NATO: can it be tamed?
Class struggle

Introducing the new slim-line pay packet.

The government and the CBI have begun a hard propaganda offensive aimed at producing very low pay settlements over the next year. Stuart Axe argues that they are trying to do something much more savage than anything we have seen so far, and that we are not faced simply with the normal employers' rhetoric.

The CBI, the central co-ordinating body for the private sector bosses in the manufacturing and service industries, is calling for pay settlements to be kept within a limit of five per cent. Simultaneously, the Tory government, after some major successes with its six per cent public sector limit last year, is seeking to lower expectations further. The chancellor of the exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, has announced a new public sector cash limit policy of four per cent aiming to hold the weak sectors back severely, while letting a few stronger groups like the miners, through a slightly higher level.

Three major factors lie behind the new offensive. The first reason is nothing new—they want to reduce workers' living standards in order to restore profitability. Under the last Labour government's social contract incomes policy, workers' living standards were reduced further than the Thatcher government has so far achieved, despite the fact that it has been even more damaging than the last government. The second reason is that the high cost of living has led to a very low demand, and therefore a very low production, which will lead to the loss of market share that Thatcher promised them.

But the fight for pay increases need not run exactly as the employers and Tories want it to. While British Airways has announced that it wants to sack 90,000 workers and freeze pay for a year, in contrast the government is very cautious about the level at which they will have to let the miners through in November. And while Harvey is threatening to impose pay cuts of ten per cent from January 1982, in contrast, Smiths Industries in Cheltenham have just agreed increases worth 14 per cent from August for 3000 workers. The picture is very uneven, reflecting the degree to which the impact of the recession has been uneven across and between industries.

Pay policy or pay norm?

To date, the CBI has been very careful not to name a figure for pay increases to keep inside, as this would set a target that many would want to breach. But the government has now come out with its figure of four per cent for central and local government workers. It would be interesting to know why it has made this announcement two months before it usually does. We can only speculate that it has been forced to do so in order to harden up the CBI, especially as some very major private sector pay negotiations have just started or are about to start.

There is, of course, absolutely no connection to be drawn by the fact that Vauxhall's opening offer is four per cent (due from September) and that Leyland Vehicles have opened talks with an offer of four per cent. The Ford pay review comes in November, which is the same month as the miners— and no bets are being taken that they could well offer four per cent. The first offer from the Engineering Employers Federation is a miserable 3.5 per cent increase at minimum rate.

One group of companies that are unlikely to get away with low settlements are the big boys in the oil industry. Last winter they all gave increases at the rate of inflation, about fourteen per cent. This winter they look set to pay about ten or eleven per cent, the current rate of inflation. The Shell oil refiners and its chemical plant at Carrington are due to settle on 1st October and the oil tanker drivers for BP, Shell, Foss, Petrofina and Texaco have their annual pay review in November. But the TGWU may sign some nasty productivity deals to get the increases they are looking for.

Following on from the tanker drivers come the tens of thousands of lorry drivers in the road haulage industry. They have been lodging claims for an increase of £20 a week plus a 35 hour week. Last winter they got very low settlements of between three and seven per cent and the drivers do not want to accept such levels for a second year running. But the industry is still one of the worst hit by the recession if production is well down, no one needs transport and many drivers have been sacked or are working short-time.

Fear of unemployment

The three million unemployment figure means a very tough context for pay bargaining. In the past year there's been a lot of fight over jobs and hardly any hard fight over pay for all the miners at the Blackpool TUC, the trade union leaders have shown little sign of stopping to challenge the new public and private sector pay offensives. In many workplaces that have suffered redundancies, people might well accept pay offers of five or five per cent and be glad they have still got a job.

One of Thatcher's successes has been an immense fragmentation of pay bargaining. Rising unemployment has not simply forced workers to retreat, it has also meant that local rather than national factors have come to the fore. Three years ago, when Ford workers broke through Harvey's five per cent pay policy, this gave some workers everywhere. Now we are in a tougher world. Breakthroughs of this kind do not necessarily lead to generalisation. Employers' arguments about further redundancies, short-time working and lack of orders have all had an effect. And with a miserable pathetic lead from the trade union bosses, any possible generalisation is going to have to be built from below.

2 Socialist Review
Rolling back the bandwagon

On the Sunday night of the Labour Party conference, the left were ecstatic. Benn had come within a hairs-breadth of beating Healey. But on the Tuesday it was the right’s turn to be jubilant. They had swept to power in the national executive elections. How did this occur? What does it mean for the future of the Labour Party? What can the left be expected to do? We look at some of the options.

"Scarborough 1980 went down in history as both a high point and a low point in the history of the Labour left. It won a vital vote at the party conference — only to see the leadership ignore the vote and the position effectively reversed within months as the controlling block vote switched sides. Wembley already looks like being the Scarborough of the 1980s. The left greeted the conference decision with pure ecstasy. Yet already the great victory looks like turning into the great defeat."

(Socialist Review, February 1981)

It is beginning to look as if we were right. The smug smiles on the faces of Healey and Hattersley show that they at least think the tide is turning in their favour. Healey may have had a pyrrhic victory in the deputy leadership contest but the seizure of the National Executive Committee by the right will more than compensate for that. For the first time in a decade the right’s domination of the parliamentary Labour Party is going to be matched by command over the party machine.

Of course, not everything is yet going the right’s way. They were annoyed at the vote on unilateralism — just as they were annoyed by the rejection of wage controls by last month’s TUC. They — and the media — will make a lot of noise about such things. But much of it will be smoke without fire.
They know that past Labour governments have been committed by conferences over such issues — and have very easily slipped out of the commitments. Politics is about power — and they believe that they are the masters now.

Saying these things gives us no pleasure. Healey and Hattersley are the enemies of us all. The defeat at Brighton was a defeat for the whole left. But it does no good at all to pretend, as some sections of the Labour left seem to be doing, that the defeat did not take place, that the right’s control over the party machine can be forgotten because of the closeness of the Benn-Healey vote.

So how did it all happen?

Let’s go back to what we said in February. We argued that the loss of confidence by workers in their ability to fight back over redundancies, cuts and wages had allowed the right to strengthen their hold over the trade union bureaucracies — especially, but not only, the engineering union. So far, the right leadership had been prepared to do trade offs that gave left wings seats on the Labour Party executive. But that would not survive any botching up of the struggle between left and right in the party.

The left would be helpless, we argued, when it came to resisting such manoeuvres. Although its forces in the constituencies and among union activists can be measured in terms of tens, or even hundreds of thousands, the millions who make up the trade union movement are retreating before an employers’ offensive, producing the lowest level of struggle for more than a generation. Under such circumstances, the media and the union bureaucracies could all too easily play on the real weakness of the Bennite left.

We were wrong on important details. We underestimated the way in which the fer ment among activists in certain unions would throw the full time leadership off balance in the early summer, producing a bandwagon in the Benn campaign that at one stage seemed nearly unstoppable and just missed knocking Healey assunder. We said that the most optimistic prediction for Benn’s vote would be 43 per cent — in fact he got more than 49 per cent.

But, as Harold Wilson once said, in electoral politics a majority of one is enough. And Bennite politics remains electoral politics. On that terrain, Healey has got control of the deputy leadership, Varley has got control of the treasurer ship, and the right wing have got control of the national executive, with its power to determine who will run the party machine. The sudden display of the strength of Healeyite forces within the supposedly ‘left’ TGWU bureaucracy — so that Benn nearly didn’t get the union delegation’s vote — shows how powerful are those who would begin pushing the bandwagon backwards.

And the success of the right in winning secret ballots and branch ballots for Healey in a number of unions (see below) show that they have a weapon they can use with a degree of confidence of getting their way.

All this leads us to believe that the forward march of the left within the Labour Party has been halted. Labour policies for the next year will be quite different from Labour policies over the past year.

**Not dead**

This does not mean, however, that those who have moved to the Labour Party for a solution to their problems will now look elsewhere.

The rise of the Labour left over the last year — the fact that for the first time in three decades people are joining rather than leaving the Labour Party — has not been because left Labour policies have been able, on the basis of any rational calculation, to offer people more than in the past. Bennism — with its economic nationalism, its belief that inflation can pull an 80 per cent private capitalist economy out of crisis, its promotion of class collaboration through ‘participation’ and ‘planning agreements’, its willingness to stay in NATO, its desire to protect parliamentary forms of rule — is offering nothing that has not been tried previously by capitalist governments. Activists have become intoxicated by this mixture as they did not in the years 1969-74, because they do not see an alternative in terms of their own struggles. They do not believe they can win their fellow workers to resist redundancies or throw out the 4 per cent. And so they have moved instead to savours from on high, to those who offer salvation by Labour in two or three years as compensation for the inability to do anything in the here and now. Labour politics has one thing in common with Christianity. The fact that the second coming never takes place does not destroy the willingness of the faithful to believe in it. That can only happen when people begin once again to discover that their own activities is able to resist the attacks on jobs, social services, wages and working conditions.

While the real fight back against the Tories and the employers remains at its present low level, only a limited number of the Labour left are going to see present struggle now as an alternative to illusions in electoral methods. The number can be increased in so far as the effort is put in to ensure the effectiveness of the small scale struggles that are taking place. But there is no magical path to mass destruction of illusions in Labour.

**Compromise**

So what is going to happen to the Labour left?

We fear that the result of Brighton will be that, in its majority, it will demand even less in terms of real socialist policies than in the past. The right’s control of the machine as well as the parliamentary party, the trade union leadership’s desperate desire for a Labour government of virtually any hue, the fear that driving right wing councillors and MPs from the party will strengthen the Social Democrats, the knowledge that the general election cannot be much more than two years away — all these factors will exert pressure on the left to compromise their policies.

The willingness of many of the constituency left to compromise was shown at Brighton itself. The majority of them continued to vote for Kinnock and Lester in the national executive elections, despite the scandalous part they played in preventing Benn from winning the deputy leadership. And the constituency left was just as willing to join in the standing ovations for Foot, ignoring his promotion of the right.

This will confront the hard left, including those most prominent in the Benn camp, with a great dilemma. They can join in the compromises, hoping that Benn’s vote in the deputy leadership election will enable them to influence the composition and policies of the leadership. Or they can continue to campaign openly, knowing this contains the risk of greater isolation than before.

**Touchstone**

The touchstone will be whether Benn himself decides to contest the deputy leadership again next year. He will know that to do so will be a gamble. He could well end up in a weaker position if he does so — particularly given the closeness of the decision of the TGWU to vote for him this year. On the other hand, if he does not campaign against Healey, there is little he can to challenge the right’s control over all the leading positions in the party.

We suspect that the hard left will react to the danger of isolation by alternating between raving compromises with the centre and bums to the left. They will both sacrifice principles in return for the possibility of office, and will try to improve their power base by half-hearted attempts at organising inside the unions.

That will make it more important than ever for revolutionaries to draw them into united action over things on which we both agree. In so far as we can offer consistency rather than vacillation and action rather than resolution-mongering, we can begin to break some of the Labour left’s following from its electoralist orientation and increase the effectiveness of their small struggles that they are taking place against the government and employers.
Consulting the members

The closeness of the Labour Party deputy leadership result and the success of Benn in getting 80 per cent of the Constituency party votes, should not conceal from the left one crucial fact. When the feelings of the mass of union members—as opposed to political activists—were tested, Healey walked home. In NUPE, the POEU, COHSE, the FBU, Natsopa, none of one sort or another went for Healey. Only in the miners’ case was opinion—as expressed at branch meetings—clearly for Benn.

Partly this was a result of the way in which any real Healey-type secret ballot helps the power—that-be as opposed to those who would challenge them. Unless voting is preceded by open discussion, with all points of view equally represented, then voters all too easily respond to the voice of authority, as expressed through the TV and the press. Hence the way in which the biggest votes for Healey—roughly three to one in each case—were in the POEU and Natsopa. Here the union members had to fall in individual ballot papers, distributed by union representatives but counted by the electoral reform society.

The union journals printed statements from the candidates but also contained main editorial pieces—urging the POEU members to vote for Healey, as the man most likely to enable Labour to win the next election. Natsopa suggesting that ‘people are alarmed by a too rapid shift of the Labour Party to the left’.

In the case of Natsopa, the London clerical branch later passed a resolution, complaining that there had not been adequate discussion among the members before the ballot papers were distributed, and of the biased nature of the material from the union.

However, this alone cannot be an adequate explanation for everything that happened. For in unions where the vote was taken at branch meetings—permitting discussion among members who tend to be more active than the average—the vote also was for Healey. This was even true in two traditionally left wing unions with Broad Left type leaderships—FBU and NUPE.

The FBU vote was about two to one for Healey on a very low poll, despite a low key, one paragraph call by the executive for a Benn vote. One SWP member describes what happened at a branch meeting attended by about half its fire station: ‘At my branch we used the argument that it was Healey and Callaghan who kept us out for nine weeks in 1977-78, and that Healey is not even trying to change. People remember that very well. Yet 11 hands still went up for Healey as against 12 for Benn and five abstentions’

What was remarkable was that the vote in the traditionally left wing FBU was not at all different to the vote in the traditionally right wing and non-militant health service union, COHSE, where, also on a very low vote, Healey carried the day by just under two to one. Yet while the FBU executive recommended Benn, who had received a standing ovation when he appeared on the visitors’ balcony at the union conference, the COHSE leadership made no recommendation and had banned delegates from mentioning Benn’s name at their conference.

The more militant union in the health service is NUPE. Yet its branch-based vote went three to two for Healey—this from a membership that turned out in vast numbers against the Healey imposed cuts of 1975-7.

Some NUPE activists explain this in terms of branch secretaries in backward areas sending off the branch’s vote without consulting the members. But reports indicate that even at well attended meetings of traditionally left wing branches, there were substantial majorities for Healey. Thus one SWP member in Scotland tells how when the issue came up at her branch, the right wing were ready and spoke up for Healey, the left were unprepared, making no effective intervention and the members voted against Benn.

Substitutionism

What are we to conclude from this all? First, it rams home one of the points we have been making in this Review all year. The huge groundswell of support for Benn—the ‘political upsurge’—is at the moment a quite a small minority of workers. This minority can be big enough to swing union conference votes, to ensure that some of the right sort of people get delegated to resolution meetings, to shout down Healey when he has the nerve to address unemployment rallies. But it can be all too easily outflanked by the forces of the right when it comes to the struggle for real political power. For then there is no substitute for a powerful, organised base within a majority of at least the strong sections of the class. Those who fall into the substitutionist trap of claiming to speak for workers they have not brought into active agreement with themselves, are open to a hammering from forces organised by the media and the right wing.

Second, the winning of workers for left politics cannot be a question just of argument. The longer the time lag since the Callaghan-Healey government, the more the horrors of that government fade from the memories of all but the most politically active. To those who attend union meetings in NUPE, the FBU or the TGWU, the million and half unemployed under Healey is already seeming like a pleasant alternative to the three million unemployed under Thatcher. The only way the left can counter this trend is if we can involve the majority of the workforce in any workplace in struggle in the here and now, so that they begin to develop an active consciousness of an alternative to Thatcher and Healey. Only then will the argument of the isolated left winger in a workplace or union branch swing the majority behind him or her.

Unfortunately the Labour left (and what remains of the CP) tend all the time to play into the Labour right’s hands by talking of the wrongs of what will happen in two or three years time, instead of addressing themselves to the question of how to begin now rebuilding working class strength and confidence.

Paradoxically, the obsession with conference delegations and resolutions, with restoration and alternative economic strategies, tends to play into the hands of the right in the unions. The growing gap between many activists and the rank and file around them. After all, if packing a conference delegation is your aim, then arguing first with workers who probably won’t attend a branch meeting is a diversion.

This shows itself most vividly when it comes to resolving the direct employers’ attacks in the workplace. Those who have claimed to speak for thousands suddenly find that even the dozen or so people in their own section will not stop work in solidarity with them.

But this time it has also shown itself in the electoral sphere. In the unions with ‘left’ leaderships, the Labour left and the CP hardly bothered to campaign for Benn, despite the issue being so close to their hearts. They assumed that because the leadership represented the members, there was no need to convince the members themselves. This, of course, has been the rationale for not building Broad Lefts in the ‘left’ unions—it would antagonise full time officials who would in any case deliver their members to left wing candidates.

There is an alternative, as was shown in at least one case, This was in Natsopa, where the deputy leadership election was accompanied by another ballot over the question of support for unilateralism. Socialists and CND members in Fleet Street used the occasion to carry out an intense propaganda campaign. Leaflets arguing the case over the bomb were handed out in as many workplaces as possible at the same time as the ballot forms. And so the same people who gave Healey a 6000 majority over Benn, gave a 500 majority to unilateralism.

But to carry such activity you have to believe in moving workers to act for themselves, not in substituting for this the behaviour of GMCs, local councils, union executives, annual conferences and parliaments.

NEWS & ANALYSIS

Socialist Review 5
All things to all Greeks

On 18th October the Greek general elections look likely to end 45 years of right wing rule. What will it really mean? Members of the Greek group Revolutionary Challenge explain.

One word is seen on walls everywhere in Greece today, in the towns and in the countryside: the word is 'change'. Everyone who has suffered the effects of the economic crisis, whether the effects of the economic crisis, whether manual workers or white collar workers or petty bourgeois or everyone who has become tired of the 40 years domination by the youth in Greek politics, hunger for 'the change'. If we look more closely, we can see that all those who want this change mean very different things by that word.

Since 1974 the right wing government which replaced the Junta has been trying to modernise the Greek economy and social institutions (education, public services, the banking system). This modernisation was essential for Greek capitalism in order to allow entry into the Common Market at the beginning of the year.

For industry, this has meant building up big units, an intensification of work and a winding out of small and medium businesses. This has lead to increasing unemployment (according to the OECD, now 16%). Investment has been capital intensive while the small firms which have been driven out of business have lost thousands of jobs.

As a result, no-one, whether worker of peasant or small businessman or traditional petty bourgeois, is happy with the results of the right wing ‘New Democracy’ government. Everyone wants the ‘change’ but each for their own reasons and in their own ways. Of course, the bad situation is not the exclusive responsibility of the government. The world economic crisis has hit Greek capitalism particularly badly, precisely because it hasn’t been fully modernised.

‘Change’ has been the basic election slogan of PASOK (Greek Socialist Movement) throughout the election campaign. This slogan has attracted massive support and everyone now expects the new government to be ‘socialist’. PASOK has promised everything to everybody.

PASOK was formed in September 1974 from three old centre parties, left wing politicians and oppositionists from during the dictatorship. Its growth has been meteoic. It gained 15% of the vote in 1974 and 26% in 1977. At the beginning it was a very strange party—

European. It is different from other European CPs. For instance it has often taken actions of a ‘military’ character against opponents.

Last year’s university occupations, which the CP did not support, were attacked by CP youth members armed with clubs, helmets and shields. Anyone who attempts to issue leaflets inside trade union meetings controlled by the party is likely to end up in hospital.

At the same time it must be said that the CP is the party of the organised industrial working class. Of course, the party bureaucrats who now control many of the union bodies are selling out one struggle after another. There has been a noticeable fall in industrial militancy since the strike wave of 1975, at which time the party had not yet consolidated its control of the trade unions.

The CP is competing with PASOK for the petty bourgeois vote, without a great deal of success because of the traditional anti-communism of the petty bourgeoisie. In attempting to win this, like the French CP, it has campaigned against ‘black money’ (it reminds them of an old refrain), ‘drug abuse’ (in an extremely pittailical way), in support of the nuclear family and in support of obedience by students to teachers.

This isolates the party from the generation of urban youth, who are developing in other directions. A few weeks ago, a Rory Gallercher concert was attended by 25,000 predominantly working class kids in a football stadium in Athens. The concert ended with running battles between MA1 (the Greek SPG), who used tear gas, and the kids who were building barricades and throwing petrol bombs. The young working class kids were shouting ‘Cops, Pigs, Murderers’. The same scenes were repeated at a concert in Salamina.

Prospects

The failure of the CP to understand the changes in the last years in Greek urban society is turning young people to vote for PASOK, to apathy, or to some kind of anarchism.

The actual policies of the CP are more or less the same as PASOK, with more emphasis on increasing relations with Eastern Europe.

The CP’s main electoral aim (and main electoral slogan) is to get 17% of the vote, as this would give it a greatly increased number of MPs and a far better chance of forming a coalition with PASOK. But it is unlikely to get more than 12-13%.

The remaining parties are unlikely together to take more than 10% of the vote. The Eurocommunist CP of the Interior, which got 2% despite its 180 degree turn to attract the women’s movement and urban youth, is not expected to increase its vote substantially.

Initially a PASOK government would introduce some radical measures, such as civil marriage, reform of the unions and tax cuts. In the long term the contradictions would appear. What happens then? A lot depends on how much the CP is prepared to co-operate with the PASOK government and keep the working class quiet. This in turn will depend on the willingness of PASOK to concede the demands of the
Mitterrand’s mediocre millennium

The enormous but superficial enthusiasm which greeted Mitterrand’s victory is already beginning to fade; between the end of June and the end of August confidence in Mitterrand, according to one opinion poll, had fallen from 71% to 62% of the population. The ousted right is still in utter disarray, but will regroup quickly enough if the government loses momentum.

The new regime has begun with a number of gestures which, while of limited significance, cannot fail to be pleasing to the Left. The Plogoff nuclear power station will not be built and the Lanzac military camp will not be extended — both had been symbolic focuses for leftist activists in recent years. Gaston Deffere, the minister of the interior, has neither refused to extradite ETA militants to Spain, but invoked his own past as a Resistance fighter to justify his decision. The satirical paper Hara-Kiri, banned under Pompidou, has reappeared, the ban on roulette within a hundred kilometres of Paris has been lifted, and — to the indignation of the paper Le Figaro — first-class compartments on the Paris metro are to be abolished.

Likewise, socialists cannot fail to welcome the news that France — later than almost every other country in Europe — is to abolish the death penalty, and that the repressive Gauthier state security court is to be abolished. Welcome too is the amnesty for many categories of prisoners, a cheap way of alleviating the chronic overcrowding in French jails. There are, however, some strange gaps in the amnesty, such as conscientious objectors and doctors charged with abortion offences.

But there is to be no real change in the machinery of the French State: France’s corrupt racist police force will remain unpurged, even if it is momentarily subdued. Deffere has refused demands from the police unions for a purge of top police officials, saying there will be no ‘witchhunt’. The much-hated CRS riot police are no longer to be used to ‘maintain order’ but a section of the army has been assigned to do the job.

The Mitterrand government has broken with some of the more openly racist aspects of the Giscard era. Illegal immigrants are to be given the opportunity to ‘regularise’ their situation, but in practice only those in full-time legal employment will get permission to stay. And controls to prevent further illegal immigration are being tightened up. The government is now rapidly reneging on a promise to give immigrants the vote; apparently this will not be practicable before the municipal elections in 1983.

All these reforms are, however, in the last resort marginal to the real problem facing the Mitterrand regime — how to deal with the economic crisis. Like every other government in the world, the French administration faces the twin problems of unemployment and inflation. Mitterrand’s attempts at a solution may be more humane and even marginally more intelligent than Thatcher’s, but since he cannot opt out of the world system he will find it hard to discover a remedy to the one problem which does not aggravate the other.

Unemployment

Mitterrand’s accession has not halted inflation. On the contrary, his first months in power have seen rises in the costs of basic necessities — petrol, transport, gas, electricity — which will produce further increases throughout the whole economy. And unemployment too is still rising. The official figures which are now to be shared by every Frenchman and woman show that at best it will be twelve or eighteen months before the rise can be halted.

The government has taken a number of well-publicised measures against unemployment. The creation of 55,000 new jobs in the public sector (post office, education, etc) may be welcome, but it is only a drop in the ocean. Beyond this the government has increased bonuses, loans and subsidies to private employers in the — probably vain — hope that this will encourage the creation of new jobs.

In many ways this is little more than a continuation of Giscard’s unsuccessful policy.

The minimum wage has been raised by ten per cent (twice as much as was legally required to keep up with inflation) but this has been accompanied by a measure which cuts employers’ social security contributions on wages which are less than twenty per cent above the legal minimum; in effect this is an incentive to employers to pay low wages. The government is postponing a full-scale plan to increase employment to the fateful year of 1984, by when it is hoped inflation will be under control.
Nor will the unemployment situation be helped much by the agreement, made with government encouragement, between employers and unions (except the CGT) for a 39-hour week and a fifth week of annual holiday. As the revolutionary paper *Lutte Ouvrière* pointed out, it is 43 years since the 40-hour week was agreed in 1936. At this rate it will take another 180 years to reach the 35-hour week. In fact the agreement also contains a relaxation of restrictions on overtime which in practice will probably cancel out the cut in the working week.

And taxation policy is unlikely to lead to any fundamental change in the distribution of wealth. The income tax increase needed to provide the funds to pay unemployment benefit to a greater number of jobless will hit workers as much as higher-paid people. And the proposed wealth tax will have a minimal impact, amounting to about one per cent on fortunes over £300,000.

**Nationalisation**

As for Mitterrand's nationalisation proposals, they are singularly failing to alarm the French ruling class. Managers and shareholders alike seem reasonably confident that their positions will not be significantly worsened. Five large industrial groups are to be nationalised, but their subsidiaries will not be included in the measure, and only 36 of the three hundred private banks are to be taken over. Nationalisation will be on the Renault model with companies having managerial autonomy; Renault has been nationalised since 1945 and French capitalism has in no way suffered thereby.

The head of Thomson-Brandt, one of the groups due to be taken over, has said that nationalisation will be no problem 'if we are left to work like a private enterprise'. As for the shareholders, they will receive generous compensation in the form of long-term bonds. The nationalisations may give the government slightly greater control over the economy, though even that is doubtful: they will certainly not shift the balance of power in French society.

In terms of foreign and military policy Mitterrand's position is even more openly reactionist. There has been talk of possible friction between France and the USA because of Mitterrand's support for leftist regimes in the Third World. In practice this may not be so much conflict as a division of labour. As *The Economist* has suggested: 'pro-Western governments in Africa may conclude that they should turn to Mr Mitterrand when they want money and to Mr Reagan when they want arms or soldiers.

And there seems little likelihood that Mitterrand's radicalism towards the Third World will extend as far as France's colonies in the West Indies, where the repressive racist regimes remain unchallenged. In the Middle East Mitterrand's pro-Zionist line led the Israeli Labour Party to call a special meeting of 'solidarity with socialist France'.

As far as East-West relations are concerned, Mitterrand lines up with the hawks. He has demanded that the Western powers should build up their nuclear strength before engaging in any disarmament talks.

France's own military strength is being carefully husbanded. An old Socialist Party promise to cut military service from one year to six months has been shelved because of the level of unemployment. And a decision has been made to construct a seventh French nuclear submarine. This means France will be able to have three nuclear subs at sea at any given time (Britain has to make do with one).

Despite the Ploegstert gesture, Mitterrand is being equally cavalier about earlier promises on the question of nuclear power. Work has been suspended on about half the nuclear power stations currently being built, but the other half are to go on. The factory at La Hague, near Cherbourg, which processes foreign nuclear waste, also continues to operate. It was demonstrators against this—including Socialist Party members and members of the pro-Socialist union CEDT—who were the victims of the first tear-gas grenades of the new regime at Cherbourg in August. The pro-Communist CGT, not to be outdone, has organised demonstrations in defence of nuclear power and the jobs it creates.

**Prospects for the left**

Mitterrand has still some time left before he faces any outright opposition from the left. The CP, politically humiliated and then coopted into government, will not launch any significant militant action this winter. For the moment they will continue to give Mitterrand full support. For example, the CP transport minister, Fitgen, persuaded French air traffic controllers not to take action in support of their American comrades.

By next winter, if inflation and unemployment continue as predicted, the CP may have to take a left turn to preserve their base. The fact that the CGT is technically quite independent of the CP might enable them to do this and still remain in the government.

The co-option of the CP might seem to give the left the opportunity to put itself at the head of any struggles. Unfortunately this will probably not happen. The OCI and the LCR (Fourth International) have spent so long calling for a Socialist-Communist government that they are a little stunned now they have got one. *Lutte Ouvrière* has insisted that nothing at all has really changed: it enables it to make correct propaganda but little else. The fact that the first struggles are occurring around the issue of nuclear power might seem to give the initiative to the Comunist PSU, with its ecolocialism beyond-the-fragments-type support; but the PSU has been too busy negotiating a cooperation agreement with the Socialist Party to take the lead. For the revolutionary left, just as for Mitterrand, time is running short.

Ian Birchall
Wall Street takes on Reagan

Last November Wall Street, the centre of American finance, greeted the election triumph of Reagan and the Republicans with obvious glee. Only ten months later the Doc Jones index of stock values was down 20% from its April peak of 1024.05 to a low of 836.19.

Interest rates are still around the 20% level (which allowing for inflation makes the real rate about 10% — easily a post-1945 high). This is instilling severe damage on key sectors of the economy which are heavily dependent upon credit, such as housing and motor vehicles.

Wall Street spokesmen are now among Reagan's fiercest critics as a remarkable controversy rages within the American ruling class. As the Financial Times put it (19th September):

'But Wall Street seems to have concluded that things will get steadily worse, mainly because of the impact of high interest rates on demand. The outlook for profits is at best mixed, at worst dreadful. This week's news that housing starts, industrial production and capacity utilisation are all sharply down did nothing to lighten Wall Street's mood.'

All this follows a period in which the economy seemed to be growing rapidly after the 1979-80 slump — at an annual rate of 8.4% in the first quarter of 1981 — and Reagan's massive tax cuts benefiting big business and the rich (750 billion dollars over the next five years) sailed through Congress. Reagan, clearly most upset by Wall Street's ingratitude, is telling his programme has not been given a chance. The truth is that the programme cannot work.

Ruling class offensive

In the first months after his victory Reagan seemed to carry all before him. Although elected by only 27% of the electorate (over a third, especially the blacks and the unemployed, abstained) his 'new right' coalition marked a clear break with the consensus of postwar American politics — a coalition founded on a frenzy of jingoism, Christian fundamentalism, and a strong undercurrent of racism.

The trade union movement, while able to mobilise 250,000 for a Labour Day demonstration on 19 September has been helpless in the face of the working of the 12,500 strik- ing air controllers. The Democrats have been in total disarray, with their Southern members voting with Reagan on the budget, and few of the rest capable of mounting much opposition.

The American ruling class is still the most powerful in the world. Its command of material, economic and military resources, at home and abroad, far exceeds that of its main rival, the USSR. Yet in its own eyes the last decade has been one of unprecedented failure — from Vietnam to the Iranian hostages fiasco, with the decline of the dollar's supremacy as a world currency, and the growing, commercial competition from Europe and Japan.

Reagan's victory seemed to offer, as with the Tories in Britain, a marvellous opportunity to hit back — at rivals abroad and the enemy within, at the Russians and at the American working class (its weakest sections, blacks, women and the unemployed, in particular).

But no government, not even that of the US can control the economy. Every move made by the Reagan regime has unleashed unforeseen repercussions — from the wave of opposition to more arms spending in Europe to the precarious state of the US economy.

The budget row

In particular, the three main economic objectives of the regime —'defence' spending up by 51% in real terms by 1986, the tax cuts, and inflation down to five per cent through balancing the budget — are proving impossible to reconcile. Even a massive 38 billion dollars worth of cuts in other spending this year, alone, largely on welfare, social security, health etc. is not enough to bridge the gap.

Open conflict has now broken out between three different agencies of the state, each overwhelmingly committed to one of the three objectives — the Defence Department under Caspar Weinberger, the Budget Office under David Stockman, and the Federal Reserve under Paul Volcker (the Fed is the US equivalent of the Bank of England).

Weinberger, backed by the generals and the whole military-industrial complex, has just successfully resisted pressure to reduce the proposed increases in arms spending. He accepted a cut of only two billion off his projected 222 billion budget for 1982.

Stockman is a committed supply-sider — the economists who believe tax cuts alone will lead to economic growth of over 4% a year and thereby raise overall tax revenues to compensate. Having got his tax cuts through Congress, he now wants additional cuts in spending of 74 billion dollars over the next two years.

But if the economy does not grow, neither will tax revenues. At the same time as in Britain expenditure on social security for the unemployed, bail out companies in trouble, and interest payments on existing government debts to the money lenders will all rise.

The budget deficit (the gap between taxes and spending which has to be met by further borrowing on the financial markets) will rise well above its target. Even some Republicans are horrified at the political implications of further cuts in welfare and social security (especially in the black ghettos of declining industrial cities like Detroit). Reagan's ambition, the supply-side miracle of tax cuts and a balanced budget by 1984, is already looking absurd.

Paul Volcker, a former private banker, has the closest ties with Wall Street of the three. An ardent monetarist, he is obsessed with the view that any sort of budget deficit will lead to inflation as extra money gets pumped into the economy.

Deadlock

Where he is right is that if tax cuts and arms spending do raise demand, the large corporations will seize the chance to raise prices after two years of slump and squeezed profit margins. They will not, however, risk investment in new capacity adding to output, if interest rates are high or demand uncertain.

Volcker's response to this problem is to impose a tight squeeze on the money supply at a time when the demand for money is rising — both from the government to meet the deficit and from many companies, especially those in trouble like Chrysler or those engaged in the current merger and takeover scramble, like Du Pont's takeover of the oil company Texaco. When increased demand for money meets limited supply, interest rates rise high and stay high. As noted above, that is what does the squeeze on the economy and offsetting any benefit from the increased arms spending. It is also forcing up interest rates and prolonging the slump throughout the rest of the world.

What it all adds up to is deadlock, and a return of what's happened to the Tories in Britain (although the American economy is much stronger than the British and more capable of surviving the treatment). The strain of course will be born by the American working class.

Some commentators are arguing that Reagan should raise taxes (Financial Times 13 September, Lombard column). Others are blaming the perversity of Wall Street. One intense Republican congressman has introduced a Bill of Impeachment (as with Nixon after Watergate) against Paul Volcker for messing it all up. Some 'supply-siders' have gone completely dotty and are suggesting that the way to deal with the inflation problem is to turn the clock back 50 years and restore the Gold Standard — ignoring the fact that the Gold Standard did not prevent the 1929 Wall Street Crash!
The Economist in a lengthy defence of the arms programme (12 September) has more sober analysis. It argues that the increase in defence spending in real terms will at worst take it back to the level of the Vietnam War in the late 1960s (when it amounted to 9% of GNP) — still less than the proportion spent on the Korean War (13.3% of GNP). The budget deficit of two per cent of GNP is not as serious as is suggested, and is less than in non-inflationary 1959.

This raises the whole question of the economic impact of military spending in the crisis-ridden 80s compared with the booming 50s and 60s.

Whatever it says in public, the American ruling class is well aware that it is setting the pace in the arms race. It knows that for the Russians to keep up will impose an intolerable strain on their aching economy. Russian arms spending is already absorbing 13% of a GNP only half that of the US's.

The whole of the Russian economy has been subordinated to the demands of the military, with working class consumption severely held down as a result. The distortions of devoting the best scientific and technological resources to arms have undermined the rate of growth of the Russian economy over the long-term. But the US economy is also subject to such strains, particularly at a time of world crisis. There is a paradox here which it is important to understand. It lay at the heart of the Permanent Arms Economy thesis taken up by the International Socialists (now the SWP) in the 1960s, but was grasped by few of its critics.

High levels of arms spending did not as such cause the post-war boom but they did sustain it. But those countries which bore the greatest burden of that spending did not necessarily benefit the most. On the contrary, the capitalists of West Germany and Japan which had low levels of arms spending could devote more resources to 'productive' investment and take more advantage of the expansion of the system as a whole. In effect, the US, Russia and to a lesser extent Britain propped up the whole economy at the expense of lower rates of productivity and competitiveness on world markets.

"Those countries which bore the greatest burden of arms spending did not necessarily benefit the most from the boom that it sustained."

Arms spending helped to stabilise the system in two ways. On the one hand, it absorbed (wasted) resources which might otherwise have been devoted to investment in new factories and machinery, which would have raised the capital/labour ratio (or more strictly the organic composition of capital in Marx's terminology) and put pressure on the rate of profit. On the other hand, if the money spent on arms had not been spent at all, levels of demand in the world economy would have stagnated with even worse consequences.

By the end of the 60s, however, the contradictions of the Permanent Arms Economy were becoming serious.

1. The effect of the arms spending was to slow down the forces undermining the boom — but it could not stop them altogether. Eventually the pressures leading to crisis began to predominate over those sustaining the boom.

2. In a period of crisis the competition between capitals intensifies. That applies to whole national capitals as much as to individual companies or multinationalists. One response to that is to increase military spending to carve out a bigger share of markets and access to raw materials (as with Germany and Japan in the 1930s) or just to hang on to what they already possess (as with the US and Russia today). But the crisis of the 70s also exposed the weakness of the US economy in terms of its competitiveness on world markets. Those sections of US capital which did not benefit directly from arms spending became more resistant in the 1970s to the diversion of resources to military goals. Arms spending after the Vietnam War fell as a proportion of GNP by almost half.

3. One solution to this problem for American capital would be to have the costs of arms spending shared out more evenly among the Western powers. Hence the demand for a 3% annual increase in real 'defence' spending for all NATO countries. But that is unlikely to be met even in Tory Britain. West Germany's government has just cut its defence budget. Japan's share is rising but is still very small. The Reagan regime is out on its own.

4. In a period of crisis the question of how arms spending is to be financed becomes extremely serious. Even during the Vietnam War the resistance of both US private capitalists and workers to extra taxation was extremely high. The response of both the Johnson and Nixon administrations was to run a massive budget deficit — and in effect to finance the war by printing extra dollars. So arms spending fuelled rapidly mounting inflation both in the USA and the rest of the world. It is the memory of that period that has got the Voelkers and Wall Street so worried today. But tax increases are not the only alternative to a massive cut in other public spending.

5. Arms spending has become extremely capital-intensive. If it is paid for by cutting other public spending the net effect will be to raise unemployment, as well as a drastic lowering of working class living standards. The US Bureau of Statistics figures show that one million dollars invested in military research creates the following jobs: 2 education, 187, health 138, construction 100, transport 92, military 76. But education and health do not provide the profits which arms spending does for some very powerful corporations — General Dynamics, McDermott, Boeing, Lockheed, General Electric, and a host of electronics and construction companies mostly in the South and West (the sunbelt) where Reagan has his base.

An increase in arms spending will limit the depth of the current slump. It will keep some sectors of US capitalism aloof. But it cannot help to resolve the underlying crisis which has been with us since the early 70s except through destroying us all. To the extent that it goes hand in hand with cuts in other spending, high interest-rates and a worsening of the US economy, it will actually help to prolong the current slump.

One final point. The lunacy of the arms race is itself an expression of the brutal competition between different ruling classes which has been central to capitalism since its origins. It is the expression of the crisis at a military level, not something separate and not something accidental. The crisis will continue, and so will arms spending, though varying in pace, will the arms race, until we consign capitalism itself to the dustbin of history.
Can they bully SWAPO?

What was the significance of the South African invasion of southern Angola in August? Who is fighting who for what in the war on the Namibia-Angola border? What does it mean for SWAPO guerrillas in the short-term and for Namibian workers in the long-term? John Rogers looks at the issue.

An Angolan driver was carrying the first Western journalists into the war zone during the recent South African invasion. Immediately after his passengers had been strafed by South African jets he made the stoical comment: South Africa is surrounded. There is Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Angola. She is like a dog: she bites. That is the conventional view of black Namibian freedom fighters. South Africa is seen as a dog playing ‘fetch me a Russian prisoner’ for its master Ronald Reagan.

The absence of a restraining US hand was clear enough as South African troops killed thousands of Namibian refugees and Angolan peasants and workers hundred miles inside the Angolan border.

The South Africans are reaping their return on enormous amounts of money that they have lavished on Reagan’s entourage. The handouts have been geared to promoting the anti-communist credentials of South Africa’s client groups—Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA in Angola and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in Namibia.

In the US the main conduit for DTA propaganda is the Namibia Trade and Cultural Council Inc., who will finance 400 visitors to Namibia this year. Recent visitors have included Robert Billings, the executive director of the Moral Majority (a right-wing American pressure group); members of the US Veterans Organisation and the American Legion; author and former Green Beret, Robin Moore; and many right-wing journalists, businessmen and politicians. The Council’s chairman, Gunther Kaschek, claims that ‘in the hundreds of articles that have reached us as feedback, not one of the guests found it necessary to paint a negative picture’.

Yet Chester Crocker, Reagan’s assistant secretary of state responsible for Africa, is not on South Africa’s payroll. He is much more typical of the hard-nosed men of the multinationals who usually occupy the middle ground of presidential appointments once the elections are over. He accepts that the partnership between the US Gulf oil corporation and the MPLA government of Angola is lucrative evidence that the MPLA is no Soviet puppet. But he goes along with South African maintenance of Savimbi as a means of pressurising the MPLA to deliver SWAPO to the negotiating table.

After South Africa eventually withdrew from its three week long August invasion of Angola he was quick to press a crippling package for Namibian ‘independence’, threatening to back the DTA unless the MPLA bully SWAPO into accepting. In this he was following the example of Carrington who used a Rhodesian invasion during the Lancaster House talks to get Mozambique to put pressure on ZANU.

One item in the latest ‘independence’ formula symbolises Crocker’s approach. He claims to have persuaded the Angolans to hold the Cubans in Angola north of a ‘red line’ while Namibian independence elections are supervised by soldiers from exclusively the Western powers. It is alleged that the Angolans have agreed that Western soldiers (wearing even their own uniforms rather than going through the pretense of being UN soldiers) will be allowed into southern Angola to supervise the SWAPO camps. These measures would stack the cards against the SWAPO guerrillas’ ability to translate their military gains within Namibia into electoral victory. And the regime’s police would be left free to intimidate voters.

So the invasion and the subsequent diplomatic tolings and froings. They are a classical imperialist exercise aimed at regional management of the radical black nationalist movement against South African domination. The ‘optimum goal’ of joint West German, French, Canadian, British and American co-sponsorship of Namibian elections would be a SWAPO government cowed by the international pressure into buttressing down Namibian worker militancy—in much the same way as the ZANU government has with Zimbabwean workers.

The Reagan administration has, for instance, increased its contribution to the UN budget which helps finance the training of a new SWAPO Namibian administration at the Namibia Institute in Zambia. The Americans rightly reason that SWAPO is much more of an armed workers’ movement, as opposed to an armed peasants’ movement, than ZANU was. Through the Namibian Institute they hope to sponsor the kind of middle class black elite which has now taken over Zimbabwe, but which apartheid education has prevented developing to the same extent in Namibia.

Just how difficult it will be to stage manage a compliant SWAPO government can be shown by outlining the last strike wave in Namibia. In January 1979 a strike by 2000 migrant labourers at RTZ’s Rossing Uranium mine over pay and conditions was followed by stoppages at three other mines.

In one dispute, where more than 200 black miners worked to refuse work at the American-owned Kranzberg Tungsten mine the workers were sent ‘home’ to the rural labour reserve (Damaraland) on the northern border with Angola and replacements recruited.

At the South African-owned UIS tin mine, however, four company officials preferred to travel from Pretoria to negotiate with representatives of some 300 striking workers. Likewise, the American company Newton and Amex preferred to negotiate new pay rates with their black employees. Then, in April 1979, the South African-based Consolidated Diamond Mines’ 5000 black workers successfully struck over food and the conditions of their single-quarter barracks.
The tourist brochures for British Caledonian's Bintumani Hotel translate Sierra Leone colourfully as meaning "The Big Lion Mountain". They add lustre to the image of winged game hunting within reach of the beaches by alluding to the country's diamond economy. Towards the end of August and throughout September, however, travel agents were decidedly jittery.

The diamond state has seen its hotel cooks, waiters and cleaners join in a general strike action along with taxi drivers, bus drivers, teachers, civil servants, canning factory workers and diamond miners.

The most remarkable feature of the nearly two months of rolling strikes has been the shaking off by urban workers of 200 years of division deliberately created among them by the British colonial system.

In the late 18th century British industrialists realised that they could more efficiently compete with their French and Spanish imperial rivals by hiring and firing 'free labour' in their American and West Indian colonies rather than continuing with the inefficient expense of slaves. The British navy thereafter played the uncharacteristic role of freeing slaves being transported from Nigeria in French and Spanish ships. The most convenient places to land the 're-captives' were Sierra Leone and Liberia.

A 'creole society' of privileged British citizens was created from the free slaves to rule over the inhabitants of these two rural territories. The propaganda image of liberating Britain was sustained by an influx of missionaries who by the 1850s boasted 42 primary schools.

Yet today Sierra Leone creole and non-creole workers are jointly involved in strike action against the inherited order. This crucially distinguishes the current Sierra Leonean upsurge from that in the southern neighbour, Liberia, in April last year. There the popular movement against a corrupt government was hijacked by political chameleons in the lower army officer ranks, led by Sergeant Samuel Doe. Apart from providing the Western media with Aimin-like public executions of former leaders and then desperately currying favour by offering the US fleet facilities, Doe has tried to turn Liberian non-creoles against creoles. In Sierra Leone creoles are only 2% of the total population of three million, but they are almost exclusively in the urban areas and therefore of significance when it comes to worker unity.

The creole way of asking Leen's famous question 'What is to be done?'—How do I do?'—is on the lips of many Sierra Leonean workers. They have not yet formulated an alternative to the sort of government run by president Shibaka Stevens. In a country where 75% of the population subsist in a shifting agriculture system which uses 10% of the land at any one time, some urban workers had, until recently, regarded Stevens as one of their own.

Like Doe of Liberia, Stevens started his career as a sergeant—a sergeant of police in the colonial system. He moved on first to more lucrative employment as a supervisor in the iron ore mines at Marampa where he became a 'bushman man' and then, in 1947, to Ruskin College, Oxford. Because of these credentials workers supported him for a period after they voted him into office at the head of the All People's Congress in 1967.

**Furious Protest**

Ten years later worker disillusionment had set in. In 1977 students from the Fourah Bay College demonstrating against corruption were beaten up by the thugs of the Cuban-and Chinese-trained Internal Security Unit (ISU). Outrage over this led to Soweto-style school student protests in Freetown, the capital, spreading to Kenema in the south-east of the country. Less well publicised strikes over pay rises followed in cement-works, breweries, flour-mills and shoe factories. Stevens' response was to declare a one-party state and strengthen the ISU. Strikers, in turn, burnt down the police headquarters.

Last year Stevens was apprehensive about a clash between the ISU and the twenty two unions of the Sierra Leone Labour Congress—which represents 250,000 workers. There were furious protests from James Kabia of the Congress at the construction of 60 lavish villas for the African heads of state attending the summit meeting of the Organisation for African Unity. To impress the other leaders, Stevens had spent vast sums on airport expansion, new luxury hotels for journalists, motorways and a French designed digital telephone system—this at a time when 70-80% of children in the rural hinterland are suffering malnutrition.

The final straw came this year when the construction of the new presidential palace overlooking Freetown was associated with the poisoning of transudent government chieffes between state departments. This scandal was dubbed 'vouchersgate' by Sierra Leone workers because of the parallels with the 'Muldergate' scandal in South Africa—Stevens had been the first West African leader to favour a 'detente' with South Africa, the base of the giant mining corporation, Anglo-American which dominates Sierra Leone's diamond industry.

In July Stevens tried to introduce food price rises at the behest of the IMF. James Kabia threatened a general strike unless the rice price was reduced by 67% rather than increased. Stevens sent the ISU to blow up the opposition newspaper offices. The Labour Congress went ahead with its strike on August 14 and thousands of strikers were massed outside its headquarters, in defiance of a ban imposed on demonstrations.

By the fourth day the mass defence of Congress headquarters forced Stevens to offer 'to control rice prices'. By the fifth day he was offering to reduce prices by 40%. Congress held out, but Stevens was able to put the boot in since the strike had not spread outside of the capital. The Congress headquarters were stormed with the aid of troops from neighbouring Guinea, and the leaders detained, including Kabia.

Yet by mid September Congress militants had recovered from the arrest of their leaders, and the second strike wave began with the closure of the diamond mines and coal mines as well as those places that struck in July. This time every urban area in the country was paralysed. Now the government elite is in a state of siege, with any attempt to reassess authority immediately being answered with strike action.

John Rogers
The "lumpen-proletariat" forces itself upon the attention of Marxists these days, from Port-of-Spain to Bristol, from Berlin to Amsterdam. All over the world there are communities of the chronically unemployed, the young squatters, "brothers on the block", street people. It has been possible for British socialists to pretend they do not exist. No such ignorance has been possible in Cairo or Calcutta.

But now it is time for us to develop an understanding of the politics of the lumpen-proletariat. We can start from Marx, who first pointed out the existence of a class drawn from all classes, living on the margins of society by hustling or peddling, but not in regular work.

Marx was downright hostile to this class, and regarded them as potential agents of reaction. This they certainly were. But mixed up in Marx's hostility was a Victorian morality; he disapproved of them for what they did and the way they lived. They were thieves, pickpockets, prostitutes, gypsies, escaped galley slaves. In short, Marx said, what the French called la bobine. And Marx wanted nothing to do with them (see his pamphlet The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte).

We can discard Marx's morality, while hanging onto his insight of a separate marginal class. But while recognising his reasons for distrust, we cannot simply ignore the street people. One of the strengths of the Leninist tradition is that we base the party in the working class but also work in other sectors. So we work among students, in the women's movement, in Irish solidarity work. We even work with some very dubious people: social workers and social security clerks, for instance. So it behoves us to look at the possibilities and limits of lumpen politics.

This is what I will do in the rest of this article. Most of my experience comes from the squatting movement in London. While all sorts of people were involved in squatting politics, the core of the communities involved was certainly lumpen. It was in the majority a lumpen-proletariat drawn from the working class, and this made it a good deal grimmer than superficially similar movements in America, say.

I also have some experience of American street politics in the early seventies, both black and white, and what I have to say about lumpen politics is pretty much true of them as well.

'They do not have to be told that they have a problem with the system.'

But I do not want to draw my boundaries too tightly. The edges of the lumpen-proletariat are vague, and there is little politics that is exclusively lumpen. Still, I am talking about a style of politics and a way of life which is markedly different from organised working-class politics. What I want to do is to highlight these differences. I am well aware that street people include a lot of workers, and that a lot of their dada are bus conductors. But there is a difference, and it is the difference I want to concentrate on.

Economically marginal

I will start with the economic position of street people. The key here is that they are not in regular employment. They may well be casual labourers, or largely self-taught self-employed craftsmen, or peddler or dope-dealers. A large proportion of them live on one form or another of state aid, interspersed with irregular or unofficial unemployment.

This marginal position means that they are particularly poor, and that they come up against the state regularly. This makes them angry and bitter, and it means they are not very open to reformism. The single mother in a squat sees the council officials and the social security people who humiliate her as the enemy. The unemployed kid constantly hassled by the police knows who his enemy is. They do not have to be told they have a problem with the system.

But at the same time, they can be tempted to individual solutions. A steady job can offer an individual way out, a decent marriage can get that mum out of that squat. There is little in lumpen economic life that leads people to collective solutions, even though they clearly have collective problems.

So while street people are angry, they are also very disorganised. The whole nature of their lives militates against organisation. There is none of the tradition of organisation produced by people who go to the same job together day after day, year after year. And there is none of the tradition of the shop stewards committees, none of the collective discipline of people who work together.

There is also usually little or no community discipline. I have lived in streets which were communities in the sense that most people were unusually friendly and open, but which were unable to deal with heroin peddling or violent gangs. For economic reasons street people often change jobs or homes, and this makes it difficult to build a community. But many street people are also hostile to community discipline for political reasons.

Street people also have very little economic power. While they can squat a house or occupy an office, they cannot withdraw their labour. And so their actions are more difficult to maintain over time and have less effect on their rulers.

Their economic position makes street people militant, angry and disorganised. So the common form of street politics is also militant, angry, and disorganised. It may be a demonstration: it is often a riot. But it is always undisciplined: knots of people hanging around on street-corners, milling back and forth, waiting to see what happens next. The protests can be very angry indeed—they can burn down whole cities. But in the end they die away, because there is no organisation and nothing to hold onto. The bitterness remains, but the activity fades.
All this creates tremendous problems with the leadership of street politics. It is very hard to hold together any organisation. One month people flock into meetings. By the next month they have gone. They have moved, they have got a job, or they are just more interested in struggle than they are in meetings. This can make such politics a nightmare for the average socialist committee man. It also means that such political work sometimes looks meaningless to people accustomed to measuring things by the extent of stable membership lists.

But it’s not mainly committee people who lead street politics. Because things are so discontinuous and disorganised, it is relatively easy for anybody to set themselves up as a leader. There is a premium on demagogy and militant words, and often ‘leaders’ have no real base they are responsible to. So all sorts of folks become leaders without being elected by anybody: dedicated party activists, careerists after a job in community relations, and out-and-out fanatics.

**Leaders without organisation**

Street people are very vulnerable through their leaders. Because there is so little organisation the leader can become the movement in many people’s eyes. There is an enormous temptation for him to strut like a hero, to threaten authority with hordes of angry kids as if he commanded them. (And the lumpen leader is always a be.) Because such leaders are not responsible and may well be crazy, they can often mislead people. Because life in the lumpen proletariat is hard and because of the tradition of rip-off politics, it is relatively easy for the state to buy off the leadership. In extreme cases, they may simply kill the leadership, as the Americans did with the Panthers. And because the leader is the only organisation the movement has, the movement can easily be broken by breaking its leader.

Leadership is often dictatorial, as well, and this tends to corrode the movement from within. Since there is no fixed base, just a shifting mass, this is natural.

For instance, Ernie Allen (in *They should have served that cup of coffee*, edited by Dick Caster) describes how the League of Revolutionary Black Workers in Detroit relied for its cadre largely on lumpen elements. The un-elected leadership tended to simply assume its right to run things and deal heavily with any internal unrest. This made it difficult for the lower ranks of the organisation to grow or for the organisation to change.

But the problem is not restricted to Detroit. Organisations that are most self-defence suffer from it particularly badly. But libertarian lumpen organisations have their own troubles with intellectual bullying and informal caucuses.

Behind the weakness of street politics lies the weakness and isolation of street people. This weakness is not just an external economic and political thing...
it's an internal thing. The lumpen-proletariat is drawn from all classes, and
the process of joining it is not pleasant. You may feel you chose it as a life-
style, but in your heart you may know that you are unemployable. And un-
employment can sap your feelings of work.

On top of this, poverty and instabi-

ty are a threat to intimate relationships. So

it's no wonder you hate the system, but

it's also no wonder part of you hates

yourself. And that makes it very difficult
to organise with those in a similar

position.

Street people try to assert their own

worth, of course. Usually they do this in
cultural terms, as the 'counter-culture',
as Rastafarians, or whatever. They
develop a separate life-style, a separate
sense of community, a separate neigh-
bouri
hood, a hostility to the whole of the
'straight world'. This has emotional

and social benefits. But it also cuts

the street people off from political support

from the working class.

Note that working class communities

are naturally friendly to street people.

Most working class people waste their

lives, minds and bodies in jobs they

hate, and most about hang on to a

little security. But the line between an

honest worker and a 'scrounger' is often

as thin as the paper your redundancy

notice is written on. And the street

people serve as a constant reminder of

just what could happen to you. So it is

natural for many workers to try to

pretend to themselves that they are

utterly different, that there is no way

they could be like those animals.

Yet paradoxically, both workers and

street people may envy each other. The

street people want the security, the

workers often develop fantasies about

the idle, work-free, pleasure filled sex-
crazed life of the street people. These

fantasies bear no relationship to the

reality, but they increase the hostility.

Weakness and counter-culture

So the two communities eye each

other warily. They are not necessarily

enemies, and each will often have

relatives and friends in the other group.

But politically they are isolated from

each other. This weakens both groups.

Obviously, the street people are cut off

from and therefore wide open to the

heaviest forces of the state.

Perhaps less obviously, the street

people are the vulnerable underbelly of

the working class. The SPC cops who

patrol on black kids in Brixton gradu-

ate to picket lines. If squatting becomes

impossible there is no alternative to

paying whatever rent they demand. If a

single mum on SS can be deprived and

abused, that weakens the position of
every working class mum stuck in a

rotten marriage.

How should we as revolutionary

socialists relate to lumpen politics?

There are three common attitudes.

The first is dismissal. Many Marxists

feel they can dismiss anything by saying

that it is lumpen, rather like saying that

is is the work of the devil. Such dismiss-

al is usually saturated with reactionary

morality, like Marx being hostile to

gypsies and escaped galley slaves. It

plays up to many reactionary elements

in working class, for the lumpens are

the soft underbelly of the working class.

This dismissal may take the somewhat

more political form of insisting that

socialists should base themselves on

the working class and that there are dif-

iculties in lumpen politics. True enough.

But this is an argument for concentrat-

ing on working class politics. It is not an

argument for dismissing lumpen politics,

any more than we dismiss work among

students or around nuclear power.

The second common attitude is to

romanticise the lumpen-proletariat as the

vanguard of the struggle. This is particu-

larly common when the working class

seems apathetic or gripped by reform-

ism. The lumpens, in contrast, are

clearly militant and often willing to

take on the state itself.

Also, of course, it is easier for ex-

student revolutionaries to get into

lumpen politics because the lumpen

proletariat are drawn from all classes.

And it is easier for them to become

leaders for the same reasons it is easier

for Ranitics to become leaders. More-

over, many middle class revolutionaries

draw their politics more from anger

than from policy, and this fits in

with lumpen politics.

This explains the vogue for lumpen

politics among the American New Left,

the Naxalities, and sections of the Italian

left. But such romanticising is bound to

tail, because after all the lumpen-prole-

tariat have serious political weaknesses.

And, any group on the left which bases

its politics on the lumpens is going to

tail victim to these weaknesses.

The third attitude toward lumpen

politics is to work with it while pretend-

ing it is something else. For instance,

we often work with squatters or support

'unemployed black youth' and pretend

that they are workers just like anybody

else. This attitude is understandable. But

there are real differences in street

politics, and it is necessary in our politi-

cal work to be clear about this.

We need to be clear, for instance,

about the dangers of isolation and of

bad leaders. We need to be clear that it

is going to be a great deal easier to build

a movement and an unstable periphery

organisation than a disciplined member-

ship organisation with a stable cadre. We

also need to be quite clear that lumpen

politics has more than its share of theft,

lunacy and instability. That means we

need to be disciplined ourselves.

That's where a party comes in. A

revolutionary party can also build links

between the lumpens and the working

class in a way that is otherwise impos-

sible. For you can only get people to

build these links by convincing them it

is politically important, and by having

them in a common organisation so you
develop the habit of working together.

There are dangers in lumpen politics.

But lumpen revolutionaries also have

something to contribute to them: more

stirred brethren hopelessly stuck into the

trades council minutes. There is creat-

ivity in street politics, energy, daring

and the knowledge that the state is

your enemy. The British left stands in

need of these qualities.

Jonathan Neale
Snobbery with violence

We've often talked about the forces of the state. But what is it like for socialists inside them? Socialist Review recently received the following letter from an acting sub-lieutenant in the Royal Navy.

We tell each other how hard it is to get up at 6.30 every morning as we dress, wash and race for breakfast, forgetting that thousands of workers are already at work or coming off nightshift for half our pay.

We wear the uniform of the only British armed force with an inter-continental nuclear capability, and we are responsible to the Lord High Admiral (the Queen). We have a distinguished tradition of plundering and wrecking wealth of third world countries, being the bully boys of the high seas, cornering markets all over the world and holding onto them.

Now, keeping open the trade routes for underpriced goods, paying courtesy calls to fascist dictators and racist South Africa, we are the defenders of 'democracy'. This means democracy which gives power to the same ruling class that makes up the officer elite in the armed forces. The armed forces are a microcosm of this hypocrisy, with their own legal code, their system of absolute unquestioned authority, and all the elitism and splendour isolation of the colonial days.

The day's so-called work begins with drill instruction (first rifles, then swords at £2000 each) to teach us the essential discipline of a fighting service where instant obedience may save a life or (what they never tell you) take another's. Blind discipline and hierarchy are the biggest myths which have survived the centuries of organised warfare. Tribal fighting organisations were efficient and more democratic than ours, guerrilla movements fighting against tremendous odds have staggering successes on the basis of collective action. The Russian Red Army during the revolution of 1917 was in a state of complete 'anarchy' in bourgeois terms, but highly successful politically. A democratic armed force cannot exist under capitalism where force is organised to defend or advance specific interests (mainly economic, but ultimately political) in the event of revolution. To do this successfully they need workers who will be as reliable as machines, if necessary against their own class. Reforming is therefore a psychological process as much as a physical or mental teaching of skills.

Drill and physical fitness also has the role of giving the individual a feeling of superiority over 'civilians' and adds to service morale which is vital in keeping people in the forces.

Since we are officers, the training is more 'intellectual', so we can rely on a few hours in the class room (at £0.50 an hour). Here we realise that it is the senior NCO's who really run the organisation.

Our job is to 'maintain an overview', keep discipline, make executive decisions and pretend to know the job. A ship at sea (merchant or military) is a dangerous place, and ignorance among the 'management' could make the working conditions for seamen much worse.

We are taught how to be officers first, and how to be seamen is picked up along the way. Instilled in us are a diplomatic sense for cocktail parties, good leadership for keeping the men in place and, above all, the bluff not to lose face or authority when approached on a matter of justice by a too articulate stoker. Behaviour at meals, courtesy at all times, are apparently more important than knowing your job. It is only when at sea that you find out about the tremendous hostility between 'officers and men' (or 'the lower deck' as the ratings' quarters are known).

'The navy is a society of its own where violence, male domination and racism are rampant.'

Homosexuality is illegal at sea, but in the military, especially, it is despised as 'the worst of all human failings', a 'corrupting influence' and undermining discipline. Even in shore establishments it is against naval regulations and if an officer 'discovers' the offence taking place he must have a witness and then proceed to treat the man with the utmost degradation. They must be separated, not allowed to speak or get dressed. They must be wrapped in blankets not allowed to use the toilet their clothing wrapped and sealed in polythene bags and then be medically examined.

Discipline, even in peacetime, violates all the principles of the rule of law. The accused is represented by his divisional officer, he has no access to outside legal help and may not appeal against an investigation against him. Fines, restrictions on leave and even imprisonment can be dealt out by a senior officer sometimes on very scanty evidence, merely the word of an officer against that of a rating.

Double standards pervade naval discipline and custom. An officer arriving back on board drunk is 'high spirited', while a rating is often accused of disorderly behaviour or bringing the service into disrepute. Privileges of leave, access to alcohol and accommodation are given to officers on the basis of social position or class.

This is the organisation that controls Britain's nuclear weapons. It is also a powerful instrument in international policy and economic strength. For workers, like all armed services, it provides an apparently exciting means of learning a trade and travelling in the world (some 40% of today's officers started out as ratings). It is a society of its own where violence, male domination and racism are rampant. It appears quaintly outdated while being dangerously technocratic and modern. It could almost be the forerunner of the new Tory dream society where private enterprise shapes the youth and moulds them in its own image, creating a machine hostile to the struggle for liberation in the developing countries and to a conscious self-activated working class at home.

People who say that anyone who enlist is a volunteer and therefore deserves the treatment feared that for workers in Glasgow, Newcastle, Liverpool or even Plymouth and Portsmouth the army or navy are the only escape from home and dole. For this reason hatred of officers is understandable, and from a revolutionary point of view it would be wellcome, except for the tight and unthinking ideological identification of the officer class which filters through the whole organisation. The individuals in today's Navy are the cheapest element of the defence equation, but is also the most important because they know the horror of modern warfare, the reality of cold war morganing, and are the weakest link in the chain of command which might order the release of Polaris missiles against Russian workers.

After a full lunch, we see some horror movies the Russian Red Fleet, 'threat to peace and Western civilisation' etc. It has little effect, but slowly an unease develops in the most liberal of minds about our ability to match Soviet war technology. Then comes the chilling knowledge of nuclear, biological and chemical defence. Usually the last lesson of the day means sleep for most of us, but in this case the nerve agents, blister and psycho-chemical agents which could be used against us or civilians are like a waking nightmare. We aren't told whether Britain has these, but the riot and arms seem very familiar, like the defoliants of Vietnam, later used by the Rhodesians against the liberation movements.

After an afternoon messing about in boats (for which anyone else would pay £1.50 to £6.00 an hour) the evening takes on a cultured civilised air with our mess guides and duty free cigarettes. This murderous profession seems so far away, as the real world does. Somewhere in the cigar smoke and pink gins there is a faint awareness that the holocaust we are preparing for may become a reality, but for now we are content to soak up valuable scientific and natural resources, some one day to stand against rather than for the working people who pay our wages.

16 Socialist Review
NATO
The untameable beast

'I think that being a non-nuclear member of NATO is a logical position.' Thus Tony Benn expressed his view a few months ago that NATO could be turned by a Labour government into a purely defensive alliance, not based on the bomb. It is an opinion which is likely to be shared by a good number of those who demonstrate with CND on 24 October. But, Sue Cockerill shows, it is not a valid one.

One of the greatest moments of my life was how Ernest Bevin, former TGWU general secretary and then Labour foreign secretary, described the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. He had been one of the prime movers behind NATO and its predecessor the Brussels Treaty. He went on to say, 'Today is not only the day of the signature of this pact; it is also a day of solemn thought—and, may I say, of conscription for peace and resistance to aggression.'

More than 30 years later, his sentiments find an echo on the right-wing of the Labour Party. And there are even more on the left, in CND and elsewhere, who, while they are sincerely opposed to British nuclear weapons, hesitate about adding to this the demand that Britain should leave NATO. Lying behind this is the belief that, however evil nuclear weapons are, and whatever shortcomings NATO may have, it is still in some sort of way a defence against the Russians and some sort of bastion of freedom.

However, when you look at the origins and history of NATO—at what it actually does rather than what its paid publicists say on the TV and in the press—this view cannot be sustained. The truth is that if the rulers of the USA, Britain, France, or any of the other states that are signatories to the Treaty, behave like gangsters when left to their own devices, they behave ten times worse when banded together.

The great carve up

The origins and shape of NATO are not the result of some sort of accident: they are very much a product of the Second World War. Towards the end of that conflict, when it became clear that the Nazis were going to be beaten, the leaders of the Allies met and drew up plans to carve up the world. They agreed, more or less, which bits would be subjected to which victor. The British were mostly interested in trying to hang on to their empire, the Russians wanted acceptance of their exclusive control over the areas of Eastern Europe they were conquering from the Germans, the Americans wanted as much of the world as possible to be 'free' from these other empires so that US corporations could flourish there.

For a time, these agreements worked out. The USA was quite happy to allow the USSR to have its way in Eastern Europe, setting up puppet regimes and looting whole industries. Stalin, for his part, was quite happy to accept Western control of Greece and Italy, despite the fact that in both of these places the Communist Party had led mass popular resistance to the Nazis and were overwhelmingly the strongest political forces. Indeed, he was quite happy to allow the anti-Communist Chiang Kai Shek to keep control of China, but events proved that the Chinese Communists had too much popular support to be ordered around from Moscow.

But the agreement soon started to break down. The USA emerged from the Second World War as overwhelmingly the world's most powerful economic, and thus military, state. In the last forty years, the USA accounted for roughly 75 per cent of the world's invested capital and two-thirds of its industrial capital. US troops were stationed in 56 countries and, by 1949, the USA had the use of some 400 naval and air bases worldwide.

The US government was not at all reluctant to use this economic and military power. The Truman doctrine, announced in 1947, gave notice that the USA intended to police the world and make sure that American interests remained intact. It was quickly followed by the Marshall Plan, which made economic aid dependent upon political good behaviour. Thus, just before the Italian general election of 1948, General Marshall declared that 'Benefits under the European Recovery Programme will come to an abrupt end in any country that votes Communism to power.

Military the USA provided aid, and often direct intervention, to numerous of its satellite-governments—from the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Guatemala in 1954 because it threatened the interests of the United Fruit Company, through to support for the Junta in El Salvador today.

NATO was part of this strategy. It bound Western Europe and the USA together very closely and, because of the overwhelming economic and military preponderance of the USA, was from its inception an arm of US foreign policy. It also, of course, suited the ruling classes of Western Europe. While they might fall out sometimes—as when the USA refused to support Britain and France over the Suez adventure in 1956—they were in general quite happy to go along with the USA and pick up what profits they could on the side.

A record of aggression

Thus NATO was not set up in response to some sort of Russian 'aggression'. Whatever crimes the Russians might have committed in Eastern Europe—and they have been as many and as bloody as those of the USA—NATO was never a gathering of threatened innocents banding together against a ruthless foe. Indeed, the Warsaw Pact itself was only set up years later, in 1955, as a response to NATO's decision to re-arm West Germany and admit it to NATO.

If we look a bit closer at the actual history of NATO, its claims to be the sole defender of freedom and democracy look very thin indeed. While NATO itself has never actually been caught intervening anywhere, it has gone on record as supporting interventions by its members.

Thus in December 1952, the NATO Council declared its support for the French colonial war in Vietnam. It expressed:

'Profound admiration for the courageous struggle being waged indefatigably
by French forces and the armies of allied states against Communist aggression. The campaign being led by the French Union in Indochina deserves the unrestricted support of the Atlantic governments.

And when the "indomitable" French were finally routed, it was the USA, that other pillar of freedom, which stepped in to take their place.

Whatever fine phrases about 'freedom and democracy' NATO hacks might spout, these have never been conditions for membership of the club. Portugal under the fascist dictatorship of Salazar and Caetano was a valued member of this club and could wage its bloody African wars armed to the teeth with NATO-made weapons.

Many Greeks believe that NATO was one of the prime movers behind the military coup which brought the Colonels to power in 1967; whatever the truth of this might be, the fact that a democratic government had been overthrown and replaced by a brutal military dictatorship was never the slightest obstacle to Greek membership of NATO.

More recently, NATO could hardly contain its delight at the military takeover in that other member of the freedom club - Turkey. One NATO officer in Turkey said, 'The prospect of worsening strife had us worried. Something had to be done.' Major-General Philip Kaplan, NATO Deputy Land Commander in Turkey, commented, 'There is a lot of land here, and I want a lot of soldiers who can kill.'

The case of Turkey illustrates the way NATO sees the world. It is the home of many US military installations and shares a land border with the USSR. Between 1975 and 1978, differences with the USA over the Turkish invasion of Cyprus led to the closure of the US bases by the Turkish government. At a stroke, the USA lost a naval station, an important air base, and monitoring facilities providing roughly one quarter of all US military intelligence on Russian missile launches.

In the judgement of NATO leaders, such facilities are much more important than minor little matters like the overthrow of an elected government by the army, the total suppression of political and trade union activity, mass arrests, torture and large scale killings of left-wingers.

### Manipulating opinion

The supposed existence of a 'Russian menace' is very convenient for NATO leaders in their own home countries as well as abroad. NATO and its supporters have always been quick to label any left-wing movements as Russian-inspired, and today they argue that even as moderate an organisation as CND is, wittingly or unwittingly, a tool of Russian propaganda, a weapon of Russian subversion, and probably riddled with full-time or part-time KGB agents.

But when it comes to manipulating public opinion for dubious political ends, it turns out that NATO is a past master at the art. For instance, last year it was revealed that NATO funded a group of 'moderates' inside the Labour Party, giving them between £8,000 and £7,000 a year to run a body called the 'Labour Committee for Transatlantic Understanding'. Through its offshoot the 'Labour and Trade Union Press Service', this small front organisation distributes a monthly collection of articles for free use by newspapers and trade union journals.

Among those on the Committee who are only too willing to lend their names as fig-leaves for the military hard-men are Roy Mason, Roy Hattem, Frank Chappelle, Terry Duffy, Bill Sim, and Sidney Weighell. These political heirs of Ernest Bevin are the true fellow-travellers: the money they spend comes from an organisation which revels in the fact that Turkish workers can expect to be shot down if they go on strike.

The joint director of this press service is an interesting man called Alan Lee Williams. He is also involved in the proposed Council for Arms Control. In the New Statesman of 28 August this year, Duncan Campbell argued that the aim of this body was:

> 'To win moral support for NATO's so-called Arms Control Proposals which were launched at the same time as the decision to install new Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe in December 1979.'

Alan Lee Williams has a history. He is a recent recruit to the Social Democrats but was a Labour MP from 1966 to 1979. He was parliamentary private secretary to Denis Healey and Roy Mason. He has been national organiser for the European Movement, director of the British Atlantic Committee and became director general of the English Speaking Union in 1979. He also strongly supported American policy in Vietnam, and was secretary of the Anglo-Vietnamese Friendship Committee in the late 1960's.

One country which has always claimed to support the sort of freedom and democracy which NATO has always admired is South Africa. Of course, it would give the game away if NATO were to publicly admit as much, and they have always denied having any links with that barbarous regime. But NATO member Britain has a long-standing agreement with South Africa - the Simonstown Agreement - for joint naval cooperation and British use of all South African naval bases in time of war. And NATO members France and Germany have joined Britain in supplying arms to South Africa. NATO explains all of this away by saying that it has no control over what its members do on a bilateral basis with South Africa.

Even this miserable logic-chopping has been exposed. In June 1975, documents were produced at the UN showing that construction of the Advekaart military communications system by South Africa depended on co-operation with firms in West Germany, Britain, France, Denmark and Holland.

The NATO system of coding equipment and spares had been made available to the South Africans. NATO confirmed that this was the case but continued to deny any involvement, claiming that the codes were an 'open system' available to various 'neutral' states - namely South Africa, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand. No explanation was given as to why, in previous investigations, South African access to these coding forms had not been revealed, nor as to who had authorised such disclosure.

The Advekaart system itself, based at Silvermine near Simonstown, has the ability to maintain surveillance from South Africa's coastline across the South Atlantic to South America and across the Indian Ocean to Australia and New Zealand. Its northernmost point of operation in the Atlantic is the Tropic of Cancer. By a curious coincidence, this is also the southernmost border of NATO's statutory area.
The system was constructed at the same time as NATO was developing an increasing interest in the South Atlantic. In June 1973, the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, was asked by NATO's Defence Planning Committee to prepare plans for the defence of the Cape Sea routes, and a resolution was adopted at the May 1973 Council of the Atlantic Treaty Association which showed the same concern about naval cooperation in the area.

So far, attempts to set up a formal South Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which would perform depend heavily on such havens of freedom and democracy as South Africa and Argentina, have not been successful. NATO, however, is only too eager to play midwife at the birth of this new monster.

**A nuclear alliance**

Last November, a planned reception for South African MPs and 'homeland leaders' at the NATO HQ in Brussels was cancelled at the last minute, apparently because of the bad publicity given the week before a meeting between NATO secretary general Luns and the South African foreign minister. According to Anti-Apartheid, this was the third such meeting that has taken place recently.

According to this same Joseph Luns, the current NATO contingency plans for the defence of the Cape oil routes have been made 'without having any contact with the countries of Southern Africa, or indeed of Africa'. Just how this incredible feat of military planning might have been achieved he did not say, and this has led some to speculate that he might not have been telling the truth. The Cape Times, for instance, quoted his statement on 17 December 1980, and added that:

'The acknowledgement that the Cape route is included in NATO's preparedness plans appears as the first official admission that something like a military clique will cover parts of South Africa. An informal understanding appears to have been achieved between NATO and South Africa.'

Margaret Thatcher, too, has been pushing for the same sort of thing. She argued for expanding NATO's sphere of operations outside of Europe:

'I do think that it is time to see whether NATO should extend its sphere of influence. There are times when your front line may be way beyond NATO. I do think that's something we need to look at, because raw material lines are absolutely vital to the capability to defend yourself.'

All that she is doing is putting on a public record what has always been the reality of NATO: it has nothing to do with countering some Russian threat and everything to do with holding on to the profits which flow along trade routes.

Any examination of the birth and history of NATO show only too clearly that it is neither a defensive security pact nor any organisation wedded to freedom and democracy. Those who argue, like Tony Benn, that it is possible to tinker around with NATO, for Britain to unilaterally renounce nuclear weapons and remain a member of NATO, are ignoring reality.

NATO's military thinking has always been based on the idea that at some point the use of nuclear weapons would occur in a war in Europe, irrespective of whether particular members of NATO themselves possess their own devices. Since the decision to introduce Cruise missiles, this strategy has been refined to the point where one member of NATO, the USA, hopes to fire a nuclear war in Europe, and itself emerge unscathed. Membership of NATO, with or without a nuclear bomb of one's own means acquiescence in this strategy.

Nordic is a case in point.

That country is a member of NATO, but claims to refuse to have nuclear weapons on its soil. But just because it is a member of NATO, US F-111 fighter bombers regularly fly in and out of Bodoe air base, just north of the Arctic Circle and perhaps twenty minutes' flying time from the Russian military installations around Murmansk. The F-111 is capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Does anyone seriously believe that those F-111's, doubtless conventionally armed in their practices today, will not be carrying nuclear weapons if they do it for real? And nobody can possibly believe that this thought has not occurred to Russian strategists, and that therefore Bodoe is not on some Russian target list for a nuclear strike.

This is the reality behind 'non-nuclear' Norway's membership of NATO. It would be no different in Britain.

Military alliances between the various groups of robbers who run different national states cannot lead to peace. The most effective force for peace in Europe today is Solidarity in Poland, and that is based on the working class. Only that power, developing internationally, can hope to end the threat of nuclear war.

Both NATO and the Warsaw Pact are there to defend the existing order against the working class in all countries. The military power of the Warsaw Pact has been used to smash opposition in Eastern Europe, not to march to the Channel. The military power of NATO countries has been used to smash anyone who dares challenge Western capitalism, not to fight Russians. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are mirror images of each other. It is only by resolute opposition to both of these juggernauts that we can hope for peace.

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**CND: PLAYING TO WIN**

CND has merged as a mass movement in the last year. Membership now stands at 25,000 but more than ten times that number have been involved in anti-nuclear activities. The 24 October demonstration looks like being highly successful. But what happens then? Jane Ure Smith looks at some of the options.

Inevitably there will be a pull after the 24 October demonstration. It is unlikely that the phenomenal growth will continue of its own accord. And at the national conference some three weeks later clear policy decisions will have to be taken as to how best to drive the campaign forward and how best to continue to build support.

More importantly the conference—and the organisation as a whole—will have to confront the question up to now largely ignored by CND, namely the question of how to win. The activists' conference which took place last May revealed that the leadership have no coherent strategy to advance. They are wary of being 'political' and want to proceed over a broad-based organisation, but the means by which they think we can stop Cruise, stop Trident and disarm Britain unilaterally are far from clear.

For a large number of people in CND, the solution lies with the Labour Party. If, on the Labour government elected on an unilateralist platform could be prevented from backtracking...
appointed one might add, by Michael Foot. Along with his four defence underlings he called, before the TUC, for union leaders to oppose the NEC proposal that a future Labour government should cut Britain's defence spending back to the average amount spent by other NATO countries. The idea that a disarmed Britain would be safe from nuclear attack was 'nonsense' he said. And to close down American bases in Britain would run the NATO Alliance! No wonder he walked out of the defence debate at Brighton.

I suppose it is just conceivably that Brynmor John might experience some kind of dramatic 'road to Damascus' conversion, but in the absence of such an event we are left with a defence spokesman whose only function must be to sabotage Labour conference policy and the struggle for nuclear disarmament in general.

Clearly the Labour Party does not provide a very convincing solution to the how to win problem. Too much faith was placed in the Labour Party by CND last time round.

Preparing to win

I suspect the leadership of CND would agree with me on this point, but for quite different reasons. (It does not stop them, incidentally, from being totally unrealistic of Foot's indecisiveness.) While we in the SWP argue that the Labour Party in government can only be kept on the straight and narrow by a mass movement firmly rooted in the workplace, CND objects to focusing the campaign on one political party.

Their alternative is to woo supposedly anti-bomb individuals in all the parliamentary parties, including even Social Democrats and Tories. Surely if we agree that the Labour Party is unlikely to deliver the goods, how much stronger when it comes to the crunch are the class allegiances of Tories and SDPs propelling them back into the arms of the bomb-lovers?

Preparing to win is now an urgent matter. The establishment—the bosses of big business, the civil service and the media—are all fully committed to the bomb. They are ready to usher in the first of 160 Cruise missiles in 1983. They are eager—albeit with divisions within their ranks—to substitute Trident for Polaris. In addition it is unlikely that US defence secretary Weinberger has yet given up hope of winning Thatcher and the British defence establishment over to the idea of including the odd neutron bomb in their Rheinland arsenal.

These people are the enemy of CND, a powerful enemy indeed, and an enemy which we cannot do other than confront if we are to win.

Massive demonstrations will not be enough to stop Cruise missiles being transferred through leafy Berkshire. Direct action will not be enough, though it has its place. The only way we have a hope in hell of stopping the missiles is if thousands of workers are prepared to take industrial action.

That means that building in the workplace and in the trade unions must become the major priority for CND. This was a major omission last time round. A good many union conferences voted for unilateralism this year—the ISTC, USDAW, CPSA, and NALGO amongst them—as did the TUC. But that is simply a question of resolutions at the top. The work still has to be done amongst the rank and file.

The small number of workplace groups that have been set up show the way forward. Active campaigning on the part of Fleet Street CND, for example, produced a vote for unilateralism when Natsopa balloted its membership. Since a ballot at the same time on the question of the deputy leadership of the Labour Party went against them, we can assume the unilateralist result was by no means a foregone conclusion. It shows the effectiveness of leafletting and argument.

As well as building in the workplace we must also try to draw in those fighting back against unemployment, the other major problem facing us. The link must constantly be made between the billions of pounds squandered on nuclear weapons and the millions of people who have been forced on to the dole. Unemployment and the disarmament issue are simply two sides of the same coin; we must bring them together under the slogan 'Jobs not Bombs', actively supporting the struggle of the unemployed as well as trying to involve them in the fight against the bomb.

Finally our how-to-win strategy must involve far sharper political argument. We are for unilateral disarmament. It has been CND policy for years. But you might be forgiven for thinking otherwise, since CND constantly advertises literature and activities, and includes on its platforms, speakers from the multilateral World Disarmament Campaign.

We have lived with 'multilateralism' practically ever since Hiroshima: one set of high-level talks after another on 'limiting' the arms race. Yet more and more deadly weapons are produced. These kinds of negotiations are a meaningless facade. If we are going to start campaigning for multilateralism we might as well invite Ronald Reagan to join CND.

Secondly there is the question of NATO. It is not really taken very seriously by CND. Virtually no literature dealing substantially with NATO in pamphlet form is published by CND. There is one leaflet which refers to a pamphlet which is no longer available. In Sanity and on placards NATO rarely gets a mention. All year Labour CND have carefully avoided pushing an anti-NATO line in the Labour Party. They reaped the rewards of their tentative approach at Brighton in the overwhelming pro-NATO vote.

Unilateralism

It is high time we campaigned loudly and clearly for British withdrawal. We must argue that getting out of NATO is an essential component of unilateral disarmament. Many people point to countries like Norway and Canada—as did Joan Lester in her summation at the Labour Party Conference—countries which do not have nuclear weapons but which retain membership of NATO. They assume that these countries would be out of the firing line in the event of a nuclear war.

This is nonsense. If you belong to NATO one way or another you must play the game. NATO is a nuclear alliance, and if you don't have missiles you must still do you bit by providing early warning systems, and the like. This is exactly the case with Canada and Norway. What's more NATO is a nuclear alliance whose function is to defend the interests of the ruling class in the West, a function usually referred to as 'defence of the free world'. Similarly the Warsaw Pact exists to defend the interests of the Russian establishment. We must argue that an alliance which serves the interests of the bosses can never serve the interests of ordinary working people. There are no half measures—we must get out of NATO altogether.

The campaign against the bomb in the early sixties was, for a time, a magnificent struggle, but in the end it failed. We must learn the lessons of that failure since we cannot afford to let CND fail a second time. That means taking stock of where we are going, publicly thrashing out the arguments, and adopting a coherent strategy geared above all to winning. That strategy must entail building in the workplace, linking up with the fight against unemployment, political clarity and above all non-reliance on Labour.

The establishment—the bosses of big business, the civil service and the media are all firmly committed to the bomb.
Isherwood: the sensitive Englishman

The British Empire was run by a small group of administrators and public servants. The number of universities was small and they were linked to public schools. The Eton-Oxford connection still rules us. But in the pre-WWII years, this connection was more distant and the recruiting grounds more restricted than today. Oxford in the 20s provided the rulers of the Empire, and a particularly boastful and uncivilised crowd they were. Brutalised by the public school system, they sewed their wild oats while at university—a world of rugger and booze, cruelty and pranks.

However in this school of yokos there had always been a small counter-current. This was made up of the sensitive 'artists' and 'aesthetes', who reacted against the philistines that ran society and 'ran' the arts. They were sensitive, fashionable and often homosexual or bisexual. Oscar Wilde in the 1880s and the Bloomsbury group around the First World War can be seen as products of this alternative scene.

It was also from this scene in the 20s that Isherwood and the fellow travellers of the 30s emerged. Reacting against the upper-class yokos, Isherwood, Auden, Spender, Upward and others formed a cultural clique that dominated the English scene for a decade. They 'ran' English culture.

It was such a small clique that it is difficult to understand the importance that they were able to have. Isherwood in particular became a cult figure (like say, Stephen Strange today). Not only were his novels important, but his languid dress style of casual Oxford bags, and his left-wing politics. He was the sensitive Englishman of the 30s.

Isherwood hated the English upper-middle-class of which he was part. In particular he hated its hypocrisy and fear of sex. He was gay and proud of it. Sex was important to him. He was always boastingly promiscuous, and as soon as he could, he left oppressive England to live in Berlin in 1930, the then gay capital of the world.

Germany was in the midst of political and social upheaval that ended with the rise of Hitler in 1933. From 1930 to 1933, Isherwood commuted between Britain and Berlin, witnessing the rise of the Nazi party, going to the gay bars, involved in the gay movement (he actually stayed at the Magnus Hirschfeld Institute in Berlin, the centre of the gay sex-pol scene), and increasingly became associated with the Communist Party.

It is from this experience that Isherwood's two most famous novels came—Mr Norris changes Trains (published 1935) and Goodbye to Berlin (1939)—which form the basis of the film Cabaret. The film is very much a watering down of the books, themselves evocations of reality. For example, the character Sally Bowles (played by Liza Minnelli) was in real life a CP member who later went to Spain.

In 1978 Christopher and his kind was published, which is a rewrite of the period with Isherwood's homosexuality as the subject.

As a writer Isherwood developed the 'I am a camera' method. This excludes the writer from the story, so that the world is viewed as if the writer were a camera merely recording the events, excluding as much subjectivity as possible. Though Isherwood's politics later changed, his detachment has remained in his books, and you never get to know the writer. In Christopher and his kind Isherwood speaks of himself as if he were another person—Christopher did this, or Christopher did that.

The technique makes for straightforward easy to read novels, but they are a bit shallow. It also allowed Isherwood to cop out on his homosexuality—though in his private life he was open and bussed of his gayness, he never publicly made a stand. In excluding his feelings from the novels he excluded his sexuality. He was critical of the CP's Stalinist switch in 1934 to anti-gay propaganda, but he never voiced these criticisms publicly (as opposed to Gide, for example). Guilt of being upper-middle class mingled with guilt of being gay.

In Berlin Isherwood met a German called Heinz, with whom he lived until 1936. After the rise of Hitler he and Heinz spent the next five years fighting across Europe trying to find a haven for Heinz who was wanted by the Nazis for avoiding national service. Britain refused to allow Heinz into the country after searching Heinz's bag at immigration control and discovering love letters from Isherwood. In the end the search for a haven ended in failure; Heinz was deported to Germany and into the army. Isherwood never forgave Britain for this, and he also became disillusioned with the CP's attitude to homosexuality. He writes of himself in Christopher and his kind that:

'He (he is referring to himself) now realised he must dissociate himself from the Communists, even as a fellow-traveller... He must never again give way to embarrassment (of being gay), never deny the rights of his tribe, never apologise for its existence, never think of sacrificing himself masochistically on the altar of the false god. Of this change of attitude (to the CP) he was embarrassed by its basic cause, his homosexuality. As a homosexual, he had been wavering between embarrassment and defiance.'

In 1938 Isherwood, with W H Auden, left Europe for America to become a pacifist and mystic.

Isherwood is still alive today in California living the life of a literary academic. He has written over 20 books, yet his Berlin writings remain the most famous. This I think is not because of their brilliance but because of their subject matter. He lived and knew the sex-pol movement, the gay bars, the social and political upheaval that was Berlin in the 20s and 30s. Few, if any, records of that remain, and Isherwood catches the mood.

Isherwood and Auden's defection to America on the eve of the war, renouncing their last decade of activity, discredited the 30s movement. From being the height of fashion in England they were shunned and attacked as shallow and traitors (Orwell, particularly hated them). It has only been since the success of Cabaret and the re-birth of the gay-movement that Isherwood has become re-established. His books are now nearly all available again. And they are certainly worth a read. I don't think he can be called a great writer but he is an easy to read and good one, and the period is fascinating.
Comparisons of the Stock Market with a casino are not far off the mark. Millions of pounds can be won or lost in the course of a few hours. Unscrupulous operators like Jim Slater (now back in the game despite being caught fiddling in 1975) and Peter Walker (now in the Tory cabinet) can make fortunes just by buying up old companies, sacking the workers and flogging off the real estate.

Yet the health of the casino is not immune to the diseases of the outside world—and as those diseases have proved to be more contagious and resistant to cure than expected, the gamblers have become a very nervous bunch indeed.

In the year up to August 1981, stock markets around the world rose almost regardless of the state of the real economy. Investors were confident that right-wing austerity or monetarist policies would do the trick. Wages were falling, unions were in retreat, and all seemed ready for a profitable ‘investment-led’ recovery. Now the illusions that monetarism could work (even for the ruling class) have been dramatically exposed.

In the two weeks after 14 September stock markets around the world collapsed (Graph 1). In London the fall of 14.2% was a record for such a short time. Even the Tokyo market had its biggest fall on record.

Once such a collapse starts it spreads rapidly. Everyone wants to sell and no one wants to buy. Once started, like the now infamous ‘Sniper’, Joe Granville, can cause a panic. Eventually (and it had started to happen as this was being written) the more sober partners, especially the big institutional investors, step in and buy up shares on the cheap.

But not all of the fall this time has been speculative. Much of it indicates that the slump, and with it low levels of profitability, is going to persist.

What is the stock market? How important is it to the rest of the economy? Is it the collapse like that of 1929? Does it herald an even deeper slump, or is it just a symptom of what’s already occurred?

The stock exchange is a collection of financial markets. It involves the buying and selling of claims to ownership of the means of production and to a share of the total surplus in the economy (or what Marx termed surplus value produced by the workers). Profits can be made quickly (by speculating on the rise or fall of share values) or slowly (by sitting back and waiting for the dividends or interest payments to flow in. In the end it all comes down to a lot of parasites doing very nicely at the expense of the rest of us.

Three main sorts of transaction take place:

1. The issue of new shares by companies to raise extra cash. But this has been declining in importance since the mid-1960s (see Table 2).

2. In years when the value of shares falls rapidly, as in 1974, companies find it impossible to raise money by this means, and are forced to rely on the banks. Whereas shares are titles of ownership, and get a return or dividend only when the company is in profit, bank loans have to be paid back over a shorter time and regardless of the health of the firm.

3. The sale of gilt-edged stock by the government to raise cash. These sales help the state to bridge the gap between taxes and spending. In recent years they have been enormous, at around £7 million annually. Gilt-edged stock carries a fixed yield or return. If the financial investors refuse to buy this stock they can force down its price on the market, and force up the rate of return or interest they get on such stocks. That’s been happening all over the world, pushing up interest rates generally. Finance capital’s gain—we eventually pay through higher taxation.

The second-hand market in stocks and shares. It is this market which hits the headlines. The FT share index, the Dow-Jones Average (for New York) etc all summarise the rise and fall in the second-hand value of existing shares. Shares in a company can fluctuate wildly regardless of the company’s actual performance. But the price of its shares does matter to a company. If prices are high so is the company’s credit rating and its ability to obtain new money from all sources. If prices are low the company becomes vulnerable to takeover.

Table 1 shows the power of the financial institutions on the stock market. The individual investor is a declining breed (although there are still some very wealthy share-owners about). Putting money into the building society or the bank earns a smaller return in times of boom, but is a lot safer in times of slump.

There is a myth that the rise of the pension funds, and insurance companies means that we are all capitalists now. In practice workers have no real say over these funds which are often controlled by merchant banks in the City. Indeed workers are losing out as the value of pensions in particular fails to keep up with inflation. In effect the funds have become a device for channelling a portion of wages into propping up British capitalism.

Once inflation is taken into account, it becomes clear that stock markets have been in a bad way since the early 1970s. As Graph 2 shows clearly, in Britain share prices have never really recovered since the collapse of 1974 (after the miners brought down the Tory government). Or as the Economist commented on the US situation:

Table 1
Who Owns the Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership of Shares (%)</th>
<th>Net Purchases (+) or Sales (-) by Sector 1976-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insurance Companies</td>
<td>£3.082.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment and Unit Trusts</td>
<td>£ 179.2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pension Funds</td>
<td>£5.365.0 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Institutions (including Overseas)</td>
<td>Not Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>£3.320.0 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Total Value of Shares £86,000 million)

NOTE — 1% of the population owns 80% of individually owned shares.

Source: Financial Times 24th September 1981
People are right to say that a Wall Street crash will not now bring world slump because the Wall Street crash has occurred already. The Dow at around 850 is only 2 1/2 times 1929's peak of 381 for an economy with a money GNP now 28 times larger, so the Dow could already be called more than nineteen-tenths undervalued compared with then (26 September)

That probably underestimates the impact of the current collapse, but the essential point is correct. The long-term decline in the profitability of industrial capital in particular, has meant low dividends and a high degree of risk from buying shares. When interest rates are high a lot more money can be made by investing in gold, or bonds or building societies, or property.

In Britain share prices were weakening well before the September collapse for an additional reason. Since the lifing of exchange controls in October 1979, and with the scale of the slump since the summer of 1980, money has poured out of the country. (Graph 1) The share of pension fund money going overseas has risen from 5% to 15% in the first half of 1981. For insurance companies it has gone from 4% to 17%. Investment and unit trusts have actually reduced their holdings in British companies.

The main factor behind the worldwide fall in share values in September was the state of the US economy. High interest rates in the United States have forced up interest rates around the world.

High interest rates affect the value of shares in two ways:
1. They make the return on government stock, bank deposits etc higher as well as safer than the return on shares in industrial companies.
2. They increase the cost of borrowing from the banks for both individuals and companies. When rates of interest are higher than the rate of profit on investment in new factories or machinery, investment rates will naturally plummet.

In Britain the more far-sighted capitalists have put their money on the financial markets rather than invest it in new physical assets. Arnold Werneck's GEC, the firm Thatcher always likes to quote, did just that with its £500 million cash surplus last year, and did very well as a result.

The fall on the London stock exchange followed that on Wall Street. But it also followed three connected events in Britain.

There was Thatcher's cabinet reshuffle, a clear statement that there would be no U-turn. Then came the forcing up of interest rates by two points to 15% and stop the outflow of funds which was causing the value of the pound to fall. High interest rates hit industrial capital which is in severe trouble anyway.

Thirdly, a series of forecasts and surveys showed that no recovery was in sight, that profits apart from North Sea oil had fallen by 15-20% in the last year, and that the real rate of return on industrial capital was at its lowest level ever.

The fall in the stock markets is much more a symptom of the crisis than its cause. It is not comparable to the 1929 crash when stock markets were vastly over-inflated anyway. But it does show that all talk of an early recovery is so much hot air. It will add to the pressures forcing down investment levels (investment in manufacturing fell by 8% in 1980 and another 13% in the first half of 1981). Unemployment will go on rising towards the four million mark in Britain.

The only answer the Thatcherite cabinet is forced to admit to the workers is even harder with 4% wage limits (ie real wage cuts of 8% at the current inflation rate) and even starker cuts in the welfare state. But as the last few months have shown even the bankers and stockbrokers are losing confidence that will save them.

Table 2
Main Sources of Working Capital—Industrial & Commercial Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Retained Profits (% of total)</th>
<th>Sale of Shares</th>
<th>The Banks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>67.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>75.4%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Financial Statistics May 1981 Table 9.7
(Note: excludes Nationalised Industries and State Subsidies to Industry)
Alternative paper—or paper alternative?

It seems that there is hardly a dispute anywhere these days which doesn’t produce some discussion about the possibility of “setting up a co-operative”. Journalists, more than almost any other group of workers, are attracted by the prospect of going alone, liberated from the bosses and free to produce the sort of publications they’ve always wanted to work for. In the last few years there have been several attempts at alternative/co-operative papers and with many more redundancies threatened in the industry, there are likely to be more.

Most ventures have started because of disputes which either ended in defeat or looked too difficult to win.

The Nottingham News was started in 1978 during the national pay strike by provincial journalists. A group of 28 NUJ members at the Nottingham Evening Post were sacked when they joined the strike—having warned the union leadership that once outside the doors they’d almost certainly not get back without a fight. Evening Post proprietor Christopher Pole-Carew had already succeeded in muscling the much more powerful printers’ union NGA by bringing in new technology. The NUJ was the last openly organised trade union in his company. It would have taken a massive campaign of picketing, solidarity action and blacking to get the 28 reinstated. But after eight weeks strike, the rest of the membership nationally sacked and went back to work—on the advice and instruction of the NUJ leadership—leaving Nottingham on their own.

The Nottingham strikers began producing a weekly paper as a strike weapon and a means of keeping the members together. But the Nottingham News came to be seen as a way of putting back at Pole-Carew by building an alternative to his scaled-down production. It has kept going—but only just, with the union still paying the wages of the journalists. It has been a hard battle to keep it alive, despite the enthusiasm and dedication.

The East End News was launched after a long battle for trade union rights at the Stratford Express Group. A series of strikes over a number of years eventually wore down a once-strong NUJ chapel. The East End News, a relatively new but popular weekly, was closed down, leaving the East London Advertiser—staffed by all NUJ unions—labour—with a monopoly in Tower Hamlets.

Uncertain future

Not long after a promising start for the News, the ELA management—who had taken over the Stratford Express Group—started undercutting on advertising in a vicious attempt to kill its rival. The News survives, but money is hard to come by and the future uncertain.

The latest alternative paper—about to be launched onto the scene—is City Limits, produced by the former staff of Time Out, the London listings magazine.

Journalists—and print union members—went on strike in May when Time Out’s owner Tony Elliott tried to end their unique pay parity agreement. Joint action between the NUJ, NGA and SOGAT meant that blacking was immediate, and Time Out was stopped straight away.

But 15 weeks into the strike, the chapel voted to abandon the fight and set up their own rival magazine.

At the Camden Journal we too were presented with the choice between fighting closure and launching our own paper—by the management. If we would go quietly, they were prepared to let us have the title for £1, they said.

Was this an act of good will by a forward-looking management reluctantly forced to make nine redundancies at Christmas? Not. It was an attempt to divide us and make it more difficult to win solidarity support—without a doubt!

For a start, the redundancy terms they offered—the bare minimum of £240 for the majority—would hardly have turned us into press barons overnight! We knew from the start that our management had no particular concern for our welfare. Nor had the ring of staff members communicated. And if we were cynical then, the confusion their ‘offer’ caused in the following weeks was more than borne out.

“Why don’t you go and run it yourselves?” Let’s look at the realities of running a paper of your own.

On your side you have the commitment, the dedication, expertise and a desire to provide people with an honest, progressive publication. A bit like going into a darts tournament with a perfect aim and no arrows.

What they’ve got is the capital—the money and the resources. Most newspaper proprietors own vast amounts of expensive machinery and plant—paid for with the profits from our labour over the years. When the going gets a bit tough in a recession are we going to walk away and let them have all that for themselves, while we struggle to maintain our alternatives?

Many of them have other interests and are prepared to maintain loss-making newspapers as valuable propaganda weapons. Co-operatives have to make enough money to be self-sustaining. So how long is it going to be before the need to attract advertisers begins to affect editorial content? What about costly distribution, and all the expensive promotions needed to establish a steady circulation? How do you stop principles being sacrificed because of absolute necessity of making money to stay in business?

Setting a trend

But aside from the viability, there are other factors to consider. Our management would have welcomed our taking over the Camden Journal to remove a number of union activists from the arena (seven of those sacked held chapel, branch or council positions).

Setting up co-operatives doesn’t just weaken our strength and ability to challenge management, it sets a trend. Every time one group of workers succeeds to get it all done, it makes it much more difficult for the next group to argue for jobs and win support in their fight.

And in newspapers, there is the question of press freedom. Who is going to challenge biased reporting, racism, and fight for the right to reply if our organisation is weakened? Some years ago, the Camden Evening Journal chapel was among the first to take industrial action over a National Front advertisement. A ban followed the action and it has been taken up in other places. Are poorly financed, struggling co-operatives—however good the finished product—an effective challenge to the right wing mass media?

Tony Elliott: Back in business
24 Socialist Review
**Labour: the easy alternative**

The consequence of the rise of Bennism in Britain, that affiliation to the Labour Party is now being more pressure-consumed in a manner of white-collar public sector unionism than ever before. We have had a fairly regular appearance and was last discussed one and a half years ago at conference when it was defeated. But NALGO, the fourth largest union in Britain, has actually got as far as a suspension at its most recent conference to limit affiliation. In the teaching unions (NUT and NUTS) and lecturers' union, the question of affiliation has broken fresh ground: fringe meetings, organised by elements of the Broad Left at both conferences this year, for the first time devoted themselves exclusively to the advantages of affiliation.

It is not surprising that when public sector unions have never had a tradition of affiliation, they were also late in coming to affiliation. The TUC and NALGO, for example, affiliated to the TUC only in 1964, though the questionnaire was asked in 1947 to the teaching unions also affiliated in the 50s. The NALGO strike was fire prevented as a result of TUC legislation following the 1926 General Strike. This for the majority of employees' unions joining the TUC and only reopened by the post-war Labour government.

So, in all these unions the tradition has been one of insularity rather than of politics. That was only overcome by developments in the 50s and 60s which made it necessary for these unions to take industrial action, or seek advances in pay and conditions. Affiliation to the TUC was part of that process, though the arguments given in favour were not always the most progressive.

Affiliation to the Labour Party, however, is obviously much more political, much more associated with the left of the movement opposed to TUC affiliation at the time was over the TUC's links with the Labour Party. The right are consequently much more firmly opposed on the grounds that what's their own personal conditions, Labour Party membership cannot be imposed on many thousands of workers who are political and/or trade unionists. However, as with affiliation to the TUC, the right could live with affiliation to the Party or the NALGO for the sake of their right to work; if the Labour Party is not committed to pursuing a programme of class struggle, to struggle against the employer, to struggle against the system, to struggle for a better world.

But, whatever the practical consequences, the theoretical argument in favour of affiliation is quite simple: by affiliating we link the industrial side of the union movement to the political side, help to secure progressive policies in the Labour Party and at the same time ensure that the next Labour government will restore the cuts imposed by the Tories.

The argument is full of flaws. When the union leadership it's quite incapable of cutting and re-building its activities, and it's also impossible to make sure that affiliation to some other body will make a difference.

The supporters of affiliation claim that the next Labour government will not have the organising record of its predecessor because the Labour Party is becoming decentralised. Next time, it is hoped, the leaders will be held to account, and the influence of the union will be worthwhile to be affiliated so that we can determine that policy.

This assumption that rank and file control over the Labour Party conveniently forgets one thing: that we would be able to have complete control over whoever was elected by the union to Labour Party branches. And they come back to the idea that we have the control of the union through rank and file, struggle through election of the right kind of progressive leaders.

But in the present downturn in activity, with left leaders, as much as the right, being incapable of delivering the goods, the prospect of heaven tomorrow is an easy alternative to fighting the hell today that is Thatcher's demolition job on the public sector.
INDUSTRIAL DISCUSSION SECTION.

bulletin; and Michael Foot and Tony Benn will be sending messages of support. CNALP is aiming for a big campaign, quite explicitly linking the fight against cuts to the fight for affiliation. But actual struggles briefly get a mention (the Liverpool typists' struggle is referred to in only one of the 13 recommendations for a campaign strategy) and whether CNALP will have much to say about actual Labour-led opposition to the cuts (such as the strike of Lothian council's collapse in the face of Tory attack) remains to be seen.

The irony is that this 'big campaign' (and it will have to be big to convince NALGO members of the wisdom of affiliation) is in the nature of the operation going to be a very bureaucratic affair. CNALP is concentrating on the official machinery of the union and bending over backwards to involve the pro-affiliation section of the NEC, called FLAG, for Labour Affiliation Group. Necessarily that means playing down anything that emphasises conflict between the leadership and the rank and file of the union.

In the NUT the push for affiliation is coming from the STA Socialist Teachers Alliance, a grouping that facilitates two rank and file politics and broadsheet. At this year's NUT conference the newly revived Socialist Education Association called a fringe meeting to discuss why the NUT should be in the Labour Party.

Present as principal speaker (alongside a leading STA activist) was a former president and executive member from Birmingham, that is to say, a member of the very same executive that has witch-hunted militants and association officers willing to lead fights against the cuts.

In fact the NUT executive has not discussed the issue and is in general hostile to any political issues being raised in the union such as affiliation to CND or the Right to Work Campaign. As one NUT members to conference and concerned, despite STA efforts, affiliation did not figure among the first fifty, which scarcely indicates a high priority among the membership.

Our attitude

What should be the attitude of revolutionaries be towards affiliation? The most tempting answer might be to oppose. The Labour Party, whatever its pretensions, is a party of capitalist government which invariably finishes by seeking to impose lower wages and worse conditions on working class people when in office. Even supposedly 'red' Labour unions, such as Lambeth or Lothian, have caved in and implemented cuts.

Whenever the issue comes up we should be pointing this out and insisting that the only politics that the trade union movement should be affiliated to is rank and file struggle for control over production and services, socialism from below by workers' self-activity, rather than socialism from above, bureaucratically dispensed by well-intentioned representatives.

However, opposition when it comes to the vote would almost certainly mean blocking with the right, who are opposed to all politics in the union and who want to keep the union from participating in general political movements that unite and strengthen many partial struggles (the examples that spring to mind are the ANL, CND and Right to Work campaign). We could always abstain, but in practice that is likely to mean the same thing as opposing (because of the number of votes required in favour for affiliation to take place).

So in the end we shall have to grit our teeth and vote for affiliation (in the same way that we vote for Labour in general elections). The danger is that by voting for we shall be helping spread illusions about the Labour Party. That can only be avoided by a merciless attack on what the Labour Party stands for and by refusing to be dragged into campaigning for or prioritising affiliation.

We have to insist that the only way forward politically is not by diversionary campaigns on affiliation (a long haul for little result) but spreading support for each and every struggle. In NALGO that means the typists' struggle in Liverpool; in the NUT, the right of associations not to be victimised for taking unofficial action to fight the cuts in the GPO, rebuilding confidence after this summer's defeat.

There is one other reason why if it comes to a vote for affiliation we have to vote for. Despite the unhelpful alliance leading the campaigns (some of whom should know better than to peddle illusions about the Labour Party) there will inevitably be some genuine Labour Party activists, with rank and file leanings, who will take voting against as sectarian and siding with the right. They will have to learn for themselves what we know to be the case with the Labour Party (and have experienced at Lambeth and Lothian). To them we can say that we really oppose affiliation, but what really matters are the struggles going on right now, so let us unite to spread support for them. That is where we begin to build a fight back against the Tories.

Gareth Jenkins

Typists jolt NALGO

The strike by 350 typists at Liverpool city council over low wages has brought about some remarkable changes of attitude within their union, NALGO, at both local and national levels.

The typists came out in protest on 6 July over a regrading claim, which was lodged last October. It is NALGO policy that typists should negotiate their claims locally, although Liverpool city council would not recognise this.

The council made one offer to the typists early on in the dispute which was a maximum of £2.50—far less than the average weekly take-home pay is just £48.

After 11 weeks of strike action the outcome looked grim for the typists. Many were demoralised by the lack of real support from NALGO members locally and NALGO's national committees. They were getting £20 a week strike pay and all of them, especially the sole wage-earners in a family, were feeling the pinch. The council seemed prepared to sit out the strike until the typists drifted back to work. But then, things began to change.

Two NALGO members at the city council were suspended for refusing to sign on the typists' strike. This came just a few days before the third request for real support—escalation—put to a special meeting of the NALGO branch. Most of the typists felt that if the request was turned down, the strike would be called off.

At that meeting everyone emphasised the importance of the issue and that, following the suspension, it was about the right to belong to a trade union and to act as a trade union member. Many speakers warned about the implications of refusing to unite around the typists for future fights—against redundancies, against the new wages, against the four per cent wages limit for the public sector. If the branch was not united around the typists, they said, then the union would be smashed and that was exactly what the city council wanted.

The meeting voted to escalate the typists' action by other NALGO members refusing to collect rents, rates, service charges and fines. Taking action on behalf of another group of workers—even those of the same union—is almost unprecedented in NALGO. The most elementary concept in trade union consciousness, solidarity, showed itself at that meeting.

Local authority workers are suffering the most brutal attacks of this government. Until now, among the white collar workers the resistance has been minimal. With the decision over the typists, that may now
begin to change.

In accordance with NALGO rules a ballot of members involved in supportive action had to take place. That ballot gave a clear majority in favour.

The second major victory in the course of the dispute was over the typists' strike pay. Representatives from the Liverpool branch went to NALGO's national emergency committee to ask for an increase in strike pay to 55 per cent of the typists gross wages. The committee, who had already turned them down over and over again, on the grounds that it would encourage typists in other local authorities to strike for more money, that the union could not afford it, that members shouldn't be paid to strike.

But on 1 October NALGO's emergency committee reversed its previous decisions and agreed to increase the strike pay as the typists requested. The meeting was lobbed by more than 50 typists from Liverpool and by NALGO members from five London councils. Three of the typists argued for more than two hours in the committee, and won. NALGO, at a national level, supported the strike from the beginning by making the action official. But for 13 weeks the union refused to the typists what they needed in order to win: money. Why did the national executive members on the emergency committee change their minds?

When the strike started, no-one envisaged such a long, bitter struggle. Few people thought that the typists would be so determined, least of all the NALGO officials and even less the workers. The workers realised the real significance of the struggle is that it has grown from a regrading claim for a small group of workers to a fight over trade union principles, primarily solidarity amongst workers.

The NALGO bureaucracy has suffered a severe jolt. The fact that a group of low paid, badly organised women workers are now showing the rest of the union that it is possible to fight, that they have won secondary action within their branch, that they have defied the six-picket law, and that they have taken on both their employers and the backward elements in their union, has forced NALGO nationally to give the typists more than just verbal support.

Mollie Simpson

Robbing Peta to pay Pauline

Times are hard for women, both as workers and in the family. Unemployment soars, the wages gap grows, social services are cut and Tory taxation policy penalises families with children. At such a time, what are socialist feminists discussing? Strikes, occupations, price riots? Hardly. For many of them, the answer now seems to lie in a new Labour programme for a 'feminist incomes policy', 'socialist family strategy', or 'alternative social strategy'.

The 'feminist incomes policy' version has now been advocated for over two years by Beatrice Campell and others in Red Rag. It involves a wholesale attack on 'patriarchal pay bargaining', in which male trade unionists are accused of having used the concept of the family wage to increase their privileges at the expense of women. Wages militancy is sneeringly denounced as giving socialism a bad name, and free collective bargaining is blamed for the increase in male/female wage differentials since 1978 even when figures are given to show that the effect largely came from government intervention in the form of Clegg. (Red Rag, August 1980)

The conclusion of this argument is that a redistribution of incomes between men and women workers and within families is necessary, and that this can only be achieved at the national political level.

Anna Coote in the New Statesman has been milder, but has tended unmistakably in the same direction. Explaining the devastating effects of Tory taxation policy on family incomes, she suggests a socialist family policy for Labour which includes a redistribution of incomes between men and women within the share of total income that accrues to working people.

Mickie Barrett, discussing the need for Labour strategy to take women's needs into account in New Socialist (No 1) does not explicitly advocate incomes policy but clearly thinks there is little to be gained by struggles in the workplace.

This new rush into Labour reformism by a significant section of feminists is partly the product of pessimism, which is hardly surprising at this time of 'downturn' in workplace militancy. But is there more to it than that? Alongside the first 'feminist incomes policy' article in Red Rag was another by a feminist who had worked in a factory with other women, bemoaning the fact that they were not much interested in having their consciousness raised. She concluded:

'Maybe the WLM as it is can only hope to be a servicing organisation for working class women, agitating for facilities which will benefit them but without their active participation.' (Reprinted in No Turning Back, Feminist Anthology Collective, 1981.)

A movement of workers without workers that does things for workers has moved very far from both socialism and the initial militancy of the feminist movement in Britain, which after all began with the Ford machinists' strike.

We should be quite clear that these women are absolutely right to attack the sexist bias of the trade union movement. It is true that skilled male workers dominate the unions that the pursuit of traditional pay differentials penalises women, that low rate increases and union democracy are important demands (all the Rank and File organisations I know about regard these as central). But all these have to be fought within the trade union movement. There is no other way of getting round this, appealing to a higher authority (such as a left Labour government), or whispering in the boss's ear that he could do a better deal with you instead.

To give the answer to any workers' problems in a redistribution of incomes within the workplace, rather than a redistribution from profits to wages, is to abandon socialism and accept the Tory argument that 'greedy, overpaid' workers are at fault.

No incomes policy can succeed in transferring wage increases refused by one employer to the low-paid workers of another. Ford are not going to make over the money they refuse at Dagenham to East End clothing sweatshop workers. When high wages are at a standstill, all wages are at a standstill.

The hard fact of life under capitalism is that nothing is won unless it is fought for, however just or reasonable the cause. The Wilson government's incomes policy of the 1960s did not raise the wages of the low-paid, but the 1969-70 wave of strikes by busmen, teachers and lower-paid car workers broke the policy and raised wages.

Often the fight is led by relatively high-paid workers being organised is how they get to be high-paid, after all. But the miners' victory in 1972, for example, was followed by successful strike action by hospital nurses and ancillaries, who were never organised or militant before.

Fiddling around with taxation policy - even if it begins only by reversing Tory fiddles that benefit the managerial sector - very soon becomes a matter of transferring resources from one, set of workers to another, and one proposal of Coote's - increasing the woman's tax allowance, raising child benefit by £3 and still saving enough to raise tax thresholds generally - seems to me to be transferring resources away from one set of women (the non-employed, who do depend on their husbands' incomes) to another!

It is perfectly possible to say that we want both a family wage and economic independence for women, because women's needs vary, especially at a time when many find it impossible to get work. Our logic is not the logic of employers or governments - we want a bigger slice, to have our cake and eat it too, because, as someone said, what we really want is the whole bloody bakery!

No Marxist ever suggested that wages militancy alone would overthrow capitalism, but it is the starting point of real struggle. If you can tell 400 Liverpool typists, on strike for higher wages (challenging the grading system, the union leadership, and the sexist local press) that wages militancy is a good beginning instead of pretending to look as though you are on the opposite side of the fence from your working class sisters.

Norah Carlin

Socialist Review 27
The First International

There is still a widespread view that Karl Marx developed his theories by solitary reflection on the dusty volumes in the British Museum library. Nothing could be further from the truth. And there is no better proof of it than his little book The Civil War in France.

From 1864 onwards Marx was a leading and active member of the International Working Men’s Association, a loose collection of socialists and trade unionists based in London but with supporters throughout Europe. When France went to war with the German kingdom of Prussia, in July 1870, Marx immediately stopped whatever else he was doing and put out a manifesto on the war for the General Council of the Association. It was written, signed and issued as leaflets in English, French and German within a few days of the declaration of war.

The manifesto made two major points. First of all, it portrayed the need for international unity among the working class. Marx reported with particular joy how messages of solidarity were exchanged between groups of workers in France and Germany.

The very fact that the official France and official Germany are rushing into a fratricidal feud, the workers of France and Germany send each other messages of peace and goodwill. This great fact, unparalleled in the history of the past, opens a vista of brighter future. It proves that in contrast to old society, with its class distinctions and its political duopoly, a new society is springing up, whose international rule will be perfect because its national rulers will be everywhere the same—Labor!

But the manifesto also took sides on the war.

The France which went to war in July 1870 was ruled by a shabby tyrant called Louis Bonaparte. Nephew of Napoleon, he had seized power in a coup d’état a month before. And he immediately sent troops to invade Germany. Marx, therefore, described the war on the German side as a ‘war of defence’ and predicted that whatever its outcome it would bring the fall of Louis Bonaparte.

But, unlike many subsequent socialists who have tactically taken sides in a war, Marx carefully spelled out his qualifications. He pulsed the Prussian regime, and warned: If the German working class allow the present war before its strictly defensive character and to degenerate into a war against the French, its people, victory or defeat will prove disastrous.

By September Marx’s predictions had come about, and so had his fears. Louis Bonaparte’s armies had been defeated and with them the Second Empire had fallen. A republic was declared in France. But the German working class had not prevented the war of defence being transformed by the Prussian regime into a war of conquest, which now demanded the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine.

With this little event Marx rushed out a second manifesto of the General Council of the International Working Men’s Association.

Marx’s savagery of the Prussian regime’s new war aims in this second manifesto is still well worth reading, because the Prussian arguments for systematically repudiating as just the same arguments that it invented, other governments in the name of revolt—a justification of their territorial claims. It was the other side of the same war, politics, what it said about the new French republic, that was to prove more important as events unfolded.

‘The republic,’ Marx welcomed the formation of the republic, and he felt that French workers now had no alternative but to consider them “our allies” in defending the French people against a Prussian war of conquest. But he pointed out that the republic had been formed “not as a social conquest but as a measure of national defence and that far from being a mere government of the people, it was a product of the compromise between a million employers of workers and a million workers of employers.”

‘They have not to reorganise the trade unions but build up the future. Let them organise and absolutely improve the organisation for republicanism, for the interests of their own class organisation. It will still them with fresh political power for the regeneration of France, and it will still be the same task—the emancipation of labour. Upon their energy and wisdom hangs the fate of the republic.’

It was a sober warning and was confirmed by events only six months later. But no one, not even Marx, could have imagined then, in September 1870, just how far-reaching those events would be.

For four months after September the French republic’s ‘Government of National Defence’ continued a half-hearted war against the Prussians. The Prussians besieged Paris, the largest, most working class
and most radical city in France. And increasingly the defence of Paris came to be in the hands of the National Guard, which largely consisted of armed workers. When the conservative politicians who headed the republic surrendered to the Prussians at the end of January 1871, it was not simply because of military exhaustion, it was also because they preferred the Prussians to radical Parisian workers with guns in their hands.

So one of the first priorities of the Thiers government was to disarm Paris. Early in the morning of 18 March they sent a column of troops into Paris to seize the national guard artillery. It was a peculiarly provocative move because the guns they were trying to seize had been paid for by subscriptions from the guards and were legally their own property.

But the plan miscarried. Working class Paris rushed to resist the guns, fraternised with the troops, most of whom refused to obey orders. Those that remained under control of their officers beat a hasty retreat.

Later that morning the Central Committee of the National Guard took power in Paris. ‘The proletarians of Paris’ went their proclamation, ‘amidst the failures and transgressions of the ruling classes, have understood that the hour has struck for them to save the situation by taking into their own hands the direction of public affairs.’

The Paris Commune had been born. It lasted for two months, until Thiers’ troops crushed it with a ferocity that left 30,000 dead.

Immediately the Commune was formed, Marx set to work to write a third, much longer manifesto on it. It was completed just two days after the last Communeards were shot down in the cemetery of Pére LaChaise, and issued under the title Address of the General Council of the International Workingmen’s Association on the Civil War in France.

It is a passionate defence of the Parisian workers against the slanders and bloodlust of bourgeois Europe. Marx pillories the ‘defenders of civilisation’ who drowned the Commune in blood. He supports absolutely the violence the Commune used to defend itself. But amidst this he spells out what it was the Commune had achieved.

It is this that turns a brilliant and moving polemic into one of the basic classics of Marxism.

Marx had already recognised that, ‘the state power assumes more and more the character of the national power of capital over labour, of a public force organised for social enslavement, of an engine of class despoticism.’ So, ‘the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.’

So how was it to take power? This Marx discovered from the Commune.

“The Commune was formed of the municipal councils chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men, or acknowledged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time. The police was at once stripped of its political attributes and turned into the responsible and at all times revocable agent of the Commune. So were the officials of all other branches of the administration. From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at workmen’s wages. The vested interests and representation allowances of the high dignitaries of state disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves.’

This breaking down of hierarchy and assertion of self activity extended into all fields. ‘Like the rest of public servants, magistrates and judges were to be elective, responsible, and revocable.’ And the first decree of the Commune had been ‘the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution for it of the armed people.’

This was the mass democracy that the Commune substituted for ‘deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in parliament.’

Such a massive revolution in political institutions was quite unprecedented and was inevitably subject to many different interpretations. But for Marx

‘its true secret was this, it was essentially a working class government, the product of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labour.’

‘Except on this last condition, the Communal constitution would have been an impossibility and a delusion. The political rule of the producer cannot persist with the perpetuation of his social slavery. The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting the economical foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule.’

Of course, in two months and with a rather confused political leadership, the Parisian workers only began this task of using their political power for their economic emancipation.

‘The great social measure of the Commune was its own working existence. Its special measures could but betoken the tendency of a government of the people by the people.’

But they were impressive enough and are recorded by Marx with evident joy at the common sense creativity of workers for the first time controlling their own destiny. That is what makes The Civil War in France such exciting reading.

‘Workingmen’s Paris, with its Commune, will be forever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society. Its martyrs are enshrined in the great heart of the working class. Its exterminators’ history has already been nailed to that eternal pylon from which all the prayers of their priests will not avail to redeem them.’

That is how The Civil War in France concludes.

They were defiant words written just two days after the Commune had been crushed. But what Marx learned from the Commune makes them far more than defiance. Forty six years later Lenin was eagerly re-reading the book as an essential prelude to the Russian workers seizing power. A hundred and ten years later it is just as vital reading for us. Marx’s The Civil War in France can be obtained for 40p plus 24p post from Bookmark’s, 267 Seven Sisters Road, London N4.
The worm that was turned

The SDP is indeed fortunate in its ability to attract persons of vision and integrity. It now numbers in its ranks not only Michael O'Halleran but one Roger Rosewell.

Rosewell, who describes himself as an "industrial relations consultant", was recently elected as an SDP district councillor for Aston, Romford and Standlake in West Oxford. But his wisdom is not being confined to his rustic constituents. On September 25th he addressed a conference, organised by the right-wing Aims group, on 'Managers and Marxists', about the role of extremists in industry.

"I have seen extremists work from the inside and they are worse than anyone else," he told the New Statesman (23/9/81).

Some of the other extremists who read Socialist Review may remember Rosewell, for he was at one time the industrial organiser of the International Socialists (the predecessor organisation of the SWP).

However, people should not worry too much that Rosewell will betray the innermost secrets of the party to the class enemy. For it is clear that Rosewell is suffering from a severe attack of amnesia.

When asked how long he had been an IS member, Rosewell told Labour Weekly (14/4/81):

"I can't really remember. It's difficult to be sure because it only really started in 1968, so I would say about five years."

In fact Rosewell was a member for eleven years, from 1963 to 1974. Throughout that period he wrote regularly for the publications of the organisation, and for a good part of it he served on various leading committees. As for the claim that IS began in 1968, Rosewell wrote, in 1972, a pamphlet called The Struggle for Workers' Power in which he gave a perfectly accurate account of the founding of the organisation in 1950. It is tragic that a decade of activity and writing can be so blotted out of a man's mind.

If Rosewell intends to carry on with his career as a lecturer on the role of Marxists in the trade unions, he may find some of his own earlier writing useful. He might well benefit from a rereading of the pamphlet On Industrial Work which he wrote in 1969 under the bizarre pseudonym of R Warszowski.

In this he discussed the necessity of building revolutionary fractions and rank and file groups in the trade unions. He also stressed (page 6) the necessity for IS members to be open and clear about their political ideas in dealing with any contacts they may make.

He might follow this with a reading of his article 'The Seamen's Struggle' (International Socialism 54 & 55, 1973). Here he showed clearly that the right-wing grip in the NUS was based on the passivity and inactivity of the rank and file, and that the Broad Left in the union failed to win leadership because:

'Instead of leading a fight against the policies of the right wing and attempting to mobilise the rank and file behind them, they remained silent, hardly ever producing any propaganda and accepting productivity deals. Instead of fighting for more union democracy and exposing the methods of the right wing they accepted full-time appointments.'

Rosewell would clearly be most helpful to his new friends if he told them the truth he once clearly understood, that revolutionary activity in the unions is about political honesty and mass involvement, rather than hiding behind the defence mechanisms of conspiracy.

Rosewell might also tell the assembled managers something of his first-hand experience of 'infiltrating' the trade union movement.

In 1974 Rosewell, still being used as an IS full-timer, applied for a position as an appointed official of the National Union of Journalists, without consulting his comrades in IS, and told the interviewing panel he had left IS. Since IS policy had always been opposed to the appointment of union officials, the IS National Committee suspended him for two months. Shortly afterwards he slipped out of the organisation.

This account (which can be documented) is somewhat at variance with Rosewell's statement to the New Statesman (23/9/81) that:

'I quit the SWP 10 years ago when I realised that, come the revolution, it would not just be bonged plotters who were put up against the wall—there would be loads of other people as well.'

After leaving IS Rosewell retired to academic section to write a history of the Electricians' Union. Somewhere along the line he seems to have been struck by the fact that if so many ex-Stalinists could get to the top of the FITPU, then maybe there was a future for an ex-Trustsab. In the SDP Rosewell has indeed found the colleagues he deserves.

Ian Birchall

LETTERS

From the editor

This is the twentieth issue of Socialist Review produced by the present editorial team. We like to think we haven't done a bad job of it. SWP members in particular seem to like the Review and sales have risen about 20 per cent in 18 months.

However, we feel that there remains one weakness in the Review. We have done very well in analysing the news and, in recent months, developing the Industrial Discussion section. We have not been nearly as successful for dealing with ideas, particularly with Marxist ideas. Yet this is especially important at a time when the low level of working class struggle is leaving all sorts of people to move away from these.

So we are starting in this issue three new occasional series—'Books Are Weapons', 'What's in a Word' and 'Inside View'. The first attempts to explain the significance of and the background to Marxist classics. These relatively new to socialism often do not come across such works, and when they do are often put off by some of the historical detail they contain. (How many people, for instance, know what the 58th Brumaire was?)

The second series attempts a similar job with some of the works which are used in political circles, much to the bewilderment of new comers. We start with 'Hunnpropaganda', but the future hopes to deal with other works such as 'Revolutionary Man' and 'Across the Iron Curtain' (inside View) are, of course, welcome.

We will attempt to present the experiences of people who have worked inside some of the institutions of capitalist society. We start with the Navy—but the series could just as easily deal with the police, the BBC, a sex shop or a mental hospital.

One final point. The limited success we have enjoyed so far would not have been possible without the many unsolicited articles we get sent from readers. Some of the best things we have printed—like the article on Pohjanlahtia in the latest issue of the Worker's Weekly—have simply turned up, unexpected, in the post. The new series will not work unless our readers write.

Send articles for possible inclusion to Socialist Review, 18, Park Prudential, PO Box 32, London W2. The deadline for any issue is the third Tuesday of the month before. Please type articles if you can although we realise this is not always possible, write legibly and try to keep a copy for yourself, since occasionally items get lost in the post.

Chris Harman

Gay omissions

I was interested to read John Lind's review of Gay Press Today (SR 81/5: 2) but was surprised to find several major omissions in his analysis.

Firstly, it is quite remarkable that he fails to mention the differences in the movement between black and gay men. These differences have, of course, been there as long as the gay movement itself, but they have become increasingly pronounced over the years. Many lesbians now find it as difficult to work with gay men as they do with straight men and have opted out of hetero-lesbian alliances. As a gay man, I find this sad but understandable. In the short term, the movement that we can probably hope for is co-operation on single issue campaigns with structures which are acceptable to the lesbians.

Secondly, I felt that John's analy-
The drama of history

Don Taylor is a freelance drama director, currently working for the BBC, who has written at least two feature-length television plays and nine stage plays, including several about the English Civil War. For example: A Lost Visitor for Sir Hugh Peter about Cromwell’s Speech, Parliament Resists about Milton, and The Agreement of the People on the Levellers. Don Sugden interviewed him regarding his special interest and attitudes towards television.

Don Taylor begins by explaining why he sees history as important:

'It's important to understand all the things that have made the world what it is now. With the exception of my historical stuff it's about the English Revolution. It was the first modern revolution, it happened in England, and it seems to me that the guidelines of political thought since were laid down at that time. When the Levellers then wanted to have a radical democracy, that was the beginning of everything. Everyone,你知道,在那个时期, thought that kind of political power through the people was the way forward, and that was what the Levellers stood for. We have to remember that the English people as a whole, and it's part of a playwright's job, I think, to make our heritage known.

Don was then asked if he was trying to put over a coherent viewpoint of his own, or just to raise questions.

'I think a particular political concern always comes out, but I don't think that's the point. The important thing is for someone people should think to understand the real history of history and of what people actually live.'

'You've got to try to create the reality of how people actually live.'

'That's what I was talking about - that the Levellers were afraid of their time, and there was no way they could possibly have succeeded because the objective conditions of history weren't right. Well, I don't think that's the point. The objective conditions of history aren't right, and I don't think that's the point. I think that's the point. The important thing is for someone people should think to understand the real history of history and of what people actually live.'

Don Taylor's work on the English Civil War highlights the importance of understanding historical events and their impact on contemporary society. His plays provide a platform for exploring the political and social dynamics of the period, offering insights into the challenges faced by the English people during that time. By creating a dramatic representation of the events, he aims to engage the audience in a meaningful exploration of history, encouraging them to think critically about the real experiences of those who lived through such turbulent times.
There's a lot of that. All I can say is that television would be a lot worse off without it. Things that keeps me going is that every time I do something good, I get letters from members of the public, very often isolated people at odds with society, who say 'Thank God somebody thinks like me', and who are delighted, when in the middle of all the pal, something by eight or ten directors who supply their kind of thing comes through.

'My position within the BBC is precarious. I still don't know when I'll get another play on. Maybe never. This is all boffin with personal relationships and finding people who are prepared to work with you. I've got a good list of credits over the last two years, but everyone of those three years has been a battle. Playwrights and directors have no money.'
**Sinister ‘scholarship’**.

The Cheka, Lenin's Political Police
G Leggett
OUP £22

With a resurgence in the Cold War, the academic apologists for Western imperialism are once again scrambling from the cover they adopted in the 1970s and 1980s. Like those who denounced in the Eastern bloc these apologists push their line in the guise of ‘historical objectivity’ and constantly praise each other’s ‘impeccable scholarship’. Edward Crankshaw, Trevor Roper, Michael Glenny, Leonard Shapiro, all have made for themselves a good living as ‘experts’ on the Russian Revolution and the Bolsheviks. From the Marxist historian like Isaac Deutscher who could write rings around them all there found himself blacklisted from academic jobs. But as time passed, these apologists, who before the blunt objectivists must succumb to the ageing process. And so they are constantly on the look out for new recruits. They’ve turned up a bounty in George Leggett—hence the advertisement heaped on this volume in the quality press over the past couple of months.

On the face of it Leggett’s book is an impressive piece of historical research, containing as it does a wealth of factual information on the formation of the first Soviet political police, the Cheka, and its relationships with the other instruments of Soviet power in the initial period of the revolution. It is an impressive volume of historical research and it would be a good thing if Mr Leggett had a few of his own personal opinions here and there, that would certainly help him in his research on the murder of Trotsky.

It depends of course on the nature of the opinions and prejudices being dipped in. Leggett is a straightforward and unconstructed apologists for the White forces and his use of sources is to say the least dubious.

On page 53, for instance, he quotes as an example of revolutionary terror, an incident in the Don country where Soviet forces allegedly threw White prisoners into the blast furnaces of a local factory. He quotes as his source for this incident the ‘Denkin Commission Report on Events at Epatovka’. An ‘objective’ historian would perhaps make mention of the fact that Denkin was one of the leading figures of the period and one of the leading figures of the period and that his conclusions were reached in a period known for its anti-communism.

Curran and Seaton have done an annoying amount of research and worked hard to produce a book which can be read by students of the mass media and the general reader. Yet the end product is disappointing. The authors are both genuine Labour Party intellectuals, as opposed to Marxists pissing off sheep’s clothing. Indeed, James Curran is the editor of the Labour Party’s new theoretical journal. They are both non-Marxist, and in the case of Curran, anodyne anti-Marxist. Yet both teach in areas which have been dominated by Marxist discussion in the last ten years, they have a very uneasy relationship with it.

One consequence is that the book falls into a number of quite different parts. Trotsky once remarked that British labour leaders get more radical the further away an issue is from home. In the case of the Labour Party this has been the case, the further away the issue gets from the present. Thus the book opens with James Curran’s very radical account of the historical development of the press, cataloguing the struggles of workers against press laws, the rise of a capitalist-dominated commercial press, etc. etc. But it ends with a very tame set of entirely legislative proposals for change which include such blood-curdling proposals as...

The BBC licence fee should be...
replaced... with a rolling quinquennial grant awarded by parliament. This would give the BBC more real independence and a fair and predictable outcome.'

and: 'The Press Council should be more representative of employees in the press industry and of the general public.'

and: "The British Film Institute should become a fully-functioning library." To be fair, some of their proposals are a little more impressive than this, but they are all, without exception, within this pedagogic reformulation of a system which, on their own analysis, is dominated by capitalism through and through.

All of Curran's splendid detailing of capitalist domination of the press and Seaton's very much less splendid detailing of capitalist control of the broadcasting media, are thrown out of the window by virtue of what the authors think they might persuade the rest of the Labour Party to do about: convincing the rest of the Labour Party to do about: building the united RCN against the working class should they ever manage to get elected. Despite their impeccable Bennite credentials, the little word 'socialism' does not appear on their agenda for the future.

In this, of course, the authors are absolutely typical of the current of political thinking to which they belong. As soon as we look behind the high-spouting phrases of the Bennites at their detailed proposals, we find that they amount to a recipe for a little more state intervention in a basically capitalist economy.

Having said that, however, the book does have considerable strengths. These are mostly in Curran's historical sections on the press, a subject upon which he is an acknowledged expert. But even here his curious relationship to Marxism leads him to difficulties. As he has developed the analysis over the years, it has become much more uncompromising and much more materialist. It is, in fact, a very mechanical account of how economic forces have shaped the basic structure of one of the major forces of contemporary cultural life.

What is missing is that active conception of consciousness which distinguishes Marxism from mechanical materialism. Thus, while Curran is forced to concede that militant workers use newspapers for rather different purposes than do capitalist newspaper proprietors, he is not really interested in developing this perspective. For him, the evolution of the capitalist press is more interesting than the patient unraveling of the relationship between militant workers and their own independent newspapers.

This, of course, ties directly back to his politics. Instead of concentrating attention on how the labour movement can develop its own ways of organizing in opposition to the capitalist press, he is more concerned with how its leaders can scoop out a little niche for themselves within the existing set-up.

Colin Sparks

THEATRE

Putting bounce into bolshevism

It might seem bizarre, but it's a great opportunity for socialists. Two hilarious farces by the Italian revolutionary Dario Fo are now showing to packed houses in London West End. Glynnis Cousins looks at the background to them.


Accidental Death of an Anarchist by Dario Fo, with Gavin Richards, Wyndhams, Charing Cross Road.

Dario Fo and his companion, Franca Rame, have worked long and hard to promote communist cultural activity throughout Italy. If you buy Plutus Press's edition of Fo's play Can't Pay, Won't Pay and read Rame's introduction you will see how they operate. They recruit workers into the production process and where possible site their plays in and around workplaces.

One of their plays has been showing in the West End for two years, and now it has been joined by another.

Admittedly the centre of London is not the ideal location but I strongly recommend you organise a branch/place group outing if possible. You won't be disappointed.

Fo threads his plays with a critique of the Italian Communist Party; he aims for an audience which is essentially reformist and his polemic is sensitive and winning.

Fo inflates that farce-like edge ever present in capitalist society, channeling it into punch-lines and characters that hurt the belly and wham in the socialist message in ways that left propagandists can learn from.

It's a technique which works better than the weary sarcasm or moral outrage frequent in socialist literature (Socialist Worker not excluded). In peddling the ideas, we often fall on deaf ears 'the rich are sinners' the left are misled and then wonder why we are confused with religious sects.

Dario Fo points to a system which is stupid, uncaring and brutal without looking humoristic or dreary. He is very witty.

Of course, it isn't funny that an Italian radical worker is murdered by the police interrogators who then claim the corpse floated out of a fourth floor window. It takes intelligent and committed talent to translate the experience into a respectable farce that leaves you never forgetting a murdered comrade or police violence. Accidental Death of an Anarchist set in 1969, was immensely successful in publicising a particular event and the death of Luigi Fsolm. It leaves you wishing for more plays of similar kind so many of the cover-ups we have witnessed in Britain (Blair Peach, Richard Campbell, The Deptford 13, etc).

Fo's other play Can't Pay? Won't Pay? satirizes on something different. It's about the wave of 'authorisation' struggles initiated some six years back in Turin.

Workers refused to pay a rise in bus fares, the idea caught on very fast. Soon, gas, telephone, and electricity bills were paid off at the rate of one a day. The press waged a furious campaign against what became a nationwide tactic to beat inflation. The Communist Party didn't like it very much at all and even some of its own members for such 'unlawful' activity. Its criminal membership grew overnight. Some radicals mutants even asked why goods had to be paid for at all. This lumpen logic led to an epidemic of proletarian expropriations which got the CPI truly frothing at the mouth.

Fo uses this context for his play. He sets the scene with two men, two women and a curious policeman, divided and fighting over the price of a display. The Daily Telegraph, a right-wing paper, gets upset — accidentally — declared that the play 'makes you feel good to be alive'. It does. It puts brave into struggle (of course the Telegraph did not quite understand the play's agitational dynamics), you leave feeling cheerful about the prospect of change.

Fo gives the story a socialist twist. Falcius ends. Luigi sees the light, promises never to be duped by CP timidly again, gives his better-off comrade and makes up. It's not all nice. But that's However. If you can't see it, at least buy the book — but do both if you can.
Will there be gold?

Undoubtedly the most significant film showing in London at the moment is *Man of Iron*, directed by Poland's best known film maker, Andrzej Wajda, and set against the background of the occupation of the Gdańsk shipyards last year. Brian Morgan and Jules Sorel gave us two different assessments of it.

Rarely has there been a closer connection between the theme of a film and the history of the film itself. Wajda's last film, *Man at Love*, was released after the defeat of the Polish workers in 1980 and was only allowed to be shown in Poland in two cities for two weeks. *Man at Iron*, which continues the story of *Man at Love*, has been able to get on general release because of the Victory workers' victory at Gdańsk.

The entire film showed the efforts of a film student to discover the truth about the Stalinist Poland of the 1950s. Through old film excerpts, she traces the creation of a Polish version of Stalinism, Solidarity, and KGB surveillance. She herself is shown as a model worker. The film ends with the signing of the Gdańsk Agreement by the Polish and West German states.

There are two problems with the film. Wajda described his aim in an interview in the *New Statesman*, Solidarity's publication: "The occupation of the shipyards in Gdańsk is one of the most important events of our history. That is why we have been exploring its meaning in the film *Man of Iron*."

The film begins with Wajda leading the occupation of one of the Gdańsk shipyards in August last year.

A highly-successful TV reporter, who had been sent by his superiors to prepare material for a programme showing that the son had been guinea pigs of state surveillance, homosexuality and currency speculation, is asked to prepare the ground for the interview, so as to prevent him becoming a martyr.

Wajda discovers that in 1960 the son was a student in the student demonstrations. He pleased in a man with his father to call on the shipyard workers and support the students. The student's interview was broadcast. In 1970 the workers' strike had been suppressed by tanks, the strikers were shot down by the police and the film was forbidden. *Man of Iron* tells the story of the strike and attempts to support the imprisoned workers in the struggles of 1970. The film ends with the signing of the Gdańsk Agreement by West Germany on behalf of Solidarity and the government of the state.

In conclusion, the film is subject to criticism because of its attempts to be popular — there are faults in characterization, at times there is a lack of political context, and the political line is not always perfectly realised. However, the film is an important contribution to the history of the struggles of the workers in Gdańsk.

To really understand the class struggles in Gdańsk and what naturally, its strength and weaknesses, Wajda would have to deal with the question of the significance of nationalism and the struggle for a political solution on the workers. Wajda would have to explore the question of the relationship between the workers and workers, and the workers and the state. The film is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the struggles of the workers in Gdańsk.
In October 1934 the miners of Asturias in northern Spain rose in armed insurrection. Although poorly armed and heavily outnumbered, they held off the Spanish army for nearly two weeks and began to organize society on a revolutionary basis.

A new reactionary government had launched an all-out assault on the gains workers had made after the fall of the Monarchy in 1931. It was backed by the semi-fascist CFDA, now poised to join the government.

In the face of these attacks the Socialist Party underwent a sweeping radicalization. Its traditional reformist character was increasingly replaced by an openly revolutionary language. In order to meet the fascist threat, revolutionary groups had inspired the formation of the Workers Alliance, a united front of most workers' organizations. The Socialist leaders joined it—if only to frighten the bourgeoisie from working with CFDA. However, the Alliance had one great weakness: the absence of the giant anarcho-syndicalist union, the CNT.

Only in Asturias were the workers truly united. The harsh reality of this mining community produced a tradition of co-operation and unity rarely seen elsewhere in the peninsula. In March 1934 the socialist and anarchist unions in this region signed a revolutionary pact. The Workers Alliance was aimed to mobilize the working class against fascism but not just to defend the democratic republic, but to make the revolution: this was the only way to defeat fascism.

On October 4th the CFDA entered the government. The socialist leaders' bluff had been called and reluctantly they called a general strike.

In Asturias this immediately took on insurrectionary proportions. The miners had waited months for this day, and hastily formed militias quickly lay siege to most of the provincial 90 Civil Guard posts. The local Workers Alliance committees rapidly took over the villages. In the key mining town of Mieres, the Provincial Revolutionary Committee proclaimed the founding of the socialist republic to a wildly enthusiastic crowd.

The revolutionary committees organized every aspect of local life from food and hospitals through to transport and communications. A makeshift war industry was rapidly set up, and factories were converted to turn out armoured vehicles, weapons, and ammunition. In the socialist stronghold of Sama the workers even produced a benzol substitute for petrol, made from coal. The communists set up their own radio station in Trubia, which kept the masses informed of the revolution's progress.

Red Guards were organized to ensure revolutionary order, looters were strictly dealt with and well-known right-wing arrested. Women were heavily involved at all levels, many joining the men in the militias.

However, it was in the military field that the workers showed most initiative and courage. The miners had few arms and relied on those captured from government forces or arms factories. Above all, they suffered from a chronic shortage of ammunition and the principle weapon throughout the insurrection was to be dynamite. The adept use of the explosive brought the miners 40% of their military successes. In the mountains, passes, and glitzen were used to hurl the dynamite at the enemy. In the cities the dynamiters crept forward smoking cigars with which they lit the lethal sticks stuffed in their hands. Numerous miners hit by enemy fire were blown to bits.

A thousand armed men were immediately dispatched to take the provincial capital of Oviedo. Here, where the local party and union bureaucracy was more dominant, the workers were slow to rise and it needed the arrival of the miners to spark off the struggle. Revolutionary power was soon established in the city's streets. Prostitute joined the workers on the barricades in the often bitter hand-to-hand fighting with the 2000 odd government forces. Oviedo was quickly driven into a small isolated stronghold.

The forces sent by Madrid to deal with the rebels met stiff resistance. In the southern mountain passes several hundred miners armed mainly with dynamite held up the much larger force for twelve days. When their ammunition ran out they fought with rocks before being overrun.

Tragically, the Asturian Commune remained isolated. Unfortunately much of the socialist leaders' new found militancy was only hot air; they had thought they could frighten the ruling class with talk of revolution at not going further along the road to fascism.

However, such was the optimism of the Asturians that news of the failure of the movement elsewhere in Spain was dismissed as government lies. Leaders who suggested this was true were nearly shot by followers. When most of the Provincial Revolutionary Committee abandoned its post on October 11th the workers arrested them and a new committee was established.

But inevitably, desperately short of ammunition, the 20,000 strong Red Army were gradually pushed back by the enemy forces. As with the Paris Commune of 1871, the bourgeoisie was determined to drown this outrageous assault on the sacredness of private property in a sea of blood. The government's intentions were clear when advancing troops used prisoners to form a human shield, and aircraft bombed food queues.

On October 18th, after protracted negotiations, the revolutionaries surrendered. But many workers refused to hand over their arms, either hiding them or fleeing to the mountains to begin a guerrilla struggle.

The bulk of the troops sent to crush the insurrection, under the command of General Franco, were Moorish mercenaries or Foreign Legions. Despite part of the surrender agreement, being that these thugs would not enter the mining villages, they had soon left a trail of murder, rape, and torture through the valleys. Over 3000 workers died during the revolution, nearly half as result of the systematic terror unleashed by the government. The terrible sufferings of those taken prisoner contrasted starkly with the model treatment of rightist prisoners during the insurrection.

Nevertheless, the miners' heroism was not in vain. They effectively undermined any legal attempts to install a fascist regime. The October uprising inspired the whole Spanish working class. And when in July 1936 the military attempted to rise, the workers did not hesitate to pour onto the streets and take over the factories.

Andy Durgan