers violate academic freedom because they meet secretly and "are fearful of exposure." Surely he must know that radicalism, or what is commonly taken for radicalism, has always been suspect in most American universities; that for a professor to admit to serious and committed radical views has meant and still often means to endanger the possibility of his winning tenure, promotions, research funds and social acceptance. There is consequently understandable reason and often considerable justification for Stalinists (who, no matter how wrongly, are usually taken to be radicals in the universities) to be "fearful of exposure." When, during the recent war, they were tolerated and accepted in American life more than ever before or since, they functioned on the campus with very considerable openness now, of the cold war, they are
being harried. To denounce Stalinist teachers for veiling their affiliations would be appropriate only if there were an intellectual atmosphere in the universities making for free and unpunished expression of all views, and only if this atmosphere were in turn sustained by a corresponding intellectual tolerance in the outer world. But to denounce Stalinist teachers for veiling their affiliations at a time when acknowledgment of them means possible loss of employment, is surely a rather dubious business.

Yet we must grant that Hook raises one highly serious point: that by the very nature of Stalinist discipline the teacher who joins the CP is unable to express himself freely. The mere fact, I would say, that he joins the CP does not mean that he is not acting as a free intellectual, for he is free to join or to quit whenever he wishes. But the discipline of the CP is such that it prevents the teacher from expressing himself critically (or at least tries to) on any segment of the CP line; in fact, it requires him to advocate the party line in its entirety regardless of his own opinions. Hook correctly says in this connection: “Usually, he [the CP teacher] squares this to himself with the reflection that the point on which he feels the party line is wrong is comparatively unimportant. But it is precisely this subordination to his total commitment, and his evaluation of what is important or unimportant in the light of a political objective, that makes it impossible for him to exercise the free criticism he would engage in were he loyal to the principles of scientific inquiry.” (Emphasis in original).

An Important Distinction

Now here a distinction is necessary. There are occasions when an organization has the right to insist that its members publicly refrain from criticizing its policy, even if they disagree with it. When a union decides to call a strike, it has the right to demand that those of its members who believe the strike unwise still quit work; otherwise, they would be violating the union’s central reason for existence. When a political party runs candidates for office, it usually has the right to demand that its members not support the candidates of an opposing party; otherwise, there no longer really are political parties. To take a more grandiose example: when, just before the Bolshevik Revolution, Zinoviev and Kamenev divulged the Bolshevik perspective of a quick ascent to power, Lenin had the right to urge their expulsion, though being a wise man he didn’t.

But such problems of political discipline rarely, if ever, arise in a classroom. The distinction between a strike struggle and a discussion of genetics, materialism or the historical role of Roosevelt is perfectly clear, and in almost no conceivable circumstance does a political party have the right to demand of teachers that they follow in the classroom the kind of discipline sometimes necessary in the world of social struggle. Thus, a teacher who actually behaved as the CP resolution quoted by Hook insists he behave—that is, for example, defend Lysenko in a classroom while privately convinced Lysenko is wrong—would obviously be surrendering his intellectual independence.

So we must grant Hook’s claim that when a teacher joins the CP, knowingly the kind of universal intellectual discipline it demands, he is, at least formally, surrendering his intellectual independence. But this does not yet provide us with an answer to the question: should Stalinist teachers be expelled? We have still to ask ourselves several questions:

Is this kind of surrender of intellectual independence different in kind from that indulged in by other, non-Stalinist teachers?

Do, in practise, Stalinist teachers behave in the way the party resolution bids them to?

And even if they do, would the consequences of expelling them from the universities be more harmful to intellectual freedom than the consequences of permitting them to continue teaching?

Now it is clear, I think, that the behavior of a Stalinist teacher in the classroom, in so far as intellectual freedom is concerned, is not qualitatively different from that of Catholic or reactionary or sometimes even liberal teachers. Doctrinal imposition that is not the product of immediate organizational dictation is not necessarily better than doctrinal imposition that is the product of such dictation. Hook has compared the teacher’s signing of a CP card with an economics teacher’s accepting money from the NAM for propaganda in the classroom, but I think the comparison invalid. In the latter case the economics teacher is guilty of venal behavior, though in practise he may not say anything different from what is said by another professor who propounds the NAM line out of sheer love. But the teacher who sells himself for money should be expelled while the teacher who expresses the NAM point of view because he believes it should not be expelled. Now when another teacher joins the CP he does so with no expectation of personal gain; quite the contrary, he can only face personal discrimination and hardship. In almost every case, the CP teacher holds to his views out of deep conviction; he actually believes in the CP line by and large; and even if he does refrain from criticizing it here and there in his classroom (which, of course, is insupportable) he does so for intellectual reasons, out of intellectual convictions. That, alas, is the way his mind works; and no teacher of standard competence should be expelled for the way his mind works.

How Stalinist Teachers Behave

How do Stalinist teachers actually behave? It is hard to say in any generalized way, for there seem to be wide variations. But it is quite certain that they
are seldom the party-line automatons the CP resolution quoted by Hook directs them to be and as Hook assumes they are. It must be remembered that many CP teachers are men quite competent in their fields, with a certain training in the methods of free intellectual inquiry. They are not ordinary Stalinist hacks. At the Washington hearings one of the accused professors, an anthropologist, said that, while a CP member, he had differences of opinion with the CP on "certain points in scientific doctrine." Whether or not this is true doesn't matter; what matters is that this teacher could make this statement publicly. In the U. S., the CP is not in a position to enforce the kind of intellectual discipline from its teacher-members that Stalinist movements can in those countries where it has state power. And since the CP knows this it allows its teacher-members a greater degree of latitude in the expression of opinion than it does other members. (I recall that when the well-known Stalinist Morris Schappes taught in a New York college, he usually—with what inner resentment I neither know nor care—had to adhere to the rules of intellectual freedom in his classroom.) And often, too, some CP teachers will go out of their way to show their independence by criticizing the party line. Perhaps this is insincere; but the very fact that it can happen undermines the view that a teacher, merely because he joins the CP, is never in a position to do anything but parrot the party-line. And once the possibility is admitted that a CP teacher might still be able to act with a certain simulacrum of intellectual independence, then clearly the criterion for expulsion can no longer be mere membership in the CP but must be the actual behavior of individuals.

The Threat to the Campus

Yet it would be absurd to deny that teachers who join the CP usually cease to function as free teachers should. To keep them in the faculty of a school means to risk the possibility that they will convert a few students, perhaps capture a little pocket of power here and there, etc. But is this, at present, a serious danger? Is it Stalinism which threatens intellectual liveliness and independence on the campus today? Of course not; the power of the CP on the campus is now infinitesimal, a power largely sustained by those who conduct—not political—but punitive campaigns against it.

Hook writes: "If removal of Communist Party members were to be used as a pretexts by other reactionary elements to hurl irresponsible charges against professors whose views they disapprove, a case might be made for suspending action." For a man whose mind is as cogent and realistic as Sidney Hook's, this statement is quite extraordinary. Were not the Washington expulsions the direct consequence of reactionary elements hurling irresponsible charges? (One of the charges was against a teacher, Melvin Rader, who, it has been conclusively shown, had no connection with the CP; he was forced to go to great pains, losing much money and time, in order to "clear" himself.) And isn't there at least an "atmospheric relationship," if not a direct causal one, between the Washington case and the subsequent expulsion of an Oregon professor for defending Lysenko's genetic system? But, most important of all, one must be willfully indifferent to the potentialities of one's proposals if one sees no serious danger in expelling teachers for being Communists at a time when the cold war becomes increasingly warm.

Reasons for Dismissal

There are, of course, instances in which it is quite proper to propose the discharge of a Stalinist teacher. Suppose a Stalinist who is assigned to teach physics devotes himself exclusively to discussing the wonders of Russia in his classroom. Or suppose a Stalinist teacher visibly discriminates against an anti-Stalinist student in grading. Or suppose, again, that a Stalinist teacher refuses his students the normal rights of discussion and conducts his class as if it were a local of the fur workers' union. In such instances, these teachers should be discharged, not because of their political views, but because they are not properly performing their duties as teachers—i.e., because of their individual behavior.

Hook offers two objections to this proposed procedure: it would involve spying on teachers and it would be difficult to distinguish CP members from fellow-travellers. If it is necessary to "spy" on a teacher to find out if he is misusing his classroom, then the overwhelming likelihood is that he is not; consequently, there is no reason to discharge him. When teachers act as petty tyrants, the news travels very quickly in the universities. (But what about those teachers who are subtle and clever in spreading the CP line? Whoever asks that question is clearly determined to expel teachers merely for their opinion.) As for Hook's second objection, it is meaningful only if one's premise is that the automatic elimination of all CP members from the campus is desirable. But if one judges teachers by their individual behavior, then it is quite conceivable that a fellow-traveller might merit expulsion while a CP teacher might not. The essential criterion is: how does this teacher behave in the classroom, not what does he think.

In his articles Hook continually makes the comparison between fascists and Stalinists. If, he says, people do not object to the expulsion of a fascist teacher, why then object to the expulsion of a Stalinist? Which is true, but irrelevant.

Teachers holding fascist views should not be discharged merely because of those views. If a man like Lawrence Dennis were a competent member of a faculty, it would be most unwise, particularly in the present atmosphere, to advocate his discharge. The expression of fascist opinion in intellectual terms should not be prohibited. But if a teacher taunts Jew-
Is an Underground Possible in Russia?

Experiences and Problems of the Resistance Movement

This question is of far more than simple practical significance. The existence of an underground would indicate that the contradictions in society find a way out, though in devious fashion, and that society itself is not rotting away as in the case of all the Asiatic despotisms where all opposition was suppressed. The suppression of contradictions in society is the Asiatic type of development; the growth and clash of contradictions is the European type. Modern civilization could develop only in the European social climate.

The replacement of democracies by dictatorships was known to all the civilizations which had hitherto existed. But only the European dictators (absolutists) were unable to concentrate in their hands all the power over society; they were compelled to share it, as with the landowning class, with the church, etc. In Asiatic societies individual freedom did not find such clear expression in private property as in Europe. Asia never knew the Roman law which so clearly defined the rights of a member of a society based on ownership. Today, when society is moving toward the abolition of private property in the means of production, we cannot overlook the extremely important role of this institution in the past. We cannot because we must make clear to ourselves exactly what in so-
cialist society will take the place of private property as a safeguard of individual freedom.

Thus, the European dictatorships can be likened to the shell of an ordinary nut, hard enough to protect the kernel growing within it but permitting the new shoots to break through it, whereas Asiatic despotism grew into a shell so hard that the shoots of the new society could not break through, and they perished.

**The Clash of Influences**

Russia was always the land where Asiatic and European influences clashed. The institution of private property there bore no European character before Peter the Great. But even after Peter, the state manifested a tendency to expand public rights into the domain of civic relations as well. Thus, even at the beginning of the 19th century, the Czarist administrator Arakcheev tried to introduce into Russia military settlements where the individuals and their possessions became the property of the state. In contradistinction to Europe, not only were the peasants enslaved but so were the higher class of the nobility.

The Russian Marxist, G. Plekhanov, wrote in his *History of Russian Social Thought*: “Already in the second half of the 16th century the serving gentry [nobility] was completely enslaved by the state, and this enslavement—perhaps to a greater extent than the enslavement of the peasantry—made the socio-political regime of Muscovite Russia akin to similar regimes of the great Eastern despotsisms.” (Vol. I, p. 79.) Another historian, the prominent liberal political leader, P. Milyukov, wrote on this question: “The Moscow prince did not have to enter into struggle with the somewhat powerful feudal elements. He preferred therefore to learn his political art not from Poland or Western Europe but from Byzantium, from the Western Slavs and perhaps even from Turkey. The system of creating a military-administrative class dependent on the government was taken by the Moscow rulers from the East.” (Outline on the History of Russian Culture, Moscow, 1918, part 1.)

Somewhere else Milyukov states: “The national ideology of Muscovite Russia was not chosen haphazardly or arbitrarily. Of the three border ideologies: city municipal-republican (Novgorod Pskov), Shlyakhta-feudal (Polish-Lithuanian) and Byzantine Turkish—the last was the most suitable for Moscow.” (P. Milyukov, National Problem, 1925, p. 118.)

Russia was the last of the European countries to liquidate absolutism in 1917, and that only thanks to the cultural and political influence of Europe, which had always brought Russia out of the state of stagnation and ossification.

The Bolshevik dictatorship in its first phase (Leninist) was a dictatorship of more or less European type since the contradictions remained unliquidated and even open. These contradictions were represented by the state, on the one side, and by the workers’ trade unions as well as peasants cooperatives on the other.

These organizations collaborated with the state authority but, at the same time, were independent of it and even counterposed to it.

The victory of Stalinism signified for Russia the victory of the Asiatic influences and of the Asiatic type of development, though it continued to bear the name of the “dictatorship of the proletariat.” It may be noted, in passing, that even during Stalin’s struggle with the opposition in Russia, it was generally recognized that it was not so much a struggle of political platforms as of Bolshevik leaders who had always remained in Russia against Bolshevik emigrants who had resided for long periods in Western Europe. And the formula “Building socialism in one country” (Lenin did not use the word “building” but “victory,” that is, just the conquest of political power) meant that Bolshevism was forsaking internationalist proletarian positions for native Russian positions.

During the twenty years of Stalinist rule (beginning with 1929-30) Marxist teaching became an empty ritual and the Russian imperialist doctrine became predominant. It revived the spirit of Asiatic traditions, in particular the tradition of unlimited absolutism which penetrates even into the sphere of private-civic relations. Basing himself on these traditions, Stalin liquidated all the institutions which safeguarded individual freedom. And if the liquidation of small working peasants’ property was motivated by the tasks of the socialist transformation of the village, the liquidation of workers’ consumers cooperative and their replacement by more costly bureaucratic state trade, could not be similarly motivated, nor could socialist arguments be applied to the liquidation of self-acting village communes and their replacement by an economy of lower, standard bureaucratic type—the agricultural artel (Kolkhoz). The liquidation of the rights of the trade unions and their transformation into bureaucratic appendages to the state—the capitalist—lacked all justification.

**An Enemy of Private Property**

But it would be one-sided to regard the Stalinist dictatorship as a phenomenon absolutely alien to the world revolutionary process. Had this been the case, the tremendous influence of the USSR on the left workers’ movement could not be understood. Subjectively, the USSR of today has nothing in common with the working class. But as a new social formation (the state—the capitalist), it is a mortal enemy of the system of private property and therefore utilizes in its struggle against it all contradictions, in particular the struggle of the working class and of the colonial peoples. Out of its selfish national aims the Russian empire links up with this liberation struggle in order to crush its rivals and establish everywhere the system of state-capitalist satellites.

In this sense Stalinism fulfills in the world revolutionary process the function of Bonapartism, called...
upon, like its Napoleonic predecessor, to clean the
Agean stables of Europe but this time not of the rem-
nants of feudalism but of capitalism, and perhaps also
of private property, if this is not accomplished in good
time by democratic socialism. However, Napoleonic
Bonapartism was not a dictatorship of the Asiatic
type. Within its depth there developed freely the eco-
nomically independent class of the bourgeoisie, which
even at the height of Bonapartist bloom introduced
correctives into the political and strategic plans of
Bonaparte.

The prominent student of Napoleonic wars, the
Russian academician, Tarlé, wrote on this score: “The
French merchants prepared that event which was the
first to shake Napoleon’s might. The bread specula-
tors, by an artificially created scarcity, forced Napo-
leon to delay his Russian campaign for another two
months, that is, for a time of the year when it was
too late.” And in Napoleon’s most difficult days of
1815, the Paris Bourse automatically increased his
misfortunes by lowering the rate on government
bonds. What social forces in the USSR would be able
to make use of the misfortunes of Stalinism in simi-
lar fashion?

**Stalinism and Slave Labor**

If we find therefore in the Stalinist dictatorship
elements of Bonapartism, we must at the same time
not forget for a moment that the similarity is only a
partial one and that Bonapartism paved the way for
the free bourgeois society, while Stalinism is an own-
erless social formation where slave labor is becoming
the inalienable characteristic of the industrial pro-
cess.

In the USSR there are not independent social
layers capable of correcting Stalinist society even in
covert fashion. If the weakness of Bonapartism be-
fore the growing new forces was its historic merit,
the strength of Stalinism, which destroys not only the
remnants of the old but the shoots of the new system
(workers’ coöperation, agricultural communes, work-
ers’ opposition) as well, is its historic crime.

Of course, every political regime will find its jus-
tification or, as Radek once said: “Once in power, the
formulation will be found.” Stalinism can say: while
there exists the powerful world of private property,
whoever is in the way and hampers the struggle
against capitalism, be it even a left-wing movement
—is a traitor and an enemy, and must be destroyed.
This formula would have been just had Stalinism been
a part of the workers’ front, but it cannot be so re-
garded, and therefore Stalinism is the enemy of capi-
talism only in the same sense as Hitlerism was. It can
serve only as a negative argument against capitalism:
Behold what horrors the capitalist regime can bring.

Theoretically only a left underground is conceiva-
bale in the USSR. With the liquidation of private
property, the right-wing underground lost its basis, in so
far as the restoration of private property became im-
possible. Today, Stalinism has lost all fear of the
White emigration, and a former Denikin officer can
return to the USSR without apprehension. He is not
feared there. Only the opposition from the left is dan-
gerous to Stalinism, for it can say: “Good; no return
to private property but down with new owners as
well—the owners through the state, who exploit the
peoples of the USSR.”

Against that kind of program Stalinism is helpless
because its strength lies in the struggle with the old
property system. In that struggle it was helped by
Marxism, in that struggle the working class was in-
capable of offering resistance to it. But now Marxism
comes out against Stalinism (against slave labor in
the USSR, no matter what the justification for it
might be). Stalinism is losing its proletarian ideologi-
cal weapon and must hastily re-form along nationalist
lines. Whoever sees present-day Soviet films cannot
but be struck by vulgar Russian chauvinism (for in-
stance, the destruction of Berlin is shown to be fol-
lowed by bragging: “And here is our Moscow!” What
appeal can this have for the Berlin workers?) This
does not occur painlessly, however, and Stalinism tries
to save itself by ever new purges, destroying the rem-
nants of communist elements.

Any mass movement in the USSR against Stali-
ism, any underground must therefore inevitably oc-
upy left positions. This is precisely what has hap-
pened with the movement known under the name of
the Ukrainian Liberation Army (UPA).

**Conditions for the Rise of UPA**

The question arises: How could an anti-Stalinist
underground and even an armed struggle arise in the
USSR when before the war Stalinism had liquidated
all germs of any opposition? Three reasons condition
the rise of the Ukrainian underground and of the
UPA: (1) The fact that Stalinism has definitely gone
over from the struggle against restorationist counter-
revolutionary elements who had lost all significance
after the war, to the struggle against the democrat-
ization of the Soviet regime. That change is what
created the general crisis of Stalinism. (2) The gen-
eral weakening of the Soviet police system after the
war. (3) The inclusion in the USSR after the war of
Western-Ukrainian lands which possessed the per-
fected apparatus of a revolutionary underground.

That the UPA and the revolutionary underground
arose only in the Western Ukrainian regime annexed
to the USSR after the war testifies to the fact that the
first two conditions were insufficient for the rise of an
underground in the USSR. Although the fact that
Stalinism went over to the struggle against the left
had produced a general crisis and created “open
spaces” for the revolutionists, these spaces could not
be occupied, for there were no revolutionary cadres.
The ferocious Asiatic system of Stalinism not only
destroyed the opposition, it atomized society, disrupt-
ed public opinion; a pre-war inhabitant of Soviet Rus-
sia could share his views with no one, there were no
discussions and ideas could not develop in the con-
sciousness of separate individuals.

Before the war Stalinism evolved an absolutely
new type of man, mindful of authority and holding
no convictions of his own. His highest virtue was the
ability to foresee the wishes of his superiors, just as
in capitalist society it is considered a virtue to fore-
see and utilize market conjunctures. Stalinism suc-
cceeded almost completely in atrophying the social in-
stincts. It mercilessly removed all buffers between the
state and the human personality, inclusive of school
children, parental guardianship over whom is under
the strictest governmental control. Therefore were
the Soviet man to gain freedom, he would not know
at first how to use it. He is unaccustomed to it, and
the youth know nothing of it.

The Terrorist Groups

That is why after the war the genuinely Soviet
lands knew no political underground organizations
though there were “open spaces” and many had gone
into hiding (army deserters, refugees from concen-
tration camps). These people sought individual cover
and, at best, created semi-criminal, semi-political or-
ganizations. A terrorist group, “Black Cat,” which
operates in the cities of the Ukraine, White Russia
and even in Russia, is such an organization. It does
away with prominent NKVD-men, robs them of docu-
ments. The “Black Cat” proclaims no political pro-
gram but its terrorist acts have some political signifi-
cance nonetheless since a purely criminal organiza-
tion would not engage in mass murders of prominent
Soviet officials.

On the other hand, such an organization is an ex-
pression only of despair and is incapable of becoming
a strong revolutionary force. Nevertheless, the exist-
ence of the “Black Cat,” under the conditions of So-
viet urbanism, would have been utterly impossible
before the war and testifies to the loosening up of the
Soviet police system. On the other hand, the fact that
the “empty spaces” are not filled by truly revolu-
tionary political forces testifies to the fact that Stalinism
has completely degenerated into a dictatorship of the
Asiatic type, which has destroyed not only the physi-
cal but even the psychological prerequisites for fur-
ther development.

Therefore, without revolutionary intervention
from without, the USSR is doomed to rot. That is
why some elements among the emigrants, even social-
ists, who have no faith in the revolutionary struggle
against “Bolshevism,” have seized on the only re-
aining means—the war. And a weird spectacle pre-
sents itself: socialists in the role of war instigators.
This is a symptom of emigrant degeneration and is a
position unworthy even of discussion in socialist
ranks. People refuse to understand that Stalinism is
the reverse side of capitalist society and that it exists
so long as capitalism exists, or at least, capitalist mo-

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The Nationalism of the Oppressed

This was the nationalism of an oppressed people,
by its nature a progressive one. However, it was di-
rected not only against Polish imperialism but also
against the Soviet regime, which was degenerating
into imperialism, and also against communism and
socialism in general. This nationalism therefore soon
fell under the influence of fascism and Nazism, which
were then sweeping Europe. The ideology of reaction-
ary militant nationalism became dominant within
Ukrainian nationalism at the beginning of the war
although, at the same time, not a few people from the
CPWU and of the youth who sought in the nationalist
movement not domination but national and social
equality (not having found it in the Communist move-
ment) had gone over to it.

At any rate, up to the war there were two tendif-
cies within Ukrainian nationalism under Poland: one
standing on the platform of reactionary nationalism
of the master-nation (fascism) and seeking support
in Nazi Germany, and the other—standing on the
platform of progressive nationalism of oppressed na-
tions and approaching the ideology of revolutionary
socialism. The first tendency was ideologically impotent since it was torn by contradictions. On the one hand, it struggled against the subjugation of the Ukrainian people and, on the other, it itself advocated the subjugation of others. But at the beginning of the war this tendency became dominant in Western Ukraine in conjunction with the rule of German Nazism in Eastern Europe. The other, the anti-fascist tendency of Western-Ukrainian nationalism, was the original combination of nationalism with revolutionary socialism.

Views of Anti-Fascist Nationalism

The liquidation of private property in Soviet Ukraine is considered progressive, the kolkhozes—a higher form of economy but it demanded that this belong to the Ukrainian people themselves, not to Russian imperialism. Not bound by Marxist doctrine, nor by socialist traditions, this movement was more daring and more irreconcilable in its criticism of “Bolshevism,” completely denying that it had any revolutionary mission and regarding it as the mortal enemy of the toilers. It could not accept the idea that Bolshevism could have retained any revolutionary significance whatever in the objective historical sense, and in that sense this tendency foresaw the final stage of the Russian Revolution which is now taking form within the USSR and the meaning of which consists in the cessation of the process of destruction and in directing social consciousness from the struggle for merely historical aims to the struggle above all for the living person. Not the individual for the revolution but all that exists and all the conquests of the revolution for the individual.

Ukrainian nationalism added another idea, the idea of the nation as the final aim of the revolutionary process. A proletarian revolution is not made in a cosmopolitan void, but in concrete conditions of a given nation, which Stalinism turned into a fiction but which is a historic reality. Being alien to a sane national idea but incapable of breaking out of concrete national reality, Stalinism has actually capitulated before Russian imperialist nationalism. Leninism solved the national problem by a compromise and in a harmonic blending of the all-human with the national. Stalinism, having rejected the compromise, rejected the idea of national freedom. But in order to realize this utopia it was compelled to base itself on . . . Russian nationalism.

It is in the organizational field, not the ideological that Ukrainian nationalism has played by far the greater role. Having passed for hundreds of years through the most perfect German organizational school, having organizational experience in its blood, so to say, and differing completely in this sense from the population of the Soviet (Russian) Ukraine where there was no organizational school whatever but only Zaporozhe-Haidamak and Makhno elemental forces, the population of Western-Ukraine, in the form of nationalism, created an organization and worked out a revolutionary technique of a quality whose equal it is difficult to find in the history of the revolutionary movements. In the last years before the war and especially in the war period, the organization of the Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) actually controlled the life of over eight million Ukrainians of Western Ukraine, whose entire population is around fourteen million. The OUN had the greatest influence in Galicia, the former province of the Austro-Hungarian empire.

During the war, through the efforts of various Ukrainian political organizations, there was created in the rear of the Germans a partisan movement which formed into the Ukrainian Liberation Army (UPA). The OUA actually dominated over the entire Western Ukraine and only the industrial centers and the railroad stations were in the hands of the Hitlerites. The Hitlerites retained in their hands only the railroad centers and the railroad stations, which looked like eighteenth century fortifications—surrounded by double log walls, buried under earth from within. These fortresses were guarded by small soldier garrisons and formed protection for the German army’s contact with the Eastern front. In the rout of the German armies in the East, no small role was played by the UPA. When the Soviet armies came into the Western Ukraine, the UPA took the road of struggle against the new occupants who brought with them a frightful terror, accusing everyone of “betrayal” and connections with Nazism. At that time, the UPA finally liquidated various political groupings and the whole movement became subordinated to the OUN. The program of the movement reflected the abandonment of the ideas of reactionary nationalism.

The UPA and OUN were joined by many Soviet elements, among whom there were people who had gone through the Marxian political school and who were theoretically much stronger than the old OUN cadres. On the other hand, these cadres, too, saw in the Soviet Ukraine a new life and above all a new village. Before them was not the downtrodden peasant whom they saw in the Western Ukraine but an energetic worker of a large industrialized agricultural economy, who hated Stalinism but did not want any return to small property holdings.

Program of the Underground

All this resulted in the entire underground OUN and UPA adopting the social-economic program of socialism: in the independent Ukrainian republic a democratic regime with socialized means of production, with three social layers—workers, peasants and the intelligentsia. Ideologically, in the ranks of the UPA there exist several tendencies, beginning with revolutionary Marxism (Gornovoy) and ending with consistent nationalists, hostile on principle to the ideology of social democratism, and rejecting all class struggle. Their ideologist, M. Poltava, says, however:
"When the Ukrainian people acquire full political independence and build their life on just democratic foundations, then and only then will it be possible to place the principle of socialized property fully at the service of the Ukrainian people. Only then will this principle become the basis for a genuinely happy, prosperous and cultured life, and a mighty factor in the development of the productive forces of the Ukraine. Return to capitalism under the conditions of the Ukraine would in all respects be a step backward, a regression." (Position of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement, p. 28.)

In other words, Poltava is a socialist but he came to socialism not through the doctrine but through living Ukrainian reality. And this is all the more striking because his doctrine is a petty-bourgeois nationalist one and it capitulates fully before reality. This is the most telling argument against all the restorationists (Ukrainian and other) who dream of the restoration of private property in the means of production in the USSR. Therefore also Poltava's struggle against socialism must be regarded as a misunderstanding. It is rather a struggle against the practice of the European Socialist and Communist parties, a protest against their opportunism, imperialism or totalitarianism and a servile attitude to counterrevolutionary Stalinism.

Thus, Western-Ukrainian nationalism, frustrated by the ideas of the great revolution, has created such a mighty organization that the dreadful machine of Stalinist terror has thus far been unable to overcome it. Even the agreement of the four powers—the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania—on a united struggle against the UPA has only restricted the scope of this movement, driven it underground; but it has not destroyed it. The rebels feel that the NKVD is not all-powerful, that it is possible to fight against it. Thus under the conditions of the Asiatic despotism of Stalinism there has appeared a European characteristic, an antithesis—the organized rejection of despotism, struggle for the highest stage of development (ownershipless democracy). This factor could not appear in the native Soviet lands (even though Ukrainian) which lived in the cultural climate of Russia.

The Soviet man was so debilitated by Stalinist Asiatism, so de-Europeanized, that he lost hope in overcoming Stalinism from within. The rejection of Stalinism came from without, from the cultural climate of Europe (Western Ukraine) where there was preserved not only the social, non-atomized person but where almost for three decades there were trained cadres of revolutionary idealists, disciplined and self-sacrificing, taught by the newest methods of the underground and the struggle against totalitarianism. These men could not only stand up against the NKVD and retain the underground in the Western Ukraine, but they spread it to Soviet Ukraine where all the prerequisites existed, but where the organization and the man-idealist with faith in victory were lacking.

Thus within the conditions of the Ukraine a problem of the greatest world-historic importance is being resolved: Will the anti-Stalinist underground survive in the USSR? Will the Ukrainian rebels and men of the underground establish in Soviet reality the factor denying Asiatic despotism, that is, will they succeed in shifting Soviet society on the road of development and not stagnation? Or, in other words, will the Ukrainian revolutionary resistance push the Stalinist system from the Asiatic to the European road of development?

A. BABENKO

**Purges in Bulgaria**

*(Continued from page 226)*

two months reveal an alarming economic state of affairs and chaos in the transport system. The passive resistance of the peasants to the dictates of Sofia is obviously the Government's greatest problem. The autumn requisition quotas for wheat and rye have been met with 90 per cent, and for oats with 80 per cent delivery. It is most interesting and significant, however, that the districts round the Black Sea and the Rumanian border (the districts nearest Russia) have fulfilled their quotas with deliveries of 143, 112 and even 219 per cent. The districts bordering on Jugoslavia, however, are seriously lagging behind: for example, Breznik 22 per cent, Tran 27 per cent, Belogradchik 20 per cent. Even more revealing are the figures for the Macedonian districts—59, 54, 42 and 20 per cent. Clearly, the "Tito influence" does exist in Bulgaria, and especially in Bulgarian Macedonia.

The Usual Scapegoats

For the defects in the transport system "Nationalistic and anti-Soviet elements" are blamed. The goods trains are said to have been running at an average speed of 11/2 miles per hour. Special "railway tribunals" have been set up now for "the quick investigation and trial" of wreckers. "Soviet transport specialists" are to "help the reorganization of the transport system."

As Chervenkov appears to have the complete confidence and support of the Soviets his ruthless regime is there to stay. How many Cabinet ministers and Central Committee members will be actually executed for treason, espionage and spying is a matter of speculation, but Chervenkov obviously wants to frighten the remaining Communists into complete submission. His purge has drastically affected the army, the police, the party machine and the economic ministries—the pillars of the Communist dictatorship.

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Stalinism has ample reason to congratulate itself. It is so unique, free to such an extent from significant historical parallel, so defiant of standard classification, as to guarantee it exceptional success in its work of universal mystification. It has convinced 90 per cent of the world that it is the legitimate and logical continuation of a revolution that was the most democratic, most popular and most equalitarian in all history. In this grotesque mystification, it has the support of 99 per cent of its articulate opponents, who do not question the claim of Stalinism but only read it back into the revolution itself. Because this support is involuntary and even hostile, it is all the more gratifying to Stalinism.

Unanswered Questions About Stalinism

However, to say that Stalinism flowed naturally out of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia does not, even if it could be proved, add too much to our understanding. It does not dispel the mystification, it only enhances it. The critics generally leave unanswered the vital questions about Stalinism which is, after all, a living movement in modern society: What are its social roots and origins? What is its social significance in the world today? What are its perspectives for mankind tomorrow?

An intelligible and rational answer to these questions calls for respectful attention to the historical record; the ability to relate to each other those forces, social and individual, that are relevant to generalization, which presupposes the ability to distinguish dissimilar or antagonistic forces and the significant from the insignificant and the incidental; an awareness that history is made by the ebb and flow of the conflict of classes and class interests. It calls for a method, in other words; for a scientific method which we know as Marxism.

Scientific discipline in social and political problems is, unfortunately, rejected on all hands today with an impatient gesture. "What good does it do, what good has it done?" asks all those who expected scientific analysis to obviate scientific action, instead of being only the indispensable prerequisite to it. The result of this reaction, at least in the case of Stalinism, is that the decisive questions are not only unanswered but as a rule are not even dealt with by the critics. Generally, it is either a case of sheer ignorance of the way in which to deal with the questions, or of such political prejudices as prevent dealing with them—or both. So the critics confine themselves to an examination of the personal history, the political-personal history, the personal character of Stalin. Such a study will explain everything, or nearly everything! It is not Stalinism that will give us the key to Stalin, but Stalin who will give us the key to Stalinism!

The results of this approach are hilarious, infuriating and saddening in turn. We read, in countless versions, how Lenin was circumvented or outwitted or defeated, how the same thing happened to Trotsky, and then to Zinoviev, and then to Bukharin, and to virtually all the leaders of the Bolshevik revolution—none of whom were political children; how the same or substantially the same thing happened to scores of the most outstanding political thinkers and leaders of the bourgeois world: Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, Sikorski, Mikolajczyk, Chiang Kai-shek, Herriot, Michael, and heaven alone knows who else—few of whom were political idiots. And what we read does indeed have a very stout kernel of truth in it.

The Social Approach to Stalinism and Stalin

Now, if we were to understand the social significance of Stalinism, which involves an understanding of its relationship to other social forces, all the pieces would fall into place, so to speak, and the great mystery cease to be a mystery at all. It would then become clear that all those who had occasion to come into grips with Stalin and were "circumvented or outwitted or defeated," failed not because they were inferior in intellect, political skill or other talent (although some of them were) or because they misread or underrated his character and qualities (although some of them did). What they misread or underrated was the social force he came to represent—and so ably, too!—or else they themselves acted for social forces which were and in some cases still are incapable of coping with Stalinism. That, if we may say so, is the scientific approach to the question.

Without it, only one conclusion is left. It is that the real cause of Stalin’s triumphs lies in his personal attributes. But since these were triumphs not only over political dwarfs but also over some of the most outstanding personalities of our time—including some of the greatest captains of different classes and of many nations—it must necessarily be acknowledged that in Stalin we have a figure of truly enormous caliber. The statement by Kirov that Stalin is "the greatest man of all times, of all epochs and peoples" must then be regarded not as an insult to human intelligence but as a fair approximation of the truth.

Yet it is not the truth. It is a legend, promulgated with dithyrambic explicitness in officially approved biographies or accepted with unwitting implicitness in the unofficial biographies. The measure of the man
can only be taken with an understanding of the movement. While Stalin played the outstanding and decisive role in developing the social force that bears his name, to the extent that any individual could shape and influence it, it is that social force that created and shaped the Stalin of our time and gives us the key to what he has become. The most talented of psychoanalysts could study Stalin for years and perhaps produce an interesting portrait of the patient, without bringing us much more than a step closer to an understanding of Stalinism. We would therefore make the categorical statement that since every biography of Stalin pursues a political purpose, as is inevitable and proper, no written portrait of Stalin is worth more than a casual glance if it is not based on a study of the anatomy of Stalinism.

It is from this standpoint that we examine the four portraits that have recently been drawn of Stalin (even though one of them calls itself a biography of Lenin).*

**Walter Duranty**

Readers familiar with the views Mr. Duranty has expressed in his dispatches from Moscow as the New York Times correspondent there and in his several books on Russia, will be neither astounded nor enlightened by his latest contribution. In the interests of fair-trade practices, the reader should be warned that the advertisements for the book which suggest that it will answer the spectacular question of who will succeed Stalin, are unwarranted. Duranty no more knows who will succeed Stalin than he knows how Stalin succeeded Lenin. But apart from that, the book is not a hoax, at least not to anyone acquainted with Duranty’s rôle and his views. It faithfully keeps the promise implicit in any writings on Russia to which he signs his name. The author produces what he has so long given you the right to expect from him, no more but also no less.

Duranty has a purpose in life which he has pursued for a couple of dozen years with adequate consistency. It is to sell Stalinism, or as much of it as possible, to that vague aggregate known as the American public. This does not mean that his book is simply a translation into English of what appears in the Moscow Pravda. That is already done by the Daily Worker. To be sure, Duranty does essentially the same thing, but it is the different way in which he does it that distinguishes him from the faithful employees of the Russian translation bureau.

The out-and-out Stalinists, who wear their badge of servitude openly and honestly, merely repeat that

Russia is paradise and Stalin is god. This contention appeals only to a limited number of people. Duranty appeals to the larger number who are less susceptible to the magnetic power of the official propaganda. He claims that Russia is not paradise and Stalin is not god, or even a saint—not he, not at all. His potential victim—the average reader in the American public—immediately pricks up his ears: this man can’t be a Stalinist!

The fact is, continues Duranty, that Russia is inferior to the United States in more than one respect. (No doubt, murmurs the reader.) For one thing, it does not have democracy in our sense of the word. (The reader nods sagely.) Of course, it does have it in the Russian sense of the word. (That might well be, thinks the reader, who is not sure of what the Russian sense of the word is.) After all, it didn’t have democracy in any sense of the word under the czar. (I guess it didn’t at that, the reader agrees.) You know, they’ve got to have tough leaders, because the people wouldn’t know what to do without them. They’re pretty dumb omen, these Russians, not like Americans [the reader’s chest swells slightly], and they are not used to self-government—something like the freed negroes in the South after the Civil War. Somebody’s got to lead them for their own good, don’t you think? (Something to that.)

—As for Stalin, he’s a pretty shrewd sort of chap. Of course, he doesn’t have too many scruples about getting what he wants and thinks is good. Fact is, he doesn’t let anybody stand in his way. But after all, politics is a pretty dirty business, as you and I know, don’t we? All politicians are pretty much the same—some just get away with more than others because they’re a little smarter. (The reader joins in the sophisticated grin and relaxes in his chair.) Naturally, there are a lot of soreheads who are against Stalin, but you know how it is between the “ins” and the “outs.” (I certainly do!) Mind you, Stalin has killed off a lot of people, but so did Lenin, and that’s how things always go with Russians who are not like we Americans. (Hmmm!) Besides, you can’t make an omelette without breaking the eggs, now can you? (This seems to be confirmed by the reader’s own experience.) Anyway, the Russians worship Stalin, and being Russians they’re satisfied with the way things are going. (Being Russians they would be, muses the reader.)

—Of course, they don’t understand us the way they should, but if we understood them it would be easier for them to understand us and there’d be less trouble all around. (Sounds reasonable, says the reader who is by now ready to join the American Council for Russian Friendship or some such flytrap.) All they want is to build up something they call socialism. But they’re terribly scared of us. (Is that a fact?) So they keep up their armed forces, even though you and I know there is no need for that. But they won’t even produce one-third as much steel next year as we

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produced four years ago, so there’s no need for us being scared of them, now is there? (Doesn’t look like it.) My own guess is that they really want peace, and, off the record, Molotov once said as much to me at a banquet. (You actually met Molotov?) In fact, if we threw them a few concessions, I would wager that the whole cold war would come to an end. (The reader becomes thoughtful over the simple but fair way in which the problem is treated.)

There is a simplified but fair condensation of the Duranty approach and presentation, aimed at enticing philistines who like to think of themselves as cynics, ignoramuses who want a quick and easy digest of the problem so that they can discuss it authoritatively in a Pullman smoker, and all those who want a “practical” solution to a “practical” question from a “practical” writer.

What is to be learned in Duranty’s book about Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky, the Russian Revolution, Stalinism and the leading Stalinists, is worth absolutely nothing. He throws no light on any of these. But he does throw light on himself, as an individual and as a type. That alone justifies the space devoted to his writings.

His portraits of the members of the Political Bureau are almost pure Horatio Alger. They are copies of the standard pictures drawn by the Stalinist lie factory, one of whose largest departments is devoted to the fabrication of official biographies to correspond with the fabrication of officials. Duranty deviates from the lines only to the extent required to prove that he has not photographed the originals but copied them freehand. Most of these members are nonentities. Before these lines appear in print, any one of them can vanish into the void from which he came without anything being changed — like Voznosensky, who was not saved from dismissal by Duranty’s eulogies, or Kaganovich. Stalin is the only one who really counts, and that is clear from Duranty’s book.

Stalin as Lenin’s Successor

Duranty describes Stalin as the logical and legitimate successor to Lenin, from whom he differs in no essential except, perhaps, that his execution of Lenin’s program is a tremendously successfully improvement on the original. Being a reporter who writes on the fly, Duranty does not have time and space for all the pertinent facts about the relationship between Lenin and Stalin. And since he has acquired a purpose in life, which is as worthy as it is rare, it is appropriate, is it not, that only those facts be chosen that fit the purpose. But what if there are not enough of them to fill out? For Duranty, that is no great problem. He learned long ago to write as he pleases.

How did Lenin come to power? His bitterest critic, after arguing that he used trickery, or force, or a thousand and one other devices, would be compelled to acknowledge that these alone explain little, if anything. Lenin triumphed in open political conflict with other politicians and political movements, with a clear, persistently-presented political program, and only after he had gained the conscious, freely-given support of masses of people. It may be argued that these masses did not represent an arithmetical majority of the population, but none denies that they numbered millions upon millions of people. That is the towering fact, and it cannot be denied even if it is argued that these millions were mistaken or misled in the support they gave the Bolsheviks.

How did Hitler come to power? Again, whether Hitler or his program is condemned or praised, whether he took power legally or illegally, democratically or by a stroke of state, none denies that he triumphed in open political conflict with other movements or that he won the deliberate, freely-given support of masses. It can be argued that these masses were social rubbish, that they were won by demagogy, that they were reactionary, that they were misled, that they were the minority, or anything else you want, but the fact that Hitler did not come to power without openly winning the support of millions simply cannot be denied.

But Stalin? What social force did he represent? What masses did he win in open political conflict with others? Every observer knows that neither the Russian masses as a whole, nor any substantial part of them, ever had the opportunity to express their support of Stalin at any stage of his bid for power; or to put it in another way, that every advance to power made by Stalin after the death of Lenin was achieved from above, bureaucratically, in the dark, conspiratorially, and in every case, the mass, even if only the mass of the party membership, was called upon to approve not a contemplated but an accomplished step. This is the rule that applies to the stages of Stalin’s rise to power, and there is not one single exception to it.

How Stalin Won Power

This is so big a fact, so characteristic, decisive and instructive (at least, it should be) that even Duranty is obliged to acknowledge it — without realizing it! Stalin is now at the top, says Duranty, “but that does not answer the questions how he did it and what he thinks of it.” What he thinks of it, Duranty doesn’t know, so we need not wait for his answer. But there is an answer to the first question, which is of paramount interest. Here is Duranty’s answer, literally:

To cut the first answer short one may say that he did it the hard way, by slow steady plugging, by intrigue and patience, and at last by the use of force.

But where are the people, the masses, the millions — those whose open support Lenin (and even Hitler, or Churchill, or Roosevelt, or Truman, or Atlee)
needed before coming to power? They do not exist for Duranty, except, perhaps, as political cattle, which is not the least of the reasons why he is so strongly attracted to Stalinism. Stalin did it “the hard way” (definition: plugging, intrigue, patience plus force). But how did the hard way manage to triumph over the easy way, as exemplified, presumably, by Lenin and Trotsky? That, too, has a simple answer: Stalin had it in him!

That he had it in him from the beginning is indicated by fact that Lenin chose him to carry the red torch in Russia after the abortive Revolution of 1905—9, and later to be General Secretary of the party.

What Stalin had in him is not so easy to determine. Whatever it was, it did not come out of him in the 1905 revolution or the 1917 revolution. In the former, he played no role at all; in the latter, his role was, by all accounts, decidedly minor, subordinate, auxiliary, gray, and so far as political leadership is concerned, it was down to zero. This is so notorious a fact that Duranty does not have one word to say about what Stalin actually did in the Bolshevik revolution. Lenin and Trotsky (we speak of them not so much as individuals, but as political types) were “chosen” openly by millions and it was this choice that accounted for their rise to great positions of leadership and power. Stalin was “chosen” by . . . Lenin, or by the Political Bureau, or by the Central Committee—always at the top, from above. Duranty does not even claim more for his protagonist, and it is indeed the outstanding and most significant characteristic of Stalin as a political type. We will presently see why.

But not even this low and revealing claim of Duranty’s is warranted. There is no record of Lenin having “chosen” Stalin to “carry the red torch in Russia” after 1905—6. Like many other “facts” in Duranty’s book, this one is pure invention. Stalin was then virtually unknown, and so far as his field of activity, Georgia, was concerned, the effect of his work for the Bolsheviks may be judged by the fact that this Russian province was almost entirely in the hands of the Mensheviks for years. As for Lenin’s approval (not “appointment,” as Duranty writes elsewhere) of Stalin in the post of party secretary in 1922, Duranty either does not know or will not say that Stalin was given the job precisely in order to remove that department of the party from political importance and influence and reduce it to its original, purely administrative purpose. It is precisely because Stalin’s predecessors in the secretariat, Krestinsky, Serebryako and Preobrazhensky, were active and prominent political leaders and had engaged in a political struggle which ended, at the 1922 party congress, with the rejection of their point of view (rightly or wrongly, is irrelevant here), that they were replaced in their posts by Stalin whom nobody expected (again, rightly or wrongly) to play a leading political role, that is, to utilize the post for political purposes. The only fact cited by Duranty speaks against the notion that Lenin looked upon Stalin as a man who could be entrusted with outstanding, let alone independent, political leadership, either in the party or in the country as a whole.

**Duranty as a Mythologist**

Duranty is a mythologist. He writes that Stalin, in 1910, “received the reward of his services to the Bolshevik cause in the shape of election, by a congress held in Paris, to membership on the Central Committee of the party. For unknown reasons, perhaps because he did not wish to live abroad, Stalin declined the honor.” It would have been difficult for Stalin to decline such an honor, if only because it was not proffered. The only thing unknown in this story, is the congress Duranty invented. The Bolsheviks never held a congress in Paris, not in 1910, or in 1910 or in any other year.

Duranty writes that after the Prague congress in 1912, (which did take place), Stalin was “named head of the ‘Russian Bureau,’ which made him virtual chief of the party on Russian territory.” Here we have an improvement upon the Paris-congress story, but not a big one. Stalin was not “named head” of the Russian Bureau, he was one of four members (with Ordjonikidze, Spandaryan and Goloshchekin). The “virtual chief of the party on Russian territory” was able to work there for a total of seven months between 1912 and 1917, spending the rest of those five years in Austria or in prison and exile in Russia.

In Vienna, in 1912, Lenin urged Stalin to write an article on the national question. About this article, there is the now well-known and easily-accessible letter of Lenin to Maxim Gorky. Here is how Duranty quotes it: “Lenin was delighted and wrote enthusiastically to Maxim Gorky about ‘the wonderful Georgian who has written a great article.’” What Lenin actually wrote was: “We have here a wonderful Georgian who is writing a long article.” What is a small forgery by the side of so many big ones?

From 1905, when Stalin first met Lenin, to the very end, says Duranty, the former “never wavered in allegiance.” Now suppose he had wavered, not once but a hundred times? What would that prove against Stalin? That he was capable of differing with Lenin and holding his own against him? This would no more be a mark against him than it is against other supporters of Lenin, every one of whom “wavered” from Lenin a dozen times. By itself, all it would prove it that Stalinist mythology is mythology and that the Stalinist leader-principle was alien to Lenin. It is only necessary to read Trotsky’s writings on Stalin or even Souvarine’s Stalin (which Duranty mentions) to know that Stalin was at odds with Lenin and drew the latter’s fire a hundred times, before and after revolution—and to know this on the basis of irrefutable and unrefuted documents. Stalin

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needs this pistol-enforced myth, among other reasons, to say: "Just as I, the good Bolshevik, never wavered in my allegiance to Lenin, so must you, if you want to live long, never waver in your allegiance to me. Lenin's heir." Duranty needs it to explain that Lenin knew that Stalin "had it in him." The same need produces another forgery (you forge by deletion as well as by insertion), which is well-nigh unbelievable: Duranty does not so much as refer to Lenin's "Testament" which proposed to kick Stalin unceremoniously out of his position as party secretary because he is rude and disloyal and abuses the power he has concentrated in his hands. In a word, as soon as that which Stalin "had in him" came out of him, Lenin said: This is not the man for us, this is not a man to lead a revolutionary movement, let alone a revolutionary state—get rid of him!

The Allegiance Changes, but Not the Conception

If Lenin thus drops out of Duranty's explanation of how Stalin "did it," we are left with nothing more illuminating than this: he did it by chicaneary, pulling strings, tricking every rival, and by being tough-minded, cruel and murderous. And the people? They were all conquered by one man? by one man plus a hand-picked machine? Of course! Why not? What are the people, after all? Rabble, cattle, at best childlike savages who need a governor until they come of age. It is more than likely that this conception of the relations between the governor and the governed was long ago instilled into the author by the ideologists of British imperialism. They bore the White Man's Burden with a determined resignation that attracted Duranty's allegiance. What has changed in Duranty is his allegiance, but not his conception. By aligning himself with the new despotism, he can do penance for the sins of his youth without a feeling of remorse, he can glow in a bath of socialist beatitude without washing away his jaded aristocratic cynicism and contempt for the herd, he can drink his vodka with the best of them in the new world without being deprived of a whiskey-and-soda fellowship with the best of them in the old, he can become a courtier of the new regime without being a rebel against the old.

To him, Stalin (Stalinism) is nothing but the continuation of Lenin (the Russian revolution), a little more cruel, perhaps, but—this is most important—a lot more successful. When you know Duranty's opinion of Bolshevism, this conclusion is not strange. His book opens with a conversation he had with Radek back in 1921, which he remembers in detail more than a quarter-century later with the aid of that miraculous mnemonic power which is so common among political writers today. It is worth quoting:

"To give you an idea," he [Radek] said slowly, "let me tell you what Lenin has often said about the role and duty of our party. You'll understand that I'm not quoting Lenin directly, but this is, I think, the substance of his ideas on the subject.

The Russian masses are incapable of self-government because they've never had anything but Tsarist tyranny for centuries throughout history. The Communist party represents the only politically conscious force in this politically unconscious mass and is formed of the most advanced workers, peasants, and soldiers, led by us Marxist intellectuals. Therefore the function and duty of the Communist party is to act as tutor, leader, and educator of the masses until such time as they are capable of self-government, or what you Westerners would call Democracy. I might say that Lenin regards the Communist party as the guardian of a minor child, Such a guardianship is a common occurrence under Western Law.

"You mean then," I said, "that the Communist party represents the élite of the masses and claims to rule in their name and on their behalf—that is, government of the people and for the people but not yet by the people."

Radek grinned. "You might put it like that, although we intend that it shall be government by the people as soon as the people is capable of government."

"Doesn't that imply," I asked, "dicatorship over the proletariat, rather than of the proletariat?"

"Perhaps, in a sense, but temporarily, just as a legal guardian appointed to manage the affairs of a minor resigns his functions when the minor reaches the age of twenty-one."

That Duranty has some such conversation, is possible—of course not with Radek, but perhaps with the British High Commissioner of Zululand, whose ideas he now attributes, by a remarkable process of transference, to the Leninists, who are incapable of defending themselves from libel because they have all been murdered by "Lenin's successor." At all events, this conversation—the imaginary one with Radek or the real one with the High Commissioner—gives us the real clue to the thinking, not of the Bolsheviks, but of Walter Duranty.

The masses and asses; at best savages. They must be saddled and ridden, bridled and chivvied, stalled, fed, nursed and taught tricks until they are twenty-one, an age which they somehow never manage to attain. In Russia, the savages are rather absurd but pleasant souls, primitive, to be sure, but quite content and even proud of their humble status. Now and then, an exceptionally bright one is manumitted and even given a public office together with shoes and a monocle. The rest remain savages who are very slow in reaching twenty-one.

Bongo for Chaka-Stalin

Proof? Take, for example, "the outrageous flattery and adulation lavished upon" Stalin. Who is responsible? "There seems to be little evidence that Stalin or his associates have deliberately evoked the idea Lenin-worship or Stalin-worship." Then why don't these atheist theocrats put a stop to it? Well, you see, you can't very well do that, now can you? The masses are asses; at best, savages. They must be allowed their comical primitive rites. No civilized High Commissioner would try to suppress them. Take the Zulus, for instance, with their custom of "making bongo" for their chiefs, especially the greatest, Chaka. Bongo, explains our anthroposociologist,
consisted in sitting around campfires chanting the praises of Chaka: "all-great is Chaka," "all-wise is Chaka," "all-powerful is Chaka, the lion who tears armies of foes to pieces, the elephant whose tread shakes the ground like an earthquake." "Duranty evidently had a certain similarity with religion. It was a mass ceremony in which thousands took part simultaneously, but as in the case of Stalin the praise was addressed to a living man, not a deity.

Or take the Russian elections, where the masses are allowed, even forced to vote for Chaka-Stalin. A farce? To American, perhaps.

But to the average Russian the fact that he is able to vote at all [1] is a symbol of democracy and the fact that he is being encouraged (or almost compelled) to vote is a proof that he is now taking a part, however small, in the government of his own country.

No doubt! In the same sense, the average Zulu who is "encouraged (or almost compelled)" to line the streets and applaud the arrival of the newly-appointed High Commissioner on his way to the Government House, is also "taking a part, however small in the government of his own country." Ignorant, benighted Zulu! Pathetic savage! He does not even know how close he is to living under the conditions of "the first true socialist state," as Duranty has called Stalinist Russia. (Alas, we shall find the same apology for Chaka-Stalin's rule over his Zulus when we come to the "Marxist," Isaac Deutscher.)

By their rising in 1917, the Russian people showed clearly enough that they had reached their "majority." Nobody gave them self-government, although not a few tried to deny them this right. They took it themselves, and thereby proved to be a thousand times more civilized and advanced than all the cultivated guardians and candidates for guardianship in Russia—from the Tsar and his Rasputin to Kerensky and his Social-Democrats. To all the guardians, and those who think like guardians, the spectacle was literally unbelievable. The rabble actually taking power and exercising it with their own arms? Impossible! They have no arms, they are only animals, and every limb is a leg. Somebody must be maneuvering them very cleverly. Who? the infernally cunning Bolsheviks! How? By an infernally cunning conspiracy! But was it so easy to trick the masses into supporting them? Of course! The masses have always been tricked, that is what they are here for. To Duranty, too, it was unbelievable. That is how he came to be one of the principal workers in the notorious Riga lie-factory of the early days, from which were dispatched to the press of the world the foulest and most cynical lies about the Bolsheviks.

The Difference Between Bolshevism and Stalinism

The masses, and their authentic spokesman and leaders, did everything that could be expected of them, and even more, but there were limits they could not transcend. Yet these limits had to be transcended if the revolution was to live. World capitalism and its props successfully prevented it. Exhaustion overcame the masses, and power slipped from their hands. And for that reason, the Bolsheviks too lost power— for their power lay and could lie only in the support of a self-acting, self-confident, compact and forward-moving working class, without which no "tricks" and no "toughness" and no "conspiracy" would be of avail.

The power of the new despotism, however, is inconceivable in the presence of such a working class. Just the contrary. It becomes a political possibility and a reality almost exactly to the extent that this class loses or is deprived of its compactness, its consciousness, its pride, its belief in its social capacities and its ability to exercise them to the full. Stalinism was both the product and the producer of a profound reaction and disintegration in the working class. That was and is its true hallmark. That is also why it oppresses and atomizes the working class as nowhere else in the world. That is why there is no fiercer, more ruthless exterminator of Bolsheviks, of revolutionists, anywhere in the world.

Stalinism triumphed and can triumph only in the absence of the basic classes of society—where they are absent as classes for themselves or, so to say, as erect classes. The new bureaucracy crept into power in the nightfall of the Bolshevik revolution, only after the exhaustion or destruction of the real classes. Only under such conditions could this new class, historically weak, historically doomed to instability, historically superfluous, acquire the appearance of strength, solidity and indispensability.

It is this class that found in Stalin a symbol and spokesman of such extraordinary natural fidelity to its own social characteristics as is hard to find in the history of any other class. Like his class, he has no past history, or virtually none, or a gray one; in the excellent phrase of Bertram Wolfe, Stalin is "the most striking example in all history of a man who has succeeded in inventing himself." Like his class, he must necessarily work behind the backs of the basic classes, never facing them except when the odds are overwhelmingly favorable. Like his class, he is coarse, rude, disloyal, stealthy, abusive of power, cruel, contemptuous of human beings, human life, human rights. Like his social pygmy of a class, this political pygmy looks like a giant only when the real giants in society are on their backs, on a deathbed or pinioned to earth like a Gulliver.

The pygmy with a democratic bullwhip and a tough minded pistol, lashing the masses to unattainable self-government—there is an overlord who attracts such as Duranty. He never believed in socialism, because he never believed in social-regenerative power of the masses. But Stalinism—that's different! There the tough and cynical are kept in power. There the rabble is kept in its place for its own good. There rubber-boned and cynical writers and other opinion-shapers are kept, just kept, but kept well. And if that's
socialism, why it suits Durany, who has already reached the age of twenty-one, right down to the ground.

For a biography of Stalin & Co., then, money can be saved by getting the undiluted fabrications straight from the propaganda department of the Russian Embassy instead of from Mr. Duranty’s publisher. As a biography of Duranty & Co., the book has a limited but unmistakable value.

David Shub

Shub’s book is a veritable showpiece of Menshevism. Ostensibly, it is a biography of Lenin. In reality, it is a portrait of Stalin; at least, that is what it is meant to be. That is, the picture of Lenin is drawn in such a way to make him look like the twin of Stalin, or if not the twin then the legitimate father, somewhat dissimilar in personal characteristics but identical in political nature and features. Stalin therefore appears very seldom and very little in the bulk of the book. He does not need to appear more often. His role is played out by the caricature Shub makes of Lenin, by all sorts of anachronistic devices and by devices that are even less honorable.

The book has created a minor sensation, especially among people, who do not allow the rhythm of their moral indignation to be interrupted by a knowledge of facts. Take the comment of Norman Thomas, which is all the more regrettable because of his known respect for truth:

Mr. Shub’s remarkable new biography of Lenin seems to me an outstanding performance in which the biographer depends for his effect upon his presentation of facts rather than highly colored adjectives of praise or blame. The biography confirmed my impression that Stalinism is a logical, almost inevitable, development out of Leninism; but I confess that I had not thought that Lenin himself had gone quite so far in setting precedents for Stalin’s completely amoral dealings with men and nations.

That Shub’s performance is outstanding will be shown without much further ado; so will the extent to which he depends for his effect upon his presentation of facts.

Shub’s aim is indeed to “confirm the impression” that Stalinism bases itself upon Leninism and follows logically from it. It was under Lenin, he writes, that “the totalitarian state was coming into being.” At the very end of his book, after quoting Stalin’s pledge at the bier to carry out the ideas of Lenin, he writes (they are his last words) : “Tactics change to meet new conditions, but the oath that Stalin took at Lenin’s bier still guides the destinies of the Soviet Union.” Mr. Durany couldn’t say it any better and he doesn’t.

What is it that Leninism and Stalinism have in common? First of all, the conspiratorially-prepared seizure of power by a ruthless band of power-hungry fanatics who established their own dictatorship over the nation in the name of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Secondly, both for the purpose of seizing power especially for the purpose of holding it, the planned and brutal annihilation of any opponent, dissident or critic, be he outside or inside the circle of the fanatics. Thirdly, it goes without saying, the utilization of any and all means, including the most repulsive and unscrupulous, in attaining their aims. Fourthly and in general, contempt and suspicion of the masses, of the majority, of democracy in any and all forms, and a congenital predilection for minority rule over the masses.

If all this were proved, it would have some meaning. It would not be very much, of course. It would not explain how a quasi-military conspiracy of despotic fanatics managed to establish and consolidate their rule, not in a palace revolution in some tiny Latin-American country, but over the largest country in the world, or why there was such a violent and irreconcilable battle between two groups among these fanatics which ended in the complete slaughter of one by the other. Yet, it may be admitted, it would be something—if it were proved. To prove it, all you need is properly-marshalled facts. A little social understanding would help, but facts are indispensable.

A Man with Creative Imagination

Mr. Shub applies to this task talents of a special order. All his life he has been a Menshevik. Most of that life he has devoted to literary assaults upon Lenin, the Bolsheviks and the Russian revolution, week-in and week-out, for thirty years or more, in the columns of the Jewish Daily Forward. In the course of these years, he has accumulated a stupendous collection of material against Bolshevism. Not being a small-minded fanatic, he has made sure that nothing is excluded just because it is not a fact, thus saving his collection from an awkward onesidedness. At the same time, he has not been content with the role of collector, who is after all little more than the assembler of the works of others. To the collection on which his writings are based, he has steadily added the products of his own creative imagination. To do him justice, some of his own products are easily the equal of anything produced by the outstanding inventors of our time.

It should not be inferred from this that Shub’s book is filled with lies from one end to the other, or that his hatred of the revolution is entirely pathological. That would be an exaggeration and it should be carefully avoided. It would be more exact to say that Shub makes a most exceptional effort to be dignified, objective and decent. On one page he reminds us that Lenin was often quite human, liked to play with children, like to wrestle and swim; on another page, that Lenin was man enough to keep a warm spot in his heart for his old adversary but
older friend, Martov; on another page, that Lenin, though a dictator, was without personal vanity, and was also free from any narrow nationalist prejudices. Such pages exist in Shub, but they are well-spaced. The effort is evidently too great a strain. It creates an unbearable tension in the nerves, so that for the greater part of the book we get the relaxed Shub, the authentic Shub, Shub as he is normally.

The book is most impressive. The pages are studied with quotations, hundreds of them, and there are no less than 24 solid pages of reference notes for the quotations, full of titles, authors, dates, places, names of periodicals and works of all kinds in five languages. The reader is simply overwhelmed with the titanism of the research and the meticulosity of the reference. Since Shub rests his case upon these quotations and references, we have an open invitation to inspect them closely. It may be protested that this shows an unduly suspicious nature. The protest need not be pursued, for the charge is unreservedly admitted. Out of every ten writers who have fulminated against the amorality or immorality of the Bolsheviks because, it is said, they would use any means to achieve their ends, we have so far found that nine of them are not very scrupulous in their choice of means to prove their case. This has so aroused our suspicion that we now proceed to the tenth one.

**Lenin Lusts for Dictatorship**

Lenin's penchant for becoming absolute dictator is set forth early in the book, where Shub writes of the 1904-1905 days, presumably to show how far back into Leninism we can find the origins of Stalinism:

> Whether Lenin in that period saw himself as a future dictator is hard to say. He never stated it in so many words until power was in his hands. Then [!] he put his cards on the table with remarkable frankness.

> "Classes are led by parties," said Lenin in 1918, "and parties are led by individuals who are called leaders . . . This is the ABC. The will of a class is sometimes fulfilled by a dictator . . . Soviet socialist democracy is not in the least incompatible with individual rule and dictatorialship . . . What is necessary is individual rule, the recognition of the dictatorial powers of one man . . . All phrases about equal rights are nonsense."

But although Lenin did not use such language in his Geneva days, the man's general approach to the coming revolution was already clear enough.

There is your Lenin for you. He talks about socialism, democracy and freedom, "then," once in power, he frankly wants to become the dictator. Is Stalin any different? It looks bad, very bad. And it would in fact be bad, if what Shub puts between quotation marks was what Lenin said in the Collected Works from which Shub claims he is quoting. Now, the only conceivable document from which Shub could take his quotation is Lenin's article on "Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government" which appeared in Izvestia of April 28, 1918. We take the article again and find that the first two sentences and the last sentence do not appear there at all—anywhere. They are what is ordinarily called forgeries, or more delicately, the products of a creative imagination. The other three sentences are to be found only in the completely twisted form in which Lenin originally mutilated the lucid thoughts of Shub. Here are the sentences to be found in Lenin which come closest to Shub's very original quotations which he so carefully spaces with periods:

> The irrefutable experience of history has shown that in the history of revolutionary movements the dictatorship of individual persons was very often the vehicle, the channel of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes. Undoubtedly, the dictatorship of individual persons was compatible with bourgeois democracy.

> [Further on:] Hence, there is absolutely no contradiction in principle between Soviet (i.e., Socialist) democracy and the exercise of dictatorial powers by individual persons. The difference between proletarian dictatorship and bourgeois dictatorship is that the former strikes at the exploiting minority in the interests of the exploited majority, and that it is exercised—also through individual persons—not only by the masses of the toilers and exploited, but also by organizations which are built in such a way as to rouse among these masses the historical creative spirit. The Soviet organizations are organizations of this kind.

> [Further on:] In regard to the second question concerning the significance of precisely individual dictatorial powers from the point of view of the specific tasks of the present moment, it must be said that large-scale machine industry—which is precisely the material productive source and foundation of socialism—calls for absolute and strict unity of will, which directs the joint labor of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. The technical, economic and historical necessity of this is obvious, and all those who have thought about socialism have always regarded it as one of the conditions of socialism. But how can strict unity of will be ensured? By thousands subordinating their will to the will of one.

Nothing else that even faintly resembles Shub's quotation can be found in this article. (We are quoting from the British edition of Lenin's Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 334. Almost exactly the same translation of this article was published thirty years ago by the Rand School under the title, The Soviets At Work.) Mr. Shub is a common falsifier. Consequently, he is the man called upon by history to prosecute Lenin for amorality.

Lenin's article is directed to overcoming the post-insurrectionary looseness and anarchy in production, the petty-bourgeois trend to "grab what you can for yourself and to hell with everyone else." He is arguing here, as is plain as day not merely from an "honest reading" of his text, but from any kind of reading, in favor of getting production going on an efficient scale, which requires, among other things, "dictators in the process of production," which may not be necessary in a cobbler's shop but is absolutely mandatory in complex, large-scale production. Anyone who can read English, let alone a highly moral Menshevik who can also read Russian, can see at a
glance that *this* is what Lenin is writing about, and *not* what Shub is not-so-slyly suggesting. Lenin, almost as if he anticipated Shub, ends his presentation on this subject with the following emphatic statement (the italics are his own):

> The more resolutely we now have to stand for a ruthlessly firm government, for the dictatorship of individual persons, for definite processes of work, for definite aspects of purely executive functions, the more varied must be the forms and methods of control from below in order to counteract every shadow of possibility of distorting the Soviet power, in order repeatedly and tirelessly to weed out bureaucracy. (P. 339.)

**How Shub Quotes from Lenin**

We find the same kind of falsification in Shub's quotation from Lenin's *State and Revolution*. Lenin is writing about a proletarian state in which the proletarian majority will subordinate to itself all bureaucrats. Here is how Shub presents Lenin, without quotation marks to begin with:

> Human nature being what it is, he [Lenin] wrote in *State and Revolution*, it craves submission.

Pure forgery, and of a purely malicious kind. Lenin never wrote it or said it, or anything of the kind, either in *State and Revolution* or anywhere else. Shub is attributing to Lenin the idea that it is the nature of people to want to be ruled (they "crave submission") and Lenin was going to satisfy this craving by ruling the masses with an iron hand. Then Shub goes on to quote "directly," that is, freehand style:

> "We are not Utopians," Lenin proclaimed. "We want the Socialist revolution with human nature as it is now. Human nature itself cannot do without subordination... There must be submission to the 'armed vanguard'... until the people will grow accustomed to observing the elementary conditions of social existence without force and with subjection."

What Lenin actually writes aims to convey a radically different thought.

> We are not Utopians, we do not indulge in "dreams" of how best to do away immediately with all administration, with all subordination; these anarchist dreams, based upon a lack of understanding of the task of the proletarian dictatorship, are basically foreign to Marxism, and, as a matter of fact, they serve but to put off the Socialist revolution until human nature is different. No, we want the Socialist revolution with human nature as it is now, with human nature that cannot do without subordination, control and "managers."

But if there be subordination, it must be to the armed vanguard of all the exploited and the laboring—to the proletariat. The specific "commanding" methods of the state officials can and must begin to be replaced—immediately, within twenty-four hours—by the simple functions of "managers" and bookkeepers, functions which are now already within the capacity of the average city dweller and can well be performed for "workingmen's wages."

We are quoting from the standard, easily available, International Publishers translation, and the paragraphs are to be found on pages 42 and 43. But where is the latter part of the last sentence quoted by Shub, and quoted as if it were part of the same sentence? It is to be found twenty-five pages later, on page 68, and, of course, it is part of an entirely different point, an entirely different paragraph and an entirely different sentence! Suppose Shub had been able to find this method of "quotation" from an opponent on a single page of the dozens of volumes of Lenin's *Works*. Can you imagine for how many chapters Shub would splutter and scream at this typical example of Bolshevist polemical unscrupulousness?

**Writing History Out of the Whole Cloth**

Shub must have read, somewhen in his youth, where Marx wrote that man makes his own history but not out of the whole cloth. He must have translated it to himself (in general, his translations are abominable) to read that Marx authorizes him to write history out of the whole cloth. For example, he quotes from the bitter speech directed by the distinguished Menshevik, Julius Martov, against Zinoviev, at the famous Halle Congress of the German Independent Social-Democratic Party in 1920, which was debating the question of affiliation to the Third International. Martov is saying that in Petrograd, presided over by Zinoviev, no less than 800 arrested persons were shot in reprisal for the assassination of Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin's life. Then, still quoting, Shub ends Martov's statement at this point with the following sentence: "(Commotion in the hall. Cries directed at Zinoviev: 'Hangman! Bandit!')"

For reference, Shub cites pages 216-217 of the Congress Minutes. We look up the official Minutes of the Congress, and apart from finding that Martov's statement is on page 215 (Shub cannot even copy a page number right; but that is a trifle compared to his strong points), and that the translation by Shub is, as usual, butchered—there is no outcry of "Hangman! Bandit!" recorded against Zinoviev, not on that page, not on any other page of Martov's speech, and not on any of the 289 pages of the Congress Minutes. It is pure and unalloyed forgery. The Minutes show only this parenthesized interruption of Martov: "(Stormy outcries: Hear! Hear! from the Right.)" It is possible that on that day, Shub denounced Zinoviev as a hangman and a bandit in his article in the New York *Forward*. In that case, he should have quoted himself. But at the Halle Congress, there was no one who said that.

Shub continues:

Martov was followed by Rudolf Hilferding, who, after Kautsky, was generally regarded as the leading theoretician of Marxism. Hilferding, who was to be slain in a French prison under Hitler, declared:

> "When we beheld on this international platform our comrade Martov, we realized from his very appearance and that of Zinoviev that we had before us the representative of the oppressed, one of those socialists, flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone, against whom the Bolshevist terror is applied. There could have been no sharper protest against this terror than
the wan and worn face of comrade Martov when he suddenly stepped on the platform.

“It is clear to us that Bolshevism is but a system of opportunist imperialist policy, flatly contradicting the fundamental principles of Marxism.

“Between us and the Bolsheviks there is not only a wide theoretical difference but an impassable moral gulf. We realize that they are people with quite a different morality and ethics.”

Sounds pretty moving and dramatic — right to Zinoviev’s face! But it rings a bit false. It sounds more like a speech that Shub would make twenty years later at a wake of the Social-Democratic Federation. However, he does give a reference—the Congress Minutes, pages 180 to 204. We find there, in the first place, that it would have been an extraordinary feat, even for Hilferding, to follow Martov in the order of speakers, since the former spoke in the morning session and the latter in the afternoon. But that is small sloppiness, which can be found on every other page of Shub. More important is the stirring quotation from Hilferding’s speech. *It does not exist!* Not one single word of it is to be found in the 24 closely-printed pages which the Congress Minutes devote to the complete stenogram of Hilferding’s speech. Not a single word of it is to be found in any other speech or anywhere else at the Congress. Shub simply sucked the whole quotation right out of his thumb, word by word and comma by comma. With the same thumb he points scornfully at the Bolsheviks who have “quite a different morality and ethics.” Indeed they have!

To follow all of Shub’s distortions, misrepresentations, falsifications and out-and-out forgeries to the end, would require a book bigger than his. Enough has been shown to indicate why not a single “quotation” in his “documented” book is above suspicion or acceptable at face value. Let us pass over to some of the authorities whom Shub marshals against Lenin in particular and the Bolsheviks in general. Shub examines their credentials for only one datum: Are they hostile to Lenin? If that question is satisfactorily answered, they are without reproach and receive Shubs’ Order of the Garter. The dregs of the old Menshevism, the dishonored scum of ex-Bolshevism, White-Guard gutter journalists, fishwives in pants and fishwives in petticoats—all of them served up as authorities, and not one of them but is distinguished by the most incredible capacity for remembering, word for word, conversations never held with Lenin and letters never written by him. To Shub it doesn’t matter: he is a fair man, and he will not deny to others the liberties he allows himself.

**Balabanova’s “Letter”**

There is Angelica Balabanova, who writes about the Bolsheviks as if her experience with them was traumatic. Garrulous old gossip, she is not to be relied upon for one single word she says about the Bolsheviks unless it is checked against ten established authorities. Warrant for this harsh statement about a woman who was once a revolutionist of probity, was presented in these pages years ago; it was not refuted because it could not be. Shub quotes from a Lenin letter which Balabanova claims to have received in 1917 while she was working for the Bolsheviks in Stockholm:

Dear Comrade: The work you are doing is of the utmost importance and I implore you to go on with it. We look to you for our most effective support. Do not consider the cost. Spend millions, tens of millions, if necessary. There is plenty of money at our disposal. I understand from your letters that some of the couriers do not deliver our paper on time. Please send me their names. These saboteurs shall be shot.

Shub does not bother to find out if there is such a letter or if there ever was one. It is printed, between quotation marks, in Balabanova’s memoirs published in New York in 1938. It shows—doesn’t it?—that Lenin threw millions and tens of millions around as if they were cigar coupons. Better yet, it shows what an utterly grisly monster Lenin was. Shoot comrades-couriers just because they delivered the mail a few minutes off schedule, with all the trouble people had traveling those days. Good enough, it’s authentic—print it!

But it’s a forgery, a downright and slanderous forgery! And just because it is committed by Balabanova does not make it less reprehensible than when one is committed by Stalin. Compare the “letter” as published in the 1938 American edition of her memoirs, with the “letter” as published in the German edition of her memoirs eleven years earlier (*Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse*, Berlin, 1927). In the German edition, she tells the very same story, but this, word for word, and also between the now familiar and very useful quotation marks, is the full text of the “letter” from Lenin as given there:

*Bravo, bravol Your work, dear comrade, deserves the highest recognition. Please do not spare any means. That the material is furnished you in such an insufficient manner, is inexcusable. Please give me the name of the courier who is guilty of such gross, inexcusable negligence.*

Quite different, isn’t it? There are no tens of millions, not even ordinary millions, and nobody is shot or going to be shot. Whether Balabanova ever received any such letter, we cannot say with certainty. What is certain is that at least one of the two versions of the “letter” is fraudulent. And it seems obvious enough that if one of them is conceivably genuine, it is not the one quoted by Shub from the 1938 edition. Shub is just naturally attracted to any fraud against Lenin, and where he has two frauds to choose between, the refined hand of anti-Bolshevik morality guides him unerringly to the worse of them.

**A Witness Against Trotsky**

There is Alexander Naglovsky. The avidity with which Shub swallows, then prints, any story which includes a report that a Bolshevik fired a pistol at
someone, is almost pathological. Naglovsky tells a story about Trotsky's arrival in Petrograd to reorganize the defense of the city from Yudenich's attacks. Trotsky accompanied by his Cheka aide, Pavlovunov says it in the local military leaders for reports. He is arrogant, peremptory and, it goes without saying, lust for blood, which he evidently has not had since breakfast. The local reports are unsatisfactory; besides, Trotsky hates Zinoviev.

Before Zinoviev had time to utter a single word, Trotsky turned to Pavlunovsky and said in his resonant voice calculated to reach all present:

"Comrade Pavlunovsky, I command you to arrest immediately and shot the entire staff for the defense of Petrograd."

That same night Pavlunovsky carried out the summary execution of the staff.

Who is the peddler of this story, Naglovsky? What makes him an authority? Did he witness this melodramatic episode? From whom did he hear about it? Nobody knows. Shub simply tells us he was once a Bolshevik, then quit the party, opposed it in October, then rejoined and became a government official, then turned emigre in the Twenties. In 1937, Naglovsky (now dead, it seems), sent Shub a manuscript to be published here. It is from this manuscript that Shub quotes the fabulous tale without blinking an eyelash or even suggesting that it might conceivably be one millimeter less than the truth! Trotsky shot a batch of Communists just to get even with Zinoviev? Fine! Put it in the book!

There is Roman Goul. He is way better than Naglovsky, because in his story about the Bolsheviks shoot not only pistols but rifles and artillery. His story is about Kronstadt. Shub devotes a whole chapter to the Kronstadt uprising. The sailors mutiny, they want peace and freedom and refuse to capitulate. But,

Trotzisky did not wait. He issued an order to the effect that if the rebels did not surrender they would be shot singly, "like ducks in a pond."

... Trotsky kept his word. Thousands of sailors were shot like ducks in a pond. Tukachevsky later said: "I was in the war for five year, but I cannot remember such a slaughter. It was not a battle; it was an inferno. The blasting of the heavy artillery continued all night and was so powerful that in Oranienbaum all the windows were shattered."

[Followed by more blood-curdling quotations from Tukachevsky, plus details on how many sailors lay dead in the streets, how many were killed later by the Cheka and how many were exiled to prison camps.]

What authenticates these harrowing quotations for Shub—Trotzisky's order to shoot them one by one "like ducks in a pond" and Tukachevsky's horror-stricken talk of "such a slaughter"? Again to the reference notes, where we learn that the quotations come from no less a personage than Roman Goul. And who, pray is this nonentity? From Shub, not a word. His authority is Goul, and that's that. But there is something to say about him. Goul was an officer, commissioned or non-commissioned, in the Czarist army, who was an anti-Bolshevik in the revolution, and turned up as an officer in the White Guard army of General Kornilov in 1918 in Rostov-on-Don. The Germans took him, interned him in Kiev, whence he landed in Berlin. There he became a contributor to the Russian anti-Bolshevik press. Before Hitler came to power. Goul wrote his principal claim to odium, Tukachevsky, the Red Marshal. In French, it was issued, appropriately enough, by the publisher of The Amazon of the Desert, Love of the Samurai, Love in South America, The Libertine, Love in Islam and Substitute for Love. Goul's Tukachevsky took its honored place among these classics. It is pure boulevard-literature, or what extremely polite people call "biographie romancée (for which a fair translation is: a biography without facts). What Goul knows about Tukachevsky is strictly limited to what appeared before 1932 in the European equivalent of the Hearst press and worse. What didn't appear, he gets by sucking his juicy finger. He quotes pages upon pages of private conversations of Tukachevsky, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Voroshilov and anyone else you might be interested in—conversations which were of course never published, which never took place and which, therefore, he could not have overheard in Berlin if he wore earphones. It is from this muck, which would not be read by a self-respecting Paris janitor, that Shub takes his fearful quotations from Trotsky and Tukachevsky.

(Stories travel. In the November 18, 1949 Seafarers Log, the paper of the Seafarers International Union, whose officials have the same genial tolerance of critics that is so characteristic of the Stalin-humanist, the editor, a soulmate of Shub, announces that he can remain silent no longer, and simply must finally tell his readers the story—the true story—of Kronstadt. Let them know, once for all that the Trotskyists, who are reducing the areas of happiness of the editor's boss, are of a kind with the Stalinists, the Fascists and the Nazis. He gives the Shub-Goul version a slight variation: "Trotsky, as chairman of the Revolutionary Military Soviet, threatened to 'shoot you like peasants.'" As we see, the inevitable, authenticating quotation marks are there. The only difference in the invention is that Shub and Goul are evidently the peasant, or barnyard type, who are satisfied with ducks in a pond. The SIU editor is evidently the robust, or Western type, and prefers the pondless pheasant. The Mensheviks have no rigid party line on fowl; they confuse the vice of uniformity to lying about the Bolsheviks.)

**A Case for Rubber Gloves**

There is (it is inevitable) Gregory Alexinsky. For this chapter in Shub you have to put on rubber gloves. At this late date, he presents his readers with the old, monstrous and long-ago discredited tale that Lenin was able to make his way to power by means
of German gold from the Kaiser’s General Staff. From 1917 onward, no decent person would touch this filthy slander. After reading Shub’s re-hash of the story, the same thing can still be said.

He prints “specific evidence” which, he says, Trotsky did not attempt to meet in the annihilating refutation of the frame-up which is to be found in his History of the Russian Revolution. The “specific evidence” might pass if read at a distance of ten feet. A little closer, the most the “evidence” indicates is that Lenin in Petrograd received “2,000” (rubles? marks? crowns?) from a Bolshevik in Stockholm, Kozlovsky, who had business dealings with another Bolshevik there, Ganetzky, who in turn was connected commercially with Parvus, the former Russo-German revolutionary who had turned German imperial propagandist in the First World War. It was not unusual for Bolsheviks to engage in business enterprises from which they helped the party treasury (nor is this unusual in other working-class organizations, as Shub ought to know and does know).

If Lenin did not avow this in July, 1917, when the public prosecutor and the whole Black Hundred press were working up a frenzied lynching campaign against the “German gold” that was pouring into the pockets of the “German spy” Lenin, that shows his very good sense, for which he could thank his escape from the fate of Luxemburg and Liebknecht. And if Shub turns up his pious nose at this non-avowal, it is because his mouth is so choked with the obscene calumny against the Bolsheviks that he cannot swallow fast enough.

With no evidence except what was framed-up and exploded under the Kerensky regime, Shub parades the figure of Parvus up and down his pages as the sinister intermediary between Lenin and the German General Staff. “Early in June, 1917, Peresverz, the Socialist Minister of Justice, received word from a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee that Lenin was in constant communication, through Ganetzky, with Parvus, who was then in Copenhagen,” writes Shub. And who was this unnamed “member of the Bolshevik Central Committee”?

Alexinsky—Gregory Alexinsky! And who was he? Alexinsky was no more a member of the Bolshevik Committee, or the Bolshevik party, at that time, then Shub was. This one-time Bolshevik had quit the party years earlier and become one of its most maniacal and unscrupulous enemies. Shub knows this as well as he knows his own name. To present Alexinsky to his readers as though he were, in June, 1917, a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee is to perpetrate a deliberate and conscious fraud, meanly calculated to show the defenseless reader, whose name might be Norman Thomas, that the first revelation of Lenin’s dirty connections with German imperial gold came from a source as unimpeachable and well-informed as only a highly-placed Bolshevik leader could be.

Alexinsky was despised not only by the Bolsheviks, but by every socialist in Russia who had a grain of integrity in him. This, too, Shub knows as well as he knows his own disreputable name. Shub knows what every one ever connected with any branch of the Russian movement knows: that Alexinsky was expelled during the war from the Paris Association of Foreign Journalists as a “dishonest slanderer”; that on April 11, after the March Revolution, the Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionists in the Executive Committee of the Soviets joined in the adoption of a resolution to bar Alexinsky from its midst for his shady character and record, and proposed to him that he try first to “rehabilitate his honor”; that the Menshevik Dan wrote in the official organ of the Menshevik-S. R. Soviets on June 22 that “It is time to put an end to the doings of a man officially denounced as a dishonest slanderer”; that Alexinsky became, in Parisian emigration, an extreme reactionary and outright anti-Semite. He knows, in a word, that Alexinsky was a common rogue. Because Shub is another, Alexinsky becomes his star witness in the case against Lenin as a German mercenary.

His other star witness, whose charges Trotsky “did not attempt to meet,” is pathetic. He is poor old Eduard Bernstein, the German Social-Democrat who had known better days and deserved a better end. In 1921, in the Berlin Vorwärts, he “amplified” the charges he had launched three years earlier that Lenin was supplied with German imperial gold. “Now I have learned from reliable sources that the sums in question were almost incredibly large, certainly amounting to more than 50 million gold marks.” This senile fantasmasgoria is taken at face value and with a straight face by Shub. More than fifty million gold marks and not a pfennig less! When the German Communists challenged Bernstein for proof, for his evidence, for his witnesses, he blistered a feeble reply but did not produce anything—neither then nor at any other time. “Even the most beautiful girl in France cannot give more than she has,” and Bernstein wasn’t even the most beautiful girl in France.

But an eminent comrade of his did investigate this charge, so monstrous in its stupidity and its intent. He was Philip Scheidemann, the Social-Democratic Chief of State of the “new Germany.” All the German imperial records were at his disposal. He had an aide, Dr. Ernst Bischoff, carry on an investigation. It goes without saying that not a speck of truth was found in the charge that the German imperial regime financed the Bolsheviks, and not a trace was found of five gold marks sent to Lenin, let alone 50 million. The results of the investigation, appropriately documented, were issued in 1919 by the official German Social-Democratic publishing house, with a preface by Scheidemann (who had as little use for Lenin as Lenin had for him), under the title, Die Entlarvung der “deutsch-bolshewistischen Verschwörung” (Exposure of the “German-Bolshevik Conspiracy”). Shub,
of course, does not even mention it. He is left alone with his Alexinsky. They are worthy of each other.

Shub has one more use for Alexinsky. In 1936, the latter published in his Parisian torchon — as the French would call it—a "sensational" story about "Lenin's Romance with Elizabeth K." It was calculated to titillate every mentality and taste that had elevated itself to the level of a gutter. "Elizabeth K." is not further identified. All the delicate details of the "romance" are distributed over several pages of Shub's book with a rake. "Their relationship was so discreet and so outside the normal orbit of Lenin's life that it has heretofore completely escaped the notice of his biographers," he writes with a pride that fits a man who first offered this garbage to the English-reading public. Shub, who probably edits the "Advice to the Lovelorn" column in the Forward on the side, vouches for the authenticity of the story. Is that surprising? Alexinsky vouched for it, too. They are worthy of each other. Seldom have Goethe's words applied so perfectly as to Mr. Shub: Du gleichst dem Geist den du begreifst, nicht mir."

There is more, but it is all about the same. In any case, there is enough to show just how outstanding a performance is this Menshevik showpiece and just to what extent the author depends for his effect upon his presentation of facts, if Norman Thomas may again be quoted. After this performance, to ask the question about Shub's political opinions about Bolshevism, or the Russian Revolution, or Stalinism, or about his evaluation of the social forces at work, would be superfluous; to answer it would be uninteresting. It would be too much like inquiring into the literary opinions of a man who writes couplets on subway billboards.

If we have learned nothing about Lenin—or second half of our review, which deals with the serious Stalin—from Shub, it is not altogether our fault. To learn something about them, we must wait for the books by Wolfe and Deutscher. But we have learned something about Mr. Shub, his morality, his ethics, his rectitude, his scholarship, his objectivity, his taste, his talents. If there is ever the occasion for another encounter with him, which God forbid, may it be no more pleasant than this one. (Concluded in next issue.)

MAX SHACHTMAN

Sir Grant-Duff Meets Karl Marx

A British Diplomat Writes About the Founder of Modern Socialism

Mr. Andrew Rothstein writes:

The description of Karl Marx, and of a conversation with him at the luncheon table, which was given to the Empress Frederick, eldest daughter of Queen Victoria, by Sir M. E. Grant Duff, and which is here published in full for the first time, has had a curious history.

Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant Duff—Balliol man, Liberal MP for Elgin Burghs from 1857 to 1881, and with a term of ministerial office (as Under-Secretary for India in Gladstone's first administration) already behind him when the letter was written—had a very wide range of acquaintance in the cultivated society of his day. His personal inclinations led him into the fields of history, geography and literature, while his active part in politics assured him of interesting conversation wherever he went. Much of it is recorded in the numerous volumes which he published at intervals, under the general title of Notes from a Diary, usually some twenty years after the encounters of which he wrote.

In 1898 the third series of the Notes appeared, covering the years 1873 to 1881. The second volume (pp. 103-106) had an entry under January 31, beginning:

Lunched at the Devonshire Club with Leonard Montefiore, to meet Karl Marx. I embodied my impressions of him in a letter to a friend on the Continent, which I subjoin with some omissions.

This highly interesting letter by a British diplomat about his meeting with Karl Marx is printed in this country for the first time, exactly as it was reproduced in a recent issue of the Times of London. It was communicated to the Times by Andrew Rothstein, whose introductory note, explaining all the circumstances attendant upon the letter and its late discovery, is also reprinted in full.—Ed.

Then followed that section of the letter here presented which begins at the third paragraph and ends with the paragraph in which the Revolution of 1688 is mentioned. Nothing was in fact omitted from this passage: but the preliminary description of Marx himself, Grant Duff's comments on his views, and all the later account of the conversation remained unpublished—together with other matters in the letter which might have established the identity of Grant Duff's royal correspondent.

All the biographers of Marx and collectors of Marxiana—including Mehring, Ryazanov, and the compilers of the K. Marx: Chronik Seines Leben (Moscow, 1934)—seem to have been unaware of this record of the meeting between Marx and a British Liberal aristocrat. Nor does Marx himself appear to have mentioned it in any of his extant letters.

The meeting evidently made a certain impression on the diarist himself. In a later installment of Notes
from a Diary, under the date of June 27, 1889, we find him writing:

Dined with the Frederick Farrers, meeting amongst others a German who said to me, “Die Truppe schiesst noch,” but there is great uneasiness among the officers at the constant influx of Socialists into the ranks. The time will come, say many of them, when “Die Truppe schiesst nicht mehr.” My conversation with Karl Marx ten years ago (see these Notes for 1879) came back to my mind.

This, too, remained unnoticed by the biographers.

In 1945 the librarian at Windsor Castle, Sir Owen Morshard, brought back from Germany, with other historical material committed to the British Royal Archives by its owner, the Landgravine of Hesse, the original letter from Sir M. E. Grant Duff to her mother, the Empress Frederick. A chance paragraph in a newspaper led to inquiries by the Marx Memorial Library in London, and these to further exchanges, the course of which has led the letter of His Majesty the King gave the most kind consent, with the full concurrence of the Landgravine of Hesse, to the publication of the letter. I am desired by the librarian and the Executive Committee of the Marx Memorial Library, in expressing their gratitude for permission to publish this most interesting addition to existing literature on the founder of Marxism, to pay a cordial tribute also to the great help received in the matter from Sir Owen Morshard.

It remains only to note that the spelling and punctuation, in the text here presented, are those of the original.

The Letter

Febr. 1, 1879

Madam,

Your Imperial Highness, when I last had the honor of seeing you, chanced to express some curiosity about Carl Marx and to ask me if I knew him. I resolved accordingly to take the first opportunity of making his acquaintance, but that opportunity did not arise till yesterday when I met him at luncheon and spent three hours in his company.

He is a short, rather small man with grey hair and beard which contrasts strangely with a still dark moustache. The face is somewhat round; the forehead well shaped and filled up—the eye rather hard but the whole expression rather pleasant than not, by no means that of a gentleman who is in the habit of eating babies in their cradles—which is I daresay the view which the Police takes of him.

His talk was that of a well-informed, nay learned man—much interested in Comparative Grammar which had led him into the Old Slavonic and other out-of-the-way studies and was varied by many quaint turns and little bits of dry humour, as when speaking of Hezechiell’s Life of Prince Bismarck, he always referred to it, by way of contrast to Dr. Busch’s book, as the Old Testament.

It was all very positif, slightly cynical—without any appearance of enthusiasm—interesting and often, as I thought, showing very correct ideas when he was conversing of the past and the present, but vague and unsatisfactory when he turned to the future.

He looks, not unreasonably, for a great and not distant crash in Russia, thinks it will begin by reforms from above which the old bad edifice will not be able to bear and which will lead to its tumbling down altogether. As to what would take its place he had evidently no clear idea, except that for a long time Russia would be unable to exercise any influence in Europe.

Next he thinks that the movement will spread to Germany taking there the form of a revolt against the existing military system.

To my question, “But how can you expect the army to rise against its commanders,” he replied—you forget that in Germany now the army and the Nation are nearly identical. These Socialists you hear about are trained soldiers like anybody else. You must not think of the standing army only. You must think of the Landwehr—and even in the standing army there is much discontent. Never was an army in which the severity of the discipline led to so many suicides. The step from shooting oneself to shooting one’s officer is not long and an example of the kind once set is soon followed.

But supposing I said the rulers of Europe came to an understanding amongst themselves for a reduction of armaments which might greatly relieve that burden on the people, what would become of the Revolution which you expect it one day to bring about?

‘Ah was his answer they can’t do that. All sorts of fears and jealousies will make that impossible. The burden will grow worse and worse as science advances for the improvements in the Art of Destruction will keep pace with its advance and every year more and more will have to be devoted to costly engines of war. It is a vicious circle—there is no escape from it. ‘But’ I said ‘You have never yet had a serious popular rising unless there was really great misery. You have no idea he rejoined how terrible has been the crisis through which Germany has been passing in these last five years.

Well I said supposing that your Revolution has taken place and that you have your Republican form of Government—it is still a long long way to the realization of the special ideas of yourself and your friends. Doubtless he answered but all great movements are slow. It would merely be a step to better things as your Revolution of 1688 was—a mere step on the road.

The above will give Your Imperial Highness a fair idea of the kind of ideas about the near future of Europe which are working in his mind.

They are too dreamy to be dangerous, except just in so far as the situation with its mad expenditure on armaments is obviously and undoubtedly dangerous.
If however within the next decade the rulers of Europe have not found means of dealing with this evil without any warning from attempted revolution I for one shall despair of the future of humanity at least on this continent.

In the course of conversation Carl Marx spoke several times both of Your Imperial Highness and of the Crown Prince and invariably with due respect and propriety. Even in the case of eminent individuals of whom he by no means spoke with respect there was no trace of bitterness or savagery—plenty acid and dissolvent criticism but nothing of the Marat tone.

Of the horrible things that have been connected with the International he spoke as any respectable man would have done.

One thing which he mentioned showed the dangers to which exiles who have got a revolutionary name are exposed. The wretched man Nobiling, he had learned, had when in England intended to come to see him. 'If he had done so,' he said, 'I should certainly have admitted him for he would have sent in his card as an employé of the Dresden Bureau of Statistics, and as I also employ myself with Statistics, it wd have interested me to talk with him—What a pleasant position I should have been in' he added 'if he had come to see me!!'

Altogether my impression of Marx, allowing for his being at the opposite pole of opinion from oneself was not at all unfavourable and I would gladly meet him again. It will not be he, who whether he wishes it or not, will turn the world upside down.

There has been a break-up amongst the English Positivists—the little sect which someone cleverly described as "Three Persons and No God." Mr. Congreve long their head in this country having wished to dis-connect himself with the body in Paris headed by Laffitte as the representative of the Comte—has been himself abandoned by Mr. Harrison and the other leading members of the congregation. I never met till the other day a lady who belonged to the Positivist sect as distinguished from the Positivist philosophical following, but last Sunday Mrs. Harrison came to stay with us and we found her a very interesting and really distinguished person, full of intelligence and charm.

I daresay your Imperial Highness sometimes reads her husband's paper in the Fortnightly or 19th Century.

My 'Miscellanies' I hope duly reached you and I now send a speech I made in the House of Commons in December, printed as a pamphlet.

I trust your purpose holds to come over in the end of February and that Destiny may make amends by giving you a pleasant and peaceful vent for all the agitations and sorrows of last summer.

I do not think I mentioned to your Imperial Highness that your little god-child was clever enough just as we were coming back from Algiers to break her collar bone in bed. That showed much resource and ability, I think. The accident gave her very little pain and it is thought there will be no bad ultimate results.

I have the honor to remain, Madam, Your Imperial Highness's most obliged and faithful servant.

M. E. GRANT-DUFF

TO OUR READERS

We owe our readers a humble apology. We have been compelled, for reasons of editorial and financial difficulty, to omit our October and November issues and to date the current issue December, 1949. It goes without saying that subscribers will be compensated by two additional issues. At the end of this month, a special meeting is scheduled of the Editorial Board of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL, at which the question of the regularity of appearance and the contents of the viewed will be gone into thoroughly. Our readers will be informed of any relevant decisions that may be taken.

Among other features of the next issue of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL will be an article by Albert Gates, dealing critically with the questions raised in the recent discussion article in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL by Henry Judd on "The Relevance of Trotskyism." The second part of the article by Max Shachtman, reviewing the books on Stalin written by Bertram D. Wolfe and Isaac Deutscher, will also appear in the next issue.

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC., REQUIRED BY THE ACTS OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946

Of The New International, published ten times per annum at New York, N. Y., for October 1, 1949.

State of New York, County of New York, ss.

Before me, a notary public in and for the state and county aforesaid, personally appeared Yetta Barsh, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is one of the owners of The New International and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the acts of March 3, 1933, and July 2, 1946 (Section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations), printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

1. That the name and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor and business manager are: Publisher, Editor and Managing Editor, Max Shachtman; Business Manager, Joseph Roan; both of 114 West 14th Street, New York 11, N. Y.

2. That the owners are: The New International Publishing Co., Max Shachtman, Yetta Barsh, Albert Gates, all of 114 West 14th Street, New York 11, N. Y.

3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities are: None.

4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing an affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustee hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association or corporation has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds or other securities than as so stated by him.

YETTA BARSH, an owner.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 30th day of Septemb er, 1949.

HERMAN WASSERBERGER, Notary Public, State of New York, No. 41-416400 (My commission expires March 30, 1951)