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since what went down in American history as the "French and Indian War." The novelty of again bringing into American propaganda the picture of the "wily French," should give State Department propaganda a more palatable taste than it has had for a long time.

In Paris, however, the coup d'état is explained more simply. Writing in the conservative Le Figaro [January 31], Max Clos said that two currents existed among the crew of officers who overthrew the Diems. One wing, headed by Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don and Le Van Kim, had a French background, having studied in France and learning the military trade in the French army. "Their thought, their culture, their outlook are certainly more French than Vietnamese." So, naturally, they were suspected by the Americans, particularly when it became clear, with French recognition of China, that de Gaulle was serious about getting French imperialism back into Southeast Asia.

American imperialism considers itself to be the heir of the French empire. They've picked up the "white man's burden" in South Vietnam and they intend to hang on to it. So, naturally, against the French-minded generals they backed "American" Vietnamese generals trained in military schools in the United States. These are not nearly so "moderate," according to Max Clos.

The French-minded wing feel that the war is lost. They want to establish a "position of strength" and then open up negotiations. "In the eyes of the Americans, such an attitude is equivalent to a kind of treason." For the past months the American "instructors" have been fighting this "softness." The end of it was another palace revolution.

"The program of the new masters of Vietnam appears to be total war against the Vietcong," says Clos. "It is evident that the Americans are behind them. It remains to be seen to what extent the ultras will be able to do better than their predecessors."

HIGH PRICES AN ISSUE IN CEYLON

COLOMBO, Ceylon, Jan. 27 -- The high cost of living has given rise to several recent important political developments here.

A peasant demonstration against high prices led by Mudiyanse Tennakoon of Nikawaeratiya was organized to go to Colombo to present a petition to the government.

The demonstration, a perfectly peaceful one, was forcibly broken up by the police who used tear gas.

In protest Tennakoon went on a six-day hunger strike without water. He gave up the fast last night.

In Borella yesterday a large meeting formally inaugurated a campaign of the United Left Front against high prices.
The aim is a mammoth petition putting forward the United Left Front demands on this question. Meetings and demonstrations are planned as the campaign develops.

Proponents of the United Left Front hope that the campaign against high prices will help provide a means of building unity between the rural masses and city workers.

SULTAN LOSES YACHT, TOO

After delivering the deposed sultan of Zanzibar to his British masters, the crew of the sultan's yacht, the S.S. Salama, sailed back to Zanzibar.

They entered the harbor January 17 and, amid applause from crowds, pledged allegiance to the new revolutionary government.

Badi Mzee, an officer of the ship, said, "We are all safe now and we fully support the revolutionary government."

The ship was renamed the S.S. African and joined another ship to make up Zanzibar's two-ship navy.

IN DEFENSE OF THE FREE WORLD

Some of Uncle Sam's troops know exactly what they want as their share for dedicating themselves to the defense of the "free world"; namely, a shortcut through customs.

This was discovered when a big case of smuggling among U.S. air-force personnel came to light at the Clark air base in the Philippines. The news was published in Manila papers January 17 on the basis of information supplied by Philippine authorities.

The smuggling ring was discovered on December 22 when 2,500 wrist watches were found in a C-47 military transport plane which had just arrived from Hong Kong.

On the same plane were ten U.S. officers headed by a lieutenant colonel.

Philippine authorities said that they had long known about smuggling activities on planes coming from the United States, Hong Kong, Tokyo and Bangkok. But this was the first time that they were able to catch any of these "freedom fighters" with the goods.
TSCHOMBE'S REVELATIONS ON THE MURDER OF LUMUMBA

The ghost of the martyred Patrice Lumumba continues to haunt the Congo. Moïse Tshombe, the former head of the secessionist government of Katanga, in whose hands Lumumba met death, according to previous evidence, now claims innocence. In a long interview granted in Madrid to the special correspondent of a Brussels rightist paper Pourquoi Pas?, he charged that the murder of Lumumba was arranged by Kasavubu, president of the Congo, in collusion with Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, Justin Bomboko, minister of foreign affairs at the time, and the Belgian government.

Publication of the charges created a sensation in Brussels. The government ordered seizure of the paper and throughout the afternoon of January 50 police combed newsstands, book stores and libraries to confiscate copies. The Belgian minister of justice held that Tshombe's revelations constituted defamation of the head of a government, President Kasavubu. Among Tshombe's charges was the accusation that Kasavubu had lied to United Nations representative Berentsen who conducted an inquiry into the circumstances of Lumumba's death.

Fayat, assistant minister of foreign affairs, made official apologies on behalf of the Belgian government to the Congolese chargé d'affaires in Brussels. The Belgian press, however, expressed outrage over the seizure of the newspaper carrying the startling interview.

The murder of Lumumba in January 1961, it will be recalled, followed the entry of the United Nations into the Congo. As head of the newly independent Congo government, Lumumba made a fatal political error. At a crucial stage of the revolution, when all his efforts should have been placed on consolidating the position of the vanguard and in constructing as rapidly as possible a revolutionary leadership, Lumumba left the country and went to New York to appeal to the United Nations for help in redressing the chaotic situation left by the massive departure of Belgian technicians and administrators. The United Nations, acting under the main inspiration of the U.S., took full advantage of Lumumba's naive confidence. Forces were dispatched to the Congo. They rapidly strengthened the neocolonialist tendencies and one of the first consequences was the arrest of Lumumba by President Kasavubu, who up to then had lacked substantial power.

After holding Lumumba in prison for some months, Kasavubu delivered him and several of his comrades by plane to Tshombe. They were beaten by their guards and handed over to their new custodian. Their fate remained unknown for some time. Finally it was established that they had been killed under mysterious circumstances.

Tschombe's Version

The truth, according to Tshombe, was somewhat different. The Belgian government paid out at least 3,000,000 francs ($600,000) to anti-Lumumbist organizations to supplant Lumumba. Pierre Wigny, minister of foreign affairs at the time in Belgium, is accused by Tshombe of giving the "green light" for expenditures made through the Belgian consulate at Brazzaville. This action led Kasavubu to dismiss his prime minister on September 5, 1960.
"Mr. Kasavubu was pushed from behind. The courage he displayed was an 'inspired' courage."

Three months later, on November 28, 1960, Kasavubu, Adoula and Bomboko, on the invitation of Youlou, met with Tschombe at Brazzaville. Lumumba was in prison in the Lower Congo. Adoula, who is today prime minister but at that time minister of the interior, said to Tschombe, "We will send you Patrice, and you finish him off..."

Tschombe claims that he refused. He was "not interested" in what happened to Lumumba. In fact he considered that the conditions created by Lumumba to the left, favored his own rise by opposition to the right.

On January 9, 1961, Adoula came to Elisabethville once again to ask him to take over Lumumba. Tschombe claims he again refused.

On January 17 while watching a film he was called to the telephone. Kasavubu was on the other end of the line. "My dear Tschombe," Kasavubu said, according to Tschombe, "I am sending you three packages. You must accept them. They are in the airplane that's going to land." He refused to say anything beyond this.

"Three Packages"

Tschombe rushed to the airport. Lumumba and two of his companions, Okito and Mpolo, who had been in the cabinet of his government, were taken off the plane. They were in very bad shape.

Bauwens, the Belgian pilot of the plane, told Tschombe that throughout the flight, the three prisoners, who were tied together, had been beaten with unimaginable brutality by Kasadi, general commissioner of the national defense, and by eight soldiers.

Kasadi, according to Tschombe, displayed "with unconscionable pride and cruelty the mustache, the beard and the glasses of Patrice Lumumba."

The Belgian pilot was so overwhelmed that "during the trip he had no recourse but to isolate himself and his crew in the instrument cabin of the plane."

Under continued blows from their guards, the three prisoners were taken to an empty house near the airport.

They were already dying, said Tschombe, and he called Dr. Piter, a Belgian physician, who said that only a miracle could save them. "Lumumba was bleeding internally, had a perforated stomach, broken ribs; Okito had an apparent fracture of the eyeball, and Mpolo was in a coma which did not prevent him from going into strange convulsions."

Tschombe panicked, he claims. He telephoned Kasavubu in Leopoldville. "If they die," said Kasavubu, "bury them and let's say no more about it."
Tschombe got angry. "Dead or alive, I'm returning them to you tomorrow."

Okito died first. And at three o'clock in the morning on January 18, 1961, Lumumba and Mpolo died in turn.

At dawn, Tschombe and his ministers were impatient to see the plane leave with the "packages" which Kasavubu had sent them. But the pilot refused to take the bodies. There were special regulations, he said, governing the transport of corpses.

Tschombe claims that he became frightened. He had three bodies on his hands. What to do with them? This is where the first installment of the interview ended, Pourquoi Pas? announcing that the second part would bear the title "What Happened to the Bodies?"

Kasavubu's Denial

The central Congolese government issued a blanket denial of the grave charges made by Tschombe. Its expression of "indignation over the so-called revelations" was published February 1 in the Paris papers.

"All the inquiries on this subject establish, if not the responsibility, at least the complicity of Mr. Tschombe in the murder of Lumumba, the Kasavubu government said.

In order to continue in Congo politics, Tschombe has tried various maneuvers, the publicity release continued. In particular Tschombe "offered to the central government to restore state money, placed abroad, in return for an important post."

Declaring that Cyrille Adoula had many times sought to make inquiries into the Lumumba affair, the Kasavubu government said in conclusion that the essential task in the Congo is to continue the work of national reconstruction "in which Mr. Tschombe stood in the way for a very long time."

WHO WILL WIN THE CHILEAN ELECTIONS?

The presidential election scheduled in Chile for next September 4 continues to be a topic of much speculation throughout Latin America. Will the conservative government of Arturo Alessandri succeed in electing as successor its choice, the "anti-Communist" Pero Durán? Will the more moderate Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei make it? Or will the "Popular Front" candidate Salvador Allende win in a landslide, as some hope he will?

The election trends point to the left. In 1958, for instance, Alessandri's Frente Democrático [Conservatives, Liberals and Radicals] polled 950,000 votes; the "Popular Front" FRAP [Frente Revolucionario de Acción Popular], 600,000; and the Christian Democrats, 450,000.
In the 1963 municipal elections the results were as follows: Frente Demócrata, 730,000; FRAP, 700,000; Christian Democrats, 570,000.

These results greatly encouraged the FRAP and its backers, inasmuch as in 1958, due to Chile's electoral system, Allende came within 29,000 votes of winning.

In an interview published in the Mexican review Siempre, January 16, Allende indicated great confidence about his perspectives. Some of the questions and answers are of interest because of the information offered about the FRAP and its program. Here are some excerpts:

Q. -- "Would you explain for Mexican readers what the FRAP is? What is its composition?"

A. -- "The FRAP is formed, fundamentally, of six parties, two of them Marxist and four non-Marxist."

Q. -- "What are the Marxist parties?"

A. -- "The Socialist party, to which I belong, and the Communist party."

Q. -- "Is this strictly an electoral alliance?"

A. -- "No. The FRAP is not a transitory grouping of parties, but a will for power and a revolutionary consciousness in march. It has a national organic structure and a common program, which does not prevent each party from proselytism on its account."

Q. -- "How did it come to be set up?"

A. -- "The FRAP is a movement that was born as a necessity and a legitimate social fact, a product of the political deceit of González Videla,* who turned his back on the people and demonstrated that they had no possibility whatever with the radicals. Thus Socialist-Communist unity was born, which continued to increase, ending by uniting the Democrats with the Socialists. Besides, there are not only political parties in the FRAP."

Q. -- "Other organizations have joined?"

A. -- "Yes, various. Among them, the Instituto Popular, to which independents belong; the Baluarte del Pueblo, an organization of

*Gabriel González Videla was the Popular Front candidate in 1946. Before the election he promised the Communist party three ministries. Five months after the victory, González pulled a double-cross. He banned the Communist party, broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, herded members of the Communist party into concentration camps and even unseated Senator Pablo Neruda, one of the greatest living poets of the Spanish language.
retired soldiers; the Frente Gívico Militar, formed by chiefs and officers of the Armed Forces... In addition, other sectors are constantly joining."

Asked about the program of the FRAP, Allende said that it called for the nationalization of the copper industry and that the program could be summarized in three words: "Anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic, and antifeudal."

On agrarian reform, Allende said: "Naturally, without paying for the land, because that would make it impossible. With regard to the forms of property, that depends on geographical, climatic, social factors, etc. In any case, according to the circumstances in each zone of the country, individual parcels, co-operatives and state farms must exist side by side."

On the Cuban Revolution, Allende responded: "We have been and are friends of Cuba and its Revolution. We have been the most stubborn denouncers of the outrages and the imperialist aggression. And because we are partisans of Cuba and because we understand what it would signify for imperialism to have a peaceful defeat in the south. This battle is not only our electoral battle; it is the battle of the peoples that is occurring in Chile."

Q. — "This signifies the diversity of roads."

A. — "Not only that. It's not only that the peaceful road is open in Chile, but that the differences between the peoples give rise to different processes in many things. I have explained it to my crowd with a phrase: the Cuban Revolution was made with a taste for sugar and rum; the Chilean will be made with a taste for red wine and meat pie."

Victor Rico Galán, the Mexican correspondent who interviewed Allende, did not appear to share Allende's confidence that the "peaceful road is open in Chile."

"Allende referred recently to his intention to make a revolution 'sin paredón' [without the wall of the firing squad]," Rico said in an opening observation, "and in general the FRAP tries to demonstrate in every way that its candidate is not a bad boy like Fidel Castro, that there is nothing to fear from him and that he will establish socialism, not surgically -- Allende is a doctor -- but with the same case with which you take an aspirin."

"Meanwhile," the correspondent continues, "this democratic and peaceful country has one of the best organized police forces in Latin America. It is impressive to see the discipline, the armaments and the skill of the Chilean carabineros, who are everywhere. In the art of breaking up demonstrations and mutinies they have no rival. They even send instructors to other Latin-American countries, among them Venezuela. Every public meeting, whether Acción Católica [Catholic Action] or the Hijas de María [Daughters of Mary], brings out an impressive force of carabineros, who do nothing but carry out maneuvers in silence."
Those with evil thoughts believe that the carabineros are training for something. For example to prevent the FRAP from taking power in case of an electoral victory."

To this it should be added that there is another great political force in Chile which those engaged in the electoral game scarcely take into account. This is the seventy per cent of the citizens who are barred by literacy requirements from going to the ballot box.

Stronger in the Fifth Year

AN ECONOMIST LOOKS AT CUBA

In an interview published in the January 9 France Observateur, Charles Bettelheim, who is widely considered to be one of the best informed economists on Cuba, voiced some extremely interesting and informative observations on the shape of things there five years after the victory of the Revolution. His conclusions provide little comfort for the strategists in Washington who have been waiting for the economy to collapse from its own difficulties and those which the Pentagon and the State Department have added. What Bettelheim says should encourage every one who has cheered and supported the valiant Cubans in their heroic struggle.

The following is a translation of this interview which was conducted by Gilles Martinet, the editor of France Observateur. (Subheadings are the same as in the original.)

Gilles Martinet -- The Cuban Revolution is five years old. But in 1959 it was not exactly the same Revolution. There was an essentially democratic phase and then a socialist phase...

Charles Bettelheim -- One could speak of a continuous or permanent revolution.

G.M. -- Except that in 1959 the heads of this Revolution and Fidel Castro himself didn't yet see clearly where they were going.

C.E. -- No doubt. The revolutionaries of 1959 were inspired by a great concern for social justice, by the desire to rapidly raise the standard of living of the masses and to destroy privileges. This was already a socialist ideal. For the rest they were not yet fully aware of all the implications involved in pursuing this ideal. They had in mind above all the agrarian reform and the elimination of foreign domination.

Was the Second Revolution Inevitable?

G.M. -- Was the second revolution, which occurred during the year 1960 and which ended in the socialization of the Cuban economy as a whole, really inevitable? Not a few people today say that Castro went
too far, that he should have proceeded by stages and thus avoided differentiating his regime so strongly from the evolution of the rest of Latin America.

C.B. -- I don't see how it would have been possible to act differently. During the whole year of 1959, no important measure was taken against the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. But they were affected indirectly by the agrarian reform. Because the interests of this bourgeoisie and the big land holders were often closely linked.

Thus the bourgeoisie displayed a hostility toward the revolution which was rapidly translated into a slowing down of investments, of the flight of capital and permanent economic sabotage. This was the situation which gave rise to the necessity of going farther.

It was not possible, in fact, to reassure the bourgeoisie by mere words. They would have had to be given a series of guarantees which would have put in question the first conquests of the Revolution. It would likewise have been necessary to include their representatives in the government.

G.M. -- Weren't some of them already there in the first phase of the Revolution?

C.B. -- That's right, but at the beginning of '60; that is, at the moment when the problem of the new stage was posed, these men had already left the government. And precisely because of the agrarian reform. The political battle that broke out within the government hinged on this problem. At the time a kind of modus vivendi was maintained with regard to the urban economic structures.

It was not until the first months of 1960 that the disquieting situation visible in industry led the government to take in hand the management of certain enterprises. It was not yet a matter of nationalizations but of partial measures taken in accordance with an act called 'intervention' originating in Spanish law. The real nationalizations did not take place until October 1960.

Increase of Wages, a Revolutionary Necessity

G.M. -- Isn't the attitude of the bourgeoisie likewise explainable by the considerable increases in wages that were decreed following the Revolution of January 1959?

C.B. -- This played an important role, naturally. These wage increases were politically necessary because they made it possible to fully show the popular character of the Revolution.

G.M. -- But if justified from the political point of view, wasn't it dangerous from the economic point of view?

C.B. -- Up to a certain moment that was my opinion. But, with the retreat, I believe that the strictly economic repercussions were of less importance than one could have feared, given the way the Revolution subsequently developed.
What was fundamental was to demonstrate that what had just happened in Cuba was profoundly different from the pseudo-revolutions which Latin America had experienced up to then and which had been characterized above all by a flood of phraseology.

In Cuba, to the contrary, the Revolution translated itself not only into a rise in wages but also by an immense effort in the domain of teaching, health and lodging. In five years the budget for national education has more than quadrupled; for health it has tripled; while the rate of construction (this time it means construction for the people), practically doubled. The struggle against illiteracy was brought to a good conclusion, the school system is now complete with regard to primary education and, in a country of seven million inhabitants, one hundred thousand pupils and students benefit from scholarships. The mortality rate, in addition, has been considerably lowered; it is significant that no typhus epidemic appeared after the big hurricane last summer — they were able to vaccinate the whole population in the disaster zones in eight or ten days.

It's for all these reasons that the government is popular, despite the difficulties and hardships that have been imposed on the country. There is a genuine identification between the masses and the political leadership of the Revolution.

The Consequences of the Blockade

G.M. — But to return to the wage increases in 1959, it must be admitted that they played a certain role in the inflationary phenomenon now occurring.

C.B. — That's certain. I myself have emphasized this phenomenon, it's the role of economists to preoccupy themselves with the defense of money. That said, I don't know an instance in history of a revolution that was not accompanied by inflationary pressure.

Taking everything into account after an experience of five years which brought about such profound overturns on the level of the economic structures as well as on the level of the circuits of commercial exchange, I find that the Cuban money has stood up well.

It is necessary to visualize the problems that could arise for a country that was a genuine American province and eighty per cent of whose exchanges were with the United States. The Havana businessmen telephoned to Miami and the merchandise was delivered forty-eight hours later. Thus warehouse capacity varied for different products between two weeks and a month. Today the bulk of the supplies are brought from five or six thousand kilometers away. Thus storage capacity has to be up to six or eight months. This involves construction of many buildings and technical measures of all kinds.

G.M. — In what year did the American blockade begin that caused this situation?

C.B. — It began at the end of 1960. The Americans had already
protested against the agrarian reform. But the real crisis broke out during the summer of 1960. The Cubans had just bought some Soviet oil. The refineries owned by the American companies refused to handle it. Castro answered by resorting to the famous law of intervention. The Americans replied in turn by suspending the sugar quota which had regulated their purchases in Cuba. Then came the massive nationalization on the one side and the blockade on the other. Since the affair of the rockets, the blockade has tended to take an even worse form due to the pressure which the American authorities put on navigation companies able to supply Cuba.

G.M. -- And the role of supplier which the United States formerly held is now held by the USSR?

C.B. -- It would be better to say by the countries of eastern Europe, because the contribution of Czechoslovakia and the Democratic German Republic is important. At present, trade with the socialist countries represents around three-fourths of Cuban imports.

This complete reversal of the direction of exchanges could not but bring about serious disturbances. I referred to the problem of storage, but there is also the one of renewing industrial equipment and means of equipment which are completely of American origin. Hence the economic difficulties which were apparent above all during the 1962-63 period.

The Problem of Sugar Cane

G.M. -- Nevertheless, these difficulties appear to have been less grave in the industrial area than the agricultural. For a Revolution that was born in the fields this seems rather paradoxal.

C.B. -- This impression disappears as soon as you look at things in detail.

First of all there was a drop in sugar production. This drop was due in part to a very understandable reaction of the Cubans following their Revolution. Sugar production is linked in their minds with the dependence of the country on foreign capital; and, in the first place, American capital. Thus they wished to reduce its importance, and they wished it all the more since, on the rupture of the former sugar agreements, they doubted they would be able to find new markets. The limitation of areas devoted to sugar was decided on by the government, but locally the tendency was to go even further. They imagined, it is true, that this limitation would not modify the volume of production very much because of technical improvements which they expected to introduce. Unfortunately these improvements required considerable time -- thus they were not able to play a genuine role.

The agrarian reform, in addition, posed a grave problem of labor supply for the sugar cane plantations. The harvest, which is called the "zafras," requires particularly heavy labor. Men can be found for it only to the degree that a mass of poor peasants exists, ready to accept no matter what seasonal work. Now the agrarian reform had done
away with tenant farming, gave ownership of the land to the sharecrops and thus contributed to increasing the revenue of the small peasants. Thus fewer and fewer people could be found to go into the cane fields. The government had to devote enormous political propaganda to resolve, and still in an insufficient way, this problem of labor.

In relation to this I came to understand why the sugar companies bought so much more land than they cared to cultivate. It was because by possessing the land themselves they prevented the poor peasants from acquiring it and forced them to hire out as agricultural laborers at the time of the "zafra."

Learning How to Grow Vegetables

G.M. -- The Cuban agricultural problem, nevertheless, does not end with sugar cane.

C.B. -- There is also coffee growing. This is second in importance. It involves primarily small plantations held by poor or middle peasants. But they likewise need labor at the time of the harvest. We find here the same problem as with sugar cane. With this difference that the work is not so heavy and, because it comes during vacations, students can be mobilized for it.

G.M. -- And food crops?

C.B. -- Here the question is quite different. Extraordinary as it may seem, the Cuban peasants were not accustomed to growing vegetables. Some fields were highly specialized to supply the cities, but the greater part of the products were imported from the United States.

This lack of tradition explains the mediocre results that have been obtained up to now. The National Institute of the Agrarian Reform -- the INRA -- was obliged to hand out pamphlets to give the peasants the most elementary information. Thus they had to be shown that unlike sugar cane, most crops require a certain density in planting seeds and that it is not necessary for a plant in developing to be very far from its neighbor!

It seems to me, in addition, that it is impossible to discuss the difficulties in agriculture without taking into account the two years exceptional dryness (1961, 1962) and, of course, last year's hurricane.

An Excessive Centralization

G.M. -- All this in fact explains the agricultural difficulties. But those in industry evidently have other causes. Didn't the excessive centralization which characterized the process of socialization of the economy play a big role?

C.B. -- This was without doubt an important element but not the most important. Moreover it is in process of changing. Here again agriculture set the example.
INRA came to concede a relative autonomy in management "to rank-and-file groups" in the nationalized farms. These groups were to have their own accounts and organize their own production plans. They then submitted their projected plans, which had been discussed and polished up, to a central body.

The former centralization did not correspond, it must be added, to a fully defined conception. It was necessary above all to face up to the lack of cadres. There were only a few experts in agronomy and it was thought that in the absence of directives precisely elaborated by these experts, people on the spot would not be able to do much.

In practice it was seen that this system brought more trouble than advantages because technically the means of controlling and directing production as a whole were lacking.

G.M. -- And on the industrial and commercial plane?

C.B. -- For the time being centralization continues. The problem of decentralization will however soon be posed through measures of "administrative restructurization" which are under way. It is a question of bringing in authorities with power of decision in small enterprises of local interest. A test is under way in the province of Havana and it seems to be giving good results.

But here, too, the lack of cadres is an obstacle. In any case there are industries for which industrialization is required. For the rest, more flexible formulas must be found.

As for local trade, its situation is made difficult by the blows from distribution, due themselves to the necessity to stock up a great number of products from very long distances.

1968, Year of Equilibrium

G.M. -- Despite all these difficulties, can Cuba hang on?

C.B. -- Certainly. Many things depend on the rate of development which can be obtained.

During the first three years of the Revolution (1959-60-61) the over-all production increased thirty per cent. During the year 1962, the consequences of the cutting off of the former sources of supply and the repercussions of the years of drouth made themselves felt. Matériel began to wear out, spare parts could not be obtained; repairs were not made. In the same period, agricultural production dropped and the return per hectare was never so low.

The results of 1963 will probably be better -- they surely would have been were it not for the hurricane.

One can be much more optimistic about the year 1964, since most of the plants on which construction began following the Revolution are just being completed or will be in the next months.
G.M. -- Will these plants be used for the export trade or for the local market?

C.B. -- Essentially for the local market.

G.M. -- But then how do they finally expect to re-establish the equilibrium of the balance of payments?

And If the Americans Reverse Their Policy?

C.B. -- It is necessary to give up the perspectives that were outlined before. A drastic revision is required and the Cuban leaders are fully aware of it. The export of sugar is again expected to play a very important role. For this, its cultivation and conditions of exploitation must be transformed. Since they can't return to the old system of low-cost labor, they have to go ahead with wide mechanization. Three thousand cane-harvesting machines (most of them manufactured in the USSR and a part in Cuba) will be placed at the disposition of agriculture. Cutting machines are also visualized. But it is difficult to perfect the technical process and it will be necessary to plant new areas to permit utilization of these machines.

G.M. -- How long will it be before Cuba can hope to achieve equilibrium in foreign trade?

C.B. -- If everything goes well, the point of equilibrium should be attained around 1968. It's around that date that the turning point will come.

G.M. -- And what if the United States between now and then revises its policy, lifts the blockade and proposes an arrangement with Fidel Castro?

C.B. -- This reversal of policy would be very well received by the Cubans. The latest declarations of Fidel Castro leave no doubt on that subject. He wants to completely separate economic and political relations.

The geographic situation naturally orients Cuba toward the American market. And if the socialist countries can continue to send Cuba equipment goods, it goes without saying that the delivery of consumer goods (for which these countries are mediocre suppliers) would be assured by closer countries.

G.M. -- But in that case, the United States would once again be able to hold a club over Cuba. In case of a political crisis, they would be able to cut off food.

C.B. -- That would actually occur if the eighty per cent of former times was resumed. But there is no question of the United States again having such a place in Cuban foreign trade. That is why Fidel Castro is likewise thinking about developing economic relations with Europe. What is going on with Spain could well occur with other countries. The visit which Castro paid to the French embassy last July 14 constituted from this point of view a revealing gesture.
JUAN LECHIN IN BREAK WITH PAZ ESTEMSSORO

The national congress of the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario], which opened in La Paz January 18, registered the parting of the ways between President Victor Paz Estenssoro and Vice-President Juan Lechin. Correspondents of the bourgeois press listed as principal cause of the break Lechin's announcement that he would be presidential candidate in the coming elections. The response of Paz was to expel his rival. The causes of the break, however, go deeper than that.

In a long report to the congress, Paz dwelt on his policies of the past years and affirmed that he would continue his present alliance with U.S. imperialism and his course of so-called "economic stabilization" at the expense of the workers and peasants. Order and stability, according to Paz, are the necessary conditions for economic improvement, being linked to North American aid and foreign investments.

The left wing of the MNR refused to participate in the congress. Just before it met they circulated a scorching criticism of the policies followed by Paz. The document was signed by Lechin, Flores, Morales Guillen, Camberos, Zuazo Cuenca and other leading figures of the MNR. They gave the following as their reasons for refusing in advance to abide by the decisions of the congress:

"(a) Failure to hold elections in the departmental and special staffs, a prerequisite to convening a congress;

"(b) Failure to guarantee the democratic rights of the rank and file in the party, and discriminatory actions by the government and leadership in favor of the ruling camarilla;

"(c) Nonrecognition of regularly elected party delegates and irregularities in replacing them by functionaries of the government, the leadership and the top hierarchy of the state apparatus and the police;

"(d) Violations of the party statutes and arbitrary application of these statutes by decreasing rank-and-file representation;

"(e) Rigging of the congress by blackmail, slander, bribes and intimidation;

"(f) Underestimation of the national problems and lack of will to find a rational solution of the crisis facing the country and the destitution of the people;

"(g) Finally, continual use of methods of violence and terror by the government against the party ranks and the Bolivian people and systematic violation of the constitutional rights and guarantees of citizens."

The document scored "the contradiction that exists between the
appalling poverty of the country and the opulence of the government bureaucracy, who live in the best of worlds and pretend that there is no crisis in Bolivia and even that the cost of living has dropped... In reality, the national industrialists, broad commercial sectors -- compelled to make their purchases in a single market -- the employees, workers, teachers, professionals, artisans and peasants suffer from the calamitous consequences of the antinational economic policy of the government... There are no possibilities for improvement for anyone except the ruling bureaucracy."

During January there were other symptomatic indications of the widening differences in the MNR. A group of militants, including some that are very well known in Bolivia, circulated a "call to the popular forces of the MNR for the formation of a large and powerful front of national liberation."

The leaflet advances the following points as a proposed platform:

"(1) The Bolivian revolution is anti-imperialist, antifeudal and an integral part of the national Latin-American revolution;

"(2) Support the monopoly of the national market by the YPFB [the state-owned oil company] and revision of the oil code.

"(3) Defend the nationalization of the mines and demand the complete reorganization of the COMIBOL [Corporación Minera de Bolivia, the management of the nationalized mining industry];

"(4) Struggle for the installation of smelters in Bolivian territory as an unpostponable necessity to complete the economic cycle of our mining industry;

"(5) Complete the agrarian reform on the socio-economic level by organizing the agrarian economy to achieve national self-sufficiency;

"(6) Democratize the armed forces by giving them a clear popular, anti-imperialist and antifeudal consciousness;

"(7) Struggle for the equality of women and men in the exercise of their rights as citizens juridically, politically, economically and socially.

"(8) Defend trade-union rights and workers control, struggle against the division of the workers movement and move toward the gradual application of workers self-management in the nationalized industry;

"(9) Democratize the internal life of the party on the basis of a correct revolutionary ideological line with maintenance of the right of tendencies within the framework of this line."

Unrest is quite high in Bolivia. Recently a group calling themselves the Committee for Anti-Imperialist Struggle were arrested in La Paz. Aged from 16 to 20, they were accused of trying to blow up the
Venezuelan and Argentine embassies and the home of General Barrientos.

In La Paz explosives were placed in the offices of the newspaper La Nación. The automobile belonging to President Paz was blown up.

At Cochabamba telegraph and military installations were dynamited.

BIG PRESSURE ON AMERICAN NEGRO LEADERS

By Evelyn Sell

After interviewing about 300 Negro and white leaders in nearly twenty cities in both the North and South of the United States, the Associated Press concluded that 1964 would see increased demonstrations from the Negro community and greater effort toward conciliation and concessions on the part of white leaders trying to avert any repetition of last summer's upheavals.

Floyd McKissick of the Congress of Racial Equality [CORE] said, "Civil rights activities will increase in numerous places any time after the first week of February."

Mayor Malcolm Maclean of Savannah, Georgia, agreed with Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., that businessmen and white officials preferred to head off street marches and protests by making concessions.

Fearful of possible spring demonstrations, white spokesmen all over the country have been urging Negroes to be patient, to trust in peaceful negotiations and the orderly process of the law. In Washington, Representative William M. McCulloch (Republican, Ohio) urged passage of a strong civil-rights bill but warned Negroes "No people can gain liberty and equality through storm troop or anarchistic methods."

On January 11, Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., of Atlanta, Georgia, attempted to head off threatened demonstrations by announcing that fourteen major hotels and motels were voluntarily desegregating their facilities. Actually many of these enterprises had already quietly desegregated. The public statement was designed to strengthen the position of Negro leaders who had been insisting that negotiations would bring greater progress than demonstrations. These Negro leaders had organized the Atlanta Summit Conference last October in order to co-ordinate negotiations between white leaders and nine Negro organizations.

Their quiet pattern of talks was shattered on January 7 when more than one hundred high-school students boycotted classes and staged a noisy demonstration in the mayor's office. They were led by John Lewis, national chairman of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). The organization also led sit-ins at restaurants that resulted in two national chains integrating their Atlanta restaurants.

This conflict between different Negro groups in Atlanta is part of a general crisis within the Negro revolution in the United States. A
continually deepening contest for the leadership of the Negro revolution is being waged between the conservatives and the new crop of activists who have emerged from the needs and mass actions of the Negro people. The power and prestige of the conservatives are balanced precariously even though for the moment they have the backing of the white capitalist power structure.

They can retain this backing only so long as they are able to control and contain the Negro masses. But in order to lead the masses, they must do something militant. In doing something militant, they will antagonize the white capitalist power structure. If they don't antagonize that structure, the Negroes will discard them. What a dilemma!

Meanwhile they are caught between the frying pan and the fire, between the white rulers who insist on altering the status quo as little as possible and the unrelenting pressure of the Negroes' demand for "Freedom Now!" Time and again they are forced to adopt a militant stance.

For example, when the New York school boycott was announced, Roy Wilkins, head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP], stated that his organization did not support indiscriminate boycotts. Sharp criticism from many Negroes, including leaders of NAACP branches, forced Wilkins to make a statement that "where parents decided upon a boycott, we would aid."

The Rev. Milton A. Galamison, leader of the Citywide Committee for Integrated Schools, which is organizing the school boycott in New York, was head of the Brooklyn branch of the NAACP for several years. He explained why he had to go outside the NAACP to get something started: "If I could have done what I wanted to do as a leader of an established civil-rights organization, I would have remained there. I would not have started my own."

He said further: "The people seem to be way out in front of some of the big organizations, and they are demanding that new techniques be used. It is symptomatic of the revolutionary times in which we live that many people are not finding an outlet for their pent-up emotions in the existing organizations."

How to Win Friends and Influence People

Whitney Young, Jr., head of the Urban League, complained recently: "The civil-rights cause has become a short cut to leadership. There's no better way today to become a prominent and well-known leader than to lead a civil-rights movement."

As the conservative leader of a conservative organization, he of course urged the white leaders to ignore the fly-by-night agitators and give whole-hearted financial support to long-established organizations.

He was addressing a receptive audience. The white capitalist
power structure is very willing, even eager, to support and sustain the rear-guard leaders. For instance, Time magazine, for the first time in its 37 years' existence, chose a Negro as its Man of the Year. "Martin Luther King, Jr., the leader of the Negroes in Birmingham became to millions, black and white in south and north, the symbol of the Negro revolution..." said the Luce publication. "By deed and preaching, he has stirred in his people a Christian forbearance that nourishes hope and smothers injustice."

That recognition should be granted leaders of the Negro community is a welcome development, of course, if long overdue. But the timing and the choice gave the Negro vanguard little cause for rejoicing. King was swept into national prominence as one of the leaders of the less militant wing that organized the 1955 bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama. Whatever militancy he displayed then was discarded as he joined the conservative leaders.

Figures like King are now being challenged on the national scene by such leaders as John Lewis and James Forman of SNCC, Gloria Richardson, chairman of the Cambridge (Maryland) Non-Violent Action Committee, and the Rev. Albert Cleage, Jr., chairman of the Michigan Freedom Now party.

A Background Article

PORTUGUESE ULTRACOLONIALISM IN MOZAMBIQUE

By Franz J. T. Lee

Portuguese colonization of Mozambique began at the beginning of the sixteenth century. In 1505, on his voyage to India, Almeida set up a factory at Sofala on the east coast of Africa. He also built a fortress at Kilwa. In 1507 a fortress and factory were built on Mozambique island. In 1531 and 1544 Sena and Quelimane were founded. Portugal hoped to discover important sources of gold and silver in the African interior. However, neither metal was ever found in substantial quantities; hence Portuguese penetration of the hinterland was limited and ephemeral.

By 1700 only the Zambesi valley as far as Tete had been occupied. The Portuguese population along the coast did not exceed 1,000. With the collapse of the spice trade and the Asian empire, the Portuguese lost interest in the east coast. The whole area declined, the interior and the coast of Sofala becoming deserted. By 1810 the Portuguese coastal occupation was the same as in 1600, consisting of forts and trading posts from Ibo to Lourenço Marques.

Only in 1885 -- scarcely 80 years ago -- with the "Great Scramble for Africa" by the major imperialist European powers did Portugal become seriously interested in Mozambique again.
From 1895 to 1896 a campaign under Antonio Enes and Mousinho de Albuquerque reduced Gazaland in southern Mozambique. In 1897 Coutinho occupied the coastal area north of Quelimane. In 1902-04 the Zambesia Company "pacified" the area from Tete to the Nyasaland frontier. In 1906 the northern sector opposite Mozambique Island was subdued. In a series of campaigns from 1908 to 1912 the Yao tribes off Lake Nyasa were brought under control. This ends the period of military conquest.

The Chartered Companies

Up until 1890, the major vector of the new imperialism, the chartered company, was almost nonexistent in Portuguese Africa. From 1891 on, concessionary companies operated in Mozambique. By 1900 the Mozambique Company (1891), the Niassa Company (1891-93) and the Zambesia Company between them controlled two-thirds of Mozambique's economy. These companies were very small in comparison with their English or German counterparts in Africa. At this time the Portuguese economy was archaic and bankrupt. It was scarcely touched by the commercial and industrial expansion of Western Europe in the nineteenth century. It could not convert itself from an extractive imperialism to a modern industrialized power. This factor is the root determinant of the structure of the present Portuguese colonies.

Population

About 1930 there were 17,800 whites and 8,350 mestizos in Mozambique. The total population was around 3,500,000. Beginning in 1940, emigration rose significantly: 1940, 27,500; 1950, 48,000; 1960, 80,000.

Since 1950 some 5,000 families have been settled at Guiga in the Limpopo valley. In order to raise living standards for the Europeans, these settlers received up to 10 acres of irrigated and 60 acres of grazing land from the government. At present there are about 12,000,000 Africans in Mozambique.

Missionary Activity

Missionary work was carried on mainly by Portuguese Dominicans. Despite intensive campaigns, proselytizing remained ephemeral. In 1825 there were just 10 priests and of these 7 were Goans. In 1850 there were 4 on the whole coast and not a single missionary in the interior. Towards 1900 there was an influx of foreign missionaries — mainly German friars, French Montfort and Salesian fathers, and Italian Consulate friars. These missionaries were supported by Portugal in their campaign to bring the Christian religion to the natives and "barbaric races." To become an obedient slave, the African had to be civilized, while being restrained from becoming skilled or given to private initiative. The Salazar regime of today, under the official rubric of "Faith, Family, Toil" is intensely Catholic.

According to the 1950 census, Mozambique had 210,000 Catholics and 60,000 Protestants. A third of the Christian community is thus heretical despite the absence of a Protestant minority in Portugal.
In 1957 there were 310 Catholic and 200 Protestant priests (or ministers).

Missionary activity is linked with wider activities. At the dawn of European imperialism Vasco da Gama said: "I seek Christians and spices." Messianism has always been partner to colonial enterprise and as such suggestive of all its other dimensions.

Education

In 1956 out of a total population of 6,000,000 according to the census (the real figure is probably much higher), only 284,000 (including whites) were in classes. In 1954, 183,092 were listed as attending rudimentary schools, these being reserved for Africans only. Of these, just 3,595 took the final examination (after three years) and of them 2,774 passed. In 1955 there were 212,428 pupils in Catholic rudimentary schools, of these only 2,761 passed to continue their education in the primary schools. In 1954 there were 120 Africans in commercial, industrial and secondary schools in the whole of Mozambique.

In the elite Liceu -- the preparatory school for university level -- there were 5 Africans and 800 white students in 1954. No African has ever completed the whole Liceu course. There is no university in Portuguese Africa. All higher education has to be acquired in Portugal or other countries.

The outcome is that less than 1% of the Africans are officially reckoned as literate (1950 census). This is important to understanding why political organization and revolutionary work are of such low level in Mozambique.

Social Practices

Any observer can attest to the most flagrant and classic type of discrimination in Mozambique. Hospitals have black and white wards; restaurants have notices stating "Admission Reserved"; hotels employ all-white staffs; in buses and trains, in parks and gardens, all over there is strict discrimination.

A bus ride in Lourenço Marques costs one-fourth the average daily African wage. High prices seal off Africans from white commercial, social and entertainment centers. Special rent levels impose separate white and African districts.

In Lourenço Marques, as in Cape Town or Johannesburg, there is a permanent curfew for Africans after nine o'clock in the evening. The African is forced to carry a pass -- a "cadernato" -- to efficiently control and enslave him.

One sees the whole Apartheid and Bansakap policy of the Herrenvolk of South Africa at work here.
Foreign Monopoly

Although the statistics and research work and inadequate, the panorama of foreign capital in Mozambique is nonetheless impressive.

In 1959-60 Mozambique exported mainly cotton, cashew nuts, tea, sugar, copra and sisal. British capital owns two of the large concessions (the third is Portuguese), including the famous Sena states. The Matola Oil Refinery — Procon is controlled by England and the United States. In 1948 the petroleum concession was given to the Mozambique Gulf Oil Company. At Maitize coal is mined; the industry is chiefly financed by Belgium. Of the capital of the Compagnie de Charbons de Mozambique, 60% is held by the Société Minière et Géologique Belge, 30% by the Mozambique Company and the remaining 10% by the government.

Of the three banks in Mozambique, only the Banco Nacional Ultramarino is Portuguese, the other two are Barclays Bank, D.C.O., and the Standard Bank of South Africa. Out of the 23 insurance companies, 9 are Portuguese. Foreign companies hold 80% of the life insurance.

Recently the Lourenço Marques Oil Refinery was established by SONAREP [Sociedade Nacional de Refinação de Petróleo], a French-Portuguese syndicate. In the sisal plantations Swiss capital is invested; in copra concerns, a combination of Portuguese, Swiss and French.

Judging from the above, it is quite clear what a stake most of the countries of the "free world" have in continuing the exploitation and oppression of the millions of toiling African masses under Portuguese slavery.

Terror

The November 21, 1963, issue of the Freedom Fighter of Ghana published the following: "People are being drowned alive; people are being buried alive; people are being burnt alive; people are being skinned alive: — all in the 20th Century, in Mozambique! Slavery is Rampant."

To show that this is no exaggeration, I wish to repeat the list of crimes charged against Portugal by the Liberian delegate at the United Nations recently: (1) Drowning Africans in her territories. (2) Burying Africans up to their shoulders in the ground and crushing their heads with bulldozers. (3) Selling people from Mozambique to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia at £2 a head. She produced first-hand evidence that 10,000 African workers were being sold each year to South Africa. And Portugal belongs to NATO!

Mozambican freedom fighters who have fled to South Africa or Southern Rhodesia are kidnapped and maltreated by the police of Welensky and Verwoerd and handed over to the Portuguese secret police (FIDE). This service is reciprocated by the Portuguese. Some examples: The kidnapping of Edward Ngubeni and Philip Sebral from South Africa, and of Jaime Sigauke from Salisbury, in April 1962, to Mozambique. Recently Filipe Madzodzere and Alfred Amargo were kidnapped from Salisbury. In June 1963, Peter Balamanja — founder of the Mozambique
African National Congress -- was again kidnapped. The Dennis Brutus, Angie Brooks and Dr. Kenneth Abrahams incidents are other examples of kidnapping and forcible expulsion from neighboring territories to South Africa.

Due to poor communications, high illiteracy and rigorous control by the authorities, political organization inside Mozambique is very difficult. Portugal persistently cuts off contact with leaders and co-thinkers in other countries.

However, all this is in vain. With the progress of the Angolan revolution and the forward march of the African revolution, Portugal will soon have to roll up her map in Africa.