

DESERTIONS ON THE RISE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

American officials in Saigon are planning on a war that will last from "three to seven years," according to a February 25 dispatch from Seymour Topping, special correspondent of the <u>New York</u> <u>Times</u>. In addition they are beginning to talk more openly about widening the war, particularly in the direction of Cambodia.

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WORLD OUTLOOK specializes in weekly political analysis and interpretation of events for labor, socialist, colonial independence and Negro freedom publications. Signed articles represent the views of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of WORLD OUTLOOK. Unsigned material expresses, insofar as editorial opinion may appear, the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism. To subscribe for 26 issues send \$7.50 or £2/15s. or 37.50 francs to: Reba Hansen, Business Manager, P.O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N. Y. 10010.

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Meanwhile in the United States, White House and Pentagon circles are stepping up intimations that another 200,000 to 400,000 troops will be required in Southeast Asia. Hanson W. Baldwin, military expert of the <u>New York Times</u> and one of the Pentagon's wellknown voices, shifted from his pseudo objective reporting about the war in Vietnam to open advocacy of a policy of calculated "escalation." Writing in the February 27 <u>New York Times Magazine</u>, the military pundit declared that "there is, in my opinion, nothing else for President Johnson to do" except deliberately escalate the war.

In his article, entitled "The Case for Escalation," Baldwin said: "Given the present situation in Vietnam and our other commitments throughout the world, it is high time -- more than time -that Congress declare a state of national emergency, that there be a limited mobilization of reserves, the appropriation of more billions for war, a major increase of United States strength in South Vietnam, and intensification of the bombing of North Vietnam."

This policy, it should be noted, dovetails neatly with Johnson's February 23 speech in which the president declared that his administration would undertake no "blind" escalation.

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While the clamor of the warmongers thus rose in the United States, and Johnson moved toward further escalation of U.S. involvement in the civil war in Vietnam, a very informative report from Saigon was filed February 23 by Neil Sheehan, another special correspondent of the <u>New York Times</u>. About 96,000 men deserted from the armed forces of the Saigon government last year, he declared. Officials in the Ky regime gave even higher figures, said Sheehan, but they did not take into account the number of deserters who later re-enlisted.

According to official figures 113,000 deserted in 1965. Of these, 47,000 were from the regular armed forces, 17,000 from the regional forces, and 49,000 from the local militia.

"Desertions from the regular armed forces nearly doubled during the last year," Sheehan said, "reaching 14 per cent of the forces total strength. Desertions from the 270,000-man army, which forms the great bulk of the regular armed forces, showed a gradual increase during the year. They ran near 18 per cent of total strength in December.

"The armed forces discharged 48,000 men for various reasons in 1965 and suffered 13,000 killed, 23,000 wounded and 6,000 missing in action or captured."

The Ky government claims that some 11,000 deserted from "the Vietcong" during 1965 and came over to the government. They offered no estimate on the number of Ky's troops that went over to the side of the freedom fighters, contending that most of the deserters do not follow that course but simply return to their homes, go into hiding, or drift into the cities looking for jobs.

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Nevertheless Saigon officials estimated that the National

Liberation Front increased its fighting forces from 103,000 at the beginning of 1965 to 230,000 by the end of December. Of these, about 20,000 "were North Vietnamese regulars who had infiltrated the south since last winter."

It would seem difficult to escape the conclusion in the light of the evidence that a high proportion of deserters from Ky's forces find their way to the side of the freedom fighters.

The Saigon officials who gave Sheehan these figures were unable to offer any reason for the high rate of desertions except the "intensification of the fighting and a general war weariness that has overtaken the country."

A more specific reason might well be that the big influx of American troops is revealing in a still more pitiless light the puppet nature of the Ky regime and the imperialist aims of the invader. If it is impossible to avoid fighting, many in Ky's army may reason, then it should be done for a cause that is worthwhile.

CIA HAND IN GHANA COUP D'ETAT?

The coupd'état in Ghana that unseated Kwame Nkrumah February 24 while the African leader was on a trip to Peking and Hanoi seeking a role as mediator in the Vietnamese war may well have been inspired by the Central Intelligence Agency. It is hard to escape any other conclusion in view of the boasts of Khow Amihyia, former chief of Ghana's intelligence service who was living in exile in London.

Amihyia told the press on the day of the coup d'état that it had been plotted in London by the "Ghana Revolutionary Council in Exile."

"We have been planning this coup for months," he said, "but it went off ahead of schedule. It was not supposed to have taken place until August."

The group of plotters in London maintained contact with other plotters in Accrá through a radio relay in "a European country." From there messages were telephoned to London.

"Mr. Amihyia says he was trained by the United States Central Intelligence Agency," a February 24 UPL dispatch reported.

The overturn, it is to be noted, caused little surprise in the U.S. State Department. It "was greeted with a noticeable lack of regret by the Administration today," said Richard Eder, Washington correspondent of the <u>New York Times</u> in a February 24 dispatch.

G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, at once called a press conference in which he stated that the U.S. could have "good and favorable relations" with the Ghanaian military chiefs.

The State Department explained officially that this was "not intended to imply recognition" of the new regime. But this was said only in order to avoid the conclusion that Williams' statement had been "premature."

Unnamed officials in the State Department indicated that relations with Nkrumah had been "chilly." They pointed to a book recently published by the Ghanaian leader attacking U.S. imperialism.

"There was also a tendency," according to Eder, "to compare the situation with the overthrow last year of Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria."

The State Department posture of waiting a "decent interval" before recognizing the military takeover may quickly shift. When Kwame Nkrumah announced February 25 in Peking that he intended to return to Accra, the State Department leaked the news that recognition of the plotters may come early in order "to stabilize the situation."

"With deliberate speed scarcely concealing its pleasure, the United States was moving today toward diplomatic recognition of the new military regime in Ghana," said a special dispatch to the <u>New</u> <u>York Times</u> from Washington February 25. "The department had intended to let a discreet diplomatic period elapse before endorsing the new regime. The timetable may now be speeded up in view of Mr. Nkrumah's threat in Peking today to return to Ghana soon to reassert his authority as head of the government."

In trying to find more fundamental reasons for the ease with which Nkrumah fell victim to a military plot, most observers pointed to the megalomania which led him to great excesses such as building a cult of his own personality. He had statues erected of himself everywhere, called himself "the Redeemer" and similar extravagant terms. Like many other leaders in underdeveloped countries he was also given to conspicuous and very costly displays of all kinds.

He was also intolerant of any political opposition, ran everything in dictatorial style and established a one-party system. Naturally Nkrumah became the target of underground political opposition.

None of this would have bothered imperialist circles; this is the normal type in their retinue. Their hatred for Nkrumah stemmed from his outspoken opposition to imperialism, from his friendly attitude toward the Soviet Union and China, the socialistic coloration he sought to give his government, and his slogan calling for a united Africa.

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Nkrumah tried to woo investments and even asked for financial aid from Washington. But the imperialists desired a regime that offered greater future security for investments. Thus Washington's policy was to seek to undermine Nkrumah's government, a policy that Nkrumah greatly facilitated by separating himself more and more from the populace and their aspirations.

What was decisive in Nkrumah's standing in Ghana, however, was the price of cocoa. This is the commodity on which the country depends for most of its foreign exchange. A precipitous decline in the price of cocoa on the world market was countered for a time by government subsidies to the growers.

It finally became no longer economically feasible for the government to continue this course and in recent speeches Nkrumah sounded the call for a retreat and for the need to make "sacrifices."

In the long run, Nkrumah hoped to get out of Ghana's dependency on a single crop by diversification, above all by developing the country's huge potential in aluminum production. This was the main purpose of the Volta dam and of Nkrumah's dealings with the Kaiser aluminum interests. That possibility of improving the economic situation could not be speeded up, however, and Nkrumah fell victim to this impasse.

SUKARNO SUCCEEDS IN SPLITTING GENERALS

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The deep instability of the Indonesian situation received dramatic confirmation with Sukarno's success February 21 in removing General Nasution from a position of central authority to which even Sukarno himself had been forced to bow since October 1.

Nasution launched the anti-Communist witch-hunt in which the number of victims slaughtered, according to an admission by Sukarno, reached 87,000. Others have put the figure at 350,000. There are stories of rivers choked with bodies; the London <u>Economist</u> reported 400,000 children had been orphaned in the bloody purge.

It appeared that Nasution was firmly in the saddle; that Sukarno was being retained as a figurehead; and that the generals would proceed along the reactionary course they had begun, eventually bringing Indonesia fully into the orbit of U.S. imperialism.

Njono, one of the top leaders of the Indonesian Communist party and head of the country's huge trade-union federation, had been placed in the stellar role in a show trial complete with a false confession wrung from him under duress. In fact he was condemned to death by the military court on the very same day that Sukarno removed General Nasution and reshuffled his cabinet, strengthening the position of Subandrio.

Reactionary sectors of the students who had spearheaded the drive to physically liquidate all the key figures in the Indonesian Communist party, staged demonstrations on behalf of Nasution. A

crowd of some hundreds marched on the presidential palace February 24. but instead of receiving support from the army, as on previous occasions, troops fired in their direction; killing three of the partici-pants. Some were wounded by bayonets.

อาณาร์ On the following day, the reactionary Indonesian Student Action Front organized a "funeral march" of some 10,000 participants. The demonstration protested the killing of the three students the day before, shouted against Sukarno's "new Communist cabinet," and called for the reinstatement of General Nasution. anat ti⊈t

The army did not join in the demonstration. Instead, troops kept machine guns trained on the crowd. ^{ter}en, an

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Sukarno followed up by banning the student organization and ordering a curfew in Djakarta. alania a p

It was clear that the Indonesian president had retrieved some of his former authority and was seeking to establish a new political equilibrium. 1.11 en en el composition de la composition

Two factors account for this abrupt alteration in the relative positions of Nasution and Sukarno.

The first is that no improvement of even the most ephemeral kind occurred in the steadily worsening economic situation in Indonesia after the generals seized the helm on October 1. Inflation, for example, has continued to slash deeply into the standard of living. e Agela l indere og loger Nother i Standares . an Elene

Nasution and his entourage had no program whatsoever offering even a plausible way out. Their program consisted of nothing but the grossest kind of anti-Communism accompanied by a fearful blood purge. There was nothing attractive about this. Thus the generals represented only narrow class forces and failed to advance a demagogic platform that might have widened their appeal.

The second factor was a split among the generals. This is clearly evident in Nasution's incapacity to counter Sykarno's latest moves by a military coup d'état, for example. Part of the officer caste, for whatever reasons, cooled off on General Nasution and swung behind Sukarno, enabling him to strengthen his hand somewhat.

Already Sukarno has given intimations that he would like to restore the Communist party as a counterweight to the army. But this may not be easy. The party was decimated by the purge. Those who survived are undoubtedly mulling over the lessons, and one of the lessons is not to depend on Sukarno. . مربع

The situation in Indonesia remains highly fluid and Sukarno's new lease on life could prove to be quite temporary. The ultrareactionary forces are not exactly out of the running. If Nasution proves incapable of playing the role of military dictator, there are other candidates eager to move forward. 101120

THE DANIEL AND SINYAVSKY TRIAL

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By Pierre Frank

The trial of the two Soviet writers Yuli M. Daniel (pen name, Nikolai Arzhak) and Andrei D. Sinyavsky (pen name, Abram Tertz) and the severe sentences imposed on them [five and seven years at hard labor respectively] have created an international scandal. There has been widespread denunciation of the fake character of the public trial, the way the trial was reported in the Soviet press, the attitude of the Kremlin's hireling "writers" toward the trial, etc.

Some people have wondered how such a trial could take place, how the Soviet leaders could commit such an "error."

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Even if the trial represented an error in judgment on the part of the Soviet authorities, the error has shown that a good many things have not vanished in the Soviet Union despite the "de-Stalinization." But we do not believe an "error" occurred; the Soviet authorities could not but know that a trial of this kind, anticipated and followed everywhere in the world, would stir up protest. One must conclude that they deliberately decided to disregard the reaction abroad because they needed the trial for domestic purposes.

The severity of the sentences likewise indicates that the organizers of the trial had others in mind besides the defendants. The fact they had published material abroad under pen names was a convenient pretext, but only a pretext. Pasternak was harshly denounced for publishing Doctor Zhivago abroad, as was Yevtushenko for similarly publishing memories of his childhood.

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The tip-off that it was a calculated move came on the eve of the trial when the Soviet authorities gave Valery Tarsis permission to leave the country although he, too, had sent writings abroad for publication. In contrast to Daniel and Sinyavsky, Tarsis has strongly proclaimed his hostility to the Soviet government. The argument offered by way of explanation for the favor granted Tarsis would be comic if the context were not so scandalous. Tarsis, it seems, is not legally accountable since he is mentally irresponsible. Under this pretext he was confined to a mental hospital, enabling him to write Ward 7, a book in which he reveals that some of the opponents of the government are locked up in such institutions. Tarsis, as his book also reveals, is a little psychopathic -- which does not mean that he ought to be locked up or that <u>Ward 7</u> is without interest. But the true explanation for his being permitted to leave the Soviet Union is that the authorities counted on his uttering virulent statements abroad that could be utilized in the Soviet Union to still further damage the two condemned writers and all those aimed at through them.*

*After this article was written, the press reported that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had annulled the Soviet citizenship of the writer Valery Tarsis, while he was traveling in England, on the charge that he had committed "acts unworthy of a Soviet citizen." The use of pen names was seized on only as a pretext. Why then the prosecution, the trial, the heavy sentences?

The Soviet government cajoles the writers, the artists, assuring them privileged living standards, but only on condition that they stick to the "line" laid down for them, that they produce the kind of works needed by the government. Some works, if there is need for it, will denounce what the government wants denounced -- but no works that depart from the strict and narrow!

However relations between the intellectuals and the Soviet government have deteriorated considerably; the intellectuals are coming more and more to evaluate at their true worth the coarse bureaucrats at the head of the country; they are asking more and more questions. The government wants to give them a severe warning, and it did it by brutally hitting those who violated the law by publishing material abroad under pen names and who wrote things that reveal the hostility of the intellectuals toward the bureaucrats in power.

In this connection a few words should be said about one of the most powerful stories Daniel published outside the Soviet Union, <u>Moscow Calling</u>.* This is far from "socialist realism," the conventional stuff. <u>Moscow Calling</u> is the tragedy of the Soviet intellectuals. First of all, they have no real relations, only official relations, very superficial ones, with the masses, the Soviet workers. In this story, the masses appear only in the general form of a crowd in the streets. The writers, the artists..live by themselves with their own problems. On the one hand, the narratives they spin about personal problems, and the need to furnish on command a production that corresponds with the requirements of official propaganda, that abides by the official canons. After all, it is their way of making a living. On the other hand, some of them feel with painful acuteness the problems of the society in which they live. This is the subject of <u>Moscow Calling</u>.

In the story, things begin with a decision of the Supreme Soviet. "Parallel with the rise in the standard of living...and in

Previously, the Soviet authorities had explained that in contrast to Daniel and Sinyavsky, Tarsis could not be brought to trial because he had been ruled to be mentally irresponsible. If this argument were true, if Tarsis could not be held responsible for what he did, then the cancellation of his Soviet citizenship could not be justified either -- what was called for was medical treatment not judicial or administrative punishment. Lack of the slightest logic does not embarrass the Soviet authorities; they got rid of Tarsis abroad. Displaying a pathological anti-Soviet attitude, Tarsis is a special case among the Soviet intellectuals. But they came down heavily on Daniel and Sinyavsky, who translated into the particular forms of their art the problems posed, not by the Soviet regime, but by the bureaucratic rod.

*This does not appear to have been published in English, at least in book form. The French title is Ici Moscou.

accordance with the wishes of the toiling masses," the Supreme Soviet decrees a "Day of Public Murder." On this day, according to the decree, every citizen is granted the right, within the rules prescribed by the decree, to murder any other citizen he wishes. The allusion is more than transparent. How many crimes were committed on orders from above, in the name of socialism, and under pretext of fulfilling the wishes and furthering the well-being of the toiling masses!

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Daniel, the author, belongs to the generation that was stunned by Khrushchev's report at the twentieth congress. For him it was a revelation. In this story, he voices his inner struggle, and also his rebellion against today's leaders, yesterday Stalin's valets, who are satisfied with an explanation that explains nothing and who live as if there had been no monstrous crimes:

"Do they imagine that after having swept their filth onto the tomb of Mustachio they are quit? No, no, no. They deserve something different!"

He wonders how the same men who proved their courage, their heroism, during the war can now conduct themselves in such a sickly way in face of such enormities. "Since the Day of Public Murder, this was the first time I had heard people talking about these events. Up to then, each time I mentioned the matter, my interlocutors had looked at me in a queer way and changed the subject...Now, that's over. Now we are going to celebrate the forty-third anniversay of the Great Socialist Revolution of October!"

And the author explains: "They had been terrorized!" Terrorized they are, in a different way of course than in Stalin's time, but terrorized they still are. <u>Moscow Calling</u> and the trial that just took place in Moscow demonstrate that liberalization and democratization are not to be confounded. Liberalization has not changed things fundamentally. Society must act and think in conformity with orders from above. In accordance with these orders the intellectuals must produce works that of necessity lack life and art.

The story by Daniel is not anti-Soviet, but without the least doubt it is very pessimistic. Implicitly, the author tends to turn inwardly, away from "this cursed and marvellous country," writing for him being a kind of religion, a kind of opium that deadens the suffering he feels over things. Cut off from the Soviet masses, who, moreover, are not yet expressing themselves anywhere, stifled by a bureaucracy that claims to speak in the name of socialism, the Soviet intellectuals see no way out. The Russian intellectuals under Czarism turned towards the West where the bourgeois democracy of the time was attractive and the workers movement opened inspiring vistas. Today in the field of culture, aside from research on forms, the intellectuals cannot be genuinely attracted by the rank-smelling democracy of the West, and they lack the social base to give stimulus to their rebellion.

But despite this the bureaucracy cannot bear such writings that reveal its true image. No more than in Stalin's time, will it permit itself to be called by its right name. The trial of Daniel and Sinyavsky was a warning to the intellectuals not to go beyond certain limits.

However, there are some changes that must be underlined. The defendants pleaded "not guilty." And, as was the case with the poet Brodsky a few years ago, there were youth and a few writers (not officials like Sholokov and Ehrenburg) who in one way or another expressed sympathy with the defendants. Thus not only the critical attitude but also the resistance is growing. And it will grow still more.

Some of the reactions in the West are not without interest. We will leave aside the professional anti-Communists who are elated. The most sophisticated bourgeois circles have expressed surprise that a regime scoring successes as great as Luna IX should harbor "obscurantism" worthy of "intellectually underdeveloped societies," as <u>LeMonde</u> put it February 16. At the same time, these circles express a kind of satisfaction over Aragon's declaration on the trial [see <u>World Outlook</u> February 25], a declaration in which they see a "direct and frank" criticism of a decision made by Moscow.

Certainly the contradiction is enormous, gigantic, between the soft landing on the moon -- a product of very high intellectual level -- and this trial where the judges, prosecution and witnesses are worthy of a court of the Middle Ages. But this has been the fundamental contradiction of Soviet society since Stalin crushed the Bolshevik party and workers democracy. The productive forces, freed by the October Revolution, have achieved prodigious results in certain scientific and technical fields; but the specific conditions that brought the bureaucracy to power have simultaneously spawned monstrous things.

The bureaucracy is trying to adapt Soviet society to presentday conditions, but it cannot overcome its own limits; it can carry out a few small-change operations against its privileges, but it cannot abolish them as a whole and it cannot renounce power of its own volition. The Daniel and Sinyavsky trial, occurring ten years after "Khrushchev's report," shows in the most striking way the limit to the reforms within the capacity of the bureaucracy. And, as a consequence, it proves the historic necessity for the Soviet proletariat to break through these limits and reestablish workers democracy by means of a political revolution. Nowhere in the world, it is obvious, will the bourgeoisie reach such a conclusion. A revolution, if only a political one and directed against the Soviet bureaucracy, is a dangerous example which it neither can nor wishes to visualize. * * *

The officials of a number of Communist parties have condemned the trial. The Italian Communist party pointed to a part of the problem, pursuant with the line of Togliatti's "testament." According to <u>l'Unità</u>, the trial poses "the vaster problem of relations between Soviet society and its intellectuals, between politics and culture." To pose the problem like this narrows it, but actually it is an attempt to put it in rather general terms.

As for Aragon's "direct and frank" criticism -- this is a joke. The declaration does not express sincere indignation. It was not an immediate reaction, being issued twenty-four hours after the trial so that it could be formulated in agreement with the leadership of the French Communist party and in terms reflecting their immediate political preoccupations. Most of Aragon's declaration aimed at telling the Mitterands, the Mollets, etc., that the sentencing of the two writers must not stand in the way of moves for an alliance in the next elections.

The fact that <u>l'Humanité</u> featured the declaration prominently has been correctly interpreted almost everywhere as a sign of the evolution of the leadership of the French Communist party, a public indication that on occasion it will take its distance from the Kremlin. At the same time, independently of the rightist objectives which the leadership aims at, conditions are maturing that will provide openings for criticism in a different direction. The opposition within the French Communist party must take advantage of this. But nothing would be worse than to grant any credit whatsoever to Waldeck Rochet or Aragon.

The part of the declaration referring to Aragon himself is particularly slimy. Aragon says, without saying it, that the condemned writers are "mediocre," just as he says, without saying it, that their writings were "injurious to the interests of socialism." He murmurs something personal about the Soviet law, but he does it in an inaudible way. The sentences appear to him to be primarily a blunder, a simple "penalty" would have taken care of things.

Aragon promises that in France there will be no trials of this kind if his party comes to power. We don't ask him to make any such promises because we doubt that his party will ever come to power. Today it utilizes the working class as "small change" in deals with the left bourgeoisie. To conquer power, the working class needs a revolutionary party, not a party of "peaceful roads."

On the other hand, we are curious to know Aragon's opinion about the measures taken by his party against the Communist students.

Naturally Aragon felt no need to say anything about the other Moscow "trials" of the period when he ran out of words howling for death to the Bolsheviks murdered by Stalin. Aragon's present declaration differs from those he made then due to the difference in the situations. (At the time, in its way, the League for the Rights of Man approved Stalin's crimes.) But Aragon remains the same; at the most, after engaging in street-walking for decades in literary and artistic circles, he now finds himself a little tired out due to age and he wishes to take on only easy and less disagreeable chores.

Times have changed and they will change still more. But it is not the Aragons and the other Stalinist dregs from whom one can expect a frank criticism of the past and hope for the future. No lesson can be passed on by those who participated in the "days of public murder."

February 19, 1966

POLISH STUDENTS HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN MODZELEWSKI

A heavy curtain of silence has been lowered on the fate of the men who were condemned in Poland last May and this January for being involved in the writing and distribution of a document of 120 pages, a document constituting a program, from the little that has leaked out about it, that was Marxist and antibureaucratic.

Two young men Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski (who is said to have played an important role at the University of Warsaw during the Polish October of 1956), and three university teachers, Romuald Smiech, Kasimierz Badowski and Ludwig Haas, were condemned to long prison terms. Haas, a member of the Trotskyist Polish organization before 1939, was deported at the time of the entry of the Soviet troops and held for seventeen years in the Stalinist labor camps. Upon finally being released he again openly proclaimed himself to be a Trotskyist upon his return to Poland.

But news about these men, who represent the future of Poland and the Communist movement, nevertheless finds its way into the press. Upon returning from Poland, Neal Ascherson wrote in the London Observer [February 13]:

"A few weeks ago three university teachers were sentenced to three years' imprisonment; they had been mixed up with a young man named Karol Modzelewski, a history lecturer who was last summer jailed for three and a half years for disseminating papers judged prejudicial to the State; during the trial he had appeared in court in handcuffs. Son of a party hero and himself a keen party member, Modzelewski had defied orders and circulated plans -- based on a visit to the Italian Communist Party -- for freer debate within the party and for a new economic deal. The students have not forgotten him, nor his ideas."

The legitimate indignation aroused by the sentencing of Daniel and Sinyavsky in Moscow should not be limited to the case of these two writers. The Polish revolutionists must also be freed from prison!

TRIALS TO BE SPEEDED FOR WOMEN HOSTAGES IN PERU?

According to the February 23 Le Monde, Peruvian military authorities have decided to put the wives of six guerrilla fighters on trial. The women prisoners went on a hunger strike demanding a speedy trial and definite news about the fate of Guillermo Lobatón.

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By George Novack

The dispute between the Senate and President Johnson which has commanded public attention in recent weeks is only one facet of a more serious problem of foreign policy confronting the American ruling class. Is U.S. imperialism, which has undertaken to police and save the world for a declining capitalist system, able to carry out that colossal historical assignment successfully?

Such a question might seem easy to answer in view of the immense forces and resources at the disposal of the richest capitalist power equipped with an overkill nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless this issue has moved to the center of the official debate over Vietnam.

This is the first time grave doubts have been widely expressed on this matter in high circles since General George C. Marshall sketched out the general strategy of U.S. foreign policy in a report to the Secretary of War shortly after the close of World War II. Marshall then called for a massive buildup of military power and bases to be deployed in a vast perimeter around the Soviet Union.

That scheme for the "containment of Communism," extended to Asia after the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949, has been carried forward by successive steps in the twenty years since. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Korean war, the Eisenhower Resolution are so many milestones along that road.

The diplomatic concomitant of this military strategy has led to the signing of "security treaties" with over forty countries. "The like of such commitments," writes James Reston of the <u>New York</u> <u>Times</u> from Washington February 19, "no sovereign nation ever took in the history of the world."

"For the United States is committed to oppose Communist aggression all along the periphery of the Communist nations from the North Cape of Norway through the heart of Europe to Greece and Turkey (NATO); along the southern frontier of the Soviet Union in the Near and Middle East (The Eisenhower Resolution); and thence through Southeast Asia (SEATO) to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Japan and Korea. And if you add our obligations under the Organization of American States and our obligations under the United Nations, you take in most of the rest of the world," said Reston.

Secretary of State Rusk asserted in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that to end "Communist aggression" in Vietnam and insure a lasting world peace the United States was ready to throw whatever forces were required into Southeast Asia. If Washington failed to fulfill its obligations in Vietnam, he said, the credibility of U.S. pledges would be grievously impaired and the entire structure of alliances would be unsettled.

For this reason the administration could not compromise with

the National Liberation Front or yield to Hanoi but was compelled to make them surrender, no matter who else was with it and no matter how much time, treasure and casualties that might take.

This "Rusk Doctrine" of unlimited commitment to block the expansion of Communism everywhere by force of arms and without allies if necessary is being resisted by other elements of the ruling class represented by the congressional opposition and their top military advisers. They fear that Vietnam is "a baited trap" which Johnson is blindly falling into by his escalation of military operations.

General Gavin and former Ambassador Kennan stressed in their testimony that the decision to send 600,000 men into that theater by the end of 1967 at the risk of bringing China into the conflict threatens to tilt the U.S. military position "alarmingly out of balance." It would weaken Washington's capacity to meet its obligations in other and more vital places. That is why they counterpose restricted involvement in Vietnam and holding operations leading toward a negotiated settlement to the Pentagon's "open-ended" escalation.

The issue at stake in the present debate, wrote the <u>New York</u> <u>Times</u> editors February 20, "is not whether the United States is committed [in Vietnam], but whether it is overcommitted." Johnson's course "would mean a quantum jump in escalation...a vastly increased number of American casualties in an over-militarization and over-Americanization of what is essentially a Vietnamese political conflict."

This warning was followed up next day by a first-page report from the <u>Times</u> military expert Hanson Baldwin that the available U.S. combat forces were already "spread dangerously thin in Vietnam and elsewhere." Baldwin quoted a recently retired officer concerned with the Army's mobilization base and strategic reserve who observed: "we are in a situation of perilous insufficiency" without much capability "of a graduated response to any serious challenge." Baldwin months ago urged that a million troops be trained for duty in Southeast Asia.

The more astute and farsighted strategists of American imperialism are coming to sense that the incalculable obligations involved in leading the international combat against the forces of socialist revolution on all fronts may be beyond their capacities. The burdens of the Pax Americana that Rusk swears to maintain at all costs may be too great even for the colossus of capitalism to sustain.

Johnson's procapitalist critics are not the only ones who can learn from the vulnerability of an overextended imperialism. Their anti-imperialist adversaries can also do so to the advantage of the revolutionary cause.

This point was clearly made by Fidel Castro in his closing speech to the Tricontinental Conference recently held in Havana. There he projected a revolutionary line which would compel imperialism to disperse its forces over many fronts rather than allow them to be concentrated at a single place as in Vietnam or the Dominican Repub-

lic today. "In Latin America," he said, "there should not be just one, or two, or three peoples struggling alone against imperialism. The correlation of forces of the imperialists on this Continent, the proximity of its metropolitan territory, the zeal with which they will try to defend their dominions in this part of the world, require a common strategy on this Continent, more than anywhere else: a common and simultaneous struggle." and edd to Ens

. The growing imbalance which so worries the administration critics also shows how favorable an opportunity for counteraction is being fumbled through the failure of the Soviet and Chinese governments to combine and coordinate their efforts against the imperialist aggression.

The mass of Americans, too, are beginning to discern some of the adverse consequences that the far-reaching counterrevolutionary objectives of U.S. militarism have in store for them. The interventions in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic have already cost the United States support from its allies and moral standing in world public opinion. In the offing are greater losses in American lives and reductions in living standards through higher prices, more taxes and wage "restraints." Hovering over all is the terrible insecurity generated by fear of war with China and a nuclear showdown.

. all a star officiants make The issue now up for decision before the nation and the world is whether Johnson and the Pentagon can be made to draw back before it is too late. The set of late and late and the set of the set of

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THE SITUATION REMAINS TENSE IN SANTO DOMINGO

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The situation remains tense in Santo Domingo although a general strike came to an end February 16 after a seven-day action that shut down virtually all industry in the island's capital.

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The strike was called off by union leaders when President . . |. García Godoy announced that he would enforce the government plan requiring leaders of both the left and the right to go into "voluntary" exile. In the radio speech in which he made the announcement he also appealed for a return to work and said that workers who did not return would be laid off. £Э

The general strike had been called because the reactionary rightist leaders had postponed leaving for abroad. Prominent leftist leaders departed as soon as the plan was announced.

The government scheme was cooked up primarily in an effort to further weaken the revolutionary forces in the Dominican Republic. The capacity of the workers to stage a general strike for a strictly political demand shows, however, a considerable advance in political understanding among the masses, and the net result of Garcia Godoy's clever plan, which was undoubtedly backed if not inspired by the American forces occupying the island, may have opposite results than those intended. 0 mar

Dominican business circles, frightened by what the general strike revealed, sent a telegram to President Johnson demanding an "immediate inquiry." They said that the Dominican Republic is on "the brink of Communism."

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The ultrareactionary generals at the head of the Dominican armed forces, who are seeking with the help of Washington to preserve the heritage of the Trujillo dictatorship, expressed anger over the concession made by García Godoy to the strikers. The Dominican president, they said in a communiqué, had "broken his promises" to them.

GIANT DEMONSTRATION IN ATHENS The Greek people may be flexing their muscles for another round with the hated monarchy, judging from the turnout in Athens February 16 to greet former Premier Bapandreou. It was estimated to be the largest popular demonstration yet seen in the city -- some 500,000 pouring into the streets.

acted colsices tot out an error The demonstration was organized by the United Center with the active support of the Communist EDA [United Democratic Left]. The slogans shouted by the crowd included, "Papandreou!" "Elections!" "Democracy!"

The scene reminded observers of the crisis last summer when the king dismissed Papandreou. The crowds that then jammed the streets demonstrated their readiness again and again to sweep out the monarchy. But the revolutionary energy of the masses was slowly dissipated through the common policy of Papandreou and the EDA leaders in centering action in parliament and playing down street demonstrations to the utmost. Eventually the reactionary supporters of the king managed to win a slim majority in parliament with the aid of sectors of Papandreou's forces that went over to the monarchy.

The government press dismissed the February 16 demonstration. as revealing "little enthusiasm." Court circles indicated that no change would be made in the regime's course. Most certainly no concession would be granted to the popular demand for immediate eleci dafta 👘 👘 tions.

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The leftist press hailed the appearance of the giant crowd, which exceeded all their expectations. The center newspaper Vima said, "A popular mobilization without precedent." And Afghi, the EDA newspaper, said, "The people have spoken."

EULOGIO SANCHEZ THREATENED WITH DEATH

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La Espiga [ear of corn or wheat], the newspaper of the Underground Committee of the Flour Workers Union in La Paz, has published a report it received that gunmen of the Bolivian military dictatorship have been given orders to assassinate Eulogio Sánchez Tolava.

A very popular leader of the union, Sánchez is also a prominent Bolivian Trotskyist leader. During the final days of the Paz Estenssoro regime, he was arrested and subjected to torture.

The January 31 issue of <u>Lucha Obrera</u>, organ of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, declares: "The flour workers and members of the POR warn Castillo, Dávila, Tórrez and their circle that we will punish any attack on Comrade Sánchez and return blow for blow! Down with the assassins in the pay of the military boot!"

DEMAND RELEASE OF ISAAC CAMACHO

The January 31 issue of <u>Lucha Obrera</u>, the organ of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario, reports that Isaac Camacho, a leading Bolivian Trotskyist, is still being held by the Barrientos military dictatorship as a political prisoner.

He has been transferred from the jungles of Madidi to the jail at San Pedro.

The POR has launched a campaign for his release. The immediate goal is to secure declarations from all the parties of the left in Bolivia demanding freedom for Isaac Camacho and an end to the savage persecution of the Bolivian Trotskyist leaders.

PURGES OF THIRTIES CITED IN SINYAVSKY-DANIEL TRIAL

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Larissa Daniel, the wife of Yuli Daniel, the Soviet writer condemned to five years at hard labor for publishing fiction abroad, granted an exclusive interview to Agence France Press after visiting her husband February 14.

She said that Andrei Sinyavsky, condemned to seven years at hard labor for the same "crime," had been visited by his wife the same day. The men were being held in separate cells at the Lefortovo prison awaiting transfer to the Mordovia labor camp on the Volga south of Gorky.

Mrs. Daniel sat in the trial for four days and was therefore in position to indicate some of the things that occurred in the supposedly "public" trial that was held behind closed doors.

Constantine Paustovsky, one of the best-known and most respected writers in the Soviet Union, had sent a letter to Sinyavsky's attorney, she said. The 64-year-old writer took a strong stand in the letter in favor of the two defendants and against the trial. However, said Mrs. Daniel, the court did not read the letter aloud as part of the record.

Paustovsky wrote that he saw nothing "anti-Soviet" in the works published abroad under the pen names of "Tertz" and "Arzhak." From an artistic point of view, he did not care for them, he added. but their publication was a matter of personal conscience and to place the two authors on trial on criminal charges was a grave affair that would tend to injure the prestige of the Soviet Union.

In his own defense Yuli Daniel stressed, according to his wife, that the "slanders" of Soviet society which the prosecution saw in Moscow Calling in particular, were basically a psychological analysis of the period of the cult of the personality of Stalin.

Daniel cited a long list of writers and artists who disappeared in the vast Stalinist purges. He told his judges that it was to avoid something like that occurring again that he had sent his writings abroad. He also accused two delegates of the Writers Union of tearing quotations out of context in order to destroy him. n shanning kalondin in berning ya An akatim tanan akatim ta

SINYAVSKY-DANIEL WITNESS FACES PROSECUTION

One of the witnesses in the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, identified by the Associated Press [February 17] as a "Mr. Golumshtok," may be placed on trial himself.

During his testimony, he admitted that he had read the works which the two writers had published abroad under pen names. A "friend," he said, had obtained the books for him.

Although he was threatened with punishment for his recalcitrance, he refused to identify the friend.

In accordance with legislation maintained by the Stalinist bureaucracy to preserve its privileged position in Soviet society, Golumshtok can be sentenced to a labor camp for six months or fined fifty rubles [\$55] for his crime of reading forbidden literature.

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NIGERIAN POLICE USE TEAR GAS ON STRIKERS

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The Nigerian police used tear-gas grenades February 18 to disperse several hundred clothing workers on strike in a Lagos suburb. The workers, who are demanding a pay increase, said they would continue their strike despite the police violence.

The incident was the first of its kind since the recent military coup. Great expectations were aroused among the populace by the overturn of the old regime which was thoroughly hated because of its scandalous corruption, incompetence, and antilabor policies.

General Aguiyi Ironsi, who heads the new government, has appealed for "patience" in face of the widespread hopes for an early rise in the standard of living.

LIKE HUNTING FOR AN H-BOMB IN SPAIN

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The old analogy has been modernized. It's no longer like hunting for a needle in a haystack; it's like hunting for an H-bomb in Spain. This is the conclusion that emerges from the latest reports about the search for the H-bomb, one of four that fell from a B-52 after the bomber collided with a tanker plane over the peninsula.

All fishing in the Mediterranean has been banned by the Spanish authorities for an area extending ten miles offshore from Palomares. This would indicate that the two American pocket submarines are still combing the mud and debris on the ocean bottom.

The ban will probably not affect the local fishing industry in view of the fact that it has been virtually impossible to sell fish from the area since the news first spread about the accident.

The Americans have also intensified their activities ashore in a continuing effort to lower the level of radioactivity in the area where one of the H-bombs cracked its casing upon landing, diffusing the deadly plutonium trigger. The troops are pulling up tomato plants and dumping them, stakes and all, in a crusher. How the mash is finally disposed of has not been reported in the press.

After harvesting the tomatoes in this thoroughgoing way, the ground is plowed. The next step is to drench the newly upturned soil with water hauled in tanker trucks equipped with sprinklers.

The most instructive lesson in all this is the amount of work required to rid even a small area of radioactive contamination. Perhaps that American general was not boasting when he said that the United States now has a stockpile of nuclear weapons of such size and deadliness that the entire population of the Soviet Union could be wiped out by merely dumping the contents over Russia, without exploding a single bomb!

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AMERICAN SOURCE OF SUPPLY FOR VIETNAMESE GUERRILLAS

Following a three-week visit to South Vietnam, Mel Barisic, vice-president of the National Maritime Union, the largest of the U.S. organizations covering merchant seamen, reported that forty per cent of all the PX supplies [consumer goods intended for the armed forces and their families] wind up in the hands of the guerrilla fighters. and the second second second

Barisic, according to the February 17 New York Times, made clear that these figures did not apply to military cargo such as ammunition. This is handled by the American military authorities at installations operated by the armed forces. Much of the PX supplies, in contrast, are stored in sheds or in the open.

The union official suggested that tamper-proof steel contain-ers should be used to cut down on the pilferage. o house as as a

The sympathies of this typical American union bureaucrat clearly lie on the side of Johnson's war policy. In fact he appears, like so many of his kind, to be trying to outdo the most reactionary like so many of his Kinu, to be on the business circles in patriotic fervor.

It is also clear from his report, however, that in Saigon and the other ports used by the U.S. in south Vietnam the sympathies of the population are so strongly on the side of the freedom fighters that they are willing to risk a great deal to help send them supna sente in a serie de la composition d La composition de la c plies.

HEAVYWEIGHT CHAMPION HAS NO QUARREL WITH VIETNAMESE

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DELTA PAR A SAME

The standing of Cassius Clay, world's heavyweight boxing champion, hit a new low among boxing officials and Johnson administration fight fans, while reaching a new high among Americans opposed to the war in Vietnam, when he refused to back down on his objection to being given a 1-A draft classification that would make it possible to induct him into the army. 14 A. 1

When told about his new draft status, the famed fighter said, "I'm a member of the Black Muslims and we don't go to wars unless they are declared by Allah himself I don't have no personal quarrel with those Vietcong." and the second

Boxing officials in Illinois tried to get him to apologize February 25 for his "unpatriotic remarks." Clay turned them down, saying, "Im not here to make a showdown plea or apologize, the way the press said I would."

Attorney General William C. Clark thereupon stated that Clay's next bout, scheduled to be held in Chicago March 29, would be "illegal" under the circumstances.

CASTRO'S INTERVENTION IN THE GUATEMALAN DISPUTE UNTRU'S

By Livio Maitan

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Fidel Castro's closing speech at the Tricontinental Conference has drawn the attention of workers and revolutionists on an international scale to the difficulties and divisions experienced by the guerrilla movement in Guatemala now for some time. Moreover, the Cuban leader, in repeating, at least in part, what others wrote, (1) deemed it advisable to employ violent terms against the Fourth International, which he holds responsible for having led Comandante Yon Sosa and his forces astray.

Unfortunately, we are not able to check up on all the details that should be considered. It is difficult, for example, to estimate the exact degree to which the guerrilla forces have become rooted at this stage, particularly with respect to the various fronts and movements. We are likewise unable to ascertain the facts about such episodes as the Galván affair, mentioned in a document by Luis A. Turcios, and the story about the businessman, who, according to Castro, was put in charge of the "political side" of the MR-13 [November 13 Movement](2). Nevertheless, these gaps, however regrettable, cannot prevent us from stating where we stand on a whole series of burning questions. sta sy daa in

It goes without saying that we feel under no obligation to reply in this article to the arguments concerning our alleged characteristic of being "agents of imperialism" -- we have already replied to Castro on this. (3) We shall limit ourselves, by way of beginning, to stressing the following three points:

(1) Fidel deliberately made amalgams; in particular, with respect to Guatemala, he made out that he was in ignorance of the

(1) Besides the documents of the Communist PGT [Partido Guatemalteca del Trabajo -- Guatemalan Labor party] and the declarations of Luis A. Turcios, we have in mind the article by A. Tzul which appeared in the International Review of the Communist parties (April 1965 Italian edition) where the differences are attributed to the influence of "Trotskyist provocateurs." Also see the December 1964 issue of the same publication.

(2) According to Turcios, Galván, after being arrested, "was freed by the Guatemalan dictatorship..." For our part, we likewise recall that the PGT leader Carlos Alvarado Jerez was freed in 1964. (See the article by Tzul in the September 1964 issue of the International Review of the Communist parties.) Galván, a member of the Posadista tendency -- if it is actually the same person -- left the Fourth International in 1961. As for the businessman mentioned by Castro, the leadership of the Fourth International knows nothing about him.

(3) See the "Open Letter to Comandante Fidel Castro" sent by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International [in World Outlook February 18] and the statements made by the organs of the various sections.

fact that the Posadas group has nothing to do with the Fourth International. However, Luis A. Turcios wrote in a document that Fidel certainly is aware of(4) that in Mexico -- the country where the "Trotskyists" involved in the Guatemalan affair came from -- "two Trotskyist groups exist that do not want to have anything to do with each other: the Liga Obrera Marxista [Marxist Workers League] and the Partido Obrero Revolucionario [Revolutionary Workers Party]. The Trotskyists of the MR-13 belong to the second group." It is thus natural to conclude that all the main protagonists in the polemic know the truth perfectly well and are aware of the completely antagonistic position of the Fourth International with respect to the Posadista grouping. Everything is crammed into the same sack for factional purposes and in the interest of ideological terrorism.

(2) By engaging directly and completely in the polemic in the way he did, Fidel is responsible for utterly distorting a political debate which is without the least doubt of capital importance and of substituting a witch-hunt in the classical Stalinist style for a theoretical and political confrontation based on living experience. This attitude is all the more reprehensible since it is a question of men fighting, arms in hand, and who, because of that fact alone, have the right to expect solidarity without reservation from every revolutionist, a solidarity that does not mean withholding all political criticism, but which does mean that criticism must be aimed at helping, and not destroying them.

(3) The arbitrariness of the attempt to convert the Trotskyists into scapegoats for all the difficulties of the Guatemalan movement can be ascertained from certain statements made by Turcios himself. He explicitly admits that the divisions existed before the alleged "Trotskyists" intervened in the situation.

But let us turn to more substantial questions.

Luis Turcios' Criticism

Luis A. Turcios, who was the second in command in the MR-13 before breaking with Yon Sosa, has played a role of prime importance in the whole affair and was recognized by the Tricontinental Conference as the head of the Guatemalan delegation. He declared where he stands particularly in his letter of resignation from the MR-13, and it is restated more briefly in the interview published in January of this year in the Cuban press. It is to be noted that while repeating the old arguments against Trotskyism and its alleged failure, Turcios, at least in these two documents, keeps the polemic essentially on a political level. Fundamentally he accuses Yon Sosa of having permitted his movement to fall under the political influence of a cell of Trotskyists who came from Mexico and whose activities. methods and concepts made any collaboration impossible. Among other things, he states that his signature was arbitrarily affixed to the

(4) The document is one we shall refer to again; i.e., Turcios' letter of resignation from the MR-13, published in the No. 13 (1965) issue of <u>Correo de Guatemala</u> which is printed in Havana. Declaración de la Sierra de las Minas which was published in <u>Revolu-</u> <u>ción Socialista</u>, the organ of the MR-13.

Let us note that if it is true that adherents of the Mexican Posadista POR [Partido Obrero Revolucionario] did collaborate with the MR-13, it is difficult to believe that members of an organization whose influence, according to Turcios himself, is infinitesimal in their own country could impose themselves on a movement in another country that is unquestionably rooted among the masses. Analysis of a series of documents points to the conclusion that the Posadistas quite probably participated in publishing some issues of <u>Revolución Socialista</u>, but this could not possibly have occurred if the MR-13 itself did not have a certain line, if only an approximate one, opposing in particular the opportunism and ambiguities of the PGT. Getting down to cases, what are Luis Turcios' criticisms? Essentially they are as follows:

The Trotskyists interpret the situation in Guatemala in a subjective way, ignoring the necessity for a prolonged war and talking about a general insurrection in the near future, thus risking fostering adventurist actions and useless massacres. They are opposed to preparing and organizing a genuine people's war, and they follow the "international line of Trotskyism oriented toward an urban insurrection, by means of special committees, as the form of gaining power in no matter what country and under no matter what conditions." They idealize mass action and underestimate the need to create a revolutionary army, without which the mass movement is inevitably crushed. They launch slogans without taking into account specific situations. For example, they agitate for the building of special mass committees, forgetting that it is impossible to build them unless you confine yourself to legal activities. They act in such a way as to make unity impossible and they exaggerate the leadership role of the MR-13 by deliberately ignoring the role of other leaderships in the Guatemalan guerrilla movement. Time of

Similar arguments are advanced in another document quite likely written in collaboration with Turcios; namely, a declaration of the Provisional Center of the Revolutionary Leadership, which criticizes in particular the tendency "to attribute a socialist character to every mass movement" and to exaggerate the level of socialist consciousness achieved by the masses.(5)

We repeat once more: when Turcios and his friends talk about Trotskyism, they systematically mix up the Trotskyist movement, organized in its overwhelming majority in the Fourth International, and the tendency represented by the small Posadista grouping. While it is evident to us that the documents of the MR-13 are influenced by Posadista ideas, it is difficult to draw a clear line between these documents and other documents where this influence is not manifest. Therefore we can form a judgment only on the basis of the documents at hand, including the <u>Primera Declaración de</u> <u>la Sierra de las Minas</u>, a May Day (1965) appeal, a few issues of <u>Revolución Socialista</u>, some interviews with Yon Sosa and Francisco

(5) See the previously cited Correo de Guatemala.

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There is no doubt that some of Turcios' criticisms are quite pertinent. Moreover they correspond, by and large, to the criticisms developed by the leadership of the Fourth International itself in the polemics of 1960-62. In the documents attributed to the MR-13, we recognize in particular a tendency to idealize the masses and their level of socialist consciousness, a sometimes grotesque exaggeration of objective situations, a highly simplistic concept of the revolutionary process in the world, a methodology that consists of always assembling all the slogans, putting them all in the same sack and forgetting or minimizing the questions of perspective and rhythm, a tendency to grossly deform reality through the subjective methods of tendentious propaganda. For example, in the May Day appeal, we read that "the revolution in the capitalist countries is developing in a constant and indefatigable intermittent struggle of the European proletariat," that "there is preoccupation, there is constant political life among the North American masses" and that "the proletariat has begun strike actions that reveal its decision as a class to face Yankee imperialism," that "there is a world anticapitalist revolution constantly on the rise." Anyone who knows the analytical documents of our movement can see that insofar as one can speak of Trotskyism here, it is a parody of the real thing.

In the same May Day document, we encounter in addition another characteristic expression of Posadism; namely, the curious concept of atomic war equating "to the world revolution, tumultuous and uncontainable." Permit us to recall that the "theoretical" lucubrations of Posadas on nuclear war were at the center of the polemic accompanying his departure from our movement.(6)

With regard to the situation dealing more closely with Guatemala, while it is difficult for us to offer an accurate judgment on the basis of incomplete evidence, in our opinion the perspective of a generalized guerrilla war, peasant militia and organs of dual power on a national scale "mañana -- en un corte plazo" ["tomorrow -- in a short time"] is correctly criticized as fanciful(7) and that certain appeals to the workers and students -- for example, in the declaration of the Sierra de las Minas -- disregard the real situation. In the best of cases, at least in the documents, propagandistic formulas are erroneously placed on the same level as immediate slogans. It is difficult to say whether this is due to the Guatemalan authors or whether it represents the intrusion of Posadista fantasies. Finally, for examples of a platform in which everything is placed on the same level, certain passages could be cited from the May Day appeal or the document celebrating the fifth anni-

(6) Nevertheless the Guatemalan documents do not contain the wildest formulations of Posadas calling for preventive nuclear war by the USSR.

(7) See the May Day appeal, previously cited.

A word on the methods used in the dispute. We have long known the methods employed by the leaders of the Communist parties when they discover the presence of "Trotskyists," whether it is a question of real or imaginary Trotskyists. The PGT has continued to employ the classic epithets against Trotskyism and we cannot take their word for it when they profess to uphold unity. Nevertheless with regard to the Posadistas, it is true that they are given to sectarian methods and rabid factionalism and even resort to outright swindles.(9) In addition, we consider it more generally to be wrong for a quite small team, coming from the outside, to attempt by artificial means to impose almost all their ideas and slogans on a new movement that is developing in a difficult and contradictory situation on the basis of its own experiences.

The Concepts of the MR-13 and the PGT

All this having been said, we must turn to the heart of the differences. Independently of the role of this or that figure, of the intervention of a few Posadistas, etc., the divisions in the Guatemalan movement are determined by the existence of different concepts on the capital question of the nature of the revolution in Guatemala and its motor forces. On this the concepts of Comandante Yon Sosa and his team are opposed to the concepts of the PGT. Turcios, it appears, does not identify himself with either side.(10)

The line of the MR-13 is stated in a series of documents and summarized in the interviews granted by Yon Sosa. "The MR-13," Yon Sosa says, "is convinced that conditions do not exist for a national

(8) My reference is the translation appearing in the January 9, 1966, issue of <u>Mondo Nuovo</u>, the weekly of the PSIUP [Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity]. In a May 1965 document dealing with the American landing in Santo Domingo, we encounter another slogan that is continually advanced by the Posadistas in a way devoid of meaning: "An unlimited general strike." It goes without saying that the slogan in and of itself is not bad -- we criticize applying it as a caricature.

(9) The main swindle clearly is to continue to proclaim themselves to be the "Fourth International," etc., when they left the organization after they saw that they would never be able to win even a small sector of the movement to their ideas.

(10) In his letter of resignation, Turcios speaks of differences over "the methods of work" and the "theoretical concepts" of the PGT, which would lead one to believe that he does not agree with the ideas of the PGT on the nature of the Guatemalan revolution. (We have already indicated the axis of his criticism of "Trotskyism.") However, in a declaration made in Havana January 4, he criticizes the perspective "of immediately making the socialist revolution" and explains that "it is preferable to make an anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolution, going through the necessary stages to create the basis for socialism." democratic revolution; that is, to have representatives of the workers and the peasants and the bourgeoisie in the government, because you can't put a cat and a dog in the same kennel...How would such a government function? Would there be a coalition between the workers, the peasants and the bourgeoisie?"

Consequently the MR-13 speaks of socialist revolution and a workers and peasants government. "Independently of the fact that in Guatemala you can't find a national bourgeoisie," Francisco Amado Granados declares, "to conceive of such a bloc as an objective, signifies ruling out all the means of revolutionary class struggle belonging to the working class. For example, it means ruling out a revolutionary general strike, the occupation of the plants, the arming of the proletariat -- in short those methods that are revolutionary and not peaceful, breaking the above-mentioned bloc. They put the proletariat into opposition against the bourgeoisie, against the company management, whether they are Guatemalans or foreigners. And the ruling out of methods belonging to the working class means to limit the extent of the struggle and its effectiveness, it means preparing its defeat."

In another interview, Yon Sosa states that he drew his conclusions "in fighting, in living with the peasants," for whom, in addition, "the idea of the socialist revolution is so simple and logical that they don't want to listen to those who talk about a different road."(11)

The current concepts of the PGT, which have been explained many times in the organs of the international Communist movement, are summarized in a March 1965 resolution of the Central Committee. According to the PGT, "the Guatemalan revolution is, at the present stage, popular, anti-imperialist and agrarian in its content" and one can therefore seek an alliance not only between the workers and peasants, but also with the middle layers of the petty bourgeoisie and the so-called national bourgeoisie. The working class is called on to play the leading role, which will enable it to deepen the content of the revolution: "The national democratic revolution and the socialist revolution are two distinct, indissolubly united stages of a single revolutionary movement."

(11) The quotations are from <u>Revolución Socialista</u> (supplement No.1, October 1964), and <u>Mondo Nuovo</u> (issues of June 6 and June 13) respectively. These documents do not justify the accusation, made in the declaration of the Provisional Center of Revolutionary Leadership, previously cited, according to which the socialist character of the revolution was deduced solely from a revolutionary rise throughout the world and not from a concrete analysis of the specific national reality. In addition, the authors once again devote themselves to an arbitrary extrapolation of the Posadista documents, presenting them as documents of the Trotskyist movement, when they write: "The Trotskyist schema of the socialist revolution emanating from the leadership of the Fourth International is a general sieve through which they want to force the diverse and multiple reality of every country in the world."

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With all due deference to the cultivators of the "new," the "specific" at all costs, and everyone who has joined the cult of "national roads," the problems that have brought the Guatemalan tendencies and organizations in opposition to each other today were posed, certainly not in identical terms, but in analogous ones just the same, in a series of countries in recent decades, beginning with the Chinese revolution of 1925-27.

It is true that after the capital experiences of the postwar period and more particularly with regard to Latin America after the victory of the Cuban Revolution, certain questions appeared in a new light. First of all, no one dares to express himself exactly as formerly and even the rightists must pay homage to the revolutionary road if they hope to hold any audience whatever. Thus while talking about two stages of the revolution, they at times stress its uninterrupted character and the necessity for the working class, in alliance with the peasantry, to play the leading role from now on. On the other hand, there are militants who, appealing to the Cuban experience, hold that any possible confused concept cannot inter-fere with the dynamics of the revolutionary process and that there will always be time for the necessary rectification provided that a real struggle develops.

Democratic Revolution or Permanent Revolution?

In any case it is not a matter of scholastic quarrels nourished by people squabbling over this or that formula in the books. In the final analysis the stake is a practical one and behind the formulas and nuances are hidden precise political implications. This is all the truer in the case of Guatemala, which has already lived through tragic experiences in which certain organizations have necessarily been judged, and primarily on the basis of their past activi-Halosd Ziletinne - ties.

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Thus, when the question of the PGT comes up, it must not be forgotten what the consequences were of its line of democratic revolution, which involved collaboration with the national bourgeoisie in the Arévalo-Arbenz period up to the aggression of 1954. In practice the PGT gave up any autonomous role and transformed itself into a pillar of the reformist bourgeois government, which at the crucial moment capitulated in face of the forces of the imperialists and the indigenous reactionaries alt is worth recalling that already in 1952 the very J.M.Fortuniswho writes in the <u>International Review</u> of the Communist parties made a self-critical report in which he regretted among other things that the party had not "brought out with sufficient clarity and firmness the leading role of the proletariat in the present stage of struggle. " The self-criticism remained on paper, even in the tragic turn of June 1954.

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It must be recalled again that after 1954, the line of the Communist party for years was aimed at restoring "democracy" in Guatemala; and it was not until 1961 -- under the influence of the Cuban Revolution -- that a turn toward armed struggle was projected. Again, it was necessary to wait two years at least before this was translated into practice. Even after the turn, moreover, the line

appeared rather eclectic and up until recently was still based on legal activities, at least in several regions of the country.(12)

The problem of the nature of the revolution, as we have already indicated, is concretized around the question of what social classes are participating in the struggle, which ones will continue through to the end and which one must play in actuality -- and not in the literary proclamations of resolutions -- the leading role. Trotskyism has never denied a priori that national-bourgeois layers could become associated in an anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle, but it has stressed that if the leadership reverts to these layers, the struggle will inevitably be slowed down, channelized, detoured, and will end in the best of cases in the installation of a neocolonial regime in which imperialism substantially maintains its grip and the masses are robbed of the fruits of their struggle. That is why it is absolutely imperative to understand and to make it understood what the dynamics of the process must be, to work out a platform that leaves no equivocation whatsoever and to assure -- this is decisive in the final analysis -- the leadership of the working class allied with the poor peasants. This by no means signifies confounding the beginning of a revolution with its final phase, nor launching from the beginning slogans that can only become concretized at the culmination of an entire revolutionary process. Nor does it mean replacing analysis of concrete situations by subjective interpretations and by an absurd idealization of the masses. Thus what is important is to grasp the permanent character of the revolution whose deepest logic is not only anti-imperialist and antifeudal, but also anticapitalist; to bear clearly in mind that under no condition can the possible convergence at certain stages with petty-bourgeois and national bourgeois forces be paid for at the cost of renouncing or diluting in any way the primary leading role of the proletariat and the poor peasants; i.e., the only genuine motor forces surging up from the structures of an economically backward society in the context of the contemporary world. It must be noted well that the touchstone for a revolutionary leadership resides in its capacity at each concrete stage to advance slogans and organize actions that will feed the anticapitalist dynamics of the struggle while starting from a mobilization for democratic objectives and national liberation.

This concept is clearly reflected in a document adopted by the Reunification Congress of our movement(13) which can well be be recalled here for the information of those who prefer not to judge Trotskyism on the basis of arbitrarily chosen sources:

(12) See the articles by J.M.Fortuni and José Milla in the December 1964 issue of the <u>International Review</u> of the Communist parties (Italian edition), and the article by Tzul already referred to in the April 1965 issue of the same magazine. Tzul speaks particularly about combining the use of legal and illegal forms of struggle.

(13) This document was previously adopted by the seventh congress and thus is not the document alluded to by the declaration of the Provisional Center of the Revolutionary Leadership previously cited several times.

"As in the case of equating the beginning of the colonial revolution (under bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership) with its victorious conclusion under proletarian leadership, any idea that this process will occur automatically or inevitably within a certain time limit necessarily leads to a distorted estimate of the actual relationship of forces and replaces scientific analysis by illusions and wishful thinking. It presupposes that the objective process will solve by itself a task which can only be solved in struggle through the subjective effort of the vanguard; i.e., revolutionarysocialist conquest of the leadership of the mass movement. That this is possible in the very process of the revolution, and in a relatively short time, has been adequately demonstrated in the case of Cuba. That it is not inevitable, and that without it the revolution is certain to suffer serious defeats or be limited at best to inconclusive victories is demonstrated by much in the recent history of other Latin-American countries; for instance, Bolivia, Argentina and Guate-mala." ("Dynamics of World Revolution," <u>International Socialist Re-</u> <u>view</u>, Fall 1963, p. 117. Also available as a pamphlet. [Emphasis in original.])

Finally, there is an obvious lesson in the fact that the line oriented on a "national liberation, agrarian, patriotic and democratic, anti-imperialist and antifeudal" revolution, in which the national bourgeoisie would also be "interested," was advocated in Cuba by the former Communist PSP [Partido Socialista Popular] up until 1961, and it was by rejecting this line through audacious revolutionary practice that the FideLista leadership assured the socialist victory of the revolution. An analogous lesson can be drawn from the fact that absolutely false and opportunist ideas on the nature of the revolution as well as the role of the national bourgeoisie greatly facilitated the Brazilian defeat in 1964. The same can be said for Indonesia where the outlook of collaboration with the national bourgeoisie, personified by Sukarno, led the Indonesian Communist party -- despite its affirmations about the continuity of the revolutionary process and the leading role of the proletariat -to a defeat even more tragic than that in Brazil and to the massacre of more than 100,000 Communists.

The questions under debate within the Guatemalan movement are thus of absolutely vital importance. That it is occurring among men engaged in guerrilla warfare under the difficult conditions imposed on them by the forces of reaction should not be forgotten for an instant by those outside the country who are partisans of their struggle. It is grievous that Fidel Castro should have to be reminded of this. It is in the interest of no one on the side of the guerrillas to replace reasoned discussion with epithets and slanders and to launch a campaign of real ideological terrorism. That is why the way in which Fidel Castro intervened, slanderously and arbitrarily striking at the Fourth International, far from assuring the success of the contribution which the leader of the Cuban Revolution could unquestionably bring, will inevitably have negative repercussions and make more difficult the clarification that is required among the Guatemalan vanguard and among Latin-American revolutionists in general.

February 19, 1966

INDIAN TROTSKYISTS LAUNCH NEW MAGAZINE

We have received the first issue of <u>Marxist Outlook</u>, the journal of the Socialist Workers party, Indian section of the Fourth International. It is a 44-page, pocket-size magazine with an attractive two-color cover.

The table of contents includes notes on important current political events in India -- the accession of India's first woman prime minister to power, the Tashkent pact, the mass movement against hunger and famine started in Kerala, and an appeal for the release of political prisoners in India.

On the international scene, the editors single out two events for comment -- the war in Vietnam and the debacle suffered by the Communist party in Indonesia. In the struggle against the imperialist aggression in Vietnam, the editors find the antiwar movement in the United States particularly encouraging. They appeal for the organization of an International Brigade to help the Vietnamese freedom fighters.

Analyzing the defeat in Indonesia, the editors find the prime cause to lie in the class-collaborationist policy followed by the Aidit leadership of the Communist party. "Although the pro-Moscow CPs have tried to blame the Chinese strategy for the tragic betrayal of the Indonesian revolution," they say, "it is well known that the policy of class collaboration pursued by the PKI for the last twenty years, a policy of 'four-class bloc' and subservience to the national bourgeoisie is basically responsible for the present debacle in Indonesia."

In conclusion, <u>Marxist Outlook</u> declares: "Thousands of rankand-file members of the PKI have been offered as sacrifice at the altar of the Stalinist strategy of a 'four-class bloc' in 'underdeveloped' Indonesia. The magnitude of the tragedy that has taken place is yet to be evaluated properly. It is only to be hoped that the CPs in other countries will draw proper lessons from the colossal betrayal in Indonesia. That there are not even mass demonstrations in other Asian countries in sympathy with the victims of the Indonesian counterrevolution, to the great delight of world reaction, should be a matter of deep concern for the international workingclass movement."

In the first of a series of articles on the subject, Dr. A.R. Desai discusses the public sector in the Indian economy. His point of departure is the "very profound and bitter controversy among the scholars who are examining the trend of growth in the underdeveloped countries, where capitalism is not destroyed during the phase of securing independence." These scholars, who belong to both the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking tendencies, divide the underdeveloped countries into three categories: those that have taken the noncapitalist path as in the case of China and Cuba; those that remain headed by a reactionary bourgeoisie that is profeudal and pro-imperialist; and a supposedly intermediate grouping.

The second category is said to be following the reactionary "Japanese Pattern." This consists of utilizing the public sector of the economy, under guidance of the government, to pioneer for private monopoly capital in fields beyond the current capacity of private enterprise.

The third category is called the "Indian Pattern." In this the public sector is alleged to take priority over the private sector and to be growing at a faster rate. The "Indian Pattern" therefore opens, according to this school of thought, the possibility for a peaceful transition from a capitalist to a socialist economy.

In view of the importance of the Indian experience in testing this theory, Dr. Desai proposes to examine the reality of Indian economic developments, particularly the relationship between the public and private sectors. The series thus promises to bring a genuine contribution to this important subject.

Other articles in No. 1, Volume 1, of <u>Marxist Outlook</u> include "Cruelties Equalling Those of Hitler" by Bertrand Russell, "Homage to Lenin" by C.G.Shah, "Situation in Ceylon" by Edmund Samarakkody, "Textile Strike and Tarapore Firing" by M.D.Parija, and the Socialist Workers party declaration on the war between India and Pakistan.

The Indian Trotskyists are to be congratulated for initiating this important venture, particularly in view of the extreme financial difficulties which they face as part of the abysmally low-paid Indian working class.

A single copy of the new Indian magazine can be obtained by sending forty cents to <u>Marxist Outlook</u>, 414 Cleveland Road, Worli, Bombay 18, India.

A one year's subscription is \$4.50 in the U.S. and Canada, £1/10s in Great Britain.

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APPEAL OF WOMEN HOSTAGES HELD BY BELAUNDE GOVERNMENT

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[The following is the text of a letter smuggled out of the Chorrillos prison in Lima by seven women held without charges by the Belaúnde Terry regime as hostages. The seven women are wives of guerrilla leaders fighting in Peru. An eighth hostage, the wife of Luis de la Puente Uceda, killed October 23, 1965, was unable to sign her name. On a hunger strike for a month, she was taken to a police hospital. The letter, dated February 11, 1966, has been translated by <u>World Outlook</u>.]

* * *

Only by respecting conscience and recognizing Human Rights will we continue to make progress and reestablish the values and ethical principles that are the pillars of a civilization free from abusive oppression and a protector of inalienable rights.

For some months in our country, under pretext of defending an endangered "democracy," excessively repressive measures have halted the historic process and taken us back toward the darkest period of the Middle Ages.

Abuses without limit have aroused human feelings and boundless indignation in everyone who has a conscience.

For a month the news of the disappearance, the capture and then the death of Guillermo Lobatón, head of the guerrilla forces of Túpac Amaru in Centro, has been handled in the most scandalous way by the Lima and provincial press without the Joint Command of the Armed Forces issuing an official statement publicly confirming or denying the reports. Various appeals, letters of protest from his family, various demonstrations within government spheres themselves have sought clarification concerning the situation of the group in Centro and their leader.

Genuine confusion, a sharp opposition, an attitude of rebellion, made the army hold to its obstinate silence still more unreasonably. But the problem has much greater scope and we feel the darkest premonitions. What is the truth about Máximo Velando? The hypothesis of suicide makes us angry and we protest against the secret disappearance of men -- vile murders. Is Guillermo Lobatón dead? Was Guillermo Lobatón captured? The case of Máximo Velando alone arouses all kinds of suspicions, all the more so when the equivocation continues, fostered and inspired by the military authorities who hide behind a curtain of silence.

It is also an abuse to hold in prison for seven (7) months, women who have children, as hostages. It is a crime against individuals in secret -- genocide, excesses that demand our most categoric opposition.

(1) In face of the silence of the Army in regard to the disappearances, the captures, in face of the deaths of the guerrilla fighters in the Centro guerrilla area, we demand an immediate denial or official and public confirmation of the death of Guillermo Lobatón and the other comrades.

(2) In face of the cynicism of the Army in asking the wife of Máximo Velando -- Carmen Castán de Velando -- to present a death certificate for her husband in response to her request for his mortal remains and personal belongings -- the request was made more than a month ago -- we demand that they stop making a mockery of sacred rights promulgated and defended by the Declaration of the Assembly of the United Nations. We ask for the truth. If Máximo Velando is dead, let them issue a communiqué confirming the accuracy of the news with detailed information about the circumstances.

(3) In face of the detention of seven (7) women comrades confined as hostages for seven (7) months, we demand:

(a) That they state the legal reasons for denying us provisional freedom.

(b) That they present the proofs of their accusation.

(c) That they stop paralyzing the proceedings and stop putting obstacles in the way of our legal representatives who up to now have not been permitted to read the charges.

(d) That they at once begin and speed the trial of each one of the defendants.

We address the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, the General Headquarters of the Army, the competent Authorities, the Student Organizations and Trade Unions, everyone with a conscience and Public Opinion. We lodge our energetic and just protest, in view of the fact that proceedings that destroy a human being go against the elementary principles of the Rights of Man.

To support our protest, we declare a HUNGER STRIKE to begin at midnight Sunday February 13, 1966.

Those on STRIKE:

CARMEN CASTAN DE VELANDOJACQUELINE ELUAU DE LOBATONNELLY ARIAS ESCALANTEGUILLERMINA VIDAL REYESMERCEDES MORALES DE FERNANDEZCARMEN GALVEZ DE GADEA

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The family of Guillermo Lobatón

[Guillermo Lobatón's family is conducting a hunger strike in a classroom of the Faculty of Law at the University of San Marcos in Lima.]

PLATFORM OF THE BOLIVIAN DEMOCRATIC COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE

[The following is the full text of the platform of the Democratic Council of the People (CODEP -- Consejo Democrático del Pueblo). Dated December 31, 1965, it was published in La Paz Janu-ary 24, 1966. The organizations composing the CODEP include the Partido Revolucionario de Izquierda Nacionalista, a dissident wing of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, the pro-Peking Bolivian Communist party and the Bolivian Trotskyist movement. The trans-lation is by World Outlook; the subheadings are in the original text.]

The Democratic Council of the People is an instrument of the workers, intellectuals and pooular sectors of the whole country, organized to coordinate and strengthen the struggle against the military oppression and with the objective of winning full exercise of democracy on the basis of respect for human dignity and to gain

national liberation from the imperialist yoke.

The majority of the nation, whose popular will has been silenced by the most brutal repression experienced up to now, are struggling intransigently for common and vital objectives that transcend the bounds of partisan interests and are being concretized in the energetic revolutionary thrust of the workers and the heroic resistance of the whole Bolivian people against the fascist measures employed to maintain in power open enemies of the country, of the working class, of freedom, dignity and social justice.

Against the Military Dictatorship, For Democracy

The Military Junta of the government is the political expression of the system of fascist oppression applied in an underdeveloped country like ours and its mission is to destroy the popular and democratic gains, restore the privileges of the oligarchy and turn over the national wealth to international finance capitalism.

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The fascist generals have stamped Bolivian politics with the seal of extreme barbarism so that no one can criticize, still less try to rectify, errors that are injuring the country. The military dictatorship is expressed objectively in the content of the socalled "Law of State Security" ["Ley de Seguridad del Estado"]; in the rabid persecution of opponents and workers; in the existence of concentration camps; in the permanent and truceless state of siege; in the physical destruction of the trade unions; in political assassination as a method of rule; in the lack of freedom of speech for the revolutionary opposition and the trade-union movement; in the series of antilabor measures and the abrogation of such conquests of the proletariat as trade-union legislation, workers control, the right to organize unions and to hold democratic trade-union elections; finally, in the periodic massacres (May and September), and in the military occupation of the mining centers on top of intervention by the state in the headquarters of the trade unions.

The military government serves as the transmission belt for the imperialist interests, obeying the dictates of the North American Pentagon. This obsequious breaching of our national dignity is expressed in a foreign policy lacking the most elementary sense of national sovereignty; in the sacking of the national wealth by the imperialist monopolies; in the systematic liquidation of all participation by the state and the Bolivian workers in the nationalized industries or industries of state origin; in the official incapacity to protect and defend national industry from the colonial policy applied by the United States of North America in questions of imports and alleged "aid" and the lack of solidarity with the oppressed peoples -- displaying instead an unspeakable cynicism in identifying themselves with the aggressive and interventionist policy of the United States.

Against this antinational and antilabor policy, we stand for an intransigent struggle to the end for the establishment of a democratic, nationalist and popular government, of the Bolivians and for the Bolivians, that obeys no dictates except those emanating from the popular will on the basis of the full exercise of national sovereignty.

In the same way, we defend the revolutionary importance of the proletariat as the vanguard in the process of necessary transformations in the national structure, resolved that its specific weight in the economy of the country should similarly be expressed in national politics.

We demand respect for the middle class's desire for political self-determination, without compelling it to suffer the humiliations, aimed at instilling servility, which are inflicted by those who, for the moment, hold state power.

It follows from this that in the present circumstances any election held in accordance with the rules of the current Electoral Statutes can be nothing but a farce and a fraud aimed at perpetuating the military dictatorship. The imposition of official candidates supported by the bayonets and dollars of imperialism, signifies nothing less than a defeat for the people and a new frustration of their aspirations. The popular forces cannot lend themselves to this game of the counterrevolutionary dictatorship and they are denouncing before the people the big electoral masquerade being prepared behind their backs.

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We demand, as a patriotic and nationalist right, the Bolivianization of the Armed Forces of the Nation, emancipating them from the subjection exercised by the foreign oppressors and identifying them with the aspirations of the Bolivian people for national liberation. Consequently, our unyielding struggle is against the fascist camarillas or lodges which utilize the Bolivian uniform only to bring shame on it or to stain it with the blood of the Bolivian proletariat. The people must unite to help the soldiers, rated men and young officers emancipate themselves from the unjust oppression which the agents of the Pentagon impose upon their minds and feelings as Bolivians.

There can be no democracy for the Bolivians until we emancipate Bolivia from foreign tutelage. We do not believe in the salvation of the country through the help of foreign exploiters. Experience itself has taught us that all that is gained through alliances with imperialism is the undermining and suffocation of movements for national liberation. Thus we advocate a national policy that maintains dignity and sovereignty. We jealously defend the right of the peoples to self-determination, struggling against any intervention by a state or international body in the internal affairs of another state. Colonialism must be swept from the face of the earth and particularly from our Latin America. We reject the imperialist posture that threatens military intervention and we are sure that if it is attempted, our people will defeat them as did the glorious. guerrilla fighters of our forefathers in the struggle for Independence, who taught us how to win the right to our own Country and **)** Liberty.

Against Fascism, For Social Justice

We must conquer, in an all-out struggle in behalf of all. especially the workers, the right to live free from all fear of repression and hunger. Not only must our daily bread be guaranteed to every Bolivian, but also the civic and cultural expression of every civilized people: the right to participate actively in politics; to organize in unions; to think and to disseminate ideas without hindrance; to use the communication media without indirect obstacles or impositions of a police nature. The shutting down of workers broadcasting stations and the repression of popular newspapers by the ruling group are not only a scandal but testify to its class character. Only the rich, both the new ones and the old ones, enjoy rights and privileges under the military boot. Women of the vanguard and courageous proletarian fighters and revolutionary intellectuals, through daily sacrifice and their example of intransigent struggle, are wrenching concessions from the dictatorship. A stop to the inhuman hunt for trade unionists and revolutionists, respect for human beings and human dignity, observance of constitutional guarantees and a return to rule by law are not obtained by pleas or as gifts. They are won in combat and they are obtained through popular pressure and revolutionary action.

We are fighting so that all Bolivians will have WORK, BREAD AND A HOME that are guaranteed and inviolable at all times and on all occasions. These must not be gracious concessions of officialdom as a barefaced method for bribing social and political circles collectively and automatically converting them into privileged layers. These are elementary rights of every citizen in any modern state. We demand the redistribution of the national income and adequate planning of the economy in order to effectively combat growing unemployment and its concomitant misery among the people. The wages and social benefits of the mine workers, as of May 1965, must be restored without postponements or subterfuges and on this base a just remuneration must be granted that will enable them to live in human conditions, working only the eight-hour day established in theory by the General Labor Law [Ley General de Trabajo]. The mining contracts with the COMIBOL [Corporación Minera de Bolivia] enterprises must be readjusted and the mining cooperatives guaranteed normal productive work without blacklists or massacres.

The mining centers must stop being converted into concentration camps for forced labor. It is not possible to even conceive the rehabilitation of the nationalized mines through the criminal methods of militaristic fascism. The lead from the rifles fired at the backs of the mine workers will never increase the quantity and quality of the tin extracted from the mines. Only respect for the popular will of the trade-union ranks, expressed through workers democracy, can establish the social pillars for genuine economic rehabilitation of nationalized industry. The same goes for any other kind of industry or work where at present even the old social laws are no longer upheld. The grocery stores have been converted into samples of the past and certain streets and plazas into open carnivals of social distraction. The prices of basic necessities have gone sky-high -those responsible for this disaster are in the Government Palace. Housewives, who are the most exploited of the exploited, carry the heaviest burden of all these social injustices, which does not prevent them, nonetheless, from going out into the streets to struggle heroically and in various ways for civil liberties and better living standards for the Bolivian people. The public health services have been abandoned, not to mention the services and loans of the National Chest of Social Security [Caja Nacional de Seguridad Social]. Besides, if yesterday we denied being a "sick people," similarly today we will not tolerate being an enslaved people. Social justice will be imposed through the iron revolutionary will of the toiling masses.

Against the Restoration, For National Liberation

We Bolivians are moving toward confronting this inevitable reality. It is necessary to take a stand: either with the revolution and for national liberation, or with fascism and the counterrevolution in the service of imperialism.

The political forces combining in the DEMOCRATIC COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE stand in the contemporary struggle on the side of the march of progress, of the revolution and the people. The people have nothing to lose with national liberation, rather they have much to gain: liberty, democracy and social justice.

The CODEP intransigently defends the conquests gained up to now in all the fields of revolutionary life. The nationalization of the mines must be extended, overcoming the errors and limitations of the past. The Bolivian people will not tolerate the crime of mortgaging their wealth to the foreign monopolies, as they are trying to do now with the mine dumps, tailings and ore leads; with the oil and gas; with the iron and tin. No form of association with the imperialist oppressor must be the norm of conduct. Cutting down the COMIBOL bureaucracy, diversifying the mining industry, installing smelters under control of the Bolivians; defending the Mining Bank [Banco Minero] as the entity in charge of fostering private mining to commercialize minerals in this sector; cooperating with and fully backing the mining cooperatives on the basis of their administrative autonomy -- these constitute the main general lines which we propose in this respect to the people as the solution of the mining problem. Strengthening of the YPFB [Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos -- the Bolivian state oil company] and revision of the Petroleum Code and substitution of all the give-away legislation by a law based on the monopoly of production and trade in hydrocarbons by the state, rounds out the position of the Democratic Council of the People on the subject of exploiting extractive raw materials.

The agrarian question, once all vestiges of the big landlords and political bosses are liquidated, as part of the struggle for national liberation, must be oriented toward the economic and social development of the Bolivian people, especially the rural sectors. It will be necessary to create agro-economic units managed technically on the basic orientation of building cooperatives in production, trade and collective labor. The planning of rural development must aim at an integral form and with a strictly national criterion; this means taking advantage of the rich experience going back thousands of years among our indigenous communities as pilot nuclei for communal or collectivist development. The rise in the technical level will be gradual and adjusted to our incipient development and the overabundance of peasant labor. The countryside must be converted into a market for national industry before it becomes a consumer of commodities of imperialist origin. The protection of industry for the transformation and its interlocking with the production of national raw materials is intimately linked to a consistent and victorious struggle against imperialism. Consequently it is necessary to also aim simultaneously at establishing diplomatic and commercial relations with all countries in the world, without any discrimination.

On the plane of education and the defense of culture, it will be necessary to project this nationalist, democratic, popular and revolutionary political line, overcoming all the concessions and rightist errors smuggled into the Educational Reform [Reforma Educativa] and which are blocking the integral development of education. Along these lines, the CODEP advocates a single national, democratic and scientific school. The liquidation of illiteracy, as well as the full enforcement and extension of university autonomy, completes our view on education.

The unity of the Bolivian people is a basic condition for achieving these objectives. The CODEP calls on all the democratic and progressive parties, the organizations of the workers, peasants, professions, teachers, students, women, and the revolutionary and patriotic soldiers, rated men and officers to back this imperative struggle and to join its ranks in fighting the ruling despotism that has brought misery to the workers, until the dictatorship that trampled civil liberties under foot and stained democracy with blood is defeated. We exhort all genuine patriots to oppose all foreign intervention in our national problems and to struggle energetically for the defense of our national sovereignty.