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The truce in Korea is a welcome one. It is welcome, in the first place, because the war to which it put an end (at least for the time being) was a futile war from its inception, a war nobody could gain from—neither its protagonists and instigators nor the peoples over whose bodies and lands it was fought—a war that could not solve a single one of the problems that caused it, a war which could not promise victory to either side. If warfare is in general a barbaric way of solving the problems and conflicts of society, a war in particular which does not even hold the possibility of solving a problem is both barbaric and senseless. It is welcome, in the second place, because any détente, as the diplomats call it, any relaxation of the international tension, any postponement of the sinister all-out holocaust that World War III would be, is—provided it is not paid for by a decisive strengthening of the most reactionary social tendencies—of corresponding advantage to the working class and socialist movements of the world. They need above all else time to assemble the forces capable of preventing the war. Part of the task of assembling these forces lies in reconsidering the three-year Korean prelude, or small-scale rehearsal, of World War III.

According to the Republican Vice-President, in his address to the American Legion convention, Truman was right in committing the United States to armed intervention in the Korean war. A statesman discreet enough to have choked back this sensational opinion for the three years of the war, cannot be expected to be so indiscreet as to reveal prematurely the reasons why Truman was right. In general, most of the other statesmen and most newspaper commentators explaining the war today, are either exceptionally discreet or exceptionally incoherent. No wonder the popular disgust and bewilderment over this most unpopular war in American history is greater than ever.

Why, after all, did the United States intervene in Korea? What were the results of its intervention? What other results could an intelligent and responsible person have expected?

Was the aim of the war the unification of Korea? This was not said at the very beginning, of course. But it was asserted more and more loudly as the fighting wore on, reached its peak with the peak of the MacArthur megalomania, and did not decline seriously until a short time before the Panmunjon negotiations ended. In any case, so far as that was the aim of the American intervention, the war was fought in vain. The unforgivable and arbitrary partition of Korea is the joint responsibility of the two imperialist powers, the U. S. and Russia, which divided the country at the end of the war with Japan without trou-
blending over the trivial formality of consulting those through whose body the knife had been drawn, the Korean people. The last three bitter years have showed that neither side is capable of imposing its decision upon the other by armed force, at least not without extending the war on such a scale that the whole question of Korea and all of its problems would be reduced to the insignificance of Sarajevo in World War I. Only an imbecile could expect the coming peace-treaty conference to dictate by palaver what could not be dictated by arms. That will not rule it off the agenda, to be sure, for the conference will be attended by not a few imbeciles or by propagandists who take the rest of the world for imbeciles. Actually, the unification of Korea is now further away, not closer, than it was on the eve of the war, and if it is that much more remote we have the war to thank for that. Not that either side is opposed to unification. Far from it! The Stalinists want to unify all of Korea the way they unified North Korea—under their bloody yoke; but unfortunately for them, the American military opposition which their armies could not break in the field is not likely to break under the spell of Stalinist oratory at the conference table.

Rhee, too, wants to unify all of Korea—but under the yoke of the police despotism he keeps fastened upon South Korea; but unfortunately for him, he faces no less an obstacle than the Stalinists do. The demolition of Korea after the coming political conference is a possibility; the unification of Korea is not. One might add that the unification of Korea, given the continued existence of either of the two present Korean régimes (let alone both together), is realizable only in the dream world or as a shambles which would make the horror of Korea today look like serenity itself. That is the great and terrible tragedy of the country. We bear no responsibility for it; we do bear the responsibility for stating the truth. Only cruel, cynical or light-minded political adventurers could urge upon the Korean people the resumption today of a war under conditions which are exclusively and entirely disadvantageous to them, suicidally disadvantageous. This is clearer than ever today. But it was clear enough when the war began.

Was it the aim of the war to "stop aggression," or to "teach the aggressor a lesson," to show him that "aggression does not pay?" If that were true, then the war was surely fought in vain!

Firstly, both sides were aggressors, the Stalinists and the Rhee-ites. The Stalinists struck first, it is true. But not only was Rhee planning a military attack upon the North in due time but, as is the nature of this chauvinistic madman, he spoke about it openly, unashamedly and often, before the Stalinists launched their military attack. Even now, Rhee proclaims openly his intention of unleashing an attack upon the North as soon as he thinks it feasible. The Stalinists unquestionably have the same intention with regard to the South—as soon as they think it feasible.

Secondly, the only lesson the Stalinist "aggressor" was taught by the war is the one he knew a long time before the lesson—the one that every aggressor knows—namely, that while unsuccessful aggression does not pay, successful aggression does. It is undoubtedly true that the carrying out of predatory, imperialist policies is infinitely more difficult in our time than ever before, for resistance to imperialism is so widespread and so powerful throughout the world that it bleeds imperialism white a good deal sooner than imperialism bleeds its victims white, as it used to be able to do with comparative ease in the past. But this truth only prompts the imperialists to plan the carrying out of their policies with a maximum of gain and a minimum of risk—not to abandon the policies. For example: the British imperialists. And for example: the French imperialists. And for example: the Stalinist imperialists.

Thirdly, the Stalinists have not been given up for a moment their intention of annexing all of Korea (either to the Russians or to the Chinese, whoever become effective masters of the North Korean quislings). Having political heads on their shoulders, they have long ago learned how to alternately political penetration and attack with military attack. To undermine Rhee, they not only have armies, but a social program which, for all its demagogy, appeals to wide masses of the people, particularly in Asia. To undermine the Stalinists, Rhee has an army of sorts, but no social program whatever with which to appeal to the masses.

Fourthly, if the Stalinists have "learned" that aggression "does not pay," they can very well console themselves with the thought that, for their part, they have been teaching that "resistance to aggression" under the leadership of the Rhees and Chiangs is not altogether rewarding, either.

Fifthly, if that was the aim of the war, it would seem obvious that whatever now happens in Korea, the war must be continued in other countries, starting, let us say, with Indo-China. There is clearly an aggressor in that war and he is clearly guilty of aggression. By our standards, the standards of democracy and socialism, French imperialism and its armies are the aggressors. By the standards of imperialism, the Vietnamese are guilty of a villainous attack upon the sacred soil of France. One of these two is surely the case. It is now to be assumed that an aggression must be stopped and an aggressor taught the lesson that aggression does not pay. Is it also to be assumed that another U. S. "police action" is to be expected, even if belatedly, to be followed by another armed intervention under a United Nations Command, troops from Colombia included? The question is directed not only to the new Administration in Washington, but above all to the New Deal labor leaders and liberals who supported Truman's intervention in Korea, with the warning that if this question is answered we have a whole series of the same sort of question in reserve.

Sixthly, let us assume that Kim Il Sung has learned his lesson and is prepared to retire his forces to North Korea. Was that worth the considerable cost to the teachers (to say nothing of the cost to the people of Korea themselves)? The same teachers taught—and rightly—that Kim is, after all, only a supine and unimportant vassal of the Kremlin, without whose inspiration, instigation, command and support he would never have dreamed of undertaking his aggressive action. What Kim has learned is of microscopic importance compared to what the Kremlin did or did not learn about aggression. But inasmuch as the Kremlin has not retired its forces from any of the countries it conquered, seized and held in the last ten years of its aggression, it obviously cannot be said that the real aggressor, i.e., Russia, has learned from the Korean war that aggression qua aggression does not pay. If, then, as the apologists so lamely say today, the aim of the war was to teach the aggressor a lesson—the war was fought, the land...
desolated, the economy destroyed, the mass graves and the unknown graves filled, the blood of the maimed and wounded drained, for nothing.

Perhaps the aim of the war was the defense, even if somewhat late in the evening, of democracy. That would be conceivable under one of two headings: the defense of a democratic régime against a despotic régime, as was the case in the defense of the Spanish Loyalists against Franco, to take a familiar example; or the defense of the democratic right of a people to national integrity, sovereignty, independence from any assault upon it—regardless of the political régime of the people attacked—as was the case in the defense of the national rights even of semi-feudal, semi-slaveholding Ethiopia from the attack of Mussolini. In either case the duty of honest democrats (by which is meant nothing more than consistent democrats as distinct from those who use democracy as a hollow phrase or a deception) is clear; and the duty of socialists doubly clear.

So far as the first aspect is concerned, nothing need be said here about the democratic nature of the North Korean régime. It can be affirmed only by paid or volunteer Stalinists, by witless or unwitless Stalinoids, but nobody is clever enough to trap them into giving proof of their affirmations. The other Korean government, Rhee's, is hardly less notorious, and on this score there is no excuse for ignorance. The American press, for all of its support to the war, simply could not uniformly conceal the facts about the Rhee régime. The facts it did publish, infrequent and circumscribed though they were, should have sufficed to crush any illusions. One of the more recent pictures of the régime to whose rescue the United States was rushed in the name of defense of the "West" (i.e., democracy, the Judeo-Christian ethic, and General Motors), was provided by Robert Alden, the Seoul correspondent of the New York Times (September 6, 1953):

In this connection [intrigues in the struggle for the succession to 78-year-old Rhee] it is well, if not very pleasant, to remember that the republic, although it has the outward trappings of a democracy—an elected National Assembly and an elected President—as a matter of fact is in all its practical aspects a police state. Power politics rather than the popular will generally win the day.

Through a newsprint monopoly the Government controls all newspapers; it controls all radio stations, and no one could voice opposition to the President or any other important Government figure in public without almost certainly being taken away and imprisoned. There is a large national police force and its power is unquestioned.

As in a police state, false accusations frequently are enough to discredit an individual and effectively strip him of his freedom of action.

For example, one of the more conscientious Korean newspaper men has been in the habit of working with and gathering some of his news material from foreign correspondents here. A few weeks ago he was denounced by one of these political parties for "giving away state secrets" to the foreign press.

Since the denunciation, the Korean newspaper man has not dared to visit with American newspaper men and he even had to stay away from stories he would ordinarily cover because to do so he would have to mingle with foreign correspondents.

Other people who have mingled freely with American newspaper men have been subjected to the same campaign of whispering instigated by the Republic of Korea Office of Public Information. As a result, rather than be charged with "selling state secrets," many Koreans prefer to stay away from American newspaper men, and consequently other than official news sources are tending to dry up in Korea.

This gives us a glimpse, but an adequate one, of the black reality of the Seoul régime. For three grisly years, the "West" fought for the Judeo-Christian tradition and democracy by defending this Oriental police despotism from being conquered by that Oriental totalitarian despotism. Congratulations to the defenders of the "West," the old ones.

The other aspect of this question is a different matter, of course. Every nation has the fullest right to self-determination and national integrity, and therefore the right to defend itself from assailants. But possession of a right and exercise of it are not and cannot always be the same thing. In general it must be said that an oppressed nation should never relax its fight against its oppressor. But the right of self-determination is no more an absolute right, transcending all other considerations, than is any other democratic right. If, for example, the leaders of a people fighting for their national integrity go to such lengths in their fight as to strengthen the hand of reaction around the throat of millions in other lands; or go to such lengths in their fight as to precipitate millions of other peoples into a reactionary war—then they are not democrats fighting for national democratic rights but blind, reckless, fanatic philosophers who impudently place the interests of their nation above the interests of all others. That, for example, is why revolutionary socialists who have been passionate partisans of the right of national self-determination from the days of Marx and Engels to Lenin, have had little patience with extreme chauvinists in the ranks of the generally progressive Irish, Polish, Alsatian, Indian and other national movements. One would think that such a viewpoint is so elementary correct that no thoughtful person could fail to share it.

Therefore, even if the cause of Rhee were the democratic national unification of Korea—a daring assumption—it would be criminal to support him in a war which immediately involves hundreds of millions of other people in a bloody struggle and momentarily threatens to engulf the entire globe. We respect Korea's right to full national integrity and sovereignty not one whit less than that of any other country; but only a lunatic visitation like Rhee would demand that the world risk self-immolation to realize this right for him.

Therefore, even if the cause of the Korean Stalinists were the socialist revolution itself—an assumption which daring cannot make by itself or without the aid of a well-softened cerebrum—it would be no less criminal to support them in such a war. If, by our standards, even the socialist revolution has no absolute rights, the Stalinist counterrevolution has no rights at all, and police dictatorships like Rhee's have as many.

After the Truce, What?

There is thus far only an armistice in Korea, a precarious suspension of the hostilities but not a peace. The peace is to be negotiated at the political conference scheduled to open toward the end of October. What proposals will the two chief protagonists make, what policies will they pursue, assuming that the conference ever actually convenes at some time within the life-span allotted to sinless mortals.

The line of the Stalinists does not seem so difficult to indicate. They will use every opportunity offered them by Rhee—and Rhee will offer them more than one—to throw upon him the exclusive responsibility for any resumption of the war, and therewith to ac-
celerate the discreditment of the Rhee régime which is already as widespread outside of Korea as it is at home. They followed the same course toward Chiang in China and there is every sign that Rhee will continue to cooperate with them, even if unconsciously, in the same way that Chiang did. They will press for a united Korea under their rule, but not in the indefensibly and ludicrously crude way Rhee proposes for unification. It will be surprising if they do not propose "social reforms" for the South of the kind that are sure to outrage Rhee but not so sure to alienate the South Korean peasant. They will undoubtedly renew their efforts to widen the scope of the conference to take up "all-Asian" conflicts—which means, first, to invite to the conference table the Asiatic countries, primarily India, against whose attendance U. S. diplomacy has set its face like flint; second, to bring Stalinist China into the United Nations and therewith to the world at large? Up to now everything proposed by the United States through its diplomatic spokesmen, Dulles-Lodge, underlines the fact that they have learned nothing of importance from the Korean events and confirms our view that they are politically incapable of learning. Virtually every one of their words and deeds betrays the belief that they have won the war not only against their adversaries but against their allies and they are now in a position to dictate terms to both of them. The belief is based on wishful thinking, on the deeply implanted tradition that the United States never did, never could and never will lose a war, but not on facts.

The facts are sinking into the reluctant minds of the American people slowly, but they are sinking in. The people are beginning to realize that the Stalinists did not lose the war and the United States did not win it. They are beginning to realize that the Stalinists have gained tremendous respect, if not prestige, throughout the world, the colonial and ex-colonial world in particular, because they proved able to pin down the armed forces of the most modern and powerful nation on earth. They have seen how, in spite of all the pathetic talk about how the United States must not and cannot "go it alone," the United States was obliged to fight the Stalinists virtually alone for three years in Korea, alone except, of course, for the South Koreans and trifling nominal cooperation from only a few of the non-Stalinist governments of the world. Most important, perhaps, is the realization that although the United States must henceforth and for an indefinite period keep large armed forces in Korea, there is no way absolutely no way—for it to win the war against the Stalinists in Korea. In other words, the U. S. can defeat the Stalinists in Korea only if the war in that country becomes a small episode in World War III or in a widely-extended war which brings us all to the very brink of World War III. The immensity of the dilemma of the United States makes its preoccupation with the stake of the present conflict seem grotesque by comparison.

Against the background of these realities, Dulles-Lodge have begun their preparations for the political conference with a line of action which would arouse in a suspicious mind the question: Is Dulles an agent paid by the Kremlin to deepen the discreditment and isolation of the United States, or is it just a series of astounding coincidences that his course is exactly the kind that suits the Kremlin to a hair? At a time when every American returning from a visit abroad reports that the prestige of the United States was never so low and the hostility against it never so great, Dulles-Lodge took the occasion to launch a battle, as idiotic as it was inflexible, against Indian participation in the political conference. After lashing into line every possible dependent in the U. N. Assembly, Dulles-Lodge emerged triumphant, having mustered the bare one-third plus required to veto India and arraying against the United States a majority of the Assembly, including the most important of Washington's formal and near allies. The formalistic arguments for the position or against it, are of less than small importance. Of immense importance is the fact that Dulles-Lodge have given the Stalinists a powerful political weapon, above all in India and in general throughout Asia, without gaining a thing for the U. S. except the approbation of McCarthy, Knowland and Rhee—which is like trading off a good harpoon for three sun-ripened herring.

With this as the overture, it is not too much to expect the worst from the conference itself. If Dulles has not made public the proposals that the United States will make to the Stalinists, it is not because he does not want to tip his hand to the other side. The Secretary of State has, it may be safely assumed, nothing more clever in his sleeve than in his mind.

Will he propose the unification of Korea? If he does, his proposal must be accompanied by a way of achieving it. Rhee has his simple solution of the problem. Democratic elections, as he calls them, have already taken place, in his opinion, in South Korea. Seats in the National Assembly, as he calls it, have been left vacant for a corresponding number of representatives from North Korea. To unify the country, it is only necessary for North Korea to fill these vacant seats with the victors in a democratic election confined to that part of the country alone—naturally, Rhee's type of democratic election (i. e., where opponents of Rhee are beaten to a pulp, imprisoned, murdered on their own doorsteps or otherwise discouraged from running against his nominees) as distinguished from the Stalinists' type of democratic election (i. e., where opponents of the Stalinists are beaten to a pulp, imprisoned, murdered on their own doorsteps or elsewhere or otherwise discouraged from running
against the “people’s candidate”). It is hard to believe that even Dulles, or his conference deputy, will have the courage to ask the Stalinist régime of the North to slit its throat on request of Rhee; it is hard to believe that there would be a single other country on the American side of the conference that would support such a request. However, Rhee has shown absolutely no sign that any other means of “unifying” Korea would be considered, let alone accepted by him. The Stalinists have shown no sign of a readiness to abdicate power simply because it would be a feather in Dulles’ cap. On the American side, nobody has yet advanced, and there is no reason to believe that anyone will advance a more-or-less reasonable proposal for the unification of Korea that would be accepted by Rhee, no matter how many other conference delegates supported it. And since Rhee has absolute veto power over any of the conference proposals or decisions, unification in the foreseeable future is ruled out for Korea.

Will Dulles propose the democratization of Korea? This is the least likely possibility. Such a course, not ordered from above, but persistently proposed and popularized, would exert an increasingly powerful pressure on both Korean régimes, rallying around it more and more of the forces capable of cracking the two tyrannies and bring unity and peace to the country. It is hardly worth the words required to assert that there is no chance of Dulles proposing anything of the sort. In general, if there is one thing that American diplomacy, under Truman or under Eisenhower, fears from as if it were a pestilence, it is any line that would stimulate, mobilize, organize and direct a popular, democratic, mass movement, against despotic dictatorships — yes, even against the Stalinist dictatorship. The imperialist-democrats eschew a genuine popular movement like the devil is authoritatively said to eschew holy water. That’s in general. In Korea, in particular, any such proposal would be tantamount to a direct repudiation of Rhee and would therefore not be considered in the first place; and if it were proposed in the second place, it would be directly repudiated by Rhee.

Will Dulles propose the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea — that is, both the Chinese Stalinist troops and the troops of what was called until recently the United Nations Command? It may be predicted with almost dead certainty that he will not only not make any such proposal but, if such a proposal should come from the Stalinists (who are far more easily capable of making it with tongue in cheek), he will reject it to the bitter end. Dulles-Eisenhower-Bradford have even less grounds for confidence in Rhee’s ability to resist a continuing Stalinist pressure than did Acheson-Truman-Bradley. The “United Nations” (i.e., the United States) armed forces once withdrawn from Korea, its permeation and conquest by the Stalinists could not be very far off, even without the open and direct presence of Chinese Stalinist troops. Washington has absolutely no intention of relinquishing this precious foothold on the Asiatic mainland — adjacent to both China and Russia. Indeed, the war in Korea has convinced it of the imperative necessity of maintaining the foothold and converting South Korea into a fortress.

Will Dulles then confine himself to proposing simply that the status quo ante bellum be restored, more or less along the 38th Parallel, with the necessary assurances on both sides that the new partition will be observed? Modest though such a proposal would be as the outcome of the three years of desolation of the country — even this proposal (assuming it is made) will not prove to be an easy one. The Stalinists would not find it too hard to accept, for they have obviously renounced any attempt at the military conquest of South Korea for the time being and adopted the line of political infiltration, corrosion and pressure. Here again, Rhee would be the obstacle. Dulles would then face the need of repudiating Rhee’s repeatedly announced intention to commit suicide by marching northward to unite the country by force, or of being repudiated by most if not all of the other countries on his side of the table.

Or is it, finally, possible that Dulles-Eisenhower will try to resolve the dilemma by pounding the table and terrifying the Stalinists with dire threats? Some such ominous significance has been attached to the Legion speech of Dulles, in which our pious Christian layman tried his best to sound a little like the doughty war captain in bivouac at Remington Rand. Vaguely and darkly he suggested that if the Stalinists fail to end the war or resume it, the “privileged sanctuary” beyond the Yalu will no longer be respected by Washington. This has been coupled with the other Dulles statement that if there is no “genuine progress” after three months of conference discussion, the United States will consider withdrawing from it.

The reference to the Yalu is a good four-fifths bluff, and one fifth bone cast to the frustrated furies of ultrachauvinism in the country who see no reason why Eisenhower fails to send a few regiments of Marines straight into Peiping to teach the Chinese the kind of lesson they need. To be exact, it is safe to make this assertion on the hypothesis that even the present Administration is capable of retaining a weighed milligram of political and military sanity in the present world situation. The hypothesis is admittedly audacious, but it may be allowed on the ground that our times call for a certain amount of audacity.

The Stalinists will surely not be fool enough to take the responsibility for initiating the disruption or dissolution of the peace conference. Most surely they will not be the ones to initiate a resumption of military hostilities, even if the conference breaks up for one reason or another. Under such conditions, can or will the United States initiate the resumption of military action in Korea, or allow Rhee to break his neck by himself? If it comes down to South Korean action alone, the war would be tragic, but it would be limited. If the initiative and the burden of the action are taken by the United States, the war would not only be tragic and even more futile than heretofore, but its consequences would be incalculably disastrous. The idea that three months from now, or six months from now (or for that matter six years from now), the United States would be plunged by reckless and desperate imperialists into an unlimited and unwinding war across the cities and plains and mountains of the China mainland — and beyond it — is so fantastic and monstrous as to rob the mind of the ability to grasp it. We cannot say it is utterly impossible. It is unlikely, most unlikely.

But precisely because of that, the bankruptcy of American foreign policy is only more emphatically underscored. Washington is caught on the hook of the Korean adventure and does not know how to wriggle off it.
Civil Liberties and the Philosopher of the Cold War

Is there a witch-hunt on in America today? Or, to put it in terms which are less figurative and more precise, is there in this country an attack, governmental and extra-governmental, legal and extra-legal on the body of civil liberties and freedoms which in their sum total make up what is commonly understood as "democracy"?

Why should such a question need to be discussed, at least in a magazine which is directed to the socialist and liberal sectors of our society? Every day the papers are full of news about the expulsion of teachers from their jobs because of their real or alleged political affiliations. Hundreds of books have been thrown out of the government's overseas libraries because their authors are suspect of pro-Stalinism, or other "controversial" ideas. In one state after another laws have been passed which make membership in the Communist Party, or other "subversive" organizations subject to legal disabilities and penalties. In fact, the list is endless. What, then, is there to discuss or to demonstrate?

It needs to be discussed because there is a danger that the very idea of civil liberties and democracy in all its variety of forms is being wrenched and distorted to fit the conveniences of the cold war. If this degradation of the idea of democracy were solely the work of the Westbrook Peglers and Walter Winchells, of the Hearst Press and of Senator McCarthy, there would be little need for the New International to argue against it, except in the same way in which we attack all openly reactionary ideology.

But to the voices of the far right which demand the suppression of all "un-American" ideas, organizations and individuals, there are now added voices from within the liberal camp. Of course, these do not cry for the destruction of our civil liberties, or at least, they would strictly limit this destruction to a select group of Stalinists whom they arbitrarily designate as "conspirators." Of course, they abhor whatever excesses may have been committed by the government or its agencies, and deplore the existence of "cultural vigilantism" at the hands of private patrioteers. But from beginning to end they insist that in fact there is no witch-hunt on in America today, that our civil liberties are under no greater attack than they have been at any time during the past thirty years, and to cap it all, that anyone who disagrees with them and claims that civil liberties are under attack is either simply parroting the Stalinist Party or, at best is outrageously falsifying the picture of American democracy.

The loudest and most persistent of these voices has been that of Sidney Hook, chairman of the Department of Philosophy at New York University. And it has been far from a voice crying in the wilderness. His reputation as a former Marxist, a Deweyan liberal and an anti-Communist confer on his arguments an authority which is widely respected among all those liberals who are anxiously looking for a rationale with which to justify their abandonment of the struggle for civil liberties in the interest of their desire to support America's struggle in the cold war.

Here is the most concentrated dose of what Sidney Hook has to say about the question. The reader will forgive the length of the quotation, for it is only in its entirety that its full significance can be grasped.

 Barely a few months after Mr. Russell [Bertrand Russell] proclaimed to the entire world, and to the delight of neutralists and Communists, that the U.S. university professors, whether or not they have tenure, are shielded by the general atmosphere of repression that now prevails, this is what the New York Times, Dec. 11, 1952, has to say about the situation as ideal—"to deny the episodic outbreaks of intolerance towards professors with unpopular views (when was the U.S. free of them?) to recognize Mr. Hutchins' statement as a fanatical capitulation to blackmail."

The following remark of Mr. Robert M. Hutchins: "Everywhere in the U.S. university professors, whether or not they have tenure, are shielded by the general atmosphere of repression that now prevails." And this at a time when professors have actually been more outspoken than ever in the past against arbitrary actions by university and state authorities as was clearly evidenced in the universities of Ohio, Chicago and California. The cold war.

Aside from a few members of the Communist Party, or other "subversive" organizations, who were convicted under the Smith Act, few other teachers were dismissed for membership in the Communist Party, or other "subversive" organizations. In the case of the Trotskyist group who were convicted under the Smith Act, but Mr. Russell never even dreamed of characterizing the situation as ideal—"to deny the episodic outbreaks of intolerance towards professors with unpopular views (when was the U.S. free of them?) to recognize Mr. Hutchins' statement as a fanatical capitulation to blackmail."

The report of the American Jewish Committee made public reports on the state of civil rights in America in connection with the celebration of the 161st anniversary of the Bill of Rights. Neither organization is inclined to end they insist that in fact there is no witch-hunt on in America today, that our civil liberties are under no greater attack than they have been at any time during the past thirty years, and to cap it all, that anyone who disagrees with them and claims that civil liberties are under attack is either simply parroting the Stalinist Party line, or at best is outrageously falsifying the picture of American democracy.

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intellectually bold as any profession in the nation. The number of attempts to impose tests for loyalty has undoubtedly risen but whereas in the past such tests would have been accepted supinely either with equanimity or without protest, today there is more vigorous opposition on the part of teachers to arbitrary action by legislatures and boards of trustees than ever before in the history of American education.

Now and again other individuals, some even in official posts, take up Mr. Hutchins' cry and assert that American college teachers are petrified with fear, unwilling to discuss controversial issues, or to protest measures of which they disapprove. Many different things are here confused. It is true that the number of criticisms and attacks on the schools has increased, and here and there some fantastic things have occurred like the dismissal of a rural college in the West of a temporary teacher on a one-year appointment because he signed a petition to the President asking for amnesty for the defendants convicted under the Smith Act. But it is as true that college teachers have never fought back so unitedly, spiritedly, and so successfully as today. They won on the key point in the University of California case; they helped put to rout the House Committee on Un-American Activities when it sought to check textbooks; they are slowly turning the tide against loyalty oaths; they have condemned investigations by Congressional committees often and vigorously.

To circulate the myth that "everywhere in the U. S. university professors" have been cowed or silenced by Senators McCarthy and McCarran or whoever else is identified with the spirit of repression is not only to circulate an untruth but may, if given credence, actually contrib­ute to bringing about such a state of affairs. It is to discourage teachers from continuing their role as active defenders of academic freedom. My own impression is that academic freedom is now more aroused and more active in behalf of academic freedom than they have ever been in my thirty-five years of experience as college student and teacher.

To discuss whether or not Bertrand Russell is right in describing the state of affairs which exists in the United States as a "reign of terror" is, at best, to engage in a semantic argument. We do not favor exaggerated statements about the degree to which the intimida­tion of public expression and orga­nization has developed in this country, because we agree with Hook that people can act most intelligently when they understand the actual situation and not when all states and degrees of reaction are lumped under the single phrase "fascism" or "policestate."

But Hook's own argumentation is not just a matter of exaggeration, this time in the direction of understating the assault on our civil liberties. He baldly proclaims that because some courageous teachers and others have refused to be intimidated, are resisting the assault on their own particular professional freedoms, the assault itself can be said hardly to exist at all.

For the moment, let us confine ourselves to the problem of civil liberties as it relates specifically to the narrow field of the schools in America. To start with, it is interesting, though not decisive, to note that the "other individuals" who agree with Hutchins comprise an important section of the experts in the field, i.e., professors, deans and school administrators.

In a recent article (June 29) the New York Times records that the National Education Association has made a study of 522 school systems, covering every section of the United States, and finds that American school teachers are reluctant to consider controversial issues in the classroom. The subjects considered most controversial by school superintendents are: religious education, sex education, communism, socialized medicine, local politics, race relations, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations. The report notes that criticism of teachers and of schools has become more common than usual and that subjects previously considered dispassionately have become debatable issues.

Dr. Ernest O. Melby, Dean of New York University's School of Education, told 600 teachers at a conference in Columbus, Ohio, that: "I wish I could be prouder than I am of the way in which our profession has fought the battle of freedom." He said that schools are open to criticism, but that recent attacks are "so ill-founded and unsound in terms of our historic tradition that we can be certain that these recent years will constitute one of the strategic battles for public education in the history of this country. Nowhere in the free world is there a fear and hysteria comparable to that which we evidence in this country." (New York Herald Tribune, March 28, 1953.)

On March 15th of this year the chapter of the American Association of University Professors at Princeton University adopted a statement which warned against "inquisitorial procedures" to determine "fitness to teach." "We deplore," said the Princeton AAUP, "the failure of many of our educational, religious and political leaders to define the true nature of this growing threat to our intellectual and spiritual heritage and to protest against it...." "... Political misuse of legal proc­esses," the statement continued, "the stifling of controversy, the suppression of dissent, the banning and censorship of books either because of their ideas or because of what their authors believe, the boycotting of the creative mind—these and other methods of control are the most dangerous en­emies of a free society."

Statements from eminent individu­als and organizations in the field of education along similar lines could be reproduced by the dozens. Are all these people guilty of "fantastic exag­geration," have they all chosen to go out of their way to "delight the neutralists and Communists" by expres­sing their conviction that large sections of the teaching profession are being intimidated, and that controversy and dissent are being suppressed?

It may be objected that it will not do, in such matters, to argue from authority, even if that authority be that of people most intimately connected with the defense of academic freedom. But a simple listing of cases in which academic freedom has been under at­tack during the past few years would take up more space than we can afford to give it. A few items may be sketch­ed, however, simply to refresh the reader's memory on the matter:

Item: Academic freedom in California. Hook says that the professors "won the key point in the University of California case." Far from true. They conceded the key point before the battle was fully joined, namely, the right of people to teach based on their competence rather than their political views or affiliations. As the fight developed, this basic tenet of academic freedom was abandoned and the struggle began to revolve around issues of university administra­tion and the efficacy of loyalty oaths. The final result: under the Levering Act all California employees now have to take an oath of the kind which the faculty at the University of California found offensive in the first place. What a victory!

But that is not all. Senator Jenner claims that more than twenty colleges and universities in California are co­operating in a blacklisting program under which about 100 members of
their faculties have been removed, "and at least as many had been rejected for teaching posts since last June 24th, when the plan was put into effect." According to testimony before the House Un-American Committee by an expert (Richard E. Combs, for 14 years chief counsel of the California Senate Committee on Un-American Activities) "some schools . . . had retained full-time investigators with FBI, naval intelligence or military intelligence service or men trained in counter-communistic activities. These investigators worked in the classroom and on the campuses . . ." (New York Times, May 18, 1953.)

We do not pretend to know how many of the 100 men fired and the "at least a hundred" not hired were members or close sympathizers of the Communist party. From the point of view of freedom on the campus, the question is irrelevant though it might be relevant to other considerations, such as intimidating anyone whose intellectual development has led him to pro-Stalinist conclusions from following his convictions . . . if he ever wants to teach in California. Can anyone seriously doubt that the presence of these ex-FBI men and their colleagues on the campuses of California and other states endanger academic freedom?

Item: New York City Superintendent of schools Jansen has stated that 81 teachers in the city schools have resigned, retired or been removed while under investigation since 1950. As of March 27th of this year, 180 teachers in the city school system are under investigation.

The method employed in this purge of the city school system has become notorious and is now in the process of being imitated in many cities and states across the nation. By one means or another the school officials come to suspect a teacher of Stalinist affiliations. He is called before a special examiner, and asked whether he is or ever has been a member of the CP. He refuses to answer, and is then automatically suspended and eventually fired. The same fate befalls anyone who is called before a Congressional committee and avails himself of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution in refusing to say whether he is or has been a Stalinist.

We are not concerned at this point with the legal technicalities or hair-splitting argumentation as to whether a teacher is entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment and retain his job. The country is fairly inundated with magazine articles which deal with this question, and the American Civil Liberties Union has found it so complicated that its officers have been pondering the problem for several months.

At the moment we are concerned only with the question: does the procedure employed by the New York schools outlined above enhance academic freedom in New York schools, or threaten it? In answering this question it will simply not do to point to the fact that "in 1940 over forty teachers were dismissed for membership in the Communist Party or refusing to testify concerning their membership," as though that in some way lessens the impact of what is happening now. The Rapp-Coudert firings were a blow to academic freedom, and the extension of the techniques and ideology which motivated them to an accepted standard of national procedure constitutes a far heavier blow.

It should be noted that the authorities showed not the slightest interest in the competence of the teachers discharged, their relationships to their students and other faculty members, their reputations in the community, or any other factor which one might think has bearing on a person's fitness to teach. In no case was the claim made before the Board of Education that any of the teachers had used their classrooms as arenas of indoctrination. As a matter of fact, no effort was made to prove that most of them were members of the Communist Party. They were fired on what amounts to a charge of insubordination because they refused to tell investigators whether or not they were or are members.

What effect have these firings, along with much else which is going on in the country, had on the teaching of "controversial subjects" in the city schools? It is obviously impossible to document the answer to such a question. But it is not without significance that following on the heels of these proceedings officials of the New York school system found themselves constrained to publish a document urging teachers to handle controversial subjects in their classrooms. While preserving one's sense of proportion, is this not reminiscent of the constant stream of exhortations issued by the top bureaucrats in Russia to their cows and quaking subordinates to "exercize initiative," to "boldly criticize shortcomings?" Unless teachers have been reluctant to handle controversial matters, why should it be necessary for their administrative officers to urge them to do so?

Item: Dean Carl W. Ackerman, head of the Columbia University School of Journalism recently wrote an article in the bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in which he stated that he will no longer cooperate with the FBI, Central Intelligence, the Secret-Service and Civil Service investigators in giving information on students. He wrote:

Students are "tried" secretly without their knowledge and without an opportunity of explaining and defending their records . . .

Today the vast majority of teachers in all fields of instruction have learned that promotion and security depend on conformity to the prevailing community or national concept of devotion to the public welfare . . .

The practical problem which confronts deans, professors, school teachers and students today is political freedom to discuss public affairs in classrooms or at lunch or during "bull" sessions without fear that someone may make a record which may be investigated secretly, either by a governmental official or a prospective employer.

Let no one think that the FBI and the other agencies named by Dean Ackerman are interested only in students who are suspected of membership in the Stalinist movement. Universities are asked to keep data on all radical students and to turn them over to the government. These then become part of the permanent file of the student; they are part of the "raw material" of the "unevaluated" derogatory information which is designed to dog him the rest of his life.

It is not only the official police net which is laid to trap the student. He must be careful not to give utterance to unorthodox views even while in high school, or he may never get to college at all! The most eloquent testimony for this comes from an ardent supporter of Sidney Hook's views. A letter to the New Leader for April 20th of this year starts with several sentences in which the writer praises Hook's article "Freedom in American Culture" which had appeared in an earlier issue of the same magazine. The letter continues:

Recently, however, in a discussion of this very issue, a student gave me an answer which left me almost ready to accept the position of alarm I had so long fought. I felt very strongly that those who did not agree that Communism was a conspiracy could never be brought to see the truth unless they could be shaken
An Expert Gives a Lesson in Word Juggling

PROFESSOR SIDNEY HOOK has written an important book, Heresy Yes, Conspiracy No.* The importance of the book lies in the fact that it is a smoothly written compendium of the arguments and rationalizations of a new school of authoritarian liberalism which has come of age in the United States in but five brief years. It is a book which for the incautious reader has an impressive air of reasonableness about it; its logical constructions seem to be unassailable—that is, if one accepts Hook’s assumptions and does not investigate his reasoning too closely.

Hook’s defense of the basic legitimacy of the Smith Act, his repudiation, in effect, of the need to establish personal guilt, his denial of the existence of a witch-hunt of major proportions, his denial of the right of a Communist Party member to teach are views which, not so long ago, would have elicited a wave of indignant protest. Such protest is now barely audible, for two reasons: first, many individuals who maintain their liberal principles are simply afraid to challenge publicly the present reaction; second, and perhaps more disturbing, many of the liberals of yesteryear have come to accept the anti-liberal values of Hook. Hook’s approach to academic freedom and civil liberties, in general, has a genuine appeal for those who would like to be considered liberals and even non-conformists, but who are incapable of withstanding the psychological and social pressures of the cold war. In the name of liberalism, Hook has developed a sanctimonious conservatism.

Before discussing the Communist Party in terms of Hook’s own definition, the all important point must be made that his whole manner of discussing the Stalinist movement is completely arid. There is no social analysis, mere a series of loose definitions rigidly applied, efforts to make the Communist Party fit these definitions and then drawing what he thinks are the necessary conclusions about our responsibilities toward the Party and its members. Hook is playing a game of cops and robbers, good men and bad men, cowboys and Indians. Stalinism is evil, Stalinists are conspirators and therefore, we’ve got to lick ‘em. What are the social dynamics of the Stalinist movement? How does it operate in real life? What is the attraction Stalinism holds for millions? The problems are virtually untouched in the book. It is politically and psychologically significant to study the analogies which Hook makes, for nothing so clearly demonstrates the vacuity of his understanding of Stalinism in this book. He constantly compares our responsibilities toward a Stalinist Party member with our attitude to an assassin or thief. Just one example from his section dealing with Communist Party teachers:


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One may be killed by an imperfect assassin.

In an unsuccessful attempt to justify a misleading analogy and succeeding only in confessing its weakness, he follows with:

This is not, of course, to accuse members of the Communist Party who are not a part of its underground liquidation squads with being assassins, or of planning assassinations. I make the comparison that one can be dangerous, sometimes lethal, even if imperfect.

Hook's analogy is preposterous. He writes as if there were no relationship between the punishments that would be meted out to a would-be assassin and a Stalinist. If the assassin is to be fired, why not the Stalinist teacher, he asks. If all he is trying to demonstrate is the perfectability or imperfectability of individuals toward their own commitments, that could be easily demonstrated and in less prejudicial terms than "assassin"; or as he does elsewhere, with thieves hired as valets who should be fired and men who come to cheat in a game of cards who should be exposed. The type of analogy is interesting because it reveals the vein of Hook's thinking on Stalinism. For him, it is comparable though not identical to a bunch of crooks, assassins, and card sharps. But, obviously, Hook is not only interested in demonstrating the imperfectability of a man in specific walks of life, be it cardcheating, murder, thievery or-Stalinist politics. He states that the Communist Party teacher has no right to teach not merely because of acts he may have committed but because of the "evidence we possess about the clearly expressed intentions cf this party ..." Thus, if we fire a would-be assassin, why not fire a Stalinist teacher who would like to corrupt his pupils? But it is precisely because there exists the qualitative difference between the teacher who is a member of a complex, reactionary social movement and the assassin, that our operational approach toward the one is different from our approach toward the other. The legitimate firing of an individual who has proved intentions to murder is no substantiation at all for a view which calls for the punishment of a Stalinist teacher who intends to indoctrinate students. The would-be assassin is obviously a "clear and present danger" to his unfortunate employer and chosen victim. To compare him on any level with a Stalinist is not only foolish, but dangerous.

We have deviated to a discussion of this analogy only to demonstrate the total bankruptcy of Hook's book as an explanation of the phenomenon of Stalinism. The analogies are more suitable to the stock and trade of the street corner rabble rouser than to the serious writer and scholar. But this failure of Hook's is not unrelated to his basic thesis that the Communist Party is a conspiracy. His "logical" approach is extremely simplistic and to discuss the complexities of American or world Stalinism either accurately or intelligently, might not tax Hook so much as it would the case he is attempting to construct against the rights of Communist Party teachers, and on civil liberties as a whole.

We have sought, at the outset, to discuss Hook's method of argumentation because unless this is grasped it is impossible to deal with the content of his argument. As in the case with men of less pretensions to logical consistency and rigorous thought, the method and the content are intimately related. The sleight-of-hand involved in the "assassin" analogy should make the reader aware that he is in the presence of a master. There is much more to come. And it is not to be attributed to some disastrous deterioration in Hook's faculties, but rather to the application of them to the demonstration of a thesis which is itself false to the core. We now proceed to the content of the argument.

The foundation of Hook's views is implicitly stated in the title, Heresy Yes Conspiracy No. Our attitude toward the heretic, no matter how repugnant his heresy, should be tolerant, while toward the conspirator, society has no moral responsibility to either protect or tolerate. An individual with Communist ideas is a heretic, while an individual who is a member of the Communist Party is a conspirator. In Hook's words:

Communist ideas are heresies, and liberals need have no fear of them when they are freely and openly discussed. They should be studied and evaluated in the light of all the relevant evidence. No one should be punished because he holds them. The Communist movement, however, is something quite different from a mere heresy, for wherever it exists it operates along the lines laid down by Lenin as guides to Communists of all countries, and perfected in great detail since then.

Preceding this, Hook writes:

A heresy does not shrink from publicity. It welcomes it. Not so a conspiracy. The signs of a conspiracy are secrecy, anonymity, the use of false names and labels, and the calculated lie. There is political conspiracy, which is the concern of the state; but there may also be the conspiracy against a labor union, a cultural or professional association, or an educational institution which is not primarily the concern of the state but of its own members. In general whoever subverts the rules of a democratic organization and seeks to win by chicanery, what cannot be fairly won in the process of free discussion is a conspirator. (Emphasis ours.)

Thank heavens Hook is a mere professor of philosophy and not a policeman, a judge or a lawmaker. For with his definition of a conspirator he might be placed in the awkward position of indicting, arresting, sentencing or illegalizing most of his new found friends in the conservative bourgeois and Social Democratic worlds. How many of our top legislators and other elected—not to mention appointed—officials have achieved status through subverting "the rules of a democratic organization", and have utilized chicanery for fear of freely discussing their real views and intentions? And how many of Hook's co-thinkers in the leadership of the trade union movement have resorted to undemocratic control of a rebellious or apathetic membership? How many secondary politicians, labor leaders and men of culture whom Hook knows and respects have managed to maintain their influence over their constituencies and followers through cheating, dishonesty, chicanery and subverting every democratic rule in the book. If Hook's definition of a conspirator "in general" were to be taken seriously, our court calendars and jails would be filled with leading Republicans and Democrats, trade union leaders—and even Hook would be far from safe.

We have seen Hook's definition of an individual conspirator. We know the signs of a conspiracy ("secrecy, anonymity, false names and labels, ... calculated lies"). Now for the definition of a conspiratorial movement.

A conspiracy, as distinct from a heresy, is a secret or underground movement which seeks to attain its ends not by normal political or educational processes but by playing outside the rules of the game. Because it undermines the conditions which are required in order that doctrines may freely compete for acceptance, because where successful it ruthlessly destroys all heresies and dissenters, a conspiracy cannot be tolerated without self-stultification in a liberal society.

Hook has now given us one defi-
nition of a conspirator, in general, the signs of a conspiracy and the definition of a conspiratorial organization.

From these definitions and assumptions follows, for Hook: the Communist Party is a conspiracy and the Communist Party member is a conspirator and neither the organization nor the individual is entitled to the same rights extended to more law-abiding individuals and organizations, willing to, in Hook's opinion, play within "the rules of the game."

There is an aspect of the Stalinist movement which can legitimately be labelled a conspiracy in the most derogatory sense in which the word can be understood. That aspect of the movement we will discuss later. But in order to make sense of his argument, Hook has lumped all aspects of the movement under the one label, and all its members under the label of "conspirators." What is important for us to understand is that Stalinism is, in addition to other things, an ideological movement. It has an enormous appeal for millions of people on the basis of its ideas and avowed intentions. To substitute semantics for a political analysis of Stalinism is dangerous. To work out a "clever" definition of conspiracy and conspirators, then to pin these labels on the party and individuals is at best a word game, and at worst, leads to a reactionary conclusion, some of which are accepted by Hook, and others (up to this moment) inconsistently rejected by him.

Let us start at the elementary component of the movement, the role of the individual Stalinist, his relationship to his party and to society as a whole.

Starting here, at the very foundation of Hook's argument there is a glaring error. The dichotomy Hook assumes exists between a conspirator and a heretic is false. It exists for his convenience alone. Why it is excluded that a man can be both heretic and conspirator at the same time, as Hook so cavalierly assumes is the case. A heretic is simply an individual who rejects commonly accepted doctrine or dogma. There is nothing in political literature (outside of Hook's work) leading to the conclusion that a heretic or a heresy by definition "does not shrink from publicity." Why not? A heretic can attempt to avoid publicity for any number of reasons, ranging from a distasteful personal quirk to keep his views to himself and his chosen friends, to fear of reprisals. Why is it only a conspiracy which "does not offer its wares openly," and never a true heresy? Again, the distinction is Hook's own. It sounds good, an important but very fine point which provides us with the key to the vault hiding the heretofore undiscovered nature of Stalinism.

After all is said and done by Hook to mesmerize his audience with his refined and largely contrived distinctions, not one of his thoughts or arguments contradicts the fact that a member of the American Communist Party is a heretic. He is a heretic because he repudiates many of the values of existing bourgeois society for the values of Stalinism. His values are corrupt, his thought processes corrupted, his methods reprehensible, but they are his values, his thought processes, his methods, and all three characteristics often run counter to capitalist society. He may be a conspirator as well, though as Hook discusses the problem, this label has no meaning. But one thing is certain: he is nevertheless a heretic.

Because the views held by a Stalinist are his views, does that mean they were arrived at as a result of his own, free, unprejudiced thought processes? Hardly. The policies of world Stalinism are dictated by the needs and interests of the Kremlin bureaucracy, and all its parties and individuals in these parties must step into line or face the consequences. All that is well known fact establishes, however, is that the Stalinist heretic is not a heretic. Because the views held by a Stalinist are his views, does that mean they were arrived at as a result of his own, free, unprejudiced thought processes? Hardly. The policies of world Stalinism are dictated by the needs and interests of the Kremlin bureaucracy, and all its parties and individuals in these parties must step into line or face the consequences. All that is well known fact establishes, however, is that the Stalinist heretic is not a heretic.
psychological but, nevertheless, as a rule, accepted. The ability of the individual Stalinist to rationalize is infinite. One day he will eulogize Tito, and the next he will proclaim to the world that Tito is now, and has always been a fascist. These political gyrations of the Stalinist movement are in greater measure accepted by the individual who remains in the party. He learns to adopt the specious reasoning of the party; he is convinced that each reversal of line was justified by “new conditions” or “tactical considerations.” For an utterly reasonable man like Hook, it is impossible to accept this weird political-psychological phenomenon: how can a man call white what is on Monday and on Tuesday claim that white is black. Obviously, for Hook, these are not heretics—who must be reasonable men; they must be something else—conspirators, let us say.

The Stalinist who is at all sensitive, whose critical faculties are simply dulled, not dead, who has some strength of character, frequently does not fully accept the change of line. A new change of line will aggravate some gnawing doubts about his heresy instilled by an earlier change, or the effectiveness of a counter-argument or revelation of new facts. What invariably happens to these “conspirators” is that they find it increasingly difficult to accept the rationalizations, and they eventually reach the breaking point with the party. This isn’t conjecture; it is precisely what has happened to hundreds of thousands of Hook’s former “conspirators.”

Exhibit B

Once more Hook quotes from the same volume of Lenin (p. 169):

“In all organizations without exception ... (political, industrial, military, cooperative, educational, sports), groups or nuclei of Communists should be formed ... mainly open groups but also secret groups.”

Here is what Lenin wrote:

“In all organizations without exception—unions and associations primarily proletarian, and also organizations of the non-proletarian, toiling and exploited masses (political, industrial, military, cooperative, educational sports, etc., etc.) groups or nuclei of Communists should be formed—mainly open groups, but also secret groups, which should be obligatory in every case when their suppression, or the arrest or deportation of their members by the bourgeoisie may be expected ...” (Emphasis ours.)

Hook ends his quote with a period as though it were a completed thought! But Lenin has a comma following the word “groups,” for he makes it clear immediately that he is agitating for secrecy as a means of self-defense against efforts to suppress, persecute, arrest and deport Communists. These are certainly proscriptions of democratic rights, and Hook is not arguing that these proscriptions did not exist for the Communist movement in 1920. But even if Lenin manufactured such proscriptions, it would be irrelevant to the point that Hook is making. He is attempting to establish that in principle Lenin advocated conspiracy—it was a way of life, you see. To prove it, he takes the first part of a quotation, makes a textual change and conveniently omits those conditioning clauses which prove Lenin to be perfectly consistent with Hook’s generous permissiveness on the propriety of using “conspiratorial activity in undemocratic countries where heresies are proscribed ...” Hook evidently believes in the double standard: when Stalinists use the “calculated lie” it is a sign of conspiracy, when Hook uses the calculated distortion it is a sign of patriotism and scholarship.

A distinction must be made between voluntary membership in the Communist Party in a bourgeois country, and enforced membership in a Stalinist-dominated nation. In the latter instance, membership may be dictated not by any agreement whatsoever, but merely by the powerful instinct of self-preservation. In the United States, however, where the party does not even offer the possibilities for social advancement today, as in Europe or Asia, membership is not and cannot be enforced by the party. The party can exert certain social and psychological pressures to retain its members, but this is seldom durable and cannot provide the basis for the maintenance of the organization. The American Communist Party can, in the final analysis, keep itself going as an organization with a membership other than FBI agents, because it has convinced its dupes that its ideas are politically correct and provide the solution to the ills of bourgeois society.

But, it may be objected, even though it is clear that in the United States and the rest of the capitalist world Stalinists are indeed heretics, is it not true that they are also conspirators? Even if the dichotomy Hook creates is false, is this not more a blunder in his exposition than a failure in assessing the real social role of the Stalinist movement? Are not all conspirators also in a sense heretics (even our old acquaintances, the assassins)? And if heretics also become conspirators in a democratic society, is it not the right and duty of that society to take the necessary repressive measures to protect itself against them?

These questions are perfectly legitimate. In them is at least contained a grasp of the complexity of Stalinism and hence of the problems which this unique movement presents to those who would defeat it without at the same time destroying democracy. Their answer can only be found in a real social and political analysis of the Stalinist movement, of the sources of its appeal in our society, of the relationship between its leaders, both here and abroad, and the mass of its followers.

Hook finds it possible, even, we must add, necessary, to solve these complex problems by a simple rule-of-thumb method. An investigation of the sociological dynamics of the Stalinist movement he finds totally unnecessary. All he needs to determine that the mass of the members of the Stalinist movement are in fact conspirators is a relatively simple social tool: a calendar, and an even simpler homiletical device: a vigorous assertion.

In Hook’s opinion, every member of the Communist Party of more than a couple of years standing is a conspirator, and a hardened one at that. He writes in most sanguine fashion: “Whatever may have been the case in the past, a man does not today somnambulistically stumble into the Communist Party. If he remains a member, this is prima facie evidence that he is a hardened conspirator and that he accepts its orders and directives.” Now, our good professor has the perfect right to construct any philosophical system he desires, he can devise all the definitions for classes he feels necessary, he can, if he feels it essential, utilize word symbols now in operation and invest them with other than accepted meanings; but he has no political or moral right to pretend that his singular definition of a conspiracy or a conspirator provides a clue as to attitudes a democrat
should adopt toward Stalinism and Stalinists.

Hook's qualifying phrase at the beginning of the last cited quotation, "Whatever may have been the case in the past..." raises an interesting problem. It creates the impression that "in the past" a man who either joined with his eyes open, or even somnambulistically stumbled into the Communist Party, there to remain for some indefinite length of time was not a "hardened conspirator." At what point did this state of affairs change? Was one simply a heretic and not a conspirator if only he left on that date when Hook ended his own flirtation with the Communist Party? Or is Hook more magnanimous? Does he allow a later cut-off date? Was it perhaps the Moscow trials that ended the standing? It must have been later than that, (or "benevolent" some indefinite length of time was applied to guard against the entrance Party operate will recognize that they are a conspiratorial group."

"Anyone," Hook writes, "acquainted with the official instructions under which members of the Communist Party operate will recognize that they are a conspiratorial group." Here, there is no qualifying temporal phrase. We can assume then, that this has always been true, with the exception of the fact that the "official instructions" today are more rigorously applied to guard against the entrance of FBI agents, and weed them out where they have managed to join. Why then, in Hook's view, should a CP member during the period of "social fascism" have been any less a conspirator? Or one who managed to follow the many convolutions of the CP line through the "Popular Front," the Moscow Trials, the Stalin-Hitler Pact, and World War II, be any more a heretic? The "official instructions" of the Communist Party have been in effect for many a year. The content has changed depending on the line being dictated at the moment by Russia's needs. Is Hook saying that anyone who has remained a member of the CP for more than a couple of years at any time was a conspirator? Logic would seem to dictate from his point of view that that be his attitude.

If that is so, then aside from the approximate 30,000 conspirators claimed as members of the Communist Party today, there have perhaps been as many as a million conspirators in this country since the end of the first World War. In the Communist and Stalinist movements alone there must have been a turnover in membership of three-fourths of this figure. Can one imagine a "conspiracy" where hundreds of thousands of "hardened" conspirators move in and out as through a revolving door. Hook's indiscriminate and flabby label is purely literary, but literary license is out of place in a book which pretends to a sober and realistic evaluation of conspiracies and conspirators.

Yet there is always that qualifying phrase: "Whatever may have been the case in the past..." It indicates that for Hook at some point the heretic turned conspirator. A process of elimination of the twists and turns of the CP line results in the conclusion that the heretic turned conspirator with the outbreak of the cold war. Given his increasingly uncritical acceptance of American capitalism and its policies, we can see that Hook's temporal qualification is purely political in nature, stemming not from any principle, but from the pressures of the present world conflict between Stalinism and American capitalism. This is further buttressed by the fact that although he has written much in past years about the Stalinist movement, his theory of the conspiratorial nature

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**Exhibit C**

Hook has a third quotation from Lenin to prove his disbeliefs and utter devotion to conspiratorial methods as a way of life. It is an utter misquotation, of course, one that Hook might call The Case of the Three Harmless Specks. For Hook uses three innocent looking specks in his quotation, which dota actually cover about two hundred words in Lenin's statement and completely negate the impression that Hook is attempting to convey. It is the now notorious Shub method which Hook has adopted.

Here is Lenin as Hook:

"In all countries, even the freest, "legal" and "peaceful" in the sense that the class struggle is least acute in them, the time has fully matured when it is absolutely necessary for every Communist Party systematically to combine legal with illegal work, legal and illegal organizations. . . . Illegal work is particularly necessary in the army, the navy, and police." (pp. 172-73)

Here is what Lenin wrote:

"In all countries even the freest, "legal" and 'peaceful' in the sense that the class struggle is least acute in them, the time has fully matured when it is absolutely necessary for every Communist Party systematically to combine legal with illegal work, legal and illegal organizations. . . . Illegal work is particularly necessary in the army, the navy, and police; for after the great imperialist butchery all the governments in the world began to fear a people's army which is open to the workers and peasants, and began secretly to resort to all possible methods of forming military units especially picked from the ranks of the bourgeoisie and especially supplied with all technical improvements." (Emphasis ours.)

Just a quick reading of the omitted sections from Lenin in Hook's version should suffice to demonstrate Hook's dishonesty. But as if such significant omissions were not enough Hook decides to take another crack at repunctuating Lenin (see Exhibit B for his first attempt). Hook again, his quotation on a period, again, as if it were a completed thought. Lenin actually has a semi-colon followed by a long explanatory clause. Hook obviously wants to paint Lenin in as frightening a manner as possible. Thus he chooses to end Lenin's remark on illegal work in the military at such a point as to straighten the hair on even an egg. If he quoted Lenin accurately, however, the democratic references to a people's army and his (Lenin's) opposition to the secrecy employed by the bourgeoisie in organizing the army might cushion the blow of a crooked portrayal of Lenin as a conspirator by profession.
of the Communist Party was never aired previously. It awaited the politically expedient moment.

Hook is not satisfied with "demonstrating" that a Stalinist of a few years standing is objectively a conspirator. To clinch his case, he uses intellectual sleight of hand to show that Stalinists even think of themselves as conspirators. Hook writes:

These instructions [to infiltrate sensitive governmental posts] . . . indicate that members of the Communist Party are not so much heretics as conspirators and in actual practice regard themselves as such. (Emphasis ours.)

In a political conspiracy it is hardly likely that a conspirator should not have a conscious awareness of his role for, as a rule, political conspirators know that they are conspiring. To show that thousands upon thousands of Stalinist party members are no exceptions to the rule, Hook has devised the tricky formulation "in actual practice regard themselves as such." But even from his point of view, what does the phrase "in actual practice" have to do with "regard themselves as such." The first phrase is objective in nature, referring to what they do; the latter phrase is subjective, referring to consciousness or self-awareness. Now according to what rule of logic, politics or psychology can Hook assume that because the Stalinists do things, they know what they are doing?

In "actual practice" Stalinist rank and file workers in the trade union movement disoriented, dislocate and even destroy unions which they cannot control. Does this mean that they "regard themselves" as disruptors of the trade union movement? What Hook conveniently overlooks is the contradiction between idea and reality in the Stalinist movement. The dynamism of Stalinism resides in large measure in its ability to convince its members to regard their actions which are monstrously reactionary, as being consistent with the most noble aspects of progressive and enlightened democratic and socialist thought.

But even if there are all kinds of uncertainties, doubts, confusions and inconsistencies in the minds of members of the Stalinist movement, is it not true that they all act like conspirators, i.e., in a conspiratorial fashion? After all, even though professors of philosophy may speculate about the consciousness of Stalinists, a society in danger cannot be expected to be too concerned with what is in the minds of its opponents. Must not the defenders of democracy in America guide themselves by the way in which the Stalinists act, by the conduct of their organization? And in a free, democratic society should not people who choose to act as conspirators rather than to present themselves and their ideas in open conflict in the free market place of ideas be thought out, exposed, and removed from any social arena in which they can implement their nefarious conspiracy?

Here again, the questions are quite proper and to the point; but only if the point is understood, and the answer framed not in vacuous abstraction, but in the light of the social reality of American society. The joke lies in identifying the present situation in the United States for anyone who holds Stalinist ideas (or even socialist ones, for that matter) with that of a really free and democratic society or of an open market of ideas. We share Hook's aversion for card sharps, and hence we object to his attempt to pass off this joke as the ace of spades.

Hook CANNOT ACKNOWLEDGE the existence of a major witchhunt at home for it would weaken his stand on Communist teachers and civil liberties. He is intent on proving that the Communist Party is a vast conspiracy and nothing must be allowed to interfere; neither facts nor discriminating analysis.

The signs of a conspiracy, Hook informed us, are "secrecy, anonymity, the use of false names and labels and the calculated lie." Hook realizes that this is not a meaningful statement unless it can be established that the organization which functions in such an underhanded fashion is afforded the opportunity to operate in a perfectly free and legal manner. If a movement's activities are circumscribed or illegalized by an undemocratic society, one cannot place moral structures on the opposition movement for operating in a secretive manner. That would be an example of moralistic absolutism which Hook finds so offensive in other writings. Thus, he begrudgingly admits that "There may be some justification for conspiratorial activity in undemocratic countries where heresies are proscribed..."

It is impossible for Hook, given his scientific method to morally condemn the secrecy and semi-underground character of the Communist Party to-day unless he can show that this conspiratorial character is self-imposed, i.e., that its secrecy bears no causal relationship at all to an "alleged" witchhunt. And this is just what Hook proceeds to do. He attempts to prove the impossible by asserting the absurd. There is no witchhunt in this country, asserts Hook. There are injustices, to be sure, but they are primarily the malevolent doings of a small number of "private citizens" and "some legislators." Also "Zealous individuals and groups, expressing themselves with anger and unrestraint on the shortcomings of national poli
cy and leadership, have been guilty of "cultural vigilantism." "It is merely hypocritical pretense, we often hear it declared," Hook writes with bitterness, "to regard America as a champion of the free way of life." Thus, America is in Hook's eyes a champion of the free way of life and it is to see an enormous grey cloud of reaction dimming this beacon of freedom is virtually playing the Stalinist game:

It is true, however, that in some respects governmental measures have fallen short of proper standards of justice. The loyalty program should be rethought and more selectively applied. The list of subversive organizations issued by the Attorney General's office was not properly drawn up; nor were proper procedures followed in reaching decisions. Visa and passport regulations should be more intelligently administered under a thoroughly revised immigration law drafted by others than Senator McCarran. But it is emphatically not true that the Government has created the anti-Communist mood of the country or that it is persecuting heresies rather than conspiracies. (Emphasis ours.)

Hook's wrath is unbounded when polemizing against "ritualistic liberals" who "have become convinced that the processes of American freedom no longer function as in the past, that the critical safeguards and mechanisms by which American democracy has remedied abuses and evils in its body politic have been undermined, if not destroyed, by an hysterical anti-Communist fever. Even many Americans who are non-Communists have been repeating this line." His vulgarity knows as few bounds as his wrath:

Recently a professional liberal figure appeared on a television program on the state of civil liberties in America. At the moment when the cameras brought him so close that one could almost look down his throat, he was shouting: "It's getting so that a man can't open his mouth in this country." Whether the thousands of people who got a glimpse of his tolls
appreciated the irony of the situation is doubtful.

It is apparent from these few quotations—and there are chapters full of the same—that Hook either cannot or will not recognize that the whole structure and atmosphere of political life in America has been poisoned. Is it possible for a teacher to have his Fulbright scholarship revoked because of guilt by family association*, for books to be burned (only a few) by the State Department, loyalty oaths and purges made widespread, the McCarran Internal Security Act passed, for a hooligan-like Senator McCarthy to wield such enormous power, etc., etc., etc., and at the same time be maintained that the "processes of American freedom" continue to "function as in the past?"

The Communist Party and the world Stalinist movement is the party and movement of the Big Lie. It has been able to achieve enormous popularity in Europe and Asia through its deceptions, lies, intrigues, etc. Parading under the banner of socialism, claiming as its own the most noble traditions of past struggles for emancipation, often utilizing the language of socialism, and capitalizing on the existing misery and the bankrupt policies of the bourgeois world, the Stalinists have employed all these techniques for facilitating the most monstrous perversion of revolutionary aspirations toward the end of establishing a dictatorship which annihilates the legitimate grievances of those they influence. The difference between the avowed and ulterior aims of the world Stalinist movement is only part of the reason for their devo-

tion to secrecy, anonymity and false labels. Hook's refusal to recognize that a good deal of the secrecy, anonymity, false labels and even some of the calculated lies resorted to by the Communist Party are defensive moves against the witchhunt is based on his belabored reasoning that no witchhunt exists. How explain the fact that the mass Communist parties of Europe function with relative openness if conspiratorial functioning is so fundamentally and totally a characteristic of Stalinism. The French and Italian Communist parties utilize deception and front techniques no less than their American counterpart, but they also have open meetings carried on under their own names, their leaders and the vast majority of their members are known by their real names. Is it the Latin temperament which predisposes the French and Italian Communist parties to more public operation? The incontrovertible fact is that the American CP resorts to ultra secrecy today because that is the only way it can continue to function in the face of persecution.

There is a section of the Stalinist movement which is a conspiracy in the full sense of the word—that part of the movement whose activities are carried on in secrecy, the spy apparatus. If Hook's remarks were devoted to this aspect of the Stalinist movement, our quarrel with him would be relatively trivial. Our concern is not with the murderers, spies and assassins operating under Kremlin supervision. But this is a fine distinction to Hook. The class of conspirators is made to include not only those presently conspiring, but potential conspirators and dupes, as well. The Stalinist spy apparatus is different and apart from the Communist Party. As a matter of fact, it is the devout Whittaker Chambers who made the noteworthy point that the Party membership and the spy apparatus are distinctly different movements and that there is a growing differentiation between the two, instead of a synthesis. It should be apparent to anyone who reads newspapers and an occasional book on the subject that the spy ring and the Communist Party are not to be treated as synonymous or even similar phenomena and cannot be placed in the same class in any meaningful sense.

*A. N. S. Lewis, Assistant Professor at Brooklyn College, had his Fulbright Scholarship revoked when he would not give testimony as to his wife's political affiliation. Professor Lewis denied membership at any time in the Communist Party.
help preserve civil liberties in America.

The "clear and present danger" doctrine was first enunciated by Holmes in the Schenck case. In writing a majority opinion for the Court, Holmes ruled that Schenck's action in writing letters to men who were being drafted in which he urged them to violate the draft law was a "clear and present danger" to the military effort of the country.

If the doctrine had jelled in final form with the Schenck case, it would have been an attack on civil liberties rather than a defense of them. Hook pretends that this was the case, and thereby once again displays the fine hand of the trained logician in his argument. Every freshman textbook on argumentation has a section on what is called "stacking the cards" in argument, that is marshalling only the facts which support your case and leaving out those which are damaging to it.

For Hook simply omits any reference to the Abrams v. U. S., 1919, Gitlow v. New York, 1925, and Whitney v. California, 1927. These were the cases in which the "clear and present danger" cases were given their classic formulations by the two great liberal justices. It is on these decisions, and not on Schenck that liberal opinion has based its legal defense of freedom of speech. It was on the doctrine as enunciated in these cases that Justice Douglas based his dissenting opinion on the constitutionality of the Smith Act. Of course, Hook knows this. He simply counts on the ignorance of his readers and the passions of the cold war to keep them from looking into the matter more closely.

In Abrams v. U. S., Holmes wrote:

"Making any exception to the sweeping command "Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech," I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country." (emphasis added)

In the Gitlow case (also a case against a Communist for writing revolutionary pamphlets) Holmes wrote that "every idea is an incitement," but that the ideas of Gitlow "had no chance of starting a present configuration," and hence voted against the conviction. In Whitney v. California, Brandeis wrote:

"To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that the serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. . . even of advocacy of violation (of law), however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where advocacy of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnishes reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated . . . only an emergency can justify repression.

We do not know how words and their intentions could be clearer. We do not know how it could be clearer that in the years following the Schenck case Holmes had gained a deeper insight into the problem of civil liberties and the dangers of governmental encroachment thereon. And if any informed person could still harbor doubts on the matter, all he has to do is read the opinions of the judges who opposed Holmes and Brandeis in these cases to recognize that the majority of the court which upheld the Smith Act was working in its tradition and not in that of the liberals.

But Hook only knows about the Schenck decision. And he has, it appears, a legalistic leg to stand on. In the cases in which Holmes and Brandeis wrote their libertarian opinions on "clear and present danger" they were in the minority, and the conservative majorities of the courts prevailed. If this is a justification of his attack on Justice Douglas, let him make the most of it. Hook writes:

"It follows at once [from the Schenck case] that Holmes could not have meant by his criterion an action that threatened to be successful. . . Nonethless, Justice Douglas in his minority opinion on the Smith Act denies that a "clear and present danger" of revolutionary overthrow exists on the ground that the Communist petitioners have "not the slightest chance of achieving their aims." That sounds pretty convincing if you have never heard of Abrams, Gitlow and Whitney. Justice Vinson and the court majority have interpreted the words "clear and present" to mean "vague and future," and Hook, who says that Communists should not be permitted to teach in our schools because their intellectual integrity bends and twists with the demands of political expediency, is on the sidelines shouting "hurrah."

But Hook is out to prove that the Smith Act decision is not an invasion of civil liberties, and hence is not part of any supposed witchhunt abroad in the land. Thus he must demonstrate that the Stalinists are a danger to our society, even within his own convenient use of the terms "clear and present."

In a series of hallucinatory paragraphs, Hook sets out to demonstrate that the Communist Party is a threat to the security of the nation. Not merely in that it provides the spy apparatus with a few recruits, or instructs teachers to pervert defenseless college students. It is a threat in the most literal and total sense. It is possible that any day in the immediate future, the Kremlin will give the order to the American CP to strike and strike hard.

In a section designed to frighten children and senators, Hook writes:

"... the Kremlin often instructs its fifth columns to make a bid for the conquest of political power by force and violence even when the probability of success is extremely small, and even when the direst predictions of failure have been made by those ordered to seize power. The reasons for this need not now concern us: they flow from strategic considerations in the Kremlin's plans for global domination. In the 1920's, with futile insurrections took place in Thurin-gia, Hamburg, and Canton. Even a wildly improbable effort at overthrow, one foredoomed to failure, may have very grave consequences for the community.

What is so wild, about this statement is not what it superficially says, but its clear intention to warn us of the very realistic possibility of an American Communist Party (without influence, without numbers, not accused of storing arms or holding military formations, riddled with FBI agents, increasingly isolated) receiving instructions at any moment to march on Washington, or Heaven forbid, assault the Philosophy Department of NYU.

But Hook is undaunted:

For without this organic tie to the Soviet state apparatus with all its engines of war, espionage and terror, the American Communist Party would have only nuisance value, its members would be ineffectual, candidates for the political psychopathic ward now inhabited by various other Communist splinter groups
like the Trotskyites. It is not the speech of members of the Communist Party which makes them dangerous but their organizational ties, for this in effect makes them a para-military fifth column of a powerful state, ready to strike whenever their foreign masters give the word.

If Trotskyists are in the political psychopathic ward, they had better move upstairs to make room for their erstwhile friend. For what can be a more telling sign of a political psychosis than to insist that the American Communist Party today is dangerous as a "para" form of a "military fifth column."

Let us look at this quotation more closely. Hook says that "It is not the speech of members of the Communist Party which makes them dangerous, but their organizational ties ..." But the Communist Party leaders and the Trotskyists before them were indicted for and found guilty of ideological subversion. Their organization was not on trial nor their organizational connections. It was purely and simply a trial of the advocacy of ideas.

Because of this ideological subversion they were accused of violating the Smith Act. And the Smith Act has been upheld. The obvious question that follows is: how can Hook endorse the Smith Act if it outlaw the speech of Communist Party members, believing as he does that their speech is not dangerous? What is more perplexing, how can he defend the wisdom of the Supreme Court which upheld the legality of outlawing the advocacy of violent overthrow, on the ground that these ideas may lead to incitations which are a clear and present danger, if it is not the ideas ("it is not the speech . . .") of "members of the Communist Party which makes them dangerous but their organizational ties. . ."

It makes no sense at all.

Hook now tells us:

The aim of the Smith Act was certainly justified in the light of available facts. But the method of achieving this aim-making powerless the Soviet fifth column—was inept. The provision should have been placed, not on speech to achieve revolutionary overthrow, but on organization to achieve it, and not merely any organization but an organization set up and controlled by a foreign power.

With all due respect to Professor Hook as a philosopher, this is just one step removed from babbling. In language of the greatest objectivity ("in the light of available facts") he lauds the Smith Act for its "aim" which is really utterly irrelevant. The "aim" is to make "powerless the Soviet fifth column." Of course, this "aim" is laudatory to every anti-Stalinist from right to left for a host of different reasons. But what does that have to do with the Smith Act?

If Congress passed a law outlawing all non-capitalist parties, making the criticism of capitalism on any level illegal, or if it outlawed progressive education because it claimed that such methods only educated a bunch of Reds—if Congress passed such laws with the noble aim of "making powerless the Soviet fifth column," we wonder if Hook would then write that the aims of these laws are "certainly justified in the light of available facts"—in order to soften his criticism of the laws which he so disarily refers to in the case of the Smith Act, as its "inept method." But what is the inept method of the law if not the law itself. Illegalizing speech is the method, immediate aim and operational consequence of the Smith Act. It is this which distinguishes it from other repressive legislation of the same type. To be opposed to the "method" is to be opposed to the law in toto.

It would be needlessly painful and boring to follow Hook through the remainder of his tortured attempt to justify and whitewash the Smith Act. At one point he advocates amending the act so that its proscriptions, instead of applying to speech, would apply to organizations controlled by foreign powers dedicated to overthrow of the government by force. That, of course, would be tantamount to repealing the act and writing another one. Elsewhere he says that all the "main, if not avowed purposes of the Act could have been achieved by invoking other legislation. . ." When he actually gets down to writing his proposed amendments, they are found to consist solely of adding the words "in case that it constitutes a clear and present danger" into different sections of the act. Thus it is evident that all his other proposals are just rhetoric to beguile the unwary reader.

But when all is said and done, he is not for repealing the Smith Act. He needs it as badly as the government does for his method of fighting the Stalinists. Although he says that the act as now written is meaningless, dangerous and inept he tells us:

Although the wisdom of enacting the Smith Law was doubtful the wisdom of now repealing it is even more doubtful. For if the Smith Act were repealed it would give a new lease on life to an illusion whose widespread and pernicious character was to a not inconsiderable degree responsible for the original enactment of the law. This illusion is that the Communist Party is a party like any other on the American scene, and therefore entitled to the same political rights and privileges as all other American political parties.

There you have it, stated as boldly and brutally as possible. Does the Smith Act, as actually written and administered, threaten and violate civil liberties? Possibly, Hook agrees. Should it not then be repealed? No, says Hook, that would be dangerous. Why? Because to repeal an act which is meaningless, dangerous and inept "would give a new lease on life to an illusion."

Even though the Smith Act is a threat to civil liberties, it must be preserved because it performs an "educational" function. And Hook is quite right, it has. It has helped to create an anti-Communist mood in the country, based not on intelligence and awareness, but on ignorance and prejudice. It has abetted and encouraged the most reactionary elements in American life to question the rights of individuals to hold, not only Stalinist ideas, but generally radical and liberal non-conformist views as well. But then, anything which, in Hook's view, is directed primarily against the "Communist conspiracy," no matter how irrelevant, potentially dangerous or inept it may be, is not to be dismissed lightly. He has declared war on the international Stalinist conspiracy, and if in the course of the conflict democracy must be sacrificed, that unfortunately is a fortune of war.

Hook Blows Policeman's Whistle on Campus

In the war against non-conformism, the educational system presents itself as a natural target. What more likely place sensationally to uncover "subversives" than behind the college desk—seemingly harmless men and women who through subterranean intellectual channels have been corrupting their students and agitating colleagues. For the demagogue out to capitalize on the anti-Communist mood, the attack on education and educators shows shrewdness and a sense of political timing. The contrast...
between the reality of the prosaicness of American academic life and the fantastic charges of moral corruption leveled against so many professors and scholars makes for dramatic headlines. It is also likely to get a fair public reception. The prejudice against "book learning" is as deeply rooted in the nation as is the suspicion of artists, poets and musicians, popularly and contemptuously referred to in such terms of reprobation as "longhairs" and "queers."

The teacher is the person whose duty it is to question, challenge and inquire; though, unfortunately, he seldom meets these obligations today because of fear, passivity or incompetence. But the mere fact that these are his professional responsibilities is another important reason for the witchhunters focusing their attention on the campus.

However, the primary source and inspiration for the attack on the educational system today is not the demagoguery of an individual congressman, or the teacher's quest for truth. It is to be found in the special role which the schools and colleges play in the gargantuan war preparations of the government.

During the twenties and even in the thirties, the college population was extremely small, consisting of the offspring of middle class and wealthier parents, a sprinkling of scholarship students and a small number of young people coming from poorer families prepared to make enormous sacrifices to support their children through college. What was remarkable about these parents was that there was little reason to justify any hope that anything practical would be derived from a bachelors' degree.

In the fifties, the picture is quite different. The colleges have become mass institutions and worthwhile investments for parents. A college education today, particularly in some specialized field, now carries with it the virtual guarantee of a highly paid position in a private firm working on a government project, or with the government itself. The science classrooms are filled, and from them are graduated engineers, atomic scientists, research physicists, theoretical mathematicians, etc. From the Arts and Humanities come thousands of government careerists, all with their special role to play in the cold war: aspiring diplomats, advisors, researchers, writers, propagandists, etc. A third category of increasing concern to the government is the large number of teachers turned out by the colleges and universities. Finally, the government sees in the colleges a significant military potential.

Thus, the college today in contrast to the thirties is a source of labor, political and military supply for the government. It is this fact which makes the school system a particularly sensitive spot in the government security and loyalty drive. The campus can no longer be referred to with any justice as an "ivory tower," as it is slowly sucked into the Washington political vortex.

The growing loss of academic autonomy is, by definition, synonymous with the decline of academic freedom. Academic freedom cannot exist unless we recognize the responsibility of professionally trained educators to guide the nation's educational system. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for academic freedom. It does not mean that decisions made by these men will always be either wise or just; but unless this right exists, there is no possibility at all for genuine intellectual and academic freedom. Once the government, either directly or indirectly, creates those conditions where the authority to select textbooks, curriculum, or faculty members resides not with the university, but with political potentates, these freedoms become mere shibboleths.

This is precisely what is happening on the campus today. Investigations by Congressional Committees and intensified campaigns by reactionary, super-patriotic organizations encouraged by the government-initiated witchhunt, have cast a pall over the campus. Some books are removed from the shelves, educators investigated and fired, others intimidated, student organizations are banned as necessary autonomy of the educational world is gradually whittled away.

This encroachment on academic freedom is not only from without. Within the educational world the timid, the confused and the reactionary are all doing their bit. Loyalty oaths are initiated by educational leaders only too eager to cooperate with local or national witchhunters, and firings are frequent.

Among the ranks of the educators, the most vociferous debates are those concerned with the right of a member of the Communist Party to teach. It is realized by all that what is involved is not merely the fate of a small number of teachers, but the future of the teaching profession itself.

This battle has been raging for five years with the tide running in favor of those denying the right of a Communist Party member to teach. The National Educational Association, the largest single body of professional educators, endorsed the exclusion of Communist teachers from the schools, five years ago. Until a few months ago, the democratic tradition was upheld by the large body of college educators organized into the American Association of University Professors. In Sidney Hook's book, this organization comes under sharp attack for its defense of the academic rights of Communists. But since its publication, the AAUP, meeting in convention, amended its stand so that, in effect, it corresponds to the views of Hook and the NEA.

In Hook's discussion of academic freedom, there is considerable overlapping with his earlier chapters on heresy and conspiracy. The distinctions between the conspirator and the heretic on campus is discussed in the same terms as we have already presented, with the difference that there is now a specific application of the general principle.

It is Hook's opinion that the overriding consideration for determining the rights of a teacher is competency. The competent teacher, it being understood, is one who can develop the critical faculties of his students, who can increase his knowledge and further his ability for making intelligent, rational decisions. The early chapters of Hook's discussion of academic freedom, devoted to the vocation of the teacher are, indeed, excellent. However, what concerns us here is not an abstract discussion of the philosophy of education, but the controversial question: do Communists have the right to teach? to which Hook replies with an emphatic "No."

The reasons Hook advances for denying Communist Party members the right to teach can be placed in the following categories: Communists indoctrinate; the CP teachers' conspiracy; the Extent of the Communist Peril in Schools. Following these points Hook takes up certain practical problems
and finally he offers some positive proposals. Let us take these items up point by point.

**Do Communists Indoctrinate?**

Hook is on very solid grounds in his treatment of the evils of indoctrination. A teacher who uses the classroom not as a means to develop the critical faculties of his students, but only to recruit them to a political party, or any other organization, is subverting the basic aim of education. We can make no brief for his academic rights. If a member of the Communist Party supposedly teaching mathematics or history is pre-occupied with proving the correctness of the latest turn of the Communist Party then he has automatically excluded himself from any due consideration as a teacher. By the same token if a fervent bourgeois-minded professor supposedly teaching Shakespeare is devoting his lectures to expositions of Stalinism then he, too, has violated the basic ethics of the teaching profession.

Hook is convinced that every member of the Communist Party in the school system indoctrinates in the pejorative sense of the term and therefore has lost his academic rights on grounds of incompetency. We say "pejorative sense of the term" because we have to make it clear that by indoctrination one frequently means coloring or slanting: an element of bias is introduced in a lecture, a special emphasis placed on a point to induce a desired reaction; or a more open presentation of a firmly held conviction is made. This slanting is quite different from indoctrination and is virtually universal among professors. It can even serve an educational function, particularly when conflicting views and interpretations are presented by different instructors, providing an intellectual stimulant and challenge to the student.

But Hook writes of the CP teacher: "As a teacher he cannot engage in the honest presentation and reasoned investigation of all relevant alternatives to the theories he is considering." Therefore, Hook concludes, the Communist teacher is indoctrinating and has no concordant rights. If this is what Hook means by indoctrination then our school system would be depleted overnight. How many instructors does Hook know who have that superhuman objectivity and knowledge to present "all relevant alternatives to the theories and policies" under consideration? Hook's own talents and propensities may run in this vein, though we are skeptical. We wonder if Hook presents "all" the relevant theories in an honest and objective manner when discussing Leninism or Marxism.

Everyone knows that Stalinist teachers inject propaganda into the classroom. It was never a cause for horror. We also know that not every member of the Communist Party in the school system indoctrinates. How many youth have taken courses with CP teachers, excellent courses in English, history, philosophy or the physical sciences; courses without indoctrination and often without any slanting or occasional notes of political bias.

Yet this is Hook's main charge against the Communist teacher. Hook, the empiricist, the man who establishes operative principles on the basis of evidence tells us that he has no direct evidence for the proposition that Communists indoctrinate. Such evidence, we are told, is not available because it would be either wrong or impractical to attempt to cull such damaging material. Hook asks what would happen if we:

... actually tried to detect whether or not a teacher who is a member of the Communist Party or is suspected of being one, is carrying out his instructions to indoctrinate in class.

How shall we find out? Shall we observe him in class?

However, he tells us quite rightly in the next sentence:

No one indoctrinates when he is under observation.

Hook decides that:

except in its rarest forms, indoctrination in the classroom can rarely be detected save by a critically trained observer who is almost continuously present. This is not only undesirable but for all practical purposes impossible.

Hook then exhausts the possibilities for checking:

If we cannot detect a teacher engaged in skilful indoctrination by classroom visits, can't we determine whether he is indoctrinating by questioning his students from time to time and putting them on guard on what to observe? Even if we could rely on students to do this, it would be a sad day in the history of American education if we used students in this way or encouraged them to stoop to the techniques of a police state.

Thus Hook's enormous accusation against individual CP teachers is undocumented. He is evidently under the illusion that a philosophy professor enjoys special dispensation insofar as the rules of evidence are concerned.

Hook has evidence, it is not direct evidence, but nevertheless, it is better than nothing. He has several back issues of the now defunct *The Communist* dating fifteen to eighteen years ago in which we are told by Communist Party functionaries that Stalinist teachers must indoctrinate. Hook parades these musty quotations as though they were revelations. We will not weary our reader with the "evidence" from *The Communist*. It is old hat. Every political person knows that the Stalinist movement would like its teaching members to indoctrinate. The desires of the Stalinist officials prove nothing conclusively about the conduct of individual Stalinists. Hook, aware of the fallaciousness of his inference, and possibly over-impressed by Hollywood cloak and dagger films writes:

If members of the Communist Party are aware of their instructions how do we know that they carry them out or attempt to carry them out? The answer to this question indicates the ways in which the Communist Party differs from other political parties. First, recruiting is selective. William Z. Foster, one time secretary of the Party, in an important article on "The Communist Party and the Professionals" describes the care with which members are selected and the criteria of the selections. "In drawing professionals into the Party care should be taken to select only those individuals who show by practical work that they definitely understand the Party line, are prepared to put it into effect, and especially display a thorough readiness to accept the Party discipline." (The Communist, Sept. 1938, p. 808, my italics.)

Second, the statutes of membership define a Party member as one who not only "accepts the Party program, attends the regular meetings of the membership branch of his place of work" (in the case of the Communist Party teacher this is the school "cell") and "who is active in party work." Inactivity, unless it is directed inactivity, renders "mieux sauter, as well as disagreement with the decisions of any party organization or committee are grounds for expulsion. Third, the Communist Party weeds its ranks carefully by purge and re-registration and other forms of control. As we have already seen, there exists a Central Control Commission whose task it is to check on all members.

Hook attempts to convey the impression that the Communist Party is a party little different from its Kremlin master. The American Communist Party, however, does not have power; it cannot force members to carry out its every whim. Bureaucratic, degenerate and corrupt as the American CP is, it could not even exist as a party if it attempted to function as a move-
ment with powerful coercive features.

The fact that the CP passed resolutions establishing requirements of membership in 1937, proves nothing about the actual state of the membership then or now. There are inactive members tolerated in the party not "reculer pour mieux sauter" (it sounds more sinister in French) but for a host of reasons.

The Communist Party teacher is not an automaton. This claim may outrage Hook but that is no cause for alarm or fear. The Communist Party teacher of philosophy may have as many scruples about his profession as Hook claims for himself. He may even be the same Communist who voted for the 1937 resolutions Hook waves so triumphantly.

In brief, the Communist teacher may not indoctrinate for any number of reasons: personal integrity, fear of reprisal, technical difficulties, etc.

Hook offers a third line of "evidence" that Communists indoctrinate students. He quotes from the proceedings of the Rapp-Coudert Committee of eleven years ago some hearsay testimony from an ex-Stalinist teacher to the effect that a colleague of his, a member of the party, attempted to popularize such terms in a course in Modern European History as "proletariat" and "Soviet democracy." For Hook this is damning evidence!

This is all that he has to offer on how Communists indoctrinate. There is not even the hint of additional proof that membership in the CP spells automatic corruption in the classroom. And this is the heart of his theory.

**The Teacher Conspiracy**

Hook denies the fitness of Stalinists to teach, not merely for their alleged indoctrination in the classroom, but because of their political, "conspiratorial" activity on the campus in general.

He opens his chapter on the teachers' conspiracy with a description of the "tasks" of Stalinist teachers:

- ... recruiting among colleagues and students for party and youth organizations; setting up "party fractions" within departments, and where administrative regulations make it possible, control of new appointments, influence on recommendations for promotions and salary increases and election of sympathetic chairmen; the dissemination of party literature; and wherever it exists, the publication and distribution of the party-fraction newsletter or bulletin. All of these activities, leaving aside the special tasks of Communist Party teachers in science departments and laboratories, are directly or indirectly designed to convert students to communism, to influence their thinking along communist lines.

We do not condone efforts to utilize the school for political ends when it conflicts with education. But what is wrong with the efforts of the Communist Party on campus, "outside the classroom." to recruit colleagues or even students? Where is the violation of professional ethics in Communist Professor "x" attempting to win over Professor Hook—or vice versa? What is so disturbing about the publication of "the party-fraction newsletter or bulletin." Hook can distribute the New Leader if he and his academic co-thinkers at NYU have no publication of their own. A listing of the titles of these bulletins, or a claim that they are written and distributed anonymously in no way changes the fact that teachers have the same right as other citizens to write bulletins, to contest for their political ideas outside of the classroom. The anonymity of the publications, the "furtiveness" of their distribution of which Hook makes so much in this chapter is simply an indication that the "market place" of ideas on the campus is not altogether free.

When Stalinists band together to influence appointments and promotions on a basis other than that of merit, they should be combated and exposed like any other cabal of teachers which seeks similar ends. That in practice Stalinist teacher factions do this, we would be the last to deny. But that alone would hardly justify the determination that no Stalinist is fit to teach, and Hook knows it. That is why he mixes in all the other charges with this one, and by a clever use of language tries to impart to legitimate attempts to win people to their ideas an air of dark conspiracy.

Another trick is to tear the whole problem out of its context of time and circumstances, and to make what was a real problem when the Stalinists were riding high on favorable political winds appear to be the same problem today. All of Hook's "evidence" comes from the turbulent thirties, but is applied to the present. It is now that he advocates that Stalinists be banned from the campus, when their organized activity is directed primarily to their own self-preservation, and not to running the American school system.

But as he always does in the end, Hook gives the show away on this question too. In an attempt to show that at least one of the Stalinist teachers' publications was "subversive," Hook quotes extensively from it (again, of course, in the '30s). The passages he chooses to underline as most damaging state that:

*The Communist Party will strive to lead the American masses to battle against the American capitalists who sent them to war, to turn the imperialist war into a civil war and a proletarian victory.* (Emphasis Hook's.)

And again, proclaim themselves in favor of:

*The establishment of socialism through the dictatorship of the proletariat.* (Emphasis Hook's.)

And he adds:

Dean Chamberlain is free to evaluate the significance of the evidence of Communist subversiveness as he pleases. He is not free to disregard the evidence. The reader may determine for himself whether anonymous publication of this type of literature, distributed to students and faculty, constitutes conduct unbecoming a teacher.

What could be clearer? It is not the conduct of Stalinist teachers, at bottom, which really brands them unfit to teach in Hook's eyes. It is their ideas, or the fact that they dare to disseminate and seek to recruit to them. And of course, he knows that the particular passages he has underlined are not some specific hallmark of the Stalinists, but represent general Marxist formulations.

He knows it, because it is hardly possible that he has forgotten that he not only accepted these formulations in the thirties himself while teaching on the staff at NYU, but that he went on to criticize Marx for suggesting the possibility of peaceful revolution in the United States. In retrospect, should Hook today have fired the Hook of the thirties for "conduct unbecoming a teacher?"

**The Strength of the Conspiracy**

Hook is willing to concede that the strength of the alleged Communist conspiracy in the school system bears some relationship to the question: how dangerous is this menace?

Again we quote him at length to forestall any charge that we are im-
putting absurd reasoning to an authority on scientific method:

Some disturbing testimony on this point has been presented by Dr. Bella Dodd former member of the National Executive Committee of the Communist Party, and quondam legislative representative of the Communist-dominated Teachers Union of New York which was expelled as a captive Communist union both by the A.F.L. and the CIO. Dr. Dodd testified that at one time a thousand members of the New York City teaching staff were members of the Communist Party—most of them in high schools and colleges.

How many students were exposed to skillful indoctrination by these enemies of freedom? Allowing for overlapping, that every year one hundred thousand of students in New York City alone would be subject to educationally pernicious indoctrination. Of these it would be safe to say that, directly and indirectly, scores, and in some years, hundreds would have been influenced by their teachers to join the Communist youth organizations from which the Communist movement draws its most fanatical followers. According to Dr. Dodd, Communist Party teachers practice strategic infiltration into posts where they can influence the greatest numbers, particularly university schools of education, where “they affect the philosophy of education and teach other teachers.” Class size, or teaching loads, must be greater in such schools than in the estimate above, because the account reads “She said one Communist teacher might influence 300 future teachers in a single term.”

The impression Hook creates is of a vast conspiracy. He has “proven” statistically that if what Bella Dodd reports is accurate (something he apparently doesn’t question for a moment) then by a “conservative estimate” one hundred thousand students a year were victimized by the Stalinists.

Elementary arithmetic would reveal that in the course of say five years, one half million students were subjected to pernicious indoctrination and in a decade at least one million were thus miseducated. The havoc the conspiracy can wreak, you see, is not only potential—it is existent and of monstrous proportions. Add to this the considerable damage done by Stalinist teachers in the schools of education, where in the five or ten year period thousands upon thousands of future teachers have been similarly indoctrinated. And all this, mind you, is just in New York City. Then add the number of students taught by alleged Stalinist teachers in such cities as Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, etc., and the number of indoctrinated students and future teachers reaches an astronomical figure.

If in the course of a four year high school and four year college education nearly one million young people have been indoctrinated, how can one reasonably account for the fact that the Stalinist youth movement is at its lowest point. If from the end of the war until today, an eight year period, the American Stalinist student movement can only claim several thousand members nationally (and this is a high figure) this means that of the nearly one million indoctrinated students (in New York City alone) only an infinitesimal percentage has been wholly seduced, and even if we allow for an enormous membership turnover, the proportion of recruits from among the defenseless indoctrinated students is unbelievably small. Even during the thirties, its peak period, the YCL membership did not anywhere correspond to the fabulous figures Hook manipulates with such agility.

There are only two conclusions that one can take seriously if Bella Dodd’s figures on the extent of Stalinist infiltration in the school system are correct: they do not indoctrinate in the accurate sense of the word; and/or their “indoctrination” is so ineffectual that they constitute no threat. It is our opinion that both conclusions are correct.

Earlier in the article we made the point that Hook is a writer of convenience. His ground is always shifting, his emphasis changing and his arguments often contradictory. It depends on what he is attempting to prove at the moment. His attitude on the Red Peril to education is an excellent example of contradictory emphasis. We have seen how Hook has portrayed the malignant nature of Stalinist infiltration in the school system, in the book we are discussing. But here he is attempting to deny the academic rights of Communist teachers. However, in a letter to the New York Times (July 19th) signed by Sid-Hook and other educators protesting Congressional inquiries on the campus, we read:

Because the number of actual Communist teachers is so minute, because the number of actual Communist teachers is so minute, because even when augmented by the number of “fellow-travelers” they are still a tiny fraction of the college teaching profession, there is no justification for a Congressional committee to concern itself with the question. There is no national problem—there is nothing that can even be described as a state-wide problem—and there is no imaginable legislation that can flow from the Congressional inquiries under way.

The thousand Communist teachers and the hundred thousand of indoctrinated students a year are not mentioned here. Nor does the letter to the New York Times admonish those who minimize the threat to the nation of Stalinists on campus. In the book we do not conclude merely from Hook’s figures that he regards the presence of Stalinist teachers a threat to the nation. He tells us so in unambiguous terms:

Those who defend the privileges of members of the Communist Party to teach on the same terms as members of other political parties do not, of course, demand that the former be put in a position where they threaten national security. They maintain, however, that there is no mischief members of the Communist Party can do in colleges and universities which is even remotely comparable to the mischief that may result from their presence in atomic energy plants. We shall see below that there is weighty authority to contest this statement. (Emphasis ours.)

Hook, in his book written early in 1953 locates for us hundreds of thousands of students subjected to Stalinist indoctrination; a crime so great that it is comparable in his eyes to the damage that could be done to national security by the presence of Stalinists “in atomic energy plants.” A few months later, in the above quoted letter to the New York Times he agrees that even the combined forces of C. P. teachers and their fellow travelers do not create a “national problem”; more than that “there is nothing that can even be described as a state-wide problem.” It is almost indecent to find an eminent authority on rational, logical thinking in such an obvious contradiction.

This example of Hook versus Hook is understandable; it is the inevitable bit of illogic committed by a man who is offering his services to American reaction and at the same time has a few remaining sentimental attachments to liberalism and academic freedom. As soon as his sentiment is dissipated by his sense of practical, hard-headed politics such contradictions will be eliminated.

Practical Problems and Positive Proposals

Hook devotes a special chapter to a serious effort to cope with a number of objections raised by critics of his views. We will deal briefly with sever-
al of his rejoinders before proceeding to a discussion of his “positive proposals” for coping with Stalinist teachers.

(1) A common objection to Hook’s views is that he confines his remarks to members of the Communist Party and does not include devout Catholics, teaching in secular schools; indicating that what is involved is not a discussion of educational theory or academic competence of an individual, but a policy of heresy hunting directly related to Washington’s aims in the cold war. For, if it is true that Hook objects to Stalinist teachers on grounds of incompetence, because they are under the rigid discipline of a totalitarian party, he should also object to the presence of teachers devoted to a semi-medieval, reactionary and authoritarian Catholic Church.

Hook attempts to dispose of this serious argument in a few sentences:

They [Catholic teachers] are expected to fulfill honorably their obligations and duties as members of the inclusive academic community and not surreptitiously to take advantage of their position in the classroom or on the campus to proselytize for the Church. Catholic teachers in secular institutions are under doctrinal obligations which violate intelligent concepts of educational procedure. Several examples of this are given in Paul Blanshard’s book, American Freedom and Catholic Power. Blanshard quotes the following pertinent paragraph from the Five Encyclicals of the infallible Pope Pius XI:

“Again it is the inalienable right as well as the indispensable duty of the Church, to watch over the entire education of her children, in all institutions, public or private, not merely in regard to the religious instruction there given, but in regard to every other branch of learning and every regulation in so far as religion and morality are concerned. Nor should the exercise of this right be considered undue interference, but rather maternal care on the part of the Church in protecting her children from the grave danger of all kinds of doctrinal and moral evil.

Here are two more examples from among many provided by Blanshard, culled from Morals in Politics and Professions by Father Francis J. Connell, Associate Professor of Moral Theology at the Catholic University of America, published under the Imprimatur of the Archbishop of Baltimore-Washington in 1946:

At times, the textbooks used in class may contain statements relative to the Catholic Church that are false or misleading, particularly in history class. The Catholic teacher should not hesitate to bring out the truth on such occasions. It would be deplorable if a Catholic teacher allowed a calumny on the Church to pass unrefuted because she feared for the security of her position or she dreaded being regarded as a “bigoted Catholic.”

Neither should the Catholic teacher hesitate to give the solution taught by her religion to problems of a moral or social nature which may be discussed in class. Particularly in high school discussions on social or civic topics she may be expected to make a statement on such matters as divorce, euthanasia, birth control, the rights of the individual in relation to the State, the mutual obligations of employer and employee, the right of the parent to educate children as contrasted to the right of the civil authorities, etc.

And the second:

Neither in the classroom nor in her dialogues with students of other creeds may the Catholic teacher use expressions savoring of indifferentism. She may, indeed, explain and uphold the American system of granting equal rights to all religions, but in lauding this system she should make it clear that she is limiting her praise to our own country, because of particular conditions prevailing here, and that she has no intention of condemning other lands in which a different procedure prevails. She must not speak in such wise as to give the impression that all forms of religious belief possess a natural right to exist and propagate. Only the true religion possesses such a natural right.

We would like to hear from Sidney Hook. Are these Catholic demands for indoctrination of all students of all ages any less inimical to educational ethics than the 1937 instructions of the Communist Party to its teaching members? Is the devout Catholic teaching in public schools any less aware of his obligation to unquestioningly follow the word of God’s representative on earth than the Stalinist to submit to party instructions? Is the practicing Catholic teacher less fearful of violating Church dogma with the threat of eternal damnation and burning in the fires of hell, than the Stalinist fears flouting party discipline with its threat of mere temporal expulsion? Is the moral and psychological hold of the authoritarian Church over its numerically increasing devout members much more tenacious than the influence exercised by the Communist Party with its enormous turnover over the individual Stalinist? And if Hook claims that Catholics actually do not indoctrinate in practice, how can he prove this if, as he has already stated in the case of the Communist teacher, there is no way of proving whether a teacher indoctrinates or not?

We do not expect to hear from Hook. We will venture our own answer to Hook’s tolerance of Catholic teachers—shared by us, of course—and his indignation over alleged Stalinist violation of teaching ethics: Neither his tolerance of the Church nor his indignation about C.P. teachers has anything to do with professional ethics. The Catholic is America’s ally in the cold war; the Communist Party is its deadly enemy. That’s the long and short of it.

(2) “Suppose a man is a good Communist but also a great painter like Picasso. Would we not permit Picasso to teach?” Hook asks himself this question about Picasso, or a great poet such as Pound if he were connected with a fascist group. He also answers it: if there is reason to believe that
the teaching capacity of these men was “extraordinary.”...

Then provided some educational measures were taken to counteract their political influence, they might very well be employed, particularly if there was no concealment on their part of their membership in the Communist Party or Fascist Party. We would regard their case as exceptions and cheerfully make them, or consider making them, whenever a painter with the stature of Picasso or a poet like Pound were being considered.

And what are the “educational measures” to be “taken to counteract their political influence”? Would Picasso’s students be required to take a course on One Hundred Percent Americanism? Perhaps just a lecture on the Red Menace? Maybe a couple of snoops in the classroom to correct Americanism? Perhaps just a lecture of snoops in the classroom to correct misunderstanding what Hook’s precautionary students with his writing on why Communists do not have the right to teach. We are really at a loss to understand what Hook’s precautionary measures might be. But then we are not alone in our bewilderment. Hook doesn’t know what he means any more than we do.

Hook’s self-addressed question about Picasso is a most serious one. The question and his answer reveal that he has not yet gone completely overboard in his patriotic binge. Sentiment and cultural hangovers are still a restraining influence. Logically, there is no reason why Picasso should merit special consideration, in view of everything that is at stake in Hook’s views. One Picasso with his enormous prestige could be as politically influential among his and other students as a dozen cells of C.P. teachers of lesser stature who could never get such magnanimous dispensations from our guardian of political and educational morals. Hook is both cheerful and dubious about employing a Picasso only because he fears the full and inescapable implications of his thesis.

(3) Is it not dangerous to favor firing all Stalinist teachers under any circumstances? This is another problem Hook poses for himself. After deciding those who think “up some extraordinary situations or some special kind of Communist Party member for whom we would be willing to breach the rules.” Hook makes the following “concession”:

Whatever exceptions we make to meet ingeniously contrived suppositions it is safe to say that most of them would be confined to the university where students are mature, full grown, and able to fend for themselves. As intellectually untrustworthy as members of the Communist Party are, a lone member or two may be conceivably tolerated on the post-graduate University level in non-science departments if they have openly admitted their membership and don’t pose as Jeffersonian Democrats, LaFollette Republicans or Christian Socialists. More than two on any campus will constitute themselves into a conspiratorial group in accordance with Party instructions.

Hook is nothing, if not a reasonable and flexible philosopher. If there is a school where students meet the following conditions: “mature, full grown and able to fend for themselves” (how “mature” do they have to be and how do we find this out?); if the Communist teacher admits membership (thus placing his career in jeopardy); if the campus in question is on a post-graduate level and the department non-science; if the individual Communist has no more than one other C.P. colleague on the same campus—then “a lone member or two may be conceivably tolerated...” More than two on any campus is apparently impermissible under any circumstances for they naturally constitute themselves into a dangerous conspiracy.

Hook’s Positive Proposal

Hook reserves “surprise” for his readers. He seems that there is no such person as a teacher who is formally a member of the Communist Party! The C.P. in a defensive move no longer issues party cards to teachers. This poses a problem, but not an insuperable one for him. The manner in which he resolves it is neither workable, democratic nor consistent with prior statements in the book, but this has not deterred Hook in the first 250 pages, and does not inhibit him in the remaining 25. Hook will not tolerate Communist deception in any form. If the Party is sly enough to refrain from issuing membership cards, it is only further proof of its conspiratorial nature and Hook, scientific philosopher and political tactician is prepared to meet the sly Stalinist maneuver head on.

How? In the first place, Hook would have a special committee which he dubs “Faculty Committee on Professional Ethics.” The function of this committee would be:

...to receive complaints either from the faculty or administration or both and conduct investigations. Its role would not necessarily be so passive. Wherever there was evidence that a Communist group was at work, or any other group organized for unprofessional practices, it would undertake investigation on its own initiative. The specific modes of procedure will vary from place to place and from faculty to faculty, but in all cases it will culminate in a fair hearing for any teacher charged with being a member of the Communist Party. Any teacher so charged would be suspended with pay until reinstated or dismissed by decision of the Faculty Committee or governing board at the recommendation of the Faculty Committee. [Is it possible that the Faculty Committee will overrule a decision of the Faculty Committee?] No publicity would be given to the suspension or to the hearing unless requested by the teacher. He would have the privilege of counsel.

But how will this vigilant committee of Hook’s uncover the secret, non-card holding member of the Communist Party? Hook proposes:

Sometimes membership will have to be construed from a complex pattern consisting of activities, participation in key organization publications, party line organs, content-analysis of variations in position establishing close correlation with the official Communist Party line. Since it is to be expected that most members of the Communist Party, not faced by threats of prosecutions for perjury, will refuse to admit membership, and certainly not present membership, the problem will be to determine when an individual is lying and when he is telling the truth. The faculty committee will serve as a kind of academic jury. It will assess the weight of different kinds of testimony and evidence offered in the inquiry offered in the light of the particular context or situation obtaining on the campus.

Earlier in the book as we have already quoted, when Hook is asked to prove that members of the Communist Party actually indoctrinate in the classroom, he assumed his most righteous, indignant and democratic pose. Prove that Communists indoctrinate! Why that would involve snooping, it would be degrading to the academic profession, to have a trained observer continuously present, checking on the suspected instructor, and as for students informing on teachers it would be, according to Hook of 100 pages earlier, “Far better to leave Communist Party teachers to do as they please than to degrade their students by impressing them into the kind of service made so notorious behind the Iron Curtain.” Let us remember, however, that this earlier sweet reasonableness of Hook was propounded at a point in his book when he was apologizing for failing to produce any direct evidence that virtually all Stalinist teachers indoctrinate.

July-August 1953
Behind the Assault on Political Liberties

THE CURRENT ASSAULT on academic freedom is given its specific direction and drive from the cold war. Since Stalinism is an ideology as well as a power-system, the struggle becomes particularly intense in the arena of ideas, and in the institutions which are most directly connected with them.

But the struggle does not take the form of an abstract intellectual debate. The stakes are high, and the argument takes place in a context of political and military clashes. Every vested interest in our society seeks to promote its own ends under the banner of the fight for freedom and democracy. In the United States the most reactionary forces see their chance to deal a blow to everything they have hated and fought down through the years. And at the moment they are in saddle and are riding the anti-communist wave for all they are worth.

Thus, it is not at all an accident that the most adamstant opponents of progressive education, of separation of church and state and of public education and of academic freedom are on the offensive. They are on the offensive because the totalitarian opposition to everything they have hated and fought down through the years.

In the United States the most reactionary forces see their chance to deal a blow to everything they have hated and fought down through the years. And at the moment they are in saddle and are riding the anti-communist wave for all they are worth.

The assault on the civil and political liberties of the American people goes far beyond the struggle for academic freedom in the schools. A glance back at the '30s will convince anyone who is capable of objective thought that what paladins of the cold war are hounding today is the genuine Stalinism of Stalinism.

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cern was with catching criminals. The Un-American Activities Committee under Congressman Dies and its similars in several states were active, but they were universally abhorred and execrated by the whole body of liberal and labor opinion.

Can anyone seriously contend that democracy in America was in greater danger during the '30s than it is now? Has the imprisonment of the Stalinist leadership, the exposure of a few Stalinists in the government and the colleges, the expulsion of Stalinist and socialist workers from their jobs in industry, the disabilities imposed on Stalinist, fascist, syndicalist and socialist organizations by listing them as "subversive," the ubiquitous wire-tapping and questionings of radicals and ex-radicals by the FBI made democracy in this country more secure? Has artistic freedom and creation been enhanced by the questioning of Stalinist writers, actors, entertainers and artists by Congressional committees, and their subsequent expulsion from their jobs? Has the American labor movement been strengthened by the imposition of the Taft-Hartley "non-Communist" affidavits required of union officers, or by the administrative measures taken by unions against Stalinist members and officers? Has the search for knowledge in all spheres, or the training of our young people to think for themselves been advanced by one iota by the widespread assent of our educators to the idea that Stalinists should not be permitted to teach in our schools, or by the elimination of a handful of Stalinist educators from their jobs?

To answer these questions the affirmative is not only to fly in the face of observable social facts, but to deny the very possibility of a democratic future for America.

Only a social order which has exhausted the potential of the democratic process is compelled to resort to naked force to maintain itself against those who would destroy democracy. The institutions and procedures of a police state type which have become so widespread in America are in the essence a resort to force which indicates that powerful sections of our society have concluded that it can be maintained only by an abrogation of democracy.

THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY is the central social and political conflict in the middle of the twentieth century. The roles assumed by individuals, or by social classes and movements in this central struggle determine whether they are historically reactionary or progressive.

Like all generalizations, the propositions stated above gain significance and establish their validity only when they are concretized. For after all, it is the struggle for democracy in concrete circumstances which has social meaning. And such are the complexities of the modern world that men who willingly give their assent to the general proposition find themselves quickly hedging it about with a thousand reservations when they face the concrete struggle for democracy. The degree of their reservations, the angle of their deviation from the principle, is determined, broadly speaking, by allegiance to social and economic institutions which are threatened by an extension of democracy in our time.

Americans can appreciate this quite clearly when it is applied to the Stalinists. In Russia, as throughout the world, the Stalinists also claim to be defenders of democracy. They are for the freedom of the colonial countries from capitalist imperialism. They are for civil liberties, for academic freedom—in all capital countries. They are for literacy everywhere in the world. But since civil and political liberties are incompatible with the maintenance of the rule of the collectivist bureaucracy in the countries which they control, they suppress them ruthlessly. And they contend that anyone who criticizes or attacks that suppression is acting in the interest of re-establishing the inequalities of capitalism in the countries controlled by them, and a capitalism of most reactionary and even totalitarian hue at that. For them this contention pretty much ends the argument. Although it is often quite true (and that is why it has been possible to convince masses of people all over the world for the past thirty years that it has merit), it obviously does not end the argument for anyone who really is devoted to democracy.

In Stalinist countries there is no freedom of speech, press, or assembly. There is no right to political opposition. The schools, at all levels, are conceived as instruments for training the youth in ideology of the ruling class. Hence academic freedom is an incomprehensible notion. There is no right to trade union organization and collective bargaining for workers. In short, the claims of the ruling class to a monopoly of all social and political rights is absolute. And since the ruling class holds its position by virtue of its control and "ownership" of the state, it is the state which puts forth and enforces these claims in a most direct and open fashion.

In the capitalist portion of the world, the situation is somewhat different. The status of civil liberties comes closest to the Stalinist model in fascist countries such as Franco's Spain. In such countries the role of the state as the direct enforcer of the ruling class' monopoly of all political rights is also the closest to the role of the state in Russia. But from there, there is a continuous gradation of civil liberties, of economic, political and social democracy, in all capitalist countries. We are here concerned with its status and the forces which are changing this in America.

There are two historical processes which dominate the struggle for democracy in the United States in this epoch. One is the decline of capitalism all over the world as a social system; the other is the rise of Stalinism as the most immediate and forceful threat to capitalism. The decline of capitalism and the rise of Stalinism are closely inter-twined processes, the latter proceeding from the former. The cold war is the sharpest form in which the two irreconcilable social systems struggle with each other all over the world.

The most striking fact about the cold war is that in it capitalism is on the political defensive. It is doomed to this role not by the stupidity of its statesmen, but by the historical fact of its decline. Its contradictions have become rotten-ripe in most sections of the world. It drags centuries of colonial oppression and the exploitation of the workers around its neck like an albatross. On the other hand, the contradictions of Stalinism, its own enslavement and degradation of peoples is fully understood by the masses in countries where it has already triumphed and established its rule. To broad sections of the oppressed masses in the rest of the world it still appears as a social change, an enemy of the known oppressors, and hence a liberator from their ancient rule.
It has been the fate of the United States to have reached its position of world capitalist supremacy at the moment in history when world capitalism was in its death throes. The towering economic strength of the country, and the unprecedented prosperity of its people is clearly based on the relative degradation of the rest of the capitalist world. It is propped up by the military preparations which can only be justified on the basis of the necessity of maintaining America's dominant position.

If we were living in the age when capitalism was healthy and expanding, one could expect that America's position at the top of the world would confuse the American ruling class and most other strata of the population with an unprecedented feeling of self-confidence and security. Such was the atmosphere which permeated British society when Britannia ruled the waves and the sun never set on her domains. In those by-gone days the struggle for democracy in Britain itself was more a struggle to rid the country of the vestiges of feudal rule than to preserve rights which had already been secured in the past.

But in the United States we see an altogether different picture. Despite the enormous wealth of the country, despite its undisputed place at the head of the capitalist world, the atmosphere which pervades the ruling class, and seeps down to all strata of the people is one of insecurity, of frustration, of fear of the future. And the reasons for this are obvious.

Since the end of World War II the United States has spent tens of billions of dollars to prop up the rest of the capitalist world and the governments which rule it. But all these expenditures, all these efforts have brought neither stability to world capitalism, nor docile acceptance to American wishes by the other governments in the American bloc. All this expenditure has certainly not exorcized Stalinism. And although direct and indirect military expenditures have kept America in an economic boom for over ten years, almost no one, except a few liberal apologists for capitalism, really believes that prosperity and a better life are America's manifest destiny. Instead, the country is haunted by the twin fears of economic depression or atomic war.

The political atmosphere in the country reflects this feeling of frustration and foreboding. In a class society, this feeling expresses itself in different forms which depend on the position occupied by different groups in the society, and by the ideological traditions which have become native to these groups as a result of America's unique economic and social history.

Thus, there have always been sections of American society which have felt themselves so completely identified with American capitalism (or as it is known here, with "business") that they have considered any challenge to the specific ideology of "business" a challenge to the American way of life. These are the amateur and professional patriots, the cohorts of the American Legion, the leaders and rank and file of the United States Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. To its ideologists and militants "democracy" is identified with capitalism to such an extent that civil liberties, academic freedom, the right to collective bargaining and all other democratic rights and privileges are regarded from one simple point of view: they are justified to the extent that they support capitalism, and are either a luxury or a menace to the extent that they oppose, weaken or even question it.

These extreme "Americaners" are opposed with varying degrees of intransigence and consistency by broad sections of the American people. In varying degrees, it is these people who are the bearers of the democratic tradition in this country. Although in their overwhelming mass they give allegiance to capitalism, they are separated by a sufficient distance from its central web of business interests to be able to recognize that these are not extensive with democracy in our times.

These are the workers who have to fight the very capitalists to whom their ideology assigns a necessary place in society. They are the "intelligentsia" to whom culture and freedom stands second only to security in their scale of operative values. They are the unreconstructed democrats in all stations of life to whom the democratic tradition of the country still means what they were taught it meant in a less constricted era: to whom "let the man talk, it's a free country, isn't it?" is still a statement of honest intention and belief.

These broad social groups recognize Stalinism as an enormous threat to human liberty and progress. They ardently desire its defeat both at home and abroad. The most conscious of them also understand that though it is a thoroughly reactionary, anti-libertarian movement, the Stalinists use the democratic aspirations of the masses in all countries for the purpose of enslaving them, and seek to pervert democratic institutions into tools for the establishment of tyranny.

The weakness of liberal ideology, however, a weakness which could prove fatal in the long run, is that it is unable or unwilling to recognize the capitalist system as the other main threat to democratic progress in our time. Caught up in the feverish armament boom in America, the liberals are blinded to the organic and irreversible character of the decay of the system in the rest of the world, and to its military, monopolistic and bureaucratic ossification at home. They do not understand that the New Deal phase of American capitalism was their day of glory, a day never to be recaptured in the same form. And hence they continue to believe that the reactionary development in the political field and its accompanying attack on civil liberties is but a passing phase, one of those things we have to put up with until the next election.

Since they reject the concept of a dying capitalism, a full understanding of the nature of Stalinism is bound to elude them. They can see its totalitarian and tyrannical aspects as well as anyone else. They can see that its political appeal to masses of people in the world is related to poverty, aspirations for national independence, and the like. The best of them thus grasp the half-truth that in the rest of the world Stalinism can only be combated politically by raising living standards and ending colonialism. Men like Justice Douglas and Chester Bowles even go further to the three-quarter-truth that these objectives involve some form of social revolution in Asia against the land holding and usury system.

But the minds of even the best of America's liberals drag an ideological ball-and-chain with them which restrains them from grasping the full truth. They are fatally encumbered by their identification of American capitalism with American democracy. Thus they keep wandering down the
The Stalinoids are not Stalinists. They are people whose disillusionment with capitalism has failed to become organized in a socialist ideology. Thus, lacking an alternative for which to work, they are fatally attracted by the power structure of Stalinism without, however, becoming soldiers in its cause. Instead, they become apologists for it. They are uneasy about its "excesses," but see hope in its "dynamic." Their distinguishing mark is not that they urge support for a Stalinist victory, but they ignore or minimize the horrors and dangers of Stalinism while concentrating all their fire on the horrors and dangers of decaying capitalism.

The Americanoids are their opposite numbers. They are uneasy about the "excesses" of the genuine 100 percent Americaners who are actually conducting the witch-hunts, who support reaction all over the world, and actually intend to use the concentration camp at home and the atom bomb abroad as their real weapons against Stalinism. But also they have no real political alternative with which to defeat Stalinism, they are fatally attracted by the military and economic power of America and become the apologists for its employment all over the world. They ignore or minimize the anti-democratic forces in America while concentrating all their fire on the horrors and dangers of Stalinist imperialism.

Both the Stalinoids and Americanoids profess an abstract devotion to democratic principles, and claim to be acting in their interests. But when it comes to the concrete defense of democracy where it is utterly destroyed as in the Stalinist empire, or where it is under serious attack as in the United States, each in his own way turns from the concrete struggle against the immediate menace to democracy, in order to do battle with the enemy in the cold war.

In so doing, both Stalinoids and Americanoids abandon the struggle for democracy and human progress. They become camp followers of one of the two imperialist power-structures which are fighting for world domination. Each twists and turns the concepts of civil liberties, of economic equality, of social justice, of democracy in the interest of the side chosen in the global conflict. Both are compelled to similarly twist their description of the social forces involved in the struggle, their character, their method of operation, their social dynamic in ways which will make them hit the slogans and battle-cries of Russian or American governments.

Julius FALK
Gordon HASKELL

The New Turn in Kremlin Policy

Background and Implication of Russia's "Soft" Policy

The speech delivered by Malenkov before the Supreme Soviet on August 8th marked an historic moment for the totalitarian dictatorship. Malenkov, the spokesman for the new regime, addressed himself not only to the assembled representatives of the privileged bureaucracy, but to the silent, disfranchised Russian people as well. The burden of his discourse transcended the limits of a mere discussion on the current year's budget. In describing the transformation of the economy in the last 25 years which the following table (in millions) summarizes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Steel</th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Electric Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In so doing, both Stalinoids and Americanoids are blindly seeking to preserve the democratic heritage of the past rather than to advance boldly toward the new democracy of the future.
In approximately the same period of time, from 1926 to 1953, the total population grew from 147 to about 210 million, and the number of urban dwellers increased from 26 to 80 million. If we correlate the growth of the population with the increase in output of food and manufactured consumers goods, we find that per capita production has barely kept pace with the growth in population, and in some instances, dropped sharply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1952</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cotton textiles (sq. metres)</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool (sq. metres)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather shoes (pairs)</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar (kilograms)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meats and fats (kilograms)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The Kremlin does not publish figures on the output of such important products as eggs, milk, vegetables and fruit, because the poverty stricken diet of the Russian masses would be exposed in all its clarity. In 1938, for example, the annual output of eggs would have allowed for a per capita consumption of about one egg per week. If no figures have been published in the post-war period, this can only mean that output is lower than the pre-war level.)

The deterioration in the living standards of the masses, and this means in the first place the working class in the urban centers, is not completely indicated by the statistics given above. One must include the serious shortage of living space in the cities which has reached the proportions of a real crisis, and is openly admitted by the regime. Although the Kremlin does not release adequate statistics, there is no doubt that the average living space per person has declined below the pre-war figure, which in turn was below that of 1928. This means that the ordinary worker and his family must still crowd into one room and share kitchen and other facilities with several other families in one apartment on a communal basis. In 1939, urban dwelling-space averaged between 4 and 5 square metres per person. The goal set in the Plan for 1951-55 would allow 6 square metres per person. This is about one-third to one-fifth of the living space per person in most West European countries.

Finally, one must add that a statistical picture of average production per capita of consumers goods does not tell us how these goods are actually distributed. One must take into account the process of social and economic differentiation which began to take on an extremely aggravated form after 1928. A growing, and very privileged layer of the population—the bureaucracy, began to claim a larger and larger share of the meager yearly output of consumer goods, while the share going to the workers declined.

A Stakhanovist can make anywhere between 2,000 and 10,000 rubles a month; an engineer in a steel plant, 3,000 rubles plus bonuses that equal his salary; and a factory director, a great deal more. The average worker's monthly wage today is estimated to be between 500-600 rubles. This means a considerable section of the working class makes less. The worker does not stand on an equal plane with the Stakhanovist, the engineer or the factory director in the acquisition of scarce goods. A good wool suit costs, for example, 800 rubles, one and a half times a worker's monthly wage. In addition, the bureaucrat has “connections” when it comes to securing what he wants.

After twenty-five years of industrial expansion, with its four Five Year plans, Malenkov now declares it is possible to provide the Russian people with a decent standard of living. With his oblique admission that “the Soviet consumer,” that enigmatic figure, has been faring badly, Malenkov destroyed twenty years of propaganda about the “happy life” in Russia. And the rising standard of living, it should be noted, is still the music of the future. As Malenkov makes clear, it is conditional on the resolution of the crisis in agriculture, which has lagged far behind heavy industry in both gross production and productivity per worker. To provide the “consumer” with more and better food, and with a larger supply of manufactured consumer goods, the light industries must receive from agriculture in as short as possible a time, a swelling stream of raw materials and food to be processed.

To this end, Malenkov declared, the regime has adopted a completely new attitude toward the collective farms and the private holdings of the individual collective farmers. The state will encourage production by permitting the collective farms to keep a somewhat larger share of what they produce. How much more we are not told. In addition, the supply of farm machinery will be increased in the next few years. As for the private holdings of the collective farmers, punitive taxes designed to wipe them out have been cut in half, and the individual peasant encouraged to raise livestock and vegetables. What was yesterday a crime against the state, today becomes civic virtue.

Is the regime sincere in its desire to raise the living standards of the masses? Lenin once dryly remarked that the regime has adopted a completely new attitude toward the collective farms and the private holdings of the individual collective farmers. The state will encourage production by permitting the collective farms to keep a somewhat larger share of what they produce. How much more we are not told. In addition, the supply of farm machinery will be increased in the next few years. As for the private holdings of the collective farmers, punitive taxes designed to wipe them out have been cut in half, and the individual peasant encouraged to raise livestock and vegetables. What was yesterday a crime against the state, today becomes civic virtue.

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In Western Europe and the United States, the most popular explanation for this new turn in Kremlin policy is sought in the weakness of the regime and its fear of the masses. As far as it goes, there is a great deal of truth in this explanation. The new clique in the Kremlin is well aware of its isolation and the vast gulf which separates it from the masses. And without a doubt, it is ready to pay a temporary price to gain some popular support.

However, this is not the whole truth, and if taken as such, is altogether misleading. Not only subjective (political) needs have pushed the regime along the road it is now taking. There are powerful objective (economic) forces which compel it in this same direction.

The regime is aware that the power and privileges of the bureaucracy and its further domination, rest on the continued growth of the economy. But the regime can no longer successfully employ its old accustomed methods of forcing the development of production at the expense of consumption, of industry at the expense of agriculture; of aggravating social and economic inequality as the motor force of economic expansion. The basic “errors” of bureaucratic planning, the chief of which is the lack of proportion in the rates of growth of the different branches of the economy, are not “errors” at all. They are the consequence of these methods, which in their sum total can be described as a process of “primitive accumulation.” Their inevitable result has been the impoverishment of the masses at one end of the social scale and the creation of a thin but extremely privileged layer of the population at the other. The social antagonisms generated by this process can only be regulated by total suppression, the exertion of an all-embracing system of state compulsion. The reason these methods can no longer work is that
the historic conditions which permitted their use have vanished never to return. In this lies the permanent and deep-seated crisis of the economy. And the crisis of the regime is its natural product because the bourgeoisie is organically wedded to these methods and can use no other without destroying its class domination.

The crisis in Russian agriculture has, of course, an independent reality of its own. But in a sense, the attention being paid it by the regime is an optical illusion. The anxieties which the regime is now manifesting about the lag in agriculture have their origin elsewhere; to be precise, in the relationship between the bureaucracy and the working-class. That enigmatic figure, the “consumer,” whose needs have become a major theme of the official propaganda, is none other than the worker. In general, the regime maintains a death-like silence about the miserable conditions of the workers and their demands, and we are only permitted this distorted reflection in the official propaganda. Yet it is clear, that the regime is motivated by a more than passing anxiety and demagogic desire to pacify the workers temporarily. The attacks on the lower ranks of the bureaucracy for the shoddy quality of consumer goods, for nepotism and petty corruption are too persistent.

Malenkov’s insistence on the need to improve the diet of the “consumer,” and to end dependence on an impoverished fare of bread and cereals is symptomatic of the problem. In the course of his speech before the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov made a statement which has a great deal of interest for us. In speaking of the agricultural crisis, he noted that there would be enough grain to satisfy the needs of the population this year. And yet, in the thirties, the “struggle for grain” was the chief concern of the Kremlin to which everything else was subordinated. So far as the Kremlin was concerned, when it had guaranteed the year’s supply of grain for the urban population, it had achieved a real victory. What has changed the outlook of the regime?

The answer certainly is not that Malenkov and Khrushchev are more cultured than Stalin. It is due to the fact that the old method of expanding production—by expanding the labor force at a very rapid rate has been exhausted. The regime must now rely more and more on increasing the productivity of the existing force for increases in gross production—and this can’t be done on a poverty diet whose main staple is bread and potatoes. An increase in productivity cannot take place unless there is a considerable improvement in the living standards of the main body of the working-class, and not merely of its privileged layers, the Stalinovists and the Ukranikas, the shock workers.

A brief review of the period between 1928—1950 will show what has happened. According to the First Five Year Plan (1928-32), the labor force (workers and employees) was to increase from 11.3 million to 14.7 million. Instead the urban labor force increased by the sum of 12.5 million between 1928 and 1932, and reached the figure of 23 million. The chief source of this tremendous pool of new labor was the surplus population in the countryside. Of the 12.5 new workers, 8.5 million alone were former peasants.

Whereas the growth of the urban working population between 1929 and 1932 far outstripped the schedules of the First Five Year Plan, the increase of the labor force in the next period fell below the more modest goals set in the Second Five Year Plan (1933-37). Instead of the anticipated increase of 6 million more workers and employees, the number of employed only rose by 4 million. If we allow for the additional increase necessary to offset retirements and deaths, the real addition to the labor force adds up to 9.4 million new employed. But the regime found it could no longer depend on the countryside as the chief source of its labor supply. Only 3.2 million new workers came from agriculture. The rest were drawn from the urban population. And the major share of this new increment to the labor force was contributed by women. Between 1933 and 1937, the number of women workers in the city rose from 6 to 9 million. In 1937 women represented 35 per cent of the urban labor force.

The revolution that had been wrought in the relation between town and country, industry and agriculture, can be seen from the following statistics. The total labor force, that is both industry and agriculture combined grew by only 5 million between 1926 and 1939, from 86 million to 91.6 million. But in that same period the agricultural population declined from 120 million to 114 million while the urban population grew from 26 to 35 million, an increase of more than 9 million. This vast internal migration from countryside to town was the primary condition for the rapid growth of the new industry, and in turn depended on the existence of a large surplus population in agriculture. By 1939, however, this chief source of new labor power had been exhausted.

In many respects, the Fourth Five Year Plan resembles the First. There is the same over fulfillment of the ambitious goals set for heavy industry, and the underfulfillment of the very moderate ones sent for light industry and agriculture. And, as under the First Five Year Plan, the labor force grew far beyond the limit set by the Plan. Between 1946 and 1950, the number of wage and salary earners was supposed to increase by 6.25 million and reach a total of 33.5 million. Instead, the number of employed reached about 38 million, and the actual increase of the labor force came close to 10 to 6 million.

Again, we find a close correlation between the actual expansion of industry and the labor force. The growth in labor productivity was a negligible factor, since the need to expand the labor force so far beyond the goal set by the Plan could only mean that not even the over-all pre-war rates of productivity had been reached. In individual cases, this was admitted by the official Russian press. In the case of so important an industry as coal mining, an economist writing in the economic magazine, Opyrosy Ekonomiki, No. 8, 1941, declared that per output wage earner was less than in 1940.

The new supply of labor came from three sources. The first consisted of demobilized veterans, a majority of them peasants, who stayed in the cities instead of returning to the collective farms. This meant that agriculture again, although in indirect form, was making a large contribution to the growth of the labor force. The second source was the Juvenile Labor Reserves, which had first been instituted in 1940 as a war measure, but remains in force to this day. According to the Fourth Five Year Plan, these vocational schools were supposed to deliver 4.5 million young workers, drawn from agriculture and the city, by 1950, with 1.2 million young workers going into industry in that year alone. The last source of labor power
was to be tapped by squeezing the urban population—in particular by forcing more women—and this meant married women with children—into industry. If in 1957, the women represented 37 per cent of the working population, by 1950 they made up at least 50 per cent of the urban labor force. (Although the subject lies outside the scope of this article, it is worth noting that women are the mainstay of the agricultural labor force, contributing about 70 per cent of the workers.)

The demobilized veterans could not remain a permanent source of labor. The effect of their influx into the labor pool was most sharply felt in the very first post-war years, especially 1945, when the number of new urban workers increased by 3 million. Thereafter they steadily decreased in importance. As for the compulsory labor recruitment of young people, their number has steadily declined. The largest number contributed by this source to industry was one million in 1948. Since then, this source of labor power has dried up in spite of all the ambitious plans of the regime. Instead of the projected 1.2 million, the vocational training schools only provided industry with less than half a million new workers in 1950. By 1952, their annual contribution had dropped to 526,000. As for women, the deflationary policies of the regime, which resulted in a sharp drop in average wages right after the war, were guaranteed to force those who were employable into industry.

The regime is quite aware that it cannot longer depend on a very rapid growth of the labor force to ensure the continued expansion of industrial output. This is revealed both by the actual rates of growth since 1950, as well as in the projected goals for the Fifth Year Plan which runs from 1951 to 1955. The following table indicates the annual rate of increase in per cent over the preceding year for different goods. The declining rate of growth is very noticeable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pig iron</th>
<th>Steel</th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Metal working machines</th>
<th>Cotton fabrics</th>
<th>Sugar</th>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Fifth Five Year Plan, which was not announced until late 1952, that is, until the Kremlin had a very real notion of the actual rate of growth it could expect of the economy and the labor force, is quite remarkable in one respect, which distinguishes it from all previous Plans. As under previous Plans, the main emphasis is on the continued expansion of heavy industry, which is to expand by 80 per cent. Gross industrial output is to increase by 70 per cent. However, this increase is to be primarily achieved by a sharp rise in labor productivity and not by a large increase in the labor force. According to Saburov, the Minister of Heavy Industry, reporting to the 19th Party Congress in 1952, three-quarters of the increase in gross industrial output was to be achieved through a rise in productivity. The productivity of labor in industry was to rise by 50 per cent, in building by 55 per cent, and in agriculture by 40 per cent. The labor force was to increase by only 15 per cent over 1950, that is, by the remarkably small figure of between four and a half and five million persons. The average annual increase of the labor force would therefore be somewhere below one million additional workers and employees, as compared with the average annual increase of more than two million between 1946 and 1950.

The goal of an annual over-all increase of ten per cent in productivity in industry that has been set by the regime is impossible of attainment. In the United States, for example, an annual increase in the rate of productivity of slightly more than one per cent took place from 1939 to 1947. Between 1948 and 1952, the annual increase of productivity in American industry rose to 3.3 per cent.

However, what is significant is that the Kremlin recognized it could no longer depend on the growth of the labor force as the chief means of expanding output. This shift of emphasis to increasing the productivity of the existing labor force indicates that the Russian economy has entered a new, and for the present regime, critical stage of development.

Stalin’s death was, in a sense, one of those rare historic events in which accident combines with necessity. The weakness of the regime, an inevitable result of Stalin’s demise, compels it to take a road dictated by the organic tendencies of the economy. However, the regime is caught in a series of contradictions from which it cannot escape. To improve the real living standards of the workers is an absolute necessity. Not even the totalitarian regime in the Kremlin can believe it can spur a sharp rise in the productivity of labor on a diet of poverty. The first step in this process, since it is not strong enough to squeeze more out of the peasantry, is to grant considerable concessions to it as a means of increasing the output of food. But in terms of the national income, this means yielding a larger share of the national income to the collective farmers. At the same time, it must maintain the living standards of the urban workers on a higher plane, if it is to attract any number of additional workers from the countryside into industry. Taking both claims together, this means a completely different division of the output of industry, between means of production and consumer goods in the immediate period ahead. A redistribution of the national income in favor of the masses must now take place.

Without arguing dogmatically, that this is impossible, it raises extremely serious difficulties for the regime. Let us examine briefly some of the alternatives. It must choose between reducing the share of industrial output going into war preparations, and this involves the prestige and privileges of an important social grouping within the bureaucracy—the officer caste; or, restricting the rate of growth of heavy industry to a degree it has never done before. But this would mean abandoning the struggle to “catch up with the West,” and would mean the gap between Russia’s industry and that of the United States would increase in the latter’s favor. In addition, if it is to raise the general standard of living of the masses within a short period of time, it must curtail the range of inequality in income. This means curtailing that share of the national income which goes for the consumption of the bureaucracy as a whole. And in general, it would have to carry on a serious campaign against the wastefulness of the industrial bureaucracy, which nullifies a considerable portion of the annual increase in gross output of industry. Both these aims cannot be accomplished by economic measures alone, and require more than supervision from the top. It would mean nothing less than the application of political measures to restrain and control the appetites and wastefulness of the privileged strata. That is, Malenkov, Khrushchev and com-
pany, would have to call upon the workers and peasants to exercise control over the bureaucratic apparatus! This would be reform from above with a vengeance, and we do not believe it is possible.

Within the limits of this article, it has been impossible to deal specifically and at length with the new policy the regime is pursuing with regard to the collective farm peasantry. We leave this for a future article to show that the methods being employed by the regime to increase agricultural production are calculated to lead to a crisis in this sphere in the next period.

Abe STEIN

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*An invaluable reference source. A must for your library.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price</th>
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<tr>
<td>1943</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combination Offer for Above Years</td>
<td>$40.00</td>
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</table>

### Labor Action

*Unrivalled source of news and views of the labor movement through the war and post-war years. Neatly bound in hard-board covers.*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>New International: 1943-52 bound (except 1944)</td>
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### Grand Combination Offer

**LATER ACTION and NEW INTERNATIONAL**

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<tr>
<td>Labor Action: 1942-52 bound</td>
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<td>All for</td>
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