A Trotskyist Current among the Contending Forces in China?

A few meager words in a January 22 Agence France Presse dispatch from Peking offer striking evidence of the difficulties facing those seeking to determine the variety of currents involved in the political crisis in China, their real objectives and the social forces they represent.

Wall posters, pasted up the previous night, attacked various officials. "One," said the dispatch, "was Kang Sheng, a man who was hoisted to the top of the power pyramid by the cultural revolution. He was made a member of the Standing Committee of the party's Politburo only last August. He was accused of protecting a Trotskyite student, Tan Li-fu, arrested in December."

Among the puzzling questions raised by this report, the most interesting involve the possible reasons as to why Kang Sheng was singled out as a target. Despite the dispatch it is not known for certain that he is a member of the Standing Committee although this seems highly likely in view of his prominence. But the list of members of this body has not yet been announced. In any case, Kang Sheng is one of the architects of the "cultural revolution." Does this attack mean that he is now being purged? What is the source of the fire being directed at him? Is a new group in the Red Guards making itself felt in this way? One was the wall bulletin the work of Liu Shao-chi's followers, part of an effort to discredit Kang Sheng by starting a rumor that he is guilty of maintaining "Trotskyite" connections?

An even more interesting question is the identity of the student Tan Li-fu. Is he a real Trotskyist?

The Trotskyist movement in China, which began when some of the founders of the Chinese Communist party assessed the lessons of the revolution of 1925-27, was deeply rooted in the working class, particularly in cities like Shanghai. With the victory of the revolution in 1949 under the impact of the vast peasant upheaval, the Chinese
A few meager words in a January 22 Agence France Presse dispatch from Peking offer striking evidence of the difficulties facing those seeking to determine the variety of currents involved in the political crisis in China, their real objectives and the social forces they represent.

Wall posters, pasted up the previous night, attacked various officials. "One," said the dispatch, "was Kang Sheng, a man who was hoisted to the top of the power pyramid by the cultural revolution. He was made a member of the Standing Committee of the party's Politburo only last August. He was accused of protecting a Trotskyite student, Tan Li-fu, arrested in December."

Among the puzzling questions raised by this report, the most interesting involve the possible reasons as to why Kang Sheng was singled out as a target. Despite the dispatch it is not known for certain that he is a member of the Standing Committee although this seems highly likely in view of his prominence. But the list of members of this body has not yet been announced. In any case, Kang Sheng is one of the architects of the "cultural revolution." Does this attack mean that he is now being purged? What is the source of the fire being directed at him? Is a new group in the Red Guards making itself felt in this way? Or was the wall bulletin the work of Liu Shao-chi's followers, part of an effort to discredit Kang Sheng by starting a rumor that he is guilty of maintaining "Trotskyite" connections?

An even more interesting question is the identity of the student Tan Li-fu. Is he a real Trotskyist?

The Trotskyist movement in China, which began when some of the founders of the Chinese Communist party assessed the lessons of the revolution of 1925-27, was deeply rooted in the working class, particularly in cities like Shanghai. With the victory of the revolution in 1949 under the impact of the vast peasant upheaval, the Chinese...
Terrorists sought to work with the new regime. Mao's policy, however, was to liquidate them. They were rounded up wherever they could be found and imprisoned. The fate of most of them is unknown. Some who were reportedly released have not been heard from since. Others are still in prison.

As a political tendency the Chinese Trotskyist movement has been compelled to remain underground. Whether their small forces have begun to expand on any scale is not known. Their program is to defend the conquests of the revolution by opposing bureaucratic privileges and excesses, by fighting for proletarian democracy, and by extending the revolution internationally.

But "Trotskyism" has also cropped up occasionally in the Sino-Soviet dispute, each of the two sides accusing the other of being guilty of "Trotskyism" or of playing into the hands of Trotskyism.

Thus the student Tan Li-fu may not be a genuine Trotskyist but only a student on whom this label was attached. However, if this is the case, it does not settle the matter. What are his views? Why was he smeared with the most terrible epithet in the lexicon of the Maoists, Khrushchevists and all those formed in the school of Stalinism?

If the answers to these and similar questions could be found, much would become clarified about the "cultural revolution." But the chances of getting correct answers at present are not very good in view of the censorship, the monopoly of the press by Mao's faction and the deliberate obscuring of issues that has been characteristic of all sectors of the ruling circle under the antidemocratic Mao regime.

The episode involving the "Trotskyite student, Tan Li-fu, arrested in December" for unknown reasons remains a tantalizing mystery as does the report that he was protected by a high official, one of the initiators of the "cultural revolution."

Despite Mao's policy of maintaining tight secrecy over the real course of events, his own press has been compelled to indicate a number of revealing facts. The wall bulletins that appeared in Peking January 7 reporting that disturbances had broken out in Shanghai at the end of December of such sharp nature as to cause suspension of all rail traffic to Nanking have been officially confirmed. The turmoil in Shanghai did not recede until around January 15, when Hung Chi claimed in an editorial that the opposition had been crushed in Shanghai and a new turning point had been reached in the "cultural revolution."

The most recent dispatches sent out by Hsinhua, the official Chinese news agency, have provided fresh material on what motivated the workers in opposing the sectors of the Red Guards under Maoist control or in taking the propaganda about the "cultural revolution" at face value and going into action to carry it out through strikes, demonstrations and sending delegations to Peking.

A January 19 dispatch from Shanghai indicates that considerable panic occurred at one point. We are told that "landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, rightists and some other people with ulterior motives spread rumours to create confusion among the public, resulting in rush buying of daily necessities and abnormal pressure on the supply of commodities."

A "big drain of state finances" occurred when local officials allegedly "tried to shift the general orientation of struggle" (meaning that misunderstandings spread among the people as to the true aims of the "cultural revolution"). A "handful of persons encouraged promotions, pay increases and the granting of other material benefits in an attempt to demoralise the revolutionary workers and turn their serious political struggle into an economic struggle." From this it is clear that the workers thought the "cultural revolution" meant they could advance their own economic demands; or, at least, that it was easy for a "handful" to convince them that this was the case.

A January 21 Hsinhua dispatch from Shanghai quotes a message issued by various Maoist bodies that has more along the same lines. "They tried to sabotage production, sabotage the great cultural revolution and shift the general orientation of the revolutionary struggle by increasing wages, raising the level of material benefits, altering the enterprises' administrative systems, merging factories and changing the nature of the ownership." The dispatch does not indicate how the "nature of the ownership" was changed but the rest is clear enough.

The same message indicates difficulties with the peasants. The "very few diehards" are "attempting to hold onto their positions in the countryside by deflecting the evil
wind of counter-revolutionary economism from the cities to the villages, further increasing the differences between workers and peasants and between the urban and rural districts, trying their utmost to create contradictions between the workers and peasants, and to incite the peasants to oppose the workers. "The peasant standard of living is clearly involved. "As to the question of rural income, it is necessary fully to mobilise the masses [in various ways]... and oppose resolutely any decision not to set aside funds for production and collective accumulation, or to reduce the funds set aside for this purpose and to pursue a one-sided policy aimed purely at increasing immediate distribution."

A January 21 Hsinhua dispatch from Peking speaks even less guarded. Paraphrasing an editorial that appeared the previous day in the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao, Hsinhua says that a handful of persons in the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the party "blew the evil wing of economism across the rural areas, instigated a large number of peasants to leave their posts of production in an influx into the city, made unjustified economic and welfare demands; widened the gap between workers and peasants and between town and countryside," and so on.

The editorial, says Hsinhua, "exposes the deceitful nonsense...that the peasants should earn more money and have more welfare facilities." The theory of "immediate elimination" of the differences between town and countryside and between workers and peasants is "left" in form but right in content. Instead, "We should work enthusiastically to create the conditions for gradually reducing and eliminating such differences." This is the ultimate aim. "However, the present conditions are not yet ripe to eliminate the differences between town and countryside and between workers and peasants and it is impossible to achieve 'immediate elimination.'"

Whether justified or not, this line is scarcely equalitarian. It tells the peasants that it is reactionary and utopian for them to hope to better their lot in the immediate future or to close the gap between their income and that of the workers.

The Mao regime is now claiming that the worst is over and that big victories are marking the drive of the cultural revolution. One of the more interesting items is a report about the success of the Shanghai committee allegedly constructed on the model of the Paris Commune, in accordance with the directives of the August plenum. A January 20 Hsinhua dispatch from Shanghai says, "The revolutionary workers and cadres of the Shanghai Glassmaking Machinery Plant have elected a 'revolutionary production committee' on the principles of the Paris Commune. The members of the committee, who regard themselves as servants of the people, work with those in the workshops and consult them on all questions. The workers give each other revolutionary support in production and have often topped their daily output quotas. The same dispatch reports similar successes in "a vigorous new production drive" in other plants where no "Paris Commune" committees have yet been set up.

Despite the successes, the battle is far from won, according to the Maoist press. A January 22 Hsinhua dispatch, quoting an editorial in the People's Daily of that day, mentions that when the first attack was made on the "bourgeois reactionary line, there occurred incidents of the masses struggling against the masses on a larger scale and even struggling by force and bloodshed." The revolution suffered "setbacks."

In passing, the editorial gives us a fresh insight into what a broad meaning terms like "bourgeois" can have when employed by the Maoists. The editorial speaks of "overthrown class enemies" still remaining in China who "are not reconciled to their defeat." (The truth is that some 300,000 capitalists have been deliberately maintained by the regime.) In addition, "new bourgeois elements appear in the ranks of the proletariat and the small producers." The "new bourgeois elements" among the proletariat are probably just workers who want an improvement in their standard of living.

The editorial stresses the importance of the struggle for power in the "cultural revolution." "He who has power has everything; he who is without power has nothing. Of all important things, the possession of power is the most important!"

Further on, the editorial exclaims: "Seize power! Power! And more power!!" And again, "they" (apparently the masses) have rightly said, "The proletarian revolutionaries, the real revolutionary left, have their eye on seizing power, think of seizing power, and act to seize power!"

It now appears that the army, which stood behind the Red Guards from the beginning, is now being openly brought into play. Some of its moves appear aimed at mere intimidation. In these, displays of force are combined with propaganda activities. In other areas, clashes have been reported. This stage could prove to be decisive in the struggle. One of the unknown elements is possible differences within the armed forces themselves.
In recent weeks the political crisis in China underwent a new surge with more dramatic conflicts than in all the preceding phases. Towards the end of December and the first part of January, tension reached a very high point not only at the level of the governing groups but also at the level of the masses, including the proletariat.

Let it be repeated once again -- it is difficult to express an exact judgment since too many elements are still lacking and most often it involves essential elements. It is true that the international press of all stripes provides abundant information day by day. But almost in its totality this information either has little foundation or is obviously tendentious, fantasy being customarily combined with lack of sound criteria. This holds, it should be emphasized, for both the bourgeois sources and sources like Tass and Tanyug which are vying in a campaign of denigration, the objectives of which are absolutely clear. It goes without saying, moreover, that it is impossible to accept either the apologetic interpretations, according to which nothing more is involved in China than a revolutionary mass movement stimulated by the Mao leadership in order to defeat the bourgeoisie and the revisionists and assure the flowering of real proletarian democracy, or the interpretations which do not grasp that the movement, aside from the aims of the Mao-Lin Piao group and the bureaucratic operations at the top, has a tendency to develop its own dynamism, if only partially.

This being said, it is clear that during the past two months, the Mao-Lin Piao group did not succeed in breaking the multiple resistance to its orientation and methods of struggle. On the contrary, the essential element has been the appearance, in an ever clearer way of differentiation and a split within the group that has headed the cultural revolution since last summer.

We have now had some explicit indication (for example, in some of the speeches made by Mao's wife) that behind the very general cover of the cultural revolution very different thrusts have developed and even different groups have formed. Some of these groups have now been made the target of public denunciations; they are said to have intervened in an arbitrary and erroneous way and are said to be guilty of committing acts of violence instead of defeating their enemies by convincing them through discussion. We do not know, of course, if this corresponds to the truth, but at least it is clear that differentiations have actually occurred at the top; and, let us repeat, in a public way. It is likely that three tendencies are emerging -- a tendency that hesitates to break with the "centrists," a tendency which, while not accepting an alliance with the latter, would like to moderate the attacks on the adversaries and limit, particularly when a certain point has been reached, the movement of the Red Guards; and a tendency that prefers to carry the struggle to the end, including by means of the harshest methods. The decline of Tao Chu was one of the most notable episodes of this new struggle, whatever may have been the positions he stood for.

To break the still remaining resistance and quite likely also to avoid being undercut by the others, the Mao-Lin Piao group decided to likewise involve the workers and peasants in the mobilization for the cultural revolution. In line with this they utilized themes analogous to those tried out in mobilizing the Red Guard youth and they went so far in this as to advocate the formation of elective committees in the plants, the members of which are charged with keeping up production.

Aside from this appeal, Mao's plays were extremely risky and in fact on one hand the resistance, far from becoming weaker, increased still more and on the other a movement with its own dynamism became clearly discernible.

Thus in Shanghai, the biggest industrial city in China, for the first time since the founding of the People's Republic, sectors of the proletariat mobilized on a broad scale. The official reports themselves tell us that the workers downed their tools in many plants and paralyzed transportation on a considerable scale, while the longshoremen likewise organized strikes. People also occupied public buildings. Again it was the official reports that reported workers demanding increases in wages and changes in conditions on the job and sought to send delegates to Peking and other cities. These delegations were actually created and undertook trips, wringing the material means for this, it seems, from those in charge of the city administration, the latter now being held responsible for this generosity.

According to the international press, both bourgeois and pro-Soviet, the explanation for these events is relatively simple -- the workers revolted against Mao and his line; his opponents succeeded in mobilizing them and temporarily assuring themselves
of control of Shanghai as well as certain other big cities.

As for the official interpretation, it is not much different, even if the assessment is naturally just the reverse -- the partisans of the "black line," the advocates of the restoration of capitalism under different masks, tricked and corrupted the workers, pushing them into a reactionary movement against socialism.

It goes without saying that neither of these two interpretations can be accepted. Let us disregard the argument about a "plot," which belongs to a very old tradition. Is it conceivable that some opponents were able to get organized in such a way as to be able to influence the very broad masses and turn some cities against the central power? This is completely absurd -- all the more so since the masses could not clearly see what is really at stake in the struggle, inasmuch as the polemic is still limited to very general accusations, to slogans that have little that is concrete, to exhortations of a moral nature.

At bottom it is precisely this character of the propaganda of the group in power since the beginning of the crisis, it is precisely the fact that the real direct aims of the discussion and the conflict have never been explicitly made precise for the masses, that contributed to making possible the most diverse and contradictory reactions, everyone hiding a bit behind the very same slogans and everyone thinking of being able to actually conduct a just battle against the hidden enemies in the party and state apparatus, against the unavowed partisans of revisionism.

Thus from the moment the mobilization of the workers was launched, in the climate which the propaganda of the Mao group had created, sectors of the workers took things seriously and began to move in the direction of demanding their rights and in the first place an improvement in their standard of living. As they saw it, the enemies against which they had been asked to struggle were concretely those who had directed them in a bureaucratic way, refusing to recognize the justice of their demands. In other words, the workers who began a strike or sent delegations to Peking did not have the idea of struggling against Mao and his policies, but on the contrary of mobilizing precisely in order to convert into reality what the official propaganda had been tirelessly explaining to them. It is significant that detachments of Red Guards, as the official journals themselves admit, also participated in the Shanghai movement.

What was the attitude of the leading group in Shanghai?

It is rather difficult to tell at present. What is clear is that it has been accused of having given way to the movement and particularly of having made economic concessions. But it is worth noting a point which in our opinion is essential -- the leadership of the city which is under fire today is the same one on which Mao based himself in November 1965 in beginning the struggle and one of the newspapers in the city, the staff of which has been changed, is precisely the one that published the article against the drama Hai Jui Dismissed from Office which marked the opening of hostilities. Could a more striking proof be found of the contradictory developments, unexpected by the main protagonists themselves, in this crisis shaking China?

As for the reaction of the central leading group, it is probable that this has been the subject of rather rough discussions and conflicts. In fact the famous appeal to rectify the Shanghai organizations was published in that city January 5 but was not reproduced by the People's Daily until four days later (four days count a lot in such a critical situation). In addition, the note in the Shanghai Wen Hui Pao, commenting on the publication of the appeal in Peking gives the impression of a feeling of relief among people who entertain fears about the attitude that would be adopted at the center.

In any case, the rejoinder of the group in power was rather lengthy, going into various areas:

(1) The leading group in Shanghai was attacked, essentially because it was incapable of controlling the movement and had made concessions. It should be noted however that at the time this is being written -- January 18 -- it seems that the violent criticism did not entail any dismissals, which would indicate that the group still holds rather strong positions and holds some good trumps.

(2) The strike movement was denounced with the greatest vehemence, including open threats of reprisals against those who might persist. The accusers resorted to the technique known as the amalgam, not even hesitating to advance contradictory arguments (people were accused at one and the same time of maintaining that the cultural revolution would affect production and of having sabotaged production by suspending work). What is particularly significant is that in the appeal published January 5, the "trouble-
makers" are falsely presented as elements of the extreme left.

(3) An attempt was made to discredit the workers' demands by accusing them of being "revisionist" and inspired by "economist" concepts. On this subject, the ideological propaganda against material stimulants revealed its dual bearing. When it is directed against the tendency of the bureaucrats or technocrats to assure themselves special incomes, it can have an objectively progressive content; but it acquires quite a different meaning when the aim is to contest the right of the workers to struggle to improve their standard of living through their own initiative, independently of the decisions of the bureaucratic rulers.

(4) Finally, a series of practical measures and instructions to eliminate or limit certain consequences of the unrecognized strike movement and the mobilizations was announced.

But at the same time, if certain reports are accurate, the Mao group is seeking to reestablish, if not a certain unity, certain liaisons at the top, including overtures to the centrist tendencies and even, perhaps, an attempt to reach an agreement with elements like Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Chou En-lai seems to be playing a major role, while Mao himself could accentuate a bonapartist game which could prove useful in the developing situation for the bureaucracy as a whole. There was also an attempt to reaffirm the authority of the Central Committee which on the one hand issued reminders of its right to decide questions of wages, while on the other indicating partial concessions to the strikers (nor should it be forgotten that even in the crucial days in Shanghai, the ruling group promised those who resumed orderly conduct not to take any measures against them).

In conclusion, the struggle of the tendencies at the top -- determined by multiple factors which we have analyzed elsewhere -- ended in an attempt on an unprecedented scale on the part of one of the tendencies in the conflict to find support through mobilizing the masses, stimulating them through ideological themes capable of boomeranging. In fact the movement that has been unleashed has at least partly escaped control of those who engendered it. This has provoked very grave tension between the bureaucratic groups and the masses, including in the latest phase, the proletarian masses.

There is no doubt that these developments will cause the Mao group to think it over and new spectacular events could occur. In any case the solution of the crisis which opened fourteen months ago does not appear to be either easy or near.

CAPITALISTS, MANAGERS AND WORKERS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

A timely and authoritative eyewitness report of the industrial structure of Communist China has been published in the January-February Harvard Business Review. The author is Dr. Barry Richman, a Canadian citizen, who is one of the West's leading experts on industry in Communist countries. The author of Soviet Management (1965), he is associated with the Graduate School of Business Administration, University of California, Los Angeles.

During April-June 1966 Dr. Richman visited 11 major cities in China and surveyed 38 enterprises in a wide range of industries as well as three of the country's largest retail department stores. In addition to interviewing and observing managers, workers, Communist party cadres, and trade-union officials at work, he met many key personnel at various central, provincial and municipal-level planning, industrial and commercial organizations. He also talked with some leading officials at educational institutions.

His findings have all the more weight because he had the advantage of having studied industry on the spot in India and the Soviet Union before going to China.

His survey opens with an account of the 300,000 capitalists who still receive interest on their investments and serve in many cases as managers of their nationalized enterprises.

After 1949 the Communist regime liquidated the holdings of those big "bureaucratic" capitalists closely linked with Chiang Kai-shek but encouraged the "nationalistic" capitalists to remain or return. These owners were assured good treatment, their old incomes, and interest on their invested capital once their businesses were nationalized.

In 1956 legislation placed all private businesses under state ownership. Such businesses have since been referred to as joint state and private enterprises. About
30-35% of all textile firms and numerous retail stores in Shanghai are of this type, while figures for Peking and Tientsin are around 25-35%. In Shanghai alone there are more than 90,000 such capitalists.

Under the joint enterprise setup businesses are directed by the party leadership and state which appoints a counterpart top manager. The capitalists are usually referred to as general managers and the state appointees as directors. The capitalists receive, in most cases, not only the same salaries that they used to draw but also 5% interest on the value of their invested capital as assessed by an appointed committee under state and party control.

Richman describes a typical textile tycoon, Mr. Wu, who picked him up in a new Jaguar and took him to his factory and sumptuous home in Shanghai. Wu's family owned 30% of the Sung Sing Textile Corporation, which controlled nine textile mills in that city. He is now major owner and top manager of Mill No. 9 which currently employs 6,000 people and is under the control of the enterprise party committee.

Wu's investment of about $6.4 million gives him annual interest payments of $32,000, a huge income in a country having a per capita income less than 3% that of the United States. Other textile owners have even greater fortunes. Liu receives about $40,000 a year while another capitalist of the same name in the match business gets $320,000 annually.

Although interest payments were supposed to end in 1962, they are still being made. In addition, Wu draws a monthly salary of 380 yuan (one yuan is equivalent to about 40 U.S. cents). The other capitalists in this factory draw 220 to 375 yuan, compared to 100 to 110 yuan for the party secretary and the state-appointed director and vice-directors. He is also allowed to keep the profits he earns from a Hong Kong business. He admits he cannot find ways to spend most of his money, so he banks it at 3.3% interest.

Two of his four children already belong to the Communist party, are convinced socialists, and do not want his wealth when he dies. Wu is vice-chairman of the Shanghai branch of the capitalists' decorative Democratic party and an elected member of the National Peoples Congress, the highest level governmental body. Another of his fellow capitalists, Yung, is now vice-mayor of Shanghai and deputy minister of the Textile Industry in Peking.

Why have the Chinese Communists kept so many capitalists while the Soviet Union (which, according to the Maoists, has presumably reverted to capitalism) has eliminated almost all of them? Richman gives six reasons: the benefits derived from utilizing their experience in running industry and business; their basically nationalistic loyalties; their incapacity to spearhead an effective counterrevolution (something the Soviet leaders were rightly concerned about in the early stages of their republic); the calculation that their good treatment would bring back many other capitalists, professionals and talented people; interest in proving that "coexistence" is feasible; and, finally, the spectacle of a relatively few "haves" living in splendor amongst masses of "have-nots" keeps alive the spirit of the class struggle.

Richman notes, however, that there have been no press reports about capitalists of this type being abused by Red Guards in the current purge. "The capitalists have relatively little real power in setting basic national policy and are, therefore, no real threat," he writes. "The purge involves mainly Communist party and important government officials whose ideology is at variance with that of Mao and his conservative supporters, and who are secure and powerful enough to vie for top leadership positions." He opines that "the recent political purges, 'Red Guard' actions, and other upheavals in Red China may even be fortifying the role of capitalists like Wu."

Richman states that "Red China has been making impressive -- but erratic -- economic progress since 1949. The nation has done better with regard to industrial development than the Soviet Union did during its first 18 years under communism. It has done substantially better than India has to date."

He has the impression that Soviet enterprises in such sectors of heavy industry as industrial machinery, equipment and components "generally seem to be better managed, to be more efficient, and to produce better quality goods. Indigenous Indian companies typically seem to be no better and often worse than roughly comparable Chinese factories; U.S. companies tend to be far superior."

Where the Chinese have copied much from the Soviets in their system of central
planning, resource allocation, and industrial management similar inefficiencies have arisen. "For example, a Wuhan paper factory that I visited has had an annual production capacity of 40,000 tons since 1957, but has been producing at the rate of only 25,000 tons. The director claims that this is due to coordination problems at publishing plants," Richman reports.

Nonetheless, there are significant differences between the Chinese and Soviet industrial setups, apart from China's toleration of a capitalist layer.

Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese do not regard the enterprise "as a purely economic unit where economic performance clearly takes priority." Chinese factories pursue objectives pertaining to politics, education and welfare as well as economic results. It is a place where illiterate workers learn how to read and write, and where employees can and do improve their work skills and develop new ones through education and training. It is a place where housing, schools, recreational facilities, roads, shops, and offices are often constructed or remodeled by factory employees. It is also a place from which employees go out into the fields and help the peasants with their harvesting.

Whereas the Soviets have a highly monolithic and fairly clear-cut system of planning, the Chinese Communists have a system of planning and resource allocation that is "flexible to the point of being sloppy." Although most enterprises do negotiate some sort of annual plan with higher authorities, many actually operate in accord with a quarterly, monthly and in some cases a weekly plan (which can hardly be designated as planning).

China has a far higher degree of decentralization of authority than does Russia. In recent years the government ministries have come to exert functional rather than direct-line authority over most industrial enterprises. Most factories are now under the jurisdiction of municipal authorities.

"In addition," Richman writes, "the existence of a vast number of small enterprises in China makes a high degree of central planning and control extremely difficult. Major deficiencies in the Chinese statistical and accounting system have the same effect."

Effective party control is the major reason that decentralization works in China. "There are party committees at all levels of the economy that typically have the upper hand over industrial administrators -- more so than in the Soviet Union. These party cadres tend to identify with national rather than local interests...While the current purge may lead to the dismissal of some of these party cadres, it is not likely that the basic structure itself will change."

With the exception of the State Bank and direct higher authorities, the trend in China has been away from government controls over industrial enterprises and their managers. For example, the powerful Ministry of Supervision -- a pervasive national control body established in 1954 -- was abolished in 1959.

While the pattern of professional administrators and technicians managing industry has been solidly established in the Soviet Union, China since 1949 has oscillated back and forth between expert and party control of industrial enterprises. During the First Five Year Plan (1952-1957) great stress was placed on one-man authority in imitation of the Soviet system. During the Great Leap Forward of 1958-61 party committees took over control. After 1961 the experts at the enterprise level were asked by the regime to help pull the country out of its severe economic crisis and factory managers again assumed considerable independent operational authority. Since 1964 another turn has been in the making and, at the time of his visit in April-June 1966, enterprise management was once more officially under the leadership of the party committees.

Since Richman identifies the points of greatest economic progress with the periods under expert control, he anticipates that the policy of politics in command" may again retard the rate of industrial advance. "There were some factories," he writes, "where incompetent party cadres seemed to run the show, and as a result there seemed to be considerable confusion and inefficiency in these places. If the current Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution continues, and leads to the management of factories by Reds rather than by experts, serious problems are once again likely to emerge."

The attitude of the regime toward the respective roles of monetary and moral incentives in spurring labor productivity has undergone parallel fluctuations. During the 1952-1957 period great stress was placed on monetary incentives. Many workers were put on piece-rate schemes and enterprise managers as well as party officials were paid bonuses primarily in relation to gross output results. During the Great Leap Forward
the regime tried to wipe out self-interest -- and hence monetary incentives -- as a key motivating force. When the experts came back in 1961, worker as well as managerial incentives were also revived. Since 1964 the priority and predominance of nonmaterial stimuli have been uppermost.

"I found during my visits to 38 Chinese factories that piece-rate incentives for workers had been completely abolished. However, at about 80% of the factories workers could still earn monthly or quarterly bonuses. And, interestingly enough, such bonuses were not based solely upon productivity; politics and helping co-workers were also key criteria." Middle-level managers, such as department heads and workshop directors, can still earn bonuses at about 80% of the factories surveyed.

Distinctions in incomes and living standards between upper-level industrial managers and workers are far smaller than in the Soviet Union. Richman presents a detailed table grading 38 industrial enterprises in terms of managerial know-how, efficiency and top-paid personnel which casts light on salary differentials.

He elsewhere sets the average yearly per capita income in China at $90. While his exhibit does not list the average wage of unskilled workers in these industries, it is probably not too much higher than that. At most factories he found the ratio between directors' incomes and the average factory pay to be less than 2 to 1; the highest ratio was about 3 to 1.

There was a bigger spread between the pay of skilled and unskilled workers than between skilled workers and top personnel. This testifies to the scarcity of qualified workers in China.

He observed no very substantial differences in the housing of different strata of the enterprises nor in their meals, means of transport or clothing. He says that "some of the better paid employees live in larger and better furnished flats, and this could be some type of incentive." Monthly rent ranges typically from one to four yuan per room.

Managers must also engage in physical work. "During my first visit to a Chinese factory, Peking Wool, I thought it was a joke or strange aberration when, during lunch in the cafeteria, I was introduced to the director who was cooking dumplings in the kitchen. He was doing one of his two days a week of physical labor. I soon learned that all enterprise directors, vice directors, party secretaries, and trade union leaders spend from one to two days each week in physical labor."

Richman is dubious about the realism and merits of this practice. "Some of the better managers at fairly well-managed factories do not take physical labor very literally. For example, they spend their one or two days of manual labor each week working out technical or managerial problems through the physical process of writing... Where experts -- in a country that has a critical shortage of experts -- are forced to spend as much as two days each week in physical labor, may not the disadvantages outweigh the advantages, especially in terms of economic performance?"

While the managers engage in physical labor, the workers participate in management through committees, meetings, suggestions and elections. They generally meet monthly or quarterly to discuss the enterprise plan and performance through representatives elected by the various sections, shops, and departments.

At frequent after-work meetings the workers discuss how to improve performance and their own skills, exchange ideas on politics and ideology, vote on bonuses and choose candidates. The elections for group leaders stop short of top management. Elections of managers are under the direct control of the party and it seems that all successful candidates are elected with a 99% to 100% majority.

"It is significant," he observes, "that at the majority of factories I found no workers on the enterprise party committees and at the other factories workers did not make up more than about 10% of the committee membership...In fact, the trade union in Soviet enterprises, although not very strong, seems to be significantly more influential and important than in China."

He gives more credit "to the Reds than to the experts or managers" in determining the "attitudes" of the "labor force." "The Communist party has organized and motivated workers on a national scale to identify with and strive for national economic progress and power." But he singles out many gaps and deficiencies in the planning and organization of industrial activities which spring from lack of managerial know-how and the general backwardness of the country.
He states that China is following a course of more balanced economic growth and industrial development in the 1960's than it did in the 1950's. Although the regime is allocating considerable capital investment funds to heavy industry, "it views the Chinese revolution as basically a peasant rather than worker revolution (just the opposite from the Russian view of the Bolshevik revolution) and therefore may feel more strongly about improving the living and working conditions of the peasants in the short run. A sizable proportion of the relatively new and equipped factories that I visited are producing for the agricultural sector."

China is also making sizable investments in various consumer goods industries. "There is a surprisingly wide variety of consumer goods of relatively good quality in the stores, even in areas which are seldom frequented by foreigners, such as Wusih and Loyang. The largest Soviet department store -- GUM in Moscow -- does not come close to the large department stores in Peking, Shanghai, or Tientsin in terms of variety or quality of consumer goods available."

The burden of military preparedness upon China's economy can be gauged from the fact that five of the eight central machine-building ministries deal almost exclusively with military and defense production, while the other three also do some defense work. In 1959 there were about 1.5 million employees in defense production, and this sector employed 20% of all the engineers and technicians in the country.

Richman gives a table comparing China's labor productivity with the Soviet Union, India and the United States. In almost all cases China's output is superior to India's but is much less than Russia's and falls far short of the United States. In cotton textiles it exceeds both India and the Soviet Union but is only a little more than half that of the U.S. industry average.

In chemical fertilizer the Chinese average output for two factories in 1965 was 103 tons; the Soviet Union 492 tons; India 25 tons in 1961; the United States 844 tons. In paper and paper products the Wuhan factory averaged 12.5 tons; the Soviet output 170 tons; India 7.5 tons in 1961; and the U.S. 580 tons.

Richman sums up his observations as follows. "The largest and most important Chinese machinery factories visited are functioning quite well. They also have the largest proportion of university graduates, engineers, technicians, and managers. But there are clearly not enough experts or skilled workers to go around, and several of the fairly large and medium sized enterprises in this industry do not seem to be very well managed or productive. Most of the small machinery, instrument and component factories are following a policy of self-sufficiency and are probably viewed as a training ground; they seem to be functioning quite inefficiently..."

"In spite of numerous managerial and technical problems at many of the Chinese enterprises, I am impressed by the wide range of goods that Chinese industry is capable of producing. China seems to be able to produce nearly everything it wants, but often it must produce very inefficiently and at a tremendous cost."

THE OSCAR FOR STUPIDITY

The editors of the London Economist and the Paris Express are running neck and neck in the race for the "Oscar" in the field of stupidity.

In the January 14 issue of the London Economist, the main article is devoted to what is considered to be the principal lesson of the "cultural revolution" in China. Under the title "The Last Revolution" we are told:

"What has been happening in China since the summer is the end of the road that started in Paris in 1789. We are seeing the last stages of the revolutionary cycle that began in France, was checked in central Europe in 1848, and picked up impetus again in Russia in 1917. It continued its eastward march in 1949, when it reached China, and it is in China that it finally seems to be working itself out."

Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, the editor of l'Express, made his own bid for the glittering trophy awarded in each field for outstanding performance. In the January 16-22 issue he wrote:

"With the dislocation of Chinese Communism, the last one, no cloud remains on the horizon of industrial capitalism, no fear. The fifty-year-old war is about to be won. The grandchildren of Rockefeller and Ford are triumphant; those of Lenin and Trot-
sky are in disarray everywhere."

The Economist probes further into the matter. In its opinion Kosygin and Brezhnev are the successors of the revolutionary leaders. The British business magazine is happy to note that "with one or two exceptions, like Yugoslavia, the communist governments of Europe are now quite astonishingly conservative." It offers the Chinese leaders some free advice, telling them that rather than entertaining revolutionary thoughts, they "ought to be...stimulating their industrial managers with the lure of profits."

For good measure, The Economist adds: "Men who want to better their lot will compare the performance of revolutionary regimes with that of their non-revolutionary rivals by the strictly practical test of how they deliver the goods."

Strictly practical test? The peasants of the underdeveloped countries in comparing India and China use different standards from those of the bourgeois journalists, much better standards it should be added.

The editor of The Economist, who must have frequented Oxford, Cambridge or some other lofty establishment of the kind, is a bit loose in his history. He forgets that before 1789 there was an English revolution in which a certain Cromwell had a king decapitated. He also forgets, more recently, the movement of the revolution towards the west -- clear up to Cuba.

The author of this monumental stupidity ought to give up his stubborn support of the policies of Johnson-MacBird in the war in Vietnam, if he is really convinced that the era of revolutions has finally worked itself out in China.

The era of revolutions is not even close to being worked out, although it appears that at least two editors were fairly well worked out when they composed their contributions to the week's speculations.

CAMPAIGN FOR HUGO BLANCO IN INDIA

Bombay

The Socialist Workers party of India has sent a protest to President Fernando Belaunde Terry of Peru, demanding that Hugo Blanco, the imprisoned Peruvian peasant leader now threatened with a possible death sentence, be unconditionally released forthwith. Several leading academicians of West Bengal, trade-union and political leaders in Bihar and other parts of the country have sent similar protests to the Peruvian government and its ambassador in New Delhi.

The position of the SWFI was stated by Murlidhar Parija, general secretary of the party, in a letter dated December 6.

"We in India," he wrote, "learn with grave concern the move of your Government to ask the death penalty on Comrade Hugo Blanco, the valiant peasant leader who has been already sentenced to 25 years imprisonment by the military tribunal at Tacna. We wish to register the strongest protest of the workers' movement in India against this inhuman move by your Government. We urge upon you to use your special powers to grant clemency to Comrade Hugo Blanco and order his release immediately.

"Comrade Hugo Blanco's only 'crime' as far as we know is that he tried to organise the workers and peasants of your country with the noblest object of bringing about a social change in Peru. He was not a military man and should have been tried by a civil court as is done in most of the civilised countries. It is plain to us that the move to execute Comrade Hugo Blanco will not halt the socialist movement in Peru but in fact brand his executioners as men bereft of humanity and sanity.

"We therefore urge you not to allow Peru to be disgraced by the wanton murder of a man who has desired only that justice be done to the people of Peru. We demand that you should free Comrade Hugo Blanco and his companions."

More than 50 academicians, including the professors and teachers of West Bengal, have sent a petition to the Peruvian ambassador in New Delhi and the government of Peru demanding that Hugo Blanco and his colleagues should be set at liberty. The initiative in the campaign was taken by Professor Chitta Mitra of Kalna (West Bengal).

On behalf of various trade-union organizations in Bihar, Somendra Kumar, president of the Samastipur Central Sugar Factory Labour Union, has also sent similar protests
Those whose rather unenviable task it is to read the London Newsletter received a pleasant surprise on opening the January 14 issue. After long years of silence on the subject, the weekly organ of the Socialist Labour League displayed a banner headline coming out foursquare against imperialism and in favor of the Chinese Revolution.

With anything as "What's so wondrous about that?" it should be explained that there had been growing doubt as to the real views of the leaders of the SLL on the character of the state in China. Besides the record-making silence on China, their position on Cuba was ominous. They maintain that Cuba is not a workers state but a bourgeois state headed by a petty-bourgeois representative of capitalist interests, a position that logically points to revision of the view that China is a workers state.

Having finally, if belatedly, clarified their position on China, perhaps they will now, in the interests of consistency, reconsider their untenable position on Cuba.

It must be added, however, that in making their big leap forward, they gained such momentum as to land in a new error. Unfortunately, they identify Mao with the Chinese Revolution. Editor Mike Banda, who signed the article breaking the ice on this subject, followed up in the next issue of The Newsletter with an article in which he even took up the cudgels in behalf of Mao's rejection of a united front with the Soviet Union for the defense of Vietnam against American imperialism.

Tim Wohlforth, an American purveyor of the SLL line, explained in the January 30 issue of his Bulletin that the "international and domestic line of Mao has not been a fully [!] proletarian one." A particular instance, he notes, was "Mao's uncritical support of the Indonesian Communist party. "But Mao's line has not been one of capitulation to imperialism either. It is essentially for this reason that we give him our support."

Wohlforth, who has vied for front place in SLL circles in denouncing Fidel Castro, may draw the obvious conclusion and rally in a similar way behind the Cuban leader, whose line has not been one of capitulation to imperialism. It would be premature, however, to credit Wohlforth with being that logical.

Much as Banda is to be congratulated for finally making clear that he stands for the defense of the Chinese Revolution against imperialism, little in the way of praise can be offered for his two articles so far as new information or analysis of the struggle in China is concerned. From his new viewpoint, of course, this may be reason for self-congratulation on a certain success in aping the models provided in the official Maoist press which is carefully checked by the censors for any evidence of independence of thought.

It is not clear how the SLL leaders and their alert American border guard will adjust their sudden support for Mao with their position in defense of the Hungarian uprising of 1956. In recent months, the SLL leaders have given top priority to the slogan of defense of the Hungarian opposition. They went to extraordinary lengths to make this plain at a demonstration in Liège last October 15 where they held it to be an issue so vital at present as to warrant splitting a united front in defense of Vietnam and they have repeated their view on this in various articles since. [See "The Healy School of Falsification" in World Outlook January 27.]

A vestige of this position is to be found in a single phrase in Banda's article. Among other light criticisms of Mao, he notes the Chinese leader's "support of the Soviet intervention in Hungary." And that's all on that.

In the very same article, it should be noted, Banda does indicate a possible way to solve the contradiction in the SLL's position. Speaking of the Red Guards in China, he writes: "As in Hungary they have fearlessly stormed police stations and barracks, communes and factories risking torture and execution to fight the bureaucrats." In brief, the SLL leaders appear to be toying with the idea of picturing Mao as leading
an uprising in China like the one in Hungary in 1956.

If Mao should deliberately lead such an uprising against his own regime, no revolutionary Marxist, naturally, will find any difficulty in giving him full and unconditional support. That the Newsletter offers only "conditional" support shows that the SLL leaders are hesitant about making the plunge.

This hesitation is commendable, for one of the themes in Mao's propaganda, one of his avowed reasons for organizing the Red Guard movement, was precisely to block the development of a movement like the political revolution headed by revolutionary Marxist workers in Hungary in 1956. In taking this as a conscious aim, Mao shows how well he understands Stalin's reasons for crushing political opposition in his time in the Soviet Union. This of course is not new. Mao put on a convincing demonstration in 1956 when he rushed to Khrushchev's aid in suppressing the Hungarian workers.

Let us hope that the "cultural revolution" initiated by Mao passes over his head and sets in motion a mass movement that will actually install proletarian democracy in China like that seen in the Paris Commune; but Mao's record in 1956 indicates that it would be wise to leave open the possibility that he will not hesitate to use the most extreme force to try to put it down if this should occur. Khrushchev set the example for him when "de-Stalinization" threatened to get out of hand in Hungary.

The hapless SLL leaders seem doomed to follow in the footsteps of others. Thus, if they would care to look further down the path they have now taken, they will find an article written by Sam Marcy in the January 20 issue of the Workers World that is quite illuminating. Marcy sings praises to the Chinese Communist party, culminating his hymn with the standard refrain: "Needless to say, all of this has been achieved under the direct guidance and leadership of Mao Tse-tung."

Needless to say, Marcy approves the "cultural revolution"; and not "conditionally," like the quesy Banda, but wholeheartedly and unashamedly as befits one with long experience in appreciating the virtues of a cult. Marcy even answers the "sincere and honest friends" of China who "view with growing alarm what appears to them to be the extra-legal and extra-governemental activities of the Red Guards..." What do you expect? he asks. There's no cause for alarm; it's Mao's way. Moreover there is no solid ground for assuming "that the great mass organizations of the Chinese people, their formidable party institutions and the numerous governmental organs including the army [] will not loyally support the cultural revolution and the leaders who are at its head."

Even if there were some substance to the worry expressed by sincere and honest friends, Marcy considers the matter secondary. The "cardinal fact" is that "the Chinese C.P. may be fighting the crucial battle for Socialism..." Marcy then comes to what is for him the essence of the whole struggle: "The alternative to the present leadership and its political line -- it must be faced squarely -- is a neo-bourgeois restorationist regime. That is what really is at stake in the cultural revolution in China." Marcy's confidence in the capacity of the workers to develop an independent political line and raise up a Leninist leadership is, as these words show, absolutely nil.

As for critics other than the sincere and honest friends, Marcy coolly lumps together the Socialist Workers party and the Communist party. It is a mistake, says Marcy, to view them as standing poles apart inasmuch as both parties attack the cultural revolution. "The viewpoint from which they launch their attacks is not really what counts; what counts is that they have lined up on the other side of the class line in this momentous struggle."

As can be seen Marcy echoes a truly old Stalinist position: "The viewpoint... is not really what counts." All criticisms are alike, no matter what their source; to express a critical viewpoint beyond permitted limits is equivalent to lining up on the other side of the class line. This was the basic reasoning followed by Stalin in going to such extreme lengths as amalgamating the Trotskyists with the fascists, accusing Trotsky of being an "agent of Hitler," and justifying the physical liquidation of all political opponents to his dictatorship no matter what the real class nature of their position was.

What is most instructive in this is that Sam Marcy was once a Trotskyist. His differences began when he identified Mao with the Chinese Revolution. His next step was to identify Khrushchev and the Hungarian puppets with the Soviet Union and the Hungarian workers state. His split with the Trotskyist movement over the Hungarian Revolution was consistent with his premises. As he saw it, the alternative to the Stalinist leadership in Budapest was a "neo-bourgeois restorationist regime." He therefore took the side of
those who decided to suppress in blood the rebellious movement that sought to establish proletarian democracy.

It is obvious that Marcy’s stand on the Hungarian Revolution makes it easy for him to accept Mao’s political aim of blocking the appearance in China of groups resembling the Petőfi circle which helped foster the ideas of proletarian democracy that brought the Hungarian workers to initiate a political revolution.

Will the SLL leaders try to be as consistent as the man who blazed the trail for them in their new position? This remains to be seen.

Eagerness to prove himself an apt student of "Mao's thought" is not least of the curiosities in Banda’s two articles. One hopes that his evident good intentions will catch the eye of those in charge of passing on applications for membership in the cult. Since they may not recognize all the subtleties involved, perhaps Banda will appreciate our giving him an assist.

In attacking the imperialist and Stalinist foes of the Chinese Revolution, Banda put World Outlook in their company. It was not easy for him to find anything that might serve as proof. After searching diligently and overcoming many obstacles, he came up with the following prize quotation:

"The victory [of the opposition] will be won by those seeking proletarian democracy based on the conquests of the revolution. That victory will... assure China a big leap forward..." (The bracketed phrase was supplied by the editor of the Newsletter.)

The kind of opposition which the author of the article was talking about is clearly specified in the original. Here it is:

"By suppressing progressive intellectuals and others, Mao may be able for the time being to silence the oppositional mood but he cannot suppress the objective conditions which gave rise to it in the first place. And in the future it will undoubtedly again challenge the bureaucracy. As Teng To put it, 'People who think of themselves as being omniscient, despise the masses' and 'attempt to win victory by devious means. Such people... will be defeated in the end.'

"The victory, however, will not be scored by reaction or by the procapitalists who are undoubtedly to be found in the administration, and in very high posts at that. The victory will be won by those seeking proletarian democracy based on the conquests of the revolution. That victory will reinforce those conquests and assure China a genuine big leap forward, not only at home but internationally." (World Outlook August 12, p. 19. Emphasis added to facilitate identifying the phrases torn out of context by Banda.)

The basic position taken by the author of the article is the same as that taken by the Trotskyist movement with regard to the Soviet Union — defense of the conquests of the revolution, political opposition to bureaucratic rule, in favor of proletarian democracy. It is the position formerly shared by the leaders of the SLL. In amalgamating this position with the positions held by the Khrushchevists and the imperialists, Banda gives notice in his own way of abandoning it for a position approaching the one held by Sam Marcy.

Banda's stand becomes all the clearer if one asks why he combed through this particular article in search of a phrase that could be bent, twisted or juggled instead of the many other articles on China available in World Outlook, including official positions of the Fourth International. The reason, obviously is its authorship, which Banda does not indicate.

In an editorial note accompanying the article, World Outlook reported that the author, Antonio Farrien, based his article on extensive notes which he made in discussions with Peng Shu-tse and that Peng had read the article and made "any necessary corrections." Peng Shu-tse was one of the founding members of the Chinese Communist party and played a leading role in it until after the revolution of 1925-27 when the party became Stalinized and he was expelled on charges of "Trotskyism." One of the founding leaders of the Chinese Trotskyist movement, Peng Shu-tse spent many years in prison under Chiang Kai-shek. Now living in Europe, he follows events in China very closely as can be judged from the article which Banda honored by applying "Mao's thought" to it.

For his success in this exercise, Banda deserves a suitable award. Our recommendation is one of the 35,000,000 copies of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung printed last year. Or, if he came too late to the cult for that, let him be awarded one of the first in the edition of 80,000,000 copies already coming off the press as this year’s quota of Maoist culture.
WARREN REPORT UNDER INCREASING FIRE IN AMERICAN PRESS

By Arthur Maglin

[Last of three articles.]

Recently, articles critical of the Warren Report have appeared in several well-known publications. In the December 15 issue of The Reporter, the magazine's associate editor, Kenneth Goodall, writes in a review of Mark Lane's Rush to Judgment and Edward Jay Epstein's Inquest:

"The Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy has failed to dispel the doubts that swept the country and the world in the aftermath of the tragedy three years ago in Dallas. A recent public-opinion poll tells us that the conspiracy theory is very much alive in the minds of Americans, despite the overwhelming credence given to the single-assassin conclusion of the Warren Report when it was issued in September, 1964.

"These two books not only have helped to feed the lingering doubts but also have infected persons heretofore immune. Some of the Warren Report's earliest and warmest admirers in the United States and Europe now have decided that their original estimates may have been too hasty."

Later the article reports some interesting information about the disposition of the X-rays and photographs taken during the autopsy of President Kennedy which have become central to the discussion of the number and direction of the shots that killed him:

"Whatever these photographs show, the tight restrictions placed on them under an agreement between the government and the Kennedy family do not seem likely to diminish the suspicions of the critics. Although the first reports of the Justice Department's action [of obtaining the pictures from the Kennedy family for the National Archives] gave the impression that any Federal investigative agent would be permitted to see them, this is not the case. Deputy Archivist James B. Rhoads told me that for the lifetime of President Kennedy's immediate family, including his children, the X-rays and photographs will be freely available only to official investigators of any Federal body that might be established to look further into the assassination. After five years, medical scientists approved by the Kennedy family may also see them."

The January 7 New Republic carries an article by contributing editor Alexander M. Bickel criticizing the Warren Report and calling for a new investigation. Bickel writes that "serious and responsible proposals for a renewed investigation — a new trial, if you will — have recently come from many quarters. The idea was first broached last summer by Richard N. Goodwin, the former presidential assistant, in a review of Edward Jay Epstein's book, Inquest. Mr. Goodwin suggested merely that an independent group should determine whether a new investigation is necessary. Others have since gone farther, among them Life magazine, Walter Lippmann, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Senator Russell Long of Louisiana, the majority whip, and a number of congressmen. Even a member of the Warren Commission, Representative Hale Boggs of Louisiana, although he sees no reason for a full new investigation, has said that it might be well to have a panel of medical men and others report on photographs and X-rays of President Kennedy's body, made in the course of an autopsy that was performed at Bethesda Naval Hospital."

Perhaps the most significant in the latest batch of articles is Richard J. Whalen's "The Kennedy Assassination" in the January 14 Saturday Evening Post. The Post is a mass circulation magazine comparable to Life. Like Life's article before it, the Post assumes that the Warren Commission's case against Oswald was a good one, but argues that the Commission did not sufficiently investigate the existence of possible accomplices. Like Life and the Post try to throw cold water on the arguments of such critics as Mark Lane, Harold Weisberg and Leo Sauvage, who contend that the Commission failed miserably in trying to prove Oswald was involved in the assassination. Whalen writes:

"The evidence against Oswald remains as 'hard' as it was when Ruby's bullet killed him. Every piece of 'soft' evidence, from the puff of smoke to the tracing of the President's head-snap, tends to support the possibility of a second assassin."

The capitalist press seems to be joining the side of the critics in order to contain the controversy. Whatever the truth about Oswald's role in the assassination, it is certainly more expedient from a bourgeois point of view to believe that the august members of the Warren Commission did not reach a "guilty" verdict against an innocent man. After what was reported as the most complete criminal investigation
in the nation's history, such a mistake would suggest too vividly the existence of an excess of either moral bankruptcy or complete incompetence holding sway over such institutions as the Supreme Court, the Congress, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Presidency. From the point of view of the capitalist class, it would clearly be far better to believe that the Commission proved its case against Oswald, but that it failed to pursue its investigation far enough to discover if Oswald had an accomplice.

The same issue of The Saturday Evening Post which carried Whalen's article, also carried an editorial calling for a new inquiry:

"Publicity and politics are both dangers to such an inquiry. It would be difficult to find anyone totally immune to the pressures that would inevitably arise -- pressures to suppress the unpleasant, to cover up any mistakes, to leak conflicting versions of the evidence. Nonetheless, it would be a total rejection of our society to assume that we cannot create a fact-finding committee of indisputable impartiality, skill, experience, rectitude, and concern for the truth."

For revolutionary socialists, who do totally reject American capitalist society, it is impossible to believe that anyone who would be acceptable to either the President or the Congress to officially reinvestigate the Kennedy assassination could also be trusted to have "indisputable impartiality, skill, experience, rectitude, and concern for the truth." Therefore, socialists should not call for a new official inquiry. Their only demand on the government should be that all the files be opened and all the facts released.

MAKE IT NOW -- AND IN HANOI, HO CHI MINH TELLS JOHNSON

In an interview with three leaders of the antiwar movement -- the Rev. A.J. Muste of New York, the Right Rev. Ambrose Reeves of the diocese of Chichester, England, and Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg of Toronto -- Ho Chi Minh, the president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, gave a very effective answer to President Johnson's blatant propaganda about wanting to "negotiate" in Vietnam. As recalled by Rabbi Feinberg at a news conference in London, January 23, Ho Chi Minh said:

"Mr. Johnson has stated that he would talk to anyone, anytime, anywhere about peace.

"I invite Mr. Johnson to be our guest, sitting just as you are here, in the palace of the former French Governor General of Indochina.

"Let Mr. Johnson come with his wife and daughters, his secretary, his doctor, his cook, but let him not come with a gun at his hip. Let him not bring his admirals and generals.

"As an old revolutionary I pledge my honor that Mr. Johnson will have complete security."

The response of the State Department to this was a threat that Rabbi Feinberg might be subject to prosecution for having visited Hanoi without a properly stamped passport. Although a resident of Canada, Rabbi Feinberg is an American citizen.

The three clergymen said they had seen the damage done by American bombs in the center of Hanoi and were "frankly appalled" by the attempt of administration spokesmen in Washington "to deny or equivocate about the matter."
FROM THE PICKAX TO THE PEN -- or, PROGRESS ON THE "NEW CRITICISM"

By L. Couturier

[The following article first appeared in La Quatrième Internationale, the newspaper of the Parti Communiste Internationaliste, French section of the Fourth International. The translation is by World Outlook. The subheadings appear in the original.]

I.

"There are the things we do because, after all, we have to eat." -- Aragon (The Unfinished Novel.)

Leon Trotsky is certainly the most slandered of men, the pages mounting into the hundreds of millions. Before and since he was killed with a pickax wielded by a GPU agent, Stalinist hacks throughout the world disseminated the distortions and falsifications of history fabricated by the Kremlin.

Trotsky had become an agent of imperialism, in alliance with the German, Spanish and Japanese fascists. He now worked at a single task -- to assassinate Stalin and destroy the regime installed by the October revolution. The "great democrats" Sayers and Kahn, in their work The Great Conspiracy, which became the Holy Bible and Scripture of the PCF [Parti communiste français -- French Communist party] after the war, wrote: "The death of Leon Trotsky left only one living candidate for the Napoleonic role in Russia; Adolph Hitler."

At the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev had requested the creation of "a serious manual of the history of our party, written in accordance with scientific Marxist objectivity."

There followed some rehabilitations of victims of the Stalinist purges. We asserted, however, that the bureaucracy would never fully rehabilitate Trotsky. His criticism of Soviet society was by far the most profound and perceptive, consequently the most dangerous to Stalin's successors. At present they no longer dare to call the founder of the Red Army a fascist agent but they either maintain a strict silence about him or pick up the old shopworn arguments used around 1930 for conditioning public opinion to accepting the bloody purges.

We know that certain demands are now being made by the young generation in the Soviet Union which is seeking to ascertain the truth about the Revolution and its leaders. In France, the interest is no less keen, being reflected in a notable circulation of Trotsky's works, which bourgeois publishers are beginning to issue because they find it profitable.

This new situation is a source of considerable concern to the leaders of the PCF. No longer can they simply copy the editorials from Pravda, since there are no more trials of "Trotskyite saboteurs," and it becomes a bit tricky to keep on paraphrasing the History of the O.P.S.U., each succeeding edition of which adds unexpected revelations (but known, of course, for some forty years, to every militant who has engaged in the least study).

Under these conditions, one resource remained: to take things up in the Nouvelle Critique [New Criticism]. This magazine holds letters patent of nobility, for it has been interested in Trotskyism a very long time.

Falsification across the Ages

As a result, François Hincker wrote an article entitled "Lenin and Trotsky" which appeared in the April 1966 issue. In the hurried style of a pieceworker, this gentleman tries to settle accounts with Trotsky in nine pages. The article contains many gems, flagrant lies stand beside truncated texts, and a thick glue composed of complacent ignorance and malice serves to hold everything together. It is an unpleasant chore to have to engage in a debate at such a low level, but there is no escape from sampling the strange brew offered by the "Review of Militant Marxism" in order to help "a certain number of readers, students in particular, who have encountered the obstacle of leftist in the course of their political activities."

Let us begin with the opening statement:

"The author does not claim to present new elements of a historical nature; he only separates the facts from the mythology advanced in Trotskyist literature -- and by heavens that mythology is abundant!"
Come now, my dear fellow, you are far too modest! Let us leaf through some back numbers of Nouvelle Critique together from the days before you began participating so brilliantly in editing it, and let us see how your magazine then spoke about Trotsky and the Fourth International. There is, for instance, the interminable series of articles penned at the time by Pierre Hervé entitled "From Trotsky to Tito." Then, too, your review never dissociated itself from the conclusions of the Moscow Trials. It has always remained faithful to Stalin's declaration: "In reality, Trotskyism long ago ceased to be a Communist faction. In reality, Trotskyism is a vanguard detachment of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, which is leading the struggle against Communism, against the Soviet power, against the building of socialism in the U.S.S.R." (1931)

In your article, Trotsky no longer presented in this way. You criticize his ideas, his personality, his role, in a very superficial way, I must admit, but at least you seem to consider him as a figure belonging to the working-class movement and no longer as a member of Interpol. And these are "new elements of a historical nature," if in studying history one has nothing but the documents published by the PCF to go by.

When and where did the Nouvelle Critique make its own self-criticism? This indeed would be an "autocritique Nouvelle" (New Self-Criticism) but we fear we will have to wait a long time for that.

His looseness in the use of references and the modifications (to say the least ...) he introduces in quotations testify to the author's seriousness.

It is a glaring fact that Mr. Hincker has not read a single work by Trotsky but judges and quotes him via Stalin, Bukharin and Isaac Deutscher.

From the serious work of Deutscher, so scrupulous on the historical plane, Hincker has scrounged several ideas, several quotations, which he has seasoned lightly in the best Stalinist style, and presented as the fruits of his own personal labor.

Before replying to him on several fundamental questions, we will offer a few examples showing how free from prejudice is this "militant Marxist" which Mr. Hincker doubtlessly considers himself to be.

(a) The somewhat theatrical excerpts from orders addressed by Trotsky to the Labor Armies are taken from Volume I of Deutscher's book (p. 495-96); but Deutscher clearly identifies these as only excerpts. Also, he specifies that the text appeared in Pravda January 16, 1920, and that at the time Lenin supported Trotsky's efforts toward some militarization of labor. These provisos are of no interest to Hincker.

(b) The "famous thesis of the Permanent Revolution" which was to become the heart of Trotskyism was elaborated in the pamphlet of April 1904 entitled Our Political Tasks. Wrong -- or rather a too hasty reading of Deutscher's work. The latter makes a detailed analysis of Trotsky's polemical document, which is primarily directed against Lenin in his role as organizer of a centralized party but without broaching the theory of permanent revolution at all. It is not until 1906, in The Balance and the Prospects, that Trotsky presented his theory in schematic form for the first time.

(c) "In April 1917, in his draft report to the April conference, which, as we know, had the task of planning the lines of development of the October Revolution, Lenin foresaw a problem with the petty bourgeoisie, among whom he ranked Trotsky alongside of Martov." Mr. Hincker is not even capable of correctly quoting which was included in Volume 36 of Lenin's Works. (Editions sociales, Vol. 36, p. 461 [French edition]). The item is an outline of a report on the April conference which Lenin made at a membership meeting on May 8 (21) 1917. He foresaw the development of: "the hesitations of the petty bourgeoisie: Trotsky, Lenin, and Biensflock, Martov, Novaya Zhizn." Trotsky had returned from the United States four days previously and Lenin did not yet know his position on the provisional government. He was soon to learn that the articles written by Trotsky in the United States were very close to the April theses, in contrast to the position of the "old Bolsheviks" present in Petrograd (Stalin, Kamenev, etc.), who were for critical support of Prince Lvov's government.

(d) "It is true that there were points of agreement, particularly on the national question in 1921, when Lenin and Trotsky joined together in fighting Stalin's Great Russian tendencies (with regard to Georgia)."

Here Hincker tries hard to play the gracious lord, but once again he is wrong. In 1921 Lenin gave Trotsky no support whatever in his protests against Stalin's handling of the Georgian problem. In October 1922, Lenin still had confidence in Stalin. It was not until December 1922 that he became aware of the real situation, dissavowed Stalin and made an alliance with Trotsky. But by juggling the dates in this way, Hincker is
able to talk about the year 1922 as one marked by total opposition between Lenin and Trotsky in the Political Bureau...We will return to this point.

(e) "Again, in 1923, in his famous 'letter to the Congress,' the so-called 'Testament,' Lenin brings up Trotsky's Menshevik past."

Lenin could not have brought up Trotsky's Menshevik past since the latter broke with the Mensheviks in the autumn of 1904 and was in disagreement with them on the questions of bourgeois liberalism and revolutionary perspectives.

What is mentioned in the "Testament" is Trotsky's "non-Bolshevism" (Editions sociales, Vol. 36, p. 607).

Lenin, referring to Trotsky's non-Bolshevik past, said he was not to be blamed for this any more than Zinoviev and Kamenev were to be blamed for the October episode. In August-September 1956, the magazine Les Cahiers du communisme (The Notebooks of Communism) already falsified this text, referring to "Trotsky's non-Bolshevik spirit."

The falsifiers follow in each other's footsteps and resemble each other...

From Chronicler to Theoretician

With the help of such unsavory methods, Mr. Hincker expands his "demonstration," utilizing by-products of the anti-Trotskyist campaign of 1924-1925:

-- Trotsky underestimated the peasantry.
-- Trotsky took an absurd position at Brest-Litovsk.
-- Trotsky was against war Communism when it was necessary and critical of the NEP as soon as it was adopted.
-- Trotsky and Lenin were in opposition to each other during the whole year of 1922.

Let us give Hincker the floor once again:

"The idea that the poor peasantry in Russia is incapable of an independent revolutionary movement and will only be awakened and led to power by the proletariat -- an idea which is fundamental to the theory of permanent revolution -- finally joined up with the Menshevik conception that the Russian problem was the same as the West European, as opposed to the Leninist analysis of Russian originality, based on the existence of an objectively revolutionary peasantry."

With every word a lie and an error. Trotsky never said that the peasantry (let alone the poor peasantry) was incapable of an independent revolutionary movement. In The Balance and Prospects, he analyzes spontaneous peasant movements in Russia and in France. He demonstrates that the peasantry, because of its economic and social situation, the dispersed nature of its property, its "local-mindedness," never succeeded in leading a revolutionary movement capable of achieving the goals of the peasants' struggles. Although the peasant has fought, it has always been either for the bourgeoisie or for the landlord. And from 1905 on, Trotsky explained that the peasantry constitutes an immense revolutionary force in Russia but that it needs a leadership. Only the young Russian proletariat, concentrated and combative, could assume this role. He is, at the same time, critical of Lenin's slogan of a "democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants," which implied that the peasantry was capable of creating a revolutionary party independent of the liberal bourgeoisie and able to deal on an equal basis with the party of the proletariat.

"It is altogether obvious that the proletariat executes its mission, just as the bourgeoisie did in former times, by winning the support of the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. The proletariat leads the countryside, draws it into the movement, interests it in the success of its plans, but always remains at the head. It is not a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. It is a dictatorship of the proletariat supported by the peasantry." (Trotsky, 1905.)

History completely substantiated this view and in 1917 the old Bolshevik slogan was discarded. So far as the Mensheviks were concerned, their position was the opposite -- since the future revolution had to carry out bourgeois tasks (parliamentary democracy, agrarian reform, etc.), it was up to the bourgeoisie to assume leadership, with the proletariat and its organizations contenting themselves with playing the role of a constructive opposition.
In trying to include Trotsky among the Mensheviks, poor Hincker is most unsuccessful; all he succeeds in doing is to pile up a series of incoherent remarks, concluding with this gleaming pearl: "But at the time [in 1905], Lenin, the realist, was thinking of the Party rather than of the Revolution. What admirable realism lies in this dichotomy, in which the Party stands in opposition to the Revolution! Truly, our author's Stalinist education has taught him perfectly how to dissociate these two "incompatible" elements.

Hincker has no more luck with the Brest-Litovsk period.

"At the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, Trotsky, while not siding with the ultralefts, who advocated resuming the war, did reject the German ultimatum while at the same time announcing the withdrawal of the Russian army -- an absurd position which can only be explained by Trotsky's illusion in spontaneity -- the proletariat, confronted by a demand to attack Soviet Russia, would refuse to do so and would revolt."

This illusion in spontaneity, castigated with such disdain by our critic, was shared by the majority of the Bolshevik Central Committee, that is to say, by men with a different past and different education from that of our author. Lenin, whose position in favor of an immediate peace turned out to be correct, was in a minority. The majority of the Central Committee was divided between "left Communists," who wanted an immediate "revolutionary war" against Germany, and partisans of Trotsky's theses, calling for demobilization of the army while refusing to sign a peace treaty, so that any eventual renewal of hostilities by the Germans would appear before the world as an odious imperialist aggression.

In order to know what took place at Brest-Litovsk, it is only necessary to read the minutes of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party at the time. Unfortunately, while the work is on sale in Moscow and in Italy, the Nouvelle Critique publishers must no doubt have found it below their standards, so that it has fallen to the lot of the publishers of Éditions Maspero to make it available to French readers.

At the Central Committee meeting of January 11 (24), 1918, Trotsky's formula "We stop the war without concluding peace; we demobilize the army" received nine votes against seven.

On February 22, Bukharin (curiously given a stellar role by Hincker for his subsequent anti-Trotskyist texts) declared that he was leaving the Central Committee and the editorial board of Pravda.

On February 23, the Central Committee went over to Lenin's side by seven votes to four, thanks to the four abstentions of Trotsky, Krestinsky, Dzerzhinsky and Joffe. Trotsky explained that he was not convinced of the need to accept the German proposals immediately, but that in no case did he want to upset the unity of the party. The party faced the threat of a split at the moment. The only solution was to permit the creation of a majority, so as to achieve a single line.

(To be continued.)

COST OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM

The cost to the United States for the war it is waging against the Vietnamese people is now running more than $23 billion a year.

Attempting to put this in understandable terms, Dr. Oscar N. Rambo Jr., professor of pathology at the University of California Medical Center, compared it in the following way, according to the January 4 San Francisco Chronicle:

"For the daily cost of the war (now more than $66 million a day, seven days a week), we could operate this medical center for two years, or pay every educational expense of every medical student in the United States for four years.

"The monthly cost would provide the training for four years of 169,000 school teachers, and 125,000 nurses, and 50,000 physicians."

Dr. Rambo gave the figures at a press conference January 3 in announcing an anti-war rally the next day at the UC Medical Center. The rally was scheduled as part of a nationwide protest by the medical profession against the war.
"SPARTACIST" PUBLISHES OPEN LETTER CALLING FOR HEALY'S OUSTING

[The January-February issue of Spartacist, which is published in New York by the Central Committee of the Spartacist League and edited by James Robertson, carries an open letter to "other supporters" of the "International Committee," calling for the ouster of Healy as national secretary of the Socialist Labour League because of his role in the beating administered to Ernest Tate in front of an SLL meeting in London last November 17. The letter, entitled "OUST HEALY!," is of special interest in view of the respect and admiration shown by this group toward the top leadership of the SLL up until last April when this leadership threw them out of a joint conference. In addition, the letter reveals new details about the antidemocratic regime in the SLL.

[The first paragraph of the open letter states that there is a "gross scandal in the Trotskyist movement, involving charges of an extremely serious nature" leveled against the leadership of the SLL. In view of the "political similarity between the Spartacist League and the SLL, and the close organizational relations existing at various times in the past, we feel it our responsibility to make our views on the matters involved clear and unambiguous."

[The content of the charges is revealed in a letter circulated by Ernest Tate (see World Outlook, particularly December 2, 9 and 23, 1966), which Spartacist quotes in full. In the letter, Tate describes how, in order to prevent him from selling socialist literature in front of an SLL meeting, he was set upon by a gang in the presence of Healy and beaten so savagely that he had to be hospitalized. Spartacist then continues as follows (subheadings are by Spartacist).

** * * *

Following the circulation of this letter among Left and labor circles in England and its reprinting by several radical publications, the SLL instituted legal proceedings against Comrade Tate and threatened publications printing Tate's letter with the same treatment.

"Alighting from Coaches"

That Healy had Tate beaten is not disputed -- in fact it is defended, as being within the framework of bourgeois "law and order." According to Healy's lawyers, the Tate letter "described a disturbance on the pavement outside Caxton Hall, where the meeting was being held at which our client was a speaker. The letter states that Mr. Healy indicated to his followers that the writer of the letter should be removed from the front of the Hall and that he was assaulted by supporters of the Socialist Labour League. We are instructed that this is inaccurate. Mr. Healy, in fact, asked a steward to clear the pavement in front of the entrance to the Hall in order to allow passengers alighting from coaches to enter the Hall without being obstructed."

This grotesque legal language only serves to point up the hypocrisy of a man claiming to be a proletarian revolutionary leader using such a law -- from the period when lords and ladies descending from their coaches had the right to smash beggars, petitioners, children and anyone else in their way -- against another member of the labor movement.

Healy's legal action was clearly intended to intimidate other publications from printing the letter and to end public discussion of the whole matter. Two of the papers which had printed the letter, the Socialist Leader and Peace News, issued retractions and paid the costs demanded by Healy.

Perhaps Healy's having Tate beaten might have been rationalized as an uncontrolled individual outburst of anger; but the appeal to "the Queen's Justice" implicates the entire SLL leadership, both in the initial hooliganism and in the attempt to suppress discussion within the workers' movement.

**Gangsterism**

Such tactics applied internally are not new to Healy. We have not previously spoken of the atmosphere of physical intimidation that surrounded the April London Conference, but it was present. We have since heard well-authenticated accounts of the use by the SLL leadership of calculated violence ("punch-ups") to silence internal critics. We already knew that Healy had developed a technique which destroyed the revolutionary morality of those around him by systematically forcing them to make false confession against themselves. It was for refusing to do this that Spartacist was expelled from the April Conference of the International Committee.
What has now led Healy to employ these tactics outside his movement? This summer the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) issued for their own purposes a pamphlet on the April Conference entitled "Healy Reconstrains the Fourth International," the one Tate was attempting to sell outside the SLL meeting. The pamphlet consists mainly of correspondence between Spartacist and the SLL prior to and following the Conference. It lays bare -- most clearly in Healy's own words -- the criminal wrecking tactics he employs within the international Trotskyist movement. In denouncing the pamphlet in the 20 August Newsletter, the Political Committee of the SLL stated: "We shall not hesitate to deal appropriately with the handful of United Secretariat agents who hawk it around the cynical fake-left in England."

"Outside the Working Class"

Healy has attempted to put a theoretical face on his actions against supporters of the SWP -- one similar to that used by the Stalinists in the thirties to justify their gangster attacks on Trotskyists. Then Trotskyists were labelled "counter-revolutionary" and beaten when they attempted to circulate literature explaining what was happening in the Soviet Union. The SLL at a "Special Conference" held 26 and 27 November passed a Declaration on the Socialist Workers Party, printed in the 3 December Newsletter and reprinted in the Bulletin. The document describes the SWP as "turning completely away from the working class." The dispute between the SLL and the SWP is "a fight between the working class and the servants of the class enemy." It states: "We tell the SWP: The days when you could address us as 'comrades' are long since gone. Your political actions have placed you outside the camp of Trotskyism and of the working class.... There can be no slightest question of your telling us what we must do to re-establish our reputation with you." At the conclusion of the document appears the statement: "The issues raised in the Nov. 21st letter by Farrell Dobbs, Secretary of the Socialist Workers Party, about what happened at Caxton Hall on the night of November 17th, we cannot discuss at this stage for legal reasons." Yet even if supporters of the SWP must be cleared from the streets as "servants of the class enemy," the appeal against them to the bourgeois courts is not explained. The Trotskyist movement has always opposed any appeal to the bourgeois state, even against Fascists.

Healy Exposed

The turn by Healy and the SLL leadership to the political methods of the petty bourgeoisie and to the bourgeois courts is not the action of either genuine revolutionists or of "ultraleft sectarians." Such methods have no relation to the formal politics of the SLL, the politics of revolutionary Trotskyism. How is this contradiction to be explained? We say that Healy is an aggressive and greedy adventurer whose particular politics have changed frequently. At the present he is claiming to adhere to the revolutionary Marxist program of Trotskyism. Tomorrow his politics will be something else, just as they were only a few years ago when Healy was indistinguishable from the Bevanites in the Labour Party. Furthermore, Healy is an adventurer peculiarly preoccupied with sharp financial deals and with technical and material matters. His Plough Press does heavy commercial work -- using his comrades' labor. He believes that "weak" national sections should financially support the "strong" one, i.e., his. Thus in 1961 he took over $1,000 from those of us who were then his supporters in this country in order to make a world tour. The tour never materialized, nor was the money returned or otherwise accounted for. (Copies of the relevant correspondence and cancelled checks would be available to any bona-fide workers' investigating commission.) Since then Healy has always sought, successfully, to conduct his relations with comrades in the U.S. at a profit. Churchill once described England as a nation of small businessmen. Healy stands as the left wing of his nation.

Sack Healy!

The persistent adherence by the Spartacist League to the revolutionary principles and program of Trotskyism, to which Healy gives lip service, have twice led Healy to break with and attempt to destroy us. Because of this adherence, the Spartacist League is not now besmirched by the public exposure of the gangster tactics Healy uses. Just as Farrell Dobbs' telegram of condolences to Mrs. Kennedy came as a revelation even to those who were most aware of the deepening revisionism of the SWP, so Healy's outrageous beat-
ing of Tate, compounded by dragging the victim before the courts of Elizabeth II's England, is a striking exposure of his and his leading committee's bankruptcy as revolutionists. To the members of the SLL and the other sections of the IC, we say: OUST HEALY!

In the United States the American Committee for the Fourth International (ACFI) has consistently aped Healy. Its members have now individually defended Healy's attack on Tate by saying, "Well, we want to smash Pabloites, don't we?" while the Bulletin reprints Healy's cynical statement that questions pertaining to "the events around Caxton Hall" cannot be discussed "for legal reasons." The ACFI members, whose initial weaknesses were exploited by Healy in typical Comintern fashion, are now being made to accept and justify ever greater departures from revolutionary practice. As with Stalin's Comintern, sections that have developed along this path have no inner stamina to resist any threat or any "opportunity" domestically. At the first opportunity we will see ACFI's vaunted "internationalism" (i.e., loyalty to a British clique) change into the most vicious American nationalism.

As for the SWP, it is certainly their right to factionally use against their political opponents this act of hooliganism. However, as Oscar Wilde once pointed out, hypocrisy is the acknowledged vice pays to virtue. The SWP today is chasing after the same pacifists, Stalinists and middle-class elements who have been and will be guilty of the most serious violence against the working class and its left wing, both directly and through the bourgeois state. However, despite motives of the SWP, its objective call at the present time for democracy within the labor movement is correct. We concur, only insisting that this democracy be applied impartially to all sections of the workers' movement. Furthermore, we are for the defense by any measures necessary of the right of Tate or anyone else within the workers' movement to press their opinions. The legal defense imposed on Tate certainly merits the support of all militants, and contributions for this purpose may be sent to him c/o Pioneer Book Service, 8 Toynbee Street, London, E.1, England.

Trotsky's Method

In addition to the defense of Tate, what can be done to apply the maximum pressure against repetitions of this conduct? Trotsky has offered us an example of how to proceed in his article, "A Case for a Labor Jury -- Against All Types of Gangsterism in the Working Class Movement: On the Murder of the Italian Stalinist Montanari." In this emigre quarrel the killer had apparently been victimized by the Stalinists and after resorting to violence he was for a time falsely linked by them to the Trotskyists. The conduct of the Italian Communist Party then roughly corresponds to the SLL's now. The conclusion of the article from the New Militant, 5 October 1935, is reprinted here:

"...The Montanari-Beiso case is important precisely because a conflict on the political plane has led to a supremely senseless act of murder of one emigre by another. In this there lies an ominously serious warning, and it is necessary to grasp its significance in time!

...The Montanari-Beiso case is important precisely because a conflict on the political plane has led to a supremely senseless act of murder of one emigre by another. In this there lies an ominously serious warning, and it is necessary to grasp its significance in time!

presidential elections, and who had put defense of the Cuban Revolution as the first plank of his proposed foreign policy, included the following: "We extend our deepest sympathy to Mrs. Kennedy and the children in their personal grief."

Healy -- not exactly a humanist, socialist or otherwise -- considered such an expression of sympathy in personal grief to be an unprecedented betrayal of socialist principles. As an archivist, Robertson should know better.

When Count Mirbach, the German ambassador to the Bolshevik government, was assassinated by an ultraleftist in Moscow on July 6, 1918, Lenin, Trotsky and other top officials discussed what to do in the emergency. It was decided that a delegation should be sent at once to the German embassy -- a delegation headed by Lenin personally.

And what should the head of the delegation say? Lenin's preference was to offer "sympathy" to the German imperialist government; but the final decision was that he should use a stronger word -- "condolences."

Lenin did it, although Trotsky observed that "it was probably one of the most difficult moments of his life."

Lenin was capable of such flexibility because, among other things, he thought through each situation concretely and sought to avoid reducing principles to dogmas, tripping over them and falling flat on his face the way ultraleft sectarians insist on doing. -- World Outlook.]
"The matter is now in the hands of the bourgeois law courts. The official investigation is obviously not intended to cast light on the bloody tragedy from the standpoint of revolutionary morals of the proletariat. The prosecution will probably try only to compromise the proletarian emigres and the revolutionary organizations in particular. But the agents of the Comintern will also try to exploit the trial for every vile purpose as they are obliged to do. The duty of workers' organizations, without any regard for political banners, lies in one thing: in shedding the greatest light possible on this case, and thereby, insofar as it is possible, to prevent the repetition of gunplay in revolutionary circles.

"In our opinion, the labor organizations must establish, without any further delay, an authoritative and non-partisan Committee which would go over the entire material, including Beiso's letters mentioned in l'Humanité, to examine all the witnesses and representatives of the parties and groups who are concerned or interested in the case, so that the political, moral and personal circumstances in the case be clearly established. This is necessary not only in memory of Montanari, not only to reveal Beiso's real motives, but also to purge the atmosphere of all working class organizations of treachery, calumny, hounding and gun play. Naturally the interests of the case would be best served if the representatives of l'Humanité and of the Central Committee of the Italian C.P. were to take part in this Committee. But we may safely predict that they will most certainly refuse: these politicians stand only to lose from an impartial investigation, and much more than would appear on the surface. But the investigation ought not to be wrecked by their refusal to participate. Every honest participant in the labor movement is deeply interested in seeing to it that this abscess is opened which can otherwise develop into gangrene. The tragic case of Montanari-Beiso must be brought before a labor jury."

Workers' Inquiry

In the event that the grip of Healy's clique on the Socialist Labour League is too strong, or Healy's leading collaborators on the International Committee too cowardly, to intervene directly to oust Healy, we think it appropriate to force a workers' inquiry to expose this fraud who disorients and corrupts the Trotskyist movement by posing as a revolutionary leader.

INTEREST IN TROTSKY ON RISE AMONG KERALA INTELLECTUALS

Bombay

Literary and political circles in Kerala, where a United Front sponsored by the left Communist party of India is "bidding for power through the ballot box," appear to be losing interest somewhat in the ideology of both the left and right CPI's and turning toward the writings of Leon Trotsky.

An indication of this is the publication in Mangalodayam of a lengthy article entitled "Trotsky -- a Great Cultural Leader." The study of Trotsky's contributions in the literary and cultural fields is by V. Aravindakshan, a leading intellectual who was a member of the editorial board of the right CPI daily Nava Jeevan (New Life).

Mangalodayam is an influential Malayalam cultural-literary magazine edited by Professor Joseph Mundasseri, a leading literary figure, who worked as Education Minister in the former Communist party ministry in Kerala (1957-59) before that government was dismissed by Nehru.

Professor Mundasseri has severed connections with the CPI; and Aravindakshan is also said to have been removed from Nava Jeevan as "punishment" for having written an article praising Trotsky.

Mangalodayam also published a letter from M. Rashid, editor of Chenkathir correcting some errors in Aravindakshan's article concerning Trotsky's concept of democratic centralism.

Chenkathir is a Marxist journal appearing in the Malayalam language under the auspices of dissidents in the Revolutionary Socialist party in Kerala who have rebelled against the leadership as a protest against its opportunistic electoral alliances.