"PREVENTIVE COUP D'ETAT" IN BOLIVIA

From information which World Outlook has received from Bolivia, it is now possible to fill in more accurately the picture of what happened in the downfall of the Paz Estenssoro regime. It is clear that at a certain moment, the repressive measures taken by the would-be dictator touched off a mass reply that bordered on an uprising. At Sora-Sora, in particular, where the press reported that the army had driven back the miners, it appears that just the opposite occurred.

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The miners, who were ill-armed but who greatly outnumbered the troops, held their own, succeeded in seizing arms from the soldiers,
and eventually compelled them to retreat. Bolivian Trotskyists were prominent in this struggle.

It was at this point that General Barrientos, who, according to all reports, had been groomed for some time by the State Department and Pentagon as the "coming man" in Bolivia decided, along with others, that the situation had become extremely dangerous and that it was necessary to carry out a preventive coup d'état at once. The result was that the regime went down and Paz Estenssoro had to flee the country.

"At present," our correspondent writes, "there is the most complete liberty since the Paz apparatus was dismantled. There is a veritable flowering of newspapers, and each class, each social layer, each party, group and political tendency is freely expressing itself and advancing its own demands. Thus one can read the program of the extreme right and, at the other pole, the program of the COB [Central Obrera Boliviana] which shows the evident influence of the Trotskyists.

"It is clear that the country is going through a provisional interlude and that the conflict will presently be resumed. Already one occurred over the demand that arms be given up to the army, something which the miners have openly refused to do.

"The miners have more arms than ever. They are stronger and more determined. The peasants are hesitating. I should add that the news on the international press wires about the peasants backing Paz against the students and miners was false or exaggerated. This occurred only at Sucre where they belong to the Falange.

"Barrientos is not playing the role of the typical 'gorilla' [reactionary militarist]. On the contrary. He is promising everything to everybody, visiting the mines, etc. He has made overtures about re-establishing workers control, his Minister of Labor coming out flatly in favor of it.

"I should add that the Trotskyists, whose ranks are recruited from the poorest levels of the population, are completely out of funds. This greatly handicaps them in presenting their program in this promising situation."

The latest news in the world press is that Washington is holding up both recognition of the Barrientos government and also economic aid for the Bolivian people. Anti-imperialist sentiment is high in Bolivia and quick recognition would not help Barrientos' image. In addition the situation is so unstable that the State Department may have decided to wait to see if Barrientos can actually consolidate his position. On November 21 Barrientos asked all civilians to hand in their arms but he has not received an enthusiastic response. The slogan of the Trotskyists is "Nobody give up your arms. The whole people and the workers need their arms."
BOLIVIAN UNIONS PRESENT JUNTA WITH 38-POINT PLATFORM

[A 38-point memorial has been presented by the Central Obrera Boliviana [COB], the country's trade-union federation, to the military junta that took power when Paz Estenssoro fled the country in face of nation-wide strife. General Barrientos, the head of the junta, asked for a "reasonable time" before stating his reaction.

The document, published about November 12, is especially valuable for what it reveals about the thinking among Bolivia's trade unionists in the days following the downfall of Paz Estenssoro. In the first part, an analysis is made of the causes of the "popular insurrection" that toppled the Paz Estenssoro regime. It is acknowledged that the military junta has liberalized many things "but this liberalization is not sufficient." Every revolution is characterized by a change in the classes holding power and the transformation of the economic base of society; but this has not occurred in Bolivia, since both the political machinery of the "tyranny" and the economic power it represented still remain.

[After analyzing the situation, the COB offers the 38 proposals which we have translated below.]

* * *

(1) Strict observance of the labor laws, the inviolability of union headquarters, the right to strike, the right to organize all sectors of the working class, and other social conquests. Maintenance of the unity, democracy and independence of the trade unions.

(2) Immediate reinstatement of the leaders and workers fired from their jobs because of political or union activities.

(3) Annulment of the administrative and juridical proceedings maliciously initiated by the Paz Estenssoro tyranny in order to repress leaders and workers.

(4) Payment for the damages to trade-union buildings when they were attacked (headquarters of the COB and FSTMB in La Paz, of the COD in Santa Cruz, Radio Sumac Orko in Potosí, the Cochabamba workshops of the COD and the miners in Oruro, etc.).

(5) Annulment of the dictatorial measures under which divisive, parallel and phony union organizations were artificially set up in order to serve the ulterior interests of the tyranny.

(6) Full restoration of democratic rights and constitutional guarantees for all political tendencies.

(7) Prosecution of the former officials of the deposed regime for trampling on the Magna Carta, disregarding the country's social legislation, for illegal gains, fraud in handling public
funds, perpetration of torture, murder and the violation of the human rights of the people.

(8) Immediate restoration of workers' control, with veto rights, in the nationalized mining industry, without any restrictions impairing this conquest of the people. Examination of the advisability of reorganizing the COMIBOL [Corporación Minera de Bolivia, in charge of the nationalized mining industry] along the lines of workers' self-management.

(9) Notification that the trade-union representation has been vacated in the Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Consejo Nacional de Vivienda, Cajas de Seguridad Social, Consejo Nacional de Cooperativas and other state institutions. Designation of new representatives by the organizations concerned.

(10) Designation of workers representatives in the Banco Central, Banco Minero, Banco Agrícola, Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo, Corte Nacional del Trabajo, YPFB, LAB, Empresa Nacional de Electricidad, Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles and the Corporación Boliviana de Fomento in order to show that the working class is the fundamental and irreplaceable factor in production.

(11) Complete freedom of the press and radio, including labor and university stations.

(12) Recognition of the democratic decisions of trade-union congresses and conferences to maintain workers guards and the arms held by labor.

(13) Fulfillment of the government offer to turn over to COB the plant and equipment of La Razon because of this newspaper's intellectual sponsorship of the murder of workers.

(14) Total destruction of the files of the former Control Político [political police], to be checked by the Comité Revolucionario del Pueblo [Revolutionary Committee of the People].

(15) Energetic struggle against illiteracy. Integration of primary education into the structure of the Ministry of Education. Restoration of the economic autonomy of the universities and the legal transfer of the ITB to the Bolivian University.

(16) Resumption of diplomatic relations with the republics of Cuba and Czechoslovakia.


(18) Acceptance of the Czechoslovak contract to install an antimony smelter at Vinto.
(19) Increase the capital in the nationalized and state enterprises by accepting international credit from any country in the world willing to grant it.

(20) Repeal of the August 22, 1963, decree and re-establishment of freedom of international trade. Diplomatic and commercial relations with the countries that offer us mutual advantages, without political discrimination.

(21) Revision of agrarian reform court decisions in violation of the law and against the interests of the peasantry by which large estates were re-established under false designations.

(22) Creation of a National Bank for Co-operative Credit and an effective material fostering of co-operativism in all fields.

(23) Integration of the public health services and establishment of clinics in the urban zones and peasant regions.

(24) Confiscation of the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario] headquarters used for repressive purposes and the homes of newly rich members of the MNR, to be converted into schools. The rural properties of these elements to be turned over to the workers to establish vacation centers. Freezing of the bank accounts of members of the tyranny and investigation of their fortunes.

(25) Conversion of the zonal command headquarters of the MNR into literacy centers and public libraries.

(26) Prosecution of the persecutors, torturers, criminals and murderers who belonged to the tyranny.

(27) Indemnification of the families of workers, peasants, students and other patriots murdered by the Paz Estenssoro dictatorship.

(28) Just attention to the wage demands of the workers as a means to increase purchasing power in the national market.

(29) Lowering and freezing of prices of goods of prime necessity and electric rates. An active campaign against speculation. Creation of government stores to regulate prices.

(30) Study on including agricultural workers, artisans, independent drivers, professionals and other social groups in the benefits of social security.

(31) Improvement of the position of Bolivian women by granting them economic, social and political equality. Dissolution of all the feminine shock groups.

(32) Revision of the oil code to provide for workers' par-
ticipation and with the objective of establishing the necessary safeguards for the national interests.

(33) Economic rehabilitation and adoption of protectionist measures in favor of the best arts and industries and the country's other branches of production.

(34) Construction and financing of homes for all sectors of the working class, eliminating the system of political discrimination.

(35) Study of a plan to bring about the return of workers and technicians who emigrated from Bolivia in search of freedom and jobs.

(36) Utilization of the funds diverted to the political police, the militia, the pork barrellers, the unnecessary diplomatic posts, the official parliamentarians, as well as the MNR subsidies, the pay-offs for trade-union bosses and other similar funds for the immediate launching of public works to absorb the unemployed.

(37) Repeal of the decree which degraded independent professionals by involving them in the collection of taxes.


With our best respects, cordially yours.

For the Nacional Executive Committee of the COB:

Daniel Saravia Quiroz  Carlos Tobar Baldieieso
Benedicto Delgadillo  José María Palacios
Orlando Capriles Villazón  Francisco Revollo
Guillermo Limpias  Mario Rico Galarza
Aldo Flores  Ofelia Altamirano
Hugo Siles Gómez  Tomás Lobera
Raúl Larrea
BOLIVIAN TROTSKYISTS ADVISE "NO CONFIDENCE" IN MILITARY JUNTA

[The following statement was issued by the Political Committee of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario [POR], the Bolivian Section of the Fourth International, upon the downfall of the Paz Estenssoro government.]

* * *

Amid general rejoicing among the people, the most bloody lackey of imperialism in recent times has fallen. The POR joins in the popular celebration over the downfall of the murderer of university students and miners, the logical corollary of the process of disintegration of capitalist policies, of the crisis of the bourgeois program (in Bolivia as throughout the world), which brought the ferment to such pitch that the end of the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario] was inevitable, bringing things to the alternative: either a popular insurrection along the socialist road, or the displacement of Paz and the MNR by order of Yankee imperialism. This is what the POR heavily stressed and taught, and with this in mind the workers prepared to establish their own government.

It was the strength of the proletariat and its revolutionary struggles that pulverized the dismal MNR government and its whole antilabor policy saturated with the most shameless servility to international finance capital. It was the action of the revolutionary Marxists, the entry of the teachers and students into battle, and finally in La Paz, Cochabamba and Oruro the valorous and patriotic action of the university students that completed the undermining of the regime's stability.

The powerful repressive apparatus of the MNR, exercised for twelve years, could not contain or destroy the militant spirit of the people. Despite the exilings, the gloomy jails, the use of the army in the massacre at Sora-Sora and the attack on the "San José" radio station, the people continued their energetic pressure and the fate of the butcher Paz was already decided and his downfall was only a matter of days.

But in face of the failure of the persecution and the massacre, the Army suddenly revolted, the very same Army which up until November 2 upheld the tyrannical regime and which at Sucre, Cochabamba and La Paz fought the people alongside the mercenary bands, the political police and the carabineros.

In the final moments of the MNR, the Army intervened, the same Army that a few days earlier, on orders of the despot, massacred the miners at Sora-Sora and attacked the miners' radio station "San José," and which before that attacked the guerrilla fighters at Santa Cruz and Apolo. Mustang planes flew over the mines to intimidate the proletariat.

[The following text continues...]

[The following text continues...]
And, in confirmation of our forecasts, what has occurred politically in Bolivia is a preventive coup d'état aimed at safeguarding the economic and social structures of the country, no doubt with the cunning connivance of the Yankee embassy, with the objective of containing the insurrection and cheating the popular feelings and aspirations.

In this way, the political power that should have passed into the hands of the people and their political organizations, slipped into the hands of a Military Junta, who did not fail to shield the butcher and his followers in their escape.

The apparatus set up by the MNR has not been touched and various functionaries are the same ones who were in the administration with Víctor Paz, including some landholders. The political economy is to remain the same as it has been for the past twelve years. Thus the Military Junta is not the government for which the people have been clamoring.

The entire people -- university students, miners, teachers, etc., rose up in arms to overthrow an entire regime and an entire conception personified in the men of the MNR; and what they want now is to bury the whole MNR policy, its men and its plans dictated by the Yankee embassy. The people don't want to continue the past or to "restore" it.

Because of this, the position of the working class, employees, patriotic university students, revolutionary intellectuals, peasants, communalists and ex-tenants can be nothing else than absolute independence with regard to the Military Junta, alert vigilance, nothing but no confidence.

It is necessary to overcome the obstacle of opportunist currents that are trying to deliver the working class to the Military Junta.

As for the workers parties, it is their duty to establish a united front of the left to organize the masses and direct their struggle toward real national and social liberation along the revolutionary socialist road.

Along this road it is necessary to revitalize the COB [Central Obrera Boliviana, the trade-union federation] in a revolutionary way and cure it of its bureaucratic ossification, rectifying the influence of the MNR. It must be converted into a living, militant, independent force as a center of proletarian power.

The trade unions of the COB must be tempered in the proletarian concept of self-sacrifice, tenacity and revolutionary determination.

And all of us, parties, unions, and the people, let's lift high the banners of the anti-imperialist struggle.
TROTSKYISTS FREED BY INSURGENT BOLIVIANS

[The following article has been translated from a special bulletin issued by Lucha Obrera, publication of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario [POR], in La Paz.]

* * *

The active participation of the POR, boldly and valiantly with the masses, in the struggle against the murderous government of the MNR (we repeated this phrase a thousand times when they still held power) cost our party many casualties.

In recent weeks, in the interior of the country as well as in La Paz, various activists of the POR fell prisoner or were wounded. In Oruro, Paulino Joaniquina, general secretary of the "San Jose" union, was savagely persecuted by the political police, the carabineros and the army until in the final week he was imprisoned and brutally beaten. He carried out his duties as a trade-union leader and Trotskyist militant in a disciplined way, fighting at the side of the university students and mobilizing the miners.

In La Paz, on the historic Thursday, October 29, a whole brigade of followers of the POR were taken prisoner and sadistically tortured in the jails of the political police. Among them were Comrades Gabriel Guzmán, Eulogio Sánchez, Jaime Latorre, Indalecio Nogales (a factory worker), Armando Ramirez, Laureano Apaza Bautista, Luis Bautista, Carlos N. Silva, Miguel Zambrana, Jorge Peredo and Ricardo Sojas. Comrade Nogales, a leader at Said, was given the lash for having brought 200 workers from his plant to the university forces. Comrade Sánchez was wounded in the head and Comrade Guzmán badly injured by torture inflicted by the thug Menacho in person. Also Comrade Adalid Latorre was imprisoned and beaten by agents of the police.

All the Trotskyist comrades were freed when the people fought their way into the shameful building of the political police. We place the names of all these comrades on the Party's Roll of Honor in the struggle against the lackey of imperialism Paz Estenssoro.

THE BATTLES OF "SAN JOSE" AND SORA-SORA

[The following article has been translated from a special bulletin issued by Lucha Obrera, publication of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario [POR], in La Paz.]

* * *

The heroic struggles of the mine workers found the militants of the POR in the front ranks. Thanks to the participation of the
Trotskyists, the mobilization of the miners acquired force and dynamism.

The party singles out and congratulates the comrades of the POR in Huanuni, Catavi and Siglo Veinte who fought at Sora-Sora. The captured arms must be guarded and utilized for the organization of an armed party force as part of the Miners Proletarian Army.

The battle of Sora-Sora and the attack on the "San José" radio station will go down in history as major symbols of the resistance of the masses. The first was marked by courage and coolness, the second by stubbornness. In both actions the regiments defending the tyranny boasted of their might and their modern armaments.

But likewise both battles against the bonapartist and restorationist regime of the MNR virtually determined the downfall of the person who wanted to be president for life.

VENEZUELAN CP HAS ITS OWN POSITION

ROME -- On his way to Moscow, Eduardo Gallegos Mancera, a member of the Political Bureau of the Venezuelan Communist party and head of its International Office, granted an interview to l'Unità, daily newspaper of the Italian Communist party [PCI].

Gallegos stated that his party has abstained from taking a public position on the problems of the international Communist movement in order "not to give the enemy the opportunity to take advantage of the discussion to weaken the party's rank and file. This does not mean, however, that the Venezuelan Communists are standing at the fringe of the discussion or favor an empty, straddling position. We hold precise opinions on the various aspects of the discussion and we have stated them frankly in talks we have had in Moscow, Peking and other capitals."

Gallegos stated that "We deplore the fact that the discussion has degenerated into a quarrel and we deplore the forms taken by the quarrel. We believe it would have been more useful to keep it on an ideological level; and, in this sense, our position coincides with that of the PCI on the necessity to deepen the debate, using fair terms and on a fraternal basis. In Venezuela we have done our best to give the widest possible circulation to Togliatti's memorandum, which, aside from any reservations one may have concerning it, is considered by us to be an exceptional contribution to the unity of the international Communist movement."

Gallegos believes that the best way to preserve the unity of the international Communist movement is to preserve unity in each party and to condemn factionalism.
Referring to the question of national roads to socialism, he said that "every party should choose its own revolutionary road by itself. Faced with the regime of terrorist tyranny that in one form or another has dominated Venezuela, we have chosen armed struggle as the main form. This is our own line, and not the Chinese, Soviet, or Cuban line, and we want it to be respected, just as we respect the line chosen by other parties; i.e., the Chilean party. And I must say that it has been met everywhere with respect and understanding, beginning with the PCI." [Emphasis added.]

REBELLION AMONG YOUNG SOCIALISTS IN CHILE

SANTIAGO DE CHILE -- The results of the September 4 elections and the passive reaction of the bureaucratic leaders of the Chilean Socialist party, who have been putting up a blind defense of their role in the defeat, has provoked considerable reaction among the ranks of the party.

The youth proved once again that they constitute the most sensitive sector. The criticisms voiced everywhere finally ended in the adoption of a rebellious stand by the youth leadership in both North and South Santiago. They adopted the following resolution:

"The results of the election of September 4 weigh like a heavy burden in the minds of the workers of the country.

"Amazement and anger dominate the feelings of the activists among our youth and wide sectors of the party. This anger is completely justified. We have been led into a blind alley; this blind alley is the purely electoral and reformist policy which the leadership imposed on the campaign, thus separating itself from the profound revolutionary impulse of the masses that has been demonstrated on various occasions. The martyrs of the town of José María Caro are a tragic demonstration of this fighting determination of the workers.

"More than a month after the election, the party leadership refuses to look at the dark reality and insists on its sterile legalistic and parliamentarian policy.

"It is clear that it is no longer possible to expect from such a leadership a return to the revolutionary line of our party. It is urgent to respond, to no longer tolerate a situation that threatens to destroy the living nucleus of the party, to deepen the retreat of the workers and again take us along a defeatist and capitulatory path.

"In this critical hour, it is up to us to rescue our own party. We will not leave this precious instrument of the workers in
the hands of a Social Democratic leadership. The honor of socialism is at stake.

"The Regional Committees of North Santiago and South Santiago of the Socialist Youth Federation call on all the activists, sectional and regional bodies of the country to defend in the most energetic way the integrity of revolutionary socialism. Comrades: We declare a state of revolutionary emergency in our party. We demand that the present party leadership be put on political trial. We demand an honest, frank and revolutionary accounting of what happened. We demand a policy that will really open the road to the conquest of power by the workers. We demand a National Extraordinary Congress at once.

"We declare that this Congress cannot be called under the sponsorship of a leadership which has proved itself incapable of carrying out the great aims of socialism. This task belongs to the ranks of the party and to leaders who have not been compromised. The two Regional Committees declare that they accept no decisions emanating from such a body. We ask the comrades to take all the necessary measures to hold a genuinely democratic Congress."

A few days after this resolution was passed, the majority of the Central Committee of the Socialist Youth Federation decided to expel three members of the Santiago committees who were considered to be mainly responsible for the resolution. This provoked a veritable insurrection of the rank and file.

At a full meeting of the youth cadre in the city -- a meeting of record attendance -- the Central Committee did not even dare announce the official measures that had been adopted. The expelled youth leaders were able to participate normally in the meeting. The decision of the Central Committee was unanimously rejected and the action of the two committees was approved.

Big sectors of the party in Santiago also successively took positions favoring the resolution.

The Central Committee of the youth organization decided to postpone a full national gathering and now appears to be awaiting the decisions of the Central Committee of the party.

BRIZOLA OFFERS A SELF-CRITICISM

The counterrevolutionary coup d'état in Brazil April 1 has led to much soul-searching among Latin-American radical circles over the errors that helped pave the way for the military take-over. The general conclusion being reached is that the single gravest mistake was to believe in the possibility that socialism could come to power
in Brazil along a peaceful road, as promulgated by the Khrushchevists. How widespread this conclusion is can be judged from an interview granted by Leonel Brizola to Armando Rodriguez which was published in the November 4 issue of the Mexico City journal *Siempre!*

Brizola, the former governor of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, is now in exile in Montevideo. Although of extremely poverty-stricken background (he left home as a boy after seeing his father beheaded by agents of the oligarchy in his region, and worked in menial jobs in Porto Alegre), he was considered to be a political representative of the sector of the bourgeoisie that clearly recognizes that Brazil faces an inevitable violent revolution unless peaceful reforms are granted. In Rio Grande do Sul, Brizola sought to begin the process of peaceful reform and thereby became one of the major targets in the propaganda of the oligarchy and its imperialist allies in the United States.

First of all, Rodriguez asked, "What happened in Brazil?"

Brizola responded, "What had to happen! We in charge in Brazil, above all our president Goulart, set up a government, carried out all our political activity, on a foundation of illusions that had no connection with reality, so that we provided all the conditions for the military coup d'etat of the gorillas [reactionary officer caste]. Nothing could result from our government but the military coup d'etat and greater imperialist domination of our country."

Brizola admitted that the high command of the armed forces openly prepared the military coup d'etat under guidance of the strategists of the Pentagon and the Department of State. He said that Goulart had been warned many times of the "grave danger" but up to the very last moment had "blindly trusted in the lying declarations of false loyalty to his government..."

Goulart paid no attention to the warnings. "His policy of constant concessions to the oligarchical landholders, to the representatives of the imperialist interests, ended in disaster. His plan of basic reforms which required the application of elementary measures related to agrarian reform, control over profits taken out of the country, improvement of the living standards of the population, was destined to failure, among other reasons because of the blind opposition of the National Congress, composed in its majority of faithful servants of the oligarchy and imperialism."

"And why didn't the forces of the left take this into account?" he was asked.

"While this is no time for recriminations," Brizola replied, "... it is necessary to say that the forces of the left in Brazil, aside from being dispersed, divided and victim of great confusion, were not capable of linking up with -- still less leading -- the
Brazilian people in their struggle against reaction and imperialism. Among the political organizations of the left, some were sectarian and dogmatic; others were ossified and insensitive to Brazilian realities; others, their leaders caught up with concepts remote from the real feelings of the Brazilians, were caught by surprise by the military coup d'état. We in the Front of Popular Mobilization recognized the danger of a coup d'état and because of this began to organize the 'groups of eleven,' but we recognized it very late. We did not have time to build up these fighting groups in the necessary way, still less arm them to resist the aggression of the gorillas."

"And the Peasant Leagues and the Communist party? And the marines and the sergeants?"

"[Francisco] Julião played an important role in indicating the enormous importance of the peasantry in Brazil's struggles for liberation, but he was unable to organize the peasant masses to resist the aggression. Very few of us were capable of appreciating the importance of the struggle initiated by Julião, who for a long time was unjustly attacked by the Communists. Today he is in prison gravely ill and the Leagues must be reorganized in accordance with a new and adequate concept of the new circumstances.

"The sergeants and the marines, at the decisive moments of their struggles, lacked adequate leadership and even support. Today many of them are suffering violent persecution; others have fallen, and still others are imprisoned. The sergeants and marines, nevertheless, are struggling better and better.

"On the Communist party what can I say? Forty years in existence, forty years in which the frustrations, the errors, the obstinate quirks and narrow attitudes remote from Brazilian reality outweigh the successes. Its main leaders long ago completely lost the capacity for self-criticism. As a result they never make mistakes and always find a justification for their errors. In this way they have become the high priests of defeats."

While sharply critical of Goulart, who is his brother-in-law, Brizola defended him against those who seek to convert him into a scapegoat, accusing him of "treason." Many of these people were his closest collaborators and shared his illusions. Before they blame Goulart they should first recognize "their own errors and their own responsibility." Brizola singled out especially those who proclaimed the certainty of being able to reach socialism "along the peaceful road," those who "fostered legalistic and reformist illusions and condemned as 'adventurism' every attempt to resist the coup d'état; who openly claimed to exercise 'a great influence' on Goulart's thinking and acts. . . "

Defining the current situation in Brazil, its jails filled with thousands of political prisoners who suffer torture at the hands of the dictatorship, Brizola declared:
Since April 1, when Brazil fell under the domination of a military dictatorship, imposed and supported by North American imperialism, I believe that the Brazilian revolutionists have been left with no alternative but insurrectional struggle. This in no way signifies that we reject other forms of nonviolent struggle, forms that will have to be combined with it, but on condition that one or another form of struggle must be derived from a single tactical and strategic conception.

In Brazil, North American imperialism and its servants have forced us into armed struggle. It would be a very serious error to even imagine that a savage, unthinking military dictatorship can be confronted with only speeches, demonstrations and strikes of unarmed people. The legal and peaceful means which some are still advocating to re-establish democracy in Brazil have been closed by imperialism and its servants. To believe on the other hand that the dictatorship will fall by itself is to return to false illusions. And we are surrounded by not a few people suffering from illusions.

We know very well that among the traitors to Brazil, concretely between Lacerda and Castelo Branco, bloody battles are developing. The bandits are quarreling over the booty. Behind Lacerda are many traitors who can replace him and behind Castelo are the gorillas who can replace him. But the problem is not to change the gorillas and the traitors. The problem is to free Brazil and the Brazilians from the military dictatorship and imperialist domination, not for a day, not for a year, but forever.

To gain this patriotic objective there is no other means than revolutionary struggle. Illusions, then, to the deluded; and to the revolutionists, this struggle."

Brizola sees no easy road to victory. "The struggle is going to be long, very painful. It is going to cost great sacrifices. The struggle for liberty carries a high price as the Brazilian people know very well. Every revolutionary fighter recognizes this reality."

GRIM SOUTH AFRICAN STATISTICS

LUSAKA, Zambia. -- According to the South African press of October 31, the count of people banned and placed under house arrest by Vorster, Minister of Justice, numbers about 404 (more have been placed under house arrest since then) under the Suppression of Communist Act. Of the 404, eighty-nine have been banned under Section 5 which refers to named Communists. The remaining 315 were banned under Section 9 which creates "statutory communists." This is a broad term applied indiscriminately to anyone who demands democratic rights or who belongs to an organization that demands those rights.
Since the imposition of the 90-day law, two detainees have died by hanging and one was reported to have jumped to his death during interrogation. Five have had their minds so affected they have had to receive psychiatric treatment or be sent to mental institutions. Complaints of beatings and electric torture reveal the uncontrolled powers given to the police during interrogations to elicit evidence and force confessions. In the allegations made by detainees, the names of certain policemen occur again and again with suspicious frequency on charges of excessive brutality.

On Section 17 of the 90-day law, Vorster reluctantly accepted an amendment providing for a once-a-week visit by a magistrate to every detainee. According to H. Russell, chairman of the 90-day Protest Committee, there is doubt whether the magistrate's weekly visit is an effective safeguard against abuse because there is no obligation to take action. He may disbelieve the complaints because he sees no external signs of third-degree maltreatment. If a detainee has been electrically shocked or suffocated with a plastic bag or kept standing in a small square for anything up to 48 hours, there are no visible signs of injury. Nor is a magistrate qualified as a doctor is to notice mental deterioration caused by solitary confinement for periods extending far beyond 90 days.

**THE CASE OF JOSEPH JOHNSON**

Since the beginning of the McCarthyite period, both Democratic and Republican administrations have sought to establish a legal pattern for depriving citizens of the United States of their citizenship because of their political views. In the case of naturalized citizens some successes have been recorded in these reactionary efforts. With citizens born in the United States, this has proved more difficult.

Thus considerable interest has arisen in what may well prove to be a test case in this area -- the efforts to deport Joseph Johnson who was born in Chicago, Illinois, November 7, 1930, and who spent his childhood in Chippewa Falls, Wisconsin.

The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service claims that he is an "alien" because he went to Canada during the fifties and ran for public office in Toronto. They also contend he fled the country in order to avoid being drafted and lived in Canada under an assumed name.

Johnson does not deny going to Canada. In fact he has some pleasant things to say about the atmosphere in Canada in contrast to the witch-hunting in the U.S. But he does deny becoming a Canadian.
When he learned that his draft number had come up and that he was being charged with draft evasion, he says, he returned to the United States. He had barely crossed the border at Buffalo when he was arrested by immigration authorities as an American citizen seeking to evade the draft. As a native of the state, he was returned to Wisconsin, tried as an American citizen, convicted as an American citizen, and was sentenced as an American citizen to serve two years in an American prison.

He argues that this should be sufficient evidence to prove that the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the U.S. Courts regarded him as an American citizen.

Perhaps they would not have changed their minds about this if Johnson had not later joined the Socialist Workers party, become organizer of the Twin Cities branch of that organization and run first for congress in 1962 and then for mayor of Minneapolis against -- crime of crimes! -- both the Republicans and Democrats. That was when the McCarthyites decided that Johnson was obviously an "alien" who should be deported.

The Emergency Civil Liberties Committee has taken the case and provided Leonard Boudin as general counsel and Douglas Hall of Minneapolis as local counsel. The two lawyers say that Johnson has given permission to take the case to the Supreme Court if necessary.

A committee has been formed to raise funds for legal expenses, to publicize the case and to get sponsors. The address is "Committee to Oppose the Deportation of Joseph Johnson," P.O. Box 8731, Northstar Bldg., Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402, U.S.A.

NOT ILLEGAL TO BURN FRANCO EFFIGY IN COPENHAGEN

The Danish government announced November 17 that it would not punish demonstrators in Copenhagen who burned Generalissimo Franco in effigy October 20.

Ambassador Marquess del Romeral of Spain filed a formal protest at the Foreign Office expressing his government's "concern" over the damage done the fascist leader.

The demonstration was organized to protest the trial of the poet Carlos Alvarez in Madrid. He faces three years in prison because of a letter he wrote last year against the drumhead trial of Julian Grimau who was later executed. The charge against Carlos Alvarez was issuance of "illegal propaganda."

Besides this sentence, Carlos Alvarez faces a new trial before a military courtmartial for the same offense.
Among the Communist parties in the West, the Swedish organization appears to still hold the record for making the sharpest criticism of the procedure followed in ousting Khrushchev. An editorial in the October 21 issue of the party's daily Ny Dag questioned the reasons first offered for kicking out the Soviet premier:

"If the only motive for his dismissal was age and illness, this would not have been unusual in view of the fact that Khrushchev is 70 years old; but why then wasn't the text of his resignation made public? Why was there no medical report, customary in such cases?"

Continuing in this vein, the editorial asks: "Why not a word of thanks to Khrushchev, who spent the greater part of his life in the service of the Soviet state in responsible and leading positions? Why wasn't he given the opportunity to tell the Soviet people himself why he decided to resign? Because of this, one must conclude that Khrushchev did not simply resign. He was dismissed, overthrown."

Ny Dag stresses the abnormal procedure. "At the party congress of 1961, he was re-elected first secretary of the Central Committee. According to the statutes, the congress must be convened at least once every four years. In addition, the Central Committee has the right to call a special congress 'on its own initiative.' This can be done within two months.

"Why couldn't they wait until the 1965 congress and arrange a change in party leadership there in a normal way and under normal conditions?"

"If an immediate change in party leadership was considered necessary, why didn't they convene a special party congress as in 1959?"

"The procedure in Khrushchev's resignation as chairman of the Council of Ministers is even stranger. Article 70 of the constitution of the Soviet Union provides that the Supreme Soviet; i.e., parliament, designate the chairman of the Council of Ministers. Parliament was not convened at all this fall. The Presidium, composed of 33 members, dismissed Khrushchev and designated his successor. But the constitution provides no sanction for such procedure. The rights of the Presidium are limited by article 49 which states that 'between sessions (of the Supreme Soviet) it can dismiss individual ministers, upon the proposal of the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, and can designate new ones.'

"The constitution specifies the exact difference between ministers and the chairman or vice chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. The Supreme Soviet holds two sessions a year. One of them normally takes place near the end of the year, in order, among
many other things, to adopt the budget for the following year. In addition the Presidium has the right to convene special sessions.

"Why wasn't the matter postponed until the session (of the Supreme Soviet) near the end of the year 1964, so that a motion of censure could be introduced in the Supreme Soviet against Khrushchev and a proposal be submitted to designate a new chairman of the Council of Ministers?"

"And if an immediate change in the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers had become unavoidable, why didn't the Presidium call for a special session of the Supreme Soviet?"

"Outside of the 33 members of the Presidium, no vice chairman (of the Council of Ministers) had the opportunity to express himself on the question of designating a new chairman of the Council of Ministers. From a democratic point of view, it is poor consolation to know that they can take up the matter later when the Presidium calls for ratification of its measures in the next session of the Supreme Soviet."

"The way in which Khrushchev resigned, or was forced to resign, leaves a bitter taste. He was not permitted to say even a simple 'thank you' and 'good-by' to the people. The curtain came down between one day and the next, in sad contrast to the open debates and intense election campaigns in Sweden, Denmark and Britain preceding the mobilization of the voters whose decision determines who is to guide the destinies of these countries in the coming years."

In this paragraph, Ny Dag displays rather nakedly to what extent illusions in bourgeois democracy have spread among the adherents of Khrushchevism. One of the features of Leninism, by way of contrast, is precisely its understanding of the erosion of bourgeois democracy which even at best never altered the essentially dictatorial character of capitalist rule.

However Ny Dag does score a telling point in the following paragraph:

"After the end of Stalinism at the Twentieth and Twenty-second party congresses, it was generally thought outside the Soviet Union that the methods used by the new leaders to replace Khrushchev were a thing of the past. This idea has proved to be wrong. Khrushchev's downfall is a useful reminder of how far away we still are from Lenin's road which in his time was followed without errors."
A SHIFT IN MOSCOW'S POLICY TOWARD INDIA?

A shift in Moscow's policy in relation to India was intimated November 15-16 during a "conference for peace and international cooperation" held at the Sapru House in New Delhi. In a closed-door discussion on the India-China dispute, the Soviet delegation, headed by Academician Zhukov, gave many indications of reluctance to say anything critical about China although it went along with other delegations in criticizing the Chinese nuclear test, according to the Calcutta Statesman of November 18.

The discussion took place in a commission charged with drafting a statement on "relaxation of international tension and peaceful coexistence of different social systems."

The Indian delegation, headed by Dewan Chaman Lal, took it for granted that the Russian delegation would support the proposal that China should accept the Colombo proposals as a basis for talks to settle the Sino-Indian dispute. The assumption was made on the basis of Khrushchev's support of India in the border conflict, including supplying arms, and the repeated assurances of Khrushchev's heirs that they will continue the former Soviet premier's policy toward India.

"But it was a rude shock to the host delegation," reports the Statesman, "... when the Russians began to drag their feet. They not only refused to endorse the Colombo proposals but also declined to accept that the India-China border was an 'area of tension.'"

According to the same source, "bitter and prolonged dispute between the Indian and Russian delegations followed" from the morning of November 16 "until well past midnight. At one time it appeared that the meeting of the commission might break up in confusion and disunity."

However, at two o'clock in the morning other delegates intervened, advising a further session. Late in the afternoon a compromise was patched up which was finally accepted by both sides. While the commission designates the India-China border as an "area of tension," the statement "falls short of clear support for India which was available during Mr. Khrushchev's leadership" and merely urges that the boundary dispute be solved "in the spirit of the Colombo proposals."
KHRUSHCHEV'S HEIRS SEEK TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION

By Pierre Frank

Khrushchev's dismissal has been followed up, a month later, with expulsions from the Central Committee and new nominations to the Presidium. On the eliminations there is little worth noting -- they involve Khrushchev's closest collaborators who are now paying the price for their former prominence. It has not been reported whether Khrushchev himself was present at the Central Committee meeting where these measures were taken although it would be quite surprising if he were. Yesterday, the premier; today he no longer exists -- did not even exist in the past.

Among the new nominations the most interesting are those involving the rise of younger figures like Alexander N. Shelepin. For the first time, men are appearing in the ruling heights who, because of their youth, not only did not participate in the first years of the revolution even in an obscure way or in executive posts during the dark years of the Stalinist repression, but who during the war occupied minor posts at best. By formation and by occupation they are bureaucrats imbued with numerous concepts inherited from the Stalinist past, but they have lived under quite different conditions from those experienced by their predecessors. These anonymous faces emerging from the bureaucratic night are featureless. No one can say with the least certainty who they are, or what they may do -- within the bureaucratic framework, naturally; which means, among other things, within the framework of the foreign policy of "peaceful coexistence" and "de-Stalinization" at home.

The first move of the Soviet ambassadors in the capitalist countries was to reassure all the governments that "peaceful coexistence" would be maintained. Up to now, however, no move has been undertaken of a positive character. However, it is probable that the new leading team has likewise reassured the Poles and the Czechs, who were nervous over some of Khrushchev's initiatives in the direction of Bonn.

In the field of Sino-Soviet relations, the first result of the change in teams in the Soviet Union was the resumption of negotiations with the Chinese. But up to now this has been about the sole result. It has been announced, although not officially, that the conference of twenty-six parties scheduled for December 15 will not be held. The fact is that a new phase has opened in negotiations; the public polemic has virtually disappeared, or, rather, has taken a veiled form. That it would be extremely difficult for them to reach a common line, we said from the beginning; inasmuch as the Chinese and Soviet bureaucracies were shaped by different conditions that have given them opposing orientations on some of the main questions of our epoch. For the time being no known change has occurred in the relations on the state level, although these could be modified much easier than between the parties and should be arranged in order
to establish a more normal situation between the two workers states.

It is in domestic policies that the new leadership reveals the weakness of its position. We will not discuss the two kilos of flour given every Muscovite; this is reminiscent of the gifts handed out in joyous celebration of the ascension of a new monarch. But it is necessary to note the concessions or the promises made to all layers of Soviet society.

First of all, the promise of a decrease in the price of goods. This is extremely important in view of the fact that Khrushchev's popularity declined heavily in the past year following the increase in the prices of meat and butter and the long queues at bakeries due to the shortage of flour.

The population has been generally reassured with regard to the production of consumers goods; there's no intention of touching that, they have been told.

For the peasants, certain measures have been modified relating to their small plots and private livestock. Advances have been made to the technocrats.

For the intellectuals, who have undoubtedly been the most critical with respect to the leaders, the new team have made reassuring gestures (liberation of the poet Brodsky from prison, criticism of Lysenko, . . .). Ilychev has likewise been removed under accusation of having displayed too great rigidity toward the writers and artists.

The November Central Committee, in addition, cancelled the reform of the Communist party put into effect by Khrushchev at the end of 1962 which upset the former structure of the party by dividing it into two branches, one for industry the other for agriculture, a kind of division into a party of city bureaucrats and a party of country bureaucrats. The former system is now restored -- which would lead one to suspect that the reform led to results contrary to those counted on.

In other words, in less than a month, the new leadership has shown that it is proceeding to put administrative reforms into effect; that it can grant concessions. This also means that it can cancel them, if necessary. But in no case is there any intention to move against the bureaucratic political regime.

This leadership is weak, however; much weaker than the leaders who, from Malenkov to Khrushchev, succeeded Stalin. It is weak in face of a Soviet society in which the old fear has disappeared and in which the demands, not only on the material level but also on the level of ideas, of freedom, is growing. And it is weak in face of the workers states and the Communist parties abroad where the leeway of independence is constantly growing.
On November 20 Peking radio told the world to stand by for an important statement. This proved to be an editorial in Red Flag, the official journal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party. The editorial, entitled "Why Khrushchev Fell," was a harsh attack against the former Soviet premier.

The tone of the attack and the arguments advanced have been met with glee in Western circles, particularly Washington. It has generally been interpreted as a warning to Khrushchev's heirs that they must accept unconditional surrender. The New York Times, for instance, voiced the editorial opinion [in the November 23 International edition] that the Kremlin can hardly avoid answering the attack and yet will find it highly embarrassing to do so. The Times therefore concluded, "This is nothing less than the beginning of Chinese political warfare against the new Soviet leadership. What Peking now assails as the Khrushchev line is precisely what has been unveiled this month as the Brezhnev-Kosygin line."

The gloating in imperialist circles arises from the conclusion that Chou En-lai's trip to Moscow ended in failure, that the attempt to patch up the Sino-Soviet differences proved futile, and that the rift will now become deeper. The sigh of relief in these quarters is quite audible, for they had earlier taken an opposite view. With Khrushchev gone, it appeared to them, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union might well find a way to compose their differences, at least on the state level, and succeed in presenting a common front against the Western powers.

It is true that the editorial is aimed at the Brezhnev-Kosygin team although the stick is ostensibly wielded on a dead horse. The editorial even obliquely attacks those who hope for the continuation of "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev"; and this gives substance to the elation of the Western experts. Nevertheless their conclusions appear rather simplistic, if not hasty, and are evidently affected by wishful thinking. Peking knows its Moscow and the editorial may have double aims. It does serve warning on Brezhnev-Kosygin; but it is premature to conclude that Mao has already written off Khrushchev's heirs and has decided to try to sweep them into the same wastebasket in which their patron ended up.

The Main Charges

Twelve main charges are levelled against Khrushchev. These are as follows:

(1) Under pretext of combatting the cult of the personality Khrushchev attacked Stalin, using the foulest language. By doing this, he opposed Marxism-Leninism.
(2) He sought general co-operation with American imperialism. He sent rockets to Cuba and then docilely withdrew them on the orders of the American pirates. He tried to sell Cuba's sovereignty by agreeing to United Nations inspection of the island.

(3) He bowed to American nuclear blackmail and sought to prevent China from building its own nuclear force. He injured the defense of the Soviet Union and signed a partial test-ban treaty.

(4) He sought in all ways to obstruct revolutionary movements in the capitalist countries, advising them to take the legal parliamentary road to socialism.

(5) He sought to oppose the national liberation movement and sabotaged it. When the U.S. cooked up the Tonkin Gulf incident, Khrushchev tried to cover it up under the banner of peaceful coexistence.

(6) He supported Tito, attempting to reverse the 1960 condemnation of the "clique of the renegade Tito."

(7) He did everything he could to injure and undermine Albania.

(8) He spread innumerable rumors and slanders about the Chinese Communist party and Mao Tse-tung.

(9) He took as his models the Common Market and the capitalist bloc, reducing the industries of the "brother Communist countries" to "mere subsidiaries."

(10) He used the congresses of his and other parties to launch sweeping attacks against parties that remained faithful to Marxism-Leninism.

(11) He played the role of a patriarch, deciding to convvoke an illegal meeting of the international Communist parties to split the movement.

(12) He followed a series of revisionist policies leading toward capitalism; his blind direction of Soviet agriculture and industry provoking chaos in the national economy and causing great difficulties for the Soviet people.

Not Pro-Maoists

There is no doubt that the Western experts are correct in concluding that the publication of these charges runs directly counter to the explanations offered by Brezhnev-Kosygin for the ouster of Khrushchev. They are also correct in concluding that Mao regards Brezhnev-Kosygin as Khrushchevists and not Maoists. One point at least would thus seem to be settled -- the superficial
speculation that Khrushchev was ousted by a pro-Peking grouping has proved to be dead wrong.

Noteworthy in this respect is the fact that the editorial lists "de-Stalinization" as No. 1 in the crimes of Khrushchev. In the peculiar language of the Sino-Soviet conflict, "de-Stalinization" and "Khrushchevism" are synonomous, and praise of Stalin -- from Peking's viewpoint -- is only next to praise of Mao himself.

Careful examination of the charges in the editorial indicates that the authors have other people in mind besides Brezhnev-Kosygin. The editorial is designed to reassure those who have rallied to Peking's banners. The firmness of tone tells them that Chou En-lai's negotiations do not mean a "sell-out" is contemplated, whatever agreement or partial agreement Peking may eventually gain. The inclusion of the point about Albania is significant in this respect. The references to Cuba and to the "brother Communist countries" are to be taken in the same light. All those inclined to back Peking, or to assert independent views, are assured that Peking will not make any deal at their expense. This heartening news, of course, helps maintain the pressure, a prime requisite if hard bargaining is contemplated.

If this is what is aimed at, then the warning itself seems more proportionate. Instead of the "beginning of Chinese political warfare against the new Soviet leadership," it can be read as a firm notice to Khrushchev's heirs that unlike Khrushchev they must recognize the growing weight and standing of the People's Republic of China. If Brezhnev and Kosygin imagined that Peking can be fobbed off with little more than a scapegoat, even one as plump as Khrushchev, they can disabuse themselves. Mao is not unmindful of the Kremlin awarding him a prize, such as Khrushchev's scalp, but he also wants something more substantial.

Peking requires, and feels entitled to, big economic aid from the USSR and on much more favorable terms than were granted in the past. Otherwise...

The Kremlin's Dilemma

What the Chinese leaders have done is to present Brezhnev-Kosygin with the same dilemma faced by Khrushchev. They have added a request for an early reply. Khrushchev's heirs have thus found the breathing space they sought through the ouster of their patron and collaborator rather short, at least insofar as the Sino-Soviet conflict is concerned. Mao has nothing to gain by waiting. He is forcing the new team in the Kremlin to face up immediately to the dilemma which they won by taking over.

The problem is how to appease both Peking and Washington with the relatively limited resources at the disposal of the Soviet bureaucracy. To provide China with aid on the scale demanded (and required) would -- in the absence of cutting down the overhead cost of bureau-
ocratic parasitism -- mean immense sacrifices by the Soviet people, sacrifices on the scale of the Stalin era. This is what Mao appears to be insisting on with his emphasis on the "glories" of Stalin's time and the "contributions" of the late paranoid dictator.

But if Brezhnev-Kosygin decide they cannot meet Mao's price, then they are threatened with continuation of the attack in the area where they, like Khrushchev, are most vulnerable -- ideology, where they have clearly revised Marxism. To outflank Peking in this field requires carrying "de-Stalinization" to its final conclusion, the revival of genuine Leninism. This would signify the rehabilitation of Trotsky, the establishment of proletarian democracy and the re- summption of the world-wide revolutionary program that guided Soviet foreign policy in the time of Lenin. The bureaucratic caste cannot do this without destroying itself, something few of its members are willing to contemplate.

Moreover, it would mean a worsening of relations with imperialist America. But immense pressure from this quarter bears down on the Soviet Union. Due to their social base and social ties, the characteristic response of the Soviet bureaucrats to imperialist pressure -- and they were trained in this personally by Stalin -- is not to mount a counteroffensive but to bend and to concede, if bending and conceding is at all possible.

Thus the Peking editorial, even if it is not a signal of renewed political war but simply a signal that Brezhnev-Kosygin are in for hard bargaining, can cause perturbation in the Kremlin. If it is followed up before they have succeeded in consolidating their victory over Khrushchev, a new crisis in the top circles of the Soviet bureaucracy and further convulsions in the international Communist movement can be expected.

Where the White House Comes In

However, there is still another element that should not be lost sight of. American imperialism is very much involved in this situation. Not so strangely, expressions of regret over the downfall of Khrushchev were to be found in the American press. Was the shoe-wielding premier the worst figure, after all, to have as ruler of the USSR; that is, from Wall Street's viewpoint? If he was not the worst, could it be said that everything possible was done to give him a hand in his difficulties?

What we are referring to here is a commonplace in international politics. Khrushchev showed his awareness of it by discreetly indicating that as between Johnson and Goldwater he preferred the former in the White House. With Stalin, this was standard procedure, constituting in his politics a substitute for revolutionary program. America's rulers have not displayed comparable dexterity on their side since the days of Roosevelt, who even went so far as to help whitewash Stalin in the infamous Moscow frame-up trials. (He in-
spired the notorious Hollywood film Mission to Moscow.)

Now that Johnson has been settled in the White House with the biggest majority vote in modern times, he faces the problem of whether to continue in the brinkmanship style of Truman and Dulles or whether, in the tradition of Roosevelt, to attempt a policy of greater sophistication.

By embarrassing Khrushchev's followers, the editorial in Red Flag gives the State Department and the White House a vigorous shake. What shall the policy of the "Great Society" be in relation to Moscow and Peking? Mere gloating over the discomfiture of Brezhnev and Kosygin? Or shall active measures be undertaken to shore them up as a "lesser evil"?

To operate really effectively in this situation, however, a seemingly very contradictory move is required; namely, U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China. Only through contact with both sides can Washington hope to mount a policy of playing them against each other; i.e., favoring now one, now the other, with the aim of weakening both in the process. In the immediate situation, Johnson could relieve the pressure on Brezhnev-Kosygin by himself granting concessions to Peking and dangling the bait of bigger possibilities.

But is Johnson fundamentally strong enough to get away with an abrupt change of this type in U.S. foreign policy despite its being demanded for some time by significant sectors of leading bourgeois circles? Can he follow in the path blazed by de Gaulle? And in the long run will such a policy actually succeed?

True, from the viewpoint of American imperialism, certain aspects of Mao's propaganda are intriguing. Particularly noticeable are his expressions of admiration for Stalin, his praise of Stalin's policy of building "socialism in one country," his repeated assurances of the correctness of Stalin's war on Trotskyism, the program and movement pre-eminently identified with active development of world revolution. Imperialism can appreciate a genuine Stalinist. American, British, French and German imperialism all found it possible to do profitable business with the original himself. And what other language can Mao resort to in talking across the walls of "fortress America" to the political translators in the State Department?

But America's knowledgeable figures in this field must ask themselves whether it is really Mao's game to seek a base in the revolutionary struggles of today for bargaining purposes as Stalin did. If not a "mere agrarian reformer," as he was once pictured to be, is Mao after all a mere Stalinist? And if so, can Mao really be depended upon to deliver the way Stalin did? Is it possible in the world of today for Mao, with the most honorable of intentions, to get away with betraying revolutions the way Stalin did? Hasn't the element of independent leadership, as exemplified by the Cubans,
become so strong that recognition of China would simply strengthen that tendency, not only in the long run but in the immediate future?

Khrushchev's heirs consequently are not alone in facing a dilemma over China. Kennedy's heir has also been handed a hot potato. What will he do with it?

WEST GERMANY TO GET "IMPROVED" NUCLEAR ARSENAL

Bonn revealed November 22 that Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel was assured during his recent visit to Washington that West Germany will eventually be given missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads to "strategic targets in the Soviet Union." The West German armed forces already have "tactical" nuclear arms but do not have rockets capable of carrying them to "the enemy" to the east.

Bonn assured the world that no one need worry about any madman in its ranks deciding to suddenly use the nuclear weapons. All nuclear devices received from the United States carry "two-key" control. This means that while one "key" is delivered to the Bundeswehr the other "key" is held by U.S. military officers, who, of course, are never affected by psychological difficulties. Both keys have to be used in order to explode the nuclear weapons.

According to a special dispatch to the New York Times of November 23, "There is no present intention to turn over the second key to the Bundeswehr."

It can thus be argued that Johnson is dutifully preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons since you don't rate as a nuclear power until you can actually explode the devices.

But besides producing an occasional madman who might prove capable of firing a live nuclear weapon at a target to the east, the Germans are also noted for their ingenuity in making and solving puzzles. Is the Pentagon really so clever as to make a key that can't be duplicated by the Bundeswehr?

Incredible as all this sounds, the most incredible is that it solves what has been a nagging "problem" for "West German defense officials"; namely, "to present a credible deterrent to an attack by Soviet ground forces upon West Germany and Western Europe."