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After the London Agreement

Everyone is breathing easier now. And by everyone we mean the statesmen, the diplomats and military men who manage the affairs of the Atlantic Alliance. Calm and confidence prevail in London and Washington where not so long ago panic and confusion were the order of the day. The French rejection of EDC is politely forgotten and a substitute formula that seemingly satisfies all parties concerned has been found in the so-called Western European Union. The American-led coalition is solid again until the next crisis.

France has the Saar, the long-sought commitment of British troops to the continent, guarantees against uncontrolled German rearmament, and the preservation of her army's national character. Bonn has won her "sovereignty" and admission into the councils of NATO as an equal. Adenauer's dream of tying the Federal Republic firmly to the West seems one step nearer accomplishment. The British have saved the Atlantic Alliance from disruption and stayed off a direct Washington-Bonn pact that would have freed Western Germany from all controls by her Western European neighbors. And Washington has the greatest prize: twelve precious German divisions — on paper.

Happiest of all is the Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe, the American general, Gruenther. Now that the dream of a united "Little Europe" is dead, the map of the continent falls back into its old, familiar contours. On it the tangible realities of national armies joined in coalition take their place.

In brief, realism has conquered the Atlantic Alliance and an old division of labor asserts itself. While the generals who staff NATO move the different national groupings about as easily as so many colored pins on a map, the politicians return to the job of composing stale, national quarrels. What the simple generals forget, and the politicians cannot, is that these armies are the products of states forever caught up in the clash of competing national interests.

Are the statesmen and their military advisers justified in their official optimism about the future of the Western European Union? No more, we think, then they were about EDC. Even if the French National Assembly ratifies the Paris Treaty, and this is a big if, the new coalition remains a make-shift affair without popular support. Public opinion in all the countries involved is hostile to America's policy of rearming Adenauer's Germany. Some sudden turn in events could as quickly undo the coalition as it was put together.

Just as important is the fact that the new treaty has not resolved but incorporated Franco-German antagon-
ism into the very heart of the alliance. Without a genuine rapprochement between these two countries (and this reconciliation can only take place within the framework of a united and democratic Western Europe) the present alliance remains a common yoke imposed by Washington. Does anyone think, for example, that the present French annexation of the Saar will forever go unchallenged by a rearmed Western Germany? Having forced the present settlement on Adenauer as the price of signing the Paris Treaty, Mendes-France traveled to Washington in search of an American guarantee. Washington has refused, and this shows which way the wind will blow later on. And what will the French do if at some future date the British take advantage of the escape clause provided by the Paris Treaty and withdraw their troops from the continent? How will the French control and restrain the rearmament of the new German Wehrmacht, now called the “Streitkraefte,” when the Brussels Treaty Organization does not even have the power to regulate the flow of American equipment to West Germany?

Washington desires to “negotiate from equal strength.” And this is why it has insisted on German rearmament. Together with its English and French “allies” it has rejected the latest Russian notes calling for another meeting on Germany and European security. It has expressed a willingness to meet with the Russians after the Paris Treaty has been ratified all around. But will German rearmament create the new equilibrium that will force the Russians to come to terms, i.e., withdraw from Eastern Germany and Austria, or will it spur a new armaments race?

Already Moscow has given a partial answer. The satellite countries have sent their representatives to Moscow to form an Eastern counterpart to NATO. Naturally, no one is deceived by formalities, and just as before, the Russian General Staff will continue to control and direct the military forces of Russia’s Europe. But what if Moscow decides to meet the challenge of West German rearmament by increasing the size of her satellite armies as well as her own? What would be Washington’s answer? Obviously, to call for still further expansion of the West German “Streitkraefte.” The twelve German divisions will give way to twenty, thirty or fifty. What will the French do then, who are hard-pressed as it is to fill out the columns of their five NATO divisions? The resurrection of German military power is the cornerstone of American policy in Europe. But that cornerstone contains a time-bomb that will sooner or later go off. When it does, the Western European Union will be its first casualty.

Just as the United States has, it would seem, finally succeeded in imposing its policies on the governments of West Europe, so these governments in turn are now being forced to execute them in the face of popular dis- tance and resistance. It is at just such times as these that the mechanism of parliamentary democracy shows its virtues for the bourgeoisie. The rabbit of non-existent mass support can be pulled out of the parliamentary hat.

On November 17, the House of Commons ratified the Paris Treaty by a vote of 264 to 4. Voting in favor was the Conservative Party bloc; voting against were four Labor Party members. Acting under party discipline, the Labor Party parliamentary group abstained. The majority vote, therefore, was not a majority, representing only 41 per cent of the total members of 625 in the House. Without the indirect help of the Attlee-Morrison Labor Party leadership, the Churchill government could not have achieved even this dubious “majority.” Had the Labor Party parliamentary bloc of 298 voted as a whole against ratification of the Paris Treaty, passage would have been impossible or meaningless. Had the Attlee-Morrison leadership permitted the members of the Labor Party parliamentary group to vote according to their real beliefs, the division in the party ranks would have been reflected in the final vote, and revealed that fierce discord continues to rage on the question of German rearmament. And this is true, not only of the English workers, but of the middle-class as well. Had this latter and only honest procedure been adopted by the Labor leadership, Mendes-France and Adenauer would now be facing their respective parliaments with the odds against them.

It is worth pausing for a moment to examine more closely the methods used by the Labor Party leadership to stifle a democratic expression of opinion. Some political commentators have explained the resort to abstentionism as due to the leadership’s desire not to aggravate party differences in a pre-election period. This is indeed part of the explanation. What is even more to the point, it showed how questionable were the formal victories of the Labor leadership and its trade union allies over the Bevanite opposition on this issue at the Labor Party Conference Trade Union Congress, both held in September. As questionable, one might add, was the “majority” won by the Conservative government in the House of Commons.

At Brighton, the TUC resolution to rearm Western Germany won by a slim and unimposing margin of 455,000, with almost eight million card votes being cast. The meaning of the vote was not lost on either an anxious and watchful Labor leadership or the British bourgeois press, who diemally registered their judgment that the vote was a “hollow victory.”

Of the Big Six unions, who form the main body of the British trade union federation, three supported the resolution, thus assuring the narrow margin of victory. They were Deakin’s Transport and General Workers Union, the National Union of General and Municipal Workers and the National Union of Mine-Workers. In the case of the NUM, a particularly glaring light is cast on the relation of the leadership to the rank and file—the workings of trade union democracy. Though its annual conference did support a resolution in favor of rearmament, the NUM leadership refused to take a referendum of the membership on the issue.

Naturally enough, the vote at Brighton was interpreted as foreshadowing a defeat for the Labor leadership at the Scarborough Conference. And yet, despite expectations, the conference supported the Attlee-Morrison wing of the leadership by a majority of 248,000. Out of slightly more than six million votes, 3,270,000 were for, and 3,022,000 against.

How this particular “majority” was achieved is a classic study in bureaucratic intrigue, maneuver and the unscrupulous use of pressure from the top. To make sure of its victory, the Labor Party Executive had to turn to some of the smaller trade unions which were already committed against the resolution to rearm Adenauer’s Germany. The delegates of the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers, with their 129,000 votes, were persuaded to switch despite the fact that they had been authorized to vote against the
United Textile Workers, evenly divided at Brighton, shifted to a twelve to ten majority at Scarborough; and the Amalgamated Building Workers, which had voted against at Brighton, abstained.

Without the bureaucratically devised victories at Brighton and Scarborough, the Labor Party leadership could not have gagged the Labor Party parliamentary group in the House of Commons. Without the support of the Labor Party leadership, the Churchill government could not have so easily pushed through the ratification of the Paris Treaty. Nevertheless, the victory is brittle and precarious.

Though the Paris Treaty has been ratified, the political struggle over German rearmament may not yet be finished in Great Britain. Should an occasion arise, the opposition can use the escape clause in the Paris Treaty to force the withdrawal of British troops from the continent.

**Adenauer in Trouble**

The day is now over when one could say, as one caustic critic not so long ago did, that the West German Government was "one man surrounded by mediocrities." The authoritarian Adenauer can no longer unconditionally impose his will on the members of his own governing four-party coalition and his supporting majority in the West German parliament. At every turn, and on every question, he meets with increasing resistance. No one remembers now the brilliant successes of the September 1953 general elections when Adenauer's position seemed impregnable for a long time to come.

When a political leader must exert the most strenuous efforts to maintain his authority on trivial and routine parliamentary questions, his position is in serious danger. Inevitably, serious political differences lurk behind quarrels over ordinary, day-to-day issues. And this is Adenauer's situation today.

A typical example of Adenauer's difficulties occurred in the middle of November when it was necessary to elect a new speaker of the Bundestag, the lower house of the German parliament. Since Adenauer's Christian Democratic Party holds a simple majority of the seats, and a two-thirds majority in the four-party coalition over which he presides, it would seem a question of this kind could be disposed of in swift order.

Instead, three ballots were required before Adenauer's candidate, Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, was finally elected by a narrow margin of 204 to 190.

An important group of members of the second largest party in the coalition, the Free Democrats, along with others, defected and joined the Social Democrats in opposing Adenauer's candidates. Only by rallying his own Christian-Democratic faction could Adenauer assure his candidate's election. On a seemingly minor issue, the ruling coalition in effect broke down.

What was really involved in the rebellion of the Free Democrats and members of other coalition parties was the fact that Adenauer's candidate was too closely identified with the Chancellor's pro-American policy. The candidate supported by the Social Democrats, himself also a member of the Christian-Democratic party, was known to favor reunification as against the rearmament of Western Germany and the permanent division of the country.

**Adenauer's Failure**

The failure of EDC marked the failure of Adenauer's foreign policy so far as an important and growing part of the German bourgeoisie is concerned. It no longer believes Western Germany can peacefully conquer the West European market, regain the Saar, and at the same time, with the backing of the American-led military alliance force Russia to withdraw from East Germany and restore the lands beyond the Oder and Neisse rivers. On the one side it sees a resurgence, aggressive French nationalism under Mendes-France demanding and receiving the Saar as the price for Bonn's admission to the Atlantic Alliance. On the other side, it sees the hardening of the Russian attitude and its continued support to the Grotewohl-Ulbricht puppet régime in East Germany which it now threatens to arm as seriously and in the same degree as the United States will arm Bonn. Adenauer's promised land is turning out to be a valley of despair bearing a remarkable likeness to the landscape of Korea.

The German bourgeoisie has never reconciled itself to the division of the country, the loss of the Saar and the Eastern territories handed over by the Russians to their Polish and Czech satellites. When Adenauer signed away the Saar to Mendes-France on October 23, to prevent French obstruction of the Paris Treaty, a collective cry of anguish went up from the German bourgeoisie. Mendes-France spoke in glowing terms about future French-German exploitation of French North Africa, but the music of further cooperation did not sound so agreeable in the present.

The New German Army

If it comes into being, never will an army be born under a more inauspicious star than the one attending the new German Wehrmacht. Never will
Adenauer may or may not have made these remarks. But when he returned from the Paris Conference, the Chancellor did issue a statement warning the country against the future army. How strange that an army being called into being to defend world “democracy” is warned against in its own country by the head of the State! In his statement, the Chancellor declared, “The new German Streitkraefte must realize they will not be on an equal footing with the civil government but will be subordinated to it.” In his dispatch carrying the statement, M. S. Handler wrote: “The military force, by sheer weight of numbers and armament would suddenly emerge as a new organic institution that could be the rival of the fledgling democratic state for the minds and loyalty of the West German people unless it were properly controlled.”

In calling attention to the pressure Washington is exerting to speed the formation of this army, Handler is performing a signal public service. But is he entirely accurate in speaking of the “new, democratic state”? Surely, some qualification must be entered. This new German state has been overserved from its inception by the aged Adenauer as if it were his personal property.

Moreover, this new, so-called democratic state is infiltrated from top to bottom by neo-Nazi elements. They are waiting in the wings for a favorable situation to develop so that they can march to the center of the stage and compete for political power. And from recent events, it is evident they believe the atmosphere being generated by the formation of a new army is favorable for their return.

The pre-election rally of the German Party in Berlin on November 23 was a sign of the times. The display of anti-Semitism, reactionary nationalistic feelings and violence in public gatherings by the neo-Nazi elements is nothing new in the Federal Republic. What was different was the boldness of the demonstration. And need it be added, the party that sponsored this rally is a member of the ruling government coalition.

No wonder then, that the German trade union movement is passionately opposed to the rebirth of the German army in Adenauer’s Germany. Its reappearance can only strengthen the reactionary elements which are woven into the very fabric of the West German republic and its state. It was the twin dangers of a renewed militarism and a revived neo-Nazi political movement which caused the German Trade Union Federation to adopt a resolution against German rearmament at its recent Congress.

However, the bitter feelings the German workers have on this question have not been confined to resolutions. How deeply they feel was shown in the hostile receptions which met Theodore Blank, the West German Defense Commissioner, when he attempted to deliver some pre-election speeches in Bavaria. Young trade unionists broke up his meetings and staged demonstrations against German rearmament. In Munich they carried signs which declared that “their grandfather had served in Kaiser Wilhelm’s army in World War I and had been killed, their fathers had served in Hitler’s army in World War II and had been killed and they themselves did not intend to repeat the experience.”

If West Germany’s European neighbors and “allies” fear the return of a German army, if her own masses have begun to act in opposition to this policy, if this army is even feared by the government officials who will nominally control it, who wants it? The prime responsibility for giving this tremendous impulse to everything reactionary in German life rests with the American ruling class and its government.

It should be said, however, that in hastening to restore German militarism and strengthening the neo-Nazi elements, Washington is consistent with its own past record on Germany. At every stage in the post-war period, Washington has done everything in its power to favor the restoration of the reactionary elements in German society and politics. First came the policy of punitive dismemberment of the country, the dismantling of industry, and the blanket condemnation of all Germans, Nazis and victims alike. It was in this period that Kurt Schumacher, the militant Social-Democratic leader, asked how it was possible to build a new, democratic Germany on a foundation of misery and a pillaged economy.

The second phase, which marked the beginning of the conflict with Russia over reparations, saw the United States embark on a policy of restoring the German bourgeoisie to power. This period has been described accurately and bitterly by the Research Director of the German Trade Union Federation, Dr. Victor Agartz. Speaking at the recent DGB Congress, Dr. Agartz said:

Germany did not have free power to make decisions. Though the British had agreed to the socialization of the coal and iron industries, the American military government was against such a new order. In Hesse, it demanded a separate referendum on that article in the constitution which called for socialization though more than 70 per cent of the voters had approved it. The parliament of the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen had already approved the socialization of iron and coal by an overwhelming major-
ity, but once again the American influence was exerted to prevent the realization of this measure.

The denial of this democratic vote was the decisive basis for the strengthening of reaction in West Germany. One should not always look to the East with the declaration that the regime in the German Democratic Republic is supported by Russian bayonets. The structure of the West German economy was established in the same manner on the bayonets of the Western powers.

Step by step, the United States has underwritten the economic, political and social restoration of the German bourgeoisie. Now, finally, it is intent on placing in their hands the most dangerous and anti-democratic of all social powers—an army. Not any army, but the old German Wehrmacht re-shaped by Hitler—under a new name. And yet, the United States has not completely succeeded in subjugating the peoples of Western Europe to its will. Against this latest crime, this historic folly, the German workers and their middleclass allies have raised their banner. The actions of the young trade unionists in Munich are a promise of struggles to come. The future of Western Europe and Germany has not yet been decided.

Abe STEIN

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The End of Socialism—III

The Stalinist Apologetics of Isaac Deutscher

Drive the apologists for Stalinism out of all their other trenches and they will take tenacious refuge in the last one. It is their profoundest one and affords them the most obdurately hold on their defenses. It is buttressed with solid learning direct from Marx, has historical breadth, roots in economics, and the sociological sweep that lifts it above the transient trivia of journalistic polemics. It is the trench, one might almost say, of the Old Crap—"die ganze alte Scheisse," as it is written in the original Marx.

In brief: socialism (or the most eminently desirable brand of socialism) presupposes a most advanced stage of the development of the productive forces which alone can assure abundance for all and therewith freedom; but for forcibly-isolated and exceedingly poor Russia to be brought to such a stage required the crude, violent, at times unnecessarily expensive but basically unavoidable excesses (alte Scheisse) of the practical realists. The proof of the pudding lies in the statistics and who is so quixotic as to argue with figures?

UNDER STALINISM

a) Production enormous increase
b) Capitalists enormous liquidation
c) Bureaucratic enormous, but
   1. inevitable, or
   2. necessary, or
   3. exaggerated, or
   4. declining, or
   5. self-reforming.

Net, after all deductions...an understandingly inferior brand of socialism.

On this score, as on so many others, Deutscher feels, like scores of contemporaries, that his demoralization invests him with a special right or obligation to cruise freely, with accelerator lashed to the floor and steering gear disconnected, from imprecision to imprecision and muddle to muddle.

The conception was first elaborated by Trotsky, who while not himself an apologist for Stalinism but a most pliable critic, nevertheless provided the apologists with far more weapons than they deserved. In Trotsky's theory, the idea was developed much more persuasively and roundedly than in Deutscher. Above all, the former was free of those unpleasant observations which the latter weaves into all his writings in deference to the low-grade anti-socialist prejudices of the intellectual philistine. In its thought out form, it is to be found in the most probing and most instructive of Trotsky's studies on Stalinist Russia (and therefore the one which, re-read, most plainly shows the basic mistake in his analysis), The Revolution Betrayed which he wrote in 1936. Early in the book he says:

Two years before the Communist Manifesto, young Marx wrote: "A development of the productive forces is the absolutely necessary practical premise [of Communism], because without it want is generalized, and with want the struggle for necessities begins again, and that means that all the old crap must revive."... the citation, merely an abstract construction with Marx, an inference from the opposite, provides an indispensable theoretical key to the wholly concrete difficulties and sicknesses of the Soviet régime. (p. 56.)

Employing this key, he comes to the conclusion that the "old crap" is represented by the transformation of the Soviet state into "a 'bourgeois' state, even though without a bourgeoisie" in so far as the Stalinist totalitarian régime "is compelled to defend inequality—that is, the material privileges of a minority—by methods of compulsion." That the bureaucracy should have established such a régime, he continues later, has its basis in

... the poverty of society in objects of consumption, with the resulting struggle of each against all. When there is enough goods in a store, the purchasers can come whenever they want to. When there is little goods, the purchasers are compelled to stand in line. When the lines are very long, it is necessary to appoint a policeman to keep order. (P. 112.)

... but hasn't the totalitarian state become even harsher with the rise in production? Yes.

Soviet economy had to lift itself from its poverty to a somewhat higher level before fat deposits of privilege became possible. The present state of production is still far from guaranteeing all necessities to everybody. But it is already adequate to give significant privileges to a minority, and convert inequality into a whip for the spurring on of the majority. (P. 112/)

In different terms, Deutscher draws, or seems to draw, similar conclusions:

... after its victory in the civil war, the revolution was beginning to escape from its weakness into totalitarianism... Rich in world-embracing ideas and aspirations, the new republic was "poor with the accumulated poverty of over a thousand years" it mortally hated that poverty. But that poverty suffocated its own flesh and blood and breath... for decades Bolshevism had to entrench itself in its native environment in order to transform it. The brand of socialism which it then produced could not but show the marks of its historic heritage. That socialism, too, was to rise rough and crude, without the vauling arches and spires and laework of which Socialists had dreamed. (The Prophet Armed, pp. 519f.)

Let us try to convert these loose literary flutters into more precise thoughts related to more precise realities in order to judge whether the "poverty of society in objects of consumption" (Trotsky) or the "accumulated poverty of over a thousand years" (Deutscher) produced Trotsky's "degenerated workers' state" or what is Deutscher's more extravagant synonym for the same thing, the "rough and crude... brand of socialism"—or it produced something as different from a workers' state and so-
The part played by poverty in the transformation of the Bolshevik revolution is too well known to require elaboration here. Poverty which is induced by a low level of industrial development never has been and never will be the foundation on which to build the new social order. That was known in Russia in 1917, as well as before and after. Without exception or hesitation, every Bolshevik repeated the idea publicly a thousand times: “For the establishment of socialism, we ourselves are too backward, poor and weak, and we can achieve it only in class collaboration with the coming proletarian powers of the more advanced western countries. Our strategic objective, therefore, requires laying primary stress upon the advance of the world revolution and, until its victory, working for the maximum socialist accumulation which is possible in a backward, isolated workers’ state.” In these thoughts the science of Marxism was combined with the virtues of political honesty and forthrightness, sagacity and practicality.

The big difficulties manifested themselves, it is worth noting, in this: the more the victory of the world revolution was delayed (and contrary to Deutscher’s hindsight, it was delayed primarily by the course and power of the newly-rising leadership of the revolutionary state), the more restricted became the possibilities of any socialist accumulation. It is not a matter of accumulation “in general,” which is always possible, but socialist accumulation. That signifies a harmonious social expansion resulting from such cooperation in the productive process as requires less and less strain on the body, nerves and time of the laborer and less and less public coercion, on the one hand, and on the other, affords more abundance and the possibility for unhampered intellectual development to everybody, increasingly free from inherited class divisions and antagonisms of all kinds. From 1918, when Lenin first outlined the masterful and brilliant conception that later got the name of N.E.P. (New Economic Policy), through the N.E.P. itself, through the struggle of the Trotskyist Opposition, through the rise of the Stalinist bureaucracy, and down to the days of the “self-reforming” bureaucracy that has followed Stalin, all important questions, conflicts and developments that have appeared in Russia were related to or depended upon the problem of accumulation (as we have pointed out in other writings). The fight of the Russian Opposition coincided with the end of the possibilities of a socialist accumulation in Russia given the continued repression (or undermining, or retardation) of the revolution in the West; and it was therefore as significant as it was fitting that the Opposition intertwined its program for a socialist accumulation inside Russia with that stiffnecked fight against the theory of “socialism in one country” which was the obverse of its fight for the world revolution.

In this sense, the defeat of the Opposition put an end to the socialist accumulation in Russia as decisively as it put an end to the socialist power in the country. But it did not put an end to accumulation of any kind, any more than it eliminated political power of any kind. The defeat merely changed the form and content of both. It had to. No society with class divisions, and therefore class conflict, can hold together for a day without a political power, that is, a state power. And no society, least of all in modern times, can live without accumulation.

There was accumulation in Russia under the Tsar, and accumulation of another kind under Lenin, and accumulation of still another kind under Stalin. The whole question revolves around the “kind.”

Trotsky noted that . . . in its first period, the Soviet régime was undoubtedly far more egalitarian and less bureaucratic than now [that is, in 1936]. But that was an equality of general poverty. The resources of the country were so scant that there was no opportunity to separate out from the masses of the population any broad privileged strata. At the same time the “equalizing” character of wages, destroying personal interestedness, became a brake upon the development of the productive forces. Soviet economy had to lift itself from its poverty to a somewhat higher level before fat deposits of privilege became possible. (Op. cit., p. 112.)

There isn’t a line in all of Deutscher’s analysis that even approaches this in the clarity with which it points to the answer of the “riddle” of Stalinism. Yet for all its compact clarity, it requires modification and some close study.

Let us start with the provocative statement that the “equalizing” character of wages “became a brake upon the development of the productive forces.” The idea is absolutely correct, in our opinion. Indeed, it remains correct if it is expressed in a broader and more general way always remembering that we are speaking of an isolated, backward Russia: The political power of the workers, represented and symbolized, among other things, by the equalizing character of wages, became a brake upon the development of the productive forces. Does that mean that with a proletarian power the productive forces could no longer develop? The term “brake” must not be understood in so absolute a sense. It merely (and “merely” here is enough!) meant that such a political power did not allow the productive forces to develop as fast and as strongly as was required by the concrete social needs of the time. This formulation brings us a bit closer to the reality.

The fact is that with the introduction and expansion of the N.E.P., which, with Lenin, presupposed the unwavering maintenance and strengthening of the state power of the proletariat, there was a steady development of the productive forces all over the land, a rise in the socialist accumulation in particular, and a gradual rise out of the depths of the “accumulated poverty.” But (still remembering the fatal absence of the world revolution) the general development of the productive forces soon disclosed its dual nature: the rise of the socialist forces of production and the rise of the private-capitalist sector of production, not only in agriculture but also in industry and commerce.

The character of the economic development as a whole was called into question with challenging sharpness. The whole literature of the time (1923-1930), as well as the whole of the factional conflict, hinged on the question: Russia — toward capitalism or toward socialism? To overcome the trend toward capitalization of the economy, a trend with its powerful roots in the retarded and petty-bourgeois character of Russian agriculture, required not only a vast but above all a rapid industrialization of the country. When Lenin used to say, “Germany plus Russia equals socialism,” he meant nothing less than that advanced Germany, controlled by a socialist proletariat, would make it possible for backward Russia so to industrialize itself as to assure a socialist development for both countries. But what could Russia do if forced to rely upon her own resources?
The proletariat in power could not produce an industrialization of the country rapid enough to overcome the bourgeois tendencies surging up with such unexpected speed and strength from its primitive agriculture and it was not strong enough to assure a socialist development in both spheres of economic activity. To do that it would have had to subject itself to such an intensity of exploitation as produced the surpluses that made the capitalist classes, in their heyday, the beneficiaries of all self and privilege and at the same time the superintendents of the miraculous economic achievements that have at last made it possible for man to rise from his knees. The trouble, as it were, was this: others can exploit the working class, but it cannot exploit itself. So long as it has the political power, it will not exploit itself nor will it allow others to do so. That is why the workers' state, the workers' power, the workers' democracy established by the revolution turned out, in its enforced isolation, to be a brake on the development of the productive forces at a pace required by the relation of class forces in Russia in the Twenties. And that is why, again in its enforced isolation, the workers' power had to be destroyed to allow free play to the development of productive forces in Russia.

By whom? What force would take over the power in order to carry out this exploitation that was demanded for Russia's industrialization under the extraordinary concrete conditions of the time? Trotsky says that "the resources of the country were so scant that there was no opportunity to separate out from the masses of the population any broad privileged strata." But this is patently wrong. On the basis of the same or even less easily available or more poorly managed resources, Tsarist society had "separated out" and maintained such privileged strata in the form of the capitalist and feudal classes. It is not to the scant resources that we need look for the answer. There simply was no bourgeoisie on hand to take over the organization and management of Russian society and the exploitation of its resources (the proletariat included) implied by its rule: there was none on hand and, as it turned out, none in sight capable of such a task.

The native bourgeoisie? In agriculture, it did not exist at all, except in the form of an inchoeate rural petty bourgeoisie which needed an urban bourgeoisie to organize, lead and dominate it. In industry, it was confined to the periphery of production and the field of trade. If the comparatively potent bourgeoisie of pre-Bolshevik Russia never really raised itself to the position of ruling class, either before or after the Tsar was overthrown, the ludicrous remnants of it, even if supplemented by the neo-bourgeois elements of the N.E.P. period, could hardly hope to achieve the same position except as tools or vassals of the world bourgeoisie.

The foreign bourgeoisie? Abstractly, yes. Concretely, no. Such was the unusual and unforeseen concatenation of social and political forces, that the world bourgeoisie completely failed to unite in a resolute assault upon the Bolshevik régime of 1917-1920, thus making its survival possible. It could only dream of another attack in the following years. And when it seemed on the brink of finding a practical, effective rallying center for a renewed assault with the rise to power of Hitler (the "super-Wrangle!" that never materialized), the conflicts and contradictions in its own midst were so acute, or else so easily exploited by the now Stalinized Russia, that more than half the world's bourgeoisie found itself in the deadly combat with Hitler that assured the survival, not the crushing, of the Stalinist state.

Society, like nature, abhors a vacuum. The more complex and modern the society the greater is its abhorrence—and the more ingenious and variegated are its improvisations. Scant though Russia's resources were, they had enough magnetic power to attract from the nethermost regions of society a new coagulation that was to perform—one way or another—the social task awaiting it. In so doing it was to consolidate itself as a new, reactionary ruling class, which established and continues to maintain its domination over society by means of the most ruthless, most unashamed, most intensely organized, centralized, and consciously directed terror against the people it exploited that has ever been known in history—without exception!

It is true that it performed its task. It industrialized the country to a tremendous extent, unforeseen by itself, its friends or its foes. It accomplished, in its own unique way, the absolutely inevitable revolution in agriculture, subordinating it to industry, integrating it into industry, in a word, industrializing it (the work is not complete, but the trend is utterly irreversible). But to achieve this goal in the only way that this social force can achieve it, it destroyed (as it was destined to do) the power of the working class, destroyed every achievement of the Bolshevik revolution, established the power of the most absolutist ruling class in the world, and reduced the entire population to the grade of slaves—modern slaves, not plantation slaves, but slaves, who are deprived of any and all public recourse against the most exploitative and oppressive régime known to our time, with the possible—and we stress the word—exception of Hitlerism.

That is how the "old crap" revived and that is what its revival has meant! To Trotsky, the "old crap" meant as an indictment of the bureaucracy and a rebuff to its apologists (it is no accident that his Revolution Betrayed has as its last chapter an attack on such "friends of the Soviet Union" as the Webbs and Durants, of whom Deutscher is only a present version), nevertheless left the proletariat the ruling class of Russia. To Deutscher, the "old crap," meant as an apology for the bureaucracy, is a brand of socialism which lacks only vulturing arches, spires and lacework which were the dreamstuff of socialism. Not, however, to Marx, let us note, if we go back to the original text in which Trotsky found his now familiar quotation*.

Marx, in his violent attack upon the German "critical critics," is presenting his ideas on communism in systematic polemical form even though they are still taking shape for their climactic presentation two years later in the Manifesto. He is seeking to free communism from all trace of utopianism, of wishful-thinking, you might say, of abstract idealism, and to show the scientific foundation under its inevitable unfoldment as the last historic achievement of the self-eman­cipating proletariat, which "must first conquer political power in order to

*It is from the chapter on Feuerbach in the Marx-Engels Deutche Ideologie. The quotation as given in The Revolu­tion Betrayed is inexact, and evidently suffers from double translation (from German into Russian and then from Russian into English). For all of its roughness, the translation in Trotsky does no violence to the thought of the original. Cf. the original German in the first version, Marx-Engels Archiv, Band 1, p. 323; in the second and apparently much more complete and exact version, Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe, 1st Abt., Band V, p. 24; or in the "official" C.P. English translation, very crude, The German Ideology, (p. 24.)
represent its interest in turn as the general interest." But if this political power is to lead to effective communism, he points out again and again to "the premise-less Germans," it must be preceded or based upon material conditions prepared by the past, that is, by capital. Without such things as the development of machinery, extensive utilization of natural power, gas lighting, steam heating, water supply, and the like, "the communal society would not in turn be a new force of production—devoid of a material basis, reposing upon a merely theoretical foundation, it would be a freak and end up only as a monastic economy."

He goes further to emphasize his point. The "alienation" which is as characteristic of capitalism as of all class societies can be abolished only if two practical premises obtain: it must become a power so intolerable that it faces them with the contradiction between their own proper­ism were to take power only in one fight over necessities would likewise become a power so intolerable that it is not in the nature of the revolution to be able to realize the aims in whose name it was organized, they must be forcibly made to believe by the prophet who crushes the utopian impracticalists (Trotsky!) and has a Mauser and prison cell for all disdaining. So runs the pompous, fanci­cal, "historical" theory of Deutscher.

But—all that becomes patent rubbish the minute he advances the theory that negates it utterly, that is, that Stalinism rose in Russia because, unlike the West with its wealth, culture, traditions of respect for the human personality, etc., etc., she was "poor with the accumulated poverty of over a thousand years," so that the "brand of socialism" which "Bolshevism" then produced "could not but show the marks of its historic heritage."

One or the other! Both it cannot be. Either Stalinism (or "revolutionary despotism") is the invariable result of all revolutions, at least for a long stage in their development, in which case the reference to Russia's poverty is irrelevant. Or—Stalinism is the inevitable result of an attempt to establish socialism in a backward country which was materially unprepared for it, but could not rise in a country or countries which have the material and cultural prerequisites for socialism, in which case the whole theory of "the prophet armed" is pretentious nonsense, and worse than that reactionary nonsense (and even hilarious nonsense since its author cannot rightly say if the "prophet armed" is represented by the tragic hero of his work or by the man who murdered him). That's in the first place. And normally that would be enough for one man and more than enough. But there is also a second place.

Out of the clear blue, we learn that Deutscher has, in fact, been asking himself whether the bureaucracy is a new exploiting class or not. In his books up to now? No, for as we said, there is no trace of such an announce­ment in them. But in one of his recent articles, as translated from the French review, Esprit, in Dissent (Summer 1954, p. 229), we note his awareness so there is a point of view that holds the Stalinist bureaucracy to be a new ruling class.

The managerial and bureaucratic class, it is said, has a vested interest in main­taining the economic and social inequality of the Stalin era. It must therefore preserve the whole apparatus of coercion and terror which enforces that inequality.

This argument assumes that there exists:

a) a high degree of something like class solidarity in the Soviet bureaucratic and managerial group; and

b) that the ruling group is guided in its policies by a strong awareness of, and concern for, the distinct class interest of the privileged groups.

These assumptions may or may not be correct—in my view the evidence is still inconclusive. A weighty argument against them is that we have repeatedly seen the privileged and ruling minority of Soviet society deeply divided against itself and engaged in a ferocious strug­gle ending with the extermination of large sections of the bureaucracy. The victims of the mass purges of 1936-1938 came mainly from the party cadres, the managerial groups, and the military of­ficers corps, and only in the last instance
from the non-privileged masses. Whether these purges accelerated the social integration of the new privileged minority, or whether, on the contrary, they prevented that minority from forming itself into a solid social stratum is, I admit, still an open question to me.

The argument Deutscher refers to against the theory that the bureaucracy represents a class, is downright trivial. If applied to any number of the ruling classes that have existed throughout history, it would rule them out of that category instantly. But for a moment that is beside the point. What is positively incredible is the reluctance—and by no means trivial, as are so many of the views that are expressed with amazing lightmindedness in Deutscher’s works. It is in harmony—with virtually a century of Marxist and historical tradition. Who else, in most of the past hundred years, but an abstractionist, a pedant, a constructionist, would have sought a field for contemporary political speculation outside the perspective of capitalism or socialism? Support of one automatically implied (except for a few incorrigible or romantic feudalists) opposition to the other and vice versa. “Down with capitalism!” was as plainly the battlecry of socialism as “Down with socialism!” was the battlecry of capitalism.

But with the advent of Stalinism, which is so unique that it continues to baffle and disorient tens of millions, and tens of thousands of the intellectual and political vanguard in particular, it becomes increasingly absurd, not to say criminal, to be imprisoned, in our analysis of it, by two dimensions, as it were: since it is so obviously not socialism, it must perforce be some sort of capitalism—or, since it is so obviously not capitalism, it must be of necessity be some brand of workers’ or socialist régime: history allows only one or the other!

History is not an obsequious engine whose wheels are so set that it can only move forward along a route firmly prescribed by Marxism, without pauses, without ever running back and without ever leaving the main rails to go off on a blind spur. Neither is it a precisely organized Cook’s tour which scrupulously sets a timetable for all nations and peoples to travel through primitive communism, then through chattel slavery, then through feudalism, then through capitalism, then through the dictatorship of the proletariat, then through the dictatorship of the secretariat, to be allowed entry finally into the best brand of socialism, with vaulting arches, spires and lacework included—but with wandering off on side trips of any kind strictly forbidden. To attribute to Marxism such a conception of the historical route of march is, in Plekhanov’s words, “an interesting psychological aberration.”

Society has wandered off on side excursions and even blind alleys before, just as it is doing in some countries today, though we are strongly convinced that the wandering is not for long, not as long as the historical era of capitalism and certainly not as long as the historical era of feudal stagnancy. The origin of the new historical phenomenon lay in the poverty on which socialism could not be built. But because under the concrete conditions capitalism could not be built either, a new social order was inaugurated which overcame the poverty in a reactionary way—reactionary first of all, last of all and above all because it set back and delayed the victory of the only revolutionary and liberating class in present society, the socialist proletariat.

Those among the avowed Marxists who have been seduced by the vague arguments about the “old crap” into rejecting the notion that the Stalinist bureaucracy represents a ruling class might bear in mind that Trotsky, stoutest adversary of the idea that the bureaucracy represents a new class, and proponent of the idea that it represents “only” a caste, not only never proved his contention and not only never tried to prove it but ended up by acknowledging in so many words that it was not a caste. The same Marxists may be interested in this reminder from Engels which does not “solve the problem” but which is nevertheless not inappropriate:

Since the emergence in history of the capitalist mode of production, the taking over of all the means of production by society has often been dreamed of by individuals as well as by whole sects, more or less vaguely and as an ideal of the future. But it could only become possible, it could only become a historical necessity, when the material conditions for its realization had come into existence. Like every other social progress, it becomes realizable not through the perception that the existence of classes is in contradiction with justice, equality, etc., not through the mere will to abolish these classes, but through certain new economic conditions. The division of society into an exploiting and an exploited class, a ruling and an oppressed class, was the necessary outcome of the low development of production hitherto. So long as the sum of social labor yielded a product which only slightly exceeded what was necessary for the bare existence of all; so long, therefore, as all or almost all the time of the great majority of the members of society was absorbed in labor, so long was society necessarily divided into classes. Alongside of this great majority exclusively absorbed in labor there developed from direct productive labor, which managed the general business of society; the direction of labor, affairs of state, justice, science, art, and so forth. It is therefore the law of the division of labor which lies at the root of the division into classes. But this does not mean that this division into classes was not established by violence and robbery, by combination and fraud, or that the ruling class, once in the saddle, has ever failed to strengthen its domination at the cost of the working class and to convert its social management into the exploitation of the masses.

But if, on these grounds, the division into classes has a certain historical justification, it has this only for a given period of time, for given social conditions. It was based on the insufficiency of production; it will be swept away by the full development of the modern productive forces. And in fact the abolition of social classes has as its presupposition a stage of historical development at which the existence not merely of some particular ruling class or other but of any ruling...
class at all, that is to say, of class differences themselves, has become an anachronism, is out of date. (Anti-Duehring, pp. 315f.—My emphasis, M. S.)

Is this not an excellent description, especially to those who recall the rational and appropriate kernel of the theory of the "old crap," of the fundamental basis upon which Stalinism rose in Russia? And is it not also an adequate refutation, at the same time, of all theories as to the "progressive" or "relatively progressive" character of the Stalinist bureaucracy—theories which cannot but be based upon national-isolationism as distinguished from the international premises of socialism and Marxism?

Of all the Marxists who, in our own day, allowed themselves to think out theoretically the possibilities of a new exploitive society, Bukharin stands out as the clearest mind, and that over a long span of time. It may further help those avowed Marxists who are immobilized between the two rigidly-conceived social dimensions to read what Bukharin wrote almost on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution. In discussing the growth of state capitalism, he insists, and quite rightly, that the "capitalist mode of production is based on a monopoly of the means of production in the hands of the class of capitalists within the general framework of commodity exchange." Thereupon he adds this most remarkable theoretical extrapolation:

Were the commodity character of production to disappear (for instance), through the organization of all world economy as one gigantic trust, the impossibility of which we tried to prove in our chapter on ultra-imperialism, we would have an entirely new economic form. This would be capitalism no more, for the production of commodities would have disappeared; still less would it be socialism, for the power of one class over the other would have remained (and even grown stronger). Such an economic structure would most of all resemble a slave-owning economy where the slave market is absent. (N. Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, p. 187.—Emphasis in the original.)

The Stalinist state did not, of course, arise out of capitalism and the development of a state capitalist economy, but out of an economy that was socialist in type. But is not the terse definition of a new exploitive class society, where commodity production has disappeared (more or less) and the ruling class has concentrated all ownership and control into one hand, the state's, perfectly applicable to the slave-state of Stalinism?

In 1928, after eleven years of the Bolshevik Revolution and with God knows what unspoken thoughts roaming about in the back of his mind, the same Bukharin had occasion to return to the same subject from somewhat different angle, in the course of a speech delivered to the Program Commission of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International. In discussing, from the purely theoretical standpoint, the possibility of classical capitalist economic crises in a society in which all the means of production are owned by the state (naturally, not of a proletarian state), he points out that in such a society only "in world-economic relations do we have trade with other countries, etc." Thereupon he continues with these equally remarkable insights:

Now, we raise the question whether in such a form of capitalism—which actually represents a certain negation of capitalism, because of the fact that the international market, the circulation of money, has disappeared—a crisis can occur. Would we have crises there? I believe not! Can there exist in this society a contradiction between the restricted consumption of the masses (consumption in the physiological sense) and the growing productive forces? Yes, that may be. The consumption of the ruling class grows continuously, the accumulation of the means of production, calculated in labor units, can grow to enormous dimensions, but the consumption of the masses is retarded. Perhaps still sharper here is the discrepancy between the growth of the productive forces and the growth of the consumption of the masses. But just the same we will not find any crises.

A planned economy exists, an organized distribution, not only with regard to the connections and reciprocal relations between different branches of industry but also with regard to consumption. The slave in this society receives his share of fodder, of the objects that are the product of the total labor. He may receive very little, but just the same crises will not take place. (Kommunistische Internationale, 1928, No. 33/34, p. 2063.)

Is this not an astoundingly apt description of the most basic relations in Stalinist society, Bukharin did not hesitate to call a society slavery, even if of a modern kind, but it would never occur to him to speak of such an abomination as socialism of any brand whatever. Or if, at a tragical stage of his life, he did speak of the Stalin inferno as socialism, the pistol of the GPU was already jammed against the base of his skull. Deutsch­er has no such excuse.

If one could force out of his mind Deutscher's utterly wretched apology for the Stalinist dictatorship, his pseudo-historical justification for the massacre of the "utopians" by the regime of the new Russian slaveowners, his sophomoric theories about revolutions in general, his logical preposterousness which would be derided by any­one accustomed to think with his mind instead of with his pyloric valve—and to forget all these things is next to impossible—he would have to reduce Deutscher's violence against the basic tenet of socialism—the self-eman­cipatory role which is exclusively as­signed to the revolutionary proletariat—to a case of the opinion that capital­ism can give way only to socialism. The opinion is as erroneous as it is common. Understandable, and for adequate reasons rightly so, fifty years ago, it is incusable today, in the light of the Stalinist experience. The common notion has to be revised for accuracy, and the revision, far from upsetting the provisions of Marxism, amplifies and above all concretizes them:

Capitalism, nearing the end of its historical rope, is less able to solve the problems of society on a capitalist basis. The problems will nevertheless be solved anyhow and are already being solved. Where the proletariat takes command of the nation, the social problems will be solved progressively, and mankind will move toward the freedom of a socialist world. Where the proletariat fails for the time to discharge its task, the social problems will be solved nevertheless, but they will be solved in a reactionary way, solved at the cost of creating a dozen new social problems, solved by degrading and enslaving the bulk of mankind. That is the meaning today of the conflict between capitalism and socialism, socialism and Stalinism, Stalinism and capitalism.

That is the meaning that must be read into the historical warnings of the great founders of scientific socialist theory and the proletarian socialist movement. They did not and could not hold that the decay of capitalism, which is a spontaneous and automatic process, would just as spontaneously and automatically assure the victory of socialism—of any brand.

In the most mature and instructive of his works, the Anti-Duehring, Engels clarifies the standpoint of Marxism on this score, not once but repeatedly:

By more and more transforming the great majority of the population into
proletarians, the capitalist mode of production brings into being the force which, under penalty of its own destruction, is compelled to carry out this revolution. (P. 314.)

... modern large-scale industry has called into being on the one hand a proletariat, a class which for the first time in history can demand the abolition, not of one particular class organization or another, or of one particular class privilege or another, but of classes themselves, and which is in such a position that it must carry through this demand or sink to the level of the Chinese coolie. (P. 178.)

... if the whole of modern society is not to perish, a revolution of the mode of production and distribution must take place, a revolution which will put an end to all class divisions. (P. 179.)

... (the bourgeoisie's) own productive powers have grown beyond its control and, as with the force of a law of Nature, are driving the whole of bourgeois society forward to ruin or revolution. (P. 188.)

These do not have their value in determining if Engels was gifted with apocalyptic vision—that has no importance. But they reveal how Engels judged the relationship between the disintegration of capitalist society and the part of the proletariat in the process—victor of the outcome or master of a regeneration. The failure up to now of the proletariat to play the latter part successfully is not our subject here. Except to say that ninety-five per cent of those 'socialists' who have in effect capitulated either to the American bourgeoisie or the Stalinist bureaucracy are possessed in common by a thoroughgoing disbelief in the capacity of the proletariat to play that rôle, we leave the subject for another occasion. But it is incontestable that up to now it has not played the rôle triumphantly. And the result of this failure? Is it perhaps the victory of a 'rough and crude... brand of socialism' established without the proletariat and against it, not only in Russia but also in China (where the even vaster poverty should produce an even rougher and cruder and more monstrous form of "socialist" totalitarianism, should it not?), and throughout Eastern Europe (with some modest but unmistakable aid from Deutsch­er), and even in not at all backward Czechoslovakia and Germany? Not at all. The essence of Engels' insights, amazing for their content even though they could not be marked off with clear lines, has been confirmed by the events. For its failure, the proletariat has already paid the penalty, in the Stalinist countries, of its own destruction, that is, its reduction to modern slavery; in more than one sense it has been driven to the level of the Chinese coolie; where bourgeois society is not transformed by revolution it is transformed into the ruin of Stalinism; the alienation ("to use a term comprehensible to philosophers") which the development of capitalism brings man to the verge of abolishing, is enhanced by Stalinism to a degree which does not have its equal in our memory.

We have no greater confidence in the longevity of Stalinism than of capitalism, less if anything. It is not reasonable to believe that at the time when the greatest of all class societies is approaching its death, the meanest of class societies is entering a new and long life. But shortlived or longlived, it will not quietly pass away. It will have to be pushed into its delayed oblivion. The essential precondition for the social emancipation from Stalinism is ideological emancipation from its mythology, be it in the crass form in which it is presented officially or in the form of urban and cynical apologists in which it is presented by Deutsch­er. In either form it implies the end of socialism, for it would indeed be an unrealizable Utopia if conceived as anything but the direct achievement of a self-conscious, self-mobilized socialist proletariat. The rebirth of the proletarian socialist movement requires not the revival of the mythology in a revised form but its entire demolition.

Max SHACTMAN

The Power of the Third Camp

International Politics After the Korean War

The outstanding feature of the post-Korean war developments in the international situation, which is dominated by the contest for world supremacy between the United States and Stalinist Russia, is the abatement of the danger of total war between the two powers. So long as the ruling classes of these two countries remain in power, the danger of war to the bitter end will continue to exist and it is an illusion to believe that any accommodation is possible that will assure their peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, the speed at which they have been drawing closer to the outbreak of the total war has slowed down for the time being. The relaxation of the war danger is the result of the stalemate reached in the conflict between the two powers. Neither side is able to impose its will upon the other by military actions confined to a small scale. At the same time, neither side is able to make serious military advances against the other side on a small scale without immediately threatening to precipitate a military struggle on a global, all-deciding scale. Such a struggle is precisely what the two war camps are at present unprepared and unwilling to enter. Hence the stalemate. The suspension of direct and open hostilities in Korea inaugurated this stage of the stalemate and is the outstanding example of it. It was a criminal adventure on the part of the Stalinists to precipitate the war in Korea in the interests of expanding the frontiers of their empire and delivering a blow to their imperial rival; for even if the cause of the national unification of that country could conceivably be represented by Stalinism, it would be a crime to seek the victory of that cause at the cost of a world war. It was a criminal adventure on the part of the Truman administration to enter the Korean war, without consulting its allies or even the Constitutionally-authorized Congress, on the entirely imperialistic ground that the United States has the right to intervene with force of arms into the internal affairs of any other country. The reactionary, anti-democratic and utterly futile character of the war in Korea, thus publicly stigmatized by the Independent Socialist League from the outset, has been demonstrated by its outcome on the soil of that devastated and still-divided people, a harbinger on a small scale of the vaster and more monstrously destructive futility of a coming third world war. The Korean war alone is enough to show that neither one of the war camps is capable of bringing about peace and freedom. However, together they have brought about the stalemate. The outbreak of the war has been averted for the moment, but no peace has been established. The main indications are that the next period in international relations between the two camps will

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be an extended one of neither war nor peace.

Fundamentally, the period of the breathing spell which has now set in represents a partial victory for the forces represented by the Third Camp. The strength displayed by the Third Camp in the most general sense—which is nothing more than a synonym for the tens of millions who resist or refuse the leadership of both American capitalism and of Stalinism and seek a democratic, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist, anti-totalitarian road to peace, freedom and prosperity—confirms the position taken by the Independent Socialist League and justifies its conviction in its ultimate triumph over both camps of reaction.

The stalemate has been produced because neither side has been able to bring to bear such a preponderance of strength over the other as to win a decisive victory in the partial conflicts that have broken out. The two imperialist camps are of more or less equal strength, each one making up for inferiority in one field by superiority in another. Decisive superiority is quintessential in the politics of both sides inasmuch as both are aware of the fact that the war, once it breaks out, will be fought for conclusive world mastery, that is, an attempt to achieve the complete annihilation of the vanquished by the victor. Consequently, to reduce the risk of defeat, and therewith annihilation, to a minimum, requires the mobilization of the last possible neutral or half-neutral, independent or half-independent country, the enlistment of the support of the last possible people or groups of people. In this most important of all fields of war preparation, more decisive even than superiority in the field of atomic or even hydrogen bombs, both war camps have suffered severe setbacks and even defeats.

On both sides of the Iron Curtain, refusal to support the war camps, resistance to the mobilization efforts and domination of one imperialism or the other or both together, the demand for independence in policy and action from both camps, have been the main characteristic of the popular struggles of the last two or three years. Until the forces engaged in these struggles—which are the forces of the Third Camp—have been subdued by one camp or the other, or been deprived or duped out of their independence and reduced to political and military troops of either camp, the imperialists are not likely to risk an all-out war.

By the same token, insofar as the forces of the Third Camp and of the "uncommitted world" are finally tied to or identified with one or the other imperialist camp, the outbreak of the world-consuming war is brought so much the closer. Hence, the apologists for imperialism who, in the name of the struggle against totalitarian Stalinism, on the one side, or in the name of the struggle against capitalism, on the other, are seeking to break the resistance of the forces of the Third Camp and to undermine their independence in order to enlist them on the side of Washington or Moscow, are in actuality working to bring closer the day when the total war breaks out. Contrariwise, the possibility of prolonging the period of peace and even of averting the outbreak of the war altogether lies exclusively with the maintenance of the Third Camp, with organizing and coordinating its endeavors, with sharpening and clarifying its consciousness, and above all with firmly preserving and deepening its independence from both war camps. Confused, demoralized, tired, skeptical and cowardly elements have deserted the struggle for democracy, socialism and freedom in recent years, asserting that there is no basis for an independent struggle or movement, or that none exists or has any significant strength or importance, and that all those who still seek to maintain their independence must take the "practical" and "realistic" step of joining and subordinating themselves to one of the war camps. Yet the forces of the Third Camp, at which all deserters sneer, have proved powerful enough, and their resistance to the two imperialist camps, even though it is still mainly a passive, uncoordinated, not fully clarified resistance, has proved firm enough, to produce the present relaxation of the immediate war danger. It is to these forces mainly, and in no wise to the peaceable proclivities of the two imperialist powers, that the world today owes its breathing spell.

The breathing spell is not only a welcome gift to the forces of the Third Camp that urgently require time in which to develop themselves; it is a necessity for the two war camps as well. To them the breathing spell is only a stage in the preparation for the war which they have been compelled to postpone. The direction which this preparation is taking on each side reveals the nature of the two conflicting regimes and the crises which continually undermine them, thereby inevitably maturing the pre-conditions for the triumph of socialism and democracy.

To protect its interests, the Stalinist regime must find allies and supporters, willing or unwilling, outside its own ranks. The fundamental social antagonism between the totalitarian bureaucracy and the capitalist classes of the world has become clearer, more pronounced and increasingly irreconcilable in the period following the second World War. This has made it more difficult for the Stalinists to follow their past course of exploiting for their own ends the violent conflicts among the capitalist classes themselves, as compared with what they were able to do with such outstanding success before, after and above all during the second World War. This is the big change since the "Grand Alliance." To be sure, for day-to-day political analysis it is necessary to see that the Stalinists still have opportunities to maneuver between their enemies and to play them against each other in particular and limited respects; but more important and basic is it to underline that they now find themselves obliged to seek allies not only and not so much in this or that capitalist class or grouping, as by exploiting for their own ends the profound and revolutionary antagonism of the masses of the world against the entire social system of capitalism and against traditional capitalist imperialism and colonialism. The reactionary exploitation of these revolutionary sentiments has always been a mark of Stalinism; since the end of the war it has been multiplied and intensified a hundred-fold.

Stalinism in power is totalitarian in its very nature, and without this characteristic it could not and would not exist in any way or form. Its oppressive, exploitive totalitarianism is manifested in the preparation of the war as in all other fields, that is, by its cynical and contemptuous disregard of the economic and political interests of the masses over whom it tyrannizes. The satellite countries are treated more brutally than the old Czarist regime treated its vassals. The aspirations and needs of the peoples of those oppressed countries are denied and repressed and the masses themselves regarded only from the standpoint of
their capacity to serve the economic, political, military and diplomatic interests of the Russian ruling class. The aspirations and needs of the Russian people themselves are treated with little more consideration. The result has been a universal slow-down strike against the Kremlin throughout the satellite nations, reaching its highest point of rebellion when it was transformed into the June insurrection of the unforgettable heroic German workers; and an almost equally universal slow-down strike against the Kremlin in its own homeland, with particularly severe consequences in agriculture.

Threatened with increased isolation and therefore danger from the masses whose passive, if not active, support it must have at the foundation of the regime, the Kremlin has been forced in the new stage of world developments into a turn to the left, or more accurately—for the terms “left turn” and “right turn” do not and cannot have the same significance for Stalinism as they have for either the capitalist or the working class world—a policy of liberalization or appeasement of the masses.

Some of the concessions which the Kremlin has been forced to make are real, even if they are neither fundamental nor large. First and foremost are the concessions which are being made to the masses of the peasantry in Russia, in the expectation of overcoming the agricultural crisis which still remains one of the most explosive sources of a general political crisis for the regime. The policy of super-industrialization, indispensable for the reinforcement of the totalitarian but basically inferior Stalinist war machine and war preparations, has had to be modified in the direction of greater emphasis upon the hitherto grossly inadequate production of consumer goods. The policy of super-concentration of agriculture and super-subjection of the agricultural population (“agro-gorods”) has been postponed indefinitely. In general, the policy in agriculture has been modified to reduce the tribute exacted from the peasantry by the omnipotent bureaucracy and to increase the productivity incentives of the peasant by increasing what he is allowed to retain for his own use and consumption.

To the extent that the working class has suffered from the low standard of living imposed upon it by the preceding policy of the ruling class, the new course in agriculture is likewise a concession to the urban masses. At the same time, the regime has been obliged to make some concessions to the various sections of the intellectuals upon whom it depends heavily for the ideological poisoning of the minds of the masses, and out of whose ranks it must be ever watchful against the emergence of conscious and articulate champions of the revolutionary opposition to the regime. Finally, the regime has made concessions to the managerial bureaucracy, to minimize the insecurity prevalent in this stratum of the exploitive ruling class as a result of too intensive, too monopolistic, too disruptive intervention in all spheres of economic life by the G.P.U.

Abroad, concessions have been made by the Kremlin in reducing the monstrous tribute exacted by it from the oppressed satellite countries and in ordering a modification of the cruel and in modern times unprecedented intensity of exploitation of labor upon which it insisted until recently. In East Germany, where Stalinism faces a revolutionary working class, with powerful live traditions and unbroken spirit, in which is perfectly fused the struggle for socialist democracy and national freedom from the yoke of the alien despot, economic concessions have been the greatest, while repressive police measures against the rebellious populace have been employed with the greatest prudence and unostentation.

Other concessions which the Stalinist regime has appeared to make are neither real nor substantial, but fraudulent through and through, calculated to serve the function of deluding and duping the masses in the Stalinist empire and public opinion outside of it or to serve some diplomatic maneuver against Washington. The “curbing” of the GPU following upon the murder of Beria and his immediate clique, is one such fraud. The purging of Beria underlines the inherent instability of Stalinist totalitarianism and the permanency of the crises which are invariably manifested in purges which neither the regime nor its props can ever fully overcome. It does not, however, reduce the power of the GPU. It was never less under the complete control of the central Stalinist bureaucracy than it is now; it holds the country as a whole, and the so-called Communist Party in particular, in the grip of its terror only and insofar as it is entirely in the grip of the central bureaucracy; and if the rule of the Stalinist bureaucracy is absolutely inconceivable without the organized police terror of the GPU, this terror is practised and can only be practised in the name and in the interests of the bureaucracy, but never in the name and interests of the GPU itself. The basic relationships between bureaucracy and police and between police and population have, therefore, not been altered in the slightest degree. The central bureaucracy has simply limited the jurisdiction and scale of the intervention of the GPU in the field of the bureaucracy as a whole. In the realm of the people over whom this bureaucracy as a whole tyrannizes, the power and terror of the GPU remain intact.

The “rise of the army’s power” as contrasted to the “curbing of the GPU’s power” is another fraud, aimed at the dupes of Stalinism at home and abroad. It is true that some of the army commanders enjoy a type of prestige among wide masses of Russian people that the bureaucracy as a whole, to say nothing of the GPU bureaucracy in particular, does not enjoy. It is true, too, that the party bureaucracy has not hesitated to exploit that prestige for its own purposes, both in getting wider coverage for its murder of the Beria gang and in spreading the impression inside and outside Russia that the “nonpolitical” army heads are playing an important role in the Stalinist regime and exercising a “moderating” influence on its domestic and foreign policy. At bottom, this is fraud and fiction.

That there exists a military bureaucracy that would like a freer hand in formulating and executing military policy (and correspondingly, foreign and domestic policy), may be taken for granted. That this bureaucracy is capable of gaining such a free hand is entirely unlikely; in any case, there is absolutely no evidence to sustain such a possibility. That this bureaucracy is the one that holds the army together, or that has the army under its control, is altogether mythical. The present Russian army is, as it has for long been, the army of the Stalinist counterrevolution, completely under the control of the central party bureaucracy which alone is capable of holding it together in its present form. That the military bureaucracy could play an independent role, let alone the dominant role, in Russia, is en-
tirely excluded in practise; and even if it were to attempt such a role, its short-lived, ineffectual and even ludicrous character would only underscore the preposterousness of the idea more glaringly than did the ephemeral "regime" of Badoglio in the second World War. The role of independent and revolutionary opposition to the Stalinist regime falls exclusively upon the shoulders of the workers and peasants; any conflict between the central bureaucracy and any of its auxiliary or related strata can only provide, as the past has indicated, a momentary impulse to the performance of this role. An example in the satellite world of Stalinist concessions which are fraudulent is the granting of "sovereignty" to East Germany. The East German regime of Ulbricht and Co. is a Quisling regime, against which the German people must and will sit in relentless revolutionary judgment; to talk of "sovereignty" is a grotesque hoax and a gross insult to the people of Germany and to the intelligence of the world.

The fact remains that the concessions, both real and simulated, have been made, and still others will be made, by the Stalinist regime under compulsion. They have the aim of increasing the faltering strength of the regime in Russia and the satellite countries, of reducing active opposition to passive opposition, passive opposition to passive support. They have the aim of encouraging and strengthening the hand of those elements outside of Russia who, desperately anxious to avert the horrors of a third world war, are ready to make the most conciliatory and even capitulatory gestures toward Stalinist totalitarianism, especially when the Kremlin gives the appearance of moderating the terror of its regime and its policies. The extent to which the turn in Kremlin policy, in the present stage of preparation for the war, will succeed in winning support cannot be determined on the basis of an analysis of this turn itself. Its success depends, first, upon the attitude toward it which will be adopted by the independent political and social groupings throughout the world, that is, upon whether they understand it and disclose its real character or are duped by its demagogy and thereby become its instrumentalities. It depends, second, upon the continued existence and development of American policy. The Stalinist policy can gain successes, if not in winning over active supporters, then in neutralizing present opponents, not so much by defending its own course as by attacking, either in representation or misrepresentation, the course of American imperialism. For more than a quarter of a century, Stalinism has succeeded in suppressing, silencing, disorienting and even winning over many of its opponents and critics by depicting capitalist imperialism as the only possible alternative to itself. That is its main stock in trade to this hour, and the demoralization and devastation it has wrought in the socialist movement above all is a tribute to its effectiveness. But this most reactionary of all reactions could not even begin to be effective without the involuntary but vast cooperation of capitalist imperialism itself, nowadays above all the cooperation of American capitalism and imperialism. The Stalinists are able to exploit not only lies about American capitalism but the truth about it. Indeed, it is the entirely genuine, and entirely justified, antagonism which the people of most of the world feel toward capitalism and imperialism— outstandingly symbolized, represented and maintained by the United States government—which enables Stalinism to so much as make its voice heard and tolerated in public. In fact, Stalinism would have the greatest difficulty in justifying the continuation of its tyrannical rule, and even its very existence if it were not for the existence of American imperialism. In this sense, which most profoundly represents the realities of the relationship between the United States and Russia as two rival imperialist powers and as two conflicting social systems of exploitation, Stalinism has a need, an irreplaceable need, for American capitalism. If it did not exist, Stalinism would experience the greatest difficulty in surviving the intensity of the contradictions that assail it, above all, in withstanding the undiverted hatred of the masses over whom it rules. The victory of the democratic, socialist working class over capitalism is therefore the surest and swiftest step that could be taken to put an instantaneous end to Stalinism. By the same token, all attempts which are made, especially in the ranks of the working class, to support and perpetuate the capitalist order are not only reactionary in general but reactionary also in the particular respect that they are the surest means of feeding new life to Stalinist barbarism.

If Stalinism needs American capitalism in order to maintain itself in state power, where it has already captured it, and in strong positions in the working class, where it still retains them, it is no less true that American capitalism has an indispensable need for Stalinism. The extraordinary development of the productive forces of the United States, unfolding under exceptionally favorable circumstances for a long time, have long ago outgrown the national frontiers of the country. At one and the same time, they require for their maintenance, let alone for their expansion, an unrestricted control of the world market and the world's resources, and by virtue of the tremendous power which they represent, they confer upon American capitalism the role of organizer and leader of world capitalism which is in such an advanced state of disintegration that it could not even exist without the support provided by the United States. The United States must soon become the only real capitalist power, by placing the rest of the capitalist world on short rations and completely at its service in all important economic, political and military respects, or it is sure to end quickly by not being a capitalist power at all. From this standpoint, the now commonplace and unquestioned use of the term "fight for survival" to describe the struggle of American capitalism, is perfectly accurate and justified. Abstractly, the endeavor to become the only important world power would inevitably tend to bring together practically all the other capitalist powers, big and small, in a united front to resist the advances of the rival who threatens to subordinate and even subjugate them to its global domination. Concretely, however, such a united front has been rendered impossible by the existence of Stalinism, on the one side, and the free working class and anti-imperialist movements on the other. While American capitalism threatens to reduce the capitalist classes of all other countries to the role of complete subordi-
nation and vassalage to itself, the anti-imperialist movements threaten to deprive them of all imperialist power and privileges and Stalinism as well as the rising socialist tide, each in its own way and toward its own end threaten to expropriate them and deprive them of any and all special power and privilege whatsoever. Hence the universal capitalist dependence upon and alliance with American imperialism, an alliance which, however reluctantly and resentfully it is made and maintained, is held together with the cement of class solidarity of the world bourgeoisie prompted by fear of social expropriation. American imperialism needs Stalinism as the main whip with which to intimidate the rest of the capitalist world into following its political and military leadership, for without this whip it would not only be completely isolated but would face a more or less united, hostile capitalist resistance everywhere. American imperialism needs Stalinism in another field, namely, the working-class movement itself. World rule is absolutely inconceivable in the face of the open and active opposition of the working classes, especially in the more advanced countries. Stalinism threatens the capitalist classes with complete extinction; the working classes it threatens with a living slavery. This is realized by tens of millions of workers and peasants throughout the world. American imperialism has sought to exploit their opposition to Stalinism, because to the extent that it has been able, not to win the active support of the working class and popular democratic movements — it has not been able to win them that support anywhere— but to reduce or neutralize the antagonism these movements feel toward it, its success has depended exclusively upon the extent to which it has established the myth that it is the only practical alternative or bulwark against Stalinist totalitarianism.

This course, schematically outlined, has not, however, proved to be an effective means to achieve the ends of American imperialism. The results obtained in the popular democratic movements outside the United States, never very outstanding, are today at a new low point. In Europe and Asia, in particular, the trend in these movements away from support of American imperialism and toward an independent political position is steadily growing. In countries like England, France, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Japan, India and Indonesia, while the Stalinists have made no significant gains in the working class or anti-imperialist movements or have even lost ground, the masses in these movements show a more pronouncedly critical attitude and opposition toward American imperialism and its policies than ever since the end of the war. They see the “crusade for freedom and democracy” more clearly every day as a defense of capitalist imperialism and colonialism, as more and more an alliance of the most reactionary political groups in the capitalist world, as a world-wide camp-ign against the ideas and aims of socialism which hold the allegiance of the working classes of every advanced country, except the United States, and most immediately and above all as an acceleration of the danger of the atomic and hydrogen bomb war.

American capitalism has not been compensated for losses in this field by gains in the form of uniting and consolidating the capitalist classes behind its leadership. Quite the contrary. The prestige of the United States as a great power has never been lower among these classes. It has failed to overcome the conflicts and antagonisms in its own administration and decide firmly on a foreign policy to follow with greater or lesser clarity and consistency. It has failed to overcome the conflicts and rivalries among the capitalist classes of Europe over whom it has asserted its claim to leadership. In Korea, it failed, for the first time in a century, to inflict a decisive military defeat upon an enemy, an enemy, moreover, of the “inferior” Asiatic peoples. In Indochina, it failed to overcome the disastrous defeat with which France has paid for almost a century of imperialist crimes. In Southeast Asia in general, it has failed to win a single major Asian country to its proposal for an alliance to defend that area from the Stalinists.

There are several other factors that have contributed to the failure of the United States to consolidate its leadership over a united international capitalist front. In some countries, the bourgeoisie, while granting that abstractly a war between the capitalist and Stalinist worlds is inevitable, hope to postpone that war as long as they can in order to gain the longest possible breathing spell. In American imperialism policy they see the growing trend toward precipitating the war, toward the “preventive war,” and they understand that while defeat means their complete extermination, even victory, which might give Washington a good deal, would leave its present allies completely exhausted, and helplessly at its mercy. In other countries, the bourgeoisie, while realizing the significance to itself of an ultimate victory of Stalinism, hesitates to follow the present bellicose American policy against it for fear of arousing the active and even revolutionary opposition of the anti-war working class it faces at home right now. In still other countries, the bourgeoisie, while fundamentally as hostile to Stalinism as the American bourgeoisie, seeks to gain greater concessions from it by appearing to follow a conciliatory line toward Stalinism. Finally and in general, in practically every capitalist country, be it imperial England or a tiny Latin-American republic, the native bourgeoisie deeply resents the fact that it must be dependent, to one extent or another, upon the economic or military might of the United States, and resents even more deeply the fact that the American bourgeoisie and its government treat their allies abroad not as equals but with arrogance, chauvinistic superiority, ultimatist demands and commands, contempt for their legitimate national feelings above all their feeling for national sovereignty.

As a consequence of the series of military, diplomatic and political disasters and setbacks suffered by the United States from the combined results of these factors, American imperialism, like Stalinism, finds itself in a crisis of foreign policy which forces it, too, into abating the danger of an immediate war, and into adopting a turn in its policy. The turn is toward a policy further to the right than before. To implement it in practice requires time and this in turn implies, again, a relaxation of the war tension, insofar as an out-and-out global war is concerned.

The turn to the right is indicated because, in the first place, a turn to the left is precluded organically. A turn to the left would entail a policy of support, partial support at any rate, or at the very least encouragement of the democratic anti-imperialist and working class movements of Europe, Asia, Latin-America and Africa. The appeals which liberals and labor leaders in this country direct to the Americ-
can bourgeoisie and its country to follow such a policy, could not be more thoroughly utopian, futile and misleading. No American capitalist government will under any circumstances support or encourage such movements which are directed, first and foremost, against the very ruling classes upon which the American bourgeoisie relies and by its very nature must and will continue to rely for support and cooperation.

The turn to the right is indicated because, in the second place, the American bourgeoisie is learning the basic political lesson—absolutely correct from its class standpoint—that the wavering and conciliatory elements of world capitalism will fall in line only when they see that the solid and intransigent elements are firmly united.

The rightward turn, which has actually been unfolding for the past period with growing emphasis and clarity, is manifested in the increased criticism and opposition to American policy produced in the British Tory ranks and the much stronger and more widespread opposition intensified in French bourgeois circles against the unborn EDC and the stillborn NATO.

Far more important, from the socialist standpoint, is the fact that not only does this course guarantee, in general, that Washington forfeits any possibility of support among the workers of Europe, but that working-class opposition to American imperialism is growing apace even in those sections which, up to recently, showed a less hostile and even friendly attitude toward it. The reckless way in which American imperialism has been ready to risk precipitating the third world war, the constant threats to unleash the terror of atomic and hydrogen bombs upon an enemy, the kind of alliances formed by Washington in preparation for the war, have provided the strongest impulsion to the European working classes' reaction against American imperialism.

Masses of workers, and members of the middle classes, of Europe, are aware of the fact that the world situation is pregnant with a suddenly precipitated war even though there has been a relaxation of the war tension in general. Opposition to the war danger is general, especially throughout Europe and Asia which expect to be the main theaters of the third world war. At the present time, the opposition to the war has taken the form, broadly speaking, of "neutralism."

Insofar as "neutralism" is supported by socialist and radical workers, it represents a sound, healthy, progressive reaction against those who seek to commit the workers to following the camp of Stalinism and against those who seek to commit them to following the camp of capitalism in general and American capitalism in particular. It is the instinctive and not yet clearly expressed aspiration of the workers to democratic self-government, socialist freedom, peace and abundance. It represents a long, strong step toward the conceptions and policies of Independent Socialism which are expressed in the watchword of the Third Camp.

Insofar as "neutralism" is present an organized movement, an organized political current, a more or less consistently expressed and advocated policy, it is thoroughly confused, at best, and utterly futile, if not downright reactionary, at worst. In general, such a movement and its policy have little in common with the Third Camp position of Independent Socialism and in many particulars it has nothing in common with it.

Independent Socialism rejects the ideas and policies of "neutralism," insofar as it can be said to have developed ideas and policies. Its Third Camp position is not neutral in the present global struggle. It is irrevocably opposed to capitalism; it is irrevocably opposed to Stalinism; it is irrevocably opposed to the conflict between them which promises mankind nothing but desolation and even extinction. This Third Camp, unlike the various brands of "neutralism," does not hold any theory of the "peaceful coexistence of the two social systems." It holds the theory to be false and misleading to the core; and bases itself not upon their coexistence or the desirability of their coexistence but upon unremitting struggle against them both. This Third Camp, unlike all brands of "neutralism," does not support any policy of appeasement of Stalinism, either in general or as a means of presumably averting war. It rejects appeasement of reaction in any form, Stalinism included, and regards the belief that it will avert or help avert war as deception when advocated by Stalinists and self-deception when advocated by non-Stalinists. This Third Camp, unlike all brands of "neutralism," believes that the struggle for peace can be conducted only by means of the class struggle and the independence of the working class from any reliance upon the bourgeoisie or class collaboration with it. It rejects and condemns such collaboration as is practised not only by Stalinists but by socialist "neutralists" with bourgeois elements as reactionary as the French DeGaullists in the name of the struggle against war.

Independent Socialism, by virtue of its opposition in principle to all capitalist militarism, is opposed to the so-called EDC as well. In particular, it shares the opposition to EDC of those French and Belgian socialists who see in it a military concentration based primarily upon the fundamentally re-
actionary political forces of European Catholic clericalism which the socialist movement has always and justly fought. In particular, it shares also the Catholic clericalism which the social-actionary political forces of European socialists who declare that the German people must not be committed to any international military obligations while they are denied their elementary right of national sovereignty. Hence, we have nothing in common with the "neutralism" of those in France who are combined in one way or another with DeGaulleism in fighting EDC. As against the DeGaulleists, as well as against American and Stalinist imperialism, we propose as the next step in solving the economic, political and military problem of Europe, the immediate formation, on a consistently democratic basis, of an Independent Western Union.

The socialist Third Camp, unlike many brands of "neutralism," rejects all attempts to continue depriving Germany of national independence and sovereignty and thereby depriving that country of the right to decide its own military policy in the same way that the occupying powers now decide theirs. We denounce the continued disfranchisement of the German people by Russia, the United States, Great Britain and France, the occupying powers, as a gross denial of the elementary democratic rights of a people. To support the continued foreign military occupation of Germany and with it the continued denial of full national sovereignty is worthy of the Stalinist overlords or glorifiers of French imperialism like DeGaulle. When this policy is also supported and defended by British Bevanites and Laborites of the right wing and by French and Belgian anti-EDC socialists, it is a mockery of democracy and a disgrace to socialism.

Socialists worthy of the name favor and support the right of the German people to reassert full national sovereignty, with all of the rights of national sovereignty, including the right to a national military establishment under their own control. What is reactionary in much socialist opposition to German rearmament is that it rests on rejection of this right.

There is, however, a different and an entirely progressive political motivation also involved in the widespread opposition to German rearmament among, for example, the British left socialist ranks that generally support Bevan. This expresses, in more or less clear fashion, the suspicion and hostility of these workers to a European army scheme which proposes to militarize Germany—a Germany led by a reactionary government—within a framework which is clearly imperialist, in order to tie a reborn German militarism to the cold-war camp of the U. S. This opposition to German rearmament is not opposition to Germany's national right to rearm but to the specific, presently proposed scheme for German rearmament which is being pushed by the U. S. camp in the form of EDC. This type of opposition is the progressive kernel of the opposition which German rearmament has aroused among European socialists.

One type of opposition, under the guise of being anti-war, is actually anti-German. The other type of opposition opposes the present European army scheme, German rearmament included, on anti-imperialist grounds, while recognizing Germany's right to national sovereignty, militarily as well as politically.

But this progressive basis for opposition to German rearmament inescapably raises the question of a positive socialist alternative to EDC and similar imperialist plans, a socialist alternative for the political organization of Western Europe and hence for its military defense. The opposition to EDC of the militant left socialists in Western Europe is sterilized by the lack of such an alternative.

The German Social-Democratic Party in particular weakens its popular appeal by taking a confused, negative and unrealistic position on the question of the defense of Germany. Part of the German people have already been militarily conquered by the Stalinist imperialists; the rest of them are threatened by such conquest and subjugation.

The German Social-Democracy rightly fears and opposes the reactionary political consequences of EDC and rearmament by the Adenauer government, but it does not itself offer a program for military defense against the Stalinist danger, which is a real one.

The social democratic movements of Western Europe cannot develop a socialist military policy until they have developed a program for a socialist political framework on the continent which such a policy would be designed to defend. In the absence of such a program, given their basic identification with the status quo as a conservative workers' party, they vacillate between half-hearted support of such schemes as NATO and EDC, and half-hearted opposition to them. This "position" alienates many workers, peasants and middle class elements who must be won to socialism and who are now being victimized by reactionary demagogues from the bourgeoisie and Stalinist camps.

A program for military defense against Stalinism is necessarily one which counterposes a socialist internationalism against the pseudo-internationalism of NATO and EDC. To the internationally organized unity of Europe, under U. S. tutelage and capitalist domination, it counterposes a European unity on a consistently democratic basis, which can be best expressed in an Independent Western Union of the European states.

Such a program is especially vital for the German Social-Democracy. On the basis of it, their present sterile and negative opposition to German rearmament under Adenauer can be replaced by a program which envisions the participation of an independent, democratic, working-class Germany as an equal partner in the military defense of an Independent Western Union from attacks from any quarter. Aside from this an Independent Western Union provides the line for waging a struggle against Stalinism by non-military-political-means and of preventing or cutting short war by stimulating revolt within the Stalinist empire.

The military defense of Germany, as of all Europe, can only be a function of its political organization. An Independent Western Union of Europe, which in our view must develop toward a third-camp Socialist Europe, points to the only progressive form in which the Stalinist threat can be met militarily.

INDEPENDENT SOCIALISM IS OPPOSED to any intervention by the old or new imperialist powers in the countries of Asia, as it is opposed in principle to all forms of imperialism and the denial, under whatever pretext, of the right of every people and nation to self-determination. In particular, it shares the opposition of all Indian socialists and revolutionary nationalists to any imperialist alliance to "defend" Southeast Asia as an impudent, unasked-for intervention in the affairs of the peoples of that area. However, it rejects the "neutralism" of those who
like Nehru, endeavor to be the "arbitrators" between the two imperialist camps. It holds that the next step in solving the problems of Asia that can be practically taken, is the formation of an Independent Southeast Asian Federation, so that all the resources are democratically pooled and the benefits thereof democratically shared, not only to assure the defense of an area which is threatened by both Stalinism and the old imperialisms, but to assure the radical agrarian reform and the modernization of the nations without which no further progress is possible.

The reactionary nature and consequences of U. S. intervention in Asia under the guise of "stopping Communism" has most recently been exemplified in Indochina even more clearly than it was in the disastrous Korean war. In Korea, at least, the U. S. intervened formally on behalf of an independent government; in Indochina, the U. S. openly appears as the champion and prop of French colonialism. In Korea, at least, the Stalinist North Korean government was the formal aggressor; in Indochina the formal aggressor is the French power, both historically as a colonial intruder, and immediately, by virtue of its past maneuvers with the Ho regime. In Korea, at least, there were no visible forces of any sort which were organized outside of the Rhee and Stalinist camps; in Indochina independent so-called "third-force" groups and elements exist, their significance to us being the extent to which they indicate that a genuinely democratic and anti-imperialist foreign policy could mobilize the Indochinese people themselves for the defeat of the Vietminh, as for the defeat of the French.

We reject any notion that the interests of the Indochinese people require the military or political support of the Vietminh against the French. The Vietminh is decisively dominated by its Stalinist leadership and functions in practice as the power instrument of Stalinist imperialism in Indochina. Its ability to appeal to the people as the champion of national liberation is the consequence entirely of the reactionary policy of French and U. S. imperialism and not of any progressive aspects of its own. We are for a policy which would further the development in Indochina of those forces who wish to fight against Vietminh domination and victory but who wish to fight not as subjects and instruments of French imperialism but on behalf of an independent and democratic Indochina. Such a policy could be nothing else but a consistently democratic foreign policy.

Once again the Indochinese war has demonstrated concretely the political power of that approach to the war crisis which is embodied in our demand for a democratic foreign policy, as put forward in more detail in the ISL 1951 resolution.

The demand for a democratic foreign policy is the positive side of the Independent Socialist's opposition to the third imperialist world war which is being prepared.

It describes why we are unreservedly for the war drive in terms of what we are for.

One aspect of this demand's strength is precisely the fact that it appeals so powerfully and legitimately to every liberal and radical who thinks of himself as a critical supporter of "the West" in the looming year. For the best elements of this kind, this approach can and should be a bridge for crossing over to a clearly Third Camp position.

It cannot, however, be a bridge for Third Camp socialists to cross over to critical support of the war in any sense whatsoever.

It is, by its very nature, fundamentally directed against the policy of U. S. imperialism and of the bloc dominated by the U. S.—not only against its present policy but against any policy which can be adopted by a capitalist imperialism like the U. S. A genuinely and consistently democratic foreign policy, in the sense in which we raise it and explain it, cannot be implemented by a capitalist government. Its implementation requires not only a labor government—that is, a government organized and led by a working-class party—but such a labor government as takes over the nation and defends the interests of the working people on the basis of a genuinely democratic course in foreign and domestic policy which is not in fact subordinated to the interests of capitalism and imperialism.

At the same time, this demand is by its very nature likewise fundamentally directed against the Stalinist war camp. For what we propose, to spell it out further, is a democratic foreign policy to defeat Stalinism. It is a demand directed against the illusions and ambiguities of "neutralism," insofar as neutralism means the general tendency to reconcile the war camps rather than fight them.

It presents in positive form the tasks of the Third Camp.

Only if the conscious, internationalist, proletarian socialists—the Independent Socialists—of all countries, succeed in winning large sections of the democratic movements to the course of policy indicated here, will it be possible to realize the tremendous potentialities for a radical change in the world situation which are deep-seated in the "neutralist" movement insofar as it expresses the progressive sentiments of the working classes. Therein lies the main task of the Third Camp today.

The ISL reaffirms its analysis of the basic forces in the international working-class movement as set forth in the resolution on that question adopted at its preceding national convention. It takes note of the following subsequent developments:

The Stalinist parties throughout the world continue to underscore their true character by their failure, to this day, to reconstitute even the formality of an international Stalinist organization which would go through the ritualistic motions of affording every Stalinist section and the membership thereof the opportunity of discussing, mutually reviewing and deciding their basic line of policy, not only in the countries where they are striving for power but in those countries where they have succeeded in seizing it. This failure is an indirect but unmistakable avowal that the Stalinist party member of a given country has not even the smallest formal opportunity, and therefore the right, to influence the course of the "brother party" of another country, least of all the two dominant Stalinist countries of Russia and China. Given the fact that nevertheless all the Stalinist parties adopt the same decisions on the same questions at the same time, the failure to present even the facade of an international organization is an indirect but clear avowal of the complete domination of the parties by the Russian or Chinese state bureaucracies, jointly or under terms of a division of spheres of influence or, as is the case primarily in Asia, in a rivalry for control. It is evident that the bureaucracies of the various Stalinist parties accept the lackey's role of instruments of Russian or Chinese foreign policy and diplomatic and
military maneuverings in exchange for aid in achieving their aim of attaining state power in their own countries. As instruments of totalitarian slave regimes abroad and aspirants to such a regime at home, the Stalinist parties have nothing in common with socialism, democracy or the working class. The ISL reiterates emphatically its opposition to any policy of united front or collaboration with these tools of totalitarian slavery in the name of the interests of the working class. It declares that Stalinism must be fought in the labor movements and its influence rooted out. At the same time, the ISL rejected any support to the employment of reactionary methods or union with reactionary forces in the struggle to crush Stalinism, inside or outside the labor movement.

The ISL notes further the confirmation supplied by events of the fundamental position on such forms of National Stalinism as have appeared, embryonically, in China and in more advanced form in Yugoslavia, and the corresponding refutation of all expectations of those whose position has been based upon wishful thinking or a gross misunderstanding of Stalinism or a tendency to conciliate with or capitulate to it. There has not been the slightest indication to support the hope that, in China, the Stalinist state power would develop in the direction of democracy or socialism. While the victory of Stalinism in China struck a historic blow at the old imperialism from which it will never recover, it also set back for an indefinite period the triumph of the working class, democracy and socialism. Independent Socialism welcomes any rift in the monolithic front of the world Stalinist reaction, be it in the form of the rivalry between Peiping and Moscow or the open rupture between Russia and Yugoslavia. All such rifts must be used to help disclose the true nature of Stalinism, especially to those sincere socialists and communists who are in the ideological grip of Stalinism or under its influence to one extent or another. But Independent Socialism cannot permit itself to fall victim to any illusions about the National-Stalinist bureaucracy and its state power. In China, all the fundamental traits of Russian Stalinism are not only plainly in operation but are in some cases accentuated, as is inevitable under the circumstances of China's greater economic and political backwardness. If the backwardness and poverty of Russia were the main reasons for the imposition of the brutal police dictatorship upon the population, this applies with double force in China. Genuine revolutionists are as mercilessly hounded and murdered by the Chinese Stalinists as by the Russian. As in Russia, there are no organizations by the workers and for the workers, but only organizations of workers regimented by the totalitarian state for the purpose of controlling their thoughts and actions and enforcing a high degree of exploitation. In agriculture, the same basic tendency is manifested and growing in China that became the dominant characteristic in Russia: the transformation of the peasant into a state serf and the ever-increasing control of his life, his product and the disposition of it by the police state. For the people as a whole, years after the seizure of power by the Stalinists in China, they have not even bothered to go through the formality of granting themselves the popular legal authority of a national election to a national representative legislature and executive. This democratic right, which is nothing more than a Bonapartist plebiscite and therefore a fraud in all Stalinist countries, is as completely and contemptuously ignored in the Chinese Stalinist state as are any and all other democratic rights. We stigmatize the idea of a democratic or socialist self-development of Chinese Stalinism as a bluff or a grotesque self-deception which has as little in common with the idea of socialism as it has with the social and political realities of the class struggle in China.

In Yugoslavia, where the break with Moscow generated so many eager illusions among all sorts of opponents of Stalinism, the most recent developments have served to corroborate the position of the ISL to the hilt. In its foreign policy and diplomatic maneuvers, Titoism continues, without modification, to pursue the same opportunistic, unprincipled, unsocialist and undemocratic course with the capitalist powers as characterized the Russian Stalinist regime throughout the period of the theory of "socialism in one country" and to an extent still characterizes it. The economic concessions which the Tito regime has made at home, above all to the peasants, under the pressure of the Western bourgeoisie, world public opinion and resistance at home, are a familiar maneuver of Stalinism to maintain its basic power intact and to gather new strength for a new tightening of the vise around the people. The basic economic and political, that is, the basic social character of the Titoist regime remains unchanged and is in every essential respect identical with that of the Russian Stalinists. In recent times, this has been most spectacularly underlined by the enforced mobilization of the bureaucracy as a whole for the unanimous crushing of the Djilas tendency and the rejection of any deviation from the totalitarian police dictatorship in the direction of genuine democratization. The reiteration of the principle and practise of complete and exclusive monopolization of all political and therefore all economic and social power by the bureaucratic ruling class, which is the quintessential characteristic of Stalinist state power, constitutes the self-avowed Titoist identification with the fundamentals of Stalinism. Independent Socialism rejects all theories and policies based upon apologies for Titoist totalitarianism on the grounds of "exceptional circumstances," this being the classical form taken by all apologetics for the Stalinist totalitarianism in Russia and China. There are not and cannot be any circumstances so exceptional as to justify the disfranchisement, oppression and exploitation of the working class and peasantry in the sacred name of socialism.

The ISL takes note of the crisis that has broken out again in the Fourth International. The split in its ranks if world-wide, is profound and appears to be irremediable. The group which has maintained control of the Fourth International has developed more drastically the theory and practise of capitulation to Stalinism against which we have warned repeatedly and systematically. The Fourth International is today nothing more than a channel through which Stalinism poisons the former Trotskyist movement ideologically and politically. The decision to enter the Stalinist parties (wherever they are mass movements) and to enter the Social Democratic parties as partisans of the Stalinist world camp is exceeded in gravity only by the final adoption of the theory that Stalinism represents, in a bureaucratic or deformed way, the international socialist revolution. This represents the self-liquidation of the Fourth International as any kind of independent socialist, revolution-
ary and internationalist movement and reduces it to the role of campfollower and purveyor of troops to the Stalinist reaction.

The ISL regards with satisfaction the reaction, however belated, half-hearted and confused, that this course has produced among many sections or supporters of the Fourth International, notably in the United States, France, Britain and Ceylon. It welcomes the resistance that these sections, which want to continue the struggle against Stalinism, are offering to the capitulation of the Fourth International. It calls their attention, however, to the need of soberly and seriously reconsidering their entire past theoretical and political position on Stalinism and the Stalinist state, which led relentlessly to the present capitulation of the majority and which is incapable of consistently and effectively combating the extremists of this capitulation. The former Trotskyist groups can be restored to a Marxist, socialist and internationalist position only by reconsidering and consciously rejecting the theory that Stalinist slavery represents a form of workers' state, that the Stalinist parties represent a form of workers' parties, and the Stalinist regimes must be unconditionally defended in any war with a capitalist regime. The perpetuation of these theories absolutely guarantees a capitulation to Stalinism, if not in the general form that the Fourth International has now taken, then in every concrete important political situation. The Fourth International has proclaimed itself an integral part of the Stalinist camp in general and the Stalinist war camp in particular. The ISL completely repudiates, as inimical to the interests of the working class of the entire world, those under the rule of Stalinism included, the theory and practice of "defense of the Soviet Union" in any form and declares that support of the camp of Stalinist slavery is incompatible with the interests of democracy, internationalism and socialism. The ISL confirms its opposition to Stalinism, not in the name of support of capitalism, but in the name of support of socialism. The ISL's position toward the planned imperialist war repudiates this conception of opposition to the war. It cannot, does not and will not assume any political responsibility and therefore give any political support to any capitalist imperialism, for the latter fights not for the defense of the nation but for the rights and privileges of private property and its imperialist interests abroad. In the period of preparation for the imperialist war as well as during the war itself, should it break out, the ISL therefore defends only the interests of the working class and of democracy by the only means at its disposal, the class struggle against the imperialist bourgeoisie, which it proposes to conduct not in order to assure the victory of the armies of the "revolutionary camp" which the Fourth International now claims is represented by the Stalinist reaction, or in any way or degree to facilitate such a victory, but solely and exclusively to advance the interests of the independent workers class in such a way as to bring it constantly closer to a workers' government and a democratic socialist struggle against capitalism, imperialism and Stalinism. From the standpoint of this position, the ISL denounced the latest turn in the court of the Fourth International as an abandonment of the struggle against the war and a shameful capitulation to Stalinism.

The ISL reaffirms its position in favor of independent socialists who are now everywhere reduced to small cadre organizations, joining the Social Democratic parties in countries where they exist as serious working class political organizations in order to work within their ranks, alongside the worker militants, as a loyal left wing seeking to revitalize these movements into revolutionary socialist instruments of the working class. It is understood, of course, that our general position, while recommended in most countries, is not automatically assumed to be applicable universally and everywhere without concrete examination of the given country. In this connection, we note two developments. First is the reconstitution of a sort of Social-Democratic International at the Frankfort Conference of European Social Democratic organizations. The repudiation of the class struggle at this conference indicates anew the complete degeneration and theoretical bankruptcy of the official Social Democratic leaderships in Europe. They represent nothing more than petty-bourgeois socialism in the working class movement, that is, the policy of reforms within the framework of maintaining capitalism, at the best, and social imperialism at the worst. The refusal of the socialist organizations of the colonial or former colonial countries, in Asia primarily, to join the newly-reconstituted Second Internationalists, is entirely justified and correct and deserves the support of every genuine socialist. However, it is nevertheless in these Social Democratic parties of Europe that, as analyzed and forecast by the ISL, the radicalization of the socialist masses has thus far found its clearest and strongest expression. First and foremost is the Bevanist movement in the British Labor Party. The widespread nature of this development is attested by the fact that developments of the same type, although of different degrees of strength and political clarity, have taken place in most of the other European Social Democratic parties and trade union organizations. The ISL gives its warmest support to these movements, which are a manifestation of the irrepressible urge of the workers to break away from conservative, petty-bourgeois, bureaucratic socialism and collaboration with capitalism and imperialism in any form, without at the same time falling into the trap of supporting Stalinism in their place. The ISL, however, not only does not support the entire program and politics of such movements as the Bevanists, but warns most fraternally and most urgently against the gravely harmful nature of many aspects of this program. The tendency to ignore or subordinate the importance of workers' democratic and workers' control in the nationalized industries can be disastrous to the socialist evolution of the Bevanist movement and with it of the British working class as a whole. The tendency toward appeasement of Stalinism, in Russia or in China, like the tendency to depict Stalinism and the Stalinist state as having basic characteristics in common with socialism, can, if unchecked, develop into a fatal cancer for the Bevanist movement in which these tendencies have made their appearance. The desire to fight vigorously and uncompromisingly against militarism, imperialism and war, which represents one of the most encouraging and welcome hallmarks of the Bevanist movement and the widespread sentiment it represents in Britain and elsewhere, can be vitiated and negated if the movement continues to demand that, presumably in the interests of democracy and peace, the German people and their nation must continue to be deprived by the naked power of foreign military occu-
pation of the elementary right of national sovereignty and self-govern-
ment which the British and French people justly regard as an inalienable right. A positive socialist program, put forward as an alternative both to the capitalist road and the Stalinist road, is an unpostponeable necessity and the desire to fight for it is the outstanding contribution made by the Bevanist movement. But it cannot, in the long run, prove to be a contribu-
tion to socialist progress unless it is permeated consciously with an internationalist spirit of democratic equality for all nations and peoples, and a union of all available forces for an unambiguously formulated independent struggle against capitalist imperialism on the one side and Stalinist tyranny on the other.

The ISL finally notes the encouraging developments in the socialist movement in Asia, as manifested by the invitation of the Asian socialist conference at Rangoon. Unlike the petty-bourgeois socialist leaderships of Europe, some of the socialist organiz-
izations in Asia represent a healthy, progressive, militant movement, on the whole, stemming primarily from the distinctive historical and political position of their countries, the distinctive social position of their working classes (non-existence of an imperially-corrupted aristocracy), and their living associations with recent or still-operating revolutionary national movements. We welcome the general tendency among most Asian socialists to adopt a course of inde-
pendence from American imperialism and from Stalinist reaction. While the effectiveness of this course is weakened, at one extreme, by the conciliatory position toward American imperialism of the Japanese Right Wing Socialist Party, and at the other extreme, by the conciliatory, or confused position toward Stalinism of some elements in the Indian Socialist Party, and by manifestations of Nehruist neutralism in general, the basic tendency of the Asian socialist movement is in the direction of a firm anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-Stalinist and there-
with an independent socialist position. The ISL welcomes the formation of the Asian Socialist International and will do all that lies within its power to help in the clear and strong socialist development of the revolu-
tionary proletarian movement of the continent, and to help in informing the American proletariat of the prob-
lems and positions taken by that movement.

**Growth of American Conservatism**

... and New Problems for the Labor Movement*

We are now entering the 10th year since World War II. The nine years which lie behind us have been years of unparalleled prosperity and social peace. They have been purchased at the expense of death on the mountain ranges of Korea and massive prepara-
tions for a global atomic war. An arm-
ament economy, a vast government expenditure on armaments both at home and for America’s allies sus-
tained all types of economic activity in this country at record levels. They have been the golden age of the Per-
manent War Economy in America.

The Permanent War Economy con-
tinues; all the key social and economic questions are decisively determined by the course of imperialist antagon-
isms and preparations for war. But the rate of armament production is not arbitrarily expansible. It is deter-
mined by political factors. The cold war does not continue forever at the same pitch of intensity. The past year, for instance, has been a period of rela-
tive lull in the cold war, the so-called depente. Developments on a world scale, both sides seeking a temporary respite from the demands of war prep-
arations, tended toward a reduction in armaments or at least their main-
tenance at something approximating present levels. Far from ending the Permanent War Economy, the impact of this reduction has demonstrated that the economy of the United States is inseparably linked to the course of war production. The imperialist an-
tagonsms continually pose the immediate threat of war, limited or world-
wide, a threat which lurks in the basic nature of the present world crisis. The graph of war production in the Per-
manent War Economy will rise and fall. The experiences of the past months illuminate some of the social problems of American capitalism in just such a period of lull. We address ourselves to them without forgetting that the threat of war, limited or world-
wide, looms in the very nature of the contemporary world crisis and can suddenly break through any tem-
porary lull.

The resolution “Social Forces and Politics in the United States” adopted by the Independent Socialist League at its last convention, in 1951, did not concern itself with the problems cast up by such a lull. It was dropped and passed in the first year of the Korean war, and was heavily influenced by the enormous expansion of the war sector of the economy which was then under way. Both economic and po-
litical developments have traveled in the direction described in that resolu-
tion, but they have not traveled as fast or as far as we then thought they would.

The “golden age” of the Permanent War Economy has been a period in which production for war was just sufficient to maintain a continual mild inflation, without being so over-
whelming as to force the strait-jacket-
ing of the civilian economy. Such is the expansive capacity of our ad-
vanced industrial technology that it was possible for the government to di-
vert over $50 billions a year from the civilian economy without significantly impairing its operation and growth.

But the stabilization of the military sector, for whatever reasons, soon con-
fronts the capitalist economy with a series of problems different from those created by its continual expansion. The military sector remains as an enormous pillar which supports the whole structure and insures it against the kind of major collapse it suffered in 1930. But around and above this pillar a vast superstructure has been slapped together which begins to sag under its own weight. The prosperity of the past two years has depended as much on the continued growth of the civilian superstructure as it has on the expansion of the military sector itself. When the latter is stabilized, the civilian sector is deprived of the dynamic principle essential to its un-
interrupted expansion. The whole economy tends to be stabilized, to achieve a state of “normalcy” at a new level. This is the uneasy “nor-
malcy” peculiar to a period of lull in the expansion of the war economy. All political and social tendencies and movements are compelled to take its impact into account.

The political mood in the country which has accompanied the prosperity
of the past nine years has been one of growing conservatism. This has affected all classes and strata of the population. It resulted in ending the 20 years of Democratic rule at a moment when the country was at the top of its prosperity, and bringing the Republicans to power to preside over the liquidation of the boom which had put them there.

But this conservatism in America has been of a peculiarly uneasy, frustrated type. It has shown none of the calm self-confidence which has been associated with the Victorian era in Britain, or even with the more brawling period of the rise of American capitalism.

Liberal and conservative ideologists alike have sought to spread the conviction among the masses that American capitalism is a unique social system which is guaranteed to expand permanently and to assure an ever rising standard of living for all. But all their arguments and statistics, all the techniques of the public relations experts, those uniquely American hucksters, have failed to exorcize the twin fears of depression and war.

Despite the brave talk about ever-expanding prosperity, the American people have an uneasy feeling that their prosperity is a function of the war economy. They know that the war economy can only be justified by the existence of Stalinism in general, and of Russian Stalinist imperialism in particular. But the expansionist drive of this imperialism is uneven. It thrusts forward or pauses to consolidate its gains, depending on its opportunities, internal difficulties and the resistance it meets both at home and abroad. So far, however, it has retained the initiative in the cold war.

Hence the internal dilemma of American capitalism, and of the ruling class which directs its policies: Prosperity and social peace can be assured in the long run only by the constant expansion of military expenditures at home and abroad. But these expenditures have neither led to an immediate war, nor to political defeat of Stalinism on a world scale. The failure of its grand strategy under both Democratic and Republican administrations has led to serious rifts within the capitalist class itself.

The return of the Republican Party to power after 20 years in opposition was a result of the general rightward drift in American politics mentioned above. This drift, which has been created by the armament prosperity and the fear of world Stalinism on the one hand, and the inability of the Fair Dealers and their labor supporters to offer anything but a warmed-over repetition of their old programs on the other, has been given a further boost by the Eisenhower administration.

In power, the Republican Party has exhibited the predictable and predictable political and economic orientation of the dominant section of the American capitalist class. While continuing to administer all the institutions of the "welfare state" inherited from the Democrats, its main concern and emphasis has been to cut the budget, reduce taxes for the rich, and turn over to private business (under an umbrella of government guarantees against any possible losses) every economic resource and program which it possibly could.

As the first months of Republican rule happened to coincide with the peak of the armament boom, this policy met with no serious political resistance in the country. But it is inevitable that insofar as the economy softens in its phase of transition to the new level indicated above, disputes will arise within the Republican Party as well as in the nation as a whole on the further course of economic and social policy.

In agricultural areas the battle has already been joined over the issue of parity. As unemployment reaches the new "normal" levels for this economic phase, the problem of what to do about its relief, let alone its cure, will have to be faced. A revival of the social and political militancy of the workers which may be expected to follow a protracted operation of the economy at less than full-employment levels will once again raise the question of a "hard" or "soft" policy toward the trade unions and other workers' organizations in sharp form.

One of the most striking facts about the Republican administration is that the ruling party has been engaged in an internal struggle from the day it took office. Long before the party was forced to face these domestic issues in the acute form which they will assume in the future, it was divided into two openly warring factions. The illusion that Eisenhower could unify the country has quickly given way to the realization that it is quite beyond him to unify his own party, or even to keep its conflicts within manageable bounds.

The chief source of the division lies in the realm of foreign policy. It represents the conflicting perspectives adopted by different sections of the ruling class over how to fight the cold war and wield America's new position of hegemony in the capitalist world. It is a reflection of the tendency, in this era of world political crisis, for global issues to dominate other aspects of national life.

The division in the Republican Party is far from having congealed into hard factional form. The lines shift from issue to issue, with the bulk of the party representation in Congress and of their active backers and supporters in the country shifting with what appears to be the exigencies of the moment.

Despite this confusion and ambiguity, it is clear that there exists a hard and powerful core of Republican politicians who are generally dissatisfied with the conservative course of the Eisenhower leadership and are determined to shift it radically to the right. They are, generally, for the "go it alone" policy in foreign affairs; that is, they stand for the most brutal application of American economic and political pressure on the rest of the capitalist world. In the starkest terms of its ultimate political logic, they lean to a preventive war against Stalinism.

Their approach to domestic policy tends, in general, to be equally reactionary, though in this sphere they have been united chiefly, to date, in a virulent campaign against all shades of liberal and radical opinion under the banner of "fighting Communism." Although there is no one-to-one correspondence between the advocacy of a "hard" policy toward the allies abroad and the working class at home, the hard core of Republican reaction tends to have a common leaning, at the very least, on both questions.

The conservative mood in the country has favored the extreme right wing of the Republican Party. Although still a minority, it is powerful, self-confident and aggressive. At the moment, there is no other political force, except perhaps the Dixiecrats in the country at large, let alone in the Republican Party, which can equal its cohesiveness, drive and self-confidence. The result is that it is this political tendency which has had the initiative, has set the political tone, and to
which all other political groupings have been forced to adapt themselves to one degree or another.

The Eisenhower leadership in the party has yielded to the reactionary right on one issue after another in the interest of party unity. Goaded to desperation by the political offensive of "McCarthyism," it has sought to beat the senator from Wisconsin at his own game by extending the witch-hunt to include a former president of the United States in the category of conscious abetment of espionage. In foreign affairs its freedom of maneuver is hampered by the knowledge that any normalization of relations with Stalinist governments, however essential from the standpoint of American relations with its allies, will be denounced at home as "appeasement."

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY is incapable of presenting a firm and effective counterpoise to the reactionary right. The bulk of the Democratic Congressional representation conceals its secret sympathy with the right, or at the very least its lack of an alternative to its policies, under the tactical slogan of "let the Republicans kill each other off." The Fair Deal wing of the party is weak in Congress, and lacks cohesion as well as any clear-cut program, or even a sense of mission in the country as a whole.

In the realm of foreign affairs, the Democrats are reduced to giving docile support to what is, in the main, a continuation of the policies of their own past administration. At most they can snipe at this or that detail of the Truman administration. The titular leader of the party, hailed by the liberals as their savior during the 1952 elections, has indicated that his chief concern is a remembrance of the ties which held the New Deal coalition bound to the Solid South. Individual members of their weak Congressional contingent have raised their voices in warning against this or that aspect of Republican policy. But they have failed to unite as a cohesive bloc in Congress to offer an alternative program to the American people. By and large, they have accepted the strategy of their party leadership of self-effacement and non-involvement in the main political struggle of the day.

If the country is in for a considerable period of economic stagnation, even at a fairly high level of activity, the social problem at home will tend to assume a degree of political importance which it lacked during the rising phase of the armament boom. With the issues of unemployment, a falling standard of living and a farm crisis demanding attention, the Republican Party, especially its right wing, will find it more difficult to convince the people that their domestic troubles have been brought about by the infiltration of Stalinists into the government. The Democratic Party can be expected to gain in influence and perhaps win control of Congress in the 1954 Congressional elections. At the same time, those factors which militate toward a strengthening of the right wing inside the Republican Party and the anti-New Deal sections of society will continue in force. It is quite possible to envisage an increase in support for the Democratic Party and at the same time the emergence of a stronger Republican right wing, even of its capture in time of that party.

THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION has satisfied no one. It has succeeded in irritating the liberal-labor left wing without fully meeting the demands of the conservative right. Its victory in 1952 came as the end result of an accumulation of amorphous dissatisfaction with the continuance of Democratic rule. Backward, conservative, and politically inexperienced sections of the population expressed their resentment against the Korean war, against high taxes, high prices, and corruption in government by striking out aimlessly against the Democratic Party in power. The Eisenhower-Dewey, so-called liberal Republican wing, understood its mandate to be for the continuance of the basic reforms of the New Deal era with a bent toward conservatism and "business in government" in domestic policy and continuance of the Truman line in foreign policy. The right wing thought it had received a green light for an all-out crusade against "Communism," broadly interpreted to include New Dealism at home and socialism abroad. But both had miscalculated.

Those who put the Republican Party back in power had in no sense repudiated the social policies of the New Deal. They were demanding the soothing of vague dissatisfaction and put into office a party, none of whose tendencies was capable of satisfying them. Now, the decline in armament production and the rise of unemployment underlines the utter inability of the Republican Party to face the problems of the day.

The Democratic Party, nationally still considered the party of the New Deal, despite the fact that its own conservative right wing holds control in Congress, maintained the bulk of its supporters in line even while suffering defeat in 1952. The bankruptcy of the Republican Party, in domestic as well as foreign policy, can only have as its immediate result a restoration of confidence in the Democratic Party. If it should capture control of Congress in 1954, it will have gained in strength; but the Republican Party will still have responsibility, in the eyes of the people, for the national administration. Consequently, it may take a number of years, probably until after the presidential elections of 1956, for the party to be tested once again. But a Democratic victory in 1956 would not usher in a genuine leftist swing in the country unless the labor movements intervened in a more decisive way as an independent force. The Democratic victory would come, in part, as a result of another futile lashing out at the party which has borne major political responsibility for the preceding failures. Such an administration would, in all likelihood,
be even further to the right politically than was the last Truman government.

The crisis inside the Republican Party which has erupted in full public view can hardly be settled amicably, especially if the internal crisis occurs in the midst of a decline in its popular support. The right wing, far from displaying any tendency toward a demagogic social program, inclines toward the most conservative, pro-business policy. This is one of the things which clearly distinguishes it from a fascist tendency. Its inability to appeal to a popular demand for action on behalf of the people in the economic recession limits its ability to counter the growing influence of the Democratic Party.

The utter bankruptcy of Eisenhower's foreign policy gives the Republican right the possibility of capitalizing upon his failure to offer any alternative to Truman-Acheson. The latest international debacle of the administration in the face of the Indo-china crisis will tend to raise the morale and self-confidence of the Democratic opposition and help it to rally the liberal, leftward thinking sections of the population. But it will be the Republican right wing, and not the Dewey-Eisenhower faction, which will begin to mobilize the conservative strata. Thus, inside the Republican Party, among those who seek an alternative to twenty years of New Dealism, the right wing can be strengthened even while the Democratic Party is strengthened in the nation as a whole.

It is worthwhile to indicate some of the factors that can contribute to such a strengthening of the Republican right.

Even a relatively slight economic decline in this country is likely to have the most serious repercussions abroad. The economies of France, Britain, West Germany, as well as the raw-material producing countries in Asia and Latin America are in a far more precarious position than that of the United States. The cry of "trade, not aid" expresses the deepest needs of their economies and is essential to the retention of even the degree of political stability which they have succeeded in establishing since the last war. A steep decline in the economies of the rest of the capitalist countries which had been triggered off by a lesser decline in the United States would tend to increase the tensions within the capitalist world, and to widen the rifts which already exist between the United States and her allies.

The pressure for trade with the Stalinist world and for political agreements which would open up such trade to the maximum would become virtually irresistible. Political movements hostile to the United States, whether they be of the Stalinist or nationalist varieties, would be strengthened at the expense of the "pro-American" tendencies. The whole structure of American cold-war policy as it was conceived by Truman and Acheson and even as it is being executed by Eisenhower and Dulles, would reveal its basic and ineradicable weakness. Thus, the foreign aspect of American economic recession, could be grist to the political mill of the extreme right wing of the Republican Party. It is the only powerful group in American politics whose line has been consistently hostile to or critical of the European alliance, and the vast economic expenditures by which it has been kept alive. In time, this "go-it-alone" tendency (that peculiar mixture of opposing the alliance in Europe while advocating the most extreme measures against Stalinism in Asia) could receive a new boost in popular acceptance by the decline of American influence abroad. The hysterical fears of Stalinism both domestic and foreign, the latest tendencies to xenophobia and chauvinism exacerbated by the frustrations of the failure of American foreign policy would be exploited by this group to the maximum.

In sum, all the tendencies toward economic chauvinism and a struggle for the world market that thrust through during periods of economic stagnation will facilitate the task of the Republican right.

A bid for power, or even a victory, by the extreme right wing inside the Republican Party would, under such circumstances, put a powerful strain on the loose alliance which is the Democratic Party. The party as a whole, and its various components, would be forced to make an "agonized reappraisal" of their own political positions, both at home and abroad. This is especially true because the Democratic Party, if returned to power, would be burdened with renewed responsibility without gaining the ability to solve any of the big problems of the day.

On the domestic scene, the labor movement will be seeking a revival of New Dealism to lessen the impact of the economic decline on the working class. For this it will look to the Democratic Party, as in the past. Yet even a Democratic victory at the polls in 1954, unless it assumes landslide proportions all over the country, can only return them to a Dixiecrat-GOP majority in Congress, but this time with Eisenhower in the White House and General Motors running the administration.

Thus, in the realm of economic and social policy at home, labor can expect little satisfaction from its policy of supporting the Democrats for at least two years. Its hostility to the Dixiecrats, that is, to a powerful and essential part of the Democratic Party, can only be increased by a Democratic victory. And the policy of conciliation of the Dixiecrats which will most likely be followed by the bulk of the remaining Democratic leaders can only increase friction between themselves and the labor movement.

On foreign policy, the leadership of the labor movement will face an excruciating dilemma. They have supported the basic outlines of American cold-war policy throughout. Its virtual collapse abroad would find them compromised along with all other sections of American politics except the reactionary Republicans on the extreme right and the tiny group of supporters of the Third Camp on the left.

A rise of the extreme right wing of the Republican Party would signalize the greatest danger to democracy at home and a vastly increased danger of war. It will demand as it has in the past, the most extreme curbs on the labor movement, measures which threaten the ability of the unions to hold out against the big monopolies. From the Democratic Party labor will be demanding measures to protect the standard of living of the working class. Above all, it will seek to defend itself from the threat of the right wing. In fact, the labor movement, which has remained tied to its policy of supporting the Democratic Party through all the years of complaining, can be compelled to reorient its political line because of the menace of the right.

As the right wing grows inside the Republican Party and labor demands protection from it and a program of renewed social reform, a tendency toward a polarization of American politics is possible under the impact and...
The initiative of the right. The labor movement cannot create an effective barrier to the Republican right as long as it remains tied to the Democratic Party.

The election of a Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress in 1954 would represent a temporary and relatively weak leftward oscillation in the general rightward drift of American politics. This drift can be expected to continue, not as an uninterrupted movement proceeding with a uniform velocity, but as the main trend of American politics until it meets a counter-force in the form of the break-away of labor from the shackles which bind it to the Democratic Party. Such a break can come as a defensive reaction to the increased power of the Republican right and the accommodation of the major section of the Democratic Party to it, or as a result of a general rise of labor militancy, or most likely of all, as a combination of the two. It is impossible to predict exactly what combination of events and trends in American politics will bring about this break, or how far it lies ahead of us. But to believe that it is impossible to predict is to say that this country and this working class are exempt from the laws of the class struggle. An effective response of the American working class to the reactionary leaders of both major political parties is offered them. Capitalism, and particularly American capitalism, stands as an obstacle to self-determination for the colonial peoples, and tends to block, or to support the social groupings which block the workers in their struggle for greater economic equality, security and well-being in the advanced countries.

Despite the tremendous outpouring of military and economic aid to the senile capitalist regimes throughout the world, the United States has been unable to crush Stalinism as a world social movement. Even in those countries where its progress has been held in check, it remains an ever-present menace to the consolidation and stabilization of capitalism in general, and to the successful execution of American capitalist policy in particular.

It is inevitable that all supporters of American capitalism and its foreign policy, whether they be critical or wholehearted supporters, should seek some explanation for the continued social drive and appeal of Stalinism. They cannot accept the simple truth: that this barbaric, totalitarian movement for the overthrow of capitalism derives its strength from the decay of the system itself. Even when the glimmerings of this truth break through to the most intelligent and sensitive supporters of the system, they appear in the form of recognizing the need for some degree of social reforms abroad, for more economic aid to bolster foreign capitalism and soften its harshest features, rather than in the realization that nothing but its abolition by a progressive, democratic movement can really inflict a decisive defeat on world Stalinism.

Unable to accept the truth about the relationship between the decline of capitalism and the growth of Stalinism, virtually all sectors of American capitalist opinion have turned to the easy notion that Stalinism derives its total strength from certain of its organizational features. To them, Stalinism is simply a conspiracy. Its strength derives from its apparatus of espionage and infiltration into capitalist governments and social institutions. Thus, a powerful auxiliary aspect of the movement is seen as the whole. Thus, the chief weapon in the struggle against it is seen in the secret police, the agencies of counter-espionage, and in "smoking out" its secret adherents in the government, the unions, the schools, the arts and professions, in short, in all areas of capitalist society.

The definition of Stalinism as simply a conspiracy may serve well enough to whip the ignorant into a hysterical state in which any measure proposed for the isolation and destruction of the enemy becomes acceptable. But as the real Stalinist movement in this world is far broader than its conspiratorial section, and as its strength derives far more from the appeal of its ideas in a decaying capitalism than from the cleverness of its secret operatives, the government, and the pro-capitalist enemies of Stalinism in general were caught in a dilemma.

Should they concentrate their anti-Stalinist struggle against the few actual spies and infiltrators, or should they seek to suppress the political movement and its ideas? For them, the dilemma was quickly resolved. They would telescope the task. Every advocate of Stalinist ideas would be treated as a conspirator, and, if possible, as a criminal conspirator.
should have been fair warning to the rather than espionage, infiltration of the Roosevelt administration when it the object of legal repression. It mission of any overt revolutionary act for Truman with the attorney suspects with the provision of concentration the foundation of the McCarran immigration act which endanger the to illegalize the Stalinist movement here or abroad. The liberal teamsters union became its first victims.

This view was at the root of the federal "loyalty" program instituted by Truman with the attorney general's infamous "list of subversive organizations" as its chief instrument of identification and persecution. It was the foundation of the McCarran Internal Security Act which combined the most onerous features of seeking to legalize the Stalinist movement with the provision of concentration camps, in a time of "emergency," for suspects of possible political criminal activity. It lies at the root, also, of those aspects of the McCarran immigration act which endanger the security of resident aliens and naturalized citizens, and prohibit entry into the country of foreigners who may, at any time, have been members of Stalinist or revolutionary political movements here or abroad.

The legal assault of the federal government and its agencies on civil liberties has been merely the apex and end-product of the witchhunt which has engulfed the country. State laws of the most brutal and blatantly unconstituional character have been passed. Every reactionary organization, every super-American crackpot has been given free license to black-list, blackmail, hound and persecute the Stalinists, Stalinoids, genuine socialists, radicals and even liberals throughout the land. It was inevitable that in this atmosphere, after this massive preparation of the public consciousness in which both major parties and the most respected leaders of public opinion in the country have participated, there should arise a movement or an individual who could build on all that had gone before, and weld it into an instrument for his or its special purposes. McCarthy and McCarthyism has been the result.

McCarthyism

Three features, among others, distinguish McCarthyism from the more standard and widely-accepted varieties of witchhunting, on the one hand, and from the bulk of the right wing of the Republican Party on the other. First is the complete lack of inhibition in the choice of methods, the open contempt for the truth, the irresponsible resort to the most vicious type of demagoguery. Second is the conscious broadening of the object of attack to include every variety of political opinion beyond the confines of the extreme right wing of American politics. Third is the use of the witchhunt as a vehicle for obtaining political power, as an instrument with which to belabor all individuals and political groupings which do not align themselves with, and actively support the clique around the junior senator from Wisconsin.

The mechanics of the McCarthyite attack are relatively simple. Once the conspiratorial aspect of Stalinism has been identified and accepted as its fundamental characteristic, once the vast drama of social struggle between two social systems and their ideologies has been reduced to the terms of a spy-thriller, the door is wide open to the social demagogue. Every failure of American foreign policy, every mistake on the home front can be attributed to the work of conspirators in the government. From this it follows that the government officials under whose administration these failures or mistakes occurred must either be a party to the conspiracy, or at the very least have been delinquent in weeding out the conspirators. Anyone who questions this analysis, or its particular application to any field or individual is suspect of attempting to shield conspirators and their work. Neither the least, nor the last victims of McCarthyism have been and will be the very liberals who adopted the "conspiracy" theory of Stalinism in the first place.

No political groupings in the country have been able to meet and defeat McCarthy on his own ground. The Stalinists and Stalinoids have, in the main, sought refuge in the Fifth Amendment. The liberals have howled about his immoral methods, but since they and the Democrats as a whole accept his basic premises, their answer to the charge of "twenty years of treason" is a feeble: but we were the first to throw Communists in jail for their ideas—we invented the subversive list—we passed the McCarran Acts—we . . .

And the rest of the Republican Party, once it recognized that McCarthyism is as much a danger as an asset to itself, has taken three tacks. One was to seek to ignore the senator and his allies. When this proved impossible, it was to attempt to "beat him at his own game." When that failed to bring him to heel, it was to catch him off base on an issue unrelated to his political activities, and to seek to crush him politically, or at any rate to blackmail him into docility by showing him that they, too, can play rough in politics.

Although McCarthyism has found its most able, dramatic and effective spokesman in McCarthy, as a political force it does not depend on him for its existence. Without considerable and powerful backing inside the Republican Party and among a group of capitalists, McCarthy could never have become the feared figure he is.

The thing which most clearly distinguishes the senator from Wisconsin and his "movement" from the rest of the reactionary right wing of his party is its evident determination to wage a struggle for power inside the party to the bitter end. In this struggle they have not hesitated to denigrate the leader of their party, and the sacrosanct office of the President of the United States. They have not recoiled from the discreditment and disrup­tion of respected and vital government agencies and institutions. In short, they have shown contempt and disregard for the interests of their party, its administration, and the prestige of the United States government both at home and abroad. By any standard of democratic capitalist politics, they have failed to play the game according to the accepted rules.

This sets McCarthy and his followers and supporters apart from the ordinary conservative or reactionary element in the Republican Party. Although he has been the spearhead of the attack against the Democrats, the goal of unlimited power which he appears to aim at has served to turn a heavy section of the party against him.

McCarthyism is not a fascist tendency or movement. Still, it is not an "ordinary" conservative or even reactionary bourgeois current. Its course is away from bourgeois democracy. It presents not the traditional fascist danger of mobilization of the discontented petty bourgeois masses as a mass force to smash labor, but rather the danger of the imposition of a dictatorial, labor-curbing regime from...
and extreme polarization of American
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brings into their own ranks.
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the working class has been considered
rational as - the quickest means to re­
t to unionism. Now it must take the
(CIO's Political Action Committee, and the AFL's League for
here and there directly in the Democratic Par­
ty, the labor leadership has slowly
been building a political organization,
right of the division it brings into their own ranks.
The rise of a serious fascist move­
ment in the United States can only be
product of a much more powerful
and extreme polarization of American
then is now the case. In such
situation, however, the real danger to
democracy and the labor movement is
the strengthening of reaction, the ex­
tension of the witchhunt, the further
encroachments of garrison and police­
state tendencies on the whole of
society.

Labor in a Period of Transition
So far this analysis has concerned
itself primarily with the political rela­
tions and struggle by the bourgeois
parties, and with the impact of chang­ing
economic and world conditions on
this struggle. The political position of
the working class has been considered
only one point of view, i.e., that
of its possible response to the pressure
of capitalist reaction.
Throughout this period the labor
leadership has been firmly attached to
the Democratic Party (the exceptions
are well known). In 1952, the Ameri­
can Federation of Labor endorsed a
candidate for the presidency for the
first time since 1924—and went down
to defeat with Stevenson. The
attachment has been somewhat
different in recent years than before.
Through the CIO’s Political Action
Committee, and the AFL’s League for
Political Education, and here and
there directly in the Democratic Par­
ty, the labor leadership has slowly
been building a political organization,
a quasi-machine of its own. Although
in the overwhelming majority of cases
this machine has been simply a tail to
the Democrat's kite, here and there it
has fallen out with the political ma­
hine of the Democrats and waged
political campaigns parallel to theirs
or even against them.
The defeat of the Democrats in
1952 confronted the labor move­
ment with a new political situation. From
a tendency in the first six months of
Republican rule to hope for the best
from the new government, the labor
leadership has been rudely shocked
into the realization that the business­
men who now run the government
will use their political power to sup­
port their economic interests with few
inhibitions.

Given their political notions, it is
quite natural that the labor leaders
should turn to their old “friends,” the
Democratic opposition. But this oppo­sition has adopted self-effacement as
the “smart” tactic to pursue. The
leaders of the party, with Stevenson at
their head, have been busy re-cement­
ing their ties with the Southern reac­tionaries as the quickest means to re­
gain control of Congress and the po­
litical patronage which goes with it.
The interests of labor, the pleas of
labor . . . there will be enough time
for that when the election campaign
draws near with its open season for so­
cial demagoguery.

New Political Problems Face Labor
But the problems which confront
the working class, and hence the labor
movement and its leadership, are not
just a continuation of the problems of
1952. They, too, face the dilemma of
the transition from a war economy to
an economy with a large military es­
ablishment. And the workers feel the
impact of the transition far more
sharply and immediately and urgently
than do the capitalists.
The working class can choose be­
tween two main policies. One is to
support the New Deal wing of the
capitalist class and the Democratic
Party and to push for its revival on an
expanded scale. The other is to match
the political drive of capitalist reac­tion with an independent political
drive and emancipating program of
its own.
It is most likely that in the imme­
diate future the labor movement will
take the first course.
(a) The Democrats had the good
fortune to be defeated before the cold
war slowed down. The Republicans
are thus saddled with political respon­sibility for the softening which is
taking place in the economy. If this
softening continues till November
1954, it is quite likely that control of
Congress will shift to the Democrats.
The working class remained basically
loyal to them in 1952. Now a growing
contingent of farmers and hard­
pressed middle class people will turn
to them also. The argument that we
had prosperity under the Democrats,
and that things started to “slow up”
when the Republicans got in can well
top the screams of the witchhunters
this fall.
(b) If the recession is a slight one
and fails to deepen during or imme­
diately after the electoral campaign,
the workers and labor leaders will
probably be satisfied, for the present,
with a few minor concessions from the
Democrats: a good deal in the way of
promises, and a bit on account in the
way of extended unemployment com­
ensation and the like.
(c) If unemployment and short
weeks cut really deep into the ranks
of the working class, they will want
much more. Yet, regardless of how
bad things get in this respect, it is
probable that the workers and the
leadership of the labor movement will
seek to win their demands in and
through the Democratic Party. Only
repeated rebuffs, and a more or less
prolonged failure of the party to
bring into being measures which can
satisfy their most elementary demands
will lead them to break with it.
(d) In the long run, the economic
consequences, and hence the political
imperatives of a lull in the cold war
cannot be avoided by labor. And even
in the short run, the end to the sellers'
market for labor power will create a
new situation inside the labor move­
ment as well as in its relations to
the two capitalist political parties.
(e) The pressure for some kind of
action from the labor leadership is
bound to grow in the ranks. Unlike
the situation in the '30s, when the
basic core of the industrial working
class was unorganized, the pressure
cannot take the form of a mass surge
to unionism. Now it must take the
form of a movement within the un­
ions for action from the leadership.
If the leadership fails to lead, the
ranks will turn against them in one
way or another.
(f) Given the political atmosphere
in the country, the grave danger ex­
ists that a section of the working class
will seek to go outside the labor move­
ment for leadership if it gets none
from the bureaucracy or the advanced
militants in the unions. The reaction-
ary demagogues will find fertile soil in a section of the union membership, particularly on foreign policy issues, as well as in the middle class.

(g) Although it is likely that the first political movement will be back to the New Deal, the limitations to which it is subject (sketched above) will produce increasingly sharp frictions between the labor movement and their Democratic allies. The former will demand a social program far more extensive than the latter are willing or able to grant.

(h) Initially, this friction will take place inside the labor-Democratic alliance, and more specifically, inside the Democratic Party. As it develops in intensity, and its scope spreads from the narrower issues of candidates and tactics to the broader ones of program and policy, the tendency will be for the struggle to break out of the bounds of the Democratic Party into the development of new political forms.

(i) At this point it is desirable to refer once again to the impact on the relations of the labor movement to the Democratic Party of the reactionary drive of the right wing of the Republican Party (see above). The tendency to hang together in the face of the enemy will naturally be present. This tendency will remain dominant only if labor's elementary need for democracy at home can be served by its alliance. But the Democratic Party as a whole is neither likely to be able to elaborate a foreign policy which can compete with the Republicans, nor to stand fast for the protection of labor's rights and interests at home. It is this fact, as much as anything else, which will create the most serious conflict inside the Democratic Party, and which can lead to labor's eventual break from it.

The ultimate development of these tendencies cannot be drawn in detail from this distance. It is enough to seek to discern the general tendency of the alternative courses of development which lie ahead. Having grasped them, it is the duty of the conscious socialist organization to propagandize and educate for those policies in and for the labor movement which are most likely to advance the political and social interests of the working class and hence of the nation as a whole.

**Program of the ISL**

The Independent Socialist League will concentrate its propaganda and education in the coming period on three major interrelated issues. These are (1) the struggle for democracy in the United States; (2) the struggle for a democratic foreign policy based on the concept of the Third Camp; (3) the struggle for an independent policy of the working class on all issues, economic, social and political, which confront the American people, and for the formation by labor of an independent political instrument as the prime requirement for the effectuation of such an independent policy.

(1) **The Struggle for Democracy in the United States**

(a) The ISL will continue to push for the most uncompromising defense of civil liberties in this country. Without for a moment relinquishing its utter hostility to Stalinism, and its political struggle against the Stalinists in the labor movement and all popular organizations, it will continue to defend their civil liberties against all legal and illegal repression.

The field of espionage and counter-espionage lies outside the realm of interest or responsibility of the socialist movement. The ISL will continue, however, to oppose the extension of the concepts and activities of counter-espionage to the field of politics and ideas. It defends the right of all people to teach, to hold jobs, and to participate in the social and political life of the nation without let or hindrance because of their political ideas and associations. In the realm of academic freedom particularly, where the principle of professional competence has been replaced with that of ideology and/or political affiliation as the basis on which to determine the fitness of people to teach, the ISL declares that this is a blow at the basic concept of academic freedom in our schools and universities.

(b) The ISL will continue to fight to get off the Attorney General’s list of subversive organizations. It views this fight not only or primarily as a necessity to defend its legal rights and those of its members, but as a major contribution to the fight for democracy in this country.

In its effort to get off the subversive list, the ISL will constantly seek to broaden the issue, in its own propaganda as well as in whatever legal action it may take, to include a general attack on the list itself. It will seek to rally the broadest possible support against the arbitrary methods by which the list is set up, and against the continued existence of a list of organizations which are banned to a state of semi-legality by the very fact of their being listed.

(c) The ISL will seek to arouse all sections of the labor movement and liberal opinion against the practices and concepts of the witchhunt in all its manifestations. It will seek to educate the widest possible circles against the idea that the witchhunt, in general, or its special manifestation in McCarthyism, can be stopped by an acceptance of its premises coupled with a plea for "decent" and "responsible" methods in carrying it out. We will continue to emphasize that Stalinism can best be defeated when it is drawn into open struggle as a political movement, and confronted by a democratic and socialist political ideology and movement which offers a superior program for the solution of the problems of the working class and society as a whole.

(d) Our press and our members must seek every opportunity to educate the widest possible stratum of workers, students and others to the connection between the reactionary drive against democracy, the economic decline in this country, and the drive toward war.

(e) As part of the struggle for democracy at home, the ISL will continue to fight against all manifestations of discrimination against racial, national and religious minorities. It will continue to demand complete social, political and economic equality especially for the Negroes, the section of the American people who are still most consistently, broadly and viciously discriminated against in all these fields.

(f) In the struggle for democracy, the labor movement must be urged to take the leading role which the defense and promotion of its own interests require. The abolition of discriminatory practices against Negroes and other minorities in its own ranks is a prerequisite to its ability to effectively combat these practices by employers and in the country as a whole. Similarly, in continuing its fight against the influence of the Stalinists, the labor movement must firmly reject the ideas and methods of the witchhunt in its internal affairs, as well as the efforts of the government and employers to introduce them into...
the fields of industry and collective bargaining.

(g) Of special concern to the workers is the struggle against the bureaucratic encroachment on democracy in the labor movement. In its propaganda on this question, the ISL will constantly emphasize the concrete necessity of rank and file initiative and participation as a precondition for labor's successful struggles on the economic and political fields. The fight against bureaucratism and for inner-union democracy will be most fruitful where it is linked to the struggle for a specific program of union and political demands.

(2) The Struggle for a Democratic Foreign Policy

(a) The failure of the government's foreign policy to stabilize the world capitalist system, either economically or politically, will continue to play into the hands of the most reactionary section of the American bourgeoisie and their political representatives. Thus, to the widespread desire in this country for a foreign policy which can assure peace without permitting the continued expansion of Stalinism is added the need for a foreign policy which can deprive the reactionaries of the initiative at home.

(b) The working class has been weakened in the face of its enemies by its relatively uncritical support of the foreign policy of both Democratic and Republican administrations. This will become an even greater liability to the labor movement in the future. In its propaganda for a democratic foreign policy, the ISL must seek every opportunity to drive this fact home to the advanced strata of the labor movement.

(c) The labor movement, and the democratic forces in the country in general, can only effectively counter the drive of reaction by adopting and fighting for a truly democratic foreign policy. Such a policy must be based on the support of popular democratic movements and social forces abroad.

(d) In the colonial and semi-colonial world, this means the unqualified support of democratic movements for independence and self-determination. It means the support of all democratic movements in these countries against reactionary economic and political institutions, governments and classes. It means a steadfast opposition to the policy of this government which supports reactionary and imperialist governments abroad in the interest of military alliances against Stalinism.

(e) A democratic foreign policy with respect to the advanced capitalist countries abroad means likewise the support of the labor and socialist movements as against the capitalist parties who seek to continue their tottering rule over the working class. It involves the struggle for the use of the enormous wealth of this country not to bolster capitalism, but to encourage and support the widest redistribution of wealth and democratic administration of the economies of these countries in the interest of their populations.

(f) In its struggle for a democratic foreign policy, the ISL will continue to emphasize the inability of a government run by either of the capitalist parties to initiate and carry out such a program. It will seek to counteract the tendency of the liberal and labor movements to give critical support to the existing government's policy on the grounds that this is essential if Stalinism is to be restrained from further conquests, and in the hope that somehow, in due course, they will be able to bring their influence to bear on this government for a modification of its policy in a democratic direction.

On the contrary, a complete break with the government's position and the espousal of a democratic foreign policy in opposition to it is necessary not only to halt United States support to colonial oppressors and reactionary governments, but as the only strategy which can defeat Stalinism both as an imperialist power and a world movement.

It is essential to emphasize that simple "anti-Stalinism" is far less capable of defeating this totalitarian movement than was the liberal and Stalinist "anti-fascism" capable of preventing Nazism from coming to power.

Stalinism must be confronted with movements which fight with the utmost determination and militancy against the decaying social systems and their ruling classes which create the social soil for the Stalinist movements. American foreign policy is guilty of bolstering and supporting the very conditions on which Stalinism thrives, and of opposing or working contrary to the interests of the very social movements which are most capable of defeating Stalinism.

It is in the creation of a positive social principle, a positive social force to defeat Stalinism that the chief strength of a democratic foreign policy lies. The fact that this cannot be done without also endangering, at the very least, the continuation of the capitalist system all over the world should not in the slightest deter all who are truly devoted to the principles of democracy and freedom from adopting and struggling for it.

(3) The Social and Political Struggle in the United States

(a) A continued softening of the economy would, in due course, exert a depressing effect on the standard of living of the workers. Unemployment, short work weeks, an intensification of the speedup and the introduction of labor-displacing machinery, the closing down of less efficient plants, all these would sharpen the problems of the workers and the labor movement.

It would be wrong to expect that such developments will have an immediate, drastic effect in the radicalization of the workers. It will take some time for the labor movement to reorient its political and industrial policies.

(b) The labor movement will find it more difficult, in the coming period, for both economic and political reasons, to achieve any gains for the workers. To the degree that the unions seek to resist the lowering of wages and the layoffs by economic struggles, these will be defensive ones.

(c) The ISL should adopt and seek to propagate a program of specific demands for placing the burden of unemployment and short work weeks on the shoulders of the corporations. The demand for a guaranteed annual wage, for shorter hours without reduction in pay, for a drastic extension and increase in amounts of unemployment compensation, for employment at trade union wages guaranteed by the federal government to all who will be outstanding features of such a program.

In addition, the organization and its members should pay the closest attention to demands put forth by the workers themselves. Our chief criteria in putting forth an economic program should be; is any particular demand of a generally progressive social character. Is it the kind of demand which can mobilize the workers to political and economic action in their own behalf.

(d) Our friends in the unions, and our writers and propagandists should
be alert to every change in the mood of the workers. We must recognize that the long period of passivity has had a dulling effect on us as well as the masses. Without exaggerating every sign of the revival of political and social consciousness and militancy among the workers, we should recognize that conservatism is the chief danger for us in this changing situation.

(e) Throughout the labor movement we must seek to spread the understanding that prime responsibility for the sagging of the economic structure rests with the government, and that the most important type of activity for the workers is political activity.

(f) To the initial swing toward New Dealism, we must counterpose in every way possible the idea of independent labor politics, of the independent labor party. This will remain the main propagandistic line of Labor Action and our friends in the unions, but in a more intense, lively and concrete way than in the past few years.

(g) Wherever possible, on a local basis, our friends in the unions should seek to stimulate and participate in the running of independent labor candidates on the basis of the most radical platform possible.

Where unions have rejected our policy and have decided for participation in bourgeois parties, must we take a hands-off position and refuse to participate any further in the discussions? Such a question was raised at our last convention and is posed again by the fact that the labor movement shows no present signs of breaking away from the Democratic Party.

It is entirely permissible, in fact it is indicated to our friends to point out to union militants who have rejected our proposals and who look toward the Democratic Party and who hope to utilize it in the interests of the working class that they, from their viewpoint, which we do not share, ought to fight for their own candidates from the ranks of labor and responsible to it even in the Democratic Party. It would be correct, in this connection, to discuss in advance how to stimulate or prompt such militants to press in union debates for such decisions. Moreover, in those instances where the participation of the trade unions in the Democratic Party has reached the point where their political activity dominates or controls the local functioning of that party, it is incumbent on us to urge that labor run its own-labor controlled-slate of candidates in primary and general elections for both public and inner party office against, or in disregard of the wishes of the regular party machine. By this means labor's active commitment to the Democratic Party can be turned into a progressive channel by projecting a struggle within that party, a struggle which will highlight the present contradictions between labor's domination of local party functions and the utilization of that party machinery for anti-labor ends. Such an independent stand, even while within the Democratic Party, will tend to split labor from its conservative, bourgeois and imperialist allies, and under favorable circumstances can represent a sparking of labor into an Independent Labor Party course.

As in the past, wherever the local electoral set-up provides for non-partisan candidates as in Detroit, or offers an independent line, as the Liberal Party in New York, we campaign for the unions to run their own candidates. In this connection, the convention decides that the categorical prohibition against ISL support for such candidates under any circumstances, which was adopted at the last convention of the League, is no longer operative.

The United States is still deep in the woods of conservatism engendered by the long armament-based prosperity. But the softening of the economy at home, and the continued inability of the United States to stabilize and consolidate the capitalist world against Stalinism cannot help but lead to moods of questioning, uneasiness and eventually to a revival of political and trade union consciousness and militancy in the working class.

The chief danger for the weak and beleaguered socialist movement in this country is that it will succumb to the pressures which bear down upon it; that the passivity which has become widespread in its ranks will prevent it from recognizing and responding to the new opportunities which may well present themselves in the not too distant future.

We have become all too familiar with the American working class from its meanest, bourgeois side. We must take care lest we fail to recognize and properly assess the beginnings of its political reawakening because of the confused and contradictory forms which it may at first assume.

The least of our dangers is that we will jump to some form of foolhardy or adventurist political line or activity at the present time. What is required of us above all is steadfastness in the face of continuing adversity, and next to that the closest and most painstaking attention to every change in the mood of the workers and the population at large. That is the duty not only of the leadership, but of every conscious socialist who has stuck by his principles and ideas through the long, dreary pull. If we fulfill this duty, and act firmly and determinedly when the situation permits, the results will give our activity an impact and meaning which may well far exceed what we have been able to accomplish during the past few years.

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July-August 1954
BOOKS IN REVIEW


The way in which this book came into being is worth mentioning at the very outset for the light it throws on the level of American scholarship in the field of Russian studies, or at least one section of it. The author of this book drew directly on the material and intellectual resources of one of America's wealthy scientific and technical centers of learning, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and, indirectly, on the entire American academic community engaged in this field. As Professor Rostow explains, the study was the outgrowth of a collective effort by a group of scholars at M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies. In addition, Mr. Rostow expresses his warm gratitude and thanks to such "experts" on things Russian as Clyde C. Kluckhohn and Merle Fainsod of Harvard's Research Center for their advice and criticism. However, Professor Rostow is man enough to take responsibility for the final results, and what results they are!

In his preface, Max Millikan, Director of M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies, stresses the point that this study is not a mere accumulation of "facts," but rather is an exercise in probing the dynamics of Soviet society, its "prime motivating forces." To that end, the Center asked Professor Rostow, a specialist in the field of 19th century economic history, to attempt such a theoretical appraisal with the help of a large group of specialists in the field.

One of the secondary aims, Professor Rostow himself modestly tells us in his introduction, is "to assist the makers of American policy." It seems that "The questions which were keeping men awake nights in Washington were exactly those which trouble us." We are inclined to believe this book will only aggravate the insomnia now so prevalent, according to Rostow, in Washington.

To demonstrate the fine edge of Rostow's thinking, it is best to begin with the following quotation: "What can be said is that Soviet society has emerged in the post-1945 years confirmed as a hierarchical structure, with its standards and privileges built around the higher levels of the bureaucracy—a class thoroughly different in values and objectives from the group of professional subversives and revolutionaries, the more or less idealistic thugs who seized power in 1917, dominated Soviet society over its first decade, and were mostly eliminated in the Great Purge." (My emphasis—A. S.)

The exquisite choice of language we have underlined indicates of course the great objectivity which controls Professor Rostow's thinking. And as for originality, surely we must grant him the laurel for discovering that Stalinist society is built on a hierarchical principle with corresponding grades of privilege! Amid this great cascade of brilliance, Professor Rostow tends to confuse his readers. Thugs though Lenin and his Bolshevik associates were, Rostow is willing, as the above quotation shows, to grant they were guided ed by a thoroughly different set of values and objectives than Stalin and his less cultured thugs. But on page 245, we are illuminated by the blinding revelation which explains all of Russian history from Lenin to Stalin and including Malenkov in the following grand manner: "It is the burden of this essay that there has been a remarkable continuity in the priorities, or effective scale of values, in terms of which dominant Soviet leaders have decided the issues with which they have been confronted." (Emphasis mine—A. S.) Furthermore, "Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, and the others now at the apex of Soviet power have lived their mature lives wholly within the Soviet tradition whose continuity can be traced over half a century, from the publication in 1902 of Lenin's What Is To Be Done down to the present." 

We do not insist on too technical a use of language. However, you cannot in one and the same breath say that Lenin and his collaborators had a different set of values from those that governed Stalin and guide the post-Stalinist bureaucracy, and also insist that there has been "a remarkable continuity in the priorities, or effective scale of values." You cannot, that is, if you are seeking to scientifically explain the origins and evolution of the present ruling class, and thereby to throw some light on its dynamics.

But if consistency is not your care, and you have the courage to ignore history, the magic principle is at hand that explains the past, present and future of totalitarian Russian society. If you want to know why Lenin introduced the NEP, read What Is to Be Done. If you want to know why Stalin reversed this policy and instituted forced collectivization, also read What Is to Be Done. As Professor Rostow explains, "The priority of power takes form first in Lenin's conception of the disciplined party as the chosen instrument for implementing the Marxist historical progression"; from Lenin to Malenkov, the main concern of the Bolsheviks has been to maintain state power at all costs. All that has happened since the seizure of power in 1917 has been the continuous application of this principle to every sphere of Russian society.

Applying his principle of the "priority of power" to the area of foreign policy, Rostow marks Brest-Litovsk as the crucial turning point where the Bolsheviks identified their historic mission with the maintenance of Russian national power. But then the good professor has to explain away the fact that at the outset the dictatorial Lenin submitted to majority decisions in the politburo and accepted Trotsky's tactic of "neither war nor peace" as a means of encouraging the German revolution. Likewise, the reader will remember, did not believe in the imminent outbreak of the German revolution and felt Trotsky's tactic would cost the Soviet power heavily in territorial losses.

Professor Rostow resolves the difficulty on page 138 by saying "In the winter of 1918 control of policy was more directly dependent on opinion within and without the party than it later became, and thus Lenin had to compromise." That is, because of party and Soviet democracy, the principle of the "priority of power" had to yield to the principle of revolutionary internationalism! This creates another difficulty which Rostow does not even touch. Following his line of reasoning, there must have been even more party democracy in the preceding year of 1917, and it must be assumed to have been greater as one recedes in time to the magic year of 1902 when Lenin wrote What Is to Be Done. Perhaps

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the Bolshevik Party and its program were infused with the very spirit of revolutionary socialism from the very day of birth. Perhaps they even took power on the basis of this same principle. And perhaps, also, Professor Rostow's slick machine constructed on the principle of the "priority of power" does not work too well, and had best be sent back to M.I.T.'s engineering laboratories for some basic redesigning.

The truth is that *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* is for the most part a mere rehash of standard bourgeois versions of Russian history since 1917, and as such can safely be assigned to oblivion. What makes it truly offensive are its theoretical pretensions and the low level of scholarship.

Professor Rostow is a specialist in 19th century European economic history. But it is Professor Rostow who says on page 170, "In general, it may be said that in allocating its national income for purposes of consumption, the Soviet system has followed an approximation of Ricardo's and Marx's 'iron law of wages.'" Leaving aside the fact that this observation is meaningless as it stands, it shows that Professor Rostow never heard of the fierce dispute which raged between Lasalle, who espoused this fictitious law, and Marx who rejected it.

The only possible justification for this book might have been the final chapters which deal with the post-Stalin period. But all Professor Rostow has done here is to read everyone else's speculations and rewrite them in his own peculiar style, a cactus-like hybrid of academic and state department prose. This section could have been condensed into a pamphlet of a dozen pages and issued as a modest pamphlet entitled, "Some Not Too Original Speculations on What May Happen in Post-Stalin Russia." This would have saved M.I.T. some money and the reader some time.

A. S.