The New Government

The British ruling class is contemplating the election of a Tory government with a peculiar mixture of delight and apprehension.

An Economist editorial the week before the election carefully weighed the pros and cons—Thatcher's right-wing radicalism, the possibility that the next Labour government, if the Tories win on Thursday, will be a very much worse (ie more left-wing) one than Mr Callaghan has led, as it now seems, to Waterloo, the prospect of a Tory defeat leading to Thatcher's rapid replacement by a safer, more centrist figure, like Francis Pym—before deciding to gamble on Thatcher.

The deciding factor for the Economist was less any positive enthusiasm for the present Tory leadership than the belief that, although the best practitioners of Tory policy are often Labour governments because they can bring their troops with them, Callaghan had proved insufficiently resolute in taking on the unions and the Tribune group.

Last winter's strikes destroyed for large sections of big business the belief that Callaghan was the best conservative prime minister they had.

The Economist's industrial editor reported the weekend after the election:

'The managers, at least in the large companies, seem all too pleased that Labour has not kept office. One of the most marked aspects of the last year has been the way that business attitudes have hardened from discreet approval of Callaghan to out-right hostility to the way they believed the government was going. Since Callaghan has failed to deliver the goods, big business seem to have reasoned, why not let Thatcher have her chance to tame their 'dragon' of union power' (ie, the strength of shopfloor organisation)? The CBI has articulated their disillusionment with the social contract and their support for anti-union legislation.

But they are anxious that she does not go too far. The Observer report continues: 'But, as Sir Heath of GKN suggested at the end of last week, nor is industry anxious to upset the consensus of the last two years with a sudden lurch into employer-union troubles.'

There will be plenty of industrialists and bankers hoping that Thatcher will adopt simply a slightly more right-wing variant of the sort of policies Callaghan and Healey have implemented over the last three years.

Peter Jenkins wrote in the Guardian: 'Perhaps we shall see the flowering of a new hybrid called Howleyism' after the outgoing and incoming chancellors of the exchequer.

The reasoning underlying this sort of prediction (hope?) is as follows. Just as reality forced the Wilson government after 1974 to drop its left-wing Manifesto and instead enforce wage-restraint and cuts in public expenditure, so too the same reality will force Thatcher to collaborate with the trade-union bureaucracy and prop up bacon ducks.

After all, the last Tory government under Heath was compelled to make its famous U-turn, dropping many of its laissez faire policies in exchange for the 1972 Industry Act (under which most subsidies to inefficient firms are still made) and beer and sandwiches for the TUC general council at number 10.

Now there is a lot of truth in this argument. The conditions prevailing under bourgeois democracy in an advanced capitalist country mean that the ruling class is forced to rely on the at least tacit collaboration of the trade-union bureaucracy or face massive and disruptive class confrontation. It is this logic which has led, with industrial expansion and a growing workers' movement, to the replacement of the francist dictatorship by a (let it be noted, highly repressive) parliamentary regime in Spain.

Moreover, the structure of capitalism today means that talk of a return to a laissez faire economy (which never in reality existed) is nothing but an utopian fantasy. Two examples
The second point is that, as I have suggested above, the actual policy proposals of the new right are contrary to the interests of big business. A reduction in job subsidies, a firmer line in implementing the necessary rationalisation programmes in steel, shipbuilding or British Leyland are one thing.

A wholesale withdrawal of the state from private industry is quite another. The Financial Times warned the

new government about the importance of 'consistency' in industrial policy.

Laissez faire makes more sense on the periphery of industrial production in small firms, where margins are so narrow that measures like the Employment Protection Act lay a heavy burden on the stock market, where exchange controls designed to protect the pound inhibit the free movement of capital (abroad).

But it is from the middle-class periphery of big capital that the rank and file of the Tory party and, increasingly, Conservactive backbenchers are recruited.

Third, the new right is represented in the cabinet by the prime minister and a clutch of powerfully placed colleagues—notably Keith Joseph (Secretary for industry), John Riften (chief secretary of the Treasury) and Angus Maud (Paymaster General).

There is no guarantee that the centrist majority of the cabinet will prevail over Thatcher and co, who will be vocally supported by fellow right-wingers among the junior ministers and back-benchers.

Beyond this, one can only speculate. All that is certain is that nobody knows which way Thatcher will jump. The Economist comforted itself

will show this.

The recession has forced large sections of industry into the hands of the state. In industries like steel and shipbuilding, state intervention serves, not as an alternative to the rationalisations and sackings which the Tory right claim should be left to the market, but to ensure that these are implemented in the manner that is least costly to and socially disruptive of the national capitalism concerned.

As the Economist put it in a recent briefing on industrial policy: 'With shipbuilding, the real issue... is not who owns the yards, but how many should be closed and how quickly'. Similarly, in France President Giscard d'Estaing's new 'liberal' industrial strategy has not prevented it effectively nationalising the ramshackle steel industry in order to co-ordinate and direct its reorganisation.

State intervention is also crucial in attracting foreign investment. When a multinational decides to build a new factory in Europe, one of the main considerations guiding the decision on where to site the plant is the share of the costs that different governments are prepared to take by offering tax allowances, regional development grants and other subsidies.

Auctions take place in which national governments compete to offer the most attractive package of subsidies. A recent example was the attempts by Spain, France, Austria and Portugal to bribe Ford over the siting of its new European factory (which it eventually decided not to build).

The civil servants are already preparing to defend subsidies of this sort from the new government and political organisations.

To use an analogy, it took Harold Wilson and the Labour right-wing 15 months, a lot of bitter in-fighting and the Common Market referendum to impose 'the reality of modern capitalism' on the 1974 Labour government—in other words, to tiew the left and implement right-wing policies.

Similarly, the Tory party is no more pawns it has an influence on how the game is played. We need to consider what effect its ideology, leadership and internal constitution is likely to have on developments.

The Conservative Party is of course, the party of big capital. But this does not mean that it is big capital itself. Marx was careful to distinguish between a class and its 'political and literary representatives'.

There can be conflicts of interest between the two (as is obviously true of the British working class and its mis-representatives in the Labour Party).

One of the most striking things about the Tory party at the present time is that there has developed within its ranks a
grouping ideologically committed to the free market. There are three things to be noted about this.

First, it is not simply that this group would like to see a reduction in the economic role of the state. There have been plenty of arguments of this sort in the past within the Tory party (e.g. over tariffs in the earlier part of the century). It is that the far right today are committed to laissez faire as the centre-piece of a coherent programme for the radical reform of the British state and society.

The Economist reported: 'Ministers will be warned that Britain could lose big internationally mobile investments being discussed with, eg, west German chemical firms and American micro-electronics companies'. It is difficult to believe that the mandarins, backed as they are by the realities of modern capitalism, will not have the last word.

The trouble with the picture that I have just painted is that it is an abstraction. It takes no account of the fact that the logic of capitalism becomes operative only through the action of social forces

a counter-attack against the 'collectivist' tide which they believe, has been steadily advancing since 1945.

The 'new right' is an organised group, with powerful support on the Tory back-benches, its own think-tanks (the Centre for Policy Studies and the Institute of Economic Affairs), and plenteous intellectual support on papers like the Daily Telegraph and the Spectator. The decay of right-wing social democracy has won them converts from Labourism (to whom 'they are welcome') like Paul Johnson, Hugh Thomas and Reg Prentice.

We need not waste any time with the ideas of this group (which are, for the most part, utter rubbish). More important to note is the fact that coherent ideological groupings of this sort represent a sharp break with the pragmatic paternalism traditional to the Tory party, of which both Ted Heath and the majority of the new cabinet are representatives.

The new Tories want an end to the 1951-64 era, when Conservative governments preserved intact the welfare state created by Labour and massively increased public expenditure.

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Post Mortem

Psephology — the study of elections — is a notoriously imperfect science. But the statistics underlying the Tory election victory have an interesting story to tell.

First of all, the election result was a disaster for Labour, not simply because it lost. The Labour Party's share of the vote, 37.9 per cent, was the lowest since the 1931 election, when the Parliamentary Labour Party was decimated. Moreover, the swing to the Tories (5.2 per cent) was the highest in any election since the Labour landslide of 1945.

More serious, perhaps, are the signs of the continued decay of Labour's working-class base. According to the Economist:

'Labour...suffered a massive haemorrhage of working-class votes...The swing to the Conservatives was 6.5 per cent among semi-skilled and unskilled workers, 7 per cent among trade unionists (despite the campaign efforts of their leaders) and an enormous 11 per cent among skilled workers.'

On the other hand, the swing was down to 4.5 per cent among office and clerical workers, and actually went in Labour's favour in the professional and managerial classes.

These figures are in line with long-term trends. A study by Nuffield College Oxford and Essex University suggests that between 1964 and 1974 middle-class support for Labour rose from 19 to 28 per cent, while skilled working-class support fell from 54 to 49 per cent.

There is a growing divergence between the fortunes of the Labour Party and the labour movement. The decline in working-class support for Labour has been accompanied by continued growth of trade-union membership.

The election result also varied widely geographically. The swing to the Tories was 4.1 per cent in the north-north-west, and 3.9 per cent in both the north-east and Yorkshire, while in Greater London it was 6.6 per cent and in the south-east 6.8 per cent.

In Scotland the swing to the Tories was only 0.7 per cent, since the collapse of support for the Scottish National Party led to a sharp increase in the Labour vote.

The Economist commented:

'This continuing regional divergence, plus a similar one between the more urban and more rural areas, means that today's Conservative MPs are a very different bunch from their counterparts only 25 years ago....'

In 1955 Sir Anthony Eden triumphed by a very similar margin to Mrs Thatcher's...But a third of his MPs were from north of the Trent and he held nearly two in five of the big city seats. Mrs Thatcher draws barely a fifth of her parliamentary strength from north Britain and holds less than one in four of the big city seats.'

One factor underlying the north-south split was the much higher unemployment rates in northern England and Scotland. Opinion polls suggest that jobs became a bigger issue the further north one went. Clearly Tory industrial policy helped keep people in the Labour camp.

All the small parties were squeezed. However, the traditional two-party system is far from secure. As the Financial Times commented: 'With 44.8 per cent of the total votes, Mrs Thatcher has a lower share of the popular vote than any post-war Conservative government'.

In favourable circumstances — an unpopular government, rising prices and unemployment — the minority parties could make a comeback. The Liberals retained 14.1 per cent of the popular vote.

The Nazis received a drubbing, no doubt partly because Thatcher's notorious 'alien culture' interview has served to identify the Tories with many of the NF's more popular themes.

Nor is the SNP a spent force. Tadey Taylor's attempt to transform the Scottish Tories from a sleepy rural party into a populist urban force failed, and he lost his own seat.

Scotland, at least in part because of the effect of the nationalists'
Mrs Thatcher's Little Headaches

One of the first tests for the Tories is the legacy of wage claims left over from the last weeks of Callaghan's administration. This is not so much a test for the government itself, but rather of the degree to which the bosses in the private sector are prepared to move onto the offensive and of the toughness of the management bureaucracy in the state sector under new political masters (and mistresses).

In fact, at the time of writing, the two largest single groups of industrial workers - the builders and the engineers - have still to settle national claims. For these and others, see box.

The most crucial - the one with the greatest possibility of a rank-and-file success - is the Post Office. The UPW leadership has gone along with 'productivity' concessions, which would lead in the long-term to considerable job loss and weakening of union organisation.

The revolt against the deal originated in London, like so much of the opposition to Tom Jackson, Norman Stagg and the rest of the right-wing leadership. This time opposition has spread far outside London - the vote was more than six to one against the deal.

**Engineering**

The most significant characteristic of the unions' performance over the national engineering claim has been shadow-boxing. The employers have offered derisory increases - worth almost nothing in the higher-paid, best-organised factories, but probably a bit to AUEW members out in the sticks.

There are also strings - official union declarations against strikes, for higher productivity - and the employers want to tie the unions indefinitely to the 40-hour week. The AUEW's new leadership has some real problems. As the Birmingham Post remarked recently: this is Mr Duff's first real test. And it's by no means clear that the employers think they have to get him off the hook.

Last year the AUEW proposed a ludicrous two-day national strike on a side-issue which the employers promptly conceded. This year the Duff - Boyd leadership is in the difficult position of trying to prove its credibility, with almost no troops to throw into the fray.

We can probably expect more rhetoric along the lines of 'the national agreement should be scrapped', a favourite theme of the right-wing when they can't think what to say.

**Victories and Defeats**

In the meantime, victories are still being won against the trend in engineering. Perkins Diesels in Peterborough was barraged to management in a parity dispute which has resulted in 18 to 20 per cent pay rises for 7,000 workers.

The AUEW EC's intervention probably prevented a complete victory (parity is to be achieved in 1981) - but the stage has been set for the other Massey-Ferguson claims.

But at the same time the engineering employers have drawn first blood with their new lock-out policy (Socialist Review No. 11 for details). Workers at Hy-Mac in South Wales went back on management terms after a two-month lock-out. Battles of this sort are going to be psychologically crucial in the months to come.

There is a wages table on P15.

A Soft Approach

With the most right-wing policies of any government since the war, Thatcher has nevertheless chosen the ministers who deal with the unions, the social services and law and order from the left or the centre of the Conservative Party.

The new Department of Employment is fronted by James Prior, who two months ago was set fair to be ditched for his 'liberal' (ie conciliatory) politics.

Although Prior is a director of United Biscuits - the firm that got the secondary picketing injunction against Reg Full during the drivers' strike - he is more widely known inside the Tory party as the only Tory publicly to call for George Ward to recognise APEX as the only unorganized public to call for George Ward to recognise APEX at Grunwick. He is also, with Barney Hayhoe, the only leading Tory to have established any sort of relations with the union leadership.

Hayhoe himself has been shoved into the Ministry of Defence - the man Tom Jackson was relying on to get a bill through Parliament allowing the IPW to go on strike. And both Hayhoe and Prior have been more than lukewarm about the Concordat, especially the TUC codes of practice on picketing and the closed shop.

**Home office**

If the DE is staffed with Tory liberals, the new occupants of the Home Office are even more firmly to the 'left' of the party. Headed by William Whitelaw, who lost the leadership to Thatcher because of his soft image, the ministers include Anthony Wedgewood Benn, who is probably to the left of Merlyn Rees, and Leon Brittan, also the object of contempt from the Tory right.

The hardliners of the Conservative Party must in fact be feeling a little like the Tribune group does when Labour gets into office - pushed to one side.

The clear exceptions to this general trend are in the Departments of Trade and Industry where Sir Keith 'Social Class 5' Joseph holds sway, along with several of Thatcher's more obnoxious supporters.

**Balance of forces**

All of this doesn't mean to say that the Tory attack on the trade unions, social services, women, the black community, the regions etc isn't coming. It means that the attack is coming in an oblique way.

A particularly stealthy approach is likely on picketing and union reform, with Prior trying to emasculate the union bureaucracy in all sorts of deals and, if he's got any sense, using the Concordat as a major stick to beat the TUC.

The Tory attacks are going to be all the more difficult to fight for these reasons.
Crisis of Confidence?

Strong militant policies have come to be expected from the National Union of Journalists' conferences and this year's was no exception.

Starting with the Nottingham Evening Post victimisation dispute, delegates approved a series of motions which would be the envy of the left in many other unions: overwhelmingly against the concordat (with NEC backing); near-unanimous against compulsory wage restraint; for blocking of advertising from racist regimes; for the abolition of the Prevention of Terrorism Act; for the disbanding of the SPG: overwhelmingly for the closed shop and a programme of strike action on behalf of Nottingham journalists - and so on.

Yet with all this militant resolutionism, and despite a generally high quality of debate, the mood inside the NUI four months after the most important strike in the union's history, in the Newspaper Society, is uneasy.

The bitter end to the strike - when Nottingham journalists were left outside the gate while 8,000 went back to work - is one reason. Many of the best militants emerge from such disputes - in places like Bristol, East Anglia and the South Midlands - have become demoralised by the tokenism that is being displayed on the Nottingham issue.

The rank and file on provincial newspapers have not yet been spurred into action by Nottingham, and mass pickets have not been fought for by full-time officials. The Nottingham journalists themselves have been tied up with producing their own weekly paper (selling 13,000 - 15,000) which, while it keeps them together and working, does not act as a rallying force for the dispute in the local trade union movement.

Despite the fact that their alternative paper is sold in hundreds by stewards in Nottingham factories, the NUI members there still to address a single shop-floor meeting.

Low ebb

Meanwhile the NUI's organisation in the provincial field is still at a low ebb in the aftermath of the strike. Chapel attendances have dropped. Branch meetings are frequently inquiaute - even in the areas which saw some of the best organisation round the dispute.

In general the fact that the strike was a qualified success has meant that a large proportion of the membership has relaxed with the fruits of victory, while the smaller but active minority are in a state of depression about Nottingham.

Right wing

Meanwhile the new national executive is the softest in years. SWP member, Steve Childs, was defeated in the postal ballot for his NEC seat - though the hard left vote held up pretty well.

In most other areas either right wingers or completely inexperienced new NEC members are likely to be easy meat for the increasingly confident new bunch of full-time officials that has emerged.

The NUI's Rank and File organisation, Journalists' Charter, had its last successful conference and, more importantly, provided the only forum where delegates could debate the conference's most critical issue - the Times.

Despite the fact that the Charter candidate for the union's vice-presidency lost narrowly, the organisation and the rank-and-file tendency within the union probably now has its best chance for growth for some time.

The problem which it has to tackle is how to sustain the activists in a small union which has been relatively extremely militant during the 'social contract' period and now faces a crisis of confidence at the moment when both proprietors and the new Tory government are poised for attack on the closed shop front.

Room at the Top

The Tory election victory has obscured - for the moment - the clear rightward turn among prominent union leaders. The massive concessions to Callaghan's government, above all in the concordat, are now being covered up in various ways.

The cruelest approach, not surprisingly, comes from the engineering union President, Terry Duff, who now declares that the concordat is 'dead'. Others are also keen to get out of the mess that this wholesale agreement on the economy, wage bargaining, strikes and shop-floor organisation has potentially put them in.

Hard right-wing majority was larger until Sir George Smith died.

On the TUC's international committee - which the left has used constantly as a device for securing free holidays in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and points east - Frank Chapple is now in charge.

This is a position he greatly relishes as each time he's attacked - as for example over his description of public service strikers as 'terrorists' - Chapple can threaten some quite nasty publicity for some of the left's relations with eastern bloc 'unions'.

Tone

The tone of this more coherent right at the TUC level
has been filtering down in recent months. Bob Garland, AUFW foundry section general secretary, writes approvingly of A Better War in his March journal editorial.

IRIS News, the traditional house magazine for the right in the AUFW and the National Union of Seamen, gave A Better War considerable publicity and is one of the organisations circulating it. NALGO issued a press release welcoming it and certain people at the top of the UPW have been pushing it.

A Better War was and remains significant as it is the first time any large number of rightish union leaders have been able to agree on a policy since the late 1960s. But perhaps equally significant is that not one of the signatories had anything to do with the formulation of the pamphlet's ideas.

It was touted round likely supporters by John Grant MP, junior employment minister under Callaghan, who was also behind a Department of Employment document on 'reforming' picketing rules published late October. Among Grant's previous claims to fame was as a key supporter of Chapple during the 1961 ballot rigging trial which swept the Communist Party from power in the ETU.

Grass roots

Meanwhile there have been some indications that the organised right has become more effective at branch and conference level over the past 12 months or so.

There seems for example to have been an organised campaign behind the 40 resolutions submitted to this year's Society of Civil and Public Servants' conference demanding an ending of connections with the ANL (the most extreme resolutions coming, surprise, surprise, from the Ministry of Defence in Earl's Court and the Home Office immigration branch). Delegates to this year's NUJ conference were subjected to an unreadable leaflet from the union's humorously-named 'moderate' group, AJAX.

But of course the real shift at the grass roots has been in confidence. It is silly to think that the new right in the union leadership has emerged overnight. It has flourished in a defensive atmosphere, and above all with rising unemployment. It is in this respect very different to the right wing which held sway in the 1950s and early 1960s.

The old right was built on years of unchallenged power after defeat, depression and serious decline in union membership. Its spokesmen (and they were all men) were much tougher, more confident and aggressive than their modern counterparts. And it was they who pushed their line on the Labour leadership rather than the other way round.

The birth of the new right is quite dramatically different. In relatively superficial ways - they seem to have no single figure who can hold them together, least of all Frank Chapple who is the only one of them who fought to build a union in his own image.

And also in much more important ways - unpredictable economic climate, lack of confidence among most full-time officials etc.

And while there are signs of increasing right wing activism at rank-and-file levels, the terms of debate in unions such as USDAW and the GMWU have moved appreciably to the left this year compared to the passivity of even two or three years ago.

It is also interesting (to say the least) that USDAW, which recently became the first union to support the concordat, did so in a way which avoided any mention of TUC guides on disputes, picketing etc. The right on the USDAW executive appears to have been very confident of winning support on the most damaging parts of the TUC's guidelines - even if they did win rejection of the ANL.

Leader complex

Lastly the creation of a strong pole of attraction for the right, in the shape of a 1½ million member AUFW/EEPTU does not seem to be working out as anticipated. As we noted elsewhere in this issue, there are a number of quite sizeable obstacles in the way of the fulfilment of the hopes of the Daily Express, Daily Mail and Sun lobby.

And this has serious implications for the hard right. For there is no single trade union leader now with the authority to control the TUC general council in the way that, for example, Jack Jones did.

What chances Frank Chapple had must have been blown with his bitter attacks on all-and-sundry during the winter disputes. Barnett - irrefutably one of Chapple's main antagonists - does not have the credibility either. Boyd is going, Allen has almost gone, Duffy is a difer

It doesn't have any answers - at least to judge by A Better War - except preserving the status quo. And the employers are in the process of closing that option.

What the emergence of the new right has done however is produce something that could be called the 'room at the top'. The broad left policies of the Jones and Scanklon era have been replaced at the general secretary/TUC level with the dithering of Moss Evans, the floundering of the old left like Ray Buckton and the irrelevance of Clive Jenkins.

The hard men of the right - Chapple, Bill Sis, Gormley, Jackson - have considerable difficulties inside their own unions - either because of a new generation of less competent or less pliable full-time officials - eg in the EEPTU and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation - or because of imminent retirement; or because of a resurgent membership.

It looks as though paralysis is the name of the game at this level. The real danger is that 'outside forces' could now step in - TUC full-timers like David Lea who did much of the work for the Concordat, John Grant with A Better War, or even John Hughes of Raskin College who drew up the proposed TUC document on wage prices bargaining last November.

With Labour now in opposition, the manoeuvring of such people may become less apparent but more dangerous.

by David Beecham
Straws in the wind

The recent AUEW national committee meeting which deadlocked on almost every major issue, including amalgamation, may have put off indefinitely the chances of the 'merger most four' between the AUEW and EEPTU right-wing leaderships.

Certainly Frank Chapple seemed to think so when addressing the EEPTU conference recently. This may provide a breathing space - and a chance of the left to fight inside AUEW-TASS for the election of officials and to turn the tables on the EEPTU by calling for a fully democratic amalgamation.

But in the mean time some interesting developments have been occurring in the recent round of AUEW postal ballots. As expected (Socialist Review No. 8) the union's executive is now entirely right-wing.

The most appalling performance was by CP member Len Choulerton who managed to lose the EC seat the left has held for more than 40 years to a very ordinary right-winger. Choulerton's 13,000 second ballot votes in the whole Southern area are made to look even more sick when compared to the more than 10,000 recorded by two left candidates for North London divisional organiser, in a constituency a third of the size.

The latter election saw Billy Taylor (a Charter supporter) easily beat broad left candidate Sid Harroway - one of the few bright spots in the election results. The other, potentially more important, was John Tocber's performance in coming within 3,000 votes of winning Terry Duffey's (and Bob Wright's) old EC seat.

This represents a 6.2% swing to left (compared to a 12.5 per cent swing to the right in Choulerton's constituency) on the second ballot vote, a remarkable performance considering the dominance of the Birmingham-based right wing in this EC area, with three times the potential vote.

John Tocber remains convinced of a broad left strategy in the union. (see our interview with him in Socialist Review No. 5) but is one of those few AUEW full-timers with an open rank-and-file orientation. There's a lesson somewhere in these results.

which criticised the EC for the 'wholesale policy of closure of branches and the spate of compulsory amalgamations', called for the right of branches to elect their own officials and in general called into question some of the ways in which the union is being run.

A harder resolution from the plumbers' North London lodge was so narrowly lost that conference chairman Tom Breakei resisted taking a card vote on it.

The conference voted only marginally - about 60-40 - against a resolution demanding free collective bargaining (though by a much larger majority in favour of the Cow- ordinat). It took Chapple's personal intervention to ensure the 'right' policy was followed on several occasions.

Inexperienced It is in Chapple's personal role that many of his problems are symbolised. The new generation of EEPTU officials does not have anything like the experience of the hard right Chapple and his friends had to wrest control of the union from the Communist Party after the 1961 ballot-rigging High Court case.

Not only is the new generation less able politically, they are - far more seriously - incapable of doing a good job of being trade union officials. The EEPTU's right wing has built its strength on delivering the goods, to some extent at least, for a fairly tough and demanding membership.

There is now much dissatisfaction with full-timers - so much so that the old guard is having to overcome its distaste and try to find competent 'lefts' to appoint to office.

Meanwhile a new generation has emerged among the membership who have not heard about the old Communist regime, and who would probably have opposed its reactionary policies anyway.

It was predominantly from this group that Rank and File Committee's impressive conference lobby came, and to which Rank and File EC candidates at least Williams will be seeking for support in the Wales and South West election currently taking place.

This election provides an inopportune for the left to test its policies with the membership immediately after the most encouraging EEPTU conference in years.

A broad left candidate - steelworker Roy Benaim - is also standing, and is originally chosen as a selected left candidate.

The EEPTU's single transferable vote (STV) system means, however, that supporters of both will be able to vote for first and second preference candidates. But the STV system also tends to ensure that, as in this case, there are half-a-dozen candidates, the least 'controversial' is generally the one selected.

Spark in the Night

By their insults, shall ye know them? They might sum up the experience of this year's EEPTU biennial delegate conference. The meeting in East London cut short by almost a day, witnessed some of Mr Frank Chapple's more personal style of invective.

It is some time since delegates have not been treated to the barrage of attacks on the left made from the EEPTU conference plat- form - and this alone suggests that all is not well down at Hoyes House.

In fact the conference provided a number of upsets for the most deeply entrenched right-wing bureaucracy in the British trade union movement.

In what the Financial Times described as a 'grassroots revolt', the executive council was defeated on motions from Cardiff, Basildon and Chatham.

Repression in Italy

The election campaign in Italy got off to a spectacular start. On April 7, the police arrested 20 people claiming they were 'dangerous terrorists' and charging one of them with being the 'secret leader' of the notorious Red Brigades. For the two major parties in the election campaign, the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Communist Party (PCI) the news was like manna from heaven. Both wanted the Red Brigades 'disposed of' before the elections took place.

The DC wanted them out of the way to show they were still capable of ruling the country after thirty years of neglect and corruption. While the PCI had to show they were as tough as anyone if it came to 'law and order' as well as removing any possible focus of opposition to their right wing strategy.
The coincidence between the approaching elections and the discovery of the elusive Red Brigades was immediately ground for scepticism. A scepticism that was increased a month later when the Red Brigades carried out their biggest operation ever with 15 members attacking the D.C. headquarters in Rome with military precision. The raid was achieved presumably without the aid of their 'secret leader' who had been languishing in prison for a month.

Despite this, those arrested have still not been released. Under Italian law there is no bail procedure the defendants can be kept in prison for up to four years without facing trial. There is a strong possibility that this could be the fate for those arrested.

The evidence for justifying the arrests seems so flimsy as to be non-existent. The accused were not arrested in some terrorist 'den' stacked full of compromising documents and bomb making equipment. Rather the arrests took place in editorial offices of left magazines and on the campus of Padua University. All the defendants have been openly active for years on the left and have published many articles and books explaining their ideas. It is for those ideas that they are now being charged. As one prominent magistrate put it:

'The extremely serious charge of having formed the Red brigades is totally unsupported ... The charge is based solely on writings, newspapers, pamphlets, books and leaflets in which violence and armed struggle are praised. The political ideas of Negri and Scalzone, (the two most famous defendants) have been well known for years. Their books and magazines are openly sold in the bookstores'.

Furthermore, there is a real difference between the ideas of Negri and those of the Red Brigades. He has repeatedly criticised them severely for ignoring the mass movement and instead weakening it by isolated acts of terrorism rather than working for its mass mobilisation. As a Communist Party member of parliament put it: 'Nothing in Negri's work would lead one to an even theoretical connection with the Red Brigades'.

So why has this frame up taken place? Why have left wing academics been rounded up solely on the basis of their ideas?

It seems there are two reasons. The first is that Negri is in prison, as his lawyers claim, 'as a consultant, and an unpaid one to boot, rather than a man charged with massacre, murder and armed insurrection. His interrogators want to find out what he, as an expert, thinks of terrorism!'

'The second reason is a lot more serious. It is only the latest episode in a long series of acts of repression against the left over the last ten years. Since 1967, Italy has passed through a massive social crisis which it still shows no signs of emerging from. The response of the state to the mass movements which have shaken Italian society to its foundations has been an increase in the use of the law to crack down on the left. Thus in 1969 there was the famous Valpredis case, where an anarchist was accused and convicted of a bank bombing in which 13 people died on the testimony of a police agent provocateur. After serving three years, he was finally released and two fascists eventually convicted. But there is a key difference between today and ten years ago. Then the PCI raised their voices however halfheartedly against repression.

Today, they take the lead in the witch hunt against the left. They have already taken the unprecedented step of expelling from the union they control leftists who speak out against the PCI's policy of 'restraint and sacrifice'. Further they are increasingly labelling all left-wing opposition to their policies as being akin to terrorism. Thus a leading PCI member, Amendola, stated: 'It is a question of finding who wants to fight to save democracy and is ready for every sacrifice who is on the other side wanting to destroy this republican state. Other leading members are asking people to denounce to the policy any 'violent people' or 'potential terrorists'. It is no surprise to find out that the prosecutor who has had Negri and the others arrested on such flimsy 'evidence' is himself, a member of the PCI!'

But while this repression may soothe the worries about the PCI's respectability amongst a
few sections of the ruling class, it is unlikely that it will stop the PCI losing further votes in the coming elections or stop the slide in membership especially amongst the young or in the workplaces.

Already PCI members have added their voice to the growing protests against the frame up. Nor are the protests confined to Italy. An international defence campaign for the accused has been set up calling for statements of support for them, and have already made an impact in the Italian press. In Britain, the ‘Italy 79 Committee’ is co-ordinating support on behalf of the accused. It urges sympathisers to send any motions of support to the Committee care of Rising Free Bookshop, Box 135, 182 Upper Street, London N.1.

Tim Potter

what explains the remarkable political resurrection of Bhutto.

It is also why the regime killed him. Unfortunately for them it was the stupidest thing that they could have done. It has guaranteed that the violence and misery of Bhutto’s regime has been forgotten in favour of his socialist rhetoric.

Zia brought enough odium on his head by the judicial murder of a political leader, something only previously done by the British. To persecute the widow and daughter, Bhutto’s political heirs, is only making things worse.

In the absence of any alternative (and the socialist groups in Pakistan are tiny fragmented sects) the workers and peasants will probably propel Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party into power and overthrow the military regime inside two years.

If the ruling class is lucky there will still be a Pakistan left. And if there is no socialist alternative built then the whole process will start all over again.

Barry Pavier

No Way Out for General Zia

The execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by the military regime of General Zia-ur-Haq seems to have misfired, as predicted. The immediate response with thousands on the streets defying troops and police—largely women—shows that all the repression has not suppressed resistance to the regime.

Zia’s position is fairly desperate. The reasons over two reasons for the existence of Pakistan and one of them—as a refuge for Muslims from Hindu persecution—vanished with the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Zia is now playing the last card for the survival of Pakistan—the idea of a state of Islam.

But he cannot avoid the fact that Pakistan is a fake country, cobbled together by the army in 1947. The people who were the main driving force for the new state were the petty bourgeoisie who wanted it for state jobs and contracts.

This meant that Pakistan has been kept together mainly by the bureaucracy and the army. The bourgeoisie itself is itself tiny and split into several national groups, so has never been able to impose a stable rule of its own as happened, of sorts, in India. For half its history Pakistan has had an openly military regime.

In 1971 it looked as if the country had had it. The secession of Bangladesh, the military and political failure of the army, the national and workers unrest in the West put the existence of the state into question. Bhutto kept it together by a mixture of populism and general opportunism which pulled workers and peasants behind the state in the expectation of a change.

These hopes were totally misplaced but his socialist rhetoric and his building of a state sector through nationalisations saved Pakistan for the time being. It also alienated the bourgeoisie and as Bhutto was quite prepared to continue repressing workers and national minorities if their demands went too far by 1977 he was politically isolated.

His attempt to fix the 1977 elections led to street battles and a new intervention by the army with whom Bhutto had always had an ambivalent relationship, since he had been partly responsible for the fall of two military regimes, those of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan.

However the problem for the ruling class is that the only available political support left with any kind of popular base is the ultra-religious opposition. Since 1947 they had been attacking the new state as ungodly and now they could take their chance to make Pakistan a state of Islam.

Now this does fit in with the state ideology and ultra-religious politics are strongest among the petty bourgeoisie who staff the bureaucracy and the army. However, they are trying to create an ideal Islamic state which in fact never existed—anywhere.

Moreover they are forced to impose it on the reluctant masses by violence and this is Kampuchea and the 4th International -Part 2
blackbuster of a reply to the Americans under the inauspicious title "Behind Differences on Military Conflicts in South East Asia" (Intercontinental Press/Inprecos, April 9).

Part of the article was a devastating demolition of the American SWP's rather bizarre thesis that Pol Pot and the Chinese were essentially acting as tools of an American desire to strangle the Vietnamese revolution. But of more interest to Socialist Review readers are his arguments about the class nature of Pol Pot's Kampuchea: and that because of their far more general relevance.

As Mandel puts it 'Kampuchea is a border case, given the extreme backwardness of the country, compounded by the catastrophic results of the American bombing and the ensuing disruption of economic and social life. In and by itself, a difference on the exact definition of the Pol Pot regime and the class nature of the state under that regime wouldn't be so serious, if it were not combined with the question of what criteria one uses in order to determine the class nature of a state.

'It is the use of wrong criteria which makes the position defended by comrades Mary Alice Waters, Fred Feldman and Steve Clark (the American SWPers) so potentially dangerous. For they have obvious implications as regards to our assessment of the class nature of many other workers states and even with regard to our basic positions towards the class nature of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.'

The 'wrong criteria' Mandel takes exception to is the American SWP's insistence that (with regard to Kampuchea, at least) 'the nationalisation of property is not by itself sufficient to establish a workers state. The intervention of the workers - the only force in modern society capable of establishing and maintaining a progressive economic structure - is needed.'

For Mandel this is a 'tacitastic' scheme which can only lead to the utterly revisionist idea that one can have a capitalist state without capitalists, without a ruling capitalist class, without capitalist property and production relations, and without the economy obeying the laws of motion of capitalism.'

And once one accepts this idea 'then 99 per cent of the traditional marxist case against state capitalism . . . collapses. The miserable remnants of the case then hang on the single thin thread of the 'origins' of nationalisations and on them alone. The razor-sharp factual minds of the state capitalists will find no difficulty in cutting through that thread'.

And, just in case our factual minds are not razor sharp enough, Mandel continues, 'If Pol Pot has squeezed "extreme capitalist accumulation" of the "forced collectivisation" of the Kampuchean peasantry, didn't Stalin do likewise with the forced collectivisation of the peasants, which was an otherwise large and bloody affair?'

What then remains of the noncapitalist nature of the Russian state and economy after that "extreme capitalist accumulation" that occurred in Russia in 1929-34? If in order to have a workers state one needs to have the bourgeoisie expropriated by the workers, how can one then have a workers state in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and North Korea where, by no stretch of the imagination, could these expropriations be interpreted as having been carried out by the workers themselves (a few street demonstrations by rigidly controlled workers in support of these expropriations are obviously something less than expropriations by the workers)?

You said it, Ernest. You said it.

Pete Goodman.

Morocco

One effect of the Iranian revolution has been to highlight the right-wing regime in Morocco. For it was there that the Shah of Iran fled into exile. No wonder - King Hassan II of Morocco is, in his own little way, as brutal and reactionary a ruler as the Shah was. He too is facing a growing popular challenge to his rule.

Like the Shah, Hassan owes his position to imperialist support. French colonial rule of Morocco ended in 1956, when, following two years of armed struggle, the Istiqlal (Independence) Party signed an agreement with the French under which the monarchy and French commercial and economic interests would be preserved intact after independence.

Since that time Morocco has become an important ally of western capitalism in the third world. Thanks to its geographical position at the entrance to the Mediterranean, Morocco is of considerable strategic importance to NATO.

Moreover, Morocco possesses rich mineral resources. Phosphates, iron ore, manganese and zinc are mined there by western companies enjoying generous concessions from Hassan. The resulting economic growth has stimulated the emergence of a native Moroccan bourgeoisie whose interests are inextricably bound up with those of the western multinationals. The drive to control the mineral wealth of the Western Sahara, a Spanish colony until 1975, led Hassan on a military adventure which is draining the Moroccan economy. He organised in 1975 a nationalist demonstration in which 360,000 Moroccans and 10,000 soldiers marched to the Western Sahara border, claiming it as Moroccan territory.

When the Spanish withdrew they handed the country over to Morocco and Mauretanian. This settlement is bitterly contested by the Algerian-backed Polisario liberation movement, which is fighting for the self-determination of the Saharan people. The Polisario guerrillas have succeeded in tying down large numbers of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara and thus draining the Moroccan economy.

The result has been a growing groundswell of opposition to the Moroccan regime. Hassan has always dealt ruthlessly with those who question his rule. In 1959 the people of north Morocco, who had a long tradition of armed resistance to French colonialism, rose up against the government when Hassan signed a defence agreement with De Gaulle. The army crushed the uprising, killing thousands of people.

In 1965 workers protests against inflation and unemployment and students demonstrating against the regime took over the city of Casablanca for three days. Several hundred people were killed by the army and police when they reoccupied the city.

Democracy, even in its parliamentary terms, is a joke in Morocco. A series of fake elections have given the king's party a majority of two-thirds in parliament.

The main bourgeois-democratic party is the recently reformed Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP). Its attempts in the past to weaken the hold of international capital, create a more independent economy and introduce political reforms ended in failure. Thus opposition protests after the stage-managed royalist victory in the 1962 elections were crushed and USFP leaders arrested.

Again the elections following the promulgation of a new constitution in 1970 saw the arrest of radical USFP members. Two abortive coups in 1970 and 1972 led Hassan to tighten the screws even further. The security forces can arrest anyone they suspect of plotting against the state and detain them indefinitely. Amnesty International and the Committee of Struggle against Repression in Morocco have details of the torture of political prisoners, who are said to total 500 to 600. Two examples will suffice:

A woman prisoner. Saïda Mnebhi, died after 32 days' hunger strike in Kenitra prison. While Abdelatif Zeroual, a marxist-leninist, died in November 1974 after nine days of continuous torture.

The 1970s have seen the growth of a more radical opposition to Hassan. The most prominent of these groups is the Frontistes (Marxist-Leninist). The Moroccan far left sees strikes as the principal weapon against the regime.

Indeed, the last few months have seen swift and disruptive strike action. On 4 January 1979 more than 10,000 railway workers came out, effectively
Southern Africa

Ian Smith must be feeling better than he has for some time. The turnout in the one peron one vote elections held under the internal settlement was much higher (64 per cent) than most observers had expected. Moreover, the Tory victory in Britain increases the chances of western recognition of the Rhodesian regime.

The Rhodesian elections

In no way were the elections ‘free and fair’ (the condition placed on recognition of the regime by Tory defence secretary Francis Pym). The main opposition to the regime is represented by the parties of the Patriotic Front, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). Both parties are illegal and many of their supporters were arrested during the election campaign.

80 per cent of the country is under martial law. In these areas special courts sitting in camera have the power to impose the death penalty summarily.

The two black parties supporting the regime, those of Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole, have their own private armies, the so-called ‘auxiliaries’, which were used ruthlessly in the tribal trust lands (where the bulk of the African peasantry live) to get the vote out.

A delegation headed by the Liberal peer Lord Chithnis is producing a report detailing the cases of intimidation. One striking example was the instructions sent out by the National Election Directorate to white farmers and householders, telling them to take their black employees to the polling stations. African farmworkers and domestic servants are the two largest categories of workers in Zimbabwe.

The delegation also collected evidence of numerous cases in which troops forced villagers to go and vote. Thus in the Buhebe tribal trust land, lorries of soldiers turned up and told the peasants ‘go and vote or we will bomb your homes’.

Still, the election results were not a complete work of fiction. They at least reflect the very uneven degree to which the guerillas of the Patriotic Front (in fact, mainly ZANU) have penetrated different parts of the country.

The poll was lowest in areas like Victoria province and Manicaland where ZANU units are well-entrenched, and in the Ndebele areas of south-west Rhodesia where ZAPU is traditionally strongest (although ZANU guerillas are now very active there).

The Matabeleland district, however, in the north-east of the country, where the ZANU campaign began back in 1972, there were persistent reports of the ‘boys’ (the guerillas) telling people to go and vote. This is evidence to the contrary.

The constitution cannot be changed without their agreement. The war will continue, fought for the regime by security forces composed largely of blacks but officered and commanded by whites. The latest tactic being employed against the Patriotic Front is codenamed ‘Operation Turkey’ and is designed to weaken the guerillas’ peasant base through starvation.

Grinding mills and shops are being closed down in many tribal trust lands. Where crops are found during incursions into guerilla-controlled areas they are destroyed. These measures, combined with a poor harvest, explain the reports of increasing malnutrition among black children in rural areas.

The security forces’ tactics— in particular the imposition of martial law and the increasingly aggressive raids against Patriotic Front in Mozambique, Zambia and even Angola—have kept the guerilla tide, which last year had reached the suburbs of Salisbury, at bay.

Western imperialism and southern Africa

Much now depends on the attitude of the western governments. The Rhodesian economy is in a disastrous mess (per capita income has fallen by a quarter since 1974) while whites continue to ‘take the gap’, (as leaving the sinking ship is called in Rhodesia), at a
rate of 9,000 in the past six months. Western recognition and the lifting of sanctions are vital to the regime's future.

Margaret Thatcher's victory has placed in office a British government basically sympathetic to the Rhodesian regime. The delegation of Tory peers sent to vet the elections had decided that they were 'free and fair' before their plane took off from Heathrow.

Of course, Whitehall is not where it counts these days, even in matters which concern southern Africa. Since the Angolan war of 1975-6 'Anglo-American' policy on the region has been decided in Washington. Jimmy Carter and Andrew Young are not going to scrap their African strategy on Thatcher's say-so.

Nevertheless, Tory governments have a record, dating back to Suez, of being less subservient to the Americans than their Labour counterparts. Lord Carrington may not be as willing as the unamended Doctor Death to act as Washington's messenger boy. As a former director of Rio Tinto Zinc he is well qualified to defend the interests of British capital in southern Africa.

Moreover, Carter is under heavy domestic pressure to recognise the Rhodesian regime. The mid-term elections last November returned a Congress which is well to the right of its predecessors, especially on foreign policy matters.

A number of vocal opponents of apartheid were unseated, most notoriously Dick Clark, chairman of the senate subcommittee on Africa. This successful Republican opponent was financed by, among others, the South African Department of Information. Carter, as the price of the ratification of a new SALT treaty, might be forced to soften his line towards the southern African settler regimes.

Muldergate and the rise of the military

Another factor working in Smith's favour is the increasingly embittered relations between Washington and Pretoria. The Rhodesian regime is heavy dependent on South Africa. Without oil and military support from the south the war effort would not continue for more than a few weeks.

In the past, the South African regime has used this position to force Smith in the direction of compromise with the guerrillas. First John Vorster and then his successor as prime minister, PW Botha, were vital interlocutors for western governments in their efforts to arrive at a settlement in Rhodesia.

No longer, it seems, Pretoria welcomed the Rhodesian election results (let it be noted, not only the National Party government but also 'liberal opposition' Progressive Federal Party). Even before they were announced PW Botha had publically speculated about the desirability of a southern African economic and military bloc dominated by the South African regime but embracing 'moderate' black governments in Zimbabwe and the like.

Meanwhile, Botha is defying Washington on a variety of fronts. He made an unprecedented row about the discovery that a US embassy aircraft had been used to spy on military installations (perhaps in search of the nuclear weapons South Africa is reliably reported to possess?). And in Namibia the tribal-settler coalition elected there last year is, to put it mildly, not being discouraged from pursuing its own internal settlement in defiance of the western proposals adopted by the United Nations for an agreement with the South West Africa People's Organisation.

One feature of PW Botha's premiership, since his election last year, has been an intensification of the already existing tendency of the regime to undermine the country's national security before all other objectives, including good relations with the west.

One feature of the Muldergate scandal, which pitted Botha against the former minister of the interior and of information and leader of the Transvaal National Party, Connie Mulder, is that it amounted in large part to a struggle for power between two sections of the state bureaucracy.

John Vorster, prime minister of twelve years before his retirement last year was the man, as minister of justice and police, who built up the formidable apparatus which crushed the black resistance in the early 1960s, discovered the white liberal opposition thereafter and denounced the Soweto uprising in 1976.

At the heart of this apparatus is the Department of National Security (better known by its old name, ROSS - Bureau of State Security). The head of the ROSS until last year and, after Vorster, the most powerful and feared man in South Africa, was General Hendrik Van Den Bergh, an old crook from the days when they were both interned for supporting Hitler during the second world war.

Van Den Bergh was a lot more than just a secret policeman. He acted as Vorster's personal representative in the efforts to woo conservative black African governments into detente with the apartheid regime. He met the right-wing Angolan leader Jonas Savimbi in July 1975, shortly before the South African invasion of Angola. ROSS agents were active in every western and African capital.

Van Den Bergh's downfall was his implication in secretaries of information Eschel Rhoadie's over-ambitious attempts to buy support for South Africa in the west. When the liberal opposition press blew the whistle on Muldergate last year, Van Den Bergh was forced out. He now has suffered the fate of so many of his
denied a passport and therefore deprived of the right to leave the country. It is the South African military establishment which has profited from the fall of Mulder until last year tipped as Vorster’s certain successor and Van Den Bergh.

P W Botha was Vorster’s minister of defence and continues to hold this portfolio as prime minister. He built up the South African Defence Force into a formidable military machine with a very powerful punch. The military are an economic power as well: the state-owned corporation Armscor produces most of the equipment required by the SADF. Associated with these developments is the drive to economic self-sufficiency. The state-run Sasolburg coal-to-liquid project was massively expanded after the fall of the Shah deprived South Africa of its main source of imported oil. The government has taken powers to assume control of industry in the still unlikely event of the west imposing economic sanctions on South Africa. (However, even these projects reflect South Africa’s economic dependence on western capital - western companies like the Fluor corporation and Deutsche Bank are heavily involved in the Sasolburg expansion programme.)

P W Botha has presided over the growing militarisation of the South African state apparatus. Senior SADF officers have increasingly adopted an openly political role, making speeches on controversial issues. The National Security Council a group of key ministers, generals and civil servants presided over by Botha, meets every Monday. The cabinet meets on Tuesday and ratifies the decisions taken the day before.

DONS has now had its wings clipped and has been subordinated to the Department of Military Intelligence. The chief of the SADF, General Magnus Malan, now fills the role occupied by Van Den Bergh under Vorster.

The Muldergate scandal has thus left the military on top. One possible consequence would be the use of South African troops in Rhodesia. Vorster withdrew Pretoria's units from Rhodesia in August 1975, but Botha might send them back if the military situation deteriorates further.

Botha is a committed advocate of South African military expansionism. Architect of the invasion of Angola, he remains unrepentant and blames the defeat which followed the invasion of the Americans’ failure to back him up.

Concessions to black workers
All this is not inconsistent with concessions to the black township workers, still ramming nearly three years after the Soweto uprising. Botha has finally implemented the reform promised by Vorster under which Africans will be permitted to buy long leases of land in the townships.

The regime seems prepared to go even further to recognise that urban Africans are not ‘temporary sojourners’ in the cities. The report of the Wiiehn commission on labour relations published at the end of April amounts to the admission that the attempt since 1948 to create the apartheid system, turning all blacks in the urban areas into migrant workers with their dependants in the tribal Homelands, has failed.

Professor Nic Wiiehn, its chairman and a special adviser to labour minister Fanie Botha, recently said that the African worker has become so integrated in our economy that he can no longer be separated from it. Accordingly the commission recommended that African workers (80 per cent of the total labour force) be permitted to join or form legally recognised trade unions, that the job colour bar be abolished, that the reserved jobs for whites in key industries (including building, mining and motor) be scrapped and that it should be made easier for blacks to become apprentices.

Fanie Botha accepted the first two proposals (but not the...
and in the subsequent growth of a number of independent black unions.

Wichmann wants to integrate these workers by allowing them to organise within the highly bureaucratised and state-regulated official union system. He is particularly keen to fragment the black work-force through the creation of company unions for black workers, and the encouragement of plant bargaining.

Independent black unions which refuse to opt into the state system, will suffer discrimination at the hands of the government and employers.

The proposals have already been denounced by a number of white unions grouped around the far-right Confederation of Labour. White workers stand to lose a lot if their privileged status is thus chipped away. It is unlikely, however, that they will carry the day.

Earlier this year the white Mineworkers Union (MWU) went on strike in protest against moves to introduce coloured workers into skilled jobs, this shortage could be eliminated and blacks would be a lot cheaper. (The artificial scarcity of skilled workers means black-white wage differentials sometimes as high as 1-10).

Moreover, the expansion of South African manufacturing industry between the late 1950s and the mid 1970s means that the economy depends on the existence of a significant number of semi-skilled African workers, who are not migrants, but who form an increasingly stable and settled work-force.

Their economic muscle was reflected in the massive strikes in the Durban area in early 1973 and in the subsequent growth of a number of independent black unions.

One of the most important members of the Chamber of Mines, still the core of South African capitalism, is the General Mining and Finance Corporation, owned by the massive Afrikaner investment company FVB.

The strategy of the regime is to adopt towards the black work-class is one of divide and rule: plant unions versus is one of divide and rule: plant unions versus national unions; settled, organised workers versus migrant workers: semi-tribal migrant workers militant versus students (as during the Soweto stay-at-home of August 1976): employed versus unemployed (black unemployment is rising fast).

Whether it succeeds depends on the black resistance's ability to build on the power and militancy displayed by the African working class in the last few years and thereby to overcome the divisions the regime hopes to exploit. Gestures, however heroic, like the armed attack on a Soweto police station probably by the Afrikaner National Congress will lead to yet more defeats.

Alex Callinicos
'In Mr Heath's belief the instrument for achieving economic growth was the private enterprise system. He was as emphatic on this belief as Mrs Thatcher after him. Though different in style his speeches and hers do not on this point differ in content. It is not through state organisation and direction but through the play of individual skills and the taking of individual risks that real prosperity is created. There can be no argument on this between members of the Conservative Party.'

Thus Douglas Hurd, Heath's private political adviser, in his recent book on the last Tory government. The election of a new Tory government, dedicated to all manner of reactionary policies, makes the experience of the period 1970-74 an important one for study. It is doubly important because many people in the socialist
movement today have come into active political life in the struggle against a reactionary Labour Government and, for them, the Tories in power are a dim memory.

For those of us who lived through the fight as revolutionary socialists, there are even greater dangers; the four years have had the status of myth. We look back upon them as a red burst of class struggle in which politics had a clear relevance to masses of workers and issues had a simplicity that they have lost under Labour.

The Heath Government did see a major upsurge in the class struggle. In three years, the Government declared five states of emergency. The number of days lost in strikes rose from under seven million in 1969 to over twenty million in 1972. Even more clearly, the average length of strikes increased from 4.1 days to 17.1 days in the same period.

But there is another side to the picture. There were bitter defeats as well as magnificent victories and the tempo of that struggle was not at all even. Neither did the working class spring forth in united hostility to the Tories the moment Heath entered Downing Street.

The period was a complex one and opportunities were missed as well as taken. Indeed, it is possible to argue that many of the difficulties that we have faced in the last five years have roots in the limits that we reached in the years of struggle.

According to Harold Wilson, the Labour Party lost the 1970 election because England lost to Germany in the World Cup a few days before polling. The real reasons, of course, were rather more substantial.

The strategy of the Wilson government had been based on three pillars: productivity dealing, wage controls and anti-union legislation. The first of these was, by 1969, meeting an increasingly sophisticated resistance from the rank and file, and the other two were about to fall apart.

The anti-union proposals, outlined in a document called In Place of Strife, were pushed by Wilson, Barbara Castle and Tony Benn, who was then one of the coming men of the government. They were opposed by, of all people, James Callaghan.

They were also opposed by a very wide section of the trade union movement. The Scottish area of the NUM called a one day strike against them in January 1969. On 27 February 200,000 workers struck and on 1 May, a further 100,000. 53 Labour MPs voted against the proposals and, by June, it was clear that they could not be carried.

On 18 June, a deal was cobbled together with the TUC whereby they would attempt to police their own ranks. According to Wilson:

"For good or ill, we had accepted the views of the TUC but only because, under the catalytic action of our legislative proposals, they had "moved forty years in a month". They had accepted responsibility for dealing not only with the inter-union disputes with which they were best fitted to deal, but also with unconstitutional strikes in a situation where the shopfloor was becoming increasingly militant and determined."

In fact, the government had been forced to back down, for the following months saw a major breach of the government's incomes policy in the 'revolt of the low paid'. A series of strikes, of which perhaps the dustmen's was the most bitter, resulted in the collapse of the wages norm. Not only was the major thrust of government policy in tatters, but they had succeeded in demoralising or alienating a great deal of their potential working class support.

The Tories, meanwhile, had been whipping up their supporters. At the 1968 conference, they had promised to change taxation policy to a charge on spending rather than a penalty on earnings and this commitment to shifting from direct to indirect taxation was carried through into their election material.

Their Campaign Guide 1970 promised
The fire last time

reduced taxation, public expenditure cuts, increased rents for council houses, ending of subsidies to industry, de-nationalisation of some firms, law and order, legal intervention in the reform of trade unions, a battery of other measures. The combination of working class disillusion with Labour's record and middle class hysteria whipped up by Tory promises won Heath the election. The result came as a surprise to most people and, initially, it was judged that the change of government would not make much difference to the way things went. Thus Nigel Harris, on the front page of Socialist Worker of 27 June 1979, wrote that 'The Tory government is likely to begin softly and that it is likely that...in practice the bark will be worse than the bite.' This view was shared widely. Vic Feather, TUC General Secretary, told the July meeting of the NUT Executive that: 'Conservative economic policies are better than those of the Labour Party. We think that the present government will do very much of the things we wanted the Labour government to do...I can knock on the door of Ian Macleod as well as I can knock on the door of Roy Jenkins and get an equally friendly response...I can knock on the door of Robert Carr and get a more friendly response than I got from Barbara Castle. The problems do not change just because a different government is elected, because the difficulties of this country are more economic than political.'

Most shades of opinion in the labour movement were thus rather badly wrong and it is worth spelling out why this was the case.

In a developed capitalist country with a powerful trade union movement, the room for manoeuvre of any government which rests on bourgeois democracy is very limited. There are, of course, different policies which can be pursued but, just as a reforming 'left-wing' government is brought up sharp against the power of the state machine and the logic of big capital, so is any reformist government armed with the atavistic desire to return to the days of Mr. Grindil. Thus the material consequences of a change of government are not likely to be catastrophic. However, despite these real constraints, the room for different policies does exist and does have very real consequences.

In addition to this, just as the Labour Party in opposition has to make concessions to its social base so too does the Tory Party. While the latter may be the party of big business, it depends for its mass support and much of its 'eadea' on a rag-tag of the middle classes - small businessmen, lawyers, estate agents, advertising people, and similar parasites - who are very far from being the direct representatives of big capital. Since the Tory party is the least democratic in Britain - its conferences do not even decide their own agenda and votes are not binding on anyone - this is less of a problem for them than it is for the Labour Party, but it is still present. It is this factor which explains many Tory irrationalities.

Income tax cuts, for example, are of little importance to big business but are very important to the Tory rank and file. Hanging and flogging would have little impact on the accumulation of capital, but they are very important to the Tory rank and file.

Thus when a Tory government comes to power it carries with it the ideological baggage of the most backward sections of the middle class and it makes a very determined effort to implement it.

The Heath government certainly made a determined effort. The first group of animals to feel the brunt of the leash were the judges in July Judge Melford Stevenson sent some Cambridge students to prison for long terms for their part in a protest against the colonos who ruled Greece.

In Ireland, the level of repression rose sharply. By September, the Home Office was moving to expel a sick former German student leader, Ruth Dutschke, from the country.

Much more central to the government's strategy however, was the proposal to introduce an Industrial Relations Act which would carry through many of the proposals which Wilson had failed on. This provided one of the major subjects for debate at the TUC Conference that autumn. The leader of the left, Hugh Scanlon of the Engineers, argued that this was: the greatest danger the trade union movement has had to face for the last five years... Feather, ever the moderate, argued that 'the trade union movement is not seeking showdowns or confrontations with anyone.'

According to the minister responsible, Robert Carr, the Bill was: 'a fair deal for all who work in industry and for the country.' Among its proposals were: legally binding agreements; secret ballots; outlawing the closed shop; sixty-day cooling off periods; compulsory registration of unions; the institution of an Industrial Relations Court. The leading role in the first phase of the struggle against the Bill was played by the Communist Party dominated Trade Union Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions (LCTDU). The first one-day strike action on 11 November was a relative failure with only 100,000 workers involved, but the LCTDU Conference on 14 November was massively attended and voted for a militant programme of stoppages, starting on 8 December. This was very successful, with about 500,000 workers coming out. On 1 January, the Birmingham bus drivers had its own action, with another 45,000 stopping work in that city.

The strategy of the LCTDU, however, was really to pressure the official movement to action. The TUC leadership were extremely reluctant to lead a fight. Their first response was to persuade the Labour Party to put down amendments to what they saw as the most objectionable features of the Bill in the House of Commons, and they tried to persuade Heath in private to drop the Bill in return for their agreement to a twelve-month wage freeze.

However, even they were forced to respond to the mood that was building up and they called a rally for 12 January 1971. There were few strikes on that day and very many factory meetings which spilled over into work time, while Wilson and Feather got a very rough ride at the official rally in the Albert Hall. The TUC demonstration in London on 21 February was massively supported with perhaps a quarter of a million marching.

The Engineers leadership responded with rather more militancy, calling official stoppages on 1 March (1.5 million on strike) and 18 March (two million on strike). The latter strike co-incident with a special TUC Conference to discuss the Bill. In retrospect, the action by the engineers was the decisive turning point. Faced with massive rank and file hostility to the act, the General Council had to put themselves at the head of the movement in order to divert it.

This they succeeded in doing, turning the special conference into a debate on whether to co-operate with the Act, rather than how to smash it. There was in fact, deep division over this policy. Frank Chapple, for the right, argued: 'We say the Bill is unworkable. Why don't we co-operate and prove it. Why do the Registrar's work for him'. In the end, the resolution that "Affiliated unions shall be strongly advised not to become registered under the Act" was carried by 5,055,000 to 4,284,000 votes.

In fact, the soft line on registration was a very risky policy, as a number of unions were very eager to collaborate. The AUEW Conference in Torquay voted 68 to 0, without a abstention, not to register, but other unions were less determined.

Scanlon pleaded for support from other unions: 'I have committed myself and I have done so in the knowledge of these things (fines etc). But I think all of us would be much happier if others would speak out and say that they are willing to take the political act which the situation demands.'

'We should issue a decisive call to them to do likewise. The absolute unity of all workers would be the greatest single act towards making the Bill become inoperable.'

The idea of action against the Bill was, by now, pretty dead. The LCTDU Conference on 24 April took no independent initiative, and the focus was firmly fixed upon a passive resistance in order to make the Bill 'inoperable'.

Substantial sections of the bureaucracy regarded even this policy as too extreme. At the ANLMS Conference in June the vote not to register was carried by 67,289 to 61,600, against the advice of Jenkins. The ANLMS Conference was manoeuvred by the Executive into taking no final decision over the matter.

The electricians, on the advice of Chap-
ple, voted not to register but, immediately afterwards, he introduced the novel ruling that the vote was binding on the conference but not on the Executive. At the September TUC the hard-line SOGAT motion for expelling registering unions was overwhelmingly defeated.

Thus, in twelve months the trade union bureaucracy had turned a fighting response to the Bill into a feeble and passive refusal to co-operate. The National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) presided over by the Tory Judge Donaldson, was ready to start its attack on the unions.

There were other major Tory successes in this period. The racist Immigration Act was forced through. Internment was introduced in Ireland and the concentration camp at Long Kesh began to fill up. There were cuts in public spending and Thatcher earned her nickname by stopping school milk. The major success of the Tories, however, was on the question of wages.

The Heath government, wedded to laissez faire, was, in theory, opposed to wage controls and it was the TUC that was propagandising for incomes policy. However, as a major employer, the Tories were in a position to set an example over wages.

In December 1970 the power workers were isolated and smashed. In January 1971 the Union of Post Office Workers began its first official strike for 50 years, demanding £3 a week. After six bitter weeks they were defeated, as were the Ford workers in their struggle for parity with other car plants. After a nine-week strike, they were sold out by a personal intervention of Scanlon and Jones.

In fact, although they had no formal incomes policy, the government constantly encouraged private sector employers to follow their example. Carr, for example, wrote in the Director magazine calling for employers to "co-ordinate their wage bargaining and develop counter-vailing power".

The major set-back which the government experienced in this period was their policy of not subsidising ailing industries. This, of course, had always been selective, with projects like Concorde eating up funds as a matter of course.

However, when Rolls-Royce collapsed in February 1971, the consequences of the company's total liquidation for British capitalism were so severe that Heath was forced to bail out the unprofitable firm by means of nationalisation, while leaving the profitable bits in private hands.

They felt much less compunction over the problems of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders, which ran into serious difficulties in June. The government were very reluctant to provide any subsidies for jobs and the workforce under the leadership of the CPV, voted to organise a 'work-in'.

This was very widely supported with 100,000 workers striking in the West of Scotland on 23 June in protest at unemployment. The issue was clearly one which provoked a substantial response. With nearly one million on the dole the UCS workers were joined by many other groups of workers.

This fight, too, had substantial weaknesses. This was particularly in evidence in the intervention of Benn. As Wilson's minister of technology he had forced through redundancies at UCS in 1969, but, after an initial rough reception, the UCS leaders were prepared to welcome him into the leadership.

The struggle against redundancies, which spread very far beyond UCS, was quickly diverted into reasonable arguments about viability, and, later, workers' co-operatives. Indeed, one of the major results of the UCS fight was the political rehabilitation of Benn as a leader of the 'left' in the Labour Party.

All in all, up to the end of 1971, the Tory government had been very successful in their attacks on the working class.

The new year opened with a miners' strike and an occupation of the Fisher-Bendix factory in Kirkby. On 30 January, the Parachute Regiment shot down 13 unarmed men in Derby and the British Embassy in Dublin was burned to the ground and retailed. As new and more militant phases in the class struggle had clearly begun.

The miners had been spoiling for a fight for some years and there had been local strikes in Yorkshire, Scotland and South Wales in November 1970. Consequently, the 1972 strike had massive support. Although the press attempted to repeat the isolation they had inflicted 12 months before on the power workers, this time they failed. Despite the horror stories and witch-hunting, there was massive working class support for the miners. Instead of sitting quietly in the coalfields, the miners sent out pickets to the power stations and docks and were enthusiastically received everywhere.

The climax was the struggle around the depot at Salley in Birmingham. On 7 and 8 February 1000 pickets, largely from Yorkshire and organised by a new figure called Scargill, had fought very bitter battles with a larger number of police. On the evening of the 8th, Scargill addressed the Birmingham East District Committee of the AUEW, who decided to call for strike action in solidarity.

On 10 February, 40,000 workers struck and 10,000 marched on the depot. An engineering militant who was on the picket line described the scene:

The gates are at the bottom of a small valley. We were struggling with the police and getting a rough time. Suddenly, the police eased off. I looked round and saw the miners over the top of the hill.

A huge column of workers marched down to the gates and swamped the police. The gates were closed. We were all in tears. I thought the revolution had come.

It was the turning point of the strike. The government appointed a special inquiry which rapidly conceded the bulk of the miners' claim.

The miners' strike was a massive victory for the working class but, despite this, the government was able to hold on. The UPW accepted eight per cent, as did the nurses and the local government manual workers. The government should have been stronger, but the leadership refused to lead a national struggle.

Instead, there was a bitter local fight in the Manchester areas with 25 factories occupied. However, the leadership refused to spread the fight and allowed local settlements. The employers had no such scruples and paid out massive support to the owners of occupied firms. The result was a messy and demoralising series of local compromises which did much to undermine the credibility of the broad left leadership in the union, particularly in their base in Manchester.

The Industrial Relations Act, in the meantime, had not gone away. On 15 March the stewards of Kaymet, a small London engineering firm, were the first to be summoned to the NIRC and, already, some unions were starting to collaborate with the Act. In April, the railway workers were forced to take a cooling-off period and then to ballot before further action.

The result of the vote was overwhelming support for strike action. Despite this clear indication of rank and file backing for the Act, the leadership of the movement was in headlong retreat and the LCTDU meeting on 10 June failed to provide any positive lead.

The retreat was stopped by the dockers. They were engaged in a series of attempts to ensure that the fast-growing container traffic was handled by registered dock labour and not by sweated and unorganised labour. In the course of this campaign, they began picketing various container firms.

The NIRC intervened on the side of the employers and, in the case of a company called Heaton's, fined the TGWU £8000. The leadership backed down and paid the fine, but this did not stop the rank and file action. By June, the focus of the struggle was on the Vestey-owned Midland Cold Store in London.

The NIRC tried various devices to break the picket, but in the end decided to take action against the leading stewards. On Friday 21 July five stewards were arrested for 'contempt of court', immediately dockers all over the country walked out.

The first attempt at solidarity was in Fleet Street and by Sunday the electricians had closed down all the national papers. The response here was not automatic and it had taken a great deal of hard arguing by dockers and militant printers to get the closure, but elsewhere the response was very much better.

Despite the fact that the action took place in the middle of the holiday period the numbers of workers on strike grew daily. On the Wednesday, the Law Lords released the men. By that time, even the TUC had got round to calling a one-day official general strike for the following Monday.

Once again, the burden of the fight against the Act lay at the shoulders of the rank and file. The official leadership of the TGWU and of the other unions were quite ready to make speeches and compromise in practice.

As for the Labour Party, the Irish MP Bernadette Devlin tried to move a motion in the Commons reading: 'This House con-
The three-day working week. The TUC made every effort to reach a compromise, even going so far as to propose to the government that they would enforce special case conditions over any settlement the miners might reach.

The government, however, was convinced that it could beat the miners and forced the leadership to a strike ballot, which produced an 81% positive vote in favour of action. This strike, however, was very different from 1972. Pickets were very carefully limited to six miners each and the rank and file was kept on a very tight leash. Solidarity action was positively discouraged.

But now the Heath government was on its last legs and had even lost the support from big business. The naive Mr Hurd records a painful incident in 1974 when he was summoned to see a prominent industrialist...

...renowned for the robustness of his right wing views (I would guess Brooke of GKN) who treated him as a message boy."

In effect, he was given an order to take back to Heath which meant: 'pay the miners or get out'. Heath chose to fight an election on the slogan: ‘Who rules the country?’ Even though it might be quite clear that it was not the unions who ran the country, it was equally clear that the government couldn’t. Heath was defeated.

The Industrial Relations Act was finished. When the Labour Government hesitated before repealing it and the NIRC tried another fine on the AUEW, the leadership at last found their courage. They issued the famous instruction: ‘All members will stop work forthwith’. Within hours, an anonymous capitalist paid the fine and the Act tottered into oblivion.

I have skimmed over the surface of those four years but even so it should be possible to draw out some lessons. In the first place, Thatcher has been elected upon policies very similar to those of Heath.

No doubt she has greater determination to implement them, given that both she and her buddy Sir Keith Joseph were among the pamphlet writers alongside Heath. She, indeed, was beaten by, of all people, the students when she tried to tie up student unions.

However, policies is not settled by willpower and, whatever delusions of iron resolve she and her followers may have, there are definite limits to how far they can implement their policies without running into opposition from big business. There is no way in which she can hope to get away with a rigid policy of non-intervention in industry.

That, however, does not mean that her government cannot be very reactionary. The extent to which they are able to implement their policies will depend very much upon the resistance which the working class puts up. There is every likelihood that the new government will try to go a great deal further in attacks upon workers than any of its predecessors.

Last time round, that did produce a major counter-offensive. But we have seen how that counter-offensive was very much more uneven than it might seem and involved a number of defeats and compromises as well as some famous victories.

There is no reason to suppose that the course of events will be any simpler this time around. The leadership of the unions, and in particular the TUC, will make every effort to reach some sort of compromise with the new government and will continually seek to sidetrack and divert any rank and file response into safer directions.

If anything it is very probable that the struggle will be very much more difficult this time around. At the start of the Heath government, the broad left was in quite a strong position in a number of unions, in particular the Engineers. The last ten years have seen not only the atrophy of much of this organisation but a growth of a new and confident right wing.

At the same time all sections of the bureaucracy have moved very sharply to the right under the pressure of the social contract. A further factor has been the extent to which the tradition of independent shop stewards activity has been eroded by consecutive wage freezes and plans for co-operatives rather than intransigence.

At this level, the demise of the Communist Party is a crucial factor. It should be clear from the record that the crucial role in the struggle against the Industrial Relations Act was played by the I.C.D.T.U. For a period at the end of 1970 and the start of 1971 this took a strong independent lead in organising action against the state.

After that, it fell gradually into passivity, having achieved its goal of influencing the official leadership. The period of Labour government has seen a further decline in its role.

It is not impossible that it will be revived with the Tory attack, but it will begin its operations from a very much weaker base. In addition, the 'left' leadership in the Labour Party, which emerged around Benn in the period following UCS, will be eager to establish its tarnished credentials and will be only too glad to slip into the leadership of the opposition to the Tories.

Against this outlook, we can set a positive factor, which is that the revolutionary left in general and the SWP in particular, are very much stronger, more experienced and better rooted in the class than they were in 1970. We entered that phase with under two thousand members, most of them very inexperienced and with hardly any industrial base.

The sales of Socialist Worker seen to have been in the order of ten thousand. By 1974, IS had some 4,000 members and paper sales in the week of the election were about 40,000. Time around, we are clearly much larger and much stronger.

In the fight back, this can be the decisive factor. The major initiatives in the fight against the Tories came from the rank and file; unfortunately, there was no force able to generalise the gut hostility of thousands of workers and provide it with a convincing political direction independent of the trade union bureaucracy. There is no guarantee that we will be more successful this time but we are much better placed to take the opportunities that will be offered us.
inflation in the sense of shifting the original sin from capitalism to the workers but rather because we cannot avoid the issue that wage costs may be pushing up inflation where they are being passed on by employers to maintain their profit levels. In addition, our analysis of inflation will have its effect on political strategy.

For example, if we simply state that wages don't cause inflation then we simply opt out of the argument. It's their economy, their inflation and their crisis. True, but hardly helpful to workers who are having their living standards cut back.

Chris argues that Andrew Glyn's claim that a larger share of wealth is going to labour is wrong. Nevertheless, there is no reason for saying that wage increases shouldn't cut into profitability. If that does create a crisis for capitalism then it's their loss and our opportunity.

You ask for anniversary comments on Socialist Review. Well, congratulations all round (apart from the proof-readers). In general, your well-written features have persuaded me to read outside my own areas of interest and even to buy books following the excellent 'Writers Reviewed' series.

How about broadening (rather than expanding) the review section? The letters on 1900 showed that this could be successful and there are other films and even TV, records and radio (what about 'Musicians Reviewed'?)

An occasional pamphlet among the book reviews would be interesting (provided that you say where it can be obtained for those of us who don't live next door to Collets or Bookmarks).

At the moment the balance, especially in the news section, appears to be in favour of industrial and foreign news. It would be good to see an occasional shift in emphasis towards the arts and science. New technology is, after all, an area that will affect all our working lives.

Best wishes for another successful year.
John Stirling
SE London

Socialist Review

PO Box 82
London E2

Wages, inflation and SR

I hope that Chris Harman's 'guide' through the inflation debate (Socialist Review 10) has enlightened more people than it has confused. The questions he raises are very real ones, but I must say that his answers still leave me in the realm of the confused.

1. Chris states that wages do not cause inflation. It seems to be the age of the capitalist economy that is the culprit. He then throws away as one of his 'few final points' that as capitalists raise prices workers will try to protect their living standards by forcing higher wages leading to cuts in profits and a further push on prices.

This leaves us asking the question, who started the spiral— you or me? There is also the major point that increased wage costs are feeding through into price rises.

While it is necessary to show who cast the first stone and why, it is perhaps more important to ask whether wage rises would not have their inflationary impact if profits were held in check.

2. Is there not also a difference between the private and public sectors? The public sector appears to be largely designed to service the capitalist economy. It is also heavily labour intensive. Surely then wage increases in this sector are more likely to raise prices which in turn are then added to the costs of the private sector.

On the other hand, wage costs in publicly profitable and/or highly automated sectors of industry appear, at least potentially, less likely to have any dramatic effect on inflation. For example, the unions showed in the 1978 Ford pay claim that conceding the whole of their demands need not add a single penny to the price of a Ford car.

3. Chris says that wages have fallen behind price inflation. This does not mean that wages have no effect on inflation but perhaps that even lower wage costs can still contribute to inflation—a much more fundamental point in relation to a crisis of capitalism.

I raise these issues not to suggest that wages do cause inflation in the sense of shifting the original sin from capitalism to the workers but rather because we cannot avoid the issue that wage costs may be pushing up inflation where they are being passed on by employers to maintain their profit levels. In addition, our analysis of inflation will have its effect on political strategy.

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John Stirling
SE London

New views for old

Looking back over the last year's edition of Socialist Review I think you have made some steps to produce a readable, interesting and informative magazine. It is certainly the best monthly on the left (which isn't saying much!) and is a marked improvement on the old IS Journal, people are actually willing to buy SR.

But there still seems to be some of the old faults creeping back in and it is these I would like to discuss.

There is a worrying air of conformity over all the articles. The set piece debates about science and socialist theatre are too abstract and remain too specialised for the average reader.

We need discussion about more mundane things: the controversy raging over the ANL, tactics on marches, the left's strategy in elections, yes, no or maybe to devolution, are reclamation and demonstrations worthwhile, what should our attitude towards censorship be?

I don't believe that these issues have really been aired sufficiently and it is a mistake the left consistently makes when it blithely assumes that of course these matters have been settled. Maybe the London whizz-kids have made their minds up, but out here in Yeggdol, the arguments flounder through lack of infor-

mation. Look, the left is full of people with their own ideas on every conceivable topic, but that richness of thought is not reflected in SR.

I think SR could best be improved by a conscious attempt to broaden out, and this is really a two-fold operation. The editorial board needs to encourage this by commissioning provocative articles and inviting contributions from different viewpoints (and I don't mean the over vocal Trotks).

How about SR day schools on some of the topics we have covered, has anyone tried SR discussion groups, what about handing a page over each issue to gay groups, ecologists, women's groups etc.

But there is a limit to the amount the editors can do alone, and the readership is ultimately responsible for what sort of magazine we end up with. I don't believe that only the same old names have something to say and the exchange of views which always follows when socialists meet should be apparent in the pages of SR.

So come on, everyone who thinks violence is counter-productive, parliamentary elections are a waste of time, or that Rock Against Racism is self-indulgence, put pen to paper and let's have a thorough discussion for once, instead of the grey consensus that currently prevails. The left can't afford to assume anything about its tactics and beliefs; but at the moment there are more staggering assumptions per column inch than misprints!

Paul Cunningham.

Is that right?

Three points. Firstly, I read SR attentively and think its marvellous, and wish a lot more people would read it. So a suggestion, Socialist Review is monthly, Socialist Worker is weekly, why not pick out from each Review the four most important pieces and do a shorter resume/review of them one by one over the four concurrent SW's? I'm sure this would be more productive than simply printing a picture of the Review cover with a few titles and a couple of lines.
As I understand it, our party publishes the Review and now International Socialism, not to accommodate the grand old bourgeois principle that graded brains make finer science, but because we want to circulate analytical and polemical material without setting SW's agitational feet in concrete.

I'm sure that a lot of our comrades, both with and without the benefit of academic training, still see these publications as approximating the 'O', 'A', and 'BA' levels of socialist comprehension, which is a crying shame.

A regular rather than occasional trailer in SW for the Review's coverage would do more than break down these barriers than any number of the 'districts should sell's x copies of any six of the following ten party publications' type of circular which sometimes deals with this problem.

Socialist Review is excellent in itself, but our work with it needs to be pushed inside the band of maximum tolerable commitments which so many of our comrades are obliged to impose on their activities as SWP members.

Secondly, I regret the Review's 'analysis' features as a vital part of the party's public statements, and my enlighten ment as a member. No doubt many others do too, who would agree that as a rule these features are first rate.

However, the more relaxed magazine format should not include sloppy political conclusions. I was startled to read in No 10, two adjacent articles, both unfolding excellent analyses and information on aspects of the Concordat, but finally drawing virtually opposite conclusions!

Bill George concludes by suggesting that if the EFP-TEU-AUEW merger consolidates the right wing group within the TUC, then TUC guidance on picketing will no longer just be pieces of paper tacked on the end of election manifestos." Phil Marfleet, on the other hand, concludes on picketing that 'over the next year...the fight will be on to protect our most basic rights'.

I agree with Phil, and so, for that matter, does SW. As his conclusion seems to contradict his analysis, I suspect (as an occasional scribbler myself) that Bill may have let the demands of fluent prose override his political judgement.

Whatever the case, the Review shouldn't confuse us in this way, especially not in matters of such importance.

Thirdly, I'm not against colour supplement style word puzzles in the Review, but we can have them as a separate item, rather than scattered at random about articles like Nigel Harris's 'New Elite'. Some of us have to concentrate hard enough as it is to take in even Nigel's crystal clear writings, so it doesn't help to get suddenly bogged down trying to interpret typesetting teasers which a single proof-reading would remove.

Is it really true that a New York pajama firm is building a plant in China to produce 'nightmare for the US market'? I hope so.

Best wishes for another year as good as the last one.
Steve Ludlam
Sheffield

POBox52

Socio-mathematico-method

I was disturbed to read Mike McGrath's letter in the March issue. Not only does he show a disturbing tendency towards idealism, but he can't add up! '2+2', he claims, 'does equal 5 - anything else'. There is no justification whatsoever for this remark. That 2+2=4 is firmly rooted in the fact that two apples plus two more apples make up the grand total of four apples. The many other concepts used in mathematics can also be reduced to, and rooted in, similarly verifiable facts.

Mathematics operates according to the laws of logic (unlike comrades McGrath). An example is the so-called law of the excluded middle, which states that you cannot have either A or not-A. The assertion that 2+2=4 cannot be both true and false. It is simply totally true, irrespective of whether the state, or an overdose of idealist philosophy, has convinced us otherwise.

2+2=4 is a trans-historical fact which will not alter however much we might want it to. So mathematics is not a creation of man's imagination in a way that, for example, physics isn't.

On the contrary, mathematics is a representation of reality, albeit and abstract representation.

I tend to go along with the rest of Mike McGrath's letter, although I would like to offer a more general observation concerning the debate over scientific method.

It seems to me that this debate has two strands, neither of which is drawn out clearly, and which are being conflated. There is, first, the sociology of science, by which I mean the social relationships and interrelationships within which scientific practice takes place and which are very susceptible to 'outside' influences.

Second, there is the method of science, by which I mean the practice itself, in the theories which are investigated, the experiments used in their investigation, and so on.

This aspect, I think, has its own internal momentum and logic, which are generally less susceptible to influences from outside.

The underlying themes of the debate seem to concern the extent to which the sociology - the government contracts, the university grants, the status gained through work in particular fields, and so on - shapes and determines the (social) practices of science.

Now, while the sociology would obviously change under the impact of revolution, the extent to which the methods of science would depend on the extent of its determination by the sociology.

John Glover
North London

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The modern gay movement has set out to validate homo-, sexuality, to give a sense of gay identity, of Gay Pride. Its approach has been to single out the unique aspects of gay oppression, the particular forms of gay struggle, the special qualities of homosexuality etc. In other words, it has built up a theory based on differences. When it comes to the connection between exploitation and oppression, classes and oppressed groups, capitalism and patriarchy, we have a range of alternatives.

For socialists, ideology and social relations become mere puppets, directly controlled by economic factors. At the other extreme, there are separatists who turn Marxism upside down and argue that social relations and ideas themselves determine economic relations. The former attitude is of little practical importance in Britain today; the latter is very important, as one expression of a libertarianism which infects the gay movement, even to the extent of influencing gay socialists.

The autonomy of the gay movement is a recurring theme of debate. Much of the discussion is dominated by moralistic objections to 'interference'. The discussion about organisational conclusions is completely useless without looking at the theoretical considerations on which they are based.

The women's movement has built up a body of theory under the general heading of patriarchy, a system which defines the oppressive relationship between the sexes and its effects on young people, homosexuals and so on. At the core of this analysis is the family.

This body of theory was a welcome antidote to the economism which had infected even the Trotskyist tradition. Not all its theorists were Marxists, though even some who claimed to be fell into the trap of treating a 'separation' between patriarchy and capitalism as more than a convenient but risky tool for analysis, into something existing in the 'real world'.

Having split off the two, the 'revolutionary feminists' at one extreme claim that the oppression of women as a whole by men as a whole is necessarily universal; their political conclusion (hardly revolutionary) is that the overthrow of exploitation and oppression can be achieved only by the annihilation (or at least castration) of all men.

At the other end of the scale, the Stalinist economic determinists argue that 'after the revolution that will all take care of itself', denying any need for a struggle around sexual politics in the here and now.

At the moment the important debate is in the 'middle' ground. The Communist Party, in part because of their need to account for the position of women and gays in societies which they call socialist, put forward the need for a 'mopping-up' operation. That is, a virtually independent struggle against sexual oppression in addition to any struggle for socialism. In doing so, they line up closely with the libertarians.

The Socialist Workers Party, although not seeking to prevent the growth of 'autonomous' groups (whatever 'prevent' means), does argue for a mass feminist party, within which various oppressed groups are accommodated.

From this angle, the idea of an 'independent' organisational form for the struggle against gay oppression is not seen in a moralistic way as an expression of 'freedom', but as a crucial weakness in the organisation of the working class in the struggle against capitalism.

The relationship between exploitation can be seen practically in the gay movement. The composition of the movement around sexual liberation which grew out of the late 1960s has often been described as 'middle class dominated' or even 'petty-bourgeois'.

From my own experience of a gay counselling service, it certainly appears true that 'middle class' gays are more likely to start coming to terms with their sexuality. (This may also have something to do with the fact that it relies on the telephone.)

Without getting bogged down in the terms 'working class' or whatever, it is probably fair to say that the gay liberation tendency is not based on the ranks of the manual working class. This is nothing more than an observation that those who are most exploited are also most oppressed. Put crudely, Gay Liberationists are likely to emphasise their oppression over and above their exploitation on the basis of their experience of the world.

The German gay movement under the Weimar Republic (1919-33), together with organisations like the Campaign for Homosexual Equality could be summed up as groups of white, middle-class males, whose positions of relative privilege are maintained only by their sexual orientation. The German movement concentrated effort on 'scientific investigation and propaganda.
designed to show that any attempts at legal control were "illogical".

The Napoleonic code did for a time reject anti-homosexual laws as "irrational" but that did not end the oppression of homosexuals in practice.

The reformists today rely more on asserting that homosexuality is harmless to the established order. The oppression of homosexuals is now seen as something more than a misunderstanding. Above all, it is of no revolutionary significance at all - dread the thought.

The second pitfall is particularly libertarian. Since gay oppression is "felt" at an individual level, so "awareness" is built up on an individual level with the aid of example, argument and mutual support (all of which are, of course, important). The Gay Liberation Front in its 1971 Manifesto states that the focus on "the real threat of the present" is the root of gay oppression and agreed on the need for a re-structuring of society to deal with it.

In practical terms, they propose subverting the family by forming communes and encouraging others to do the same, echoing the sentiment "Abolish the Family," without saying who by, when and how. Their forms of struggle centred around cultural propaganda, "gender-bending," consciousness-raising and an abstract disapproval of capitalism. Marx was regarded as straight and therefore irrelevant.

The politics of these radicals are still important, not so much because of their numbers but because of their number effect on the development of the struggle for gay liberation. They are the most outspoken advocates of "autonomy" and separatism.

One of the most reactionary backwaters in which the radicals find themselves is that of separatism, based centrally from the division between gay and straight, women and men. Gay men who go to the same extreme as the "revolutionary feminists" mentioned earlier, it appears that the root of their oppression lies in the exclusion of all men. The logic of ending their oppression is presumably by committing suicide, which is ironically the worst expression of that oppression itself.

At a much more moderate level it is often argued by feminists that the oppression of women pre-dates capitalism, so there is no guarantee that it will also bring women liberation. Their argument is again false - feudal society, like capitalist society, was sexist, but like capitalism, feudalism was a class society. The whole point is that the struggle to smash this class society is the struggle to replace it with a society which no longer has the preconditions for the existence of sexism.

Since the analysis of the gay separatists fails to take into account any class analysis of oppression, it manages to side-step all problems of real difficulties. The oppression of homosexuals, for instance, is put to one side. Heterosexuals are the oppressors, which solves that problem. The identification of the enemy as heterosexuals in general, conversely defines the ally as homosexuals in general.

The central drive in the gay movement is therefore to involve homosexuals per se. The result is that non-gays are systematically

ly or indirectly excluded from gay struggle. At the same time, the involvement of gays, far from being maximized, is actually discouraged on two fronts: non-separatists are obviously part of the problem who have not yet come to terms with the idea that homosexuals are denied the opportunity to gain confidence by taking part in a gay struggle without first identifying themselves as gay. The politics of the gay movement are therefore self-limiting and condemn it to the downward spiral of an inward-looking clique.

A graphical illustration of this attitude was last year's Gay Pride March. The whole orientation of the march, down to its name, was directed to involving homosexuals.

The chosen route, in part selected, was through the Chelsea, selected in order to pass a particular pub which has become a symbol of the gay movement's failure to mobilise support from the commercial gay scene. This contrasted with the much larger and more effective march a few months before, which mobilised a large section of the left in defence of Gay News.

A concern with ideas in isolation is characteristic of much of the gay and women's movements. There is more emphasis on sexism because that is the most important aspect of this. An awareness of sexism is, of course, fundamental to being a revolutionary socialist today but that awareness is useless unless sexual oppression is related to its roots. It is seen simply as something malicious, as another kind of natural disaster, the only response is to moralise, to say 'That's nasty, take it away.'

In practical terms this is often all that takes place; tactics are limited to screening children's books and shouting "Sexist!" at those who use wrong words. The tactics are, in fact, very much like Victorian Moralism, based on self-righteousness rather than analysis. Storming into a factory and screaming at the boss 'You pig! How dare you treat your workers like this!' can be justified from a moral point of view but would be useless as a form of revolutionary practice.

At a superficial level, it appears to some people that the manual working class is the most sexist section of the working class. This is often seen by libertarians in terms of 'ignorance', just as heterosexuals are seen as responsible for gay oppression. What we have then is not just moralism but moralism which is specifically anti-working-class.

This elitism also expresses itself in apologies for homosexuality which express 'gayness' through such idealist, mystical slogans as 'The Lesbian Spirit is a Beauty Within Every Woman.'

The emphasis is on ideas as independent force allowing slogans such as 'Smash the Family!' or 'Gay Liberation Now!' to be put forward, where All Power to the Soviets! or 'Workers Power Now!' would be laughed at.

Rejecting the fact that gay oppression has a class basis may make the problem apparently easier to solve but in reality interferes with any actual solution being reached. The struggle for gay liberation is meaningless unless it is also the struggle for socialism.

Marxists already have some answers to the sorts of problems described above. They will put forward the concept of class consciousness in opposition to the preoccupation with individual consciousness and 'personal solutions'.

They will argue that hostility to homosexuals is just one aspect of an oppressive ideology which expresses itself through individuals but has its roots in the maintenance of capitalist social relations; that the key to destroying ideology lies in overthrowing those relations, not just in slaging off individuals. They will argue that gay liberation is pie in the sky unless the foundations are built for the working class to do the overthrowing.

The approach taken by many gays on the left has been to start by asking 'What is special about homosexuality?' What is needed more is to look at the identity of interest between the working class and homosexuals as a whole. The obvious thing, though, is that the interests of the working class do not coincide with those of homosexuals as a whole.

For a start, there are gay capitalists and gay Nazis. In addition, there are more homosexuals whose class position is such that they may be antagonistic or ambivalent towards the idea of socialist revolution.

They may for a while identify themselves with a movement which they see purely in terms of a struggle for gay liberation but in a revolutionary situation (and it is revolution we are talking about) their hostility may come to the fore. In short, they may line up with the ruling class as a counter-revolutionary force.

It is in this situation that we need a revolutionary party. If the people referred to could have sufficient numbers and influence to carry with them sections of the working class in blocking the overthrow of capitalism, it is essential to out-maneuver them.

A tiny revolutionary party, loosely tied into an assortment of 'autonomous' political tendencies which are organised on the basis of liberal democracy would not be firm enough base for the strike of the overthrow the workers, the workingclass. This is one of the central conclusions drawn by the SWP.

Our conclusions for the immediate struggle around gay politics are totally different to the libertarians and those who walk half-way with them. We believe that gay struggle should be directed towards involving the best organised and most exploited sections of the working class. That applies to the whole of our activity.

The second important conclusion, is to integrate gay struggle into class struggle as a whole, to concentrate on drawing in militants, rather than looking specifically to 'homosexuals'. That means going into the Anti-Nazi League, rather than fighting Nazis as 'homosexuals' in gay anti-fascist groups. It means having homosexuals on the Rights to Work marches against support for Gay Liberation. It means setting up a very broad base for campaigning against police harassment in all its forms.

It means joining the SWP to put an end to 'rape the streets' but also means support to building for a socialist transformation of society.

Gay Pride is not just holding hands with other homosexuals, it's being able to link arms with the straightest. Lionel Starling.
Dashiell Hammett

'The Bourgeoisie has subjected the country to the rule of the towns. It has created enormous cities, has greatly increased the urban population as compared with the rural and has thus rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life,' (The Communist Manifesto).

To Marx in the 1840s, the growth of cities which followed the development of capitalism, seemed to be a move towards a higher form of civilisation. The 'enormous cities' he welcomed then, gradually took on an increasingly sinister aspect. Writers began to perceive the city as a new source of oppression. In the 1920s this view was convincingly expressed in the fiction of Dashiell Hammett.

All his five novels, written between 1929 and 1932, are situated in American towns or cities. Hammett depicts these industrial and commercial centres not as liberating, cosmopolitan havens, but as repressive anti-heaps. In Red Harvest Persimmonville (appropriately nick-named 'Poisonville') is described thus—
'The city wasn't pretty. Most of its buildings had gone in for gaudiness. Maybe they had been successful at first. Since then the smelters...had yellow smoked everything into uniform dinginess.'

This town was built for the convenience of industry, disregarding its inhabitants. Hammett goes further; life in them is brutal and dangerous. Persimmonville is owned by one man, Elisha Wilson. He controls the mining company, the city bank, the two newspapers, the police department, the District Attorney, plus all the politicians from the Senator to the local council.

The only opposition to his dominance the anonymous detective-narrator discover, came in 1921, when the Wobblies struck. The outcome of the strike is depressingly familiar;—both sides bled plenty. The wobblies had to do their own bleeding. Old Elisha hired gunmen, strike-breakers, national guardsmen and even parts of the regular army to do his.'

The union is finished, but Willson discovers that the mobsters decide to stay. The city becomes the prize and the numbers; the novels final body-count resembles the aftermath of a B17 bombing-raid.

The politicians in Red Harvest are the stooges of the mobs. In The Glass Key: the two are indistinguishable. Shad O'Rory and Paul Madvig, both gang leaders, are fighting an election. Madvig's chances seem slim, since he is implicated in a murder. O'Rory is able to pose as a reformer and the D.A. and the Police Chief, once Madvig's men, are on the verge of shifting loyalties. The issue becomes simple—
'If he loses the election, loses his hold on the city and state government, they'll electrocute him.'

Survival is tied to success and power. The legal system is as much a weapon as a cash or a Tommy-gun. Control it and you are right; weakness is the only immorality. There is no moral order, death comes suddenly and at random. The risk of unexpected death applies to
the hood and even the respectable business man.

In The Maltese Falcon Sam Spade describes an incident in which a stolid citizen called Fietcraft vanishes. Spade eventually caught up with him and discovered the cause of Fietcraft’s disappearance.

'Going to lunch he passed an office building that was being put up. A beam or something fell 8 or 10 stories down and smacked the sidewalk alongside him... The life he knew was a clean, orderly, safe, responsible affair. Now a falling beam had shown him that life was fundamentally none of these things'.

When death can come so accidentally, the established routine of bourgeois life becomes meaningless. The reality behind the appearance of an orderly, urban life becomes clear and Fietcraft can’t face that style of living any longer.

This gulf between appearance and reality is central to Hammett’s fiction; criminals change names and appearances, sweet old couples turn out to be murderers, a simple gems-heist unearthed long hidden family secrets (as in The Dain Curse) and no one is ever who they seem—

'The hell of it, Miss—a name you’re 75% of your name Wonderly or Leblanc? She flushed and murmured. 'It’s really O'Shaughnessy, Bridg O’Snaughnessy."

Institutions and people are part of a confusing jungle. The individual is disorientated, helpless and turns to the private detective for guidance. He is the main character in all these novels.

We learn very little about their private lives. 'The continental-op' remains unnamed and Sam Spade hardly exists apart from his work; they are all deeply committed to their sleuthing; to the exclusion of all else. All are familiar with their city; they know it both geographically and socially, and move around it unhindered by personal ties. Amidst the bewildering city they are the only stable forces, because they remain aloof, uncomplicated in society.

Because they see through conventional (and to them irrelevant) legal methods, because they see through conventional (and to them irrelevant) legal methods, Hammett’s detectives use highly dubious procedures. They work to a more basic idea of justice. In The Golden Horseshoe, the continental-op convicts someone for a crime they did not commit: 'I can’t put you up for the murders you engineered in San Francisco, but I can sock you with the one you didn’t do in Seattle—so justice won’t be cheated.'

They work outside the corrupt law: modern avenging angels, striking down criminals with 38s instead of thunderbolts. To allow a criminal to escape, regardless of the legal niceties, offends their professional integrity.

Spade explains—'I’m a detective and expecting me to run criminals down and then let them go free, is like asking a dog to catch a rabbit and let it go'.

This professional code replaces morality. Spade avenges his partner, because it is the accepted course to follow—'

'When a man’s partner is killed he’s supposed to do something about it. It doesn’t make any difference what you think of him.'

In other hands, the idea of the avenging detective working outside the law became a right-wing myth. But Hammett avoids this, because the roots of crime are identified as social in his work. Hammett’s writing is a response to the city. Morality is dead and survival is all that remains.

It is a bleak view, omitting the possibility of social change introducing humanity to the city. But the novels remain worthwhile, for both the lean, clear quality of Hammett writing (which foreshadows Hemingway), while he captures the feel of urban life. Hammett’s cities are a miniature of capitalism itself, the gaudy surface hiding misery, oppression and violence. Against this background, his 'gumshoe' heroes are just survivors in a chaos of a cocktail bar and cadillacs.

Paul Cunningham.
In the last decade the cinema has featured all kinds of crazes, some more short-lived than others, for particular types of films: we have had a proliferation of horror movies, disaster movies, space movies and recently films about the Vietnam war and films about women.

'Womens films' is a newly coined term, used very loosely to cover quite a wide range of films but basically all such films have one thing in common: women, their ideas, problems and relationships are treated seriously and at least one main part in the film is played by a woman.

This was quite unheard of in the days, not so long ago, when women were treated in films as decorative extras thrown in to add some sex appeal at the box office or, if they had a more prominent role, it was either as a triumphal, nagging, housebound wife/mother or as a gun-toting, karate-chopping dolly bird acting as the unlikely and unconvincing sidekick to some big macho hero such as James Bond, both types of women being portrayed as pretty brainless.

In the new style films we see women portrayed as wanting to and being able to control their own lives and having interests other than man-hunting (Anne Bancroft as the ballerina in *The Turning Point*, Vanessa Redgrave as an active anti-fascist and Jane Fond as a writer in *Remember My Name* and Isabelle Huppert in *Violette Nozière*). Women as sexual aggressors (*Diary of a Mad Housewife*, *Looking for Mr. Goodbar*), women's relationships with men treated very differently in the two films *Anne Hall* and *The Bitch*, women's relationships with their families in *Intimate or Autumn Song*, women facing the problems of mental ill health in *Never Promised You a Rose Garden*.

However, in my mind the best of all such films to date is *Girlfriends* where the main character is a very ordinary New York girl, not particularly attractive, wealthy or successful who has her ups and her downs. The film allows you to share a slice of her life in such a way that it really seems as if you experienced it and leaves you feeling normal unlike many films where afterwards you feel totally inadequate and inferior compared to the people you were watching.

Alongside the increase in 'women's films' is an increase in the number of women appearing on the credits as designers (Shirley Russell and Polly Platt, writers (Nancy Dow and Jane Wagner), directors (Agnes Varda and Lina Wertmuller) and producers (Tamarra Assey, Alex Rose and Sandra Marsh).

Also worth noting is the change in the nature of female film stars: the young, glamorous, blonde pin-up type has been replaced to a large extent by an array of older, more mature women with strong minds of their own and a wide range of political interests, e.g. Jane Fond, Glenda Jackson, Vanessa Redgrave and Shirley MacLaine.

It certainly has to be said that it is a sorry state of affairs that these rather small advances and changes deserve so much praise and attention in 1979. Women have made greater progress in many other areas after all. There is still a long way to go in the film industry before we see films coming out that are genuinely and consistently non-sexist and non-male chauvinist and longer still before the films have a working class consciousness.

Many of the films mentioned in this article have had criticism lavished on them by socialists and feminists and it is true that often the ending is a sell-out to traditional heterosensual role playing and the underlying assumption is that women really need men and babies to make their lives worthwhile, anything else being a second-best substitute. One of the worst films of this type was *One Sings, the Other Doesn't* which put motherhood on pedestal and worshipped it in the most nauseating manner.

What is the reason for the advent of 'women's films'? I think there are two main reasons, both connected with the rise of the women's liberation movement.

Firstly, women are going out to work far more than before, through financial necessity and to satisfy their need for a more stimulating and challenging life. Some of these women have entered the film industry and gradually they are working their way up to positions of power and authority where they can start to get backing for their own projects and ideas.

In 1966 on the other hand, Natalie Wood bought the film rights to *I Never Promised You A Rose Garden* and tried unsuccessfully for years to get the finance to make the film. Liza Minnelli and Charlotte Rampling also tried and failed. Now in 1979 the film has just been released (with male writer, director and producer). If Natalie Wood had made her efforts 10 years earlier she would probably have been successful and perhaps ended up with female writer, director and producer.

It still isn't easy though as Barbara Kopple discovered as she went through an unbelievable struggle to raise the money for *Harlan County* (1976). Eventually she was able to make the film and the result was a brilliant study of a strike in the American mining town of Kentucky, showing the important role women played in the dispute.

Secondly, shrewd filmmakers are beginning to realize that the demand exists for 'women's films' because there are men and women who are interested in them and who have been enough imaginative and sexist films to last them a lifetime. It is still considered to be a minority demand though and such films are either made with big stars (The Turning Point and *Julia*) to help the box office returns or they are put out on very limited release (Girlfriends and *One Sings, the Other Doesn't*). Hopefully this will no longer be the case as demand grows.

On depends on the ability of the writers, actors and directors (both male and female) in the commercial film world to get financial backing for such films, something it is still fairly hard to do in such a male-dominated industry. The other avenue to progress lies outside the domain of Hollywood and big business and is in the hands of the small independent film companies which often operate as cooperatives and collectives, making and distributing minority taste films on shoestring budgets.

I think that it is important to recognize and welcome the progress that has been made so far in the films mentioned and not to constantly put forward the predictable criticisms that can be made of any film that does not conform 100 per cent with feminist and socialist ideas and principles. Criticism is easy, the effort they are being made is not. *See Previous*. 

27
Books

Marx without teeth

Karl Marx and World Literature
S. S. Prawer.
Oxford University Press. £2.50 paperback.

This is a curious work. It begins by insisting: "This is not a book about marxism nor an attempt to construct yet another marxist theory of literature." What it turns out to be instead - at least in its worst moments - is an oddish listing of Marx’s references to world literature. Thus, for example, we read of Marx’s journaling in the late 1840’s.

"There are quotations from Heine’s Ritter Otto, Der Tannhäuser, Our Navy (Unsere Marine), Georg Herwegh, Anna von der Weise, The Changeling (Der Wechselbägel), Agra Trost, and Kafka’s Der Golem on the Nobility (Kahilof über den Adel).

Quotations from Burger’s Lara and from a play by Ferdinand Raimund appear in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in contexts similar to those in which Heine had used them.

There are constant references to, and quotations from, the literature of the past: Homer, Virgil, the Bible, the Arabian Nights, Shakespeare, Malvare, Beowulf, Beethoven, Schiller, and Schiller: minor works like Arnold Kortum’s eighteenth-century mock-epic The Adventures of Herostratus John (Die Jobische) are not neglected: and we find an allusion to - "cunk, as your reviewer passes into a gentle sleep and his trenchard thuds down into the Olivetti.

In short, the book is close to being a 446 page footnote. Poor old Karl set out to expatriate the expropriators and here, a century later, the expropriators in the shape of the Taylor Professor of German Language and Literature at Oxford University quietly expatriate Marx on behalf of bourgeois scholarship.

The result is a Marx who is castrated, tided up, given a shave and haircut, worn and carsculles patched over, he becomes respectable enough, almost the sort of chap you could take to dinner at the club on your night. And the result is a success: even the club bore, a fierce old reactionary in recent years, welcomes him: ‘A learned, useful and entertaining book’, says the Times Literary Supplement.

Not since Prof. Higgins got to work on Ella Doolittle has a lump of bold, unshapely rice been passed off so cleverly in polite society. Marx, Prof. Prawer solemnly informs us, is too important to be left entirely to the marxists’ so he whisks him off, polishes up his accent and together they make a bright with the toffs and find warm reviews in the Sunday Times.

But - and it’s a bit that saves the book - Marx manages to resist total mesmerization and, like Eliza at Ascot, blurs out the brutal truth from time to time to the consternation of the royal enclosure. The problem in the end is that Prof. Prawer is too good and too honest a scholar, so that enough of the real Marx is allowed a look in to make the text worth reading.

For example, Prof. Prawer’s careful disentangling from the conclusions of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of Marx’s sense of literature and its importance is precise and articulate and leads to a memorable conclusion:

“Literature reminds us of a health we have lost (Aeschylus’ ‘dwelling of light’; literature diagnoses our corruption (Tirist’s ‘common whore of mankind’); and literature will have its part to play in our cure.”

Equally impressive is the stout sense Prof. Prawer talks in his concluding chapter on such vexed questions as Marx’s views of economic determinism, base and superstructure, naturalism, realism and reflection.

So, all in all, an odd book, symptomatic of the best and worst, the strengths, weaknesses and contradictions of bourgeois scholarship as it is driven out of its own sense of Marx’s greatness to try to place him and to come to terms with him.

He is glimpsed at one moment, disturbingly, as a threat to civilization as we know it and at another, comfortably, as a sort of latter-day Hebrew prophet, complete with flowing beard and demands for righteousness.

Meanwhile, bourgeois scholarship, not to mention the bourgeoise, seems more entrenched than ever and, as I write, a Labour prime minister is trying to win an election by frankly offering himself as more conservative than the most Conservative Tory leader for a generation.

At such a time we can perhaps find some inspiration in Prof. Prawer’s quotation from the poetry of the young Marx - even though the mature Marx regarded it with hilarity as ‘purely idealistic’:

“Therefore let us dare all. Never pause, never rest. Let us never sink into dull silence. Into waiting nothing and doing nothing. ‘Let us not walk, in brooding anxiety, under the yoke that weighs us down: For longing and desire and action - these remain to us in spite of all.’

Paul O’Finn
Rebels without a cause?

Injustice: The Social Basis of Obedience and Revolt

Barrington Moore

Maemillian £10.00

This is a very pretentious and a very bad book. It sets out to 'uncover recurring elements in the diversity of moral codes', and then to explain the conditions under which people feel such intense moral revulsion against an existing social order as to rebel against it.

The author attempts this by looking at certain key moments in German history—1848, the revolutionary years of 1918-20, the rise of Hitler—allegedly on the basis of the experience of the workers who lived through them.

Barrington Moore does not, however, even begin to rise to the task he sets himself. The material he uses to assess workers' attitudes is sparse, despite his pretentious claims (usually the biographies of union bureaucrats or the impression of outsiders who made flying visits to the working class, as one source admits in its title 'Three Months a Factory Worker').

He draws glib general conclusions that just don't fit in with other in-depth studies of the German working class (contrast his view of the Ruhr miners and steel workers with that of Erhard Lucas's excellent account of the reactions of two quite different groups of workers to the First World War and after, in Zwei Formen der Arbeiterklerikalismus).

He interprets material in a quite arbitrary way (for instance, he concludes that the majority of the population in the Ruhr 1918-19 could not have been 'proletarian' by excluding from this category all those employed in the agricultural or government sectors—and by claiming that women workers were not 'a classical proletariat').

Barrington Moore's worst fault, however, is inserting his own subjective value judgements and giving them the air of being profound factual statements. Again and again he asserts that 'the evidence shows that the workers were not revolutionary'—yet his evidence consists merely in his own assertions.

Once or twice he nearly admits this: 'I would hazard the suggestion', he is honest enough to write at one point, 'that in any of the great revolutions that have succeeded, the mass of the followers have not consciously willed an overturn of the social order'. Elsewhere he is dishonest enough to treat such 'suggestions' as the result of factual research.

Like most academics, he displays a hardly concealed aversion to the notion that the great mass of people can ever discuss political and social problems with the same seriousness as himself.

And so the very real arguments that raged in papers and pamphlets, at Congresses and mass meetings, on picket lines and in detention of the Bavarian and Ruhr Red Armies, between social democrats and centrist revolutionaries, disappear beneath his personal conviction that the only practical choices in 1918-20 were those posed by the 'practical' leaders of the right- and left- social democratic parties.

Not that Barrington Moore can ignore all the facts that rebel against the straight jacket he imposes on history. After all, he can hardly deny that the Berlin workers (or at least some of them) did rise up in January and March 1919, that the Bavarian soviet republic was declared with widespread working class support; that the 60,000 strong Ruhr Red Army did drive the German army out of the heartland of German industry.

But he belittles these actions by claiming that they were merely 'defensive actions', carried through by workers who did not want to overthrow existing society. It simply does not occur to him that workers are human beings, just as capable as himself of knowing that a system that drives them to bitter defensive actions needs to be overthrown.

Underlying all his arguments is a notion that he shares with so many liberals, social democrats and Eurocommunists: that consciousness is a static property of individuals and classes in the same way as hair colouring or physical size.

He just cannot conceive of it as it really is: a dynamic aspect of the interaction between human beings and social and physical environment that is continually undergoing quantitative and qualitative transformations.

Barrington Moore used to be said to be one of the better representatives of academic 'social science'. This book only underlines how remote that social science is from coming to terms with the flux and reflux of history as it is made by living human beings. Chris Harman.

Let us Praise

Unilever Overseas—The Anatomy of a Multinational 1985-1985

D. K. Fieldhouse

Croom Helm, London, 1978

Price £2.50

'This book is meaningful' Fieldhouse tells the reader, 'only within the context of a com-


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- Women in Technology and Revolution
- The Necessity of Value and a Return to Marx Part 2 in reply to the critics
- Islam and Revolution
- Crisis of the Revolutionary Left
- A 'New' Reformism?
- The Strong State
- The Canadian Women's Movement

possible. That area coincided exactly with the old British Empire. Eventually restrictions by newly independent governments against foreign exports led to Unilever setting up its own factories and becoming a local manufacturer primarily for local consumption.

The Unilever of the title is primarily these overseas investments and the book attempts to explain how and why investments were undertaken in Australia, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, West Africa and eventually Turkey.

The main argument centres around the question of whether a multinational like Unilever in any sense exploits the economies of the countries it chose to operate in. Fieldhouse goes to considerable length to show that both parties may receive a return from the multinational investment than either could have obtained if they had invested in the next best alternative.

Fieldhouse argues that although losses may sometimes occur, the proceeds depend on a return to both parties equal to or in excess of their opportunity costs. If this wasn't the case the multinational wouldn't invest and/or the host country wouldn't allow them in. Getting on for one hundred tables, listing rows of figures and comparative data are marshalled to show that the benefits of multinational investment are strictly mutual, that profits reattributed by Unilever are more than compensated for by the taxes the company pays and the exports they generate.

"For India, Unilever was a source of inputs whose perceived value outweighed costs such as the basic inconvenience that this was a foreign-owned enterprise. For Unilever, India constituted a significant and reasonably profitable lengthening of its total market".

So Unilever consistently operated to the mutual benefit of itself and its host. At the same time Fieldhouse points out, Unilever must be given credit for pioneering the industrial base of many of these countries, giving them products on a large scale and to a standard of quality new to these societies.

Likewise the company established "national systems of distribution" and trained managers, industrial workers and traders whose value in a developing country was disproportionate to their numbers.

But there's something wrong with all this. If it was all so self-evidently to the advantage of both parties, why the persistent criticism of the multinational's business activities arising from the host economies and which are apparent even in the selective account given by Fieldhouse, and why did so many host economies seem to get so easily into 'serious difficulties'?

The account of how Unilever responded to the Sri Lankan government's restrictions on its business is enlightening.

'Unilever executives were sorry for the Ceylonese rather than resentful at their own lost opportunities... Unilever could only sit and watch as the country struggled with its self-imposed problems'.

But a more serious criticism relates to the selective nature of the data. Unilever's plantation interests are only summarily dealt with. Unilever's world monopoly of soap and margarine makes it the world's biggest buyer of edible oils and the nuts and seeds from which its extracted. But arising from these, and an even greater omission, is the absence of any discussion of the United Africa Company—later UAC International.

As the main trading arm of the Unilever monopoly dealing in essential raw materials and transport, no analysis of Unilever would be complete without extensive discussion of its operations.

In recent years it has grown beyond trade in raw materials to become one of the world's largest industrial trading companies, bigger than Lonrho and Inchcape combined. And yet, its contribution to Unilever profits appears nowhere in the company's Accounts.

City analysis suggests that it brings in a third of Unilever's profits and dominates the giant's overseas activities.

The omission of any discussion of UACI by Fieldhouse, reflects Unilever's own reluctance to elaborate on its activities.

But is all the more serious since most of the third world economies dealt with by the book are plantation economies and the underlying dependency relationship which this entails is central to any discussion of the overseas business of Unilever.

Bill Rodgers.

What didn't happen at Grunwick...

Grunwick: the workers' story:

Jack Dromey and Graham Taylor
Lawrence and Wishart, £2.95.

It was 9.30 in the morning on 11 July 1977. The Royal Group docks' banner was planted firmly in the middle of the road; alongside, Chrysler, Hull docks, Southampton docks, Acton Works...

Forty mounted police come down the hill towards us. They stop in front of the ranks, now something like 20-deep. There's a minute passed. A feeling like everything's happening a mile away, seen through a telescope.
The crowd moves. Forwards.
And the police line breaks; the horses wheel, turn and clatter back up the hill accompanied by an enormous roar of triumph. Bob Light turns to Teddy Gates (secretary of the National Ports Shop Stewards’ Committee) and says 'The Queen will be asking you to form a government next.'

That whole morning was full of moments like this. For literally thousands upon thousands of workers nothing can take away those hours when the biggest single combined police operation ever mounted was stopped dead in its tracks. I say nothing can take it away, but Jack Dromey's book nearly succeeds. He devotes two pallid paragraphs to the feeling of that mass picket in a book commemorating the Grunwick strike.

And this symbolises the book. There's little factually wrong with it—there's a hell of a lot left out. Instead of writing a history to inspire and teach, Dromey has written a worthy 'official record' which manages to be offensive to no one in the trade union movement from Roy Grantham to the SWP—and in doing so avoids almost every major issue.

The only point it makes is to set up a caricature and knock it down. The book ends with a little homily against 'some on the left' who 'apparently think' a bureaucracy has different interests to those of its membership and that the only path is to forsake the structures and concentrate on rank-and-file organization alone.'

I wasn't quite sure who this referred to until I remembered that local members of the SWP spent some months of the Grunwick strike trying to cajole Dromey and various co-optees in the North London AUEW to do something at factory level about Grunwick and the recognition dispute at Desoutter which occurred at the same time.

I'm still trying to work out why six separate lobbies of the North London district failed to produce any action at all from the 'structures'.

But memories apart, Jack Dromey's book contains some extraordinary assertions. For example, Roy Grantham—who makes even Terry Duffy look dynamic—is described as 'normally the sharpest of operators'. Dromey then tries to explain why Grantham, in a lull in the middle of the mass picketing, went into the Grunwick factory to 'meet George Ward'. It was an obvious set-up. Grantham was told it was set-up, and he was accompanied by a posse of journalists.

I was fortunate enough to be among those who got in and was thus able to see local APEX official, Len Gristey, pleading with Grantham to get out of the factory, while at the same time a mob of Grunwick supervisors and clerical employees were doing their best to turn a mass meeting into a lynch mob.

This is not the only occasion when Dromey is extraordinary generous to Grantham who felt, we learn, 'a genuine sense of commitment to the strikers' and constantly demonstrated it by threatening to cut off benefits to strikers who failed to toe the line.

For some reason such courtesies are extended to all union leaders, left and right, with the exception of Norman Stagg, post office workers' deputy general secretary, who stabbed the Cricklewood sorters in the back when they'd stood firm against every form of intimidation to lift their black on Grunwick mail. Tom Jackson, meanwhile, is allowed to hide behind the cowardice of his UPW executive. Such are the distortions that 'official histories' lead to.

But a far more general criticism can be made of Dromey's book, as it can be of his role as a leading figure in the Brent trade union movement. This is his abiding faith in the traditional forms, his almost childlike belief that if you only do things properly a natural order of events will follow to pull the trade union movement into line.

A classic example of this—not mentioned in the book—came when Dromey went up to address the Desoutter strikers in the middle of the Grunwick battles and declared that he represented the solidarity of 'three million workers in the South East Region of the TUC'.

The same spirit permeates the book. We're told that massive bodies—the AUEW North London and South DXC, TGWU Region No 1 London Region UCATT etc—mobilised support, 'called on stewards' etc. Most people who've been in a trade union meeting for more than an hour should know what this sort of resolution-making means.

Yet it's still central to the whole broad left mythology. At
Subversive Proletarian Eroticism?

The Sadeian Woman
Angela Carter. Virago, £1.95

'Pornographers are the enemies of women only because our contemporary ideology of pornography does not encompass the possibility of change, as if we were the slaves of history and not its makers, as if sexual relations were not necessarily an expression of social relations, as if sex itself were an external fact, one as immutable as the weather, creating human practice but never a part of it.'

So Angela Carter begins this short book, 'an exercise in cultural history': one worth reading even if the very idea of cultural history is normally enough to set you climbing the walls. She gives an extended account of what pornography means, lays down the criteria for a potential 'subversive' pornography, and goes on to consider the test case of de Sade, showing how, and more importantly why, his work falls short of subversion.

It's a dazzling book, packed with ideas and excellent aside-she deals sharply and sharply with mother goddesses and womb worship and best of all, constantly informed with a sense of the way class defines our experience as well as (more importantly than) gender. We're also not allowed to forget that sexual relations, like social relations, are not 'as immutable as the weather': rather, we can make history, (though not in conditions of our own choosing) - and so the book ends with a quotation from Emma Goldman affirming the revolutionary potential of the 'right to love and be loved... that alone can fill the emptiness, and transform the tragedy of women's emancipation into joy, limitless joy.'

It's true that these two poles of the book remain disconnected, I was left with no very clear idea of how one can 'overcome the holy terror of love... which is the source of all opposition to the emancipation of women'; but if you demand of everything you read that it not only offers a clear analysis but also a direct guide to action, then presumably you limit yourself to poring over old central committee directives.

To sum up, it's a short book, so it won't take up too much time from the more pressing tasks of the class struggle; it's packed with ideas; it's often funny; and it makes you think... which is not bad for £1.95 of anyone's money. You don't need to have read de Sade to understand and appreciate this book - any subway wall/bus-shelter/Sunday Colour Supplement will do as background! Tin James.

A New Class is Born!

Protest and Participation: The new working class in Italy
John Low-Beer
Cambridge Univ. Press £3.00

Substituting his book the 'New Working Class in Italy' Low-Beer announces in his preface that he is concerned with examining 'new middle class' occupations like technicians, draughtsmen and laboratory assistants. We enter the mysterious world of class 'identification' removed from class action, a type of analysis that in recent years has dominated all the social sciences.

This obsession with formal classification, appeared in the Communist parties of France and Italy, among revisionists like Poulantzas and Carchedi, although its roots lie with the growth of a large middle section in monopoly capital.

The emergence of an intermediate stratum of clerical and technical labour has been discovered more often than the wheel, under assorted headings and theories.

Alternately, and periodically this group has been claimed by
the middle class and working class, and the prefix 'new' adds nothing to the current debate. Edward Bernstein used the expansion of non-manual workers as a reason against revolutionary change. They can't rely on them, so that's why radicalism is important. This book explores the theme of the 'new working class' (NWC), especially from the writings of Serge Maliet and Andre Gorz (prior to 1970). Both these writers saw the mid-1960s as the beginning of a new era, but the expansion of technical labor as fundamentally altering the strategies for achieving socialism. Basicly the two factors combined made a 'revolutionary reformism' (Gorz's phrase) possible.

The new working class in the new industries were identified as a new vanguard of the working class, holding high the banner of 'self-management', 'participation' and 'workers control', instead of being looked upon as the narrow economic of wages and conditions. The events in France in May '68, and in Italy in the summer of '69, appeared to confirm their views. Low-Beer looks at the evidence and adds to it, challenging the association of radical change with technicians.

The theme of workers control, isolated from other demands, appeared in Great Britain later than in France in the Institute for Workers Control in 1968. It is because of the nature of capitalist development in France and Italy, that the technicians are placed in the driving seat of technocratic reformism. The early linking of education and business, the greater emphasis on state planning, the rapid growth of the new industries and the nature of industrial unionism in France and Italy, provide a backdrop conducive to technicism in the socialist movement.

Technicism assumes that the position in the labour movement; therefore because technicians are a 'privileged' group very integrated with their work, any attack on this position immediately provokes a revolutionary response. Because technicians and workers in the 'newer' industries are involved with processes, rather than single machines, it is assumed they have a wider picture of production, a picture previously preserved for management, and consequently a view of the Anarchy in the relations of production, along with the vast potential in the forces of production.

It is the technicians who control production, who see machinery being slotted into a capitalist relations and profit demands, when a socialist science and organisation of production could produce far more efficiently. This logic is crude, and based on the narrow and statistc line, that socialism is about bigger factories, not better living.

Low-Beer attempts to test the validity of the NWC theories.

Although a large amount of his book deals with attitudes and spurious sociological methods, he does use strike stories as a measure of class consciousness and action by technicians. Do technicians really get far more involved in issues of control than manual workers? Do they really represent a vanguard of the working class?

Low-Beer examines strikes that involved calls for 'control', although not dealing with the most spectacular instances, reveals how not only technicians but middle management and manual workers are heavily involved in such strikes. Also that these strikes take place in factories faced with rationalisation, take-over, closure or all three.

There is nothing inherently revolutionary about technicians, but under pressure they are pulled by management or manual workers—depending on the strengths of these groups. When redundancy is threatened, management, especially lower management are reluctantly pulled into struggle with workers, because as wage labour they too are affected.

It is redundancy, not technicians that spurs a 'radicalisation' of middle groups, there is little evidence that technicians are automatically revolutionary, but a lot do suggest that their supply of 'self-management' are radical to the extent of changing the personnel and in production for efficiency's sake. Not to increase the control/power for the majority of workers.

When sections of technical labour are raising new strategies for resisting redundancies—Workers' Control of the late 1960s and early 1970s has turned to Alternative Plans (La Lucas Aeropace, of the late 1970s—a book which examines the record of the '60s and early '70s 'control' demands is useful.

Low-Beer's political conclusions aside, this book should be got through libraries for anyone interested in the growth and implications of the technical sector in Western capitalism.

Chris Smith

Myths and Methods

Marx's Method: Ideology, Science and Critique in 'Capital'

Derek Sayer
Harvester Press £10.95

Marxology is one of the few boom industries in contemporary capitalism. A major branch is the study of Marx's Capital, of which the two main inspirations have been Reading Capital by Louis Althusser and others, and Roman Rosdolsky's great The Making of Marx's Capital.

In itself, careful and repeated reading of Capital is no bad thing. Capital is a marvelously rich work with an enormous amount to teach us. But, it has to be said, it was written to grasp the laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production as a means to its overthrow (Marx never finished Capital). But he wrote to Engels that it would conclude with the

Socialists have always been short of cash. Karl Marx was only able to write his masterpiece Capital thanks to the financial support given him by his lifelong friend and co-thinker, Friedrich Engels.

Engels' income came from his job as Manchester representative of the family firm, Ermens and Engels. He hated 'filthy business' as he called it, but stuck to it for over 20 years in order to keep the Marx family going.

Marx acknowledged his debt to Engels when he finished Volume I of Capital: 'It was thanks to you alone that this became possible. Without your self-sacrifice for me I could never possibly have done the enormous work for the three volumes. I embrace you, full of thanks!'

Now, although we wouldn't dream of comparing Socialist Review with Marx's Capital, we too are short of cash.

Our hopes of finding our Engels were dashed when Ermens and Engels went bust in February (perhaps the final crisis of capitalism is really here). So we will have to make do with your subscriptions. All we ask you is less than six pounds a year (a lot in Engels's day, but very little in these inflationary times). Of else maybe we will end up the same way as Ermens and Engels.
class struggle, into which the movement and the smash-up of the whole business resolves itself.

A danger, therefore, in the study of Capital in isolation is that it will become simply an exercise in scholasticism, the production of learned commentaries upon Marx's work which advance our knowledge of the world since his day not one whit. A good example of this danger is to be found in Althusser and his school.

Undoubtedly Derek Sayer's intention was not to produce such a commentary, as the printed notes to this book indicate, he sees his work of political relevance. However, his approach to the question of Marx's method prevents him from realising this aim.

Sayer sees the key to an understanding of Capital to lie in Marx's critique of bourgeois ideology and, in particular, of the fetishism of the commodity, the process through which, under capitalism, social relations are transformed into relations between things, the exchange of goods on the market rules the process of production itself.

In the first part of Marx's Method Sayer concentrates on outlining Marx's critique of fetishism, which placing it in the context of the labour theory of value (of which he gives an excellent exposition).

He takes the example of the 'trinity formula', the notion still central to bourgeois economics today, that it is the contribution of capital, labour and land as physical 'factors of production' which determines profit, wages and rent, rather than capitalist relations of production, and shows how this notion is no illusion, but arises necessarily from the workings of the capitalist system.

The task of science, Sayer argues, is to penetrate beneath these deceptive appearances and uncover the relations of production which give rise to them.

As far as this goes this is fine, and captures one aspect of Capital. After all, Marx himself wrote: 'All science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided'.

But it would be a serious mistake to suggest, as Sayer seems to, that Capital is solely or primarily concerned with a critique of the fetishistic appearance of reality under capitalism. This critique is a necessary but secondary aspect of Marx's chief concern: to uncover the dynamics of the capitalist mode of production.

The labour theory of value is developed with precisely this end in view. It shows that capitalism is a system of generalised commodity production. In other words, there is no collective social organisation of production, the control of the means of production is in the hands of competing capitals whose relations are governed by the market.

Competition forces the prices of commodities down to the socially necessary labour-time required for their production; those capitals who fail to make the necessary investment are driven into bankruptcy (or, in contemporary capitalism, often into the arms of the state).

Competition also governs the long-term tendencies of the system. It is the pressure on individual capitals to innovate, to employ new forms of technology, in order to keep ahead of their rivals. Which underlines the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

Competition is a part of the basic structure of capitalism, the control of production by competing capitals. As Marx puts it, 'since these latter confront each other only as commodity owners and everyone seeks to sell his commodity as dearly as possible, the inner law enforces itself only through their competition, their mutual pressure upon each other'.

Sayer's failure to confront this basic feature of Capital means that he tends to treat the book as a mere work of ideological demystification, rather than of scientific analysis.

There are other weaknesses which I shall not dwell upon for example, his attempt to reconstruct Marx's method of inquiry is quite wrong, and his daffy Maoist-Stalinist politics pops up from time to time (thus we are told in a footnote of 'Stalin's relative progressiveness' compared to Trotsky in 'the building of socialism in the USSR'). All in all, a work of scholasticism rather than a contribution to knowledge.

Alex Callinicos.

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On 7 June the first direct elections to the European parliament will take place. They will be greeted in Britain with almost complete apathy and hostility, especially since the European parliament has no power.

Nevertheless, the elections represent one of a number of steps designed to transform the European Common Market into a far more effective political and economic organisation than it has been for the last few years.

Most important of these moves is the establishment of the European Monetary System, which, if successful could lead to an integrated European economy dominated by west German capital. In the following briefing, Peter Binns outlines the background to the European elections.
### The EEC budget—net contributions and receipts in 1978

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The above table represents the actual payments made/received in 1978. But next year article 131 of UK's accession treaty to the EEC lapses, and this will lead to much greater disparities. Had article 131 not been in operation the situation would have been as follows:

-500   | -300   | -500  | -500       | -400   | -400       | -400| -500 | -500    |
| -1000  | -700   | -900  | -500       | -600   | -800       | -600| -700 | -900    |

Under each country there are two columns. The first one assumes that the subsidies (the MAs or the Monetary Complementary Adjustment) are to be credited to the exporting country. The assumption here is that without it the Germans could not have exported better, say, to Italy competitively. The second column is based on the assumption that the net importers are the real beneficiaries, since they get EEC produce at much less than its true cost. We shall not pursue this fine point of economic theology further, for whichever way the calculation is made the overall direction (though not the overall quantities) remains the same.

What is significant though is the fact that this leads to a vast flow of profits to the farmers in Germany, Holland, and Denmark. For while they are able to continue to sell at the 'old' price, in markets guided etc even when those currencies are appreciate in value as a result of the MAs and the weighted green's exchange rate, the fact remains that the price they have to pay for imported feedstuffs, agricultural machinery, etc has gone down as a result of this appreciation, and thus there is a fat profit to be made.

The CAP thus leads to the impoverishment of significant numbers of small farmers in Italy, France etc plus an enormous flow of capital to agriculture in Holland, Germany and Denmark.

### Background

From the Tribunate left to the Tory right there is now almost universal hostility to the deal that the last Labour government renegotiated over entry to the European Economic Community (EEC). Even the pro-European Financial Times now claims that Britain, one of the poorest EEC nations, 'bears an unfair share of EEC costs', that however the figures are computed, 'if Britain is not already the EEC's biggest net contributor, it is virtually certain to become so next year' (28 March 1979).

Unlike Eire which last year was a beneficiary to the tune of £300 million or more (depending on how it's calculated) and which stands to gain considerably from further grants via the European Monetary System (EMS), Britain and (to a somewhat lesser extent) Italy—the two other poorest nations in Europe—have now emerged as its paymaster.

The basic cause for this has been the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which subsidises the north European farmers, paying them billions of pounds a year to produce food which is then sold to the European working class at sometimes twice,
International Parities, 1977-79

Throughout this period the real rate for the pound, measured in terms of its 'Smithsonian parity' (i.e., compared with a basket of currencies weighted in proportion to their significance in world trade) remained approximately constant, never varying beyond ±6½ percent of its 1973 figure. Hence its decline against the Deutschmark was approximately compensated by its rise against the dollar. However, had Britain been forced to preserve the parities of the pound with the European currencies as it would in the new EMS, the graph above shows that it would have been forced to intervene in the British economy (by means of monetary restraint, deflation, cuts etc.), to solve the 'problems' of the excessive strength of the German economy. No wonder then that the National Institute of Economic Research concluded that there is almost universal hostility, or disbelief in its effectiveness, of the EMS amongst British Economists. They cannot believe that it will work, and that if it should work, it would not be advantageous for the UK to join it.

In general, there has been a remarkable shift towards chauvinism and protectionism on the part of British economists—from both the right, and, especially, from the reformist left.

sometimes four times the price on the world market.

This situation, which will become much worse when the ceiling set for Britain's contributions to the EEC budget are removed (next year)—has led to attempts (by the last Labour government under Callaghan, and also by Tory members of the European Commission like Christopher Tugendhat) to disrupt and veto other Eurodollar issues in an attempt to claw back the lost billions.

In the 1978 negotiations to set up the EMS Britain was offered a few hundred million pounds in the form of cheap credits as part of a regional aid fund, but even this proved an insufficient inducement. When the agricultural subsidies hit their budget barrier (probably sometime in 1982), Britain, along with Italy and Germany, will almost certainly vote against extending the limit.

With European regional disparities growing fast, and with centrifugal pressures so great, how then is it possible for something so grandiose as the European Monetary Union to even be considered at all?

The chronic weakness of the US dollar in the 1970s strongly influenced the move to set up the European Monetary System (EMS). It did so in three principle ways. First, hitherto most payments between European countries, whether for trade or the transfer of capital, have been made in dollars. The catastrophic fall of the dollar has meant that effective forward planning of costs and revenues, particularly those transactions involving the DM, which rose sharply against most other currencies, has proved almost impossible.

This has added a huge risk factor to the economic integration of Europe, and one that becomes increasingly marked as intra-European trade grows.

Secondly, and as a consequence of this growth in trade and capital flows, a huge international money market, centred in the City of London, the so called eurodollar market, has emerged to cope with it. The City became awash with vast sums of stateless money, outside national exchange control. In a few short years these have grown so fast that they now greatly exceed the entire value of Britain's gross national product.

This in addition has encouraged the eurodollar investor to make use of the disparities in exchange rates to speculate rather than make long-term productive investments.

Thirdly, the impact of the growth of the eurodollar market, effectively prevented the various European governments—singlly or collectively—from gaining adequate control over the money supply. The 'stateless' money market is by definition outside direct government controls. Its huge size and its volatility—billions of pounds can cross national frontiers in a 30-second telex—have brought about this state of affairs.

Yet at the same time, under the impact of the crisis, more and more European governmental policies are shifting to the right; bringing with them an increasing stress on control of the money supply as a solution for inflation, balance of payments deficits and so on. They hope that through the resulting governmental cuts and unemployment, the working class can be forced to pay for the crisis.

The growth of the eurcurrency market has cut right across this strategy, and must therefore be reduced significantly—as the latest annual report of the west German Bundesbank argues.

But how can the significance of the dollar be diminished for international payments, capital transfers etc., without reducing world liquidity and therefore inducing a new slump? Already the world's leaders are worried by the diminishing share of international trade in the world economy since the 1975 recession. How can the dollar be junked without a repeat of the Blackey of the 1930s?

It is in the context which has brought into being the European Monetary System (EMS). So far Britain remains out of it, but the only effects to date of staying out have been a few irate shoppers in the six counties finding their Irish punts discounted by a couple of pence by Belfast shopkeepers. For the fact is that the British £ is included in the weighted basket of currencies that make up the European Monetary Unity (EMU), which now, renamed the 'ecu' (European currency unit), is the basis of international transaction between the EMS member nations. And in spite of keeping Britain out of the EMS, Callaghan has promised to preserve the parity between the £ and the ecu.

So the only difference between Britain being in or out of the EMS is that it is not committed to being a member of Fecom, the European Monetary Cooperative Fund, and it has not received the few hundred millions of cheap credit that it would otherwise have done. It is not committed to depositing its reserves into the 'revolving swap' arrangements from which the ecus are formed, but it may well choose to do so anyway. Should the EMS not break down, Britain, due to the increasing importance of its trade with Europe, will in any case be forced to hold more and more of its reserves in ecus, and this will inevitably push it into being a full member of the EMS.

Can the EMS work?

Most economists—particularly in

37
Britain—doubt that it will work. They point out that the old European ecu is, in which the member agreed to keep their own currencies within 2½ per cent of each other, soon broke down because of the strength of the D-Mark. Denmark and the Benelux countries were able to keep pace with it.

If Britain finds the going too tough, how then will France. Eire and Italy manage when their balance of payments problems are worse? To make matters worse, still, The EMS countries are supposed to intervene at ecu rates that are about ⅓ as narrow as the old parity grid rates. No wonder then that the central banks and Fecom have refused so far to release details of ecu limits and even ecu rates! In common with everyone else they know they are operating on a knife edge.

But even if they succeed in preserving the new fixed parities, the burgeoning new agencies like Fecom will also provide fresh areas of dispute between the EEC member nations. It will not solve the intractable problem of agriculture, but it will be able to alter significantly the fiscal and monetary policies in Europe as a whole. This will inevitably aid one country at the expense of another and therefore sharpen the conflicts between them.

This does not mean, however, that the EMS must break down. Far from it—its fragility is a short term issue. Should it last two to three years, expand reserve and exchange holdings to 10 billion ecus or more and above all lead to a significant rise in the volume of intra-European trade and capital flow, then any country that left the system (or, in Britain’s case, stayed outside it) could suffer severely.

Consequences of the EMS

All the talk of ‘monetary stability’ and the like, is in fact much less important a reason for setting up the EMS for European capitalists than its effect on industrial development. The key question is German industry: its ability to compete and expand in a world market where, since the 1974-75 slump, exports have played a diminishing role in the volume of world production. For Germany’s very success as an exporter has pushed up the D-Mark to unprecedented heights. The rise of the D-Mark against the dollar has lifted the prices of West German exports compared to those of American goods, so that German car

The EMS and how it works

The EMS is founded on a new currency, the ecu. Composed of a weighted basket of the currencies of the EMS countries plus Britain, its use is for the time being distinctly limited. Only central banks have the right to issue ecus, and in its initial months ecus will be issued to the value of $32 billion in significant sums, but hardly in the same league as the massive $500 billion Eurodollar market. Each ecu (value approx $0.65) is made up of the quintessence of the various national currencies shown.

But it comes about not through, say, the Danish government donating 22 ecus for each of the 24 billion of ecus now being formed. In fact all the ecus now being created are paid only on the basis of gold and dollars currently in the hands of the European central banks. 20 per cent of the value of the ecus and that of the EMS currencies are deposited with Fecom, the European monetary cooperation fund in a ‘revolving swap arrangement’ that is they are reallocated quarterly, and the appropriate number of ecus are issued against them.

When the fund is properly established (according to the EMS schedule this should happen in two years) the balances become permanent. The essential aim is to see ecus against national currencies, thus adding commonly to international liquidity and reducing pressure from the floating dr.

The ecu is first of all a supereuro currency: a medium for the exchange of the European currencies with the rest, which is still based upon a rigid grid of exchange rates amongst the EMS currencies appropriate to their economic circumstances, to treat the three EMS currencies are linked by means of parity grids, one which fixes each national currency with the others (as in the old European ‘snake’), and the other that fixes each to the ech.

In theory, the margins on the latter grid should be tighter because in the old snake every central bank was in principle capable of intervening if any one currency got out of line, a situation that ended up in chaos. If it be the real limit that is tightened, then it boils down to the notion that no one has to intervenes. (Though here too, the Deutschmark is exceptional, its weight accounts for a third of the value of the ecus and any changes in its value will therefore change the value of the ecus by a third, the change in the DM, thus possibly putting other currencies in jeopardy on the grid).

In practice however, the extreme secrecy of all the financial agencies involved over the extent of the margins allowed on the grid suggests that they are as yet incapable of making the ech parties bite sooner rather than those of the revamped snake. But the aim of the EMS is to make the ech grid operate so as to trigger intervention at ⅓ the margins of the national currencies parity grid.

The different weights of the currencies in the ech basket makes this quite complicated. A change in the value of the currency of a poor economy like Eire will affect the value of the ech as a whole. But German’s whole currency makes up 33 per cent of the ech and to a lesser extent France (29 per cent of the ech), have to have correspondingly smaller margins to compensate for the fact that changes in their currencies will raise and lower the ech correspondingly.

But the ech is not just a supereuro currency: a medium for exchanging existing currencies. It is also a speculative commodity. It has its own ech-price for gold which is not reducible to those of its member currencies (this has been fixed by the EMS at the average market price over the preceding six months, with the proviso that this must not be higher than current London fixing, but is below present, but in this case it is the average of the Minimum Lending Rates of the member countries weighted in the same proportion as the currencies that make up the ech).

On top of that the intention is to create a full scale European Monetary Fund, in which all member countries’ gold and official gold reserves would be held and held at ech. This would apply both for intra-EMS dealings and for those of the EMS countries with the rest of the world at this stage the ech would have emerged finally as a variety of capital as money in its most fully developed form.

But even in its present form, the 1.24 billion ecus at the disposal of the EMS will go some way toward providing significant short and medium term credit. Special provision have been made for Britain and Italy in the EMS. Italy, while a full member, is permitted a margin of 6 per cent instead of 2.25 per cent on the national currencies parity grid. And Britain, while not a member, is able to participate in loans through Fecom. And because sterling is included in the ech, Britain’s Minimum Lending Rate contributes to the interest paid on the basis of which the echo discount rate is formed. In practice therefore, it would be very easy for Britain to slip into being a full member of the EMS.
manufacturers now face declining US sales while Detroit is selling at near its all-time maximum.

Now if the D-Mark is tied to all the other European currencies via the euco, then a 3
percent hike in the D-M. it will lead instead to merely a 1 percent rise in the rate with
respect to non euco currencies (a move, all the doilers of exchange rates from the """"European
industry will not be limited by the upward valuation of the D-M to anything like the same
degree as previously.

Within a national economy without exchange controls disparities between advanced
and backward industries work themselves out by a flow of resources from the
backward to the advanced region: from the North of England to the South East,
from the Ruhr to Stuttgart, from the Appalachians to Texas and so on. Unable to
export tariff walls against Stuttgart's Mercedes cars, the Ruhr worker finds
himself jobless and is forced to move or
remain poor.

Now the EMS would work in a very similar manner within the European supere
nation. Hitherto the member nations that were not part of (or broke away from) the D-
M snake were able to devalue their own currencies, thus giving their exports a
competitive advantage on the world market. (And this has been a world-wide
phenomenon: without it, Japan, Korea or Brazil would not have industrialised in the
first place.)

The operation of a tight snake coupled with restrictions of state aid to un
competitive industries would rule all that out. Instead the member states would be
forced to use the only weapon at their disposal: control of the money supply. As
one manager of a London-based finance house put it recently: There is no question
that the EMS will eventually result in a transfer of a conservative approach to the
management of the national economies of the members"""" (Business Week 26 February
1979).

Inevitably then, the EMS will bring with it high unemployment to Europe's
backward regions and a flow of productive resources to the most advanced areas in
Belgium, France and above all Germany. But this does not mean that the ruling class
in Italy and Britain will oppose it. For a start in each country there are 'advanced
enclaves' of production (including in Italy the sizeable motor industry) which will
prosper in the new Europe. Secondly there are also, particularly in Britain, banks, other
financial institutions and corporations that are already highly Europeanised in structure
and poised to take a strategic share of the management of the new capital flows.

Most important of all, the benefits to the advanced sectors of European capital from
the EMS will be considerable. Already they have been prepared to shell out a billion
dollars in cheap loans to the poorer EMS members-Eire and Italy-as an inducement
for them to enter the system. No doubt there could be a lot more to come for
Britain's entry and to keep the other poor nations happy.

For large sections of British and Italian capital the prospect of staying out of the
EMS and gambling on a falling pound or lire to keep their goods competitive is a
bleak. It therefore would much safer to shelter under the hegemony of French and
German capital and give up the attempt to compete on the same ground at all. The
assumption is that a diet of sub-contracts plus cheap finance and grants via Monnet's
regional aid fund, while not exactly caviar, is at least better than starvation.

The alliance of the Tribunites with some professional economists (the Cambridge
school especially) is thus in all probability a short-term phenomenon. The most likely
scenario for the next two years or so is a strong pound coupled with accelerated
industrial decay. The two will go together; North Sea oil pushing up sterling, which in
turn will push up UK goods off the world market and encourage a greater flow of
imports.

The bolting of economists will, to a greater or lesser extent, accept this state of affairs,
arguing for the promotion of a few enclaves, the development of small subsidiary and
components manufacture, and the extension of the bank and finance sector. The
Tribunites will disagree, arguing, less and less plausibly, that an independent and
viable British industrial capital can and should be regenerated.

But in the short run the new across-the-board anti-Europeanism offers the whole of
the Labour party lots of mileage. Endorsed by the 'expert' economists, it presents a vista
of improving workers' living standards by altering the terms of international treaties
rather than through the class struggle.

However, we cannot; be neutral over developments that will inevitably enforce even
more right-wing anti working class policies: we must oppose them. And of course,
unlike the Tribunites and their hangers-on in the Communist Party, we do so
in the name of proletarian internationalism. Not because we believe, as do
the reformists (or for that matter the National Front), that better living standards for
British workers can be bought about by making British capital more viable. But in
the coming months it will be crucial to intervene in these arguments: the principled
stand on proletarian internationalism is not an empty moral gesture, it is the only
practical way to defend workers' living standards here and now. The reformists
solution is not only offensively chauvinistic, but in practical terms it cannot possibly
work.

What is the European Community?

The European Economic Community was set up in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. Its
creators intended it to be both an economic union within which capital and com
modities could flow freely, with a common set of tariffs, and the first step to a federal
European state which, allied to the US, would provide a bulwark against Soviet
expansionsm.

Initially the EEC consisted of Germany,
France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Luxemburg. Britain opted out of the initial
Treaty of Rome, preferring to stick to the Empire (which then proceeded to divide
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For large sections of British and Italian
The phrase the dictatorship of the proletariat was coined by the communist Gracchus Babeuf during the French revolution of 1789-99, but Marx took it over and made it his own.

In 1852 he wrote: "What I did was new was to prove: 1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society."

But what is the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it, as the opponents of Marxism have always claimed, the totalitarian rule of a party over the masses?

Marx's answer is in The Civil War in France. Written the day after the Paris Commune was crushed by the reactionary French government in May 1871, to champion the cause of the workers of Paris, it shows that the Commune was the first example of the dictatorship of the proletariat, representing a far higher degree of democracy than the sham democracy of the bourgeoisie. It remained valid today.

The working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes... The first decree of the Commune, therefore, was the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution for it of the armed people.

The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men, or acknowledged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time.

Instead of continuing to be the agent of the central government, the police was at once stripped of its political attributes, and turned into the responsible and at all times revocable agent of the Commune. So were the officials of all other branches of the administration. From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at the working men's wages. The vested interests and the representation of the high dignitaries themselves. Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the central government. Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative of the state was laid into the hands of the Commune.

The judicial functionaries were to be divested of that sham independence which was historically a mask of the clase. One by one, they were taken and broken, the oaths of allegiance. Like the rest of public servants, magistrates, and judges were to be elected, responsible and revocable.

. . . . The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by the Communal constitution and to become a reality by the destruction of the state power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrecence.

While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society. Instead of deciding once in three of six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, organized in communities, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business . . . .

The Commune made that catchword of bourgeois revolutions, cheap government, a reality, by destroying the two greatest sources of expenditure—the standing army and state functionaries. Its very existence presupposed the non-existence of monarchy, which, in Europe at least, is the normal incumbrance and indispensable cloak of class rule. It supplied the republic with the basis of really democratic institutions. But neither cheap government nor the 'true republic' was its ultimate aim; they were mere concomitants.

The multiplicity of interpretations to which the Commune has been subjected, and the multiplicity of interests which construed it in their favour, show that it was a thoroughly expansive political form, while all previous forms of government had been emphatically repressive. Its true secret was this. It was essentially a working-class government, the produce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of labour.

Except on this last condition, the Communal constitution would have been an impossibility and a delusion. The political rule of the producer cannot coexist with the perpetuation of his social slavery. The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting the economical foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule. With labour emancipated, every man becomes a working man, and productive labour ceases to be a class attribute . . . .

Working men's Paris, with its Commune, will be for ever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society. Its martyrs will be enshrined in the great heart of the working class. Its exterminators history has already nailed to that eternal pillory from which all the prayers of their priests will not avail to redeem them. Karl Marx