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In a news conference in Washington March 2, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara revealed that the United States now has 215,000 troops in south Vietnam, an increase of 10,000 over the previous figure. In addition, he said, another 20,000 troops are en route, bringing the total force to 235,000 as of the moment.

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Besides announcing the latest big escalation decided upon by the White House, McNamara argued heatedly against all the critics of Johnson's war policy. He was particularly infuriated over questioning as to the capacity of the United States to keep up such a flow of troops without emergency moves at home.

The most ominous aspect of McNamara's announcement was its timing. It comes directly on the heels of the televised hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which raised the most serious doubts as to the wisdom of escalating the war in Vietnam -- wisdom, of course, from the capitalist point of view.

The hearings made a deep impact on the American public, who have also been viewing on their TV screens close-ups of the war in Vietnam. Mail to Congress in opposition to the war has risen to new highs.

McNamara's announcement likewise came at the same time as reports that U.S. casualties in Vietnam are much worse than in 1965, recently taking another jump.

Thus McNamara's declarations at his press conference gave the impression of a White House answer to the rising antiwar sentiment among the American people. Whether they like it or not, Johnson has decided to take a major plunge in Southeast Asia.

This is precisely how the very influential New York Times interpreted the move. In an editorial of the kind it reserves for big turns or highly important events, the Times said March 6, as if it could scarcely believe it: "...there can no longer be much doubt that the United States is becoming committed to precisely what its civilian and military leaders have almost unanimously wanted to avoid: a massive land war on the continent of Asia."

To drive the point home, the Times declared that no matter what the eventual number of U.S. troops in Vietnam may be, 'the fact is that already, as of today, 'we are there'"..." This was the title placed on the editorial, "We Are There."

The Times had a number of proposals to make on how to back out of this situation. All of them, boiling down to modes of getting negotiations going, can be dismissed. The real problem is how to get the U.S. to withdraw its troops. Anything less means maintaining the threat of a nuclear conflict.

Other forces than those represented by the bourgeois opposition to Johnson's war policy are required to solve that problem. More and more the American people will find themselves faced with perhaps the most crucial question in all of history. Can they rise to the need of the hour and put a stop to this madness? The answer foreshadowed by the rise of the antiwar movement is a resounding YES. Johnson and the warmongering coterie he has assembled will shortly begin to hear this in tones that even the deafest among them will be able to hear.
"DECENTY" FORGOTTEN IN RUSH TO RECOGNIZE GHANAIAN PLOTTERS

The U.S. State Department tried manfully to maintain its posture of waiting a "decent interval" before recognizing the plotters who overthrew Kwame Nkrumah. A "decent interval" is the traditional diplomatic device used by the State Department to bolster the argument that the U.S. does not intervene in the internal affairs of other countries and that its hand is never involved in sudden over­turns like the one that occurred February 24 in Ghana.

But when the legal head of the Ghanaian government went un­expectedly to nearby Guinea where he was given a tremendous welcome as an exile and victim of CIA machinations, the striped-pants crew in Washington panicked and threw decency to the winds. On March 4, just eight days after the Ghanaian generals pulled their coup d'état, the State Department recognized them.

The speed of the move, said John W. Finney, Washington cor­respondent of the New York Times [March 5] was a "deliberate attempt to support the new Government against any bid by the deposed Presi­dent, Kwame Nkrumah, to reassert power."

From the same source, one that obviously reflects briefing by the State Department, we learn that Washington succeeded in acting with "deliberate slowness" in other recent military coups in Africa. The aim was "to avoid giving an impression that it was encouraging military coups." "But with Ghana the United States decided it could not wait the same discreet diplomatic period because of the threat by Mr. Nkrumah to return to Ghana to reassert his authority."

The State Department, of course, may have had good reason to fear the possibility of Nkrumah making a quick comeback; the Ghanaian generals have kept in daily contact with the American Embassy since they seized power.

In the lower part of Manhattan, the banking and stock-market moguls are also rallying behind the new military regime. The appeal made by Lieut. Gen. Joseph Ankrah March 3 for an immediate loan of $50,400,000 was at once given a sympathetic hearing in Wall Street.

"Such help, authorities here believe," said Brendan Jones, writing in the financial section of the March 6 New York Times, "will start with debt refinancing by the International Monetary Fund, of which Ghana is a member. Outstanding debts, chiefly short-term cred­its, will have to be consolidated and rescheduled on a long-term basis.

"If the plan is accepted as workable, and includes budget cuts and a halt to non-essential expenditures, the I.M.F. is expected to aid debt liquidation."

Although the members of Ghana's new military regime are not exactly habitués of the counting houses in lower Manhattan, they seem to have established a good credit rating there with remarkable
ease: "Authorities here," continues Jones, "generally consider the financial and economic officials of the new regime as capable and responsible. It is felt, consequently, that as they show a determination to restore Ghana's financial health, other assistance will be made available in loans."

Besides the United States, it is thought "probable" that "Britain, West Germany and possibly Canada" will join in backing Ghana's generals with a good supply of funds. "It is expected also that private investment may not be long in moving into Ghana once a different political orientation becomes evident."

In other words, the sharks have smelled blood and are moving in swiftly to assist in any way they can to "stabilize" the situation.

As for popular support for the new regime, the moneylenders have not overlooked that. "Shortages of food have been recurrent in sugar, flour and rice, and an early end to the shortages is considered essential for the success of the new Government. The United States, which last year turned down the Nkrumah Government's request for $100-million of Food-for-Peace aid, may soon be expected to give favorable consideration to a new and more modest Ghanaian request."

On March 2, New York Times correspondent Lloyd Garrison wrote from Accra: "Non-Communist diplomats could scarcely contain their delight with the turn of events." This could be said with equal accuracy of the reaction of the State Department and the New York banking world. As these spheres view it, a country uncomfortably close to going noncapitalist has been pulled back. With a bit more attention it can be converted into a land that is really safe for the American dollar. Can there be any higher or worthier goal than that?

**CONGOLESE GUERRILLA MOVEMENT STILL ACTIVE**

The guerrilla movement in the eastern Congo is still active, according to a report in the March 6 New York Times. The Congolese army exercises control over about only a quarter of the area.

The situation amounts to a "prolonged stalemate," the Times correspondent, Joseph Lelyveld, declares; "the army remains insufficiently mobile or disciplined to finish off the rebellion.

About two weeks ago a force of some 1,000 rebels attacked a Belgian sugar plantation at Kaliba. Mercenaries hired by the company, along with units of the Congolese army, managed to repulse the attack, killing 70 rebels, according to the official account.

The size of this force may indicate that the rebel movement has begun to recover from the ferocious repression launched by the Belgians with the aid of the U.S. and Britain two years ago.
CUBELA CHARGED WITH PLOTTING TO KILL CASTRO

According to a Cuban government communiqué, issued March 5, seven men have been arrested for allegedly plotting to assassinate Fidel Castro. Among the two are Rolando Cubela Secades and Román Guín Diaz.

Cubela was a prominent leader of the Revolutionary Directorate during the struggle against the Batista dictatorship. He was active in the guerrilla struggle in the Escambray mountains. After the Revolution, he was named Deputy Minister of Interior in the first revolutionary government and then appointed president of the Federation of University Students. As the main leader in the Cuban student movement, Cubela became well known outside Cuba. After graduating as a physician in 1962, Cubela gave up his student work and was named director of the Manuel Fajardo Hospital in Havana.

Guín is not so well known. He began his revolutionary career as a guerrilla in the Escambray mountains, serving under Cubela. An engineering agronomist, he became a high official in the National Institute of Agrarian Reform.

The communiqué states that in agreement with the CIA Cubela planned to shoot Castro with a high-powered rifle equipped with a telescopic sight.

Cuban security agents said they discovered the plot early this year. According to their account Cubela went to Europe in 1964 to attend a student gathering. He stopped in Paris and while there got in touch with two Cuban-born CIA agents named Luis Enrique Treanco and Carlos Tepedino. They in turn put Cubela in touch with other CIA agents in Paris.

Meanwhile in Madrid, Odón Alvarez de la Campa, counsellor of the Cuban embassy there, made contact with two CIA agents in the Spanish capital, Hernán Enriquez and Agustín Alvarez Machado. The counsellor brought along a fellow employee José Luis González Gallarreta. A meeting was then arranged between the pair and James A. Noel of the American embassy in Madrid, who gave Odón Alvarez de la Campa $100,000 to be divided between himself and González.

In the next step in this complicated plot, González met with Jorge Robreno and Alberto Blacno Romariz, two counterrevolutionary Cuban residents in Madrid. They arranged a meeting in February 1965 between Cubela and the counterrevolutionary Cuban leader Manuel Artme, a prominent figure in the Bay of Pigs invasion.

"During this meeting," the communiqué asserts [as reported by the March 6 New York Herald Tribune, which consistently misspells Cubela's name], "Cubelas and Artme discussed concrete details of the plan to assassinate the Prime Minister and the steps to be taken afterward. They both discussed the roles they would follow subsequently in the country."
"Rolando Cubelas demonstrated the importance of the physical elimination of Fidel and that he, Cubelas, should be the principal head of the counter-revolution. Manuel Artime offered the technical means and emphasized the enormous support which he had from the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States as well as his relations with various Central American governments and the Organization of American States in general.

"He promised that with [sic] 48 hours of the assassination of Comrade Fidel he would disembark in Cuba, supported by the United States and the OAS."

As reported by the Herald Tribune, Robreno and Blanco, the two counterrevolutionary Cuban exiles in Madrid, were to infiltrate into Cuba with Artime's help, after Blanco had been "trained" in the Dominican Republic:

"The interview," the communiqué continues, "ended also with the agreement that both Cubelas and Artime would share the direction of the counter-revolution without offering participation to any other leader."

Execution of the plot was delayed, according to the prosecution, due to the Dominican civil war and "other" problems. In March 1965 Odón Alvarez de la Campa defected. What happened after that to further delay the plot is either not mentioned in the communiqué or not included in the reports appearing in the American press.

In view of the gravity of the charges and the prominence of the two main defendants, as well as their political background, the case is obviously a most important one. It will be followed closely by friends and supporters of the Cuban Revolution throughout the world. An open trial, with full presentation of the evidence in support of the allegations and a full opportunity for the defendants to reply in detail is an absolute requisite.

MURDER OF "COMMUNISTS" CONTINUES IN INDONESIA

The murder of "Communists" is still going on in Indonesia in what has become one of the most massive slaughters of modern times. The latest report is from Seth S. King, special correspondent of the New York Times, who writes from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, under a March 4 dateline:

"The killing of Communists in Indonesia continued this week despite President Sukarno's removal of Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, who had led the army's campaign to destroy the Communist party."

Authoritative sources in Djakarta, according to King, "described the nightly execution of Communist prisoners or suspected Communists in eastern Java, Bali and Lombok."
"Travelers passing through these areas as late as Feb. 25," King continues, "reported seeing bodies in several villages. In one village they saw heads fixed on poles in the market place.

"When they questioned villagers, they were told that it was necessary to kill all Communists because they were evil and enemies of Indonesia."

King appears to believe that Sukarno is attempting to end the bloody mass purge but that it may be continuing through the momentum initially given it or because of a breakdown in communications. He writes:

"The continued executions indicated that antileftist groups outside Jakarta were either ignoring the implications of General Nasution's dismissal or had not been ordered to end the killings. In the latter case this could have been caused by Jakarta's poor communications with the outer islands."

It still remains to be seen whether Sukarno will succeed in his efforts to reestablish a balance in the contending class forces in Indonesia -- with himself occupying the strategic but precarious center position. On March 4 some 3,000 reactionary students, who were instigated and protected by the army before Sukarno dismissed Nasution, barricaded themselves in the University of Indonesia and formed the "Hakim Regiment," named after a university medical student killed the week before by palace guards during rioting in front of the palace. The student action was taken in defiance of Sukarno's order the day before to close down the university as a damper to the reactionary student movement.

On March 5 a crowd of 3,000 screaming schoolchildren tried to invade Foreign Minister Subandrio's office. Troops fired several warning shots over their heads.

University students painted anti-Subandrio slogans on the walls of the building and on the street.

In some instances, army officers appeared to be divided in attitude toward the student demonstrations. They have not permitted them to achieve such objectives as storming the government palace or Subandrio's office. On the other hand, in a covert way, they give the impression that they are not really against continuation of the reactionary demonstrations.

Seth S. King notes that Brig. Gen. Amir Machmud, commander of the Djakarta military district, has issued equivocal statements. The general ordered all persons having arms to turn them in by March 6, declaring that there were "wild and illegally armed troops in Djakarta." These troops, he said, had been raised by "elements of last October's coup."

This was taken by some observers to mean, according to King, "that the army might be preparing another roundup of leftists despite President Sukarno's apparent attempt to revive them as a political force."
LESSONS OF THE DEFEAT IN INDONESIA

By Ernest Mandel

The following article has been translated by World Outlook from the February 26 issue of the Brussels weekly La Gauche. Ernest Mandel is editor of La Gauche and author of the two-volume Traité d'Economie Marxiste (Treatise on Marxist Economy).

* * *

The international workers movement, the colonial revolution, have suffered a terrible defeat in Indonesia. Since October 1965, thousands of militants belonging to the Communist party and other left groupings have been murdered in a veritable white terror. This sweeping massacre has met with hardly a word of disapproval in the Western press, so "humanist" and so sensitive when it comes to defending the "sanctity of the human being" when a victorious revolution eliminates butchers who have committed unspeakable crimes, as occurred at the time of the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

But innumerable victims have fallen in the wave of terror that has swept Indonesia. Sukarno himself has officially admitted 87,000 dead. At the Tricontinental Conference Fidel Castro spoke of 100,000 dead. Western observers in Indonesia have put the figure at 120,000 to 125,000 murdered workers and militants, and certain sources even speak of 150,000 to 200,000 dead.

Journalists of conservative right-wing newspapers like the special correspondents of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the London Sunday Times and the Basle National-Zeitung have given detailed descriptions of the terror in certain parts of the country. The report of the special correspondent of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on the events in Bali, the island formerly considered to be a Communist fortress, is terrifying. He tells about bodies lying along the roads, or heaped in pits, of half-burned villages in which the peasants dare not leave the shells of their huts. There is likewise a nightmarish account of the hysterical fear that has caught up large numbers, so that people suspected of being Communists have killed their alleged comrades with their own hands in order to show the ferocious army men that "they were not Communists."

In addition to the dead, there are innumerable other victims of the repression. The figure has been given of 250,000 militants or sympathizers of the extreme left in prison. At the beginning of October 1965, certain trade unions tried to react timidly against the counterrevolutionary wave of terror. Every worker who went out on strike was summarily fired. According to the Sunday Times, in the north of the island of Sumatra, 4,000 workers and functionaries in the public services were fired on suspicion of being Communists. A monstrous purge has eliminated all the "suspects" in the ministries, the press, enterprises playing a vital role in the country's economy. In a country where endemic unemployment and growing misery reign, the firing of these workers condemns their families to actual famine.
One hundred thousand families in mourning, several hundred thousand reduced to desperate straits, this seems to be the provisional balance sheet of the wave of "white terror" that has swept the Indonesian archipelago since October 1, 1965.

In face of such a massacre and such a repression, the first duty of every socialist, of every human being who has a minimum of feeling for humanity, is to protest with all his energy against the collective murder now going on in Indonesia of Communists and other people of the left. The war in Vietnam has begun to stir public opinion because of the atrocities being committed there by the imperialists. But it must be stated that many more victims have fallen in a few weeks in the counterrevolutionary repression in Indonesia than in several years of the civil war in Vietnam.

This shows once again that in face of an enemy determined to resort to all means, including the most barbarous, to maintain class rule, the most rational course is to resort to revolution, including an armed revolution. Even on the purely humanist level this holds true because human lives can be saved (not to mention the fact that in the former case, the victims died for nothing, while their people sink deeper and deeper into misery; while in the latter case, the sacrifices of the people at least make it possible to build a new society and to emerge from centuries of prostration and ferocious exploitation).

Let all the defenders of the rights of man raise their voices vehemently against the massacre of Communists in Indonesia. Let them make a not less vehement denunciation of the perpetrators of these crimes, and those partially guilty, like Sukarno. One notes without much surprise that most of these "humanists" and these "liberals" of the West have remained silent up to now. And one notes, too, that not a few Communist parties are to be found among those who have remained silent up to now...

But our reaction in face of the fearsome terror unleashed on the Indonesian people cannot be limited to denouncing those responsible for the massacre and to demanding that the prisoners be freed (beginning with Njono, the president of the Indonesian trade unions, who has just been tried in Djakarta and given the death sentence) and the murderers given the punishment they deserve. We must also consider the cause of this terrible defeat which the international workers movement has suffered in Indonesia. Because the Indonesian militants and workers will have died in vain if in their own country and in other countries, the workers movement does not draw all the lessons of this defeat and does not alter its tactics, taking into account the lessons of Indonesia.

The first question that comes to mind is how a Communist party having 3,000,000 members and more than 10,000,000 sympathizers organized in all kinds of "mass organizations" (groupings of youth, of women and of peasants, as well as trade unions led by the PKI [Partai Kommunis Indonesia]) could be crushed overnight, in October 1965, by an adversary that was certainly weaker in numbers.
The answer involves essentially two points: the reactionary enemy was able to utilize surprise; that is, the masses were not systematically prepared for this inevitable confrontation with the reactionary army. And the initiative was left to the reactionary enemy; that is, the PKI leadership did not utilize the innumerable mass actions during recent years to organize a systematic offensive aiming at the conquest of power by the working class and the poor peasants.

Underlying this erroneous tactic is a false theoretical concept of the conditions for victory in the colonial revolution and of the nature of the state that has arisen in the colonial countries that have won political independence but which are not yet freed from exploitation.

The countries that were formerly colonies, which have just won their political independence, are the product of a special historical development. While modern industry and a modern proletariat exist there, the classical historical tasks of the bourgeois-national revolution (for example, the revolution in the Netherlands in the sixteenth century, the English revolution in the seventeenth century, the American and French revolutions in the eighteenth century) have not been carried out. There is no genuine national unity, but only a conglomeration of regions, if not tribes, strongly affected by particularism. The land does not belong to the peasants, but is more or less in the hands of foreign plantation companies and indigenous semifeudal or capitalist landlords. A considerable part of the rural population suffers from underemployment and unemployment. Thus there is no domestic market permitting extensive industrialization to be realized. The axis of the country's economy is the export of a few raw materials or agricultural products to the world market, involving a considerable transfer of value (a considerable super exploitation) from the country to the profit of the industrialized countries.

But in these underdeveloped countries, the real master is foreign imperialism and its indigenous agents. There is no "national" bourgeois class capable of leading a resolute struggle to victory against imperialism, of adding economic independence to political independence, of assuring genuine economic growth, of providing full employment. The numerical and economic weakness of the indigenous possessing classes, and their close ties with landed property, makes them incapable of carrying out a genuine agrarian revolution. And without an agrarian revolution, industrialization is impossible.

Without exception, the experience of half a century bears out the following: Either the freedom movement of the former colonial countries remains under the leadership of the indigenous possessing classes, or of petty-bourgeois groups unable to break resolutely with the capitalist economy -- and in this case the fundamental tasks of the colonial revolution, above all the agrarian revolution, remain unsolved and the country is condemned to continue stagnating in misery and incessant social crisis; or the freedom movement is conquered by the working class in alliance with the poor peasants; the revolution is continued up to the expropriation of imperialism and the indigenous possessing classes, the agrarian reform is completely
carried out -- and in this case the bourgeois state must be replaced by a state based on the toiling masses, and construction of a socialist economy must be begun.

Wherever the leadership of the revolution has remained in the hands of "national fronts," directed in actuality by the "national" bourgeoisie or by petty-bourgeois groups, there has been no radical agrarian revolution, the state has fundamentally remained a bourgeois state, and the reaction was able to break the front at any moment and unleash a ferocious repression against the workers. Whenever the revolution has come under a proletarian leadership basing itself on the poor peasantry, it proved necessary to destroy the bourgeois state and create an entirely new state if only to carry out a genuinely radical agrarian reform (China, Vietnam, Cuba).

The leaders of the PKI did not assimilate these lessons of history. Deeply affected by the "putschist" and "adventurist" errors committed by their predecessors -- the PKI leaders of the period of the "Madiun incidents" of 1948 -- they wished at any cost to "stick with" the Sukarno group representing the national bourgeoisie. Consequently they followed the policy of a "united national front." They accepted Sukarno's partial suspension of democratic freedoms at the beginning of the sixties. They joined the NASAKOM (national front composed of the Sukarno nationalists, the Muslim grouping -- a reactionary formation that has been in the vanguard of the anti-Communist terror since October 1965 -- and the PKI). They joined a coalition government which included in particular the ultrareactionary head of the army.

Their political line for the past five years has been defense of this national front formula and not propaganda for a workers and peasants government. They did not stand for the conquest of power by the masses but for the slow conquest of state power "from within." And this policy was based on a false characterization of the nature of the state apparatus, a characterization formulated as follows by D.N. Aidit, the head of the PKI:

"At present, the state power in the Republic of Indonesia includes two antagonistic sides, one representing the interests of the people (in support of the people) and the other the interests of the enemy of the people (the opposition to the people). The side supporting the people is becoming stronger day by day, the government of the Republic of Indonesia has even adopted revolutionary anti-imperialist measures." (D.N. Aidit. The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Indonesian Communist Party. Foreign Languages Edition, Peking, 1965. Pp 137-38 of the French edition.)

For a Marxist, every state apparatus, no matter what its antagonistic sides, always serves the fundamental interests of one class ruling over another. The state, said Frederick Engels, in the final analysis is a group of armed men. What class interests did the Indonesian state and the Indonesian army serve? The events of October 1965 do not leave the least doubt as to the answer that must be given this question -- the interests of the so-called "national" bourgeoisie.
Naturally there are many contradictions between the "national" bourgeoisie, the newly independent peasants and imperialism. The workers movement is not indifferent to the conflicts arising from this; it engages resolutely in the anti-imperialist struggle. It was correct of the PKI to first support the struggle of the Indonesian people against Dutch imperialism and then against Greater Malaysia. But it was wrong to deduce from these struggles that a permanent united front must be made with the "national" bourgeoisie, involving in actuality subordination to the bourgeois leadership of Sukarno and failure to criticize it at all. It was wrong to abstain for years from any struggle in behalf of the demands of the populace of Indonesia on the domestic economic and social level, deliberately subordinating these to maintenance of the "national front" with those who were responsible for the misery of the masses.

It is a fact that the economic situation has been going from bad to worse, that in industry the means of production are utilized to only thirty per cent of capacity, that public funds are wasted in outlays for "prestige," that the army manages the requisitioned foreign properties as it chooses (that is pillage on a major scale), that the agrarian reform remains on paper, that inflation is raging, that provisions are becoming scarcer and scarcer. With a correct line, the PKI could have stimulated the mass struggle on the basis of their justified immediate demands in order to lead them to the conquest of power. The policy of the "national front" left the initiative up to the enemy until it was too late.

Unquestionably the erroneous views of the PKI leaders were largely inspired by the theories defended by the Soviet leaders from the time of Stalin to that of Khrushchev. All their concepts about the Indonesian state apparatus, the national front, the need for "unity," are copied from the program of the CPSU [Communist party of the Soviet Union] with its theses on the "national democratic state." Even after the coup d'etat of the reactionary generals, the spokesmen of the pro-Soviet Communist parties continued to woo Sukarno and to advocate re-establishment of NASAKOM and "national unity" (see in particular the October 24, 1965, issue of Neues Deutschland). They charged the PKI leaders with "leftist errors" while they were guilty of right opportunist errors.

It should likewise be added that a good part of the arms with which the reactionary army massacred tens upon tens of thousands of Indonesian Communists and workers were of Soviet origin. Was it so difficult to foresee that this bourgeoisie and this army, which "fights" so hard, in words, against imperialism, would in practice utilize the bulk of the aid thus received, not against imperialism, but against the popular masses of their own country?

What is significant, however, is that the PKI with its opportunist line based on collaboration with the "national" bourgeoisie, was not part of the Soviet but of the Chinese camp. But the Chinese Communist leaders covered up all their errors, making no public criticism of them. Together with the Soviet leaders, they thus share responsibility for what happened.
Yet, in numerous articles devoted to the history of the Chinese Revolution of 1925-27, in numerous criticisms of "Khrushchevist revisionism," of Togliatti's opinions, etc., the Chinese leaders have severely condemned the thesis according to which in our time there could be a state that is neither bourgeois nor socialist. They severely condemned the idea of a bloc with the national bourgeoisie, left under the latter's leadership, the illusion that this bourgeoisie could lead a consistent struggle against imperialism. But the PKI leaders were guilty of all these errors of such fatal import. The leaders of the Chinese CP have maintained silence about this.

Why this unprincipled attitude, in flagrant contradiction with their own ideas?

First of all, because in the struggle within the international Communist movement, the Chinese leaders have sought to get together the maximum number of partisans by applying the principle of abstaining from publicly criticizing those who abstain from criticizing the Chinese CP. Such a "principle" is inadmissible when vital questions of the workers movement, signifying life or death for millions of human beings, are involved.

Next, because the Chinese government -- the same as the Soviet government -- has sought to gain Sukarno's support for its diplomatic moves, and because it is applying Stalin's "principle," according to which the Communist movement must line up completely with the diplomatic maneuvers of the so-called socialist state. The "principle" signifies disaster for the workers movement and is contrary to the practices of Lenin's time.

When Soviet Russia signed treaties with German imperialism -- at Brest Litovsk in 1918, at Rapallo in 1921 -- the German Communists did not at all conclude from this, in those days, that they ought to soft-pedal the revolutionary struggle against this bourgeoisie. The Chinese leaders are imitating Stalin in this. The Indonesian Communists have paid heavily for it.

Naturally the struggle has not ended in Indonesia. A part of the Communist cadres have been able to go underground. The discontent of the hungry masses is increasing from day to day; the empty stomachs of the workers and peasants are not filled through massacres. The revolt will widen against the corrupt regime. Sukarno understands this and will resume his eternal balancing act; he has just eliminated the most ferocious of the generals from his cabinet. The people will again have their turn. But the 100,000 dead cannot be resurrected. And a correct policy could have averted these very heavy losses and this heavy defeat.

HIGH COST OF BUTCHERY

It has been estimated that for every Vietnamese freedom fighter killed or captured, the U.S. spends $351,111. Since the figures include many who may be only civilians, the true expenditure may be as high as $500,000.
Forty-four days after that B-52 accident over Spain, the State Department officially confessed that it was four H-bombs that fell. And while their power was not specified, the experts concluded they were the giant 20-megaton jobs.

The State Department also officially confessed in its March 2 communiqué that two of the H-bombs really blew open on the way down. Up to now rumor had it that only one of the H-bombs had opened up, splitting its casing upon impact.

Conventional explosives, according to the statement, were touched off. These broke the two H-bombs and scattered the plutonium triggers over the Palomares farming area. Plutonium, used to set off a hydrogen fusion reaction, is one of the most deadly poisons known to man.

However, it was all safe enough, said the State Department. First of all, the plutonium would not explode unless the conventional explosives were set off simultaneously, and this could not occur accidentally. Proof of this was that the two H-bombs that were dropped accidentally, and in which conventional explosives exploded accidentally, did not end in H-bomb explosions.

Moreover, the plutonium, scattered over the Spanish countryside caused no harm, radiological surveys in the Palomares area showing "no evidence of a health hazard."

Furthermore, scientific experts "say there is no hazard in eating vegetables marketed from the area, from eating the meat or fish or drinking the milk of animals."

And on top of this, the Atomic Energy Commission is shipping 1,500 tons of radioactive contaminated top soil and vegetation [tomatoes that is?] back to the United States for burial at its Savannah River plant near Aiken, South Carolina.

Of course, it may still be wondered just how frank and honest the State Department is in its confession. For instance, Agence France Press reported March 2 [in Le Monde March 3] that the amount of radioactive contaminated soil being shipped out of Spain to the United States amounts to 6,000 tons. And the State Department said nothing about the Spanish architect, reported by Le Monde to be undergoing treatment for radioactive burns.

Just to show how healthy it now is at Palomares, the American ambassador in Spain, Angier Biddle Duke, and the Spanish Minister of Information, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, are going to go in swimming at the beach dressed only in bathing trunks.

Brave men! Two American pocket submarines are still combing the sea bottom nearby hunting for the H-bomb that is still unaccounted for.
TOKYO CONFERENCE SCHEDULED AGAINST WAR IN VIETNAM

The Japan Socialist party announced February 20 that it will sponsor an Asian People's Conference in Tokyo in May as part of its campaign against the war in Vietnam.

Koichi Yamamoto, director of the party's international bureau, is scheduled to leave for Cambodia to ask that country to participate in the projected conference.

Chairman Kozo Sasaki is to go to the Philippines and India in search of support for the conference. He will also probe in these countries for ways to end the conflict in Vietnam.

The Japan Socialist party is also demanding that the government abandon its unfriendly attitude toward North Korea.

The party sharply protested a refusal by the Foreign Office of the Japanese government to issue visas to North Koreans wishing to visit Japan. In a policy statement, the party called for promotion of economic, technical and personnel exchanges between the two countries; a deferred payment formula for promoting trade with North Korea; promotion of exchanges in such areas as culture, arts and music, and sports, and freedom of travel to North Korea for Koreans residing in Japan.

BOOK ON MALCOLM X PUBLISHED IN JAPAN

An attractively printed book has appeared in Japan on Malcolm X and the meaning of his movement.


The cover features a photograph of Malcolm X speaking at a Militant Forum in New York.

WEST GERMAN METAL WORKERS WIN 11% WAGE BOOST

Cologne

After a two-day session in the Rheinhartshausen castle on February 16-17, representatives of the employers in the West German metal industry came to agreement with union leaders on a new contract that includes the following gains:
A wage increase of 6% retroactive to January 1 (when the old contract ended).

- Reduction of the work week from 41½ hours to 40 hours, effective January 1, 1967 (instead of July 1 as called for in the old contract).

- A further wage increase of 5% effective January 1, 1967.

The new contract, which includes a total pay boost of 11%, is for 18 months. The previous contract was for 15 months and gained only a 9% wage increase. However, it included other important gains such as a special premium of 30% of monthly wages for annual vacations (in addition to the regular wage paid during the vacation period). Besides this, paid vacations were extended to four weeks for all workers and employees over thirty.

The Rheinhartshausen compromise came after a tug-of-war in which the employers threatened a general lockout in those provinces where the union engaged in strike action. This threat was unconstitutional, at least in one of the areas involved (the province of Hessen). In addition, in some regions, the employers rejected a proposed agreement drawn up by a commission of mediators. Thus public opinion favored the union, as did the press with the exception of newspapers directly controlled by the employers which engaged in their usual union-baiting.

Negotiators for the union were strengthened by a decision to stage warning strikes lasting from thirty minutes to an hour, mostly in the form of sit-down strikes. The decision was made by rank-and-file union leaders in the plants in the areas where the employers had not accepted the agreement proposed by the mediators. Some 60,000 workers engaged in these warning strikes which were especially effective in the Mannheim and Frankfurt areas where the Daimler-Benz auto plants are located.

The workers further showed their readiness to fight by sending telegrams to the union negotiators at Rheinhartshausen castle urging them to stand firm. This mood was especially apparent in the Baden-Württemberg region where the workers went out on strike in 1963 for a new contract. In Hessen, where no strike action has been taken since 1951, the atmosphere was quieter.

Although gains were made, they were much more modest than they need have been. In return for a 1% increase over that proposed by the mediating commission, the union agreed to postpone reduction of the work week for an additional six months. Yet the West German metal workers union -- the biggest trade union in the world -- has more than 2,000,000 members and a tremendous strike fund.

The timidity of the union leaders stems from the pressure of the Social-Democratic party leadership which does not want any "trouble" that could possibly lead to reprisals at the ballot box.

The slowly rising militancy of some sectors of the West German
labor movement was also shown by a demonstration of 15,000 miners at Gelsenkirchen February 21. The demonstration was organized as a protest against the projected closing of the Bismarck coal mine near that city.

THE JAIPUR SESSION OF THE CONGRESS PARTY

By Kailas Chandra

Bombay

In his presidential address to the seventieth session of the Indian National Congress, which concluded on February 13 at Jaipur, Congress President Kamaraj candidly confessed that "although eleven years had elapsed since the ruling party accepted socialism as its goal, the development programme of the Government had not succeeded in lessening, let alone removing, the disparity between the rich and the poor." Although he blew off hot air as is customary at such Congress gatherings, even declaring that "the economic challenge far outweighs the immediate military threat," he did not indicate how the Congress proposed "to fight its way and overcome all the obstacles" he cited.

In the speeches made by the various delegates, there was indeed "a mood of angry impatience at the persistent shortcomings, frank self-analysis, an agonising reappraisal of inadequacies to implement the so-called Bhubaneshwar resolutions on democracy and socialism." (Free Press Journal, February 14.) There was an apparent "revival of the spirit of determination to pursue" the oft-repeated objectives which the "left Congress" weekly Link (February 20) termed an attempt "to return to the Bhubaneshwar road." This demagogy was obviously prompted by the coming general elections in the country barely twelve months away. From the vast sea of platitudes which swept over the deliberations at Jaipur nothing concrete emerged but "a few precious nuggets of resolutions indicating promises of earnest action to revive and revitalise the country's economy."

Even Link was skeptical about the implementation of the high-sounding resolutions. "All that Jaipur proved," it said, "was that the trend of radical thinking among Congressmen had survived the attempt to beat a total retreat from Bhubaneshwar made during the last two years."

The weekly New Age of the rightist Communist party of India, which normally identifies itself with the so-called Congress "left," described the Jaipur confab as a "status quo session." New Age said editorially (February 20): "At Jaipur there was really nothing very exciting except for a brief interlude in the subjects Committee when delegates somewhat vented the feelings of the people over the grave food situation and perhaps for the first time in recent years pressed their dissent in open defiance of the High Command. There were some refreshing speeches." New Age blamed the Congress for not adopting a comprehensive resolution on foreign policy.
Kamaraj, the "unsophisticated" politician, called for wider dispersal of responsibility among the states for the development of natural resources and public-sector undertakings, as it might yield "better results than a heavily overburdened centralised control."

He appeared to be talking against centralized planning even within the present capitalist framework. Perhaps this was a concession to the regional bourgeois interests. As a concession to the small industrialists, he called for liberalization of the policy regarding issuing of industrial licenses and advancing of loans. Furious debate indeed occurred on the food situation, as the Jaipur session was held under the shadow of the food agitation in Kerala. The delegates magnanimously "authorised" the Congress president to constitute a committee to study the various aspects of the food problem and submit a report before March 31, 1966!

Not even the bourgeois press appeared impressed by "the parrot-like repetition of the Bhubaneshwar ideals and the appointment of a few committees to solve the country's economic ills." (Times of India, February 14.) A strong plea was made by some delegates to abolish the existing food zones (a system of grouping together different states on the basis of their marketable surplus of food grains and restricting interzone movement of food grains); but the demand was cleverly sidestepped.

The resolutions on food and the economic situation, adopted by the session, were so vague that even the conservative Times of India (February 14) was constrained to observe: "The Congress has done very little in the last 18 years to draw on its reserves of idealism. Its very survival as a dynamic political force will depend in the years to come upon its ability to make good this lack." In fact the farcical nature of the deliberations was self-evident.

Replying to the debate on the failure of the government to implement the Bhubaneshwar resolution, Home Minister Nanda admitted that its implementation "had been weak and ineffective." Although he claimed that "the country wanted to move towards socialism" and the pace had to be "accelerated," he said that the "achievement of the goal of socialism is not an easy task."

Referring to the Bhubaneshwar decision to run rice mills either in the government or the cooperative sector, Nanda said: "We have not been able to do it." Then he offered this pearl of self-criticism: "We must either not decide to do the things without knowing the difficulties or first remove the difficulties before deciding to do things."

Biju Patnaik, former chief minister of Orissa who turned critic of the government, said that many "brave" resolutions had been adopted year after year but the government and the party had "slept over them." He referred to the failure of the Congress to implement, even after fifteen years, the resolutions advocating "a national food policy, nationalisation of the processing industry, monopoly procurement and the establishment of farmers' banks." He also pointed out that even in an advanced capitalist country like
Japan, all trading in rice and wheat is nationalized and every producer has to sell his produce to the government at a fixed price.

As usual, different groups representing different sectors of the ruling class spoke in different voices at the session. Mushtaq Ahmed, president of the Delhi Pradesh Congress, caused a flutter among the delegates when he said that "protégés of big capitalists had captured key positions in the Congress and were impeding the progress towards socialism." On the other hand, the "big business" representative B.M. Chinai demanded de-control of various commodities on the ground that the recent de-control of cement has considerably improved its availability.

B.R. Bhagat, Minister of State for Finance, admitted that the performance of the public sector had been poor during the last two years, and the returns were not commensurate with the investments. He also declared that the "advance towards socialism would not be possible without first improving the administration of public sector projects."

The entire farce shows up one thing. The Congress, as the biggest and best organized party of the Indian bourgeoisie, has been able to fool the masses for the last twelve years in the name of socialism mainly because of the absence of a strong working-class party offering the perspective of a socialist revolution to the masses. The capitalist leadership of the Congress has been helped in this by the left-fakers, like those in the Dangeite Communist party of India, who built up an aura of "progressivism" around it. Ex-Socialist Asoka Mehta succumbed to the "compulsion of a backward economy" by finally accepting the planning portfolio in the Congress cabinet. There are many pseudo leftists even today who believe that they can swing the Congress to the "socialist path" by sharing the crumbs of office thrown to them by the capitalist rulers of the country.

In reporting on the Jaipur gathering, Link said: "As economic difficulties mounted, many progressive Congressmen began to feel the need to make a concerted effort to assert themselves. A number of conventions of socialists in the Congress met, the last of which was at Jaipur itself just before the A.I.C.C. [All-India Congress Committee] session began. This convention drew up a memorandum calling for faster steps towards 'socialism' and presented it to the Congress president before the proceedings began." Nanda reportedly associated himself with the meeting of the "socialists"; and the outcome of the Jaipur session needs no further comment.

The Birlas and Jains, who finance this "socialism," no doubt laugh at the endless self-deception of the petty-bourgeois "radicals" and "progressives" inside the Congress. But the gain is theirs. An illusion is created to deceive the masses. The hoax presented by the Congress can only be dissipated finally by the independent class movement of the workers and peasants. However, the capacity of the Congress to keep up its deception has become limited; its prestige is definitely on the wane.
MEANING OF THE BOLIVIAN JUNTA'S CALL FOR ELECTIONS

[The following article has been translated by World Outlook from the January 31 issue of Lucha Obrera, official publication of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Revolutionary Workers party), Bolivian section of the Fourth International.]

** * * *

The setting of elections for next July by the Military Junta, is not due to any democratic desire to return to the constitution and to restore the freedoms and rights suppressed by the "gorillas" [reactionary military officials]; it is a maneuver aimed only at maintaining the military in power. To believe the contrary would signify falling from ingenuity into stupidity.

The preventive coup of November 4, 1964, organized in the Escuela de Altos Estudios Militares [School of Advanced Military Studies] with Yankee militarists as accessories, had as its main objective the destruction of the trade-union organizations and the left parties of the workers and the repression of the masses. These tasks were assigned the Military Junta by imperialism. This was also the reason why the Bolivian reaction gave it unconditional support.

However, more than a year after seizing power, the results are very limited. Although the gorillas carried out a massacre, dissolved the unions, fired workers and conducted the most brutal repression, they were nevertheless unable to defeat the masses, which launched struggles again and again. For all practical purposes, the repressive policy of the Military Junta, falling short of its objectives, has ended in a resounding defeat.

In addition, in applying their policies, the military lost the support and sympathy which they were initially granted by some sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. Despite all their efforts, they were unable to gain the massive support of the peasantry -- only the doubtful adherence of the peasant bureaucracy. Thus the bourgeois and oligarchical sectors who assisted in the military coup and who placed hopes in the possibility of ruling jointly with the military, were unable to unite; the divisions among them remained, together with different political positions on what road to offer the country.

By the end of 1965 the bourgeoisie and the imperialists began to see that the military dictatorship was a failure, that the stability they sought, the desired-for social peace that would attract capital, remained distant, the situation -- contrary to expectations -- grew worse and worse, the struggle reaching the level of armed action and guerrilla warfare. Discouragement, doubt and fear spread in some of the military circles as they observed day by day the power of the masses despite the massacre, the repression and the political murders. Some of the bourgeois sectors, becoming desperate, sought to save themselves, indicating their disagreement with the policies of the Military Junta, even threatening them with a possible
coup d'état.

Among Latin-American bourgeois circles and among the imperialists, the fear grew that Bolivia would become converted into a revolutionary volcano fed by the brutality and incapacity of the Military Junta. Thus they began to look for a new way out, which, without abandoning the uniformed dictators, would enable them to widen the base of support for their government and give them greater stability. The way out must at the same time serve to extinguish the conflicts on the point of breaking out both from the side of the masses as well as the bourgeoisie itself.

It was in accordance with this line of thinking that the Military Junta suddenly found itself obliged to set elections and Barrientos was forced to resign and leave Bolivia. This step, a result of the pressure of various factors like those indicated above constitutes a striking expression of the defeat of the fascist gorillas and their repressive, antilabor policy.

Thus it is clear that the convocation of elections is a result of the defeat of the gallows policy of massacring the masses. The Military Junta, driven into a corner by the mass struggle, by the aggravated crisis of the bourgeoisie and by incipient internal struggles in the army, is trying to save itself by means of an electoral farce.

With the election call, issued at the same time as a cautious, calculated and cunning withdrawal of the army from the mines takes place, many prisoners are freed, and the "election" is permitted of certain mine leaders and rehabilitated members of the bureaucracy (who will serve the gorillas as they formerly served the MNR [Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario]), they unquestionably hope to create illusions among the masses with regard to the elections and divert them into preponderantly electoral activity. In other words, with the mirage of elections and temporary observance of certain rights and freedoms, the Military Junta hopes to disarm the workers and absorb the conflicts that have been accumulating and that threaten to break out. In the camp of the workers, particularly the miners, this maneuver aims at destroying the Underground Committees and isolating the revolutionary partisans of armed action and guerrilla warfare.

Nevertheless, in view of the highly militant mood of the working class, particularly the miners, this objective is not easily achieved. Among the radicalized workers, who feel the effect of the criminal policies of the Junta, the electoral gambit has not caught on.

It is the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois parties that have responded to the setting of elections; but the crisis there, instead of being overcome, has grown even sharper.

The bourgeoisie have not been able to unite around the Military Junta. They have not been able to foster a broad movement around the official candidate. The weak Frente de la Revolución
Boliviana (MPC-PIR-PRA* and the usurpers who claim to represent the Excombatientes) is the maximum gained up to now. But this Front, from which the FSB, PDC, Liberals, PURS** and other bourgeois outfits have been excluded, has not been able and will not be able to hold back the masses of workers and peasants and the middle class. From the electoral point of view, it is a fresh failure. Its components, particularly the military men of the Junta, already feel defeated in the elections, even before the electoral campaign has begun.

Reality has thus crossed up the desires of the Military Junta and imperialism, placing them in a blind alley.

The coming elections, with a minimum of freedom, will end in a tremendous defeat for the military and its allies. To gain at the ballot box, the Junta will have to order out the entire army and the police to control the mines, the villages and the countryside. But this will compel them to drop their mask of pseudo democracy. Under present conditions, free and democratic elections are a luxury which the dictatorship cannot permit itself, hated as it is by the people.

But to prepare elections and then hold them, rope in hand, and with a gun aimed at the back of the people, can only help ripen the conditions for a popular insurrection. A confrontation between the masses and the government will again occur with the employment of arms as in May and September 1965.

But either of these roads leads to a defeat for the military murderers!

Placed at the crossroads so quickly after calling elections, the Military Junta now faces mounting pressure to postpone them indefinitely and maintain Ovando as president for a long time. Tendencies within the FSB and other rightist parties are actively working for this outcome.

If the calling of elections whets appetites and sharpens squabbling among the bourgeois and oligarchical circles hunting for office, postponement of the elections will only deepen the crisis. The sectors who are fans of the mad Barrientos, as well as the office-seekers, will feel cheated. To continue Ovando in power would frustrate the aspirations of Barrientos.

The capitalist regime in Bolivia is doomed. The alternative party of the bourgeoisie and the imperialists has not been able to stabilize the situation. In power it has only accentuated the internal crisis and radicalized the antagonistic masses. Precisely the masses, with their mobilizations, their struggles, their inexhaustible energy, make it impossible for the Military Junta or any other version of the imperialist dictatorship to stabilize the country with a capi-

*Movimiento Popular Cristiano, Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, Partido Revolucionario Auténtico.

**Falange Socialista Boliviana, Partido Demócrato-Cristiano, Partido Unido Republicano Socialista.
talist program and capitalist policies that no longer stand up, that are historically exhausted.

Consequently the workers and their vanguard must start from the real fact that the social peace hypocritically advocated by the Military Junta is no longer possible. It is necessary to prepare and to organize the working-class and popular forces with the perspective of approaching and repeated battles and armed confrontations.

The elections must be considered as a probable variant of the measures to which the Junta may have recourse to, but not as an immediate reality and still less as a road capable of solving the problems facing the nation and the workers. Elections held under the presidency of the military dictatorship, with the Law of State Security in effect as well as antiunion decrees, can only serve to legalize the government of the murderers. The people and the workers must turn their backs on them and not have any confidence in the elections.

In face of serious early confrontations, it is the duty of the revolutionists and the political groupings that claim to be for the masses to come out for a powerful Left Front [Frente de Izquierdas] that could unite the broad majority of the nation, prepare and organize its armed contingents and launch the struggle for power.

It would be an error to try to limit the operation of this Front solely to electoral activities when the situation in reality demands a unified command in order to direct the struggle to solve all the national and working-class problems along the road to insurrection and the conquest of power.

THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN ALGERIA

[When Colonel Boumedienne overthrew Ben Bella in a military coup d'etat last June 19, there was a sharp reaction particularly among the students and most advanced sectors of the women in Algiers. The army was able to put this down, however, by a show of force in the major centers of Algeria that resulted in a number of casualties. The opposition sullenly withdrew from the streets for the time being. Boumedienne appeared to enjoy absolute authority. At the end of January, however, signs of unrest were again visible among the students; and during February they engaged in a series of demonstrations.

[The following factual account of the first days of this action has been translated by World Outlook from a mimeographed publication, The Week in Algeria, which is circulated in the underground. The identity of the tendency that is producing and circulating this newsletter is not clear, but evidently it has good sources of information. The particular issue from which this report has been taken is dated "January 28 to February 5." The subheadings appear in the original.]

* * *
Chronology of the Facts

- Friday, January 28, in the morning, 30 to 35 Moroccan students invaded the offices of the Moroccan embassy, distributing leaflets to the crowd that gathered, demonstrating their hostility in this way against the regime of Hassan II and protesting Oufkir's assassination of Ben Barka.

- Saturday, at noon, a demonstration was organized by the Algiers Committee of the UNEA [Union Nationale des Etudiants Algériens -- National Union of Algerian Students] on Didouche Mourad Street. The demonstrators (about 250 at the beginning) shouted against General Oufkir and the demonstration quickly took a turn hostile to the June 19 regime. The students demanded the release of their president, Houari Mouffok, and shouted in addition, "Free Ben Bella."

The crowd grew as it marched toward the Plaza of the Martyrs until it included about 4,000 persons. The police charged the crowd and made some arrests, but the demonstrators dispersed peacefully. In the evening the demonstrators were released, but on the other hand the Executive Secretariat dissolved the Algiers Committee of the UNEA. The handling of the demonstrators by the regime was noticeably less severe than during the events of last summer.

- Sunday, the UNEA Committee was in continuous session all day. In the evening it decided to stage a three-day strike at the university.

- Monday, at dawn, the work began of pasting leaflets and handwritten posters on the school walls. Leaflets were distributed to the students asking them to go on strike to protest against "the barbarous methods" of the government. The appeal called for the release of all the students arrested since June 19 and the reestablishment of the UNEA's right to function freely.

The strike was actually complete -- 95% to 98% of the students observed it everywhere, the various Schools, Fine Arts, Polytechnical Studies, as well as the School of Agriculture. The police were active to some extent everywhere. They compelled the teachers to hold class with a single student whom they forced to attend.

The same day, in certain high schools (for example Ouride Meddad in El Harrach), the graduating classes also went on strike. But here police calls to the parents stopped the movement. Moreover the student organization is very weak in the high schools.

- Tuesday, the strike continued in the same way.

- Despite the most varied threats and pressure, the strike was still 80% effective. Wednesday evening, a leaflet issued by the Algiers Committee of the UNEA asked the students to resume classes: "the strike is ended, the struggle continues."

The Reactions of the Regime

Sherif Belkacem took charge of operations beginning Friday
evening by personally writing a letter from a reader which was published Saturday morning in *Révolution Africaine*. The letter condemned the demonstration of the Moroccan students.

Saturday evening, the RTA [Radio-Television Algiers] maintained a chaste silence on the UNEA demonstration. (The radio is under the responsibility of Boumaza and not Belkacem.)

Sunday. Nothing in the press but frenzy begins on the radio. Each news bulletin -- 7:30, 1:00, 8:00 -- attacks the students for 20 to 25 minutes with wild statements, all sounding the same theme. This was not difficult since the national commissars of the FLN [Front de Libération Nationale] happened to be meeting in Algiers and "editorials" in the press were filled with an extraordinary verbiage: "abject cosmopolitans"; "fishers in troubled water"; "so-called students, foreign agents"; "methods contrary to our national and moral values"; "fascists"; "reactionaries"; "diabolical agents of obscure forces."

The Algerian press (Le Moudjahid) kept up the chorus, naturally, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday.

At the same time, Sherif Belkacem tried to get messages of support from the national organizations. The UNFA [Union Nationale des Femmes Algériens -- National Union of Algerian Women] published nothing because it ceased to exist six months ago. The UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens -- General Union of Algerian Workers] refused to intervene in any way, replying to Belkacem: "Consider yourself lucky that we don't denounce you." For the JFLN [Jeunesse du Front de Libération Nationale -- Youth of the National Liberation Front] it was easy. Under pressure from the Executive Secretariat, they wrote up a relatively mild statement. Belkacem found it insufficient and composed another one which he distributed.

The representatives of the UNEM [Union Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc -- National Students Union of Morocco] were called to the party headquarters Tuesday evening and told to make a declaration supporting the Boumedienne government. They wrote a document, presenting the facts objectively, including a few polite diplomatic phrases but assuring the Algerian students of their support. The document of the Moroccans was fixed up with a censor's pencil and otherwise modified and then presented as a message disavowing the UNEA and supporting the Boumedienne regime.

All this is serious, but everybody in Algiers knows about it, so that the aim sought for was not achieved. Through word of mouth and leaflets, the Moroccans explained their real position.

Belkacem became the butt of ridicule for publishing communiqués signed: "the students in literature, sciences, medicine, law, etc... who denounce the strike." These messages were written by a phony student, one Ben Aissa, ordinarily a teacher at the El Mokrani high school, who is generally known as an ultrareactionary, belonging to the "Muslim Brotherhood" tendency, an intimate of Tedjini, the ultrareactionary Secretary General of the Ministry of National Education.
It was also this Ben Aissa who wrote the long article in the Saturday, February 5, Révolution Africaine where frenzy against the students reached a high point.

The Ministry of National Education took several actions:

- On the one hand, the scholarships of troublemakers were cancelled and they were expelled from the university.

- On the other hand, Tedjini issued a circular asking the teachers to spy on their pupils and students and to inform on opponents of the regime. Already numerous reactions have occurred against this -- the unions representing foreigners refusing to have anything to do with such an obnoxious procedure.

Lessons of the Strike

Algerian public opinion has shaken off its torpor and the Secretariat of the party has lost the little prestige it still had.

Belkacem's reaction was one of panic, revealed in the expedients he resorted to. Everyone knew during this period that the strike was a complete success. The masses gave a favorable reception to the strike. The lack of publicity and the relative isolation of the students prevented the movement from becoming broader. As for the students more directly, it should be noted in particular that they were the first to be caught by surprise at the extent of their movement. The success is explained by the favorable conditions (Boumediene's regime is highly unpopular), by the breadth of the strike program that brought the students together, and finally the brutal, stupid reactions of the regime which strengthened the cohesion of the students which was not too good at the beginning of the strike movement. However, we should note that at bottom the student demands were on a union rather than political level.

In addition one should remember here the very serious organizational work which the UNEA has carried out since the time of the ORP [Organisation de la Résistance Populaire -- People's Resistance Organization, the underground anti-Boumediene, pro-Ben Bella movement], a work that has placed on a solid footing an efficient and solid parallel structure, on the organizational as well as material level (leaflets for example). It should be noted that a different legal organization now existing is far from having attained the same organizational level; it should be observed that the students were able to go into action on 24-hours notice.

The publication of leaflets and halting the strike at the end of three days again shows the seriousness and the maturity of the students.

All this therefore proves:

- On the one hand, the organizational capacities of a considerable part of the most politically conscious sectors of Algeria.
On the other hand, the possibility of striking echoes among the masses (the Sunday demonstration, the most important since June 19).

The weakness of the regime and the state apparatus, hence the possibility of really toppling it in the future.

Finally, the hysterical campaign unleashed by Belkacem shows in particular his desire to attract the attention of the ANP [Armée Nationale Populaire -- People's National Army] through the following language: "Now is not the time for you to get agitated; the Communists will take the offensive." It remains to be seen whether this argument will carry any real weight.

In addition the impression is given that the power of the regime has been overestimated. It has been forgotten, or not noticed, that the various organs of power represent only the members of the leading bodies and a narrow following. The fragility of the regime -- lacking a popular base and a program, able in eight months of rule to assemble nothing -- is thus apparent. The men of June 19 only have their hands on the machinery of power, but the divisions among them lead one to ask -- for how long?

DOMINICAN WORKERS DRAW ANOTHER LESSON

Bitterness is mounting among revolutionary-minded leftists in Santo Domingo over President Héctor García Godoy's naming two reactionary generals to his cabinet February 26. Told by the president on January 6 to go abroad in order to lower tension in the island, they steadfastly refused although leftist leaders at once jumped to obey the decree.

To compel the two generals, Jacinto Martínez Arana and Juan de los Santos Céspedes, to go abroad, the unions called a general strike. At the end of a week, García told the strikers that he would enforce his order and the generals would go.

Thereupon Juan Bosch, president of the Dominican Revolutionary party ordered the strike ended. The strikers honored the order and called off the crippling strike February 16. Ten days later García named the two generals to his cabinet.

Among the figures now under attack is Bosch himself. Over the radio, Bosch defended himself, saying it would have been "madness" to go on with the strike after the president's "promise." To win a smile from the frustrated workers he said that García "crowed like a rooster and laid eggs like a hen."

But the Dominican workers were not smiling. They were drawing one more hard lesson about the class struggle. Not the slightest confidence can be placed in the word of any bourgeois leader whether of the right, left or center. And if one of them cackles like a hen, it is because he lays eggs like a goose.
AN EMBRYONIC LEFT WING IN THE ITALIAN CP

By Sirio Di Giuliomaria

I.

Rome

Since the June 1965 session of the Central Committee [see World Outlook June 11, 1965] where some of the members, for the first time, either voted against or abstained on a document submitted by the "Direzione" [Political Board], the Italian Communist party [PCI] has undergone a deepening and increasingly significant process of internal differentiation. The CC session held October 26-30, 1965, showed that the differences had not only taken on greater political substance, but the number of leaders involved had increased.

The October meeting was unusual in length (four days), in the number of members who took the floor (53), and in the openness (for a Communist party) of the discussion. For the first time, differences were brought out and sharply discussed, revealing their existence in all the top leading bodies, from the National Secretariat and the "Direzione" down to the Central Committee. The discussion took place in an atmosphere made hotter by threats and blackmail attempts and all the traditional arguments inherited from the Stalinist past.

Meantime, all sorts of meetings showed that the differences among the top leaders were also reflected among the rank and file. No matter what might be on the agenda, in local meetings discussion continually reverted to the two sharpest issues in dispute -- the question of a "united party" and the escalation of the war in Vietnam. At leadership meetings in important areas like Rome and Milan a significant minority of left-wingers voted against or abstained when the Central Committee positions were put to a vote.

This was the climate as preparations for the eleventh congress got under way. A large subcommittee had been set up by the Central Committee almost a year ago to prepare theses for the coming congress. The subcommittee set to work, holding sessions at which members spoke at length on their views. Finally the task of actually drawing up the theses was turned over to the "Direzione." Drafts were prepared, rewritten and amended. Pressures of all kinds were brought to bear on two members of the left wing seated in this body, Reichlin and Ingrao, who is also a member of the National Secretariat. The "Direzione" presented the final theses to the Central Committee.

The reporter was National Secretary Longo. His speech October 26 was substantially a summary of the document. Longo began with the international situation, evaluating Kennedy's policy.

To defend the imperialist positions, said Longo, Kennedy had to move differently from his predecessors. Kennedy was "preoccupied with avoiding the catastrophe of a world war," although he also
aimed at consolidating the relationship of forces internationally. "No doubt," declared Longo, "new ground was broken at the time for the initiative of the peace forces and for the development of a more favorable climate in relations between the USA and the USSR." This did not materialize because the USSR refused to agree to a general deal behind the backs of all the other states and peoples.

"As for Cuba," Longo continued, "at one of the sharpest moments of international crisis, she obtained recognition of her right to independence and the choice of socialism. The compromise reached on that occasion represented a clear defeat of the American thesis of dividing the world into spheres of influence."

After the assassination of the president, said Longo, the leading groups of American imperialism abandoned Kennedy's peace strategy.

The aim of this ardent evaluation of Kennedy's policies was clear to everyone -- Longo was defending Khrushchev's course and that of the PCI.

Arguing that the policy of peaceful coexistence was valid, Longo launched a very heavy attack against the Communist party of China, denouncing its use of "political and ideological blackmail" and its policy of acting like a "great power." He said, however, that the admission of China to the United Nations is an important goal. Concluding this point, the National Secretary listed the items on which his party demands a change in Italy's foreign policy.

Turning to the national scene, Longo stressed one of the main ideas of the document, an idea that had met heavy opposition in the drafting committee and the "Direzione" -- the "failure" of the government's center-left policy. "The center-left policy," he said, "has failed as a reformist design and as a general political operation." He acknowledged that the center-left policy succeeded in pulling the Socialist party away from the workers front -- yet, he said, the PSIUP [Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity] was formed and a new left wing has developed in the Socialist party. Nevertheless, the essential element to note is the failure of the policy. The criticism that this formula "may dangerously underestimate the dynamic elements in the present process of restructuration of the monopolies and the consequent integration of the working class into the capitalist system through corporative and authoritarian means" is to be rejected, said Longo, because this policy of integration may be "a stimulus to the resistance and the struggle of the working class, provided its unions and parties can mobilize and lead it."

What policy should the PCI elaborate vis-à-vis the failure of the center-left policy? The party's policy, Longo declared, must be "a general alternative to the line that the moderate and conservative front is trying to impose on the country." This should be based on fundamental ideas like democratic public intervention in the economy, opening a struggle for a new model of economic development and modification of the process of accumulation as it is carried on at present.
Contending that the theses answer the concern of both the right and the left wings on the question, Longo declared: "The model of development; i.e., democratic programming, which we oppose to the present reorganization of the monopolies and the insubstantial Pieraccini plan [the government plan], has no socialist character, but it aims at hitting and breaking the power of the big monopoly groups in order to ensure real supremacy of the public interest in economic developments, to force profits and the market into a line of development capable of assuring new relations, new margins."

The fight for democratic programming as against capitalist programming thus becomes "a new form and a new medium for advancing towards socialism," Longo said, quoting Togliatti's testament.

However, what should the content of the policy be? Not so strangely, after criticizing the center-left policy, Longo pointed to goals substantially the same as those of the Pieraccini plan. This constituted a clear bid to those sectors of the Socialist party that are not against the center-left formula but only the way it is being applied. Longo stated that the "fundamental goals" should be as follows:

- Full employment and higher incomes for workers.
- Transformation of ownership structures on the land and the development of associative relations in agriculture.
- General development of industry and attenuation of the unbalanced relation between the North and the South.
- Development and reform of the public schools, vocational training and scientific research.
- Development of collective transportation, social security, housing and town planning.
- Development and modernization of commercial distribution.

As for the nationalization of industry, the reporter pointed to three sectors: sugar, cement and pharmaceutical products. Nationalization should be carried out under a policy of "democratic control of investments and of plans for industrial reorganization." However, the reporter cast no light on the obscure meaning of this slogan which the PCI has been using for the past few years.

Longo then took up the problem of what forces should implement this program. He had nothing new to add aside from stressing the need to overthrow the present government. The stress was a concession to the left wing. The fight to overthrow the government should be accompanied by action to build a new majority constituted of all the leftist parties and the "most open and morally engaged Catholic forces."

"The Communist party," said Longo again quoting Togliatti, "is a government party because it wants to play and it does actually play
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-- even by being in the opposition -- the leading role which historically belongs to the working class and it does not limit itself to propagandizing for a coming society; it points out, in the struggle, concrete solutions to the problems of the masses and the country. This involves, of course, a struggle to build democratic coalitions which, through the participation of the Communists or their mere support, may gain strength to take a new political course.

In connection with this policy, Longo spoke once again of the problem of building "a united party of the working class."

In conclusion, the National Secretary reaffirmed his belief in the validity of the "Italian road to socialism." "As demonstrated by the draft theses," he said, "the building of a new society is conceived by us as the outcome of a struggle for the continuous development of democracy and for structural reforms which should move towards a positive solution to the big problems of the country and a growing and actual participation of the working class in the management of economy and in all spheres of public life."

The first critical speech in the subsequent debate was made by Gullo. He criticized the theses on three main points: (1) its length which makes it difficult for the rank and file to understand it; (2) the formula "the center-left has failed" is not correct, for the policy achieved its main goal -- it split the working-class movement; (3) the idea of a "new majority," as well as the idea that "the struggle for a socialist society may be stimulated by religious consciousness" are both wrong. This attack, however, had the appearance of an isolated speech and did not cause any serious reaction.

In another critical speech, Pizzorno talked on the theme that "public intervention in the economy, programming and even structural reforms, at the present stage of capitalist development, are not by themselves elements of democratic progress but may even be factors in the rationalization of the capitalist system."

Ingrao took the floor. He began by saying that the draft theses furnished a useful basis for discussion. "I think, however," he continued, "that it does not adequately emphasize important new developments in the situation and adjustments that should be made in our policies." Ingrao held that the theses did not provide sufficient material to answer the most important political question: "the necessity of a front and a majority capable of orientating the economy as a whole and hence also influencing the decisions taken by the advanced sectors of industry and big business." If success is not achieved in this, conditions will worsen for the working class. "In this connection the content of the economic and political order to be realized now, which is not yet a socialist order, should be stated more clearly; the struggle required along this road should also be better defined."

To influence the "advanced sectors," Ingrao continued, the participation of the state in the ownership of some enterprises is not enough unless a planned economy is in effect. It is necessary to create "a mass movement, which may conquer instruments of both pub-
lic power and workers intervention in the factories, gaining elements of knowledge, of control, of negotiations in regard to investments and labor organization in the big enterprises." In Ingrao's opinion this had not been given the central place in the draft theses which it deserved.

"We should go deeper in our criticism of the policy that fosters the illusion we can use the state as it is in facing up to the system and correcting it. We have been stating that it is necessary to transform the state machinery and to depend on a large mass movement. In our actions and in speaking with other political forces, we must bring out more clearly the continuity and the correspondence between our renovated political program and the mass movement. Undifferentiated pressure from below, open to use by politicians, is not enough. More than that is required; something really new can become asserted only insofar as social and power relationships change. To control capital by political means from above instead of by social means from below is an illusion. This casts fresh light on a new series of problems: the political value of establishing a new workers contractual power in factories; peasants management of the Land Reform corporations; people's control of state institutions; participation of unions in the management of social institutions.

"Taking these as goals means planning to advance the political and social fight as a whole, setting targets that are new even in relation to those of our tenth congress. The draft theses should say this more vigorously. Of course, today, as yesterday, ours is a platform of antimonopolist struggle, but with a more advanced content that poses the question of power in a sharper way."

After denying that this could be labeled "economism," Ingrao insisted on the necessity of a common strategy with the PSIUP and the left wing of the PSI [Nenni's Socialist party]. "This common approach on fundamental problems becomes all the more indispensable as the platform of our adversaries is made more precise. It was the exigency of defining that platform that led me to consider the formula 'failure of the center-left' to be inadequate. The draft theses actually denounce in a strong way the serious damage this policy has caused the country. However, the draft does not clearly show how, on what political grounds, the bourgeois ruling groups are working to build a new power bloc that may include a part of the left wing of the workers movement. The bourgeois action is not developed through mere intimidation; it not only takes advantage of discouragement -- it develops through dynamic policies such as the concept of existence of the status quo, Social-Democratic unification, an incomes policy, international integration. The capitalism we face is not inert, either on the economic or political fields. Emphasizing all this is essential if we are to orient the party in the real field of battle and underline the necessity for a positive answer by the left."

The final part of Ingrao's speech was devoted to the need for more internal democracy and the burying of monolithism forever, allowing differences to be openly discussed even when they arise in leading bodies such as the "Direzione."
Ingrao was followed by a number of members of the Central Committee who took the floor either to support or oppose his stand. It is notable that this was done not only openly; it was accurately reported in L'Unità, the Italian Communist daily newspaper. In this respect there was an advance over previous sessions where a similar phenomenon occurred.

About fifteen members, including the two who had spoken before Ingrao, took the floor to support his stand, either in whole or in part. Among these were Garavini, secretary of the Turin CGIL [Italian General Confederation of Labor]; Reichlin, former editor of L'Unità and now secretary of the Regional Organization of Puglia; Petrucciolli, of the National Secretariat of the youth organization; Paolicchi, former chairman of the Federation of Cooperatives; Natoli, a very popular leader in the Rome organization; Rossanda, chairman of the National Commission for Cultural Problems; Pintor, former co-editor of L'Unità. Of the older party leaders, Colombi's defection should be noted, while Vidali, leader of the Trieste organization, Secchia and Roasi criticized the theses and pleaded for more internal democracy.

As for Occhetto, the National Secretary of the Communist Youth, although he upheld certain leftist positions, his support for Ingrao was rather cool. He did not support Ingrao's "criticisms of method," he said. Occhetto had just returned, fresh from a heavy-handed and most bureaucratic intervention among the youth leadership of Milan, where he fired full-timers, and changed the secretary and the secretariat although the left wing holds a majority in the Federal Committee (the leading body in the province).

Among Ingrao's opponents, the attacks were very sharp. Ingrao was criticized for having written the minutes of his speech himself for publication in L'Unità, thus showing his thirst for "publicizing" his criticisms. He was also attacked for having voted for the theses in the "Direzione," along with Reichlin, and then criticizing them afterwards. (Ingrao stated that he considered the document constituted a basis for discussion but that he had reservations on its content). He was accused, too, of being reluctant to develop the true logic of his positions. During the discussion, the atmosphere was poisoned by heckling of the speakers and the use of violent language. Prior to the session pressure of various kinds was exerted, from appeals for party "unity," to threats that full-timers would be fired and members of the Central Committee would be kicked off at the next congress.

Among those who attacked Ingrao, the following were in the forefront: Macaluso, a member of the National Secretariat; Sereni; G.C. Pajetta, a member of the National Secretariat; Cossutta, a leader of the Milan organization; Colombi, a member of the "Direzione"; Novella, a leader of the CGIL; Amendola, a member of the National Secretariat; and Alicata, a member of the National Secretariat. Alicata was given the task of answering specific criticisms of the draft theses. One of the main points made by these figures was that a member of the National Secretariat and even the "Direzione" cannot take his differences outside the leading body he belongs to. The party bureaucrats were obviously worried over how far Ingrao had
gone in making his criticisms available to the ranks.

Alicata concentrated on the speeches made by Ingrao, Pintor (he labelled Pintor's contribution as "indefinable"), Natoli, Reichlin, Secchia, Cerreti, Roasio, Vidali. Alicata even quoted parts of the speeches that had not been reported by L'Unità, thus in his own way enriching public knowledge of the debate. (Pintor, for instance, allegedly said that the PCI is chasing the PSI like a rabbit that can't be caught, and that the leading group is almost afraid of concentrating party action in the factories.)

Even cruder and sharper was Longo's summary at the conclusion of the session. He did not formally deny the right of Ingrao and Reichlin to register dissent. However, he made two remarks: (a) Ingrao's statements were vague; (b) in face of the pressure on the party from various directions to form factions and tendencies, the party leaders should seek unity and not become divided among themselves. Answering an argument repeated by Pintor, Roasio, Secchia and Vidali that pointing to the danger of factionalism may be considered "illicit intimidation," Longo declared that they should open their eyes. Outside groups, including the pro-Chinese, were seeking to build tendencies and to divide and disintegrate the party. He mentioned Occhettoto's report about pro-Chinese groups in the youth organization of Milan and the existence of an anonymous "monthly letter," drafted by comrades, calling for the formation of factions.

After the discussion, the Central Committee voted unanimously for a resolution calling a national congress on January 25-30, 1966, approving the general line of the theses, and entrusting the "Direzione" with the task of editing and publishing them, "taking into account the positive contributions for better elaboration and pointing up of the line of the document."

At the June session, the final vote was differentiated, whereas in this session it was unanimous. But this should not be considered to be a step backward. The most important feature of this session was the deepening of differences up and down the line in such a "delicate" period as the one preceding a congress.

[Next: The Eleventh Congress.]