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The Russian Empire After Stalin

And lo behold, onto the broad Red Square
With modest majesty, gloriously enters
The Himalaya, and casting its blue shadow
Against the lofty skies, proudly lifts its head.

Stalin! My greetings I bring to you today.
I have come to pay homage!
Your eternal being is more powerful than I.
You the great mountain of Himalaya!

Tiszataj (Debrecen),
December, 1952

Joseph Stalin indeed made a modest and truly glorious entrance onto Red Square; glorious only for its finality, modest only because the “great mountain of Himalaya!” was being borne in a coffin on the substantial shoulders of Malenkov and those of his subordinates. The death of this mountainous personification of reaction, terror and violence leaves us with but one regret; that it was not the consequence of any upheaval in Russia, but, apparently, was brought on by an accident of nature.

What was the reaction of the Russian people? Did the news of Stalin’s death provoke profound grief or profound shock? Were the officially announced mourning millions disquieted by a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty over the future, or was Stalin in a beloved father image to the 800 millions in the Stalinist empire?

It is likely that the dead dictator’s efforts to reach pontifical heights, his clever role as saviour of the nation in time of war and his guise of being stern and firm, yet kindly and moderate, may have reduced the people’s animus toward him compared to their detestation of the regime as a whole.

The absurdity spread by some correspondents in America that Stalin was a “moderate” who went to great lengths to keep the extremists in check was a myth consciously cultivated by Stalin. It was calculated to deflect mass hostility toward the regime from continuing in a consistent path and centering its repressed hatred on the chief despot of the Russian empire. This talent of Stalin’s to appear as arbiter and never as per­petrator, as mediator and seldom as an exponent of an extremist view served him well in the twenties. At that time he was also a “moderate,” opposed to the “extremism” of Trotsky’s permanent revolution on the one side and the rightist extremism of Bukharin on the other; neither world revolution nor capitalist restoration, he proclaimed, but socialism in one country. It was a thoroughly reactionary and extremist view but covered with a thin glaze of...
was employed by him with much less clarity for Stalin among sectors of the Russian population in the twenties and thirties. Ever acted the role of public prosecutor and executioner. Thus, the man who was chiefly responsible for the liquidation of the last of the important personal symbols of the Russian Revolution could manage an evasion of direct and primary public responsibility for the trials which consolidated his bureaucratic power. And when the purge threatened to get out of hand the executioners were ordered executed by the wise and genial Stalin, obviously a man of moderation.

But it is important that we do not exaggerate the point. If Stalin's favorite role as a moderate man evoked personal fealty to him under the given historical circumstances of the twenties, it is inconceivable that a similar feeling of affection remains among numerically significant portions of the Russian population. His moderate pose could not have won anything resembling human sympathy in the face of 25 years of totalitarian terror. But the pose itself continued to have some effect. Even among the millions of Russians who experienced a deep sense of personal satisfaction at the news of Stalin's death, it must have, nevertheless, produced a mood of uncertainty. Perhaps things would be even worse. Perhaps, with Stalin dead, the more extreme elements in the regime would take over and there would be an even greater terror. Perhaps, with Malenkov now Premier, this executioner who was known to have put the pin-prick mark of death next to the names of the old Bolsheviks, a series of trials, deportations and executions would be organized dwarfing anything hitherto known. Then again, suppose Malenkov and the reorganized presidium adopts a more aggressive policy in the cold war? Without the more moderate hand of Stalin to check this adventurism we might once more be engulfed in a war. These must have been some of the thoughts which overwhelmed the Russian people at the news of Stalin's death. We deduce that these were the sentiments behind the solemnity of millions of Muscovites paying their last respects to Stalin out of any excursions into that popular mystical entity, the Russian soul, but from the reasonable political assumption that a people living under the whipflap of totalitarianism for 25 years is not moved to tears of compassion over the death of its chief despot. The attitude may be more complicated than undiluted hatred but it can never be one of touching sympathy and love.

Yet Stalin found his adulators in the American press. Above all, the articles in The New York Times by Harrison Salisbury, read as if his pen were dipped in his own tear ducts.

The long lines of silent Musovites extending for ten miles into the suburbs, wending their way past Stalin's bier to the accompaniment of Chopin's Funeral March sent Mr. Salisbury into lyrical raptures. It never occurred to the Times' correspondent that the millions who shuffled past the funereal display were as much motivated by the instinct of self-preservation as by any reverence for the deceased tyrant. Can one imagine a Moscow citizen presenting an explanation to a local party leader for failing to pay his last respects to Stalin?

In evaluating the historical personality of Stalin much of what the analysts have written reveals that they have fallen unwitting victims to the Stalin-created myth of Stalin. His life, they note, was fraught with Machiavellian evil, but an evil of great and genius-like proportions. With his abnormal capacity for deception, intrigue and violence combined with courage, stolidity and an uncanny feeling for gauging the moods of the masses, he pulled the floundering Russian nation out of chaos. In 25 years he engineered an industrial revolution in Russia that required centuries in the capitalist West. Stalin was able to succeed where everyone failed. All the efforts of Count Witte to bring modern techniques and industry to semi-feudal, pre-revolutionary Russia failed to make more than a dent in the economy compared to what Stalin accomplished. All the naive idealism of the early Bolshevik party, all the efforts of the stubborn doctrinaire Lenin, and the Western-minded intellectual, Trotsky, could not bring order to Russia. It was Stalin who finally succeeded; Stalin whose talents built a mighty industrial Russia, introduced science to agriculture, Stalin who extended the borders of the Russian empire beyond the most extravagant ambitions of the Czars with an army, the mightiest and most feared in the world.

The "greatness" of a man is a relative concept. The heroic proportions of an individual cannot be mechanically measured but we do assume that the great or heroic individual must be endowed with certain "positive talents which set him aside from other men. He cannot be an individual who is steeped in all the backward prejudices of his time and whose thought and action is heavily influenced by them.

A man, in the words of Plekhanov, "is great not because his personal qualities give individual features to great historical events but because he possesses qualities which make him most capable of serving the great social needs of his time, needs which arose as a result of general and particular causes." He can serve those social needs either through thought or action or both. Where other men cannot understand their epoch, he can; where other men cannot foretell history, he can; where others cannot clearly see the path of progress he can point it out to them. He is the intellectual and active leader of men who, as servitor, not creator of progress can nevertheless influence the development of social institutions through his consciousness.

Lenin and Trotsky were great men of the Russian Revolution because they were able to rise far above the stultifying prejudices of their social milieu. They were men of vision, imagination and action, capable of developing ideas and policies essential to the liberation of the Russian people from Czarist oppression.

Stalin, on the other hand, can measure up to none of these criteria. As a man who served "the great social needs of his times" during and before the revolution, Stalin's record is hardly a footnote of history, but as the Grand Executioner who led the social reaction, Stalin's fame was made secure for all times.

As a man of ideas he fares no better as a would-be great man. For Stalin was unique among the top leaders of...
the early Soviet government for his lack of intellectual attainment. His major work before the twenties was a brochure on the national question written in 1913 at the mature age of 33. Aside from this short work he has contributed nothing to intellectual thought. His theory of "socialism in one country" has no theoretical value. It was not taken seriously by Marx when raised in its essence by a German national socialist, Georgi Vollmar, as far back as 1876. The importance of this "theory" for history is that it articulated the reaction which was engulfing Russia following the Civil War.

As a man of vision, Stalin cannot qualify for admission to the hall of great historical personalities. A man without originality, he did not have the capacity to predict history. Although he was the chief architect of the new bureaucratic class it is certain that he did not play his role with any degree of prescience. As a man of culture Stalin was no less lacking. More than influenced, he was moulded by the prejudices of his time and he never raised himself above the provincial bigotry of his youth in Georgia. Men who were intellectually versatile were suspect and never forgiven by Stalin for their superiority.

The mediocrity that was Stalin, is not perceived by the journalists who are awed by his achievements, but it was apparent to and deeply felt by Lenin. Stalin was no less lacking. More than influenced, he was moulded by the prejudices of his time and he never raised himself above the provincial bigotry of his youth in Georgia. Men who were intellectually versatile were suspect and never forgiven by Stalin for their superiority.

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the contrary the bureaucracy needed an individual whose character incarnated the narrow visions and petty ambitions of the bureaucracy as a whole. Just as the inspired working class sought great men of progress to lead it during the October Revolution; so, inversely, did the bureaucracy feel the need for a leader of the same mediocre quality as itself.

The bureaucracy needed a chance to relax and maneuver. Stalin helped to provide it with that possibility. His theory of socialism in one country gave it a “program” to counter what was left of the internationalist traditions in Russia; and his ascendency in the Communist Party apparatus provided it with the club necessary for beating down any opposition to its efforts to achieve the victory of totalitarianism in one country.

We have discussed the attempts of the statesmen and journalists to create an aura of evil greatness around Stalin because it is politically significant today. Beneath this admiration for Stalin as a leader the bourgeoisie reveals its own weaknesses. They do not look upon Stalin as a great man because of any misunderstanding about the meaning of the term. This praise is inspired by their own bankruptcy; to them Stalinism has become an invincible force, something they can neither look upon nor cope with and do not understand. Hence their admiration for a single individual who appeared as mighty and awesome as the system he served so well.

The admiration for Stalin’s talents reveals not only the fear of the capitalist class for Stalinism, but envy as well. Stalin accomplished a task that they would like to see performed in their own countries: the Russian ruling class appears consolidated and unified, there is no open conflict between classes, everything seems orderly and well-organized.

In discussing the possible developments within the Russian empire following Stalin’s death, the columnists eliminated whatever copy problems their editors may have had. Unfortunately, the space consumed by the journalist experts was not justified by the product, with such rare exceptions as, for example, the sober and factual articles by Harry Schwartz of the New York Times. Just one sample of misinformation: Hanson Baldwin, also of the New York Times, writes that Malenkov is “associated by some observers with the school of thought in Russia that believes it is to Soviet interests to fight sooner rather than later.” The military analyst does not identify these anonymous “observers” which would be interesting only because their observation is at loggerheads with all known interpretations of the Malenkov-Zhdanov rift. The New York Post’s columnist, Frank Kingdon, possibly for lack of anything better to do takes a peek into the Russian mind and finds that Lenin and Stalin were born of the “Russian brooding soul . . .”

But we do not wish to be cantankerous. If one were to examine the hundreds of articles written on the subject of Stalin’s death, it would not be difficult to find dozens of minor and major factual errors. But a more serious quarrel with the journalists is over the question of their analytical approach.

Any extended analysis of Russia cannot avoid speculation, but it should be speculation in which the writer’s imagination is tempered by an understanding of the basic features of the society under discussion. Because this was absent, their speculations often ran out of control, with predictions of palace revolutions, unbridgeable rifts between China and the Kremlin, revolutions in the satellites and Malenkovite consolidation through war with the West as the imminent aftermath of Stalin’s death.

The basic weakness in the analysis and predictions of the “experts” was their failure to note the differences between the Russian bureaucracy and other elite bodies.

The Russian bureaucracy is more than a bureaucracy, it is a class. It is not merely a governmental apparatus, as in a capitalist country. The bureaucracy in Washington can undergo internal strife publicly, it can be replaced, and even investigated, but that will not necessarily entail a conflict signifying the collapse of capitalism. Whether or not the Republicans remain in power in 1956, capitalism will remain intact and a Democratic administration will guard the American capitalist way of life with no less zeal than its predecessors. The right to exploit labor and the right to produce and sell commodities on the market are not endangered and are not contingent upon which major party enjoys governmental power; and they are not threatened by inter or intra party strife.

In Russian society this division between politics and economics does not exist. The bureaucracy is in no way separated from a class controlling the means of production. In Russia the state is the sole owner of the means of production and the bureaucracy is itself the collective controller of the means of production, through its control of the state.

A conflict, then, which emerges within the Russian bureaucracy cannot be thought of in the same terms as the factional struggles and interparty conflicts of capitalist democracies. Two capitalist politicians who are constantly at each other’s throats may both be imbued with the same class consciousness and more or less equally responsible from their own class point of view. For their fight does not necessarily endanger the rule of their class. In a bureaucratic collectivist society, on the other hand, a fight between different factions of the bureaucracy on any significant scale does endanger the rule of their class. Factional struggles must be subdued, and kept within bounds. If a conflict in the Russian bureaucracy is not settled discreetly and quietly through the final decision of a dictator or directory, or a purge or similar methods which the Russian bureaucracy uses to resolve real, imagined or potential differences within its ranks, how then can it be resolved? Certainly not through organization of different parties and elections. A prolonged and fierce faction fight within the bureaucratic collectivist class which is not settled or ameliorated in a reasonable period within its upper echelons threatens to dislocate the whole social system. That such a struggle is anathema to the bureaucratic collectivists is as obvious to them as it is to us.

It is not with the easy wisdom that comes from hindsight that we say that no one rightfully could have expected a fight of major proportions to break

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out in the Kremlin for Stalin’s mantle; for that could have materialized only if the Russian leaders were completely irresponsible fools, bent on self-destruction. The bureaucratic collectivists have a class consciousness which is more highly developed that of any other class in the world today. It has a clearer understanding of its needs and interests, and one of its primary needs is to present a united, cohesive front to its class enemy at home—the working class; to its immediate class enemy abroad—the bourgeoisie; and to the subordinate compradore bureaucratic collectivists in the satellite countries.

The appeals for unity to avoid panic were not directed to the nation as a whole; they were addressed to the ruling class, warning them that any breach in this monolithic front might be filled by the enemy. There could have been no doubt that the bureaucracy would answer this call with an unerring class instinct. There has been no indication that the political differences within the bureaucracy—on the organization of agriculture, the political role of culture and science, a Western versus an Eastern orientation, degree of risk to take in the cold war—are so great that they cannot be resolved or mediated today by the Communist Party in the usual manner.

Several experts looking to history for precedents to justify their predictions of paralyzing dissenion within the Communist Party, turned to the factional struggles in the party which were intensified after Lenin’s death. Poorer evidence could not be offered. Looking at the openly conducted party struggles in retrospect, we can see that they were conducted in a democratic paradise in comparison with what exists in Russia today. At that time, it was still possible for different factions to conduct an ideological fight publically. When Bukharin expressed a point of view, which Trotsky felt reflected the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie and might have led to the restoration of capitalist power, he did not believe that his life was at stake. When the Left Opposition fought to preserve the policies and traditions of the October Revolution Trotsky could not have known that some day a Stalinist assassin would reward him with a pickaxe at the base of his skull for it. In short, a factional struggle in the early twenties still had the semblance of an ideological conflict, while today, to disagree with any persistence can prove fatal. Terror is not only exercised against the masses to keep them in check, it is exercised against all levels of the bureaucracy. Yesterday, only Stalin was secure from the confessors’ dock or less public liquidation; today one can enjoy that sense of security tomorrow it may be Malenkov who will be the only reasonably safe man in Russia.

The conflict in the Russian Communist Party which actually began before the death of Lenin had the elements of a class struggle. The forces represented by Stalin were those of an incipient bureaucratic collectivist class, pitted against the proletarian policies of the Left Opposition and then running counter to the pressures of the petty-bourgeoisie within the party.

The forces of bureaucratic collectivism won the struggle and proceeded to liquidate all class opposition within and without the party. No such situation exists in the Stalinist Party today. There are, indeed, different tendencies but they are not moved by the social force and passions engendered by class warfare.

THE DEATH OF STALIN in our opinion is no cause to expect a break in the coming period between the satellites and Russia or to destroy the working arrangement which exists between the Kremlin and Peiping rulers. The bureaucratic collectivist classes in the Eastern European nations no doubt feel considerable discomfort over their political and economic subordination to the Kremlin. But the bureaucratic collectivist class is not an internationalist class. Equal partnerships between different bureaucratic collectivist countries are only possible on the basis of equal power. This equality of power does not exist between Russia and any other totalitarian regime in Europe, or even with China. Russia is the supreme totalitarian force. In Eastern Europe it is particularly unwarranted to think that as a result of Stalin’s death the ruling classes there will make any dramatic break for independence. *They owe their very existence to the Russian ruling class.* They did not come to power as the result of any misdirected mass movement against the bourgeoisie. They came to power and maintained it only because they had the force of the Russian army behind them. Lacking in any popular appeal, constantly supervised and purged by the selective Russian bureaucracy and at the same time unsure of their future if they did manage to achieve independence from Moscow during the cold war, we do not give much credence to the theory that Stalin’s death will precipitate a violent struggle between the Russian and satellite bureaucracies.

The relations between China and Russia are more tenuous, for the former is in a better position to bargain for equal partnership with the Kremlin than any of the satellites in Europe. The Chinese ruling class did not come to power via a Russian army of occupation; nor was the central authority of the Chinese Communist Party residing in Moscow for long years, transported to Peiping at the propitious moment and conveniently installed by the Kremlin. The Chinese Stalinist class established its own traditions; with its own armies and with widespread support among the Chinese people it came to rule over a nation of 400 millions.

The force which binds the Peiping bureaucracy to the Kremlin is only in part due to a fear of Russian military might but to a much greater degree by a mutuality of interests. China is an economically primitive land which can expect no material assistance from any country other than Russia. Moreover, she is engaged in a shooting war with America and cannot afford a rupture with Russia which would mean cutting herself off from vital military supplies. Finally, the Chinese ruling class is well aware of what is involved in the cold war. Should war come and Russia lose, then bureaucratic collectivism as we know it today would be destroyed. This crucial fact increases the consideration of both ruling classes for each other. To think that Mao would initiate a break with the Kremlin because he is jealous of Malenkov, as many writers have predicted, in the light of all the factors operating today which tend to weld them together is reducing the importance of personal ambition in politics to an absurdity.

Our discussion thus far has emphasized those factors tending to give a measure of cohesiveness to world Stalinism today. But it must be understood that we do not consider the bureaucratic class a homogeneous force, or regard bureaucratic collectivism
as either invincible or stable. The nervousness with which the bureaucracy reacted to Stalin's death, the talk of "disarray and panic" in its unity appeals, are themselves indications that beneath the surface cohesiveness of the Kremlin oligarchy, there are disruptive cross currents and potentially explosive conflicts. It cannot be otherwise with any regime which finds it necessary to resort to naked terror to maintain itself. The terror does not find its source in the depraved mentalities of the ruling clique but reflects the unpopularity of the regime among the masses and mirrors serious dissatisfaction in the ruling class itself.

In Russia we have the anomalous situation of a ruling class which lives in perpetual terror of itself. The purge system is not merely directed against dissenters; nor is it only for the purpose of keeping the working class in subjugation. It is directed against all levels of the ruling class, serving the bureaucracy as a guarantee against any relaxation on the part of bureaucrat or worker. It is the means whereby the bureaucracy attempts to regenerate itself, for the Russian ruling class is unquestionably a tired ruling class. It has won tremendous economic advantages for itself: wage differentials in Russian industry and in her military and administrative organs are even more disparate than in capitalist countries. But it has never been able to relax; that is, it has never been able to attain anywhere near the maximum personal satisfaction out of the material advantages it has won. The purge system will not allow it.

Life in such an atmosphere, even for a bureaucrat, is not an enviable one—and sometimes it is a suddenly foreshortened one. This political-psychological factor cannot be overestimated as a disintegrating tendency in Stalinist society. Each member of the ruling class jealously guards his position, maneuvers for promotion, yet lives in constant fear of punishment for an obscure misdemeanor, or even for none at all. The plant superintendents seek to please his party superior, but is suspicious of his subordinate foreman. The party official, himself, is in constant fear of displeasing his political overseer, who in turn is never certain that there will not be an ominous knock on the door in the early morning hours. Each bureaucrat must cater to his superior, but be prepared to denounce him at the same time, should he fall from grace.

This mutual fear and distrust penetrates the uppermost reaches of the bureaucracy. Constant vigilance against all is the law of the bureaucratic land. It is inevitable that in this atmosphere of all pervading terror personal factionalism and cliquism should flourish.

Aside from factionalism born of pure fear, there is a related factionalism motivated by different interests. The Russian bureaucracy is a vast conglomeration of 15 million party functionaries, party and non-party industrial magnates, kolkhoz supervisors, army officers, administrators, internal security officials, etc. Within this mass of 15 million, approximately half belong to the Communist Party, whose top committee, the presidium, is the undisputed ruling body of the Russian empire. But this committee, aside from Malenkov, includes the Minister of Internal Affairs, Beria, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Molotov, Minister of War, Bulganin, etc. These men owe their first allegiance to the party. Nevertheless, for their own ambitions and safety, they are forced to seek some sort of mass base in their ministries and to secure this support they must enhance the relative prestige and material well being of their respective ministries, thus generating jealousies, intrigue and cliquism within the presidium which reverberates down to the lowest levels of the bureaucracy.

Economic inefficiency is another product of the purge and terror system. Meeting quotas can be, literally, a question of life or death. Given this somewhat morbid prospect, it is not difficult to see why factory managers will often manufacture figures instead of goods. But as Russia has a state planned economy, false figures in one sphere of production leads to further unrealistic quotas and loq sided overall planning.

The disintegrative tendencies within Stalinism have been increased rather than diminished by Stalin's death. Stalin served a unique role within the Russian ruling class. He had behind him the machinery and prestige for placing himself above the factional conflicts within the bureaucracy. He was the supreme moderator and the ultimate judge and executioner. There is even evidence that the arch-manipulator of our times encouraged personal and political animosities within the ruling circles as a means of insuring his special function.

The death of the almighty co-ordinator leaves vacant on the peak of the bureaucratic hierarchy, a post which served as a stabilizing factor in the life of the bureaucracy. A directory cannot operate with maximum efficiency and no individual in it has the "qualifications" to assume Stalin's terrible personal power. Stalin consolidated his unquestioned personal power over the corpses of ally and foe.

There is no reason to believe that a new Stalin would utilize any more charitable methods.

Malenkov is no Stalin, though apparently he was created in his mentor's image. He has no ties with the October Revolution, he was not instrumental in consolidating the bureaucratic class in the late twenties and thirties and he has not been able to build the personal machine which Stalin did over a period of thirty years. Moreover, Malenkov comes to leadership of the bureaucracy at a time when it numbers in the millions, is already divided, suffers from fatigue and has none of the idealism, warped though it was, of the generation which backed Stalin's bloody march to power. Given these facts it will take many years and many purges to build a Malenkov myth and if one is established it can only be done over the opposition, and perhaps over the bodies of the elder statement on the presidium whose bureaucratic souls must rankle at the thought of playing a subordinate role to this newly arrived leader. The consolidation of the presidium, the reduction of the number of ministries are symptomatic that all does not go well with Stalin's choice. This initial reorganization has a levelling effect in the highest committee of the party by placing the tightened presidium in a better position for watching both Malenkov and the reduced number of ministries. Malenkov's "voluntary" abandonment of his secretaryship of the party, even though it was to one of his lieutenants, is symptomatic of the Premier's dubious position.

Malenkov, Beria and Molotov already have a history of personal and political rivalries, promoted and at the same time kept in bounds by Stalin. Each has already headed factions...
which have undergone purges and liquidations since the end of the war. For Malenkov to attempt to assume Stalin’s personal powers would arouse not only the hostility of frustrated ambitions, but a fierce opposition by the other members of the directory who would have good cause to fear for their very lives. Today, the fear of the personal consequences of a struggle for power and the class need to present a monolithic front acts as a balance against a mortal struggle in the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, Stalin’s death has created a precarious unity which has become an additional disintegrative tendency in the Russian ruling class.

It is in our opinion worthwhile to speculate on the possible effects of the supreme moderator’s death on the mass Communist parties outside of the Iron Curtain. The Stalinist organizations in democratic capitalist countries are not bound to the Russian bureaucracy by all the ties which weld the satellite bureaucracies to the Kremlin. In the French and Italian Communist Parties, the Stalinist leaderships have bureaucratic collectivist class ambitions which are not likely to be realized in the near future through an invasion of the Russian armies. These parties remain subordinate to the Kremlin because of the similarity of class interests, the pressures of the cold war, the prestige which is gained against a mortal struggle in the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, Stalin’s death has created a precarious unity which has become an additional disintegrative tendency in the Russian ruling class.

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hoped there would be a new spirit." However, if American psychological warfare mediums are alerted for a campaign to utilize the death of Stalin as a divisive force between Russia and Eastern Europe and China, and even as a means to dislocate the Russian government, new tactics and new strategy are called for; at least something a little more plausible than a "new spirit." (It was not made clear where this hoped for change of spirit was to take place—in Washington or Moscow—and no clue given as to the anticipated new contours of this dividing force.)

While the Kremlin dominated peoples' are not likely to learn of Dulles' hoped for new spirit, the Voice of America can at least make direct convincing force.) upset the Stalinist regime was to repeat America's "official condolences" over the death of Stalin, repeat Eisenhower's statement of sympathy and good wishes for the Russian people, and quote from editorials appearing in American newspapers. None of these announcements, we fear, is going to weaken the Kremlin's rule. Radio Free Europe, the heavily financed, private American counter-part of the Voice of America broadcasting to the satellite nations informed its listeners that the death of Stalin would not bring about their immediate liberation and advised them "to remain calm and act with caution." The precise meaning of these anxious words is, we suspect, as much a puzzle to their author as to their audience.

It is not difficult to find the immediate reasons for the inability of the current administration in Washington to make any political capital out of the death of Stalin. It is an administration with a Congress that is heavily weighted with the worst of know-nothing traditions. Eisenhower himself is a symbol of intellectual vacuity in American politics and his cabinet and advisors, so heavily loaded with prosperous car-dealers and others recruited from the babitt business world, are singularly ill equipped to cope with the dynamic political phenomenon of Stalinism. The Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, had no inhibitions over declaring that one of his choices for a leading post on American psychological warfare division was Arthur Godfrey because he "knows the mass mind!" Not with the best will in the world (and we do not grant this) can Washington's chief executive and his grey administration conduct an ideological struggle against bureaucratic collectivism. And if these men lack talent and understanding, what must be said for the American Congress! Can one imagine a Congress which is increasingly failing under the influence of the most ignorant and malicious elements in American political life, the McCarthy, Jenners, Veldes, etc., developing a political program and approach to counter Stalinist propaganda in France, Italy and Asia. The very thought is ludicrous. McCarthy is an expert at hounding all real and imaginary non-conformists, Stalinists and anti-Stalinists but he is without any qualifications, personally, politically or intellectually to break the hold of Stalinism over millions of people—unless, of course, he could bring them before a Congressional investigating committee and eventually jail them on contempt charges.

The political paralysis of the Republican administration's world ideological battle cannot accurately be diagnosed as cerebral malfunctioning or a low intellectual metabolism, real and widespread as these illnesses are in the Eisenhower entourage and Congress. Had Stevenson been elected along with a Democratic Congress we doubt that his administration could have inspired a division in the Stalinist ranks more successfully than Truman, whose administration provided so much grist for the Stalinist propaganda mills.

Ironically enough, not only did the administration fail to make any political capital out of the Russian despot's death, but it was the new Russian regime which managed to exploit the death of their god to some ideological advantage. With the speeches of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov at Stalin's rites it initiated a new "peace" offensive which has gained considerable momentum, succeeding in disorienting the Washington experts.

The failure of the Eisenhower administration to capitalize on Stalin's death is not only due to ineptness; it is the result of a fundamental inability of American capitalism to counter the political drive inherent in Stalinism. Stalin's death affords no significant advantage to Washington because the conflict has never been a duel between two governments, much less between individuals. It is a deadly struggle between two contradictory social systems and in this struggle the American-led forces of capitalism have proven only their impotence.

Julius FALK

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Shifts in American Foreign Policy
An Analysis of the New Administration's Offensive

The Eisenhower administration has been in power for only a few weeks. Yet these weeks have sufficed to indicate a very definite shift in the tendency of American foreign policy. It will be a long time before the new tendency reveals itself in all its concrete manifestations, before all the preparations, both political and physical, are completed which will make it possible for this policy to be transformed from words into decisive actions. There are so many obstacles and counter-vailing pressures in the world that the policy may be deflected from its set objectives, and turned into its opposite. Yet none of these considerations should be permitted to obscure the fact that a new policy is here, and that the fate of the world is being shaped by it.

It has become popular to discuss American foreign policy in terms of “liberation or containment.” Actually, both these terms are fundamentally misleading. What is at stake is really this: in the struggle for unrivalled world hegemony, shall the United States take the political and military offensive now. Or shall it retain its defensive posture for a longer period, hoping for more favorable conditions under which to bring its sole remaining rival, Russia, to her knees?

The American government has decided to turn to the offensive. The so-called policy of “containment” which dominated the thinking of the Truman administrations was a policy of the strategic defensive. Its objective was to stabilize the struggle on the basis of the lines which divide the Stalinist world from the world of capitalism, that is, to firmly secure the division of the world achieved in the Second World War. Implicit in this policy was the acceptance, for the time being at least, of Stalin’s control over Eastern Europe, and even if in more qualified terms, of the strategic relations in Asia. Implicit was also the idea that in a world thus stabilized, the internal problems of the Stalinist world (particularly those created by the national antagonisms within it) would eventually weaken it and make it more inclined to accept a future adjustment on terms less favorable to itself.

THE TRUMAN GOVERNMENT’S policy was a result of two factors of unequal weight. The more important of these was an assessment of the economic, social and military strength of the American bloc in the struggle. The American government had acquired a vast experience during and since the last war in world affairs. It had come to have a healthy respect for the revolutionary temper of the masses of the colonial world, and a no less healthy respect for the ability of Stalin to make capital out of every American misstep in Europe. It recognized the weakness of the governments which it had bolstered and supported everywhere since World War II, and the fatal effect on them of any policy which seemed too contemptuous of their peoples, or too openly directed toward dragging them into another world holocaust. In short, the Truman government did not believe that the American bloc could go over to the offensive now.

The second factor stemmed from the political psychology of the men who, in their aggregate, made up the Truman governments. These men had been intimately connected with the direction of World War II, and of the cold war which followed it. Although they were vastly disillusioned by the failure of the United States to achieve its real objectives in the war, they were emotionally attached to what had been achieved. The division of the world was not as they had foreseen it. Yet they had acquiesced in it in 1944-5 as the best that could be got out of the situation. They were shocked to find out that Stalin was not willing to rest on his achievements, even for a period. But they had expended their energies to salvage whatever they had achieved at the enormous expenditure of treasure and lives in the war. For the time being they were willing to rest if only they could feel that the world would remain carved as they had carved it.

But the bases of strictly American power are not so weak as to imprint our ruling class a deep and lasting defensive psychology. For France, after World War I, and for the rest of Europe today any thought of the offensive, political or military, is a nightmare. Even to the Truman administration, the defensive posture was thought of as a strategic, but temporary expedient. They know very well that the principle propounded by old Clausewitz for military warfare applies to the politico-military struggle for the world today: “We must maintain throughout that a defensive without any positive principle is to be regarded as self-contradiction in strategy as well as in tactics, and therefore we always come back to the fact that every defensive, according to its strength, will seek to change to attack as soon as it has exhausted the advantages of the defensive.”

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tempt for the American workers is tempered only by the respect they have been taught by the union movement, but it expresses itself in their open proclamations that "there is nothing wrong with a little unemployment." Their contempt for the masses of the rest of the world is boundless.

It may be thought that an attempt to emphasize the difference between the rulers of the Republican government and their Fair Deal predecessors in this respect can be only of indifferent value. This realm of the psychology of classes, or of groups within classes, is always the happy hunting ground of "experts" in "mass psychology." Yet one ignores it at one's peril.

It is quite true that Truman, and Roosevelt before him, and the men who surrounded them were utterly cynical about the desires and aspirations of the peoples of the world. They proclaimed that they were fighting for the right of self-determination for all nations, and then sat down at Teheran and Yalta and carved up the peoples of the world like so many sides of beef. They said that they were fighting only for democracy and freedom, and then made their dirty deals with Darlan and Badoglio ... and Stalin. They said that colonialism would have no place in the new world they were fashioning, and then armed the British troops who suppressed the national liberation movement of Indo-China until the French could get there to take over.

But they learned that even deceived and defeated and bartered, the masses are never to be ignored. They learned that disaffected populations were ripe plucking for the social demagoguery of Stalinism. They discovered that they and their allies could dissipate their strength in far corners of the world in keeping down mass movements even when these had no connection with Stalinism. Although they could not bring the masses to their side with a real program of social and economic liberation, they knew that they could not afford to turn them into outright and active enemies by threatening them with naked imperialist domination.

The Republicans, by their very nature are of a different mentality. To them the American workers are not a potential ally to be wooded by concessions, they are an unfortunate power which has to be emasculated. To the mid-Western senators who dominate the Congressional committees, the masses of Europe and Asia are a bunch of ignorant and dirty foreigners who must be shown their place ... which is in armies fighting for the enlightened Americans, or on plantations and in factories doing a fair day's work which will bring a fair week's profit by American standards. In this view even the capitalists and governments of foreign countries are at best ineffective moochers who seek to perpetuate a power which they can no longer rightfully command, and at the expense of the American taxpayer at that.

This, it is true, is the lowest mental denominator of the breed, but it is a widespread and dominant one nevertheless. In its more sophisticated form, this contempt for the masses reveals itself in the idea that power, economic and military, and power alone is what decides the fate of the world. As long as the world is organized in class societies in which the rule of man over man is institutionalized everywhere, there is much truth to this idea. But the crudity with which it is felt and translated into policy is what gives the Republican government its peculiar stamp, and which lays the background for the specific aggressive policy in foreign affairs which it is now launching.

To a certain degree, the inclination of a sizeable section of the Republican Party in recent years toward an "Asian" policy as against a "European" one can best be understood in this context. Since the end of the world war there was no real room for an offensive American policy on the Continent. None of the European allies were ready for it, and Stalin was so firmly and directly entrenched in Eastern Europe that nothing short of all-out war could hope to budge him there.

Asia seemed to offer much more appetizing opportunities for a "positive" policy. The Stalinist consolidation in China was far less powerful and developed than its consolidation in Europe. The revolutionary-nationalist temper of the masses of all Asia was a factor to be considered, but the white man had always been able to settle such problems with enough firepower in the past. Further, there were ruling classes in Asia which had already lost everything (Chiang Kai-shek) or were on the verge of losing it (France in Indo-China) and hence were willing to become the pliant tools of the Americans in the hope of regaining something. Such groups, although worthless in themselves, are always necessary to give modern imperialism the mask of legitimacy.

Although the "Asian" wing of the Republican Party may not be dominant, it is powerful and vociferous. Led by Senator Knowland of California (or Formosa?), backed by the Kohnberg "China Lobby" and given ideological support by the Luce publications this group represents the immediate and narrow interests of a gang of promoters who hope to make a real financial killing in the vast economic potential of China. They also represent a conviction that America's historical destiny lies in the East (Luce) and not in the old and exhausted center of our civilization, Europe.

This conception is not accepted by the whole of the Eisenhower administration. The struggle between the "European" and the "Asian" wings of the party will continue. But given the agreement between both wings that America must move to the political offensive at once, the "Asian" wing has a decided advantage. Asia is obviously the "easier" and less dangerous sphere in which to launch dramatic actions, even if not in which to get quick results.

The "European" wing of the party is more subject to the sobering realization that Europe cannot be ignored. The needs of maintaining the world capitalist alliance must be coordinated with the policy of attack, even if it is mutually agreed that the first offensive is to be launched in Asia. Thus the very important cleavage in the Republican Party does not stem from different conceptions of the nature of American foreign policy. On that they are all united for the offensive. It stems from differences over how far and how fast they can afford to go in the immediate circumstances.

But there, to put it mildly, is the rub. All the objective factors which dictated the policy of the strategic defensive to the Democrats are still in effect. True, American and allied armament has been built up to a strength vastly surpassing what the government had at its disposal when the cold war took definite shape. Russia is girdled by a chain of air bases from which atomic attacks or reprisals can be launched in the event that aggressive policies explode into full-scale war. The Atlantic Pact powers have
an army which is no longer only on paper. In that sense, the balance of forces is not what it was from 1946 through 1949.

But Russia still has the interior lines from which to launch concentrated political and military fulls against the vast periphery on which Western imperialism must stand guard. The Stalinist political movements, though waning, are still entrenched powers in France and Italy, essential to any hope of holding the line in Europe while engaging in adventures in Asia. And above all, the governments of Europe and those who are sought as allies in Asia (India, Indonesia, etc.) are absolutely opposed which are still free of it.

are sought as allies in Asia (India, Indonesia, etc.) are absolutely opposed which are still free of it.

The administration set forth firmly on a speedy ratification of the agreement to form a European army on pain of a “re-evaluation” of what America can do for (read “to”) the shaky ruling classes of Europe if they refuse.

And thus, finally, the proposal of the Eisenhower administration to symbolically destroy the work which was concluded at Teheran and Yalta and Potsdam.

“I decline absolutely to embark here upon a discussion about Russian good faith. It is quite evident that these matters touch the whole future of the world. Terrible, indeed, would be the fortunes of mankind if some awful schism arose between the Western democracies and the Russian people, if all future world organizations were rent asunder and a new cataclysm of inconceivable violence destroyed what is left of the treasuries and liberties of mankind.”

Winston Churchill, in the debate in the House of Commons on the Yalta agreement, Spring, 1945.

As this is written, the Eisenhower administration has just sent up to Congress its heralded resolution on the so-called “repudiation” of the “secret agreements” concluded at Yalta and Potsdam. The more antideluvian Republican legislators are grumbling that it does not go far enough.

They had expected a pronouncement which would attack impartially their Communist colleagues and their Russian enemies. But in its effort to produce a statement which can win unanin­mous consent, the controlling brains of the Republican government have written one which is of a somewhat different character. There is no telling at the moment, what its fate will be, textually, in the Congress.

But “weak” as the proposed statement may be, it clearly and unambiguously marks the turn of the helm in the direction of the world-wide offensive. For all who can read, it sets as the ultimate objective of American foreign policy a drastic reversal of the division of the world achieved as a result of World War II, a reversal which cannot be realized short of World War III. If there are Republican leaders who cannot read, this is due to a lamentable inadequacy of their political education.

In fact, the statement is not weak, it is very clever. It is designed to trap the Democrats into an acceptance of the reversal of their former administration’s policies. Though ambiguous, it pushes the limits of what may be accomplished with the allies at this stage of the new policy. If they do not balk now, they can be shown, at later stages, that the Republican government never concealed its intentions to take the offensive and push it until the world was re-divided; on the contrary, that they proclaimed their aims for the whole world to see as soon as they had taken power.

Textually, the proposed resolution simply states that the American government will never accept the Stalinist “perversions” of agreements made during the last war which have resulted in the enslavement of peoples. The meaning of this is to clearly repudiate American acquiescence in every territorial grab made by Stalin during or after the war, and to announce the intention of America to “peacefully” get him to let go of them in due course. The profession of purely peaceful intent was indispensable to the resolution. Otherwise the allies would face an almost impossible task

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in keeping their governments tied to the American chariot in the face of popular opposition.

Now that the course has been laid and announced to the world, it may be a long time before anything very material is done in its pursuit. All-out war on American initiative is excluded for a long time to come. As the Stalinists have been quite aware for years (even at the time when they were conferring with Roosevelt and Truman) that eventually America would not abide by the decisions of World War II, this announcement does not compel them to take any drastic action. No one can predict at the moment just how they will react, but the likelihood is that they will see their best chance in breaking up the Western alliance; in using America's policy of the offensive to convince the less courageous or more vulnerable allies that it will be safer for them to dissociate themselves from America than to be pushed or dragged into the vortex of war by it. In any event, they seem confident that the economic tendencies of capitalism will play their role in disrupting the offensive and that time is more on their side than against them.

All these factors will play their role in thwarting the Republican ambitions. They are already caught up in their own contradictions of promising a balanced budget and tax cuts, objectives which are not only mutually exclusive, but quite incompatible with the military and political requirements of their foreign policy. And although these promises may not weigh too heavily with the heads of the giant corporations who staff the cabinet, they are dear to the hearts of the mass of their small-business retainers.

But vastly more important than this is their utter inability to understand what moves the minds and hearts of the millions upon millions of workers and peasants all over the world. To the extent that they even think in ideological terms, they seem to believe that these people can be won to their struggle against Stalinism by an endless reiteration of catchy slogans, about the same way as one can increase the sale of a particular brand of eyewash. People who are condemned to a life-long diet of onions and dirty bread, while they watch their American-supported masters cavorting in luxury are to be recruited to the struggle for "a better life." Whole nations which have been and still are deprived of the elementary right to rule themselves are to be won by a barrage of talk about "freedom." Peoples whose governments have suppressed all opposition, who have not known what freedom of speech or press is for decades, are to shed their blood under the banner of "democracy."
The Fair Dealers at least had an inkling of what was involved. Their "Point Four" program was a dim and flickering reflection of it. They could not do what was required, because despite their relatively better understanding, they too were committed, at bottom, to the preservation on a world scale of the rotting capitalist system and the decayed capitalist and semi-feudal classes from which the peoples in the non-Stalinist world suffer. But the Republicans lack even the inkling which bothered some and animated others among their predecessors. They will carry on their "ideological" campaign more as a formality than out of any conviction. Like General MacArthur, they really believe that the masses understand only one language: force.

This blindness to the needs of the masses everywhere, this contempt for their ability to understand what their interests are and to act on them, is the prime guarantee of a world-wide defeat for the Republicans and their policy. Stalin is just as cynical as they are. He has, if possible, an even greater contempt for the masses. He is a past master in the use of force as a political weapon. But he knows that the peoples of the world are capable of upsetting all calculations if they are not taken into account. While holding his own masses in the iron grip of a totalitarian rule without equal for brutality in the world's history, he recognizes that the masses who are oppressed by other, more ancient forms of tyranny, can be moved to revolt against them.

Thus wherever the peoples are struggling for political democracy, against foreign rule, for a higher standard of living, Stalin builds his movement on the basis of supporting their struggles. It is true that he is quite capable of ordering his minions to suppress such struggles if they tend to get out of control. But the struggle for the peoples of the world cannot be won against him by a government which regards their fight for freedom and democracy and a decent life now as a danger almost equal to that of Stalinism itself. Such a government can only aid the world-wide growth of the Stalinist movement. It can only succeed in progressively isolating the American people from the rest of the peoples of the world until the day when we stand alone, the object of universal distrust and hatred.

As the implications for the American people of this policy become translated into hard and harder experiences, their resistance to it can be counted on to grow. But for it to be transformed into meaningful and effective opposition, there must also be understanding both of the nature of American imperialism and of Stalinism. There must be a growth of the understanding of the different interests of the American people in general, and of the workers in particular, from those of the present rulers of our destinies. As long as even the advanced workers continue to think in terms of "America" and "Russia," or of "Democracy" and "Communism" as the protagonists of the world conflict, opposition to the burdens of war and its preparations will be fritted away at best, and can turn into utterly reactionary channels at worst. We have seen a first step in the latter direction in the reactions to the Korean war as they were expressed in the recent elections.

Independent Socialists are for a policy of liberation for the peoples oppressed by Stalinism, but for us the word liberation is not put in quotation marks. We are also for a policy of liberation for the colonial peoples oppressed by the capitalist nations, and for the masses of those nations who are subjects of the oppression of their own ruling classes. We are for the complete destruction of Stalinism as a world force, both in Russia and elsewhere, but not in the name of restoring a hated capitalism to the peoples who have got rid of it, or of keeping it on the backs of the peoples who still groan under it.

But we recognize that the war which is being prepared by the Stalinist bureaucracy and by the American capitalists does not have liberation as its objective. It is aimed toward another division of the world on terms even more favorable to each protagonist than those which were available to them at the end of World War II; in fact, this time it is really a question of the whole world or nothing. Freedom, democracy, peace, liberation . . . these are just the shop-worn emblems
which they seek to mobilize the exhausted and fearful and rebellious masses.

Our credentials in putting forth our views on the nature of the war which is being prepared is the analysis we made of the struggle which engulfed the world ten years ago. Although we yielded to no one in our hatred of fascism and our determination to resist it and crush it, we proclaimed throughout the war that the aims of the belligerent powers on both sides could not claim the support of people who fought for democracy and freedom for all peoples. We did not have to wait till the cold war broke out in all its fury to recognize the consequences of Teheran, which were confirmed at Yalta and Potsdam . . . we stated them clearly at the time:

The seeds of the Third World War are being sown already. World War II is not yet over, decidedly not yet, and the conditions for speeding World War III are being laid. . . . The military struggle between the two big camps is accompanied by a feverish political struggle inside the Allied camp. The attempts made in it to come to an agreement on the division of the spoils are condemned in advance to failure which the essentially temporary character of any imperialist agreement bears from the moment it is adopted. They agreed before, once, twice and ten times. Their very agreements contained the germ of conflict. The agreement over Poland simply injects one of the many germs of tomorrow's conflict.


And the proposal which we make now is the same that we made then. It is not a proposal directed to the Republican government, or to Stalin. It is directed to the workers, the common people of our own country as well as those throughout the world: If you want peace, you must struggle on your own behalf against the war-makers.

For the American workers, blessed with democracy and living in a land of power and plenty this means: break loose from the policies of a government which will drag you through blood and slime to assure its supremacy in the world. Form your own political party to oppose it. Form a political party which will proclaim to the peoples of the world, and act on such a proclamation, that you will support their struggles for freedom and democracy against their rulers everywhere and in every circumstance. Take the political offensive away from Stalinism by championing the cause of the oppressed everywhere, beginning right at home and close to home where you can prove that these are no empty words, but represent a solemn commitment for action.

To follow the Republican administration in its headlong course toward World War III would be a disaster for humanity. To seek merely to replace the Republicans with their Democratic rivals whose policy, in the longer run amounted to the same thing, would be little better. The only chance of avoiding another and ultimately horrible catastrophe for mankind is to start on the road of mobilizing the peoples on both sides of the iron curtain to struggle for themselves against both war camps. It is a difficult policy, which requires the utmost clarity of understanding, and the most inflexible purpose in carrying it through. The forces committed to it are small indeed. But in their growth lies the only hope of humanity.

Gordon HASKELL

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and, imperceptibly flowing from this, the contemporary phase of the “war danger” growing out of the expansion and consolidation of the new empire. It is in this context that anti-Semitism has undergone the change—from a miasma poisoning the whole of society into a policy of state.

The Roots of Anti-Semitism

The October Revolution destroyed all the legal and social restrictions which had confined the Jews of Russia within the Pale. It thereby destroyed the social foundation of the Jewish ghetto and set in motion the process of assimilating the Jews into Russian society. The nationalization of industry and later its feverish expansion in the Stalinist epoch dissolved the economic basis on which the Jewish community had chiefly rested, i.e., the Jewish merchants, shop-keepers and artisans were doomed to disappear. In their place were to arise the Jewish state or party functionaries, the professionals and the Jewish workers. The results of this transformation were quite striking. According to the English economist, Hubbard, in 1941 Jews filled approximately the majority of rank and file executive positions in Moscow. Another writer estimates that on the eve of the Second World War over two-thirds of employed Jews fell into the categories of the “intelligentsia”—that category which encompasses all the non-manual layers of Soviet society. The remainder were to be found in industry as workers and to a much smaller degree in agriculture.

But the gains made by the Jews as a result of this liberating process were not all one-sided. Because of the whole history of Czarist persecution, the Jew suffered from what is known in sociological jargon as “high social visibility.” His entrance into the factory and above all into the economic-administrative and political machine made him conspicuous by virtue of his whole crippling past.

As a result of the social and economic strains which prevailed in the middle-twenties, anti-Semitic feelings were slowly manifested, compounded in part of the traditional hostility of the peasant and the backward worker closely linked with him (the Jew as town neuron, tradesman); also, the resentment of various layers of the urban population who were subjected to “competition” from a new source—the recently liberated Jews—assumed anti-Semitic overtones.

In the period between 1925 and 1930 this wave of anti-Semitism began to take on violent proportions. Peculiar to it was the fact that anti-Semitic sentiments and physical outbreaks were not confined to the countryside and small towns. They were just as numerous, if not more so, in the large urban centers. Anti-Semitic incidents took place in the factories of Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, Kiev; in the offices and universities, as well as on the streets and in public places.

Ultimately, the regime had to take measures of a sort against these anti-Semitic manifestations. Propaganda and educational campaigns were launched by the party, the Komsomol (party youth organization) and the trade unions. One of the products of this campaign was a book written by a leading party member, Yuri Larin, and published in 1929. This book, *Jews and anti-Semitism in the USSR*, is of interest to us because it documents the nature and extent of anti-Jewish feeling among workers and in the ranks of the party and the youth. One section of the book dealing with a seminar Larin conducted under party auspices in one of Moscow’s industrial boroughs is extremely important and far more revealing that any detailed recital of anti-Semitic excesses would be. Larin’s audience consisted of party members, Komsomols, advanced workers and party sympathizers. Out of 66 questions that this audience asked Larin the following were chosen as the most typical and we quote them:

Why is it that the Jews don’t want to do heavy work?

How is it that the Jews always manage to get good positions?

Why are there so many Jews in the universities? Isn’t it because they forge their papers?

Won’t the Jews be traitors in a war? Aren’t they dodging military service?

Why was the opposition within the party made up of Jews to the extent of 76 per cent?

Two layers of the urban population were especially virulent in their assault on the newly won positions of the Jews. The first consisted of former middle-class elements—the intelligentsia—who now had to find a place for themselves in the new social order. Their anxiety, uncertainty and fear crystallized into resentment against the “upstart” Jews. It is worth quoting the frank words of Mikhail Kalinin, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, in an address delivered in 1926 to an audience of Jewish agricultural settlers in the Crimea:

Why is the Russian intelligentsia perhaps more anti-Semitic today than it was under Czarism? It is a natural development. In the first days of the revolution the mass of urban intellectuals and semi-intellectuals threw itself into the revolution. Members of an oppressed nation, a nation that never had any share in the government... they naturally flocked to the revolutionary work of construction, of which administration is a part... At the very time when large sections of the Russian intelligentsia were breaking away, frightened by the revolution, at that very time the Jewish intelligentsia were pouring into the revolutionary stream, swelling it in a high proportion as compared with their numbers, and starting to work in the revolutionary administrative organs.

The second layer of the urban population which reacted violently against the Jews consisted of large sections of ambitious young workers and worker-students who saw unexpected paths of unlimited social advancement open before them. They, too, feared the competition of the Jews, and indeed the hostility of the students not only exposed itself in sickening acts of physical violence; it went so far that in certain universities the cry went up from the student bodies (with Komsomol members in the lead) to restore the hateful Czarist device—the *numerous clausus*—the quota restricting the number of Jews who could enter the universities.

What is of supreme importance here is that the Stalinist faction relied heavily on these social groups for support and that from them, ultimately, the Stalinist bureaucracy was to be shaped. The anti-Semitism present in the lower strata of society was fed and kept boiling by the open prejudices of a part of the elite—the party members and party youth belonging to or supporting the Stalinist faction. The inspiration for anti-Semitism, in fact, came from above. It was the Stalin faction which encouraged it in the ranks of the party, party youth and working-class sympathizers. What other source was there for the question asked so often of Larin; so “precise” in its statistical form: why is the opposition within the party made up of Jews to the extent of 76 per cent? As a distinct social force, Stalinism was born with anti-Semitism in its blood. In the course of its history it was to
establish a cruel syllogism: in 1926-27—the Jews are oppositionists; in 1936-37-38—all oppositionists are spies and traitors (the main defendants in the purge trials were mostly Jews); and in 1953—all Jews are oppositionists—spies—traitors. The victory of Stalinism was to mean the permanent infection of Soviet society.

The War and Post-War Period

While the rise and growth of anti-Semitism in the mid-twenties and its temporary decline in the early thirties (the period of forced collectivization and feverish industrial expansion) can be traced in official articles, statements and books, the growth and intensification of anti-Semitism during the war and post-war period has been cloaked in an official veil of silence. But we know that it appeared not only in the Ukraine, its traditional seat, but in Bierorussia and the Great Russian republic as well. It is also noteworthy that as a result of the war, anti-Semitism spread to the interior areas of Russia where it had never existed before. It sprang up in such remote regions as Kaskhstan, Western Siberia and Central Asia.

Although the Stalinist regime has never lifted the veil on what happened after World War II in Europe ended, a picture can be drawn from the accounts of eye-witnesses, letters and depositions of former Soviet citizens, particularly army men. We know, for example, that immediately after liberation, Jews were received with open animosity by the Ukrainians. Those attempting to regain their homes and personal possessions were subject to physical attack. In general, as was the case in the satellite countries as well, Jews returning home never succeeded in regaining more than a small portion of their personal property. In Kharkov, during the post-liberation period, Jews did not dare venture out into the streets at night. In Kiev, during the same period, a pogrom took place in which 16 Jews were killed. The official answer to Jewish complaints was that the population had been infected by the Germans and that anti-Semitism could only be uprooted gradually. (Bulletin of the Joint Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1943.)

The spread of anti-Semitism to the interior areas of the Soviet Union was in large part the product of the evacuation of central government institutions to these areas during the war. Dr. Jerzy Glikman, the Polish Social­ist, who observed conditions in Central Asia at this time has this to say: “Another group of Russian Jews, belonging predominantly to the bureaucratic class and having financial means, aroused the hostility of the local population by sending prices up on the free market, which were very high to begin with.” (Jerzy Glikman, Jewish Exiles in Soviet Russia, 1989-43.) The Hitlerite propaganda—which the regime did nothing to combat, either during the war or post-war period, against the “Bolshevik Jews” found its echo even here. Though the Jews represented but a minute section of the privileged group, the hostility of the provincial population against the bureaucratic intruders from the urban centers was directed against them as an obvious and easy target.

Anti-Semitism existed also among the rank and file of the Russian army. Russian soldiers and officers of Jewish origin have given abundant evidence of the resentment at the front against civilians in general and Jews in particular. The latter were considered “draft dodgers” and “profiteers.” And many Jewish ex-officers have reported they changed their names during the war not because they feared capture by the Germans but because of the hostility of the rank and file of the army. (Rachel Erlich, “Summary Report on 18 Intensive Interviews With Jewish DPs from Poland and the Soviet Union,” October 1948.) The prejudice of the returning soldiers must have been a potent factor in strengthening the anti-Semitic feelings that already existed among some layers of the population in widely scattered sections of Stalinist Russia.

The same prejudices were displayed by Russian partisans fighting behind German lines. Much of this information comes to us from Jewish partisans who fought in separate groups alongside the Russian partisans. Most authentic is the testimony gathered by Moishe Kagonovich in his book The Jewish Share in Soviet Russia’s Partisan Forces, because Kagonovich was sympathetic to the cause of Stalinist Russia. Kagonovich explains that many of the Russian partisans had been war prisoners or slave laborers and had been infected by German propaganda. He declares that anti-Semitic outbursts were frequent and often violent. But the most telling part of his story is the fact that it was virtually impossible for a Jew to join the Soviet partisan groups. The Jew was not only an object of hate, he was also suspect. One example out of many will suffice. Kagonovich recounts a long talk Jewish partisans had with Russian army paratroopers who had been dropped by Soviet planes in the Lipichi forest in 1943. (The fact that these partisans came from inside Russian controlled territory contradicts Kagonovich’s assertion that the source of anti-Semitism among the Soviet partisans was German propaganda.) The Russian army men fired the following questions at the Jewish fighters:

How is it that Jews still keep alive in the Lida ghetto in 1943?

Why do Jews work in shops producing military supplies for Germans?

Don’t this prove the Jews have collaborated with the Germans?

Aren’t the Jews who have survived and taken to the woods grateful to the Germans, and acting as spies for them?

The distrust of the partisans was not confined to the ranks. In September, 1943, a special order was issued by the Partisan Supreme Command warning partisan detachments against Jewish spies.

The Difficulties of the Jewish partisans were complicated further by the hostility of the local peasants, who was being crushed between the Germans and the partisans. In the case of the Jewish guerrilla detachments, the peasants felt double resentment because they exacted food and clothing not only for themselves but for the family camps of older people and children whom they were trying to save from utter destruction.

The reports we have cited above date from the war and immediate post-war period. But any possibility that their testimony is either biased or out-of-date is excluded by referring to a series of interviews conducted by Dr. Barghoorn of Yale University with a group of 200 former Soviet citizens, all of whom fled Russian-controlled soil after 1948. In practically every instance, the reports of these non-Jews, all of them members of the middle and upper strata of the Soviet intelligentsia confirm the earlier reports and indicate that anti-Semitism did not diminish after the war but had grown more intense. Time and again they echo the charges that the feeling exists that the Jews “got all the good jobs” and “did not participate in the frontline fighting.”

The response of the Stalinist regime
to the post-war outbreak of anti-Semitism was... silence and a cautious concession to popular feelings. The explanation for this policy lies in the difficult situation that confronted the Kremlin. The primary tasks were to reconstruct and set in motion the great bureaucratic machine that had been disrupted and weakened by the war, and to restore "discipline" in the factories and collective farms. Immediately before the regime lay the problems of "de-westernizing" the army and those civilians who had come into contact with the West; of squeezing the "unreliables" out of the war-inflated party. Stalin understood only too well the dangers inherent in encouraging anti-Semitism at a time when the state apparatus was shaky. The violence against the Jews could easily have widened into violence against the bureaucracy as a whole and might have had dangerous repercussions.

In the Ukraine there existed a specific reason for the regime's silence. As late as December 30, 1947, Russian authorities admitted the existence of armed bands of Ukrainian nationalists. Some of these groups were reactionary and anti-Semitic. In a speech before the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, the Politburo member Krushev frankly discussed the need to grant amnesty to the leaders and members of these avowedly anti-Semitic groups and even to accept them into the party. Not until 1948 was the Stalinist government in complete control in the Ukraine.

If the regime did not exploit popular anti-Semitism during the immediate post-war period, this does not mean that members of the elite did not express their hostility toward the Jews, or that in certain instances the Stalinist government did not show its distrust of the Jews. It is important to lay bare the anti-Semitic disposition of leading members of the Kremlin hierarchy and certain actions of the government in this period, for they foreshadow what was to come.

An outstanding example of the anti-Semitic bureaucrat at the highest level is to be found in the late Alexander Shcherbakov, brother-in-law of Zhdanov—both of them alleged victims of the Jewish doctors. A member of the Politburo and secretary of the Moscow provincial and city committee of the Communist Party, Shcherbakov was also head of political work in the army. The name of Shcherbakov crops up repeatedly in the reports of former army men of Jewish origin—particularly officers. According to these witnesses, it was Shcherbakov who blocked the promotion of many Jewish war heroes and denied them the decorations they had earned in battle.

Another leading figure reported to have expressed anti-Semitic feelings is General Vassily I. Chuikov, now Commander-in-Chief of Soviet armed forces in Eastern Germany. According to a report in the Christian Science Monitor of February 14, 1952, General Chuikov denounced the Jews as a "disruptive force."

The former Hungarian Minister, Nicolas Nyaradi, gives an illuminating picture of the anti-Semitism rampant in the highest Kremlin circles. Both in his recently published book, My Ringside Seat in Moscow and in magazine articles, Nyaradi declares that he frequently heard Jews referred to by the contemptuous term "zhid" (English equivalent—"kike"), although a law against racial defamation exists. When Kaltanov, the Soviet Minister of Education, was about to introduce Nyaradi to Ilya Ehrenburg, he told him: "You know, he is a zhid, but in spite of that he is a prominent communist and a good Soviet patriot."

According to Nyaradi, 400,000 Jews were deported from the western border territories of Russia to Siberia and the far north in the summer of 1947. When he asked General Merkulov, with whom Nyaradi was negotiating Hungarian reparations, about this, the General replied:

Why are you so worried about the future of those Jews, Mr. Minister? They are traveling in comfortable box cars, they will be settled in a beautiful scenic area, and all they have to do is cultivate the land if they don't want to starve. It will not, of course, be too comfortable for those cosmopolitan speculators.

Anti-Semitism is not, of course, confined to the top layers of the Kremlin hierarchy. We have cited the existence of anti-Jewish feelings in the Ukraine—but it is a feeling that is found in Ukrainian officialdom as well. A deposition made by a Ukrainian Jew to the Rescue Committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, who left the Ukraine in 1944, states: "The Ukrainian authorities are greatly anti-Semitic... when the Commercial Academy moved from Kharkov to Kiev several Jewish professors applied for permission to go there; but their applications were rejected. They addressed themselves to the chairman of the Ukrainian Soviet but received no response."

We have already cited the indifference of the Ukrainian local bureaucrats to the physical attacks on Jews in the immediate post-liberation period.

While the Stalinist government did not launch an open attack on the Jews until the fall of 1948, we have many specific examples of its distrust of the Jews and of concealed actions to eliminate the Jews from certain spheres of Russian official life—actions that go back to pre-World War II days.

In 1939, the Soviet armies marched into the "Western Ukraine" and "Western White Russia" and annexed these territories as Stalin's reward for signing the pact with Hitler. Immediately the counterfeit revolution was set in motion by Stalin's political machine. "Soviets" on a local and regional basis were set up, and though this was an area heavily populated by Jews they were not permitted to occupy responsible political positions. A dispatch by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency based on the reports of its agents on the scene describes the situation:

Jews in East Galicia are being accepted in small numbers into the militia, into the school system and as state engineers. Similarly, colleges which had been closed to Jews are now open to them. But no Jews—not even Jewish communists—have political influence and not a single responsible position is entrusted to a Jew. All such positions are held by Russians sent from the interior of the Soviet Union or by local Ukrainians.

Illustrative of the situation in the fact that among 1,700 delegates to the Soviet National Assembly (People's Assembly of the Western Ukraine) held last October (1939) in Lvov to proclaim Galicia a part of the Soviet Union, hardly twenty delegates were Jews, despite the large Jewish ratio in the population. It is known that when Jewish Communists were nominated by Jewish workers, the Soviet authorities intervened and advised withdrawal of the Jewish candidates and their replacement by Ukrainians. In Lvov, whose population is 30 per cent Jewish, only two Jews were elected to the local Soviet of 160 members.

We have referred above to the anti-Semitic sentiments expressed by General Chuikov in 1946. But it was not only a question of Chuikov's personal sentiments. For what followed was a purge of Jewish officers and rank and file soldiers. (The purge of Jewish soldiers in the Russian occupation forces in Eastern Germany was resumed and completed between 1949-51.) Again the same pattern emerges: In an area where Russian power is not firmly ex-
established and anti-Semitism is presumed to exist among the local population—the regime makes concessions to these prejudices and at the same time demonstrates its lack of faith in the political reliability of the Jews.

The gradual elimination of Jews from certain spheres of official life is a process that began before the war. In his book, The Iron Curtain, Igor Gouzenko, a former member of the Russian diplomatic corps in Canada, relates that in 1939 “we were privately and individually warned that Jews in general were in ‘disfavor.’ We were told of a ‘confidential’ decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.” This decree established a secret quota for the admission of Jews to educational institutions. In 1945, according to Gouzenko, Aleksashkin, chief of Soviet intelligence, arrived in Ottawa and told members of the diplomatic staff in Canada that the Central Committee of the party had sent “confidential” instructions to directors of all plants and factories to remove Jews from responsible positions and under any pretext whatsoever to place them in less responsible work.

While it is, naturally, impossible to verify Gouzenko’s statements directly from Russian sources, the whole trend of events confirms his claims. In a series of articles written for the Christian Science Monitor in January, 1950, Edmund Stevens, the former Moscow correspondent of that paper, reports on the plight of Jews with professional and administrative training. Stevens asserts that the head of a department in a large educational institution had told him that he had received a directive ordering him not to hire Jewish teachers and dismiss those already on his staff. In another article in this same series Stevens gives further examples of discrimination against Jews which are fairly well-known by now, but which we cite to fill out the picture of this slow, hidden process that was taking place. Stevens says, and his statements have been corroborated by other observers, that Jews are not admitted to the special school for the training of personnel for the foreign diplomatic service; the same restrictions apply to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. An indirect verification of Steven’s claim with respect to the latter ministry may be found by studying its monthly journal which lists the names of officials authorized to negotiate on its behalf. According to Solomon Schwartz who made a careful study of this magazine the number of such officials came to 87 in four different months. In this total only three Jewish names appeared. The decline is all the more glaring because before the war Jews played an important role in this ministry.

The process of pushing the Jews out of the state apparatus has not been confined to those branches of the government dealing with the outside world. In his thoroughly documented work, Jews in the Soviet Union, Solomon Schwartz notes that Jews were conspicuously absent from the lower echelons of the party and state apparatus in the post-war period not only in the Ukraine but also in the Great Russian republic where anti-Semitism had never been as wide-spread. The determination to push the Jews out of Soviet life finds its political reflection in the marked decline of Jewish representation in the Supreme Soviet. In 1937 a total of 47 Jews were elected to the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet. But in 1946 there were not more than five Jews among the 601 members of the Soviet of the Union as against 32 Jews among 569 representatives in 1937. By 1950 there were not more than two Jews (one of them Lazar Kaganovitch, Stalin’s brother-in-law) among the 678 members of the Soviet of the Union. In Stalin’s Russia, where elections are not left to chance or the will of the voters, this decline in the role of the Jews could have only one meaning.

The Line Changes

The attitude of the Stalinist regime toward the Jews did not involve any direct or open attacks until the fall of 1948. Instead, a slow, hidden process unfolded designed to get rid of Jews in the state and party apparatus at critical points—in such “border” zones as the newly acquired territories in the West, the purge of Jewish army officers in the Soviet Occupation Army in 1946, and the exclusion of Jews from all organs dealing with foreign affairs—a process that began in pre-war days.

However, in the fall of 1948, the Stalinist regime sharply altered its official attitude and began a merciless and public pillorying of the Jews. It is important to examine the events which precipitated this sharp turn toward official anti-Semitism. The arrest of the Jewish doctors in January, 1953, was not the beginning of this campaign but merely the climax and conclusion of the first stage in a pogrom that had begun more than four years ago, and the preparation for an even sharper and more direct attack on the Jews as a whole.

In the autumn of 1948, Moscow was the stage for two of the most extraordinary mass demonstrations that have ever taken place during Stalin’s reign. Thousands of Jews gathered in and around the main Moscow synagogue on Rosh Hashonah, the Jewish New Year, to greet Mrs. Goldie Myerson, who had arrived in the Soviet Union to open the Israel legation. Joseph Newman, the Herald Tribune correspondent in Moscow at the time, has described the scenes in eloquent and moving terms. According to Newman, the demonstrations were repeated a week later on Yom Kippur, the solemn Jewish holy day of atonement. The sentiments expressed by these thousands of Jews were unmistakable in their content. They identified themselves, not with Stalin’s Russia, but with the new state of Israel. A continuous flow of Jews began to pass through the temporary headquarters of the Israeli legation requesting information about emigration.

Stalin was quick to take action. A group of leading Jewish writers and political figures (who had always served Stalin faithfully) were rounded up as the organizers of the demonstrations. The security police thereafter raided and liquidated the only two remaining Yiddish language printing plants in the Soviet Union, both located in Moscow—the newspaper “Einheit” and the publishing house “Emess.” Simultaneously, Stalin liquidated the offices of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, an organization Stalin had set up during the war to enlist the support of Jews in the West for the Kremlin. The Israeli legation was declared off bounds for Soviet citizens and the desire to emigrate to Israel declared an act of disloyalty to the state.*

*A red thread runs directly from these vents to the arrest of the Jewish doctors in January 1953. For one of the six Jewish doctors arrested was the brother-in-law of the late Solomon Mikhoels, whose real name was Vovsi, the noted Yiddish actor, who served as the chairman of the JAC. According to the newspaper reports, Dr. Vovsi, the physician in question, has “confessed” that he received a directive on the destruction of leading cadres of the USSR… from the ‘Joint’ through a doctor in Moscow, Shimeliovich, and the well-known Jewish bourgeois-nationalist Mikhoels.”

Stalin has another reason for slander—
It is from this period that the policy of cultural genocide begins. Not only were the Yiddish newspaper and book publishing plants closed down, but all Jewish theatres and schools that had remained in existence were shut down; the virulent campaign against Zionism and "rootless cosmopolitanism" was initiated, and the campaign to discredit and drive the Jews out of Soviet life begun. Needless to say, the onslaught was inaugurated by Stalin's Jewish hireling, Ilya Ehrenburg, with an article that appeared in *Parvda* on October 21, 1948. The assault on Zionism quickly spilled over into anti-Semitism and some of the newspaper attacks were so vicious that the censor refused to permit correspondents to cable them abroad. The most violent was a review of a book *Years of Life* written several years earlier by Isaac Bakharkh. The reviewer, S. Ivanov, ridiculed not only Zionism but the Jewish religion as well. He concluded his review by denouncing the editor Fyodor Levin, who had just been expelled from the party, as a "cosmopolitan bastard."

The general ideological campaign to "de-westernize" Russian intellectuals was redirected in part and concentrated on Jewish writers. These attacks have received widespread publicity and need no detailed documentation here. But two examples deserve to be quoted because they give the purest flavor of Stalinist ideology on the offensive. Attacking a well-known Jewish-Ukrainian poet, Leonid Pervomaiski, the secretary of the Board of the League of Soviet Writers in the Ukraine, L. Dmiterko, wrote: "Here Pervomaiski has produced a perfected theory of cosmopolitanism. It appears that Shevchenko [a famous Ukrainian poet and leading figure in the Ukrainian literary and political renaissance in the 19th century—A. S.] with his intransigence toward the enemies and his love for his people was narrow-minded; whereas Ivan Franko, whose favorite supposedly was Heine—that forbear of all 'cosmopolitans without ancestry' broadened the understanding of the world and Lesya Ukrainka lifted Ukrainian literature up to 'the humanity of the whole of mankind.' This is accomplished cosmopolitanism ... having sunk into the morass of bourgeois humanism, Pervomaiski expounded corrupt cosmopolitan theories."

On February 14, 1949, *Pravda* attacked a well-known Jewish dramatic critic, A. Gurvich: "What can be A. Gurvich's notion of the national character of the Soviet Russian man when he writes that in the 'kindhearted humor and naively trusting optimism' of Pogodin's plays ... the spectator saw himself as a mirror, for 'kindheartedness' is supposedly not alien to the Russian. This slanders the Soviet Russian man. This is abject slander. And precisely because kindheartedness is utterly alien to us, we must expose this attempt to heap insult upon the Soviet national character."

The response of the regime was indeed extreme, and it may be asked why two such harmless demonstrations should have provoked so violent and immediate a response. To seek an answer to this question, we must refer to certain war-time actions of the Stalinist regime.

On August 28, 1941, a government decree dissolved the Volga German Autonomous Republic for alleged diversionist activities. A large part of this population was banished to the Altai region of western Siberia and other areas as a punishment for "disloyalty." This was the first direct example of genocide by the Stalinist regime. (The deportation of millions of Ukrainians during the early thirties was carried out under the guise of a struggle with the Kulaks.) The second step was not too long in following. After the Germans had retreated from the Caucasus and Crimea, the regime condemned the Chechens and Ingush of the Caucasus and the Tartars of the Crimean Autonomous Republic for collaborating with the enemy. These Autonomous areas were also dissolved in 1944 and their territory incorporated in the Russian Federal Republic. The final measure of genocide taken by the Stalinist regime as a result of the war was the liquidation of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic and the Karachayevo-Cherkess Autonomous Region. The scope of the punishment meted out to these peoples can be measured by the total population affected. According to the 1939 census, the population of the five regions came to 2,798,000.

In the case of the Chechen-Ingush, reports have filtered out concerning what happened. On February 23, 1944, during the festivities celebrating Red Army Day, MVD troops appeared in the villages and began the arrest of all adult males. Those who attempted to flee were shot. The remainder, together with their women and children were exiled to Central Asia. At least half of those exiled died in transit from sickness and hunger. Today the Chechen-Ingush no longer have a national existence. Not only were they deported, but they are denied the right to schools and newspapers in their native tongue.

The liquidation of the above minorities was only one aspect of the total picture. The war not only destroyed the fiction of monolithic unity, it also breached the hitherto impenetrable myth of the superiority of life in the "Land of Socialism." The millions of Russian soldiers who had marched into the West had to be convinced that what they had seen with their own eyes was not true—the incredible difference between their low "socialist" living standards and the relatively comfortable circumstances of poor workers and peasants in the "decadent, capitalist" West. The opening shot in this campaign came on September 3, 1944, when *Pravda* featured an article by Leonid Sobolev advising Soviet soldiers not to be deceived by the tinself of the West. Two years later, in 1946, Zhdanov opened fire on the intellectual front with a demand that the Russian intellectuals stop "kowtowing to the West." That ideological war has continued till this day and not one stratum of Soviet society has escaped the increasingly savage assault: everything Russian must be exalted, everything Western damned.

But Stalin has not relied on propaganda measures alone. In the immediate post-war period, a vast operation supervised by the NKVD was undertaken to sift out those "ideologically infected" Russians, and their number was considerable, who had fallen into the hands of the Germans as prisoners or slave labor. In some cases they were shot as traitors; in most, they were denounced as "socially dangerous" and sent off to the slave labor camps.

The liquidation of the national minorities, the especially cruel treatment of prisoners of war and civilian captives, the ideological offensive against "kowtowing" to the West in all spheres of science and the arts, and
the reaction of the Kremlin to the Jewish demonstrations in Moscow all fit into the same pattern: The need to reinforce the monolithic facade and eliminate or terrorize all real or potentially "dissloyal" elements. Given the increasing tensions on the international scene, the very real "war danger" and the anti-Semitic predispositions of the Kremlin hierarchy, the anti-Jewish policies of the Kremlin become comprehensible.

But yet another question is raised by the open anti-Semitic course of the Stalinist regime. Why did it launch an open, public campaign of such vicious proportions? Why didn't it merely accelerate the hidden process that was already in effect of purging the Jews, and carry it out silently and without fanfare as had been done in the case of the five liquidated national minorities and the "cleansing" of military and civilian prisoners of war?

Much has been written about the attack on the Jews being designed as an appeal to the Arabs and the Germans. Undeniably such considerations must enter into the calculations of the Kremlin. But a close study of the pattern of events and propaganda will show that the primary audience was and remains domestic. The anti-Semitic campaign was designed chiefly for home consumption and not for export.

On February 3, 1951, the Christian Science Monitor carried a report that anti-Semitic outbreaks had assumed the proportions of minor riots in a number of small Ukrainian towns, and that assaults on individual Jews had even taken place in Moscow. The report also declared that government officials took no effective steps to curb these incidents. Similar reports leaked through with the acceleration of the anti-Semitic drive in December, 1952. Clearly, the Stalinist regime is inflaming and provoking popular anti-Semitism. In a police state such incidents cannot take place on a wide scale without the tacit approval of the police. The use of the Jew as the scapegoat appears here in its classic form. Just as in Czarist times, anti-Semitism becomes a "patriotic" manifestation.

The announcement on January 12, 1953 of the arrest of six Jewish doctors together with their three non-Jewish colleagues established the new and more deadly amalgam: The Jews were not merely "rootless, passportless, cosmopolitans," they were also "Trotskyite-Zionist-American agents and spies." Around this new characterization of the Jews as overt "enemies of the state" a new series of legal murders, arrests and denunciations has taken place which must be examined in detail.

In Kiev, in the early part of December, just after the Slansky trial in Prague had ended, an extraordinary event took place. Three Jewish state employees were tried before a military tribunal (in peacetime) as "speculators," immediately condemned to death and shot by a firing squad. On December 18, 1952, five Jewish Communist Party members were arrested in Odessa on charges of sabotage. The five were denounced as "Trotskyite agents" and "confessed" to having carried out various anti-Soviet activities. This, by the way, was the first time that the Soviet press or radio had openly mentioned the word "Jew," having previously referred to Jews as "rootless cosmopolitans." Again, in the middle of January, 1953, the Ukrainian Pravda reported the dismissal of a number of Kiev party and state officials and the exposure of a series of "crimes" in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and Voroshilovgrad. The names of these "criminals" according to the Ukrainian Pravda were "Greenstein in Odessa, Pers in Kiev and Kaplan and Polyakov in Kharkov." On January 25th, the same paper carried a story denouncing one, "Jacob Davidovich Mehlman" who had made a family business out of a glass factory.

The fact that such a high number of arrests and shootings have taken place in the Ukraine can hardly be considered an accident. The appeal to popular anti-Semitism is here being carried one step further. But the drive on Jewish state and party functionaries has not been restricted to the Ukraine. In the January issue of the party magazine Communist, the secretary of the Leningrad regional organization declares that a number of "alien and foreign" elements have been exposed and purged from the Leningrad organization. Who are these "alien and foreign" elements? They are "bourgeois-nationalist, counter-revolutionary elements, former Nepmen having connections with the Jewish Bund and the Trotskyites. Similar reports have been made by the heads of the Moscow party organization and other large cities."

But the arrests, shootings and expulsion of the Jews from the party and state apparatus, which started in early December are only one side of the coin. The other side, it is important to note, is the threat of a general purge in the party and state apparatus. A little more than a week after the arrest of the Jewish doctors, the new secretary of the Stalinist state party, Mikhailov, "demanded that the party mercilessly drive from its ranks all 'degenerates or double-dealers,' root out hidden enemies no matter what mask they wear and incessantly strengthen the Soviet armed forces and intelligence organs." On January 18, 1953, the Moscow correspondent of the New York Times reported that the Ukrainian Communist Party's Central Committee had issued an edict ordering the end of "all political carelessness and slackness" and the complete rooting out of all criminal elements. He also reported that the Kiev newspaper, Ukrainian Pravda, has "linked the drive against commercial fraud with the general campaign for state and party discipline, and the strictest vigilance that is now under way throughout the country as a result of the announcement of the discovery of a plot involving nine Moscow doctors..." the Central Committee directed the attention of the trade minister, the food minister, the meat and milk minister, the light industry minister, the local industry minister and the chiefs of the Ukrainian Cooperative Union and the Ukrainian Industrial Council to unsatisfactory conditions in their respective spheres."

An ingenious theory has been offered to explain the linking of the purge of Jewish officials and the threat of a general purge. According to this theory, a struggle for power is taking place between Beria, the head of the secret police and other members of the Kremlin hierarchy. The evidence consists in part of the attacks on the secret police for their failure to detect the "rebels and other enemies of the state. The other part of the evidence, which has been offered by Alexander Werth, a correspondent who spent a good many years in Stalinist Russia, is that Beria is popularly believed to be half-Jewish. From the combination of these two factors, it is deduced that Beria and his supporters are the real target and the attacks on the Jews only a camouflage. That some sort of struggle must be taking place at the top is quite believable, and perhaps Beria is the target of the present campaign.
but there are other and far more serious factors which have driven the regime to link the attack on the Jews with a threat of a general purge. And it is important to note that for the present, only a shadow purge is taking place. The regime is satisfied to threaten and to purge...only Jews.

Beneath the monolithic facade of the totalitarian state there rage a number of subterranean conflicts—not only between the masses and the regime—but between the topmost stratum of the party and state and the lower ranks of the apparatus and the intelligentsia. In the name of the approaching "war danger" the Kremlin hierarchy is demanding complete submission to its will and ever greater efforts. And it is obviously meeting with resistance from the apparatus on the provincial and local levels as well as from the intelligentsia. This great mass of the bureaucracy, which immediately reflects the dissatisfactions of the lower strata of society as well as expressing its own moods, wants to enjoy life here and now.

It has passed through the storms of collectivization, the "heroic" epoch of industrialization, the horror of the purges, the war and the tremendous strain of post-war reconstruction. And now again it faces the prospect of war and all the sacrifices war entails! To this, it responds with silent resistance. Nothing else explains the never-ending cycle of purges, denunciations and threats which began right after the war and have not diminished but increased like an ever-expanding spiral. A close look at the relationship between the central power and the provincial and local apparatus provides us with a devastating picture. Since the end of the war a continuous series of purges has been decapitating the leadership in the different national republics. In the Ukraine alone, two years after liberation, thirty-eight per cent of the regional secretaries of the Communist Party, sixty-four per cent of all regional party chairmen and two-thirds of the directors of the machine-tractor stations, were purged. In 1951, the purges reached a post-war high with a major cleansing of the party and state apparatus in at least seven of the federal and autonomous republics; the Ukraine, of course, leading the rest. The other republics that suffered changes in leadership were Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, Kirghizia, Uzbekistan and Kasakhstan.

Inside the party the Kremlin has concentrated on liquidating the "unreliables." To the degree that the regime has gained control of the situation it has slowed down and reversed the policy of recruitment it followed during the war and immediate post-war period. In March, 1939, the total membership of the party stood at two and a half million. By October, 1945, the party had mushroomed to five million, seven hundred thousand members. Between September, 1947, when the membership of the party stood at six million, three-hundred thousand, and January, 1948, three hundred thousand members were dropped from the party rolls. At that time the number of party members had declined to six million.

The severity of the process is striking. In the five years between February, 1941, and October, 1945, the party enrolled almost two million members. In the seven years between 1946 and the end of 1952 the party grew by approximately one million members. Yet, despite all these prophylactic measures, the regime is again compelled to threaten the bureaucracy with a purge of serious proportions...perhaps on the scale of the mid-thirties.

The link between the ruthless purge of Jewish officials, which has taken the form of shootings, jail sentences and expulsion from the party, and the threat of a general purge lies in this, that the Kremlin is holding the fate of the Jews up as a warning of how drastic the purge will be if and when it comes. The "crimes" of the Jews now encompass every form of resistance to the will of the Kremlin, and those who behave like the Jews will be treated just as ruthlessly.

A great deal of attention has been devoted by the world press to the speculation that a struggle for power is taking place within the Kremlin hierarchy. But such speculations should not divert our eyes from the central significance of the anti-Semitic policies of the Kremlin. They are a sign of a loss of dynamic, of exhaustion. They signify that the regime has lost whatever attractive powers it had and must now rest altogether on ideological and physical terror. And this marks a further stage in the inner decay of the Stalinist ruling class.

For it should be understood that the Stalinist regime never rested on terror alone. The threat was always supplemented by the promise. The propaganda slogan of "building Socialism in one country" was full of meaning for millions of young people, who had visions of a world of unlimited material and social advancement for themselves. The regime drew them up by the tens of thousands into the upper levels of the state and party apparatus, and not only won their enthusiastic support but established a necessary link with the lower strata of Stalinist society. No matter how distorted, the propaganda was positive and seemed to correspond in some degree to reality. In the "heroic thirties" the younger generation, as we know from many sources, was literally ready for any sacrifice because it believed it was creating socialism and thereby, its own future.

The "heroic" age of Stalinism has vanished never to return. Kremlin society has lost its social mobility and the movement from below upward has slowed tremendously. The class structure has begun to freeze and take on hereditary, caste features. The uniforms assigned to the various occupations and professions is the outward symbol of this fact. Anti-Semitism is the supreme expression of the political and social exhaustion of the regime. Today, the bureaucratic machine, it appears, can only be kept in motion by threats, purges, the elimination of "potentially" disloyal elements and more threats. And in this sense, with all due proportions guarded, a parallel can be drawn between the last decades of Czarism and the Stalinist regime in the present period.

On the eve of the first World War, Czar Nicholas II indulged in cruel, anti-Semitic excesses. In 1913, the notorious ritual murder trial of Mendel Beilis was staged. And the language of anti-Semitism was used to justify this trial. And today, in the official paper, The Russian Banner of the pogromist League of the Russian People: "The government's duty is to consider the Jews as a nation just as dangerous for the life of humanity as wolves, scorpions, snakes, poisonous spiders and other creatures which are doomed to destruction because of their rapaciousness toward...
human beings and whose annihilation is commended by law." How little change is necessary in order to insert this statement as a lead editorial in Pravda or Izvestia!

During the first world war the government attacks on the Jews assumed savage proportions. Someone had to be blamed for the disasters which were shattering the Russian armies on the Galician front. Like Stalin, the Czar discovered Jewish spies and poisoners everywhere. Like Stalin, he deported Jews from the "danger" zones in the Ukraine. It was forbidden to speak Jewish in public places or over telephones because it resembled German. Is the parallel sheer historical coincidence or is Stalin cynically drawing on those deep memories of the past which are embedded in the minds of the older generations and which have been learned from history books by the younger?

It has been suggested by Supreme Court Justice William Douglas that the open persecution of the Jews by the Stalinist regime is a sign of confidence and strength. If he means that the regime is firmly in the saddle today, he is right, of course. But if he means the regime is acting from strength in the sense that it has the confidence and support of the whole country behind it, he is as wrong as anyone can be. Anti-Semitism always has been and always will be the sign and symbol of a ruling class completely at odds with the rest of the nation, a class that is unable to draw upon the deep reservoir of idealism and enthusiasm with which a people always responds in times of crisis, a class that can only rule by deception and terror and by appealing to the basest instincts known to mankind.

Abe STEIN

TWO ERAS OF WAR—III
A Discussion of National and Imperialist Wars

The war of 1864 opens the series of Bismarck's national wars. After the death of King Friedrich VII of Denmark, Holstein, with its almost completely German population, and Schleswig with its predominantly German population indicated their desire to separate themselves from Denmark and to join Germany. The popular representatives of both states elected the Duke of Augustenburg as their regent. The question of the fate of both dukedoms became, in this manner, a national question. The German patriots raised a noisy agitation for the liberation of the dukedoms from the national oppression of the Danes. In January 1864 Prussia undertakes a war against Denmark, together with Austria, and it is won quickly. However, the dukedoms are not given to the German Duke of Augustenburg, as had been demanded by patriotic public opinion in Germany. Instead, Prussia and Austria decide to divide the spoils. Prussia gets Schleswig, Austria gets Holstein.

Immediately after the war of 1864 the question comes to a head: under whose hegemony will Germany unite itself. Prussia or Austria—this dilemma now stands most pressingly on the order of the day. Bismarck strives for a war against Austria, for the exclusion of Austria from the German league, and for the founding of a centralized "Little Germany" dominated by Prussia.

While arming for the war against Austria, Bismarck secures Russia's neutrality (by support against the Poles), friendly relations with France (by granting compensations to Napoleon III) and with Italy (by handing Venice over to it).

In several decisive battles, Prussia is victorious over Austria with lightning speed. Bismarck takes away from Austria the Holstein which they had just recently won together, and annexes Hannover, Kassel, Hessen-Nassau and the free city of Frankfurt in addition. He does not want to destroy Austria completely, for he knows that through the German minority in Austria, the Germans have the opportunity to rule over many millions of Slavic Austrians. For this reason he is "modest" in his demands. He struggles against the insatiable appetite of the Prussian court circle. And he puts through his moderate demands which shortly make it possible for Germany to gain support for her foreign policy by an alliance with defeated Austria.

After Prussia's victory of 1866, and after Austria's declaration that she was leaving the German league, Napoleon III sought to prevent the complete consolidation of Germany by attempting to bring about two unifications: the North German and South German federations. The South German one, however, did not come into existence. The year 1866 becomes a year of victory for the "small German" policy. The organization of the North German federation is completed in 1866-67. It embraces the whole of Germany up to the four South German states. This is no longer a federation of states, but rather a federal state; it is not a federation of individual completely independent states, but a state which has been created by the amalgamation of separate, previously independent states.

In this manner Bismarck overthrows the three most legitimate princes of Germany for Prussia's benefit. His "Christianity," his pietist suffers absolutely nothing by the ousting of the three revered and lawful "Christian" princes. "It was a complete revolution," remarked Engels about this. "Naturally, we are the last to reproach him for it. On the contrary, what we blame him for is that he was not revolutionary enough; that he was only a Prussian revolutionary from above; that he began a whole revolution in a situation in which he could only carry through half a one; that once he had started on the road of annexations, he was satisfied with four shabby petty states."

The establishment of the North German Federation does not yet signify the complete unification of Germany. Rather, this was a compromise between the drive for a complete national unification, and the particularistic tradition. Prussia placed herself at the head of the federation; she was the Presidium. The North German Reichstag was, to be sure, elected by universal ballot. But the Federal Council (Bundesrat) was counterposed to it, and Bismarck balanced back and forth between these institutions, supporting himself first on the one, and then on the other.

In any event, the creation of the North German Federation signified a decisive political step. The tendency to ignore the federation, to boycott the North German Reichstag: Wilhelm Liebknecht's attempts not to recognize what had taken place, and his preference for Austria after 1867, were unquestionably mistakes. The
unification of Germany under Austria's leadership became an impossibility. Prussia had triumphed irrevocably. Austria's resistance was broken. But German unification had another, no less powerful enemy — Bonapartist France. Napoleon III. Bismarck had promised Napoleon III appropriate "compensations" for his neutral behavior in the war of 1866. But he did not give them to him. After Bismarck had defeated Austria; after he had begun the unification of Germany around Prussia, the whole situation was such that he could not relinquish German territories to Napoleon III. Prussia's great power policy did not permit it. In a conflict, the occasion for which was presented by Luxembourg, Napoleon III came out empty handed once more. He felt himself cheated. His prestige inside France, where he could only hang on by means of external military and diplomatic victories, began to sink. The disunity, the splitting up of Germany was a necessary prerequisite for Bonapartism in France. Meanwhile, however, Napoleon had to admit to himself that the final unification of Germany was close at hand, and that with it the golden days of Bonapartism were numbered.

Thiers later characterized this as the biggest stupidity of Napoleon III: that he had permitted the decisive steps to be taken toward the national unification of Germany and Italy (1859, 1866). For the hegemony of France could only be maintained as long as Italy and Germany were split up into a series of small and middle sized states. Now this fact became clearer to Napoleon III than it had ever been before.

The decisive moment came. Napoleon III had to say to himself: now or never. Either he had to weaken Prussia's power in a war, tear loose the small states and re-establish the splitting of Germany, or—Bonapartism was through. The moment must also have appeared specially favorable to Napoleon III because he could count on the support of Austria (revenge for Sadowa, Denmark (revenge for Schleswig-Holstein) and even on the support of Italy.

On the other hand, Bismarck also wanted war against France. It was completely clear that the final unification of Germany would only come about after a victorious war against France. The military preparedness of Prussia was excellent, at that moment, as the experience of the years 1864 and 1866 had shown; it was significantly better than that of France. Prussia had already won two victories. The German petty states bent their knees in awe. Prussia's diplomatic situation was not bad, as in the existing distribution of power Bismarck had a greater right to expect that Austria would remain neutral, and this was confirmed by the events themselves.

Bismarck also sought war, and he placed snares for Napoleon III everywhere. Both sides took pains to fashion the circumstances in such a way that the opponent would appear to be the aggressor. Bismarck was more adroit, and he achieved a declaration of war by France on Prussia in the summer of 1870.*

Bismarck's plans were completely fulfilled. Prussia's military preparation was actually superior to that of France. The particularist South Germany joined the united North against France with the best of mutual understanding. The jointly won victory over Napoleon III brought about the closest collaboration between North and South, and thus promoted the unification of Germany. The second French empire fell on September 4, 1870, after Sedan. Napoleon III was defeated, and the republic was proclaimed. During the siege of Paris, the founding of the united German empire was solemnly announced. The last enemy of German unity was overthrown. The unification of Germany from above had been achieved. One way or the other, the conditions for the successful capitalist development of Germany were irrevocably secured.

The Franco-Prussian war completely changed the political situation in Europe. It had brought about the unification of Germany, broken the all-mighty influence of the Pope and thus completed the unification of Italy; it had overthrown the second empire and created the third republic in France. To this extent this war was progressive. But the unification of Germany was accomplished from the top down by Bismarck and the Junkers. This had made possible the violent rape of Alsace-Lorraine. The war of 1870-71 had created the Alsace-Lorraine question, in the sign of which very reactionary power-groupings were formed later on. In addition, the war of 1870-71 did away with the neutrality of the Black Sea, and thus made the Eastern question an acute one once more.

These were elements which complicated the war of 1870-71. But of and by itself, this war was the last great national war in Western and Central Europe. With this war, the cycle closes of the great European wars whose objective problem it was to create large, united national states which were necessary for the successful development of capitalism, and which were thus historically progressive in character. Because of special circumstances, Germany was able to consolidate itself into a united national state later than the others. Hence it was Germany which completed the cycle of the great national wars. It was due to this belated achievement of unity that there was already at that time at hand in Germany a numerous working class, and that a more or less organized social democratic workers' party existed which had to take an independent position in this war. We will speak about this position in greater detail in another chapter . . .

"The national unification of Germany and Italy satisfied a painful longing which had been felt over an extended period by these nations. After the defeat of the Revolution of 1848 this was accomplished, to be sure, not by an internal movement, but rather by external wars. The Crimean War of 1854-56 overthrew serfdom in Russia and forced the government of the Czar to pay attention to the industrial bourgeoisie. The unification of Italy was accomplished in 1859, 1866 and 1870, and that of Germany in 1866 and 1870. A liberal era was brought about in Austria by the war of 1866, and in Germany too the universal franchise and a certain freedom of the press and of organization was introduced. The year 1870 completed these beginnings, and brought the democratic republic to France. And in England an electoral reform was put through in 1867 which gave the franchise to the upper layers of the workers and the lower ones of the petty bourgeoisie of which they had been deprived until then. Thus governmental foundations were created on which all classes of the European nations could build up their
existence, with the exception of the proletariat.*

In the period between 1789 and 1871 there were, naturally, also wars which one cannot describe as national. This we have already noted. A classic example of this was the war between England and China of 1841-42 which was brought about by the trade in opium. But we are not discussing such wars at the moment.

National wars are wars which are provoked by a lengthy epoch of national oppression at the hands of foreign powers. They are usually wars which have been preceded by stormy national movements among the peoples who had been subjugated under foreign rule. They are wars which were directed against absolutism and feudalism. They are wars whose objective problem it is to satisfy the need for the creation of large, economically closely integrated national states, a need which is brought about by economic necessities. They are historically progressive wars, which smoothe the road for the rule of a youthful capitalism. They are wars in which the bourgeoisie plays a progressive, often even a revolutionary role. They are thus differentiated from the imperialist epoch of the supremacy of finance capital in which the bourgeoisie becomes reactionary in all capitalist countries and is doomed to decay. They are wars in the course of which the proletariat first begins to consolidate itself as a class, while in the imperialist epoch the proletariat becomes the sole bearer of the urge for freedom and the development does not take place in the context of a struggle between feudalism and the bourgeoisie, but rather in that of the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. These wars took place at the beginning of the capitalist era, and are fundamentally different from the present imperialist wars.

**National and Imperialist Wars**

National oppression, the baneful consequences of the splintering of nations, naturally lay as a particularly heavy burden on the lower strata of the populations, on the workers and the propertyless, on the "democracy" in the widest sense of the word. It had to suffer most under foreign rule and the splintering of the fatherland. It is therefore obvious that it became the prime mover of the national movement which had as its goal the overthrow of foreign rule, and the foundation of the nationally united states. The slogan "defense of the fatherland" became at that time the battlecry of democracy.

We have seen what a tremendous role the national movement played in France, Italy and Germany in the period between 1789 and 1871. This movement passed over the land like a raging hurricane and embraced millions upon millions of people who groaned under the yoke of national oppression. Whole peoples were shaken to their foundations, and all public and political life was dominated by this movement for decades. The defense of the fatherland from a new partition by foreign oppressors (France), the struggle for an end to the splintering of the nation which weighed like an awful nightmare on all aspects of public life (Italy, Germany)—these were the aims of all. They became the mainspring of the whole political development of Europe.

It was precisely at this time that the slogan "defense of the Fatherland" first appeared, and it soon enjoyed a tremendous popularity among the widest layers of the population.

At that time millions of people who groaned under the yoke of national "separateness" had to take up this slogan. It had a historically progressive content at that time for it was directed against absolutism and feudalism. It buttressed the fight against the remnants of the middle ages which now had to give way to governmental forms appropriate to the epoch of growing capitalism.

The national wars of 1789-1871 left ineradicable traces in the psyche of the widest masses of the people behind them. Whole generations took a direct part in these wars. Hundreds and hundreds of thousands sacrificed their blood and belongings in them. These wars created a tremendous number of heroes. Folk poets sang their praises, and legends grew up which passed from mouth to mouth. The simple folk song dealt with the struggle for national liberation, and it was a subject of discussion in church and school. This tradition was also supported by the most progressive and enlightened section of the bourgeoisie. It is easy to picture to oneself what deep traces all this must have left in the consciousness of the masses; how much hatred must have accumulated in Germany against France and in France against Germany, in Italy against Austria and in Austria against Italy. Specially in the lower layers of the city and rural populations. For in the period of the national wars there could not yet exist a numerous, developed proletariat. These wars formed the beginning of capitalism, and hence also the beginning of the proletariat as a class.

This accumulation of national hatred, brought into existence by century-long national wars; these inheritances from the period 1789-1871 are now being exploited by the ruling classes of the different countries for the purpose of giving to the present purely imperialist war the imprint of a national war. Thus they seek to make the hearts of millions of people beat faster when they hear the phrase: "defense of the Fatherland." The whole enormous apparatus of the governments, the press, the parliament, etc., were set simultaneously in motion in all countries to exploit the mass psychology retained in the people as an inheritance from a previous age—to mobilize the masses for a cause which is alien to them under the national banner of "defense of the Fatherland."

The ruling classes are successful in this exploitation in proportion to the durability of the traces in the mass psychology of each country left by national oppression and the national wars. It is remarkable that nowhere do the masses of the petty bourgeoisie and the more backward strata of the proletariat give such blind credence to the fable that the war of 1914-16 is a national war as in France and Germany. Nowhere did the bourgeoisie have such success with the slogan "defense of the Fatherland." Nowhere did it call forth such an immense national exaltation as in France and Germany. This was, possibly, repeated in Italy, although the whole situation forced the true motives of the Italian imperialists to come quite clearly out in the open.

In France the traditions of the national wars from the epoch of the great French revolution are still alive, and the hatred for "the Prussians" who beseigned Paris in 1870 lives too. On the other hand, the memory of the long, tortured period of national par-
Ritzner, one of the most eminent representatives of German diplomacy, published a book called "Outline of World Politics" ("Grundziege der Weltpolitik") shortly before the war broke out (he used the pseudonym Ruedorffer). He writes quite openly about the war preparations: "If international socialism succeeds in completely separating the worker subjectively from the texture of the nation and transforming him into a mere member of the class, then it has triumphed. For the means of pure force alone can not be effective in the long run. But if international socialism does not succeed in this, if inner bonds remain which tie the worker to the organism which is called the nation, even if unconsciously, then the victory of international socialism remains in question."*

What must one do, however, to prepare a defeat for socialism and to free ones hands for imperialist wars— for the wars which, in the opinion of the same German imperialist Ruedorffer are necessary in the "interests of capital?" For this there is only one means: dress up the imperialist wars in the ideology of the national wars. Create the illusion in the laboring masses that they are "defending the Fatherland" in a supposed national war.

Ruedorffer continues: "The governments may perhaps be compelled, out of regard for the peace theories of socialism, to give thought to a careful covering of their (imperialist) undertakings by national sentiments. This will change nothing in the cause which is to be served by modern policy, but rather will only change some aspects of its political forms and techniques" (!).


That which the German imperialist Ruedorffer acknowledges openly is not valid, of course, only for Germany, or only for the bourgeoisie and the governments of a single group of the warring powers. Rather, it is the basis of capitalist politics in general in the age of imperialist wars. We have only presented a typical example.

One cannot say to the masses of the people directly: go and sacrifice yourselves by the millions on the battlefields because "our" bourgeoisie needs Belgian and French colonies in Africa, or because "our" bourgeoisie wants to win this or that "sphere of influence" in one country or another, etc. The bourgeoisie needs a better means to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses: it appeals to the inheritance from the previous epoch; it enflames the national feelings by the popular watch-word "defense of the Fatherland." This is a necessity for wartime. Just as one must prepare munitions and improve the technology for war, it is equally necessary to influence the consciousness of the people. One must give thought to "covering . . . by national sentiments." This is—according to the characteristic expression of the German diplomat Ruedorffer—the simplest method and "technique."

How wonderfully this imperialist "technique" has been perfected, how flawlessly it has functioned in this war can be seen, for example, in the fate of Bulgaria.

The national traditions are specially lively in Bulgaria. The hatred against the Turks, by whom the Bulgarians had been oppressed for many years, was very great.

W. G. Korolenko had an opportunity to observe the Bulgarians in the Dobrudja shortly before the war broke out. He describes the following scene in a Bulgarian school in a small, remote village. Many Bulgarian school teachers of both sexes had gathered together to participate in a literary evening at which the liberation of Bulgaria was to be celebrated.

"Young teachers who look much like our own, but who have bold eyes, and glowing, enthusiastic faces, recited verses from their poets. And in the small schoolroom there reigned an atmosphere which was pregnant with the impressions of former struggles.

"The Turks tyrannized you." These words were repeated over and again. Tanned, mustached, and crooked-nosed Bulgarian shopkeepers, old and young women listened eagerly to the poetic effusions, which reminded them of the national struggles which had just been won. Blood, death by the bayonette, courageous disdain for all afflictions, and revenge against the oppressors!"

The national hatred is directed against the Turks. And what do we see? The war begins—and with what ease German imperialism succeeds, in 1915, with the help of its Bulgarian "young people," in giving this hatred a different direction. The Turks suddenly become the best of friends. It is willed thus by German finance capital, by German imperialism. And haven't we seen other similar transformations in the course of this war?

The criterion of a war of aggression or a war of defense also came into being in the epoch of national wars between 1789 and 1871. The democracy and emergent socialism had to differentiate between wars of aggression and defense. This difference took form in the diplomatic pre-history of the wars, and was not to be found in establishing who declared war first, or who fired the first shot. From the point of view of historical
progress the matter went much farther. An aggressive war was a war which had as its aim to protect and secure the inheritances of absolutism and feudalism, to perpetuate national opposition and partition, and to prevent the establishment of united national states. A war of defense was a war which sought to abolish the remnants of feudalism, and the aims of which corresponded to the economic need to establish a national state. This division of the wars of the previous epoch into wars of aggression and defense had left deep traces in the consciousness of the democracy. Today the bourgeoisie grasps the government of each country spares itself no effort, no treasure, if only it can portray its war as a "defensive war," and that of its opponent as a "war of aggression."

The bourgeoisie and the government of each country spares itself no effort, no treasure, if only it can portray its war as a "defensive war," and that of its opponent as a "war of aggression." In the imperialist era the criterion of defensive and aggressive wars has suffered the same fate as the slogan "defense of the Fatherland."

The bourgeoisie and the governments of Germany, Austria (and not only of these countries) exploits the inheritance of the period of the national wars exactly as it exploits the religious prejudices of the masses, the political prejudices of various layers of the population... for instance that of the peasantry, etc.

And the imperialists succeed in this stupefication of the people all the easier to the extent that they "internationalize" their methods. The fact that the famous "technique" is applied simultaneously in all countries on an all-European scale facilitates the imperialists in each individual country in their swindle.

The socialist opportunists in the various countries have adapted themselves unconsciously to this ideological-political exploitation, without taking into account that what is involved is simply a "technique" applied by the bourgeoisie. The German (and other) socialists should have availed themselves of the opportunity to assist the working class to resist this capitalist "technique" and to oppose nationalism which had again raised its head. Instead, the opportunists, section of the socialists bowed to the bourgeoisie "technique," and itself became social chauvinist. To offer resistance was certainly not easy. The 'technique' of the bourgeoisie is very developed. It has succeeded in creating a nationalist mass psychosis. Yet this obligates the German (and the other) socialists not to capitulate, but to resist all the more vehemently.

National elements and purely dynastic interests can play a role in the imperialist wars of the present period. But this role is accidental and episodic. In the era of national wars, elements of a different nature were also present, as we have seen. But in the historic sense we can and must distinguish two different epochs: that of the national and that of the imperialist wars. And we must never forget that the representatives of imperialism, the representatives of all-mighty finance capital will always exert themselves to beautify the imperialist wars, to give them a "covering... of national sentiments."

The war of 1914-16 also contains national elements: the Austrian-Serbian conflict, the collisions in the Balkans are closely connected with national questions. The national question is generally of greater significance in Eastern Europe. But in general the national element plays a quite subordinate role in this war and alters nothing in its generally imperialist character.

If it were still necessary to prove that imperialism is the main driving force in wars nowadays, this could best be illustrated by the war of 1914-16. Who has still not understood that in this whole war the mighty imperialist interests of England, Germany and France set the tone.

National wars, such as we have seen in the epoch between 1789 and 1871 are still possible only in Asia or in large, rapidly developing colonies. National wars can still be waged by China and India—wars for their liberation from the yoke of European states, for the abolition of foreign rule which seeks to split them up and enslave them. Such wars are also possible on the part of large African, South American and Australian colonies which strive for complete independence. But the imperialist age would impress its stamp on such wars also. These countries would emerge in any event not as subjects, but rather as objects of imperialism. But the stage of capitalism which has been reached in Europe would make itself felt through a thousand consequences in these countries as they are bound to Europe by many threads.

Marx and Engels surveyed with their mind's eye the general historical evolution which is now taking place as easily as the year 1847 (as the "Communist Manifesto" was being composed.) At the time when capitalism was emerging, the struggle of the proletariat had to assume national forms. But by its very nature it must become ever more international, and it must lead on an international scale to the replacement of the capitalist mode of production by another one, which is different from it in principle.

"Although not in content, the form of the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is at first a national one. The proletariat of every country must naturally first deal with its own bourgeoisie... Insofar as the proletariat must first win political supremacy for itself, it is itself still national, although not at all in the same sense as the bourgeoisie." (Written in 1847. Author.) "National differences and antagonisms between peoples are vanishing gradually from day to day, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto..."

"The workers have no Fatherland," said Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. How far removed from this is the slogan "defense of the Fatherland," which is defended by the German and other social chauvinists who misuse Marx's name under the influence of the bourgeoisie.

The social chauvinists often have the "best intentions." They believe that they are showing the bourgeoisie. But—

"You think you are showing, but it is you who are being shoved." In actuality, the social chauvinists are only following the "technical" manipulations of the Ruedorfers of all countries. To the extent that they help the Ruedorfers to give the present war the stamp of a national war, the social chauvinists become at best the blind tools of imperialism.

But, we have got ahead of ourselves...
An Open Letter to Zapotocky

From a Founder of the Communist Movement

The author is highly qualified from every standpoint to address this open letter to the Czech Stalinist leader, Zapotocky. Alois Neurath was one of the most prominent of the founders and builders of the international communist movement in the days when it was a communist movement. In 1921, after the founding of the Communist Party of the Czechoslovakian Republic (in the German-speaking sector), Comrade Neurath became its General Secretary. After the union of the Communist Party of the German section and the party of the Czechoslovakian section, Neurath became director, together with Dr. Hauser, of the Central Secretariat of the united organization. In the subsequent internal party conflicts, they were replaced by Fílek, first, and then by Zapotocky, as General Secretary. From 1922 to 1926, Neurath was a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International; from November, 1922 to June, 1923, he was a member of the Moscow Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, along with the Bulgarian Kolarov, the Finn Kuusinen and the Russian Pyatinskij. In 1926, Neurath came out in opposition to the policy of the Comintern and Czech party leadership and after a protracted struggle, left the party in 1929. He became a supporter of the Trotzkyist movement, without actually joining the international organization, although he was in constant touch with Leon Trotsky by mail. He succeeded in escaping the Hitlerite terror and has been residing for years in Sweden.—Ed.

Mr. Antonín Zapotocky
Minister-President
Prague, CZR

Only a few days ago I received the issues of Rude Prazo containing all the materials relating to the trial as well as the testimony and “confessions” of the accused. The materials, especially the “confessions” of the accused, show that it was not so much Slansky but Frejka (Freund) and Geminder who were guilty of the economic bankruptcy of Czechoslovakia. Geminder as well as Frejka confessed that they had been seduced by me, the “Trotzkyite” thirty years ago, having been put on the wrong track, so to speak, that far back. In this respect Geminder had even more to say, namely, that Slansky had confided to him that he (Slansky) was in agreement with his political opinions. And Frejka provoked reproaches from the prosecution because of the tremendous losses his economic measures had caused the state; “confessed” that it was I who had given him such a responsible position in the party apparatus. This part of the “confessions” of both accused corresponds to the truth as much as everything else to which the victims of the trials have “confessed.” I had practically nothing to do with Geminder and I helped Frejka in 1923 or ’24 to get a job as city editor with the Reichenberger Vorwaerts.

The fact that your former colleagues and friends have been compelled to mention my name in the course of the trial a few times would not be a reason to address this open letter to you. For Frejka and Geminder testified only to that to which they had been forced to testify. It cannot be a question of polemizing against the testimony of the trial victims, but to expose your responsibility for this shameful trial.

Though neither Slansky, Geminder nor Frejka are my concern, nevertheless it is you, though you are not alone, who is responsible for the arrest, conviction and execution of a number of the “Karloiner gang.” It was the party leadership which together with the functionaries of the NKVD drew up the list of those party functionaries who were to stand before the Peoples’ Court as “saboteurs,” “spies,” “murderers” and above all as “Zionists.”

In this connection, therefore, it is in order to illuminate your political past and your specific political acts. It was not so much Slansky, Frejka and Geminder, but Gottwald and a few others of the above group which you denounced at the time as the “Karloiner gang” whom I sought to influence during the years 1923–25. One of the important tasks of this “Karloiner gang” consisted among other things in trying to forestall those excesses which you, together with Nosek, Smeral, and others organized. (Attacks on the editorial offices of Rude Prazo and individual members of the Central Committee, who did not belong to your group.) Stalin himself at the time termed these excesses “banditry,” and he called you, who had been responsible for them, “bandits.” It is far from certain that Stalin has revised his opinion of you even today.

In 1925, the “troika” (Zinoviev, Kamenev and Stalin) decided on a thorough cleaning out of the Central Committee of the Czech Communist Party. The “troika” categorically demanded not only Smeral’s, Nosek’s and your removal from the CC, but your exclusion from the party altogether. The majority of the CC did not abide by this demand of the “troika.” Some of those belonging to the “Karloiner gang” group, whom you have sent to the gallows, at that time opposed the decision of the “troika.” You have them to thank for the fact that you were not thrown out of the party as a “counter-revolutionary” or “bourgeois agent.” (At that time the Central Committees of the Communist Parties were not yet full of “spies,” “murderers,” “police agents,” and “Zionists.” That became the fashion only after Stalin had attained power.)

It would be pointless to enumerate all your political mistakes or those of other Stalinists, since Stalin determines the “general line” not only of the Soviet union, but of the Comintern as well; and therefore, it is the Kremlin that decides in the first instance who is a “spy” or “Zionist,” and who shall be hanged. Furthermore, it is the Kremlin that supplies the background of the various witchcraft trials. Moscow has now decided to begin an international anti-Semitic campaign. Were this not so, it would not be Slansky, Frejka, Geminder, etc., who would be facing the Peoples’ Court but possibly Gottwald, Zapotocky and Co.

One of the accused admitted, among other things, that he had been sympathetic to the Marshall Plan. What comedy! It was, after all, your “friend” and only opponent in the Central Committee, Gottwald, who was ready to welcome the Marshall Plan in the name of the Prague regime. Not Slansky, but Gottwald, as is well-known, was ordered to come to Moscow to re-
receive a dressing-down because of his attitude on the Marshall Plan.

Today the only task of the Central Committee of the CPC consists of facilitating the activities of the NKVD insofar as the matter concerns dooming this or that group of party functionaries to the gallows. The fact that this time Moscow has initiated an anti-Semitic action has given you the opportunity of getting rid of some of your antagonists for ever, since among them were a few Jews. The question was not one of who might be a "spy" but one of who was a Jew among the leading cadres of the party. And then the "chosen ones" were compelled to confess that they not only had acted as "spies" but in the first place as "Zionists."

What shame! No party, no human being, and above all no person actively engaged in politics can sink to a lower level than anti-Semiticism!

No one knows better than you that none of those convicted in the Prague Witchcraft Trial were spies, that none of them committed the crimes to which they "confessed." All the accused are victims of a bestial judicial murder. You know, of course, that the Prague Trials were in no way intended to influence public opinion in the

CSR favorably. Only a very small part of the Czech population takes the materials of the trial seriously or believes in the "confessions" of the accused. If the trial in Czechoslovakia has any favorable result, it consists in strengthening "Titoism." But it was not after all the purpose of the trial to create a friendly attitude on the part of the population, the trial represented the beginning of the international anti-Semitic campaign that meets the momentary needs of the Kremlin.

I repeat here the dialogue between the prosecutor and Geminder as it was published in Rude Pravo:

Prosecutor: What language do you speak well?
Geminder: German.
Prosecutor: Do you really speak a good German?
Geminder: It's been a long time since I spoke German, but I know it.
Prosecutor: Do you know German about as well as you know Czech.
Geminder: Yes.
Prosecutor: Then you really can't speak any language decently. A typical cosmopolitan.

All the trial proceedings are conducted on this low level. And the level on which the whole trial occurs corresponds completely to the purpose of the trial itself: propaganda for anti-Semitism.

It is not so long ago that Slansky forced you to engage in "self-criticism." You publicly confessed in 1945 that you were the author of the slanderous name "the Karliner gang," and that it has turned out that they (in the first place Slansky) had always been right and you wrong.

Moscow's international general anti-Semitic offensive has completely changed the situation inside the Central Committee of the CPC. Moscow demands Jews as scapegoats. And you have taken advantage of this favorable opportunity to denounce not only Frejka, Geminder and others, but above all Slansky, as "Zionists."

Apart from the pleasure you derived from handing your strongest opponent over to the NKVD, you really had no other choice. Nor is there any way out. You cannot escape your own fate. After Zinoviev, Kamenev and the others, those became the victims who had borne witness against them: Bukharin, Radek, etc. And after that came the turn of those who had testified against Bukharin, Radek, etc. Yesterday it was Slansky and company. Tomorrow it will be Gottwald, Zapo­tocky and company. Such things have their own logic.

Alois NEURATH
Stockholm, January, 1953

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