Hugo Blanco's Codefendants Ask Death Penalty, Too, If He Is To Be Shot

The seven codefendants, who were given various terms in prison when Hugo Blanco was condemned to a sentence of 25 years in El Frontón, signed a letter on November 5 which they sent to the authorities demanding the honor of having their fate linked with his. If he is to be shot, they asked, let them be permitted to stand at his side and be shot at the same time.

The news of this action was reported in Le Monde of November 26. The Paris daily also reported that political prisoners of all kinds in Peru have gone on a hunger strike to express solidarity with Hugo Blanco. Students in a number of universities have called strikes as a way of showing support for him. According to another source in Paris, the Pentagon is placing pressure on Belaúnde to go ahead and execute the popular peasant leader.
HUGO BLANCO'S CODEFENDANTS ASK DEATH PENALTY, TOO, IF HE IS TO BE SHOT

The seven codefendants, who were given various terms in prison when Hugo Blanco was condemned to a sentence of 25 years in El Frontón, signed a letter on November 5 which they sent to the authorities demanding the honor of having their fate linked with his. If he is to be shot, they asked, let them be permitted to stand at his side and be shot at the same time.

The news of this action was reported in Le Monde of November 26. The Paris daily also reported that political prisoners of all kinds in Peru have gone on a hunger strike to express solidarity with Hugo Blanco. Students in a number of universities have called strikes as a way of showing support for him. According to another source in Paris, the Pentagon is placing pressure on Belaunde to go ahead and execute the popular peasant leader.
BEJAR AND GADEA GO ON HUNGER STRIKE IN SUPPORT OF HUGO BLANCO

The November 17 issue of Gramma, the official organ of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Cuba, reported that two outstanding Peruvian guerrilla leaders, Hector Bejar and Ricardo Gadea, who are being held in prison by the Belaúnde regime, went on a hunger strike as a demonstration of solidarity with Hugo Blanco, who has again been threatened with death by one of the regime's military tribunals.

Alfonso Arata and some other guerrilla fighters also went on a hunger strike to show their solidarity with Hugo Blanco, according to Gramma.

The Cuban newspaper reported that in two prisons a number of inmates holding similar views had been on a hunger strike for eight days protesting the threat of death against Hugo Blanco. To execute the Peruvian peasant leader, they said, would constitute judicial murder.

CHILEANS APPEAL FOR HUGO BLANCO

Santiago, Chile

A petition appealing to President Fernando Belaúnde Terry to grant amnesty to Hugo Blanco, Hector Bejar, Walter Palacios, Ricardo Gadea, Licurgo Pinto, Daniel Pereryra, José Martorell, Vladimir Valer and hundreds of other revolutionists and fighters for social emancipation, was presented to the Peruvian embassy here on November 25.

The petition was signed by Clotario Blest, chairman for nine years of the Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile [CUT]; Humberto Valenzuela, a leader of the Municipal Workers; Luis Vitale, a writer and former national leader of the CUT; Alejandro Chelén R., a former senator at present a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist party; Julio César Jobet, a socialist writer; Luis Rivano, writer; María Elena Gertner, writer; Rolando Cárdenas, writer; José Gómez López, journalist; Eduardo Long Alessandri, attorney for the Confederación de Obreros del Cobre; Arnoldo Camú, labor attorney; Oscar Waisb, lawyer, writer and leader of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria [MIR]; Walter Blanco, socialist attorney; Manuel Irarrázaval, attorney; Sergio Lizama, attorney; Jorge Manzor, attorney; Gustavo Espinoza, attorney; Enrique Sepúlveda, general secretary of the MIR; Dantón Chelén, 1966 candidate for the presidency of the Federación de Estudiantes de Chile [FECH]; Arturo Yussef and Juan Yussef, attorneys.

Other signatures have been added since the petition was presented.

SARTRE AND DE BEAUVIOR PLEAD FOR HUGO BLANCO

The following telegram was sent to President Belaúnde Terry of Peru, with copies to the Supreme Council of Military Justice and Hugo Blanco's attorney: INFORMED APPEAL CONTAINS NEW THREAT OF DEATH AGAINST HUGO BLANCO WE ASK YOU MR. PRESIDENT TO GRANT GENERAL AMNESTY FOR HIM AND ALL THOSE IMPRISONED.

The telegram was sent by the Committee of Solidarity with the Victims of Repression in Peru and was signed by Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Arthur Adamov, Roger Blin, Claude Bourdet, Marguerite Duras, Maître Jouffa, Claude Lanzmann (editorial board of Temps Modernes), Michel Leiris, Maître Manville, François Maspéro, Maurice Nadeau, Anne Phillips, Alain Reznais, Frédéric Rossif, Jean Schuster (Surrealist movement), Geneviève Serreau.

THREE FRENCH UNIONS JOIN IN APPEAL FOR HUGO BLANCO

New protests against the threat of death placed against Hugo Blanco have been sent to President Belaúnde Terry, according to the November 30 issue of the Paris daily Le Monde. On November 26 Daniel Mayer sent a cable in the name of the International Federation for the Rights of Man.

Mme. Nathalie Sarraute, MM. Pieyre de Mandiargues and Jorge Sempurn added their names to an appeal for amnesty sent by the Committee of Solidarity with the Victims of Repression in Peru which was signed by a group of figures headed by Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir.
The National Union of Higher Education, the National Union of Students of France, and the sections of higher education and research of the General Union of National Education, protested in a joint cable "against the death penalty demanded against Hugo Blanco." The three unions also cabled Belaúnde Terry demanding that the "proceedings be stopped at once."

MEMBERS OF BELGIAN PARLIAMENT INTERVENE IN BEHALF OF HUGO BLANCO

Brussels

Forty-three members of the House of Representatives, belonging to all the different political parties, responded to the initiative taken by Pierre Legrèves, deputy of the Union de la Gauche Socialiste, and sent the following message to President Belaúnde Terry:

"The undersigned members of the House of Representatives in Belgium are disturbed by the threat of death weighing on Hugo Blanco.

"This peasant union leader of the Valley of the Convention in the province of Cuzco, was arrested on May 30, 1963, because of his struggle for an agrarian reform. He was held in prison, where he carried out a number of hunger strikes, for more than three years until his trial opened August 30 before a military tribunal. He was sentenced, in accordance with the demand of the prosecuting attorney of the republic, to 25 years in prison, but against the demand of the military consulting judge who sought the death penalty. Hugo Blanco having appealed the sentence to the Supreme Council in Lima, the prosecution is demanding the death penalty.

"In view of the unquestionable idealism that inspired the action of the prisoner and the long detention that was imposed on him before he was granted a trial, the undersigned members of the House of Representatives of Belgium believe themselves authorized to beg his Honor the President of the Republic to use the powers that are his in order to prevent carrying out the sentence if it involves the death penalty."

PETITION FOR HUGO BLANCO PRESENTED TO PERUVIAN EMBASSY IN LONDON

A petition in behalf of Hugo Blanco has been signed by a number of figures in the labor movement in Britain, including Sidney Silverman, a member of Parliament; Bob Edwards, also an MP and a veteran of the International Brigade who fought in the Civil War in Spain; Eric Heffer and Andrew Faulds, both members of Parliament; Arthur Deane, a leader of the chemical workers union; Judy Todd, and a number of others.

A delegation of three -- Peter Taaffe, editor of the Militant, Arthur Deane, and Colin Penfold presented the petition to the Peruvian embassy November 12.

The Young Socialists in Hackney also sent a telegram to President Belaúnde Terry of Peru asking that Hugo Blanco be granted an amnesty.

GLASGOW WORKERS AND SOCIALISTS DEMONSTRATE AT PERUVIAN CONSULATE

Glasgow

Upon learning of the new threat of death to Hugo Blanco, members of the Revolutionary Socialist League here got up a petition and hurriedly gathered a number of signatures to indicate the feelings of workers in this city. With more time, the number of signatures could have been greatly increased.

The Peruvian consul in Glasgow interviewed five of the demonstrators who went to his office, but after talking with them he refused to send the petition to the embassy in London.

The police tried to intimidate the demonstrators but without success.

Representatives of the demonstrators lodged protests with the Peruvian embassy in London both about the case of Hugo Blanco and their consul in Glasgow.

The text of the petition, together with the names of the signers, is as follows:
"We, the undersigned, wish to register the strongest protest against the military authorities of Peru at their latest attempt to murder the peasant leader Hugo Blanco. We have learned with dismay that the military have secured a further trial of Blanco after having been thwarted in their original plan to have him condemned to death in September, 1966.

"The previous sentence of 25 years imprisonment on this selfless revolutionary was an act of barbarism which shocked even those of us who are familiar with the brutality meted out to the peasants and workers of your unhappy country. If this attempt at judicial assassination succeeds it will convince the world that the Peruvian ruling class is not only one of the most despotic but that it is incapable of observing even the most basic of humanitarian principles.

"If, however, in spite of the growing body of world opinion, a rigged court decides to kill Blanco, you must realise that you cannot destroy his ideas; his example of fighting tyranny and the alternative way of life he pointed to will be cherished by the workers and peasants of Peru and will be used by them as a new starting point in their struggle to realise a socialist republic.

"[Signed]: David Dick (Secretary Pollok Constituency Labour Party Young Socialists); Monika Sinclair (Central Labour Party); Sophia Cameron (Housewife); Charles McMahon (Corbals Constituency Labour Party); Brian Biggins (Scottish Youth Organiser, Co-operative Union Ltd.); Robert Dick (A.E.U. Branch No. 5); J. Mcguire (General Workers Union); M. Evans (Pollok C.L.P.Y.S.); Margaret McMahon (Govanhill Ward Labour Association); J. Forrest (Govan Constituency Labour Party); Pat Frydd (Woodside C.L.P.); David Riddell (T.&G.W.U.); Margaret Lilley (Pollok C.L.P.Y.S.); D. Mcgraw (Kirkcaldy Branch Communist Party); Wm. Smith (D.A.T.A.); John McGinty (Sheet Metal Workers' Union); J. Lilley (U.S.D.A.W.); J. McCallum (D.A.T.A.); N. McQueen (Pollok C.L.P.Y.S.); A. Donnell (Pollok C.L.P.Y.S.); M. McCallum (A.Sc.W.); A. McPherson (Gorbals C.L.P.Y.S.); Ian Mooney (Woodside C.L.P.); Les. Grant (Chairman, A.Sc.W., University of Strathclyde); Toney Stouthall (Sec. of Woodside C.L.P.); Charles Montgomery (Chairman, No. 1 Branch, Electrical Trades Union); John McPherson (Amalgamated Engineering Union)."

These were the actual signatories of the petition that was taken Saturday morning to the consulate. On Sunday when demonstrators again appeared at the consulate, many other people showed up, but additional copies of the petition were not yet available. Since then, many rank-and-file members of trade unions, Labour parties, etc., have asked to have their support recorded.

RISE IN WORKING-CLASS MILITANCY NOTED IN PERU

The Lima correspondent of the Buenos Aires daily Clarín reports a certain amount of movement in the Peruvian social scene that may foreshadow a sharpening of the class struggle. As cited in the November 28 issue of La Verdad, he wrote:

"Without a solution in sight, the strike in the fish industry, a strike that constitutes a very stiff blow to the country's economy, is beginning its twentieth day. Up to now, according to the Sociedad Nacional de Pescadores, the loss amounts to 240 million soles [27 soles = US$1]. The conflict began in several ports on November 2 and up to date has paralyzed 18 big fish centers along the entire coast, leading to dangerous hunger strikes among the fish workers in Pisco and the capital. The strikers in Supe, Huacho, Chancay, Tambo de Mora and Pisco have announced a march on Lima for next Tuesday with the aim of interviewing the president of the republic. The march is being encouraged from Lima at a time when, significantly, partial work stoppages are occurring in some of the banks, a sector of the students are in convulsion, and groups of elements have appeared in the streets. If the latter have been peaceful up to now, marching in such a way as to only create traffic problems at the peak moments, they are publicly displaying their political tendency through placards which bear as their sole inscription the name of Hugo Blanco, or refer to the bloody encounters in the Toquepala mines, references that clearly have no relation with the conflict that concerns them, but which clearly tell what forces are behind the dispute, which is taking on signs of increasing gravity."

FACING PAGE: A portrait of Hugo Blanco done especially for World Outlook. It is based on a snapshot, taken as the revolutionary peasant leader finished testifying at the trial in Tacna September 6, which appeared in La Cronica. The Lima daily quoted Hugo Blanco as telling the military court, "I am satisfied with everything I have done for the peasants and now I can die tranquilly."
WASHINGTON'S OVERTURES TO MOSCOW AND EASTERN EUROPE

By George Novack

The realists in Washington take diversified attitudes towards the various workers states. It judges each of them, not by the features of its internal regime, but by the main thrust of its foreign policy and influence. The State Department is up in arms whenever it considers these to be an imminent and potent threat to the strategy and interests of U.S. imperialism. Thus Washington feels friendly toward Tito's Yugoslavia and extremely hostile toward Castro's Cuba.

Comparable differences are manifested in Washington's present postures toward the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. While the U.S. strives to tighten the encirclement of Communist China and moves its military might ever closer to the southern border, its diplomats are hopeful of improving relations with the Kremlin despite the escalation of the war in Vietnam.

They have recently been taking small but significant steps along this line. The latest move of this kind came on November 28 when the U.S. raised its diplomatic relations with Hungary and Bulgaria from the legation to the ambassadorial level.

This decision was announced by the White House and State Department soon after the Bulgarian Communist party had concluded its congress at Sofia and while the Hungarian Communist party congress was going on. One of the principal topics of public and private discussion at both congresses was the proposal tendered by the Soviet and Bulgarian party leaders to call a "summit conference" of the world Communist movement to deal with the Chinese problem. This proposal is being resisted, for various reasons, by the Romanian, Yugoslav, Italian, many Asian and other representatives.

Washington's current diplomatic maneuvers with the Communist governments are designed to serve four aims. The State Department seeks to further China's isolation; induce the Kremlin to put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate a settlement of the conflict in Vietnam on terms acceptable to Johnson; draw the East European countries away from dependence upon Moscow and closer to the United States; and prepare the ground for a larger settlement of the most important issues in dispute between Washington and Moscow.

The White House did not start the process of reconciliation until it had first tested the real disposition of the Soviet leadership by checking its reactions to the developments in Southeast Asia. The feebly response of the Kremlin to the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong reassured Washington that its intervention in Vietnam did not bar friendlier relations between the "Big Two."

The administration set out to woo the Soviet bloc with the president's October 7 speech in New York where he enunciated an important change in European and Soviet policies. Johnson in effect renounced the "rollback" policy toward communism in Eastern Europe held by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. He called for the transformation of coexistence into "peaceful engagement" between the Soviet Union and the United States.

"It is not our purpose to overthrow other governments," he stated. Germany can be reunited only "through a growing reconciliation" of East and West. The split in Europe "must be healed with the consent of Eastern European countries and consent of the Soviet Union. We respect the integrity of a nation's boundary lines." This meant that the United States no longer challenges the legitimacy of the present governments in Eastern Europe or seriously questions existing frontiers there.

This new doctrine was presented three days before Russian Foreign Minister Gromyko held an amicable meeting at the White House which Johnson characterized as "helpful" and "fruitful." The president went on to tell reporters: "I believe it will be productive. I don't want to get your hopes up...but I feel good about our meeting and I said to him that we would welcome a visit by the leadership of his country to this country."

Obviously Kosygin and Brezhnev could not dare to duplicate Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959 and revive the "spirit of Camp David" while American planes were raining bombs on north Vietnam. Brezhnev replied that Johnson suffers from a "strange and stubborn delusion" in thinking that Soviet-American relations can be bettered regardless of the Vietnam war.

Nevertheless, this formal turndown of Johnson's invitation has not hindered the
emergence of several signs of welcome to Johnson's overtures.

Mr. Gromyko has publicly recognized the U.S. desire to seek a nuclear non-proliferation treaty as "sincere." Up to now Soviet sources had termed the American efforts to reach agreement on this matter as hypocritical.

Washington removed 400 commodities from the list of goods banned for export to Eastern Europe which has pleased those governments eager to do more business with the United States.

The Export-Import Bank henceforth will be permitted to guarantee commercial credits to four additional East European countries—Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

Direct airline service between Moscow and New York will commence in the spring. Congress will be asked to approve a U.S.-Soviet consular agreement.

These concessions have been made to show Moscow and the East European capitals that Washington is serious about friendship with them. This is not a one-way street.

The New York Times divulged on November 22 that, during his talks with President Johnson and Secretary of State Rusk, Foreign Minister Gromyko discussed the presumably provocative attitude of a nuclear-armed Peking and the danger of war involved in border clashes between the two countries. (See World Outlook, December 2, 1966, p. 8.)

Six days later the Soviet embassy in Washington took the unusual action of denying the Times account of Gromyko's conversations and dismissed them as "mere inventions." It asserted that the publication of the allegations about Russia's apprehensions concerning China "was evidently designed for use by certain circles who are looking for any pretext to smear the Soviet Union and who are interested in worsening Soviet-Chinese relations."

While the Times stood by its story, a State Department spokesman made a formal disclaimer that Gromyko had expressed concern to U.S. officials over rising border tensions. But the Department did not specifically deny that the Soviet and American diplomats had discussed Sino-Soviet relations, China's development of nuclear weapons, proposals for an anti-proliferation treaty, and Russia's dispatch of additional troops to the border area in recent months.

In any case, it is difficult to see how Sino-Soviet relations could get much worse, short of a complete diplomatic rupture between the two governments. Their representatives walked out of each other's National Day celebrations rather than listen to invectives from the podium. Even cultural ties have been reduced to the minimum with the expulsions of their exchange students from the two countries.

In the latest exchange, Moscow and Peking have assailed each other in the most vehement tones. An editorial in the November 27 Pravda declared that Peking's "splitting" and "chauvinist" policies were imperiling the world Communist movement. Its indictment of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters included the following bill of particulars:

-- Abandonment of the world Communist line adopted at the Moscow conferences of 1957 and 1960.

-- Jeopardizing of the Chinese party by the purging of members opposed to Chairman Mao's policies.

-- Damaging the war effort of north Vietnam by refusing to cooperate in joint aid.

-- Brainwashing of the Chinese people to instill anti-Soviet hostility.

-- Discrediting the idea of Communism by the excesses and violence of the cultural revolution.

-- Harming the liberation movement in colonial dependencies and newly developing nations.

Pravda stated that there was "growing dissatisfaction" over Chairman Mao's policies among Chinese party members, intellectuals and army leaders. "Mao Tse-tung and his entourage could not disregard the fact that the party cadres, who went through the school of revolution, despite the anti-Soviet campaign of the past years, came to realize increasingly all the harm for China of the line of the split with the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries," the editorial said. "This is why Mao Tse-tung and his group chose the road of defamation and destruction of the party cadres, or best representatives of the working class and intellectuals, using for this purpose a part of the students and pupils and military and administrative apparatus."

The Soviet party organ called for overcoming all these pernicious policies, presumably by removing Mao and his associates from their positions of power.

In introducing Brezhnev at an assembly of factory workers in Budapest December 1, Zoltan Komissz, the Hungarian Communist party's specialist in foreign affairs, attacked Mao in a way that was widely interpreted as an appeal to oust him from leadership in Peking.

"We can also infer from the events taking place in China," said Komissz, "that there are people among the party's cadres who have recognized that the pseudo-leftist anti-Soviet divisive line has misguided the Chinese Communist party and that they want to return to the commonly accepted party line of the Communist and workers parties.

"We are sure that the future, at whatever price of turmoil and sacrifices, will justify those Chinese comrades who represent unity against great power chauvinism and fraternity toward the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."

Peking has reciprocated in kind. An article in Jenmin Jih Pao, the party newspaper, labeled the Soviet leaders as "a group of renegades" who "will all be overthrown, defeated and eliminated by the revolutionary people." The article, entitled "Great Call for Battle," accused the Soviet government of pursuing a "policy of collaboration with the United States for world domination" and "of playing the part of an accomplice of United States imperialism in suppressing the revolutionary movement of the peoples of the world.

The sole beneficiary of the deepening division between the two major Communist powers are the U.S. imperialists who view it as a golden opportunity to promote their military plans in Southeast Asia and their diplomatic designs on the world arena. Thus, while Moscow and Peking were hurling anathemas against each other, the General Assembly in New York defeated a resolution to seat Communist China in place of Chiang's puppet regime in the United Nations by a vote of 57 against 46.

The result was accounted a gain for the United States which has consistently opposed China's entry. Last year's vote on China's membership was 47 to 47 with 20 abstentions.

According to the New York Times correspondent, "some delegations from non-aligned states said the Soviet Union and its allies had been less energetic in support of Peking's admission this year than in the past. They attributed this to Moscow's fear that the Chinese Communists might use the United Nations as an arena for their ideological dispute with the Soviet Union."

* * *

Under present circumstances the Soviet leaders are restricted in their response to Washington's overtures. They cannot possibly go "all the way with LBJ." They cannot risk undertaking initiatives for a compromise with the United States on Vietnam which would substantiate Chinese charges of a sellout. Moreover, neither Hanoi nor the National Liberation Front are retreating from their stand that the United States must withdraw from Vietnam.

But by blaming the Chinese for sabotaging a united Communist effort to secure victory in Vietnam, Kosygin and Brezhnev have an alibi in reserve for subsequent behind-the-scenes negotiations with Washington on this problem. Unfortunately, Mao's adamant refusal to consider any form of common action with the Soviet "renegades" and "revisionists" in defense of Vietnam plays into Moscow's hands while weakening the international front against American aggression.

When Peking accuses the Kremlin of complicity with the United States, it has in mind not only its past performance and the growing indications of an entente between the Big Two but the underlying long-range motives of their diplomatic machinations. The Soviet leaders attach far greater value to strengthening their national security in Europe than to assuring victory for the colonial freedom fighters in Vietnam. They would like a guaranty from Washington that Germany will never again be allowed to menace Russia or to acquire nuclear arms.

The policymakers in both Washington and Moscow look ahead to a broad settlement
of world affairs at some propitious point in which the United States will pledge to deter German reunification by force and help contain West Germany in return for a Soviet promise to work with Washington in isolating Communist China.

Peking is well aware of these mutual objectives. Its leaders can hardly be expected to keep silent about a projected diplomatic deal which, like the partial nuclear test ban treaty, will be directed against them. Considerations of this sort which lurk in the background of the present situation keep envenoming Sino-Soviet relations and widening the breach between the two Communist countries. Meanwhile the U.S. State Department cautiously works toward closer ties with Eastern Europe and gradually prepares for a détente with Kosygin and Brezhnev through the mediation of Foreign Minister Gromyko and its newly appointed, experienced envoy to Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson.

WASHINGTON VULTURES WATCH POWER STRUGGLE IN PEKING WITH INTEREST

How carefully the U.S. State Department is following the development of the political crisis in Peking is indicated by the way it continually sends out feelers to the warring factions. Thus Washington officials revealed December 1 that U.S. ambassador to Poland, John A. Gronouski, who holds regular meetings with the Chinese ambassador in Warsaw, Wang Kue-chan, had offered to exchange seed samples. It was not indicated whether the offer, made last September 7, had been officially rebuffed or simply ignored. Similarly, the State Department has been widening the categories of U.S. citizens who would be granted official permission to visit China if Peking would grant them visas. Peking, however, has refused to grant any visas to visitors who have been screened by the State Department.

In a dispatch from Washington, reporting these developments, the New York Times of December 2 also indicates how the State Department assesses the struggle going on in Peking. This is not without interest.

"Washington analysts," says the Times, "see no signs whatever of any break in Peking's rigid and militant attitudes. They have, however, revised earlier assessments on the course of the power struggle now under way in Peking -- to which they attach the utmost importance.

"About two months ago Washington thought the power struggle had been won by the militant hard-liners led by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his heir-apparent, Defense Minister Lin Piao, and backed by the Red Guards.

"Recent evidence, Washington believes, indicates that the struggle has not yet been resolved and that the hard-liners have encountered difficulties in breaking the influence of the group of party officials led by Liu Shao-chi, the chief of state, and Teng Hsiao-ping, the Communist party's Secretary-General.

"Analysts note that although Mr. Kiu and Mr. Teng have been publicly denounced by the Red Guard movement, they continue to appear at official occasions with Chairman Mao and Mr. Lin, suggesting that they have strong backing within the party hierarchy.

"American experts believe there is little the United States can do, or should do, to try to affect the course of the power struggle. Indeed, top Administration officials are extremely cautious in their comments in order to avoid any appearance of implied interference.

"Nor does official Washington believe that the outcome, even if the less militant wing emerges on top, would bring significant changes in Peking's foreign policy or over-all strategy.

"The interpretation of officials here is that this group might modify Peking's tactics slightly to improve its reputation in the world at large by appearing less rigid and less determinedly isolated.

"There is some expectation that this group might also move toward a slightly more pragmatic and less doctrinaire approach to China's domestic economic problems."

The propaganda that the Johnson administration is not interested in intervening in this struggle is, of course, pure poppycock. Up to now, the China experts in the State Department have simply been unable to find a point at which they could insert a wedge. Likewise, the State Department view that the opposition to Mao may be "less
"militant" is not to be taken as a faithful reflection of the reality. The opposition is in actuality divided into at least three sectors -- a bourgeois tendency, which, however, is very weak and not a genuinely serious element in the struggle, a Khru-thrivist tendency, which may indeed be less militant, and a revolutionary Marxist current, the strength of which cannot be determined in view of the absence of workers democracy in China.

**WHY THE VIETNAMESE COUNT ON EVENTUAL VICTORY**

Why do the people of Vietnam continue such heroic resistance against the most colossal military power in all history? It seems beyond the comprehension of the Pentagon which keeps escalating the amount of explosives dumped on the inhabitants of the tiny country and employing the most fiendish weapons in the arsenal of the U.S. armed forces in an unremitting effort to crush their will.

Joseph Kraft, a correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, sought an answer from representatives of the National Liberation Front at their delegation in Prague. His account of what they told him in long conversations appeared in the November 25 issue of the Chicago paper. Kraft condensed the NLF view as follows:

"On why they keep up the war: We have fought for independence for more than a quarter of a century. After we have shed so much blood and lost so many lives, it is not easy to accept the kind of capitulation the Americans are now offering.

"We know that America is a great country and a rich country. But its power is not unlimited. We know what it has already taken to fight against 14,000,000 people in a tiny piece of land. It has taken one-third of the American combat divisions, one-half of the American air strength, one-third of the American fleet.

"Despite that effort, the Americans have not yet destroyed a single one of our companies, not one company totally destroyed. We know that the Americans have responsibilities here in Europe and in Latin America. We think that if it has already taken them so much to accomplish so little, in the end our struggle will not be in vain.

"On escalation: If it has taken so much American power to fight a tiny country with such small results, it does not make sense to fight 17,000,000 more people from North Viet Nam in a still larger area.

"On why the Liberation Front has not formed a provisional government: We were a front representing many segments of the population of South Viet Nam. But there remain some elements outside the Front. If we formed a government, we might exclude those people. We think that, if we keep our ranks open, we can still win over whole cities and even units of the South Vietnamese army.

"On reunification with the North: By reason of language, culture and the economy, Viet Nam is one. But we recognize as a reality the Geneva partition and the fact of 12 years of separate history.

"We are fighting for an independent South Viet Nam, with its own constitution, its own elections and its own government. Later, that government might, step by step and stage by stage, work toward unification with North Viet Nam.

"On prospects for negotiations: We do not think the time is right for negotiations for two reasons. One is that the Americans keep intensifying the war by sending more troops, by raising the military budget and by increasing draft calls. The other is that the Americans have not recognized the National Liberation Front.

"On the possibility of negotiations between the United States and North Viet Nam: The North cannot negotiate for the South. Hanoi is not the voice of the South. The Front is that voice."

Kraft was struck by two qualities in the statements of the Front. "For one thing, there is immense confidence -- even pride -- in the capacity to absorb punishment and win out in the end." The other was that the confidence of the Vietnamese fighters is not based on comfort drawn from critics of Johnson's policies. The confidence is based "on a detailed analysis of benefits and costs."

"The conclusion of the Front is that, given the small American stake in Viet Nam and the huge American stake in the rest of the world, the commitment made to Viet Nam by the President and the secretary of state is too lopsided to be sustained indefinitely."
WILSON TO EXTEND WAGE FREEZE IN BRITAIN

By John Walters

London

The Wilson government published a White Paper on November 22 setting out how it proposes to apply its "incomes policy" in the first six months of 1967. It lists the criteria for a period of "severe restraint" on incomes and prices after the six-months freeze imposed last July. The "norm" for general wage increases is to be -- zero!

" Increases in incomes during this period," declares the White Paper, "will only be justified in exceptional circumstances where they can be shown to meet the following criteria for exceptions, and even then only on a severely limited scale." The criteria concern primarily "productivity" agreements; but the language is so obscure that it is difficult to see how any wage increases can be justified even in this instance. Not only must there be a real increase in productivity, but it must be of such nature as to be in the "national interest" as well. Precisely what that means no one knows.

The Transport and General Workers Union [T&GWU] commented: "The criteria for productivity increases could have only been drawn up by people without practical industrial experience."

The other exception envisaged is the very low-paid workers. However the loophole is a very tight one. It would seem that the government has in mind workers whose wages are controlled by government orders; i.e., those who are so poorly organized and paid that minimum wages are determined by law. Many workers in such industries are paid above the minimum legal rate due to labor shortages in certain areas. The government is making clear that where wages do rise in such industries, those workers already being paid above the legal minimum are not to be granted an increase.

As far as the rest of the workers are concerned, there are to be no wage increases, no cuts in hours, and no increased holidays [vacations]. In other words the wage freeze is to be maintained in full force.

When it comes to prices, the White Paper tells another story: "...price increases may be justified where there has been a marked increase that cannot be absorbed in the cost of imported materials or costs arising from changes in supply for seasonal or other reasons, or which are due to action by the Government, such as increased taxation; or where an enterprise finds itself faced by increased costs which it is unable to restrain and which is too large to absorb, such as the costs of bought-in-components forming a large part of its total costs."

Becoming even more blatant in its defense of profits, it continues: "There may also be exceptional circumstances in which without some increase in price the receipts of an enterprise are not adequate to maintain efficiency and undertake necessary investment." In other words, if the rate of profit for a firm slips, it will be justified in putting its prices up.

Of course there is to be a dividend freeze for the first six months of 1967; but this means that the investors incomes are only deferred, not lost.

The White Paper makes it very clear that the British working class are expected not only to endure a wage freeze again in 1967, but that this will amount to a wage cut. When wages are frozen while prices move up, it is obvious that the workers won't be able to buy as much as previously.

In an attempt to sweeten this pill, the government announced a few days later that 600,000 lower-paid workers will receive wage increases on January 1. Since these should have been paid last July, nothing is being given away. The wages of most of the workers involved range from £10 to £11 [US$28 to US$30.80] a week; and the highest increase will be 13 shillings [US$1.82] a week. Where rent can run from £3 to £5 [US$8.40 to US$14] a week, it can be seen just how miserable such wages are, and it can be seen that the T&GWU demand for a £15 [US$42] a week minimum wage is a moderate one.

A spokesman of the Association of Supervisory Staff, Executives and Technicians [ASSET] said, "The White Paper is muddled and incoherent. Obviously we are in for another 'New Ice Age.'" This is precisely what the British working class faces unless it fights back.

On November 24, two days after the White Paper was published, the figures for unemployment in November were released. The total jobless now stands at 541,585. This
is 2.3% of the labor force. Although a number of these come under the term "short-term" unemployed; i.e., partially employed, the significant fact is that the number of wholly unemployed is still rising. The trend has accelerated month by month from 13,000 in August to 26,000 in September to 33,000 in October. The November increase was 46,000 and all signs indicate that this trend will continue well into next year. Most commentators seem to think that there will be between 700,000 and 800,000 unemployed by spring or early summer and that the number will continue to rise even if the rate of increase slows down somewhat.

Several conclusions can be drawn. First, the economy was definitely on the downturn when the deflationary measures were imposed last July. What they did was to accelerate the downturn. Secondly, the employers were tending to hoard labor, production falling faster than employment. Thirdly, the government decided that only a substantial amount of unemployment would give it the climate in which to impose a wage freeze for a considerable length of time. When the wage freeze was first announced in July, the unions were in a very strong position with regard to the labor market. They (or at least a big enough majority) were prepared to accept the wage freeze out of loyalty to the Labour government. Now when it is clear that the freeze is going to be continued, they face rising unemployment, and the layoffs are cutting into precisely those sectors that have been the most militant in the past. Fourthly, the government may have overreached itself by imposing such a savage deflation. The Financial Times, commenting on the latest employment figures, said: "Whatever is done now, the rise in unemployment is likely to overshoot the level desired even by those in the Government most insistent on running the economy at a reduced pressure of demand."

Right now there are cautious hints from various commentators that the government should start some selective "reflation" before the economy slides into a slump. Such warnings are not as gloomy as they may seem. There is no doubt that there is now a recession in investment in the British economy; a recent survey put out by the Confederation of British Industry (the employers organization) showed that next year investment will have declined by about 12%. In this situation, if unemployment continues to rise at its present rate there will be a drastic reduction in aggregate demand in the economy, which could reinforce the downward trend. It may well be that the government will decide to inject some spending into the economy early next year in an attempt to overcome this.

However, Wilson has made it quite clear that there will be no general reflation of the economy in the near future. When questioned in the House of Commons about the latest unemployment figures, he said he was not going to be panicked into an early reflation, and that after the so-called redeployment of labor he expected to see an unemployment figure of about 2%; i.e., roughly the present figure. This means that he expects the figures to rise higher than that in the interim. So that even after reflation of the economy Wilson expects to have a large body of workers jobless -- to serve as a counterweight in the labor market. Thus Wilson seems to have accepted a thesis that has been peddled for a number of years now by one Professor Paish, according to whom it is necessary to run the economy with some idle capacity and idle manpower to sustain growth.

This does not mean, of course, that the present situation in Britain points inevitably to a deepgoing slump. Nevertheless the elements making for such an eventuality are present in a way not seen since the end of the second world war. Much now depends on two factors: firstly, what happens in the U.S. economy, and secondly how soon the British government attempts to reflate.

However, even assuming that a full-scale slump is avoided and that only a recession, even if more deepgoing than others that have occurred since the war, hits Britain, should the government succeed in carrying through its present plans this will signify a qualitative change in class relations, a defeat for the working class.

It is very obvious that British capitalism cannot go on in the way it has in the last twenty years. To face up to its manifold problems -- balance of payments, sterling, declining share of world trade, slow growth rate, declining rate of profit, etc. -- one crucial problem must be faced up to first. That is a working class that has not been defeated and that has enjoyed modest prosperity for twenty years. This is the major task which the Wilson government has set for itself in the coming twelve months -- to break and tame this working class and at the end of the process to have recreated the reserve army of labor which will be used to limit future gains.

What remains to be seen is how the workers will react to this in the long run. At the moment the large majority of workers are still basically loyal to the Labour government, even if they feel bewildered and uncertain because "their" government is carrying out measures that the Tories would never have dared to. It is true that a number of unions have opposed the wage freeze right from the start; and this has helped the
morale of those workers who have spontaneously reacted against the present situation. However, this opposition by the T&GWU and ASSET has up to now been only half-hearted and formal.

An instance of this attitude can be seen in a recent strike. This took place when car delivery men employed by a Birmingham group of firms were told that half of them would be sacked. The T&GWU called an official strike and effectively stopped cars being moved from the plant at Longbridge. However, instead of calling out their members in the production plant they allowed them to continue working. This meant that the drivers strike was allowed to drag on for several weeks. Only when there was danger of the plant being shut down because cars could not be moved was a settlement reached.

The drivers did not gain an outright victory. The deal was to allow other firms, not involved in the strike, to move the cars. Meanwhile a number of strikers had drifted away to other jobs. When one or two of the smaller firms involved caved in this was hailed as a great victory because they agreed to take back those men who had not found other work.

Even more important for the labor movement as a whole has been the fact that Cousins, who resigned from Wilson's cabinet last July, has not come out for any general opposition to the government's policies. On the contrary, he has reiterated that he does not want to lead the left in such a struggle. This again has tended to disorient those rank and file workers who thought that Cousin's resignation meant that an effective leader had been gained for the left in the Labour party and the trade unions. Up to now this has not been the case. Cousins hung his clothes on a hickory limb but doesn't go near the water. His opposition has been very limited, purely on the trade-union level and within the limits of capitalism. His main argument against the wage freeze is that Britain's problems can be solved by increased productivity and that this is what the government should concentrate on.

This ambivalence is also reflected in Parliament, not only by Cousins but by all the so-called "lefts." When the latest unemployment figures were discussed, not one of them, Cousins included, voiced any protest. It was left to the Tories to capitalize on the situation with demagogic speeches. The Tories are even voting against standstill orders on wages that are being imposed under the Prices and Incomes Act. This is pure hypocrisy on their part, in reality they fully support the wage freeze but want to pick up some kudos by seeming to defend "freedom."

Tony Topham voiced a widespread sentiment among labor activists when he wrote in a letter to the Tribune: "The only way to change the Government's policy is to threaten a concerted vote against the monstrosities which are being perpetrated in our names. And to carry out the threat... Neither in sorrow nor in anger, but in cold blood, we are bound to ask are they aspiring 'statesmen' or leaders of the working class? How serious is their opposition? How effective do they want it to be?"

The appalling inactivity of Cousins and the other opposition union leaders and "left" M.P.'s is due to their very limited ideological basis. Contrary to what the sectarian ultralefts say, their position at present is not one of conscious betrayal; it arises from their inability to develop a program, one that is related to the struggles of the workers but that takes them outside the capitalist framework.

The task in this situation is not to shout rude names at these people; rather it is to advance a concrete program of action and policy for the whole labor movement in such a way that it will advance the level of the movement.

What would be wrong is to place any confidence in people like Cousins, Jenkins and the "left" M.P.'s, etc., to provide the basis for advancing such a program. They will do this only to the extent that a movement develops independently of them and becomes something they have to reckon with. In other words, the winning of such people to a program is incidental to the struggle for such a program, not the main task.

"CAPTURE" OF MONTES -- A CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY

Guatemalan government forces told the press November 30 that they had captured Cesar Montes, the leader of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeles, the previous day. Montes succeeded the well-known Luis Turcios as leader of the guerrilla group when the latter was killed in an automobile accident recently. On December 2, however, the Guatemalan government admitted that the man they had captured was not Cesar Montes. They claimed, by way of excuse, that he bore a "remarkable resemblance" to the head of the FAR.
SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT GIVES RISE TO A "THIRD CURRENT"

By Pierre Frank

Some new developments in the continuing crisis of the official Communist movement are worth noting in following the process of the decomposition of Stalinism.

The dominant element still remains the Sino-Soviet conflict. But it is evolving in a different way from the time when Khrushchev was in charge of the Kremlin. The elimination of Khrushchev marked, in a certain way, the high-water mark for the Chinese leadership, both in progress politically and in influence among the Communist parties and revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries.

Since then, the Sino-Soviet conflict has changed by and large from an ideological conflict between parties to a quarrel between governments, involving in the first place the policies to be followed in the war in Vietnam. The influence of the Chinese leadership has declined, due to its sectarian policies, without the Soviet leadership -- which has sought to skillfully exploit the situation -- being able to recover its position.

This was shown rather clearly at the congress of the Bulgarian Communist party which was just held at Sofia; and it will certainly also be the case at the Hungarian Communist party congress in Budapest.

The leadership of the Bulgarian Communist party, undoubtedly acting under the inspiration of the Soviet leadership, proposed holding an international conference of Communist parties, the principal object of which would obviously be to condemn and put a ban on the Chinese CP. The support given by Brezhnev to this proposal shows that the Soviet leaders who succeeded Khrushchev and who at the time reversed the machinery set in motion by Khrushchev for such a gathering, have given up hope of reaching an understanding with the Chinese leaders. Instead, they consider it necessary to resort to extreme measures in their effort to lessen the crisis, which is whipped up by the Chinese attacks, regardless of their content. The Chinese policies do not attract much sympathy today, but they greatly undermine the authority of the Kremlin.

How was the Bulgarian-Soviet proposal received? The Kremlin won the approval, as always, of the leaders of the French Communist party, the Czechs, etc., but resistance or opposition to the proposal was widespread. The Poles condemned the Chinese policies, but turned a deaf ear to the proposal. The Romanians flatly stated that so far as they were concerned any condemnation was out. The same for the Italian leadership. Likewise the Yugoslav leadership, which has not forgotten its experience with the Cominform.

Let us recall what has happened recently in what could be considered the pro-Chinese camp. The Indonesian Communist party suffered a defeat so bloody, a slaughter of such proportions, that it has been reduced to but a minor factor for some time to come. The Japanese Communist party at its recent congress officially took its distance from the Chinese Communist party. We do not have at hand the official declarations of the left-wing Indian Communist party, but it has recently been reported that it has sought rapprochement in actions with the right-wing Indian Communist party. Moreover, it should be remembered that the left-wing Indian Communist party was not a product of the Sino-Soviet crisis but of the long crisis that broke out in the Indian Communist party because of the policies it had followed since the country won independence in 1948, long before the Sino-Soviet dispute; and the left-wing Indian Communist party could never be considered to be a satellite of the Chinese Communist party. Finally, it should be noted that the leadership of the Albanian Communist party, even during its recent congress where a Chinese delegation was present, did not at all line up with Peking with regard to the "cultural revolution."

The most interesting new phenomenon in the crisis of the official Communist movement is the appearance of a kind of "third tendency," directed "against revisionism and against dogmatism." Its outline is clearly apparent. It consists of a bloc of parties and governments, including north Vietnam, north Korea and Cuba. North Vietnam, due to readily understandable reasons, is still rather discreet. While the Chinese and Soviet leaders accuse each other of the worst things in connection with the aid they have or have not given to Vietnam, Hanoi thanks both of them but says nothing more. And if it says nothing additional, it is obviously because it does not want the Sino-Soviet conflict transferred to Vietnamese soil through troops not under Vietnamese command.

The leaders of north Korea and Cuba, on the other hand, speak more openly. It is understandable that they, more than any of the others, are sensitive to the American escalation in Vietnam. They will be among the first next victims in case the Vietnamese
revolution is defeated; and they do not have the advantage of offering Washington a problem of the size of China. Quite recently in Pyongyang, President Dorticós of Cuba, and Premier Kim Il Sung, took a joint public stand [see World Outlook November 18] which by implication condemned the policy of the Soviet government in according such feeble aid to Vietnam and condemned the policy of the Chinese government in rejecting a united front on this question.

What is most interesting in this demonstration, so far as Cuba is concerned, is that it accompanies or follows other statements of position that clarify the attitude of the Fidelist leadership on some of the points which were brought into question by the speech made by Castro at the beginning of the year at the close of the Tricontinental Conference. At the time, Castro's attack against the Chinese on the one hand and Trotskyism on the other raised the question -- has Castro lined up with Moscow?

We will not take up here the motives that led Castro to attack Trotskyism; we said from the beginning that we did not think he did it in order to serve Moscow, which in any case is unable today to use slanders against the Trotskyist movement scavenged from Stalin's time. But one could quite legitimately wonder if Castro had not gone over completely to Moscow. For some months it has been clear that Castro did not line up with Moscow and that he has even become all the more aroused in view of the frustration to the hopes he entertained at the time of the Tricontinental.

At that conference, the resolution on Latin America and the body which it set up to assure solidarity in action was based on a revolutionary line. But upon returning home, the old leaders of the Latin American Communist parties (Argentina, Chile, and also Venezuela, where the guerrilla fighters were disavowed in fact) continued as if the conference had not taken place, pursuing the policy of "peaceful coexistence" and the "peaceful road" to socialism.

Under various guises, the Cuban press has been attacking these pseudo revolutionists, these fake revolutionists, to call them by the right name. Pablo Neruda came under attack from the Cuban writers and artists because of his equivocal attitude in the United States. [See World Outlook September 9.] The Cuban government has not hidden its feelings over the $100,000,000 granted by the Soviet government to the military regime in Brazil. In addition, the Yugoslavs have come under sharp attack for the support they have accorded the Christian Democrat Frei in Chile. [See World Outlook April 22 and April 29.] Finally, quite recently, Granma, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Cuba, carried a criticism of the Indonesian Communist party for stopping midway on the road to revolution, thus contributing to its heavy defeat.

This "third current" has only begun to come forward. For these small countries, the identification of the party with the state, which is general among the workers states, constitutes a handicap in giving expression to their differences with the leaders of the big Chinese and Soviet states. But in view of the fact that their position constitutes a development in the direction of a revolutionary orientation, particularly in the burning question of the day, what to do about helping Vietnam, it cannot fail to have repercussions. It will contribute to preventing the shipwreck in sight on the course now being followed by the two giants of the official Communist movement.

November 27, 1966

FORBES BURNHAM SEEKS DICTATORIAL LAW IN GUYANA

Forbes Burnham, the prime minister of Guyana, is seeking to get a "Preventive Detention Act" passed by Parliament that would give his regime virtually dictatorial powers. In demanding the law, Burnham claimed that the measure would not be as tough as the law used by the Indian government to jail political opponents, but he admitted that it would give him power, if passed, "to detain troublemakers without due process for as long as three months."

Dr. Cheddi B. Jagan, who heads the opposition, said in an interview November 21: "The Preventive Detention Act, or whatever they call it, only proves Mr. Burnham's intentions to become a strongman. The bill is a blatant incursion into the democratic rights of the Guyanese people. I shouldn't be surprised if it is followed by an anti-strike labor act." Jagan also said, "You see, Mr. Burnham is in a bind. He has changed masters -- from London to Washington. His government is bankrupt in ideas, although he has far greater freedom of action than I had under colonial rule."
TRUJILLO GANG MAKING COMEBACK IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Under a Santo Domingo dateline, the Toronto Daily Star published an informative report on recent political developments in the Dominican Republic. The gist of the article, written by Norman Gall, is that the island is reverting to a situation similar to the one under Trujillo.

"A resurgence of police brutality and military authority has followed the evacuation two months ago of the foreign troops, mainly American, who occupied the country for 14 months under the auspices of the Organization of American States," he writes.

"New political factions have emerged within the armed forces, similar to the military conspiracies which led to the April 1965 explosion."

Gall notes that "The slum dwellers of Santo Domingo, who defeated crack tank and infantry units during the revolt, still have thousands of arms hidden."

"Many," he continues, "are frightened and angry about the beatings, deaths and disappearances in recent months of members of the rebel forces who fought in the streets last year for the return of deposed President Juan Bosch."

After losing in the election held under the bayonets of foreign troops, Bosch suffered swift eclipse. "He is expected to leave soon for an indefinite voluntary exile in Spain, a decision bitterly criticized within his own Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD)."

Sharp divisions have been developing in the PRD, and the "moderates" have been resigning under pressure from the rank and file who favor a militant line. The latest resignation was that of José Rafael Molina Urena November 17. President of the chamber of deputies during the Bosch regime, he was named provisional president during the 1965 uprising but sought diplomatic asylum when it looked like the revolt might collapse.

"Bosch," the Star correspondent writes, "has been a restraining influence over the angry slum dwellers who follow him, especially in the tense days following the June election when the PRD rank and file believed itself cheated of victory through fraudulent counting of the ballots."

"His counsels against resumption of street violence have been one of the principal underpinnings of political stability supporting the five-month-old Balaguer regime."

Gall quotes a PRD slum dweller who was in command of a machine-gun post during the 1965 uprising. "The police are searching our houses for guns and commit fewer abuses than in the past while doing so, but...people are getting killed mysteriously and are disappearing for good after their arrest by police.

"The people want to fight again because they don't want to be killed this way."

"In the April revolution we did not go into the rich people's houses and into the main street stores to loot the nice things we want."

"Next time it will be different. Juan Bosch's departure will free the people to fight again. His presence is the only barrier to renewing the revolution."

A "moderate" PRD leader is quoted by Gall as saying, "The country by now has left Juan Bosch behind. The people are now looking for a leader with a larger pair of pants."

As for the Balaguer regime, Norman Gall indicates its rightward drift:

"The old curse of Dominican militarism has been revived with the frictions within the military establishment."

"General Neit Rafael Nevar Seijas, head of a group of army generals who pushed hard for Balaguer's return to the presidency after Bosch's 1963 ouster, has become chief of the presidential guard."

"He is a principal palace figure in the effort to control the air force generals and colonels at the San Isidro air force base outside Santo Domingo."

"The key tank and infantry units at San Isidro, which used to exercise decisive
military influence in national politics, have been dispersed throughout the country. But they are still commanded by officers believed loyal to General Elías Wessin y Wessin, the exiled San Isidro commander who ordered the bombing of Santo Domingo during the 1965 revolution.

"Anti-Balaguer right wing elements have been pressuring heavily for Wessin's return from his Miami exile, where he has been in close touch with the exiled figures of the Cuba Batista dictatorship.

"United States military advisers, always influential in the internal politics of the Dominican armed forces, have been organizing another elite military unit, highly trained in counter-insurgency and riot control techniques, to replace the dispersed San Isidro ground units.

"The new unit is being organized along the lines of the elite presidential guard of the deposed Diem regime of South Viet Nam, with U.S. officers serving in advisory roles at all command levels.

"Earlier this week former police chief General Belisario Peguero Guerrero, who became a millionaire following Bosch's 1963 ouster through contraband imports of liquor and electrical appliances and who symbolized police abuses that generated popular resentment before the revolution, returned to the republic amid great publicity."

"Balaguer," reports Gall, "has surrounded himself with a kitchen cabinet of former Trujillo politicians -- judges, cabinet ministers, congressmen and governors during the long dictatorship.

"Other leading figures of the Trujillo era have also returned to public life.

"One of these is Colonel Nin Melo, formerly of Trujillo's dread Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM), later implicated in illegal drug traffic and now head of the secret service of the national police.

"Another is Colonel Soto Echavarría, the last chief of the SIM, who was incorporated into the police in 1965 by Balisario Peguero and recently promoted to full colonel by Balaguer.

"Another is Tadeo Guerrero, who terrorized the populations of several interior towns during the Trujillo era and last month was also promoted to full colonel."

Gall tells about an incident indicating the way the political wind is blowing in the Dominican Republic today:

"A week ago police Colonel Cesar Nicolas Ramirez Alcantara, another killer of the Trujillo era, became drunk in the home of relatives.

"He became enraged as he announced that money was missing from his pockets and taking a submachine gun, shot two persons dead and critically wounded another.

"Ramirez Alcantara continued his regular functions pending investigation.

"The police public relations chief denied that the colonel would be summarily dismissed, saying that such dismissals under these circumstances occur only in the cases of enlisted personnel."

NASSER DEFIES RETALIATION IN SCORING U.S. ON VIETNAM POLICY

In a speech delivered in Cairo November 24, President Gamal Abdel Nasser scored Washington's policies in Vietnam. He characterized the war there as a "tragedy whose horror surpasses any humanly conceivable horror." The head of the United Arab Republic demanded that the United States stop its bombing of north Vietnam and withdraw its troops.

Nasser revealed that his own government had been subjected to heavy pressure from Washington to cease and desist in saying anything critical about the United States. The pressure is of the most brutal kind; namely, cutting off food shipments to the Egyptian people. "American policy has chosen to suspend this arrangement," Nasser said, "and our first duty is to prove to those who want to put pressure on us that we can rely on ourselves and can follow an independent road and bear its consequences."
ERNEST TATE APPEALS FOR SUPPORT AGAINST INTIMIDATION BY HEALYITES

In a letter which he sent to the press of the labor movement November 20, Ernest Tate provides further details of the circumstances in which he was set upon by a gang of young toughs at the entrance to a Socialist Labour League meeting in London at Caxton Hall on November 17. [See World Outlook December 2.]

The meeting, he reports, had been scheduled by the SLL to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the uprising of the Hungarian workers against bureaucratic misrule. He arrived early in order to offer Trotskyist literature for sale at the entrance. The two items which he thought would prove of particular interest were the International Socialist Review and a pamphlet, Healy "Reconstructs" the Fourth International. Others were also present at the entrance selling various publications. These included a group of Irish Communists and a partisan of the English Militant.

Tate found himself singled out for special attention by supporters of the SLL and was subjected to some heckling. He did not mind this, however, as no one sought to prevent him from continuing to hawk his literature.

About one-half hour later, Gerry Healy, the general secretary of the SLL, accompanied by Michael Banda another top leader of the SLL arrived. They went inside.

A few moments later, Healy appeared at the entrance.

As if they had been given a signal, six or seven individuals known by Tate to be supporters of the SLL, attacked him in gang fashion.

"My literature was knocked from my hands," he writes; "I was punched and thrown to the ground, my glasses were smashed, and as I lay on the ground I was kicked repeatedly in the groin and stomach.

"After the attack I had to attend the casualty department of the Middlesex Hospital and I was forced to stay in bed for the greater part of the next day. At the moment of writing I am still badly bruised."

As to the reason for the attack, Ernest Tate offers the following opinion: "The issue is a simple one. The Socialist Labour League leadership hope by their actions to prevent me selling my literature outside their meetings. They hope to take away my freedom of speech. This attack comes after a number of threats against me and my friends by members and supporters of the Socialist Labour League. At Brighton during the Labour Party Conference, my comrades were physically threatened and prevented from selling our literature. The same was true at the recent antiwar demonstration in Liège, Belgium, where I was threatened."

Tate ends his letter by declaring that he refuses to be intimidated. "Neither a fascist Mosley nor an ultraleft sectarian Gerry Healy, who imagines himself to be a Trotskyist should be allowed to curtail our democratic rights. I intend to be present at the next public meeting of the Socialist Labour League to sell my literature. I ask for full support from all people on the left to ensure I do it without interference from the misguided followers of Gerry Healy."

YOUNG CANADIAN SOCIALISTS EXPRESS SOLIDARITY WITH ERNEST TATE

[The following is the text of a letter sent to Ernest Tate, who was attacked by a gang at the entrance of a meeting of the Socialist Labour League November 17 and beaten for attempting to sell Trotskyist literature to those going inside. The Healy referred to in the letter is the general secretary of the SLL.]

***

Toronto, Ontario
November 22, 1966

Dear Ernie:

On behalf of the Editorial Board of Young Socialist Forum, we extend our firm support in the face of the attack made upon you.

There can be no greater testimony to the accuracy and strength of the ideas of
revolutionary Marxism which you are working to spread in Britain than the hysterical opposition they arouse among our opponents. Unable to deal politically with our analysis, our program, they resort to physical violence of the vilest kind.

It is significant that Healy's band of sectarian Stalinophobes are found resorting to the very tactics the Stalinists used against our movement in the thirties.

We know that on your recovery you will continue the struggle for Trotskyism in Britain, and that this struggle will be victorious. The gangster tactics of the Healyites will in the end contribute to their downfall.

For International Socialism,

Yours fraternally,
John Riddell, Editor
Ian Angus, Managing Editor
YOUNG SOCIALIST FORUM

INDIA'S Famine IS JOHNSON'S OPPORTUNITY

Last February 14, the House Committee on Agriculture opened hearings in Washington on President Johnson's "Food for Freedom" program. The main point on the agenda was the rising threat of mass starvation on the Indian subcontinent.

Dr. Roger Revelle, director of the Harvard Center for Population Studies, painted a dark picture, stating that "it is almost certain that tens of millions of people will starve" in the famine "and there will be millions of deaths that would otherwise not occur."

"The saddest part of the story is that it may be too late for us and the other rich countries to help very much," he continued. "My recent experiences in India have filled me with a great personal concern about the desperate conditions that our fellow human beings face today in that deeply impoverished country."

President Johnson got into the act by revealing to the press that he was considering calling an international conference to develop and coordinate greater famine relief efforts for India. He said that he was even considering asking for special emergency legislation, presumably to help India pay the shipping costs for U.S. wheat.

A typical response by generous-hearted Uncle Sam to a despairing plea from abroad? No doubt. It was also typical in another way. On November 29 in New Delhi, outraged members of Parliament rose one after another to denounce Johnson for delaying the grain shipments.

It appears there were certain strings attached. The Johnson administration wants bigger opportunities in India for American oil companies to build fertilizer plants. Johnson wants the so-called "surplus" states in India to ship food to the newly stricken areas. Above all, Johnson is fuming over the temerity of the Indian government in calling for a halt to the bombing of north Vietnam.

And so speaker after speaker in the Indian Parliament rose to denounce the freeze on grain shipments, to accuse Johnson of using improper pressures on the Indian government and to accuse Indian officials of not showing a proper feeling of "insult and national humiliation" over Johnson's blackmail tactics.

Even the New York Times felt that Johnson had been a bit too blatant in the way he had sought to advance his policies in India. To interrupt the grain shipment in mid-December, "just as famine threatens and critical elections approach," said the big New York daily editorially, "is a serious error." While the newspaper found extenuating circumstances in the depletion of American grain reserves and failure to increase crop acreage soon enough, still this was "not sufficient excuse for the tough tactics now being followed in the Indian crisis."

The grimmest note, however, is the fact that even last February Dr. Revelle felt that "it may already be too late" to prevent starvation in India.

The Johnson administration might ponder Dr. Revelle's additional comment: "A livable world cannot long exist in which two-thirds of human beings never get enough to eat, and the remaining third are overfed."
ARGENTINE BOURGEOIS NEWSPAPER LABELS CASTRO A "TROTSKYIST"

Last January at the close of the Tricontinental Conference, Fidel Castro opened an attack on "Trotskyism" in which he used terms that might have been dug up from the days of the Moscow Trials. Now, by an ironic twist, he himself has been labeled a "Trotskyist" by one of the most staid newspapers in Argentina, La Nación. In an editorial in the November 19 issue, this voice of the Argentine bourgeoisie declares:

"The official voice of Castroism, the Havana daily Granma, recently celebrated the anniversary of the coup through which Lenin took power in Russia by devoting a specially significant editorial to it. In addition to the usual dithyrambs to the Soviet chiefs, the article advances the old arguments praising an armed Communist insurrection in Latin America. Although the journal expounds its theses in conformity with the strictest orthodox Trotskyism -- since all it does is present the thesis of 'permanent revolution' with slight variations taking into account regional perspectives -- the doctrinal juggling and pretentious theoretical babbling seek to make Lenin look something like a prophetic apostle for the coming of Fidel Castro."

That the Argentine bourgeoisie should indicate their fear of the specter of Trotskyism in Latin America is quite understandable. It is also understandable why they see a connection between the Russian Revolution and the Cuban Revolution. What is not so clear is why the Cuban leaders recognize the threads connecting them with 1917 but continue to reject and even to denounce Trotskyism. In view of this what can the editors of Granma say in response to La Nación? Isn't it rather embarrassing to just remain silent?

STATEMENT OF AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL

[As reported previously in World Outlook, the International War Crimes Tribunal, which was initiated by Bertrand Russell, met in London November 13-16 to complete preliminary work and lay the basis for a thoroughgoing inquiry into the criminal aspects of the war in Vietnam. The group of intellectuals, public figures and legal experts who have joined the Tribunal include Jean-Paul Sartre, Vladimir Dedijer, Isaac Deutscher, Mehmet Ali Ayaş, Mahmud Ali Pasuri, former President Lázaro Cárdenas, David Dellinger and Stokely Carmichael.

[At its first press conference, held in London November 16, the Tribunal issued a statement defining its aims and the scope of its inquiry. The following is the text of this statement.]

..."

The conscience of mankind is profoundly disturbed by the war being waged in Vietnam. It is a war in which the world's wealthiest and most powerful state is opposed to a nation of poor peasants, who have been fighting for their independence for a quarter of a century. It appears that this war is being waged in violation of international law and custom.

Every day, the world press and, particularly, that of the United States, publishes reports which, if proved, would represent an ever-growing violation of the principles established by the Nuremberg Tribunal and rules fixed by international agreements.

Moved and shocked by the suffering endured by the Vietnamese people and convinced that humanity must know the truth in order to deliver a serious and impartial judgment on the events taking place in Vietnam and where the responsibility for them lies, we have accepted the invitation of Bertrand Russell to meet, in order to examine these facts scrupulously and confront them with the rules of law which govern them.

It has been alleged that in the first nine months of 1966, the air force of the United States has dropped, in Vietnam, four million pounds of bombs daily. If it continues at this rate to the end of the year, the total will constitute a greater mass of explosives than it unloaded on the entire Pacific theater during the whole of the Second World War. The area bombarded in this way is no bigger than the states of New York and Pennsylvania.

In the south, the U.S. forces and their docile Saigon allies have herded eight million people, peasants and their families, into barbed wire encampments under the surveillance of the political police. Chemical poisons have been, and are being, used to defoliate and render barren tens of thousands of acres of farmland. Crops are being
systematically destroyed -- and this in a country where, even in normal times, the average man or woman eats less than half the food consumed by the average American (and lives to less than one third of his age).

Irrigation systems are deliberately disrupted. Napalm, phosphorus bombs and a variety of other, sadistically designed and hitherto unknown weapons are being used against the population of both north and south Vietnam. More than five hundred thousand Vietnamese men, women and children have perished under this onslaught, more than the number of soldiers the United States lost in both world wars, although the population of Vietnam had already been decimated during the Japanese and French occupations and the famine which followed the Second World War.

Even though we have not been entrusted with this task by any organized authority, we have taken the responsibility in the interest of humanity and the preservation of civilization. We act on our own accord, in complete independence from any government and any official or semiofficial organization, in the firm belief that we express a deep anxiety and remorse felt by many of our fellow humans in many countries. We trust that our action will help to arouse the conscience of the world.

We, therefore, consider ourselves a Tribunal which, even if it has not the power to impose sanctions, will have to answer, amongst others, the following questions:

1. Has the United States government (and the governments of Australia, New Zealand and South Korea) committed acts of aggression according to international law?

2. Has the American army made use of or experimented with new weapons or weapons forbidden by the laws of war (gas, special chemical products, napalm, etc.)?

3. Has there been bombardment of targets of a purely civilian character, for example hospitals, schools, sanatoria, dams, etc., and on what scale has this occurred?

4. Have Vietnamese prisoners been subjected to inhuman treatment forbidden by the laws of war and, in particular, to torture or to mutilation? Have there been unjustified reprisals against the civilian population, in particular, the execution of hostages?

5. Have forced labor camps been created, has there been deportation of the population or other acts tending to the extermination of the population and which can be characterized juridically as acts of genocide?

If the Tribunal decides that one, or all, of these crimes have been committed, it will be up to the Tribunal to decide who bears the responsibility for them.

This Tribunal will examine all the evidence that may be placed before it by any source or party. The evidence may be oral, or in the form of documents. No evidence relevant to our purposes will be refused attention. No witness competent to testify about the events with which our enquiry is concerned will be denied a hearing.

The National Liberation Front of Vietnam and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have assured us of their willingness to cooperate, to provide the necessary information, and to help us in checking the accuracy and reliability of the information. The Cambodian head of state, Prince Sihanouk, has similarly offered to help by the production of evidence. We trust that they will honor this pledge and we shall gratefully accept their help, without prejudice to our own views or attitude. We renew, as a Tribunal, the appeal which Bertrand Russell has addressed in his name to the government of the United States. We invite the government of the United States to present evidence or cause it to be presented, and to instruct their officials or representatives to appear and state their case. Our purpose is to establish, without fear or favor, the full truth about this war. We sincerely hope that our efforts will contribute to the world's justice, to the reestablishment of peace and the liberation of the oppressed peoples.

* * *

Resolution of the Tribunal:

We are grateful to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for the work which it has already done. We are sure that the preliminary steps already taken by it will help us to complete our task within a reasonable time and with considerable more efficiency than it would have been possible if its preliminary work had not helped our deliberations.
LIDIYA CHUKOVSKAYA'S LETTER TO MIKHAIL SHOLOKOV

[The texts of two noteworthy documents, drawn up by Soviet writers in behalf of Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel, who were convicted last February of maligning the Soviet Union and given sentences of seven and five years respectively, have been released in English translations by Harvill Press, a London publishing concern. Given to the press in New York by Harper & Row, the documents were printed in The New York Times November 19.

[The first document is a petition addressed to the presidium of the Twenty-third Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The petition was signed by 62 writers, including Ilya Ehrenburg. They offered to serve as "surety" for the two condemned authors so that they would not have to go to prison. The petition, submitted at the time of the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel, was ignored by Moscow officials.

[The second document is a letter written by Lidiya K. Chukovskaya, a literary critic and daughter of Kornei I. Chukovsky, who is one of the most respected literary figures in the Soviet Union. The 84-year-old Chukovsky, as well as his daughter, signed the petition asking for the release of Sinyavsky and Daniel. Lidiya K. Chukovskaya sent her letter to a number of literary organizations and publications and the editors of Izvestia and Pravda. All of them ignored it.

[Because of the mood revealed by the letter, which is addressed to Mikhail Sholokov, author of And Quiet Flows the Don, and which undoubtedly reflects the feelings and views of broad circles of intellectuals in the Soviet Union, we are reprinting the full text below.]

***

When you spoke at the 23rd party congress, Mikhail Alexandrovich, you went to the rostrum not as a private person but as "a spokesman for Soviet literature."

You thereby made it legitimate for every writer, including me, to pass judgment about the things you said supposedly in the name of all of us. Your speech at the congress really can be called "historical." In the whole history of Russian culture I know of no other case of a writer publicly expressing regret, as you have done, not at the harshness of a sentence but at its leniency.

Furthermore, you were upset not only by the sentence -- you also did not like the actual court proceedings in the case of the writers Daniel and Sinyavsky. You found them too pedantic, too legalistic. You would have liked it better if the court had tried these two Soviet citizens unhampered by the legal code, if it had been guided not by the law but by its "sense of rough justice." I was staggered by this suggestion, and I have good reason to believe that I am not alone in this. Stalin's contempt for the law cost our people millions of innocent victims. Persistent attempts to return to the rule of law, to strict observance of the spirit and letter of Soviet law and the progress made in this, constitute the most precious achievement of our country during the last ten years. But this is the very achievement of which you wish to rob the people!

True, in your speech at the Congress you held up as a model to the court not the comparatively recent period in which Soviet laws were infringed wholesale, but a more distant time when law and the legal code had not yet come into existence: "the memorable twenties." The first Soviet legal code was introduced in 1922. The years 1917-1922 are memorable for their heroism and grandeur, but they were not distinguished by their respect for the rule of law, as could scarcely be expected, since the old order had been destroyed while the new one was still in its infancy.

The habit of trying people on the basis of "rough justice" was fitting and natural during the Civil War, in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, but there is absolutely no justification for it on the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Soviet regime. Who benefits from and what is the point of a return to "rough justice" -- that is, in effect, to the rule of instinct -- when laws have been established? And who exactly do you dream of having tried by this particularly severe procedure, which operates outside the framework of the legal code, and was applied in the "memorable twenties"? Primarily the writers...For a long time now, Mikhail Alexandrovich, you have been in the habit in your articles and public speeches of talking about writers with scorn and crude mockery. This time you have surpassed yourself. These sentences of five and seven years' penal servitude on two intellectuals, two writers, neither of whom enjoys good health -- that is, sentences, in effect, to illness and perhaps death --
seem to you to be too light. You seem to think that a court which would have tried them not in accordance with the criminal code, but in a quicker and more straightforward manner, would have devised a stern punishment, and you would have welcomed this.

Here are your actual words:

"If these fellows with their black consciences had been caught in the memorable twenties, when people were tried not on the basis of closely defined articles of the criminal code, but 'in accordance with the revolutionary sense of justice,' then, my goodness, they would have got something quite different, these turncoats! And then, if you please, people talk about the sentences being too harsh."

Yes, Mikhail Alexandrovich, together with many Communists of Italy, France, England, Norway, Sweden, Denmark (whom in your speech you call for some reason "bourgeois defenders" of the condemned men), together with left-wing organizations in the West, I, a Soviet writer, take it on myself to talk about the uncalled for, completely unjustified harshness of the sentence. You said in your speech that you were ashamed for those who tried to get a pardon for them by offering to vouch for their good conduct. But, quite frankly, I am ashamed not for them and for myself, but for you. By this plea they were following the fine tradition of Soviet and pre-Soviet Russian literature, whereas you, by your speech, have cut yourself off from this tradition. It was in the "memorable twenties," that is, from 1917 to 1922, at the height of the Civil War, when people were judged in accordance with a "sense of justice," that Maxim Gorky brought all the weight of his authority to bear not only to save writers from cold and hunger, but also to save them from prison and deportation. He wrote dozens of letters of intercession and, thanks to him, many writers returned to their writing desks. This tradition -- the tradition of interceding for people -- is nothing new in Russia, and our intelligentsia is rightly proud of it. The greatest of our poets, Alexander Pushkin, prided himself that "for mercy on the fallen I have called!" In a letter to Suvorin, who in his paper had dared to blacken Zola, the defender of Dreyfus, Chekhov said: "Even supposing Dreyfus were guilty, Zola would still be right, because it is the business of writers not to accuse or prosecute, but to intercede even for the guilty, once they have been condemned and are undergoing punishment...There are enough accusers and prosecutors as it is."

"It is the business of writers not to prosecute but to intercede..."

This is what we are taught by Russian literature in the person of its best representatives. This is the tradition you have breached by loudly regretting that the sentence was not harsh enough.

Just consider for a moment the meaning of Russian literature.

The books of the great Russian writers have always taught and still teach us to look not in an oversimplified way, but deeply and subtly, armed with social and psychological insight, at the complex causes of human error, misconduct, crime and delinquency. The humanizing message of Russian literature is indeed to be found mainly in this quality of understanding. Think of Dostoyevsky's book about penal servitude, "Notes From the House of the Dead," and Tolstoy's novel about prison, "Resurrection." Both writers were passionately concerned to plumb the depths of man's soul, human destiny and social conditions. It was not in order to pronounce a further condemnation on men already condemned that Chekhov made his heroic journey to the island of Sakhalin, and the book he wrote about it had great depth. Last but not least, think of "And Quiet Flows the Don": with what concern the author treats the mistakes, misdeeds and even counterrevolutionary crimes committed by his heroes, with what depth of understanding for the enormous social changes taking place in the country and for the slightest impulses of the bewildered human soul. It was startling to hear the author of "And Quiet Flows the Don" reduce a complicated human situation to the simplest and most elementary terms by asking the crude question which you addressed to the delegates of the Soviet Army: "What would you have done if traitors had been found in one of your detachments?" This is nothing less than a call for drumhead justice in peacetime! Why bother, after all, to wonder which article of the criminal code Sinyavsky and Daniel had infringed, why try to figure out which sides of our recent history had been satirized in their books, what events had led them to take up the pen and what factors in our life had made it impossible for them to publish in their own country? Who cares about psychological and social analysis? Put them up against the wall! Shoot them within 24 hours!

To listen to you, one might think that the condemned men had been distributing anti-Soviet leaflets or proclamations, or that they had sent abroad not works of fiction but the blueprints for a fortress or a factory at the very least...By reducing complex propositions to simple ones, by bandying around the word "treason" in such an unworthy manner you have once again, Mikhail Alexandrovich, been false to the writer's duty of constantly explaining and bringing home to everybody the complexity and contradictory
nature of the literary and historical process, instead of playing with words, thus deliberately and maliciously oversimplifying the case.

On the surface, the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel was held with due regard to the legal formalities. For you this is a fault, and for me it is a good feature. Yet, even so, I protest against the sentence pronounced by the court.

Why?

Because Sinyavsky's and Daniel's committal to trial was in itself illegal.

Because a book, a piece of fiction, a story, a novel in brief, a work of literature -- whether good or bad, talented or untalented, truthful or untruthful -- cannot be tried in any court, criminal, military or civil, except the court of literature. A writer, like any other Soviet citizen, can and should be tried by a criminal court for any misdemeanor he may have committed, but not for his books. Literature does not come under the jurisdiction of the criminal court. Ideas should be fought with ideas, not with camps and prisons.

This is what you should have said to your listeners if you had really gone to the rostrum as a spokesman of Soviet literature.

But you spoke as a renegade from it. Your shameful speech will not be forgotten by history.

And literature will take its own vengeance, as it always takes vengeance on those who betray the duty imposed by it. It has condemned you to the worst sentence to which an artist can be condemned -- to creative sterility. And neither honors nor money nor prizes, given at home or abroad, can turn this judgment from your head.

Lidiya Chukovskaya

A NEW BIBLE OF REVISIONISM

A book that really speaks volumes about trends in the Communist parties of Western Europe has appeared in Sweden.

Entitled The Road for the Left in Sweden, the book was written by Carl Henrik Hermansson, who has served as chairman of the Swedish Communist party since 1964. Under his guidance, the party has gained a reputation among CP circles internationally for a policy that is more "adapted" to present conditions in Sweden.

It is sufficient to skim through the book to see that the "adaptation" is not exactly in a revolutionary direction. Under cover of being realistic, the Swedish Communist party is developing a policy that makes Togliatti's class collaborationism seem ultra-left.

According to Hermansson, the state apparatus must not be broken up and replaced with something qualitatively different; it must not even be transformed!

He actually writes as follows: "In a society that reaches the critical stage between monopoly capitalism and socialism and in which the workers and employees represent the majority of the population and in which the workers movement holds a majority in parliament and in the administration, the state apparatus must be utilized to break up the economic positions of big finance capital and to transform society in a socialist direction."

Thus Hermansson takes the same position as the Social Democrats for whom "political democracy" merely needs "completing" with "economic democracy."

As for the state apparatus, it "must be democratized in the following way: the cadres in the state apparatus must be replaced in such a way that they correspond more or less to the social composition of the population. This also means that the top posts must be occupied mostly by functionaries who were formerly wage workers."

As can be seen it all boils down to the question of voting for the best man for the job.