

THE

RED FLAG

Organ of the Communist League of Great Britain

VOL. I. NUMBER 11.

ONE PENNY.

OCTOBER 1934.

THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE: Its Past and its Future

ON another page we print the statement of our National Committee on the League and its immediate programme. Our point of view has been set out in various articles and leaflets but only in relation to certain problems: up till now we have not had a concise summary covering the whole field of present day problems confronting the workers' movement. The statement will repay careful reading and consideration for, unlike so many so-called revolutionary documents, it is the result of an examination of the actual situation in this country and an attempt to estimate the needs of the working class movement as a whole, as well as to define the special position of the Communist League. The statement should make possible a considerable strengthening of the League members' activities and provide a broad basis upon which our members and supporters can work with left-wing members of the Labour and Trade Union Movement.

It is almost twelve months since the Left Opposition of the Communist International became the Communist League; the change of name symbolised our break with this International and our recognition that all hope for its re-generation had to be abandoned. We ceased to bend our main efforts to the reforming of the Comintern, arguing that, as a progressive force, it was finished; that however long it lived on the prestige of the Soviet Republic, however long its machine and money kept it in existence, henceforth it could perform no useful political function; rather the reverse. From this arose the new work of the League - the creation of a new revolutionary International with a strong section in every country.

At that time it did seem possible that the elements for the new international would come from the "Left Socialist Parties". This argument had considerable basis in the past history of the Comintern: under the pressure of great events whole sections of Left Social-Democracy entered the ranks of Communism in the post-war period. And after the Hitler victory the interest in the viewpoint of the Left Opposition was high within the ranks of the Left Parties: in this country quite a large section of the I.L.P. displayed a readiness to consider our views favourably in the light of the hopeless retreat of the German Communist Party. It seemed that taken at the flood the tide would lead on to fortune!

It is hard to recognise a set-back, harder still to admit it. By far the most natural and least blameworthy mistake of revolutionary enthusiasts is to assume that others see as clearly as they do themselves. Did not the Left Opposition predict clearly and consistently the certainty of Hitler's victory unless the Comintern changed its

policy? Did it not put forward, two and a half years before, the vital importance of the United Front of working class organisations against the common danger? Did it not attack precisely those policies which the Communist Parties of all countries have since been silently abandoning with almost indecent haste? Did not its criticisms and explanations become the stock-in-trade of almost all thinking workers? Under such circumstances it was natural that our members should expect, with the verification, in almost every detail, of our position, great numbers to flock to our banner, especially in those countries where the work of the Opposition had been conducted for a longer period and on a much wider scale than in this country, where the forces were new and weak. Not all of us shared the optimistic hope in the Left Socialist Parties but few doubted that there would be a strengthening of the Left Opposition.

We can see now that, whilst, as a result of our work, the reasons for Hitler's victory and the defeat of the workers' organisations were made clear to scores, perhaps hundreds, millions saw only the fact of the terrible collapse, and either drew back in confusion or pressed forward for a hurried consolidation of the workers' ranks, irrespective of political ideas or party divisions. The aftermath of the German defeat was not increased support for a new International, save in certain limited circles, so much as pressure for greater unity; a feeling that has grown until today it has compelled the workers' parties in three great countries to operate the "united front". The turn to the 4th. International proved transitory: the "Left" leaders drew back as we expected they would but held back also the bulk of their followers. There were some breakaways in the Communist Parties, but the constant changes in membership, and the bureaucratic terror had so crushed the past revolutionary traditions and so weakened the theoretical level that the membership showed little response to the events of the time.

The 4th. International is still needed: more now than ever. We do not doubt that the set-backs are temporary or that it will arise again, stronger and better for its experiences. But first we must realise that a firm basis must be built in every country, recruiting from the ranks of the organised workers and from the youth. For only in this way will the conditions for its rapid growth be assured. The task remains the same but the circumstances have changed: with the changed circumstances our methods must change. The road will be more difficult, that is all.

Correct ideas are not in themselves sufficient: there must be established the means to realise them in action, to relate them to the immediate needs and problems

of the workers. Some will maintain that the easiest route to the new party lies through the conversion of the parties formed outside the reformist movement: the I.L.P. and the C.P.G.B. Those still clinging to the C.P.G.B. have found renewed hope in the throwing overboard by this party of great chunks of its own policy. The essential fact is, however, that these changes are made without consideration of past error or without full open discussion among the membership, an essential for effective change. Changes in the opposite direction can be made as quickly and as futilely and undoubtedly will be. They are imposed from above, not grasped below. They are not clean breaks with the past but carry with them, like millstones round the neck of the party, great pieces of the previous policy, nullifying considerably the effect of the changes. It is a stampede, not a serious reconsideration. How far it will go, how soon the Comintern will revert back to yesterdays follies, none can say.

With regard to the I.L.P. we do not doubt that numbers of its members are sympathetic to our views or that they can be won to our banner. What we do deny is the possibility of making out of the I.L.P. a sound national revolutionary party. The last Conference of the I.L.P. marked the third year of intense political discussion, of considerable organised effort to move it from reformism to revolutionary politics. Yet it was unable to formulate an unambiguous programme and elected again the self-same centrist leaders to its N.A.C. This, given an increasing wave of discussion and activity would mean little: its effects would be but temporary. But the wave was, and is, a declining one: since the last congress sections have broken away on both wings whilst the wave of political discussion has weakened considerably. Its leaders either ape the worst vices of the Communist Party or else content themselves with vague phrases and highly commendable, but useless, sentiments.

We are ready to work with all militant workers in the I.L.P., through their party or otherwise, in the fight for a correct policy. We look to many of them to play a considerable part in the building of the base for the new party. But we hold no illusion that the Party as a whole can be made into the new revolutionary party.

No, there is no easy way to the new Party: the path marked out in the "Communist League and its Immediate Programme" must be held to. Upon all our supporters we urge the need for a full, unprejudiced consideration of this document: events will, we feel convinced, justify to the hilt its main contentions, and the results more than repay the efforts it calls forth.

R.G. Aug.30 th. 1934.

A Letter

To the Russian Section, International Communist League

Dear Comrades,

The Stalinists have long prepared the capitulation of Rakovsky as a decisive blow. And now, after many months it is evident that the blow has missed its mark. In the U.S.S.R. amongst the thousands of prisoners, deportees, expelled from the Party and deprived of bread two or three weary veterans follow Rakovsky; from all the remainder - not one man! And all this in spite of the extraordinarily difficult situation of the Bolshevik-Leninists, at a time in which the Stalinists link themselves with world reaction in hunting and pursuing them.

The main argument for capitulation is, at the same time, the main proof of the political inconsistency of the capitulators. The victorious offensive of Fascism demands according to Rakovsky, the union of "all forces" for the defence of Soviet power. But the whole point in question is knowing HOW to withstand reactions' victorious offensive, and HOW to safeguard Soviet power. Stalin declared that Social Democracy and Fascism were inseparable twins. The policy of the united front was, upon that very basis, condemned once and for all. Two days before Hitler's victory the C.I. affirmed that the proletarian revolution in Germany was going forward at full steam to victory. The setting up without hindrance of the fascist dictatorship in the most highly industrialised country in Europe was put forward by the C.I. as the "speeding-up of the proletarian revolution". The policy of the German Communist Party before, during, and after the fascist seizure of power was declared to be irreproachable. It was with such criminal deceptions that there was lost in Germany a situation extraordinarily full of revolution ary possibilities.

Throughout the years 1929 to 1933, the C.I. prepared and delivered such a blow at Soviet Power and the world revolution, that in comparison with the economic successes of the U.S.S.R., even of the second and third Five Year Plans, are left far behind. Rakovsky has not even attempted to reply to the question: Was the policy of Stalin-Thalmann in the great class battles correct or disastrous? Those who replace the defence of the historic interests of revolution by complacency regarding the Soviet bureaucracy, its faults and its crimes, can expect nothing from Bolshevik-Leninists but well deserved contempt.

When in France the rising tide of fascism mounted about their necks, the terrified leadership of the C.I. accomplished, in a few hours, a turn unprecedented in political history; throwing aside like a dirty dish cloth the theory of social-fascism; declaring for - and under what a vulgarly menshevik form! - the defence of democracy and the united front with Social Democracy, proclaiming it not only as the superior principle but as the only principle, to which must be tacitly sacrificed the revolutionary tasks and criticism of reformism. With monstrous cynicism in ideas, these individuals no longer do us the injustice that we preach "as counter revolutionaries" the

the united front from above, but of not having a "loyal" attitude towards those at the top, of attempting to use the united front to strengthen the revolutionary wing at the cost of Social Democracy. What means this "leap to Death"?

Moscow understands. It seems, that the increase of tractors alone not only will not resolve Socialism, but will not even guarantee the existence of the Soviet State. If even for a moment one believed that a complete socialist society would be built up in the U.S.S.R. in the course of the next four or five years, it would, despite that, be impossible to shut one's eyes to the fact that Fascism achieves its cannibal victories with much less delay. It is unnecessary to explain what consequences the fascisation of the whole of Europe during the next year or two would have for "Socialism in One Country"! From which a sharp increase of panic amongst the leading bureaucrats. From which the telegraphic order to effect a turn of 180 deg., and the masking of it behind a new wave of poison gas calumny against the "Trotskyists".

To aid these proceedings, the bureaucracy maintains an unlimited domination over the C.I.; but, at the same time, the C.I. loses the respect and confidence of the working masses. The change of policy in France is produced without any semblance of either criticism or discussion. On waking, the members of the French party have simply learnt that to-day it must call that truth which yesterday it called lies. Then the Rakovskys and the Sosnovskys declare that this regime is to the "merit" of Stalin! We ourselves think that this regime is the misfortune of the revolution; in any case, the capitulators must at least say before what they have capitulated: before yesterdays Stalin-Thalmann policy which has given such happy results in Germany, or before to-days directly opposite policy of Stalin-Cachin in France? But the capitulators will not venture to make a choice. They have capitulated not before a policy but before a bureaucracy.

The C.I.'s policy has permitted the Second International to retake, during the last ten years, the dominant position in the working class. With the lessons learned, the crisis, the poverty, the reactionary gangsterism, the approach of another war, violently drives towards the sections of the Communist International many groups of workers. But these superficial and ephemeral "successes" in no way correspond to the political situation and to its gigantic tasks. The German Communist Party had until the end of its legal existence "successes" incomparably greater, but these did not save it from the depths of ignominy.

Amidst the parties of the Second International, the leaders of which are the picture of miserable shameful uncertainty, as to where they stand, a process of radicalisation is going on at the moment amongst the masses. The C.I. regime, the somersaults of the Stalinist bureaucracy, the cynicism of its proceedings and of its methods, now constitute the principal obstacle in the way to the revolutionary

training and mustering of the proletarian advance-guard. Meanwhile, without the mobilisation the working masses - not merely for mass meetings and great processions, but for decisive struggles; with out the correct leadership which unites revolutionary intransigence to Leninist realism, the fascist victory will come in France with the same inevitability as it came in Germany. What will then be left of the theory of "Socialism in One Country"? Nothing more than what remains to-day of the theory of Social Fascism.

The Bolshevik-Leninists get ready not to capitulate but on the contrary to increase their effort tenfold. The socialist workers must now become their chief field of activity. The issue must be shown to them more exactly; shoulder to shoulder with them the way out through revolution must be found. Thus only can the communist workers be wrested from the grip of the bureaucracy and not only unity of action in the struggle against Fascism be assured but also a true revolutionary mass party created, part of the Fourth International which will lead the proletariat to the conquest of power.

Dear Comrades! Those who share your standpoint throughout the world know the inhuman conditions in which the Stalinist bureaucracy has placed you. They have so much the more respect for the firmness with which the majority of you have given proof in face of new repressions, new calumnies, and new treacheries. No, you have to give way to nothing. On the contrary, you have before you a great revolutionary mission to accomplish. You have the task of placing before the advanced workers of the U.S.S.R. the problems of the International revolution, which are now remitted as a monopoly into the hands of Manuilsky, of Kuusinen, of Piatnitsky, of Lozovsky, and Irresponsible third and fifth rate functionaries.

Bolshevik-Leninists! The future of Europe and of the rest of the entire world has now entered on a critical stage, in which the destiny of the U.S.S.R. and of the International Revolution must be settled for the whole of an historic epoch. The revolutionary lessons which we have mastered in a dozen years of struggle against bureaucratic centrism, or Stalinism, we must now bring to the masses. We ourselves must open out the way to them, cost what it may.

FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE U.S.S.R.!

FOR THE WORLD PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION!

FOR THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL!

The Representative of
Russian Communist League (Bolshevik-Leninists) Abroad.

The United Front in Britain and France

The Communist League, over a long period, has advocated the united front from organisation to organisation of the working class, in the fight against Fascism. The failure to obtain a genuine united front in Germany was one of the main causes for Hitler's victory. As was pointed out at the time: largely responsible for this was the incorrect policy of the German Communist Party which advocated a "united front only from below", that is no united front with the leadership of Social Democracy, and therefore proved no united front at all.

After the debacle in Germany, the desire and pressure of the French workers for a genuine unity against Fascism, precipitated an opposition within the French Communist Party against their insane policy. This opposition was the Doriot case.

THE DORIOT CASE

Jacques Doriot was a foundation member of the French Communist Party, a member of its Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and one of the founders of the Young Communist International. He has been a leader of the Party in the Chamber of Deputies, and Mayor of the St. Denis district of Paris since 1929.

In January 1934, Doriot raised the issue of the united front policy of the Party; that they should drop their "united front from below" tactic, and pursue instead, the united front from organisation to organisation, for an approach to the social democratic leadership. The Central Committee rejected Doriot's proposals, and Maurice Thorez stated "Some opportunists of the Communist Party of France are proposing that it abandon its policy of the united front from below and carry out a policy of a bloc with the social democracy, . . . to abandon the positions of Bolshevism in order to turn to the Social democratic rubbish heap" (International Press Correspondence 13.4.34). Having failed to obtain a discussion through out the Party, Doriot published his views in the local paper L'Emancipation, and under his presidency a united front of all the proletarian parties was formed in St. Denis during the stormy days following February 6th. This was against the instructions of the Central Committee, but Doriot obtained the support of practically the whole of the St. Denis district of the Communist Party (over 350 members). The French Party fought by every means against Doriot's united front policy. Meanwhile Doriot, to show that he had the support of the workers withdrew from his post as Mayor and ran again as candidate on the basis of his policy. He was re-elected with an overwhelming majority. When Doriot set down his arguments in an open letter called "For Unity in Action", and which was sent to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, no attempt was made by the latter, to argue ideologically with his case. In stating that Doriot must cease his struggle or otherwise appropriate organisational measures must be taken against him, the Comintern declared "Doriot's open letter . . . is only a mask to cover up his splitting policy. Thus Doriot has entered upon the path once travelled by the counter-revolutionist Trotsky in his struggle against the Russian Communist Party and against the Comintern." Doriot replied to this in his local journal: "It has now been proved that it is not possible to discuss loyally inside the party without being visited with the disciplinary sentence

of excommunication. The system is bad and only two perspectives are left to a Communist; either to swallow the line and mistakes of his party without ever discussing, or else to discuss this line and its mistakes and be expelled". In a speech to the Central Committee of the party Doriot proposed that the party take up the united front on a national scale offering a practical programme of joint struggle to all reformist organisations. When Doriot's proposals became known to the workers, they were printed in our brother organ in France, La Verite, this proved too much for the C.P. and Doriot was expelled.

The sequel to all this has now been the adoption by the French Communist Party of almost the very policy of Doriot for which he was expelled. The pressure of the workers, exerted on the leadership of both the Communist and Socialist parties, resulted in the formation of a united front between these organisations. Thus the theory of "social-Fascism", wherein the reformists were regarded as "the moderate wing of Fascism" falls to the ground. For as long as the reformists were estimated as part of fascism, a united front with them against Fascism was impossible.

THE NON-AGGRESSION PACT

The new turn in the policy of the C.P. F. resulting from the pressure of the workers in a united front between the Communist and Socialist parties of France, is to be welcomed as a step forward, and as a vindication of what we have long advocated. But already there are indications of certain drawbacks, which will hinder successful unity in action. First, that all political currents outside the apparatuses of the French Communist and Socialist parties, have, it appears, by agreement been excluded from the United Front. There has been no enlargement of the united front to other political and trade union organisations of the working class, and its realisation in the local committees has not been pushed. Secondly, the united front is more correctly a non-aggression pact than a real united front, for there is a mutual guarantee not to criticise each other within the limits of the united front. This is bound to lead to absurdities and become an unprincipled unity. The tasks and methods of the united front can only be worked out through criticism and discussion, and not through renouncing the right to criticise in such an important field of struggle as that against Fascism or War.

The international aspects of the new turn in the policy of non-aggression pact with the Socialist Party, is of importance. There is every indication, that, in order to obtain support of capitalist "democratic" France, a policy of non-aggression pact with the Socialists could be aimed at maintaining the status quo within and amongst the capitalist nations as a means of preserving peace under capitalism: that is by preventing not only fascist reaction but also proletarian revolution. Thus a policy devoid of any revolutionary content.

The non-aggression pact with the French Socialist Party has now led to an electoral agreement. For a genuine united front to contain an electoral understanding is correct, and was supported by Lenin in his "Left Wing Communism", provided the right of criticism is maintained. On turning to Britain we also find the united front policy of the C.P.G.B. full of absurdities.

For instance in August 1932 the C.P. policy was no unity with the Labour Party "unity amongst the workers in the factories and streets, and NOT 'unity' between the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party . . . For the C.P. to unite with such a party would be to become an accomplice to the drive to a Fascist dictatorship". (Daily Worker Aug. 13 1932). Today, the C.P. in contradistinction to their previous policy approaches the leadership of the Labour Party for a united front. These zig-zags - at one time the united front will help Fascism, and the next they are feverishly seeking this united front - only express the centrism of the Communist Party. For the united front was urgently required in 1932, even if more so today.

ELECTORAL TACTICS

Although the Communist Party is now prepared to approach the leadership of the Labour Party with a united front offer, they are not prepared to have an electoral understanding with them, or under any circumstances to give support to Labour M.P.'s. This sectarian attitude is best instanced by Harry Pollitt, who, in writing in justification for the Communist candidate in the Hammersmith Bye-election states "The Communist Party takes part in all elections on the basis of its Party programme, no matter what other parties and candidates are contesting. THE PRESENT UNITED FRONT CAMPAIGN MAKES NO DIFFERENCE TO THIS VITAL POLITICAL PRINCIPLE. There is no contradiction between being associated with other parties in united front activity against the capitalist attack, and opposing the same parties in elections." (Daily Worker, March, 17th, 1934). And yet in the years prior to 1928, it was the policy of the Communists to support the Labour Candidates, and was not considered to be against Communist principles. Again, only a month ago, we are reminded of the ultra-leftism of the C.P. when they state that to have a united front on the electoral field would be "renouncing its revolutionary policy and programme . . . This it cannot do and remain the workers party . . . Therefore it opposes Labour Party and I.L.P. candidates whenever possible" (Daily Worker, August, 9th, 1934). On again turning to the Daily Worker, 21st, Aug. about a fortnight later we are told about the French Communist Party concluding an electoral agreement with the Socialist Party, and even under certain conditions would withdraw in support of the Radical.

Apparently that which is a Communist principle in France is unprincipled in Britain. As a matter of fact the real Communist position and that supported by Lenin, is that the united front and question of electoral agreements is a problem of tactics and not an immutable principle. Unity only becomes unprincipled when freedom of criticism is suspended, and the hands of the Communists are tied. Under certain circumstances it is necessary to press forward the united front, under others just as necessary to make a decisive break. In remembering these conditions, an electoral agreement facilitates and makes for a smooth working of a genuine united front of the working class, - not non-aggression pacts, - then it is the duty of Communists to give their whole hearted support to such electoral understanding.

W. H.

31.8.34.

TWO VIEWS of the NAZIS' VICTORY

"Nazis, Nazism, Nazidom". (The Labour Party, price 2d)

"The Secret of Hitler's Victory" by P. and I. Petroff. (The Hogarth Press, price 3/6)

Nearly two years have gone by since Hitler became Chancellor of the German Reich: throughout those two years has come forth countless books and pamphlets explaining or describing the Fascist victory. These two, at the tail end as it were, cannot be said to add a great deal to our knowledge of the event.

However, there is a great difference between them. "Nazis, Nazism, Nazidom" was, we are told, written by a German Historian and a German Lawyer. We can quite believe it. A pamphlet of 32 pages, it is written with the pseudo profundity, the laboriousness, and the weighty dullness most typical of German Social Democracy at its worst. Likewise typical, it says nothing of special interest. It is as though the impact of the event they set out to describe has stunned the authors and left them incapable of clear thought and exposition.

A pamphlet describing Fascism and its rise to power need not review the weaknesses of the Socialist Movement: it should however, if it is to be of any value to that movement, explain the conditions providing for this rise and the circumstances that made possible Fascism's victory. The pamphlet does neither.

The Petroffs have attempted to be more helpful. To a limited extent they have succeeded in giving a short, simple, and readable account of the German Socialist and Communist Movement and the causes for its prostration before Hitler. Here will be found the authors' impression of the German Movement, of the bureaucracy and the weaknesses that sapped its strength: of the inner decay, of the retreats and the treachery. Whilst not going deeply into the matter the Petroffs leave no doubt that Hitler's victory was due, in the main, to the errors and the weaknesses of the existing Socialist and Communist Movement, each section, as it were, supplementing the other. What it does not show, is how the whole policy of the Movement was rooted in the preceding epoch and how it arose, in the case of Social Democracy, directly from the political standpoint it adopted.

Certain features of the book call for comment. For example, on page 126-7 the international consequences of Hitler's victory are vaguely referred to and the impression left is that the authors favour military action by non-fascist countries against Germany, an attitude similar to that of many British Trade Union leaders. If this is so, then it needs sharp reproof. Again: in dealing with the post-war youth it is said that "This generation was devoid of sincere enthusiasm for the future free

socialist commonwealth. It was striving only for immediate practical aims... Lies, slander, disloyalty and forgery, and the use of violence against its opponents were regarded by them as legitimate weapons"

This is very far fetched. New occasions teach new duties and a generation that grew up in the Great War, that has seen revolutions, great strikes and class violence is not likely to resemble the generation of pre-war days, living under entirely different conditions. The sleepy-headed, narrow minded Social Democrats of yesterday are, because of the war and the gap it made in the generations, still in control of the movement. But conditions demand radical changes and this can be supplied only by the youth. And are lies, slander, and forgery the weapons of the present generation only?

The new generation expresses more clearly the needs of today without necessarily, as present day Germany shows, sacrificing the heroic spirit of the past, than do the older men and women who are often barriers in the road of advance. Youth is the only possible force that can remould the movement and make it fit to carry through the great tasks of the time. The Petroffs would do well to understand this, for little useful can be achieved if hostility towards present day youth blinds and obscures the vital need for new forces.

The book has many shortcomings. But we recommend it as a useful summary of the conditions making possible Hitler's victory.

MORE EXPULSIONS

The High Street Cell of the South East District of the Communist Party has broken up following on the expulsion of Comrades A.F.G. Cooper and another comrade (McCool) and the repudiation of these expulsions by the Cell.

We take the following from a statement signed by seven comrades: "Hitler's coming to power in Germany, the Brighton T.U.C. March, and the conduct of the Anti-War and Anti-Fascist campaign have made us uneasy as to where the Party is going. In fraction meetings we have raised our objections only to be met with furious personal attacks leaving our points unanswered. We have made continual efforts to get some explanation of points in the C.P. policy which seems to us to be dangerously wrong....Of course we were attacked as "Trotskyists"....."

Following on the break-up of the High Street Cell five comrades have announced their adherence to the Communist League. Sympathisers in the Peckham and South East area should get in touch with A.F.G. Cooper, 40 Blenheim Grove, S.E.15.

Criticism of the policy of the C.P., particularly in relation to the German situation has resulted in further expulsions in the Tottenham area, as reported in the Daily Worker. Three of the comrades have announced their adherence to the Communist League. All sympathisers write M. Mitchell, 457 Seven Sisters Road, South Tottenham, N.15.

Printed by W. Cullis, 23 Gunter Grove, S. W.
Published by H. Dewar Flat 3, 25 Robinson Road S.W.17.

A NEW RED FLAG! Out on November 1st.!

BEGINNING with the November issue the RED FLAG will be greatly improved. There will be twelve magazine-size pages and the price will be 2d.

THIS change is not merely technical: it has been made necessary by the change of our form of work and of our appeal, and the need for a more suitable form for a paper that is unable to deal with topical questions owing to its appearing but once monthly, sometimes less.

THE change will mean that the RED FLAG will be, from November 1st., a theoretical journal, indispensable to all revolutionary marxists. The day-to-day questions will be dealt with separately in special leaflets and supplements to the RED FLAG, all of which will be included in the RED FLAG itself, and help to provide us with some method of meeting and dealing with the more urgent questions of the day as well as providing matter of real value on more general questions.

ALL our readers and distributors are urged to assist us in this change by increasing their present sales or orders. Prompt payment for back issues and increased sales will ensure the new RED FLAG a good start, regular publication and constant improvement, and provide us with much needed funds for the purchase of new equipment for our press.

The new two-penny RED FLAG will be the best Marxist journal in this country. See that you get your copy!

ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO:
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