LEON TROTSKY:
On Workers Control of Production

Hector Bejar:
On Guerrilla Tactics in Latin America

Kenya: Not Yet Uhuru
—a Review of Oginga Odinga's Book

But Why Clifford?

Four H-Bombs in Greenland and One Spy Ship in North Korea
LEON TROTSKY:
On Workers Control of Production

Hector Bejar:
On Guerrilla Tactics in Latin America

Kenya: Not Yet Uhuru
— a Review of Oginga Odinga’s Book

But Why Clifford?

Four H-Bombs in Greenland and One Spy Ship in North Korea
JOHNSON DEFIES HIS CONGRESSIONAL CRITICS

By George Novack

Johnson's appointment of Clark Clifford to replace Robert McNamara as Secretary of Defense substantiates the prevailing view that the president is set on pushing ahead with intensified military operations in Southeast Asia.

Clifford is a Washington lawyer and high-priced lobbyist for the biggest U.S. corporations and military contractors. He has been a confidential adviser to the last three Democratic presidents on both domestic and foreign affairs. Two years ago he opposed the 37-day bombing pause in Vietnam. The New York Times writes that "he is ranked by knowledgeable observers as even more hawkish than Secretary of State Dean Rusk and is said to be firmly convinced that President Johnson's strong stand in Vietnam is right and will be so judged by history."

Clifford's assumption of the second most important cabinet post makes the roster of intransigents complete among the top decision makers on foreign policy. The two principal proponents of de-escalation, McNamara and former Under-Secretary of State George Ball, have been eased out. Now every one of the "fearsome foursome" which meets every Thursday for luncheon at the White House -- the president, Secretary of State Rusk, Clifford and W.W.Rostow -- is committed to the most belligerent course in Asia. That makes the quartet more fearsome than ever.

Johnson's critics in Congress and other high places are becoming increasingly alarmed at his recklessness and angered by his arrogant disregard for their counsels of caution. On the day that the president announced his choice of Clifford, Senator George D. Aiken, the conservative Vermont Republican who is the second ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee, delivered one of the strongest denunciations of the official policy yet heard on the Senate floor.

He accused the administration of resorting to "military strength" in Vietnam to cover up its "political ineptitude." According to him, the problem there involved an internal conflict over the direction of nationalist aspirations rather than a centrally directed international communist conspiracy. "To make out that the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong even today are integral parts of a unified monolithic world communism is simply self-destructive fantasy," he declared.

Aiken said that "the Administration has had to create a monolithic enemy to justify its refusal to admit past mistakes. By clinging to its inventions the Administration is simply duping Americans at home and undermining credibility abroad in the sincerity of our purposes and the efficiency of our diplomacy."

In fact, he said, the administration has "so trifled with words" that it has managed "to endanger the peace of the world and to embitter our society at home in a manner not seen in a century." Aiken's speech was commended by Democratic Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Republican Senator Cooper of Kentucky.

On January 22 Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield warned that "the logical consequence of greater American involvement is still greater American involvement. At some point in this process, if it continues, the escalator may well go out of control. The war could then spread throughout the Asian mainland and push headlong toward a catastrophic world conflict."

Johnson does not show the least inclination to conciliate the growing array of his opponents. He made that plain in the key passages on Vietnam in his "State of the Union" address to Congress. His attitude on continued U.S. intervention in the civil war in Vietnam remains substantially the same as Goldwater's.

In a January 22 television interview Rostow set forth some of the strategic considerations behind the present policy. He stated that the United States had drawn a firm line in Korea, Laos, Vietnam and Germany beyond which it would not permit any "Communist aggression" and was fully prepared to uphold that boundary by military force.

Moscow had already learned in the Berlin and Cuban missile confrontations that Washington's will was unshakable, he said. Now Peking and Hanoi (and by inference Havana) had to be taught that subversive guerrilla movements aiming at the overthrow of Western-backed regimes could not succeed. U.S. forces were in Vietnam to protect American interests in that area and these would be defended come what may, Rostow emphasized.

That the administration is animated by such blatant imperialist motives is confirmed by Senator Eugene McCarthy, who in somewhat subdued fashion, is challenging the president for the 1968 Democratic nomination. He wrote in the February 6
issue of Look: "My decision [to run] was strengthened by indications that the Administration has no plans for Vietnam other than continued escalation and intensification. It seems to have set no limits on the price it will pay for military victory."

McCarthy complained about the secrecy cloaking the designs of the administration. "As a senator and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, I find it increasingly difficult to gain information about the conduct of the war, let alone exercise the constitutional responsibility of influencing it. To raise questions in public is to bring down showers of ridicule and invective. The Secretary of State refuses to come before the committee to give public testimony."

The public at large is being kept even more in the dark than the senators who are delegated to advise on foreign policy. It is being systematically misled about the real state of affairs in Vietnam. The official optimists present a picture of steady improvement in American military and political prospects when in actuality these are deteriorating from one month to the next.

The American people strongly suspect they are being hoodwinked and lied to. Johnson alluded to this uneasiness when he observed in his annual message that "there is in the land a certain restlessness, a questioning." Although he tried to minimize its depth and extent, there unmistakably exists a tremendous groundswell of disenchantment with his administration that is going to find expression in new antiwar actions and ghetto revolts during 1968 and at the polls next November.

BUT WHY CLIFFORD?

It has been explained by those who make a living reporting the inside dope on Washington politics that Johnson decided to remove Robert S. McNamara from his cabinet because the man had grown soft and was no longer suitable for the immensely important post of secretary of defense, his mind having become affected by doubts about the wisdom of continuing to escalate the war in Vietnam.

According to this account, McNamara was moving toward a "dove" position. This was surprising news to the ornithologists who had listed him up to that time among the bolder variety of hawks. However, in light of the news, they conceded that perhaps from the standpoint of the Pentagon, McNamara might have become a bit dovish.

McNamara went down with tributes from all sides that could hardly have been more laudatory if he were already laid out in his coffin. The man with the computer brain was credited with having reorganized the defense establishment from top to bottom, with having put this colossal, sprawling, worldwide enterprise - America's biggest business - on an efficient, cost-accounting basis.

Then came the surprise. McNamara was not replaced by a military strategist - nor by another executive type. Johnson chose, instead, Clark M. Clifford - a lawyer.

Why would Johnson want a lawyer at the head of the war department? It is true that his escalation of U.S. intervention in Vietnam is completely illegal. The U.S. constitution specifically places
the war-making powers with Congress, and Congress has not declared war. Moreover, in his conduct of the war, Johnson has violated international law and custom in countless ways. The International War Crimes Tribunal has found his administration guilty of deeds as unspeakable as those committed by the German imperialist government in World War II, for which leading Nazis were hanged by the victorious Allied powers.

The truth is that Johnson already has his legal flank well covered. Congress, by passing the Tonkin Gulf resolution, gave Johnson power of attorney to act in Vietnam. The congressmen knew what they were doing when they put their names to this document, since nearly all of them, both Republicans and Democrats, are lawyers well acquainted with fine print. In addition, as reserves on the legal front, Johnson can count on the entire Supreme Court. These nine men, of course, are all lawyers, the most distinguished and powerful in the land.

So why Clark Clifford?

To unravel the mystery, it is necessary to know what Johnson considers to be the most important and pressing problem facing the United States at the moment. The January 1 New York Times indicated Johnson's thinking on this through a dispatch from Saigon. An unnamed official of the puppet government told the Times correspondent:

"It was in a briefing the other day, and the man briefing us came out and said it: 'An election year is about to begin. And the people we work for are in the business of re-electing President Johnson in November.'"

The acuteness of the problem arises from the fact that Johnson's popularity, with ups and downs, has steadily declined so that at points it has appeared that any Republican, even Nixon, could beat him.

Johnson himself has pictured the situation as comparable to the one faced by Truman in 1948. An analyst as authoritative as Walter Lippmann has disputed this, saying that Johnson's situation comes closer to the one faced by Herbert Hoover in 1932.

Johnson has dismissed with contempt both Lippmann and his conclusions, insisting that the real parallel is with Truman. He has already sought to find a solution along the lines which worked out so well for the man who beat Dewey and then took the country into the Korean war.

The press has described Johnson's efforts to change his image in some detail. Thus the public has been kept well informed on how the president has let his hair turn silver, or had it tinted silver; how he has let it grow long, even putting a seductive wave in locks that are not yet flowing but are commendably close to the style made popular by Everett Dirksen, the Republican party charmer.

The extreme nature of the latter bit of image reconstruction can be judged by the fact that in his younger days Johnson would probably have been sooner caught dead than with his hair marcelled. But anything for the American people! If they want a touch of the hippie in their president, Johnson is ready to oblige.

This is exactly where Clark Clifford comes in. A book about the 1948 election, now in the press, describes the key role played by Clifford, who was called in by Truman for some badly needed advice.

Clifford, who is a realist in these matters, saw that the situation was very bad, if not desperate. He drew up a forty-page memorandum which is cited in the book and which is now being quoted in the press.

"The Democratic party," Clifford told Truman, "is an unhappy alliance of Southern conservatives, Western progressives, and Big City labor....The success or failure of the Democratic leadership can be precisely measured by its ability to lead enough members of these misfit groups to the polls."

"The blunt fact is," this lawyer told his client, "that the party has been so long in power that it is fat, tired, and even a little senile."

He then outlined how Truman should go about his campaign. The key thing was to change his image. He must put on an act, playing the role of "a man of the people trying to do his best." He should, moreover, "take the offensive."

Noting all this, James Reston, the Washington correspondent of the New York Times, points out why Johnson has now turned to the same lawyer for advice on the difficult problem facing him in 1968: "...it is not surprising that Clark Clifford, the architect of Truman's spectacular victory of 1948, should suddenly appear on the Washington scene."

"The only surprising thing," continues Reston, "is that he did not take over as chairman of the Democratic Committee, which is where Mr. Johnson really needs a secretary of defense. Nevertheless, the appointment is logical and in some ways even welcome, for Mr. Clifford is not only a brilliant lawyer, but a good public speaker with a sense of humor and a sense of history."

James A. Wechsler of the liberal
New York Post has suggested a further consideration in Johnson's calculations. Wechsler, in his column of January 22, quotes a "shrewd Johnsonologist" as follows:

"If Eugene McCarthy suddenly got moving or Robert Kennedy decided to get into the fight himself, the cold fact is that Johnson can manipulate the war to keep his critics on the defensive.

"If the pressure gets strong enough, he can somehow get himself to the peace table — and leak word that his bargaining power was being undermined by his domestic opponents. And if the talks collapse, he can blame them for what happened."

Conversely, if the war is widened, Johnson "just keeps running against Ho Chi Minh right through to November."

Wechsler then declares, "Clifford is not only remembered as an architect of the Truman 'miracle' of 1948. He is an instinctive political man. In accepting the assignment and renouncing all his private ties, he said deftly that henceforth his 'only client would be the United States.' This was a euphemism; his primary client will be the President, and a large part of his mission is a repetition of the Democratic victory two decades ago.

"The commitment involves no personal conflict of interest; unlike McNamara, Clifford has suffered no tortures of doubt about our role in Vietnam and, if anything has echoed the Achesonian 'hard-line' view as unofficial counsellor. He is no doubt persuaded that Mr. Johnson's renomination and reelection are crucial to the continuity of our course in Southeast Asia. But his selection also presents the prospect that there will be more direct 'manipulation' of the conflict -- both military and diplomatic."

In short, Johnson has decided that the electorate in 1968 will act somewhat like a jury. As a war criminal, he needs genuinely competent legal advice. Clifford is the best he can get. To make it possible for this Machiavelli to operate with maximum effectiveness in shaping the appeals to the jury, he must be in position to pass judgment on every key move in the most sensitive area affecting Johnson's case. The indicated thing was to have him serve as Johnson's first lieutenant in conducting the war in Vietnam.

For the sake of efficiency, McNamara had to make room for a different expert.

FOUR H-BOMBS IN GREENLAND AND ONE SPY SHIP IN NORTH KOREA

It was a record week for the Johnson administration.

On January 21, a B-52 crashed in Greenland, near Thule, with four hydrogen bombs on board. Some of the bombs probably sank in about 500 feet of water. Radioactivity was later discovered in the snow, however, indicating that at least one of the bombs had broken its casing.

The accident came in the wake of immense publicity about Johnson's success in negotiating a nuclear nonproliferation treaty with Kosygin-Brezhnev. The sudden proliferation of radioactivity in Greenland cast a revealing light on the true nature of the treaty. While other countries are to be denied bombs, the U.S. retains the "right" to fly them continuously over the territories of all countries too weak to resist.

In Copenhagen, pickets immediately responded. They carried such placards as "Stop U.S.A.'s Death Flying" and "Atom Weapons Are Now on Danish Soil."

While the White House was trying to brazen it out, as in the previous fifteen accidents involving nuclear weapons, the North Koreans on January 23 seized a spy ship caught red-handed in "electronic" activities near Wonsan. All of Washington at once set up a howl about "aggression" on the part of North Korea. They dared to lay hands on our spy ship!

An authority on codes, David Kahn, former president of the American Cryptogram Association and the New York Cipher Society, explained what the Pueblo was up to. The crew was trying "to pick up as much radio and radar emissions as possible." The ship operated less than twenty-five miles from the coast "for the obvious reason that weaker signals fade out, so they wanted to get in as close as they could to get as many signals as possible and as loud as possible." This accounts for the radio silence observed from time to time by the spy ship as it cut close to shore.

The North Korean government issued three specific warnings -- on January 6, 11 and 12 -- on U.S. spy boat activities. These were disregarded by the Pentagon and the CIA. Thus Johnson finds himself in a position like Eisenhower's when the famous U-2 spy plane was shot down deep inside the Soviet Union in 1960. Will he admit the truth like Eisenhower or insist on standing on the lies?
A NEW CURRENT IN THE DANISH LEFT

[The elections to the Folketing in Denmark January 23 registered a shift to the right. The leftist parties, headed by the Social Democrats, lost their parliamentary majority, and Jens Otto Krag handed in his resignation as prime minister. The shift is shown by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People's Socialist party</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Liberals</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Liberals</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Center</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[In addition to the 175 seats listed above, the Faroe Islands and Greenland are each entitled to two deputies, making 179 in all.

[Various smaller parties ran candidates but did not succeed in winning any seats. The Communist party vote was 1% as compared with 0.8% in 1966. The newly formed Left Socialist party won 2%.

[The background to the election, as well as an explanation of the trends in Danish politics today, is provided by the following article, written on the eve of the election by a Danish correspondent of World Outlook.]

* * *

Copenhagen

"The People's Socialist party has been split. The vote last night showed that in less than a decade the PSP has come under bourgeois influence to an extent reached by the Social Democrats only over the course of two or three decades.

"It also showed that the revival of healthy organizational forms in political work, which we expected from the PSP, has not been forthcoming and that the party has accepted the autocratic form of leadership which exists in the old parties.

"And finally, it showed that the left wing, which stayed in the party to guarantee such a revival, would no longer be tolerated."

These are the opening words of a statement issued December 19, 1967, to announce the formation of a new socialist party, the fourth workers' party on the Danish political scene. (The others are the Social Democratic, the Communist, and the People's Socialist parties.)

The new party was founded by roughly half of the delegates to an extraordinary congress of the PSP. This move came in the wake of a decisive vote on December 18 that split the party irreconcilably down the middle. It was the culmination of a bitter struggle by the left wing of the PSP against the arrayed forces of the PSP right wing, the Social Democratic party as a whole, and the trade-union bureaucrats.

The ramifications of this struggle included, among other things, the collapse of the Social Democratic government on December 16 and the scheduling of an election January 23.

For a better understanding of the situation, a look at the history of the People's Socialist party is necessary.

The PSP was founded in 1958, thereby becoming one of the first "new left" currents in Europe to begin building its own political party. And it succeeded, in fact, in breaking the monopoly over working-class politics held by the Social Democrats and Communists.

The PSP example served as an inspiration for left socialist currents in other Scandinavian countries -- for the founding of the People's Socialist party in Norway; the de-Stalinization of the Swedish CP; and the development of a left wing in the Finnish Social Democracy.

In the first election in which the PSP took part, in 1960, it won all six of the previous Communist seats in parliament, and took another five away from the Social Democrats. This rapid success was attributable, in part, to the nature of the new party's leadership, which included well-known politicians and trade-union leaders -- among them, Aksel Larsen, former head of the Danish CP, an excellent speaker and experienced debater. Nearly all the leading cadres were old Communists.

It is here also that the reason for the party's rapid degeneration is to be found. The CP in Denmark, like many other Communist parties, found itself isolated from the vanguard of the workers as a result of its Stalinist policies.

To break out of this isolation was the chief aim of Larsen and company. Unlike the young members of the PSP, he and most of the old Stalinists never understood that the root of the problem was Stalinism. Instead of settling accounts with this reactionary theory, they formulated a "new" political line for the PSP, which included hostility toward the workers' states and confinement to parliamentarianism at home.
The "parliamentary road to socialism" in reality became the road of transformation into a new Social Democratic party. As for the inner life of the PSP, the old Stalinists remained true to their traditions, using any and every means against any opposition.

During the first eight years of the PSP's existence, its narrow parliamentary orientation did not cancel out its positive features in the eyes of its supporters. The Social Democrats who dominated the government had no interest in the new party as far as parliamentary deals and maneuvers were concerned. They considered the PSP the same old Communist serpent, even though it had sloughed its skin. The Social Democrats preferred to base their governments on coalitions with bourgeois parties.

The result was a long row of neo-capitalist ("welfare state") compromises, which placed on the backs of the workers the burden of keeping capitalist society functioning. Since the PSP did not participate in these compromises, it gained increasing sympathy from the workers.

In the general elections in November 1966 the PSP won twenty seats, doubling the number won in 1964. In many working-class districts in Copenhagen it became the biggest party. The background to the voting at that time was a measure carried by the governing coalition a few months before, which "solved" the housing problem by a formidable rise in rents.

The PSP campaigned with the promise to repeal this measure and to fight against the imposition of a new ten percent sales tax on all goods, including food. They called on the electorate to put a "workers majority" in parliament.

When the vote was counted, it showed that the combined strength of the PSP and the Social Democrats would give them a one-seat majority. At a moment's notice the entire attitude of the Social Democrats toward the PSP changed. The day after the election the leaders of the two parties met to discuss forming a coalition government.

Such a coalition was blocked, however, by the rank and file of the PSP, who for the first time threatened an open revolt. Instead, the two parties worked out an agreement to collaborate in support of certain measures. These included a "tax reform," the first step of which would be to impose the very sales tax that the PSP had campaigned to prevent.

The cause of this about-face lay in the opportunism of the PSP leadership and in its senselessly exaggerated election propaganda. It had portrayed the establishment of a "workers majority" as a veritable coming of the millennium.

The Social Democrats refused to form a "workers majority" unless the PSP agreed to their conditions. If the PSP would not comply, the blame would rest on PSP shoulders for not establishing the millennium they had promised.

In Aksel Larsen the Social Democrats found a willing instrument to carry this message back to the PSP. However, the left wing in the PSP failed to see all the blessings of such a "workers majority" government. The forces opposing Larsen's line grew rapidly.

In April 1967 the left wing succeeded in having an extraordinary congress of the party called. At the congress the left wing dominated: it had an overwhelming majority of seats on the executive committee and held seven out of eight seats on the secretariat. The eighth seat was reserved for Larsen as head of the party.

From this point on, the party in fact had two leaderships: the executive committee, dominated by the left wing; and the parliamentary group, headed by Larsen, who founded his own organ and "party office" and claimed the right to call a new extraordinary congress.

In the very bitter struggle that now began, all means were used. Seconded by sensational articles in the bourgeois press, the old Stalinists charged the new leadership with being under "foreign influence." A bourgeois member of parliament even demanded that the prime minister give an account "of the influence of the Fourth International on the policy of the Danish government"!

The new executive committee of the PSP immediately took measures to combat this right-wing drive. They maintained that the duty of the PSP could never be to guarantee to Social Democrats the opportunity to carry out their antisocialist policies. On the contrary, the task of the "workers majority" should be to carry out policies in the interests of the workers and to prepare the road to socialism through "anticapitalist structural reforms" -- a term ascribed to the Belgian Marxist Ernest Mandel.

If necessary, said the left, the PSP should vote against the Social Democratic government, even if that meant its fall.

It was not long before the new strategy was put to a decisive test. In connection with the devaluation of the Danish currency, the krone, the government proposed a law according to which certain automatic cost-of-living wage increases would be canceled.
This meant that the workers would again have to pay the main cost of averting an economic crisis. Furthermore, it meant interference in the contracts, and hence in the independence, of the trade unions beyond anything yet attempted by a bourgeois government in Denmark.

The union bureaucrats gave their sanction to the proposal immediately, but the bourgeois parties, who saw a chance to topple the Social Democratic government, campaigned against it, craftily assuming the role of defenders of the workers rights.

The fate of the bill, as well as of the government, turned on the votes of the PSP.

The executive committee of the party instructed the parliamentary group to vote against the proposal. It worked out an alternate proposal and asked for negotiations with the Social Democrats. For one whole night, a 25-year-old student, not himself a member of parliament, negotiated with the skilled bureaucrats of the Social Democracy. But the Social Democrats were not interested in an agreement. They wanted to see the PSP destroyed.

Thus, the executive committee had no choice but to instruct the parliamentary group to vote against the bill. Fourteen members of the group, led by Larsen, refused to follow these instructions. But Kai Moltke and five younger members complied.

Before the entire nation, which viewed the debate over television, the six left-wing spokesmen explained, one by one, why they could not support the reactionary policies of the Social Democrats and had to vote in a way that would mean the fall of the government. Their objective reasoning as well as their brave and honest attitude won respect in the population to an extent that could not have been foreseen.

Two days after this decisive vote in parliament came the extraordinary congress of the PSP. The report of the executive committee was rejected by a four-vote majority, and the left wing immediately moved ahead to form its own party. Cooperation between the two wings of the PSP was no longer possible.

How should the Left Socialist party be characterized, and what are its chances of becoming a force in the workers movement?

Like the other Danish workers parties, the LSP lacks a revolutionary program; it has for the moment retained the basic PSP program, which, however, is an honest attempt to apply Marxist methods to Danish realities.

The history of the LSP, however -- the way it came into being -- constitutes a basis in experience that can lead to revolutionary conclusions. The party has directly encountered the true nature of the "neocapitalist" economy, the role of the state in relation to the economy, the role of parliament, and that of the Social Democrats and the union bureaucrats.

In the campaign for the January 23 elections, the Left Socialists have stressed the important role of extraparliamentary forces in the fight for socialism. They have also called for solidarity with the national liberation movements in the "third world." There is no doubt that the new program being worked out will base itself on the struggle for anticapitalist structural reforms.

Taught by bitter experience, the LSP has dropped the old forms of leadership. It practices collective leadership, without the office of chairman or other autocratic symbols.

The party begins with an already existing national base. In nearly half of the old PSP local branches the leadership went over to the Left Socialists, followed by half of the PSP town councillors, the whole youth and student organization and, most important, the majority of union leaders formerly in the PSP.

The fact that the Danish left is forced, for the second time in ten years, to build a new party has not diminished the enthusiasm with which, above all, the youth have gone to work.

FAMINE REPORTED IN INDONESIA

A famine in Indonesia on the island of Sumatra, said to have already claimed forty-eight lives, was reported in an Agence France-Presse dispatch of January 24.

The famine victims were among immigrants who had arrived from East Java and Bali, where the price of rice has tripled and signs of desperation among the people are evident. Suicide is said to be mounting among the poor. Many parents no longer able to feed their children are trying to give them away.

The army is reported keeping close watch to prevent the appearance of slogans calling for cheaper rice.
An extensive interview with Fidel Castro, granted to the internationally known journalist and political analyst K.S. Karol, appeared in the February issue of *Evergreen*, the literary review published in New York.

This is the interview that Karol obtained at the time of the conference of the Organization of Latin-American Solidarity held in Havana last July and August. It is published under the title, "Four Days With Fidel."

The two met at two o'clock in the morning in the newly built village of Los Arados at the extreme southern tip of Cuba. Together with a group of Cuban army officers, Castro and Karol spent two days on a tour by jeep through the Sierra Cristal, arriving at last at an experimental agricultural project at Pinares de Mayari.

Castro talked about Cuba's economy, stressing projects to increase the volume of free goods and services in order to eliminate money as a regulator of social relations.

"This isn't a poor country," Castro said. "It has a number of natural resources (precious metals and iron in particular) and is an extremely fertile land for a country with a relatively small population. What made Cuba an underdeveloped country was imperialist exploitation. More than half of our land was not cultivated, and we had no clear idea of its resources."

As one example, Castro pointed to the increases in milk production:

"We have always had plenty of cattle in Cuba, but our herds were never good dairy cattle and we used to import milk. Even now it remains rationed. Then, two years ago, we bought some bulls reputed for their dairy qualities; we've studied various methods for improving our pastures, we've created almost 2,000 insemination centers... By 1970 we'll be producing 20,000,000 liters of milk per month, and our maximum domestic needs will be only 2,000,000 liters. Free milk is not a pipe dream."

At Pinares de Mayari, Karol was shown a vast agricultural project: 25,000 hectares of citrus fruits, truck gardens, and precious wood on land which had lain fallow before the revolution. It is worked by 7,000 young people, all volunteers.

Karol questioned Castro about the still significant number of small private farms.

"You asked me why we helped the small landowners," Castro replied, "giving them credit and furnishing them with fertilizer and free installations: they represent the private sector resisting control, whose existence is, to all intents and purposes, diametrically opposed to our socialist plans. My answer is: private property will disappear in Cuba the day when the socialist sector will have a productive capacity sufficient to make family businesses obsolete."

"Why haven't you tried to group these peasants into cooperatives?" Karol asked.

Fidel answered, "What, after all, is a cooperative? It is a certain number of individual farms brought together, and if one or two families are hostile to us, that's enough to influence the entire group. The cooperative does not represent a socialist form of property; it even threatens to create another form of private property on the land, and consequently impedes real socialism later on. It is not my impression that this problem has been solved in the other socialist countries."

Castro said that there are still 250,000 peasants who own their own land in Cuba.

Karol asked Castro to comment on the charge that Cuba's economy is "subsidized" by the Soviet Union, citing estimates of $600,000,000 per year that the Soviet Union spends on Cuba.

"Our economic relations with the socialist countries are quite clear," Castro said. "The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have made a political choice by establishing economic relations with us at a time when the United States was trying to eliminate us. This decision enabled us to reorient our foreign trade and thwart our enemies' economic maneuvers. Russia also supplies us with arms, because not only must we cope with an economic war but also with sabotage and the constant threat of invasion by the United States."

"But, aside from the arms we receive free of charge, we pay for all the merchandise we import from socialist countries. No one gives us any gifts or 'subsidizes' us. When we owe money to France or England, no one thinks that they are 'subsidizing' our socialism. They profit by their trade with us, as does the socialist bloc."

During the last lap of the trip through the Sierra Cristal, the revolu-
tionary leader and the reporter discussed Cuba's position in the world revolutionary struggle:

While very concerned with the development of Cuba's socialist economy, Castro declared, "We're not crazy enough to want to try and build here at home a 'national communism' which would work out a modus vivendi with the United States and, little by little, become reintegrated into the American economy. Such an attitude would be both immoral and unrealistic...."

"The American leaders.... will agree to coexist with us if we will issue an invitation to the rest of Latin America to accept the status quo.

"This kind of 'peaceful coexistence' is of no interest whatever to us."

The last meeting between Karol and Castro took place just after the end of the OAS conference, August 10.

Karol concludes on the basis of this discussion that Castro does not view the OAS as a new international. This flows, he says, from Castro's statement to him that "The Communist parties have their place in this movement...." and Fidel's insistence that guerrillas cannot be led from outside their country. "It is the adherence of each member organization of OAS to internationalist principles," Karol says, "which will guarantee the cohesion of this new organization, with the task of the permanent committee being simply to coordinate mutual aid among them."

He quotes Castro as saying of the dispute with the Kremlin-oriented Communist parties, "No one has a monopoly on revolution or revolutionary theory. We make no claims to playing the role of guide, nor do we think that our party should serve as a model. We believe in the virtues of discussion and constant re-examination of certain truths which for thirty-five years have been considered as self-evident and which, in fact, are not at all."

Later the discussion shifted to the war in the Mideast. Castro attributed Egypt's defeat to its army's "lack of revolutionary spirit."

"A truly revolutionary force," he said, "can sometimes retreat in the face of an enemy who is better equipped, but it is always capable of continuing the fight under another form and of wresting final victory."

He said that even if Egypt had been entirely overrun, if it had the necessary cohesion and revolutionary determination it could have carried on guerrilla warfare and eventually beaten the Israeli forces.

Karol said that Castro was "profoundly shocked by certain Arab propaganda" on the eve of the war: "True revolutionaries," Castro declared, "never threaten an entire country with extermination. This propaganda unwittingly helped the Israeli leaders mobilize their people's patriotism which they then used in a war of conquest, carried out under the protection of Yankee imperialism. Our condemnation of Israel is unequivocal, but we do not dispute its right to exist."

Karol says that he was able to verify that Cuba is a country of armed people, ready to defend themselves if the United States should attempt to invade.

Castro told him that "Our only guarantee in the face of aggression is our capacity to defend ourselves and our determination to fight to the last man. In my speech in Santiago I said that, if ever there were an American invasion of Cuba, there would never be a cease-fire here, and whoever might employ these words, no matter what his position or past attainments, would be considered a traitor. The Americans know I mean what I say."

MOSCOW REACHES ACCORD WITH BOGOTA

Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Colombia were restored January 19 after several months of very peculiar secret negotiations.

The preliminaries were kept so confidential that even the subject of the press conference announcing the move was not disclosed in advance. While diplomatic relations are not wrong, the secret diplomacy involved raises doubts about what the Soviet bureaucrats may have agreed to in possible under-the-table clauses.

Only last summer the Latin American Solidarity Organization objected to "socialist" countries giving aid to oligarchic regimes that are fighting guerrillas. This resolution was mainly provoked by the visit of a Soviet mission to Colombia to discuss technical aid to that oligarchy.

Colombian President Lleras Restrepo recently stated that the "only obstacle" to establishing relations with "socialist" countries would be "their support of subversive movements that seek to change our institutions."
NEW WAVE OF REPRESSSION IN PERU

[The following is a translation of a letter sent from Lima by the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights.]

* * *

A new wave of repression is sweep- ing Peru. In recent days ferocious perse- cution has been unleashed against mili- tants of the left. Hundreds have been de- tained. Hundreds of outrages have been perpetrated. These include holding in- communicado the families of defendants alleged to be implicated in a bank rob- bery in Lima which the authorities say was committed by "extremist commandos" and which was utilized as the pretext for unleashing the present wave of persecu- tion.

The reactionary press has likewise opened a scandalous anti-Communist public- ity campaign as a means of covering up and camouflaging the current infractions and violations of the law.

In Trujillo, the chairman of the Federación de Estudiantes del Perú, Ruffo Cárcamo, together with many student lead- ers, was seized. Student meetings have been broken up by the police with force, resulting in many injured, even shotguns being fired at the demonstrators. Several students were each blinded in one eye.

This is the atmosphere in which it was announced that the trial had been set in January for Ricardo Gadea, Erik Arata and Dante de la Cruz, guerrilla fighters and leaders of the 1965 insurrectional movement, who have been held in prison for two years, and Enrique Amaya Quintana and Oscar Alvarado Aráuz, who are named as "fugitives from justice." The prosecu- tion is demanding sentences ranging from four to eight years in prison.

The trial, however, is a travesty stained with blood. Enrique Amaya was ar- rested last April by army forces. He then "disappeared" while being held. His cap- tors have refused up to now to respond to the inquiries and denunciations made by our CODDEH [Comité de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos — Committee for the De- fense of Human Rights] and other orga- nizations and figures in Peru and the rest of the world. After refusing to give any information whatsoever on the circum- stances surrounding the disappearance of the political leader and guerrilla fight- er, Enrique Amaya Quintana, the Peruvian military now seek to serve him with a five-year prison sentence as a "fugitive from justice."

In addition, it is clear that the minimum legal rights are not being ob- served in the trial against Gadea and his comrades. It is possible that the sen- tences demanded against them [which are unexpectedly mild in view of the possible death sentence provided by new legisla- tion] are only a smoke screen designed to lull public sympathy for the defendants, and that in the trial itself the sentences will be arbitrarily increased to accord with the repressive goals of the military judges.

Justifiably alarmed, the CODDEH appeals for solidarity from all progress- ive individuals and organizations throughout the world in the form of pro- tests against the travesty of justice represented by the trial. We must demand that the Peruvian government and the mil- itary, who presume to sit as judges, reply to our requests for official in- formation on the death of Enrique Amaya, and that minimum legal norms be observed in the trial of Ricardo Gadea, Erik Arata, Dante de la Cruz and others. Let us show them that they cannot act without being called to account and that the world is watching them. This is the kind of im- mediate aid needed by the people of Peru in their struggle to uphold human rights and to put an end to the continual re-pressive aggression.

Comité de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos

P.S. Cables and letters should be sent to the president of the republic, Fernando Belaúnde, and to the chairman of the Con- sejo de Guerra de la II Zona Judicial de Piérola, Lima, Peru. Copies should be sent to Ricardo Gadea's defense counsel Dr. Alfredo Battilana, Av. Nicolás de Piérola 966, oficina 215, Lima, Peru.

U.S. TROOPS TOLD TO STOP TAKING MARIJUANA TO AUSTRALIA

Increasing concern over GI use of marijuana in Vietnam serves as ironic counterpoint to earlier claims that the National Liberation Front was using drug-crazed suicide squads against Ameri- can forces there.

U.S. army officials in Vietnam have warned troops there that Australia may be closed to GI's on rest and recre- ration leaves because of the number of American soldiers bringing marijuana into that country.

"Is there any limit to Africa's ability to surprise the world?" asked the British Economist in its May 7, 1966, issue. The occasion for The Economist's somewhat gleeful surprise was the rightward drift in East Africa -- particularly in Kenya -- signalized at the time by Jomo Kenyatta's attack on his number two man, Oginga Odinga.

"Kenya slapped down an offer of Russian aid in February," The Economist stated. "In March it expelled a number of Russian, Czech, and Chinese diplomats and journalists... Now President Kenyatta has declared 'total war' on his own left wing."

Kenyatta had culminated a two-year long red-baiting attack on Oginga Odinga by removing him from the vice-presidency on March 13, 1966. Odinga responded by resigning from Kenyatta's party, KANU [Kenya African National Union], to form an oppositional party, KPU [Kenya People's Union].

But the KPU could not get off the ground. Many of its secondary leaders were imprisoned. It was deprived of an electoral base through legal manipulations.

By November 26, 1966, New York Times correspondent Lawrence Fellows could report "Kenyatta's foes are limited to funeral orations." Odinga was the brunt of ridicule in the official press.

Not Yet Uhuru, recently published in the United States, is Oginga Odinga's defense of his political career.

Odinga's life spans the history of Kenya's struggle for independence from British imperialism. Born in Central Nyanza in about 1911 -- no exact date is recorded -- Odinga is a member of the Luo tribe, the second biggest tribe in Kenya.

This fact is important because the main force of the so-called "Mau Mau" guerrilla uprising was the larger Kikuyu tribe. While Kenyatta and the entire Kikuyu leadership were imprisoned during the British-sponsored "Emergency" rule, from 1952 to 1961, Odinga was free to remain active in the liberation struggle.

For nine years, Odinga played the leading role in the independence fight. He was primarily responsible for the release of Kenyatta, making the slogan of "free the political prisoners" the main thrust of his political organization. Odinga founded KANU in 1950, a national alliance of the political groupings dedicated to the freeing of Kenyatta and the independence of Kenya.

Two central themes are emphasized in Not Yet Uhuru: the role of missionary schooling in developing an intellectual elite, divorced from and hostile to its African upbringing; and the long and conscious preparation of this leadership by the imperialists in the years prior to independence.

The first half of Odinga's adult life, almost thirty years, was spent in the missionary schooling system. He fought a continual battle to assert the right of Africans to equal education against the colonial schooling for subservience -- and at the same time, for the right of Africans to maintain their national identities against colonial assimilation.

But towards the end of the second world war, Odinga had concluded that it was impossible to change the educational system without changing the governing authority.

Between 1946 and 1957, Odinga experimented with "building independence through business." (This covers the period of the Kikuyu revolt, the decapitation of its leadership and its crushing by the colonial regime.)

Odinga and others had the idea of setting up an African business cooperative which could compete with white business while at the same time unifying Africans. The enterprise failed in the first task but was successful in the second.

It was through the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation that Odinga built the Luo Union -- a transitional political organization which spearheaded the Luo struggle for independence.

Odinga met Kenyatta in 1952 and became convinced of the necessity of armed struggle to overthrow the colonial regime. Although Odinga did not take part in the Kikuyu fighting, which erupted almost immediately, he supported it and gives it full credit for catalyzing the independence forces.

Nevertheless, the "Mau Mau" fail-
ure gave Britain needed time. It was during the long imprisonment of the Kikuyu leaders that the Colonial Office was able to create divisive forces within independence organizations.

And the account of how this secondary leadership with neocolonialist rather than African aspirations was created, forms the most valuable part of Odinga's autobiography.

From 1957, when the first Africans were admitted into a dummy government, until 1966, Odinga worked side by side with most of the men who rule Kenya today for Western interests.

He never believed that such participation in government could gain meaningful concessions to Africans, but he thought that parliament could be used as a forum for public attack on colonialism. And at the same time, he attempted to use it to build a party capable of struggling for freedom.

If Odinga was successful in using parliament as a forum, he was not successful in using it to build a revolutionary party.

World public opinion was ultimately rallied to the defense of the imprisoned Kikuyu leadership and the freedom of Jomo Kenyatta. But the freedom process was a long one involving continuous maneuvering between the Colonial Office and various leaders of the African parties. In the meantime, Kenyatta himself became conservatized.

When independence finally came, the drive of the mass freedom movement had lost momentum. Regional rivalries had been exploited to divide the nation. A leadership too weak with much experience in doing business with white "settlers" and Western offices.

The land reform laws which Kenya's new government enacted put many peasants in worse situations than they had been before independence. White settlers were allowed to sell their plantations at premium prices to the government and then given first option to buy them back at reduced prices, displacing Africans from the land all the more.

Kenya turned against the guerrilla struggle in the Congo and in 1965 blocked arms shipments to the liberation movement. It played a decisive role in splitting the OAU [Organization of African Unity] at the time of Rhodesia's "independence," the same year.

"Imperialist tactics in southern, central and east Africa are clear," Odinga writes in the conclusion.

"They are to hold back the assault on the southern strongholds of colonialism and White domination for as long as possible; to protect and preserve strategic and economic interests in the Congo; and in East Africa, using Kenya as a base, to keep a careful watch on and if necessary to isolate and undermine the new state of Tanzania which is making rapid progress in building socialism and is the cutting edge of the revolutionary forces of Pan-Africanism for the total liberation of our southern half of the continent...."

"I do not imagine for a single moment that these formidable problems are easily solved; but to begin to solve them, one must recognize that these are the key problems -- and the Kenya Government turns its eyes away from these questions to examine private bank balances and the lists of vacant company directorships."

It is not difficult to understand the British Colonial Office's arduous machinations to isolate Oginga Odinga from political leadership -- and The Economist's unconcealed jubilation when the machinations apparently succeeded.

GREEK COLONELS WIN RECOGNITION FROM WASHINGTON

The United States resumed full recognition of the Greek colonels' government on January 23 after a brief but loudly trumpeted delay. U.S. recognition, which had been suspended following the flight of the Greek king, was resumed after the ruling colonels formally resigned their army positions and exchanged their uniforms for civilian garb.

Washington held that King Constantine was the legitimate ruler and that his endorsement of the colonels' coup made it legal. Thus his flight, after an abortive coup of his own, was rather embarrassing to the State Department.

The "flexibility" shown by both the king and the colonels enabled Rusk to extend full recognition to each faction. Thus the Johnson administration kept both options in Greece and was spared the painful necessity of showing disrespect for the king while saluting the colonels.

In requiring the colonels to take off their uniforms, Johnson, of course, showed how principled he is in maintaining democratic attire, if not democratic institutions.
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DISCUSSION ON GUERRILLA TACTICS IN LATIN AMERICA

By Hector Bejar

[The following article by the well-known Peruvian guerrilla leader has been translated from the December, 1967, issue of Solidarité Pérou, the bulletin of the French Committee for Solidarity with the Victims of Repression in Peru.]

* * *

Our action in Peru in 1965 was spread out and lacked a real functioning leadership. We tried to solve the problems of the insurrection in diverse ways. The MIR [Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria -- Movement of the Revolutionary Left] and the ELN [Ejército de Liberación Nacional -- Army of National Liberation] applied different concepts in setting up their guerrilla foci. Thus, there was no practical coordination between the two organizations; and the dispersion of the guerrilla groups was by no means a favorable factor -- quite the contrary. Subjected to harsh trials, the guerrillas responded in accordance with their fighting capacities. All -- with the possible exception of Lobatón's guerrilla nucleus -- established themselves in definite zones, thus making it possible for the army to easily guard the points of outlet. Almost all of them allowed the enemy to get close to their positions; feeling sure of themselves and confident of their knowledge of the terrain, they all functioned in an amateurish way, while the army operated efficiently.

Moreover, the peasants only rarely had the opportunity to offer organized and active support to the guerrillas and, in any case, could not follow through on this support when it was organized in advance. The reason is clear: secrecy is not a characteristic of work among the peasants and the incompetence of the insurrectionary organizations, together with their excessive desire for publicity, left their collaborators at the mercy of the repressive forces, which acted, as should have been expected, ruthlessly and with cold calculation. The truth is that we were fighting a war for the first time and we were not really prepared. The guerrillas were liquidated less through combat -- in which they always displayed great courage and valor -- than through information given by ex-collaborators of low political level and poor fighting spirit or by deserters, who were given the choice of talking or being executed.

While the leaders fought exclusively in the countryside, a few embryonic supporter groups remained in the cities. They were quite limited and incapable of carrying out important actions. We thought that sweeping repressive measures would force the entire left in one way or another to join in the insurrectionary movement. But the reactionaries used repression in a calculated way and did not attack those who failed to express support for the insurgents. They sought to isolate us from the rest of the left -- and succeeded. The rhetorical and formal support of groups and parties was of no use to us at all so long as it was not transformed into supporting actions. The army, which thus had few problems in its rear, had its hands free to fight us in the interior of the country. There, it instituted a general terror to eradicate the political population -- in which it also succeeded.

And so, while the ruling groups quickly joined forces for the defense of the system, the rest of the left, including the two Communist parties, took a wait-and-see attitude and the urban population watched the dramatic events unfolding far away with some bewilderment and a certain indifference.

At the end of 1965 we drew up our first balance sheet. It showed the loss of an entire revolutionary leadership, the product of long years of struggle; and of very valuable cadres, irreplaceable in the short run, cadres trained in the struggle against reaction and against the leaderships of the traditional parties. At the same time, the fighters figured as heretics in the eyes of a pacifist and scholastic left. However, the MIR and the ELN were able to maintain their organizational apparatus and in the struggle they gained a heroic image which is irresistibly attracting the youth.

Now, the recent events in Bolivia will compel the revolutionary left here and everywhere to engage in debate. In fact, we are already in the midst of debate; whether we like it or not, these failures oblige us to reflect. For the ELN, some of whose members died at Che's side in Bolivia, a second critical reckoning is inevitable.

The question is basically whether Che's death was also the death of a concept, of a tactic... This question right now concerns the two most prominent figures in the continental insurrection at the moment, Che, the fighter, and Debray, the theoretician.

We must begin with a glance at the panorama of Latin America and of the guerrilla movements. It is an incontestable fact that the guerrilla movements continue despite all the offensives launched against them. In Colombia, in Venezuela, in Guate-
mala and now in Nicaragua and Bolivia, they continue to stand up against all the attacks of powerful combined forces. And in other countries there are sporadic attempts with varying results...

All this shows us something which is almost a commonplace: we stand at the very beginning of a vast process of liberation. Latin America is an immense continent and will not be able to cast off in a few years the yoke of an imperialism which stands at the peak of its power. But we must not rest content with phrases. We must also note that this process cannot be contained within pristine forms and rigid schemas. Its length cannot be predicted just as it is impossible today to predict what tactics revolutionaries will adopt in the circumstances which they must confront in their path. There is no point then in discussing this. However, it is important to stress that their success will depend on their analytic ability and on the degree to which they can free themselves from schematic preconceptions. Struggle against dogmatism, against every kind of dogmatism, is a matter of life or death for us.

During the lull preceding 1965, a campaign for armed struggle spread through our universities and also reached working-class centers; this was purely a propaganda campaign, it must be said, but it was no less dangerous for the regime. Nothing could prevail against this current -- which was inseparable from a certain sectarianism -- neither the failures suffered nor the logical appeals to moderation by the more timid. The left which is insurrectional in fact and not just in words is inexorably gaining ground and -- we can say it with absolute conviction -- will engage in new armed insurrections.

This fact merits an explanation -- it lies in the radicalization of our middle classes. The middle classes have always played an important role in our country, both in a negative and positive sense. They have provided the conservative extreme right's military leaders, but they also gave rise to the liberal, anti-imperialist upsurge of the thirties. Today again, transformed by the new conditions nationally and internationally, they are in ferment, seeking to make the country over, either by peaceful or violent means. And the impoverished and backward sectors of this class are assuming the role of standard-bearers of the armed struggle. With a romantic and heroic spirit, they have created the guerrilla movement. The dual nature of this petty bourgeoisie is faithfully reflected in the virtues and faults of the guerrilla struggle: it is behind the bold successes but also of the errors and failures.

This petty bourgeoisie is being held back by uneducated masses, still incapable of theoretical abstraction, without which Marxism is impossible. This leads me to point out that the number one problem of the Peruvian revolution is how to link up the insurrectionary activity of this class with the rebellious peasantry and the demands of the working class hit by economic crisis. The consciousness of the masses has developed quite unevenly, and therein lies the principal advantage of the oligarchy, which has learned how to defend its class interests through long exercise of power.

The Cuban revolution, in a certain sense, gave the answer to this question and Debray has presented it in great detail. But Debray's book is necessarily the generalization of a method and a resumé of the experiences of the past. There are new experiences and new situations which his analysis does not take into account. Therefore, it is dangerous to end every discussion by referring to Debray's analysis. Guerrilla tactics must undergo a twofold adaptation -- to the new economic and social conditions in our countries and to the experiences which the armies have gained in irregular combat. In order to achieve this we must start from the reality in each country.

In Peru our peasants are an unstable mass. Both individually and collectively they have difficulty in incorporating themselves into the national economy. They emigrate to the suburbs of Lima but in these belts of misery they continue to function as peasants and maintain very strong sentimental and economic ties with their places of origin.

In many cases the suburbs of the cities serve to a certain extent as the brain of the peasant groups. Thanks to the natural evolution of the economy as well as force, the peasants are freeing themselves from latifundism. But now that they sell their products and do not just consume them, they demand land more insistently and are beginning to demand education and state aid.

Land is still the basic lever for mobilizing the peasants, but in the near future opposition to feudalism may lose its importance as a revolutionary rallying cry. Urbanization and elementary education may temporarily satisfy the peasants but they open up the way to free thinking. A peasant who organizes unions, demands roads and public works and aspires to a real agrarian reform is a different kind of peasant. He is a peasant, who, bringing pressure to bear on the state apparatus in manifold ways, can no longer be ignored by the authorities.

In confronting this problem the regime has a certain margin for maneuver. We have already seen it dealing with major points of conflict by calling for
collective labor, by constructing means of communication and by executing bloody repressions where it is deemed necessary. Agrarian reform, popular cooperation, demagogy and repression all enter into a single bourgeois strategy the aim of which is at least to temporarily contain the peasants' demands.

The ruling classes won a success in their repressive campaign but failed in their reforms. The peasantry, whose unions have been dissolved and which still bleeds from the wounds suffered in the guerrilla struggle, is recovering slowly. But we must not make the mistake of considering its present setback to be final. The tide will soon turn and it will find the bourgeois state tied down more than ever by a disastrous fiscal situation, by limited resources and the ever more powerful domination of the reactionary economic groups.

Accelerated urbanization has swelled the ranks of the working class, now standing at a million and a half in round figures. The country's industrial development will not be sufficient to absorb this gigantic supply of manpower. In its financially weakened condition, the state will not be able to meet the most elementary needs for jobs, housing and public works. This mass of unskilled workers with a perfunctory education, who live largely by part-time labor, are half-satisfied and waver between the cities and the country, between revolutionary demands and reformism.

For the time being, they largely constitute the electoral following of the capitulators to the bourgeoisie and represent an appreciable element of stability for the system. But how long will their patience last? The ruling classes are terrified at the thought of a mobilization of these semiproletarian social strata.

Its lack of skills and the surplus of manpower make the working class defenseless against the bosses. These two factors are the principal causes of the unions' general weakness and also give rise to the "mediating" role played by their leaders. Thus the working class does not express itself openly, but discontent exists and constantly mounts. It is semiconcealed and expressed only in sporadic explosions of protest which reveal its great potential power.

Favored by the powerlessness of the people, the ruling classes grow ever more cynical. Our representative democracy can function without serious difficulties, limited to the parties of the right, and in the next few years it can be broadened to accommodate a legal left which accepts the rules of the game.

As long as they control the basic mechanism of power, the ruling groups will feel sure of themselves and will look to the future with optimism. They will not, however, be able to prevent disillusion, rejection and revulsion at the system as a whole from mounting around them.

Something new has appeared in this context -- the insurrectionary groups with their radicalism and their heroism, by giving their lives and their blood, offer the people a cause, a mystique. The groups have been thrown into confusion by defeats; they must learn to be at once idealists and realists, poets and pragmatists. The years have not passed in vain. The oligarchies and their armies have learned from the struggle and profited from the imperialist experience in Algeria and Vietnam. To the armies of reaction on the march we must oppose disciplined vanguards, well-grounded in military tactics, skilled, mobile, omnipresent. The struggle in the cities and the struggle of the masses must not be neglected. We must fight on every terrain, while maintaining guerrilla warfare as the strategic backbone, as the fundamental tactic.

In a situation so much in flux, seizure of power is not yet on the order of the day. Actively constructing a united political-military organization and a military force equal to the demands of the revolutionary situations of the future, however, is.


STUDENTS AT UNIVERSITY OF MADRID RESIST POLICE

A week of dramatic clashes between Spanish students and authorities at the University of Madrid culminated on January 26 in a police invasion of the Medical School which was violently resisted by hundreds of rock-throwing medical students.

The day before, the School of Technical Sciences had been indefinitely closed after being paralyzed by student strikes.

Earlier in the week the School of Philosophy and Letters was closed after besieged students rained desks, benches and Molotov cocktails on invading policemen.
ON WORKERS CONTROL OF PRODUCTION

By Leon Trotsky

The following letter from Leon Trotsky to his followers in the United States, which is not readily available today, was published in The Militant in two issues, October 17 and 24, 1931.

While it deals with an acute problem of the time -- how to stop the fascists in Germany from gaining power -- it should not be lost sight of that revolutionists concerned with general problems of tactics and strategy because of the striking example it provides of how Trotsky approached such questions; that is, the method utilized by the Bolsheviks in Russia which made possible the revolutionary success of 1917.

The heart of the method is (1) to never lose sight of the goal of socialism, to keep it constantly at the center of all calculations -- understanding that the ruling class, as shown by history and by many current examples in the world today, can be expected to utilize the most violent means to retain power; (2) at the same time to estimate as realistically as possible the actual mood of the masses -- their level of understanding, immediate capacity for struggle and the issues on which they are prepared to take action if only of the most limited nature for the moment; (3) to seek slogans, lines of action, and of organization that will help bridge the gap between the present thinking and feelings of the masses and the revolutionary socialist goal.

The reasons for this approach would seem to be rather obvious. Nevertheless, several points are worth noting. First of all, it is held as axiomatic that deep-going revolutions are made by the masses, and not by a small minority, no matter how revolutionary-minded, dedicated or self-sacrificing this minority may be. A minority of conscious revolutionists in society can play a leading role; in fact, such a minority is called on to play the leading role, but it cannot substitute for the masses. It follows that there are no short cuts to success. The minority must first organize itself; then become rooted in the masses; finally, it must participate in the self-organization of the masses in such a way as to make success possible when the masses, as a result of their own experiences, go into action.

This does not mean that revolutionists, as an organized vanguard, play no role in the mobilization of the masses. On the contrary, they can act as a catalyst when conditions are propitious for this. To play this role necessitates the most careful study of economic, social and political processes and the selection of correct slogans and lines of action.

On the one hand, it is necessary to have a proper appreciation of economic developments, both the long-range ones as well as the most conjunctural. On the other hand, it is necessary to know accurately the psychology of the masses and their various strata as it actually is and not as it ought to be or as the revolutionists would prefer it to be.

General considerations of this kind lay behind Trotsky's thinking when he wrote the letter below. But it was written in a specific context -- the Germany of 1931. This makes the letter all the more instructive, since it provides an actual example of Trotsky's procedure. The country was being profoundly shaken by a major depression. The workers were becoming radicalized; big business was readying the Nazi club with which to smash the labor movement and much else besides; the middle class was torn between the polarizing centers to the left and the right. Germany was clearly moving toward a showdown in which the alternative was a socialist revolution or fascism.

The working class was so powerful and the labor movement so solidly organized that the odds were against Hitler and his Nazis. Unfortunately the workers were in disarray politically.

The loyalty of the broad vanguard was divided between the Social Democratic and Communist parties. This would not have been fatal if either of these parties had been truly revolutionary and able to work out policies adequate to the situation. Neither Trotsky nor any other revolutionary Marxist expected anything of the Social Democratic leadership, which had already shown its bankruptcy during the first world war and the ensuing revolutionary period when it supported the German ruling class and saved it from a socialist overturn.

The key piece was the Communist party which, like the Social Democratic party, had millions of followers. But here a new complication had arisen. The Communist party, despite its relative youthfulness, had become deeply affected by Stalinism. Whether the damage was irreparable could be determined only by further experience.

For the handful of genuine revolutionists, then, the problem boiled down to reaching the militants of the Communist party, convincing them -- at their
level of development — as to the real nature of the situation, its dangers and opportunities; then, through these militants, reaching the rank and file Social Democrats, and finally the working class as a whole.

[This was the context in which Trotsky wrote his letter on the use of workers control as one of the slogans which should be considered in Germany.

[It might be argued that the Nazi victory disproved the efficacy of Trotsky's method. But Trotsky's method was not applied against Hitler. In place of it, Stalin's line was followed by the German Communist party, with the catastrophic consequences that led at the next stage to World War II and the imperialist invasion of the USSR. Where Trotsky's method, which was also Lenin's method, was actually used in a comparable situation it assured the greatest revolutionary victory yet achieved by mankind -- the victory of October 1917 in Russia.

[Some obvious typographical errors have been corrected and in a few places phrases in the translation have been reconstructed to make them more readable.]

* * *

In answering your inquiry I will endeavor here, as an introduction to the exchange of opinions, to outline a few general considerations which concern the slogan of workers' control of production.

The first question that arises in this connection is: can we picture workers' control of production as a fixed regime, not everlasting, of course, but as one of long duration? In order to reply to this question, the class nature of such a regime must be more concretely determined. The workers have in their hands -- control. That is: ownership and right of disposition remain in the hands of the capitalists. Thus the regime has a contradictory character, presenting a sort of interregnum.

The workers need control, and not for platonic purposes, but in order to influence practically the production and the trading operations of the employers. This cannot, however, be attained unless the control, in one form or another, within these or those limits is transformed into direct functions of disposition. In a developed form, workers' control thus signifies a sort of economic dual power in the factory, the bank, trading enterprise, and so forth.

If the participation of the workers in the administration is to be lasting, stable, "normal," it must rest upon class collaboration, and not upon class struggle. Such class collaboration can be realized only through the upper strata of the trade unions and the capitalist associations. There have been no few such attempts: in Germany ("economic democracy"), in England ("Mondism"), etc. Yet, in all these instances, it was not a case of workers' control over capital, but of the subserviency of the labor bureaucracy to capital. Such subserviency, as experience shows, can last for a long time: as long as the patience of the proletariat.

The closer it is to production, to the factory, to the shop departments, the more impossible is this regime, for it is a question here of the direct vital interests of the workers, and the whole process develops before the eyes of the workers themselves. Workers' control through factory councils is conceivable only on the basis of sharp class struggle, but not on the basis of collaboration. Yet even this means dual power in the enterprise, in the trust, in the branch of industry, in the whole of industry.

What state regime corresponds to workers' control of production? It is obvious that the power is not yet in the hands of the proletariat, otherwise we would have, not workers' control of production, but the control of production by the workers' state as an introduction to the regime of state production on the foundations of nationalization. What we are talking about is workers' control in the domain of the capitalist regime, under the power of the bourgeoisie. However, a bourgeoisie, which feels itself firm in the saddle, will never tolerate dual power in its factories. Workers' control, consequently, can be carried out only under the condition of an abrupt change in the relationship of forces unfavorable to the bourgeoisie and its state. Control can be forced upon the bourgeoisie by the proletariat only violently, along the road to the moment when it takes away from it the power, and then also the ownership of the means of production. Thus the regime of workers' control, by its very essence provisional, a transitional regime, can correspond only to the period of the convulsing of the bourgeois state, of the proletarian offensive, and of the falling back of the bourgeoisie, that is, to the period of the proletarian revolution in the deepest sense of the word.

If the bourgeoisie is already no longer the master, that is, not entirely the master in his factory, then he is, consequently, also no longer completely the master in his state. This means: the regime of the dual power in the factories corresponds to the regime of dual power in the state.

This relationship, however, should not be understood mechanically, that is,
not in the manner that dual power in the factory and dual power in the state see the light of day on one and the same day. The advanced regime of the dual power, as one of the probable stages of the proletarian revolution in every country, can develop in different countries in different ways and out of different elements. Thus, under certain conditions, with a deep and persistent economic crisis (strong state of organization of the workers in the factories, relative weakness of the revolutionaries party, relative strength of the state which has a strong Fascism in reserve, etc.) workers' control of production can precede the developed political dual power in one country.

Under the conditions traced above in broad outline, especially characteristic of Germany, dual power in the country can develop precisely out of workers' control as its main reservoir. One must dwell upon this fact if only to reject that fetishism of the Soviet form which the epigones in the Comintern have put into circulation.

According to the official view prevailing at the present time, the proletarian revolution can be accomplished only by means of Soviets, where Soviets must arise directly for the purpose of the armed uprising. This stereotype is absolutely worthless. Soviets are only an organizational form; the question is decided by the class content of the policy, and in no case by its form. In Germany, there were Ebert-Schleidemann Soviets. In Russia, the conciliatorist Soviets turned against the workers and soldiers in July 1917. That is why Lenin, for a long time, took into account that we would have to carry out the armed uprising not with the aid of the Soviets but of the factory committees. This calculation was refuted by the course of events, for we succeeded in the month and a half to two months before the uprising, in winning over the most important Soviets. Yet this example alone shows how little we were inclined to consider the Soviets as the all-saving means. In the fall of 1923, defending against Stalin and others the necessity of passing over to the revolutionary offensive, I fought at the same time against the creation of Soviets in Germany on command, side by side with the factory councils, which were already actually beginning to fulfill the role of Soviets.

There is much to say for the idea that in the present revolutionary ascent, too, the factory councils in Germany, at a certain stage of developments, will fulfill the role of Soviets and replace them. Upon what do I base this assumption? Upon the analysis of the conditions under which the Soviets arose in Russia in February-March 1917, in Germany and Austria in November 1918. In all three places, the main organizers of the Soviets were Mensheviks and Social Democrats, who were forced to do it by the conditions of the "democratic" revolution during the war. In Russia, the Bolsheviks were successful in tearing the Soviets from the conciliators. In Germany, they did not succeed and that is why the Soviets disappeared.

Today, in 1931, the word "Soviets" sounds quite differently from what it did in 1917-1918. Today it is the synonym of the dictatorship of the Bolsheviks, and by that the bugbear on the lips of the Social Democracy. The Social Democrats in Germany will not only not seize the initiative in the creation of Soviets for the second time, and will not only not join voluntarily in this initiative, but will fight against it to the last possibility. In the eyes of the bourgeois states, especially of its Fascist guard, the Communists setting to work creating Soviets will be equivalent to a direct declaration of civil war by the proletariat, and consequently, can provoke a decisive clash before the Communist party itself deems it expedient.

All these considerations prompt us strongly to doubt if one could succeed, before the uprising and the seizure of power in Germany, in creating Soviets which would really embrace the majority of the workers. In my opinion, it is more probable that in Germany the Soviets will first arise on the morning after the victory, already as direct organs of power.

The matter stands quite differently with the factory councils. They already exist today. They are composed of Communists as well as of Social Democrats. In a certain sense, the factory councils realize the united front of the working class. They will broaden and deepen this function with the rise of the revolutionary tide. Their role will grow, as will their encroachment into the life of the factory, of the city, of the branches of industry, of the district, of the whole state. Regional, district as well as federal congresses of the factory councils can serve as the basis for the organs which will actually form all the state Soviets, that is, the organs of dual power. To draw the Social Democratic workers into this regime through the medium of the factory councils will be much easier than to call upon the workers directly to begin with the forming of Soviets on a definite day and at a definite hour.

The factory councils' central of a city can thoroughly fulfill the role of city Soviets. This could be observed in Germany in 1923. By executing their function, applying themselves to ever bolder tasks, and creating federal organs, the factory councils, intimately connecting the Social Democratic workers with
the Communists, can grow into Soviets and become an organizational support for the uprising. After the victory of the proletariat, these factory councils—Soviets will naturally have to separate themselves into factory councils in the proper sense of the word, and into Soviets as organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

By all this, we in no case want to say that the rise of Soviets before the proletarian overturn in Germany is completely excluded in advance. There is no possibility of foreseeing all conceivable variants. Were the collapse of the bourgeois state to come long before the proletarian revolution, were Fascism to run its head into a wall, or fall to pieces, before the uprising of the proletariat, then the conditions could arise for the creation of Soviets as the fighting organs for power. Naturally, in such a case, the Communists would have to perceive the situation in time and raise the slogan of Soviets. This would be the most favorable situation conceivable for the proletarian uprising. Were it to follow, it would have to be utilized to the end. Yet, to count upon it in advance is quite impossible. Insofar as the Communists must reckon with the still sufficiently firm bourgeois state, and the reserve army of Fascism at its back, to that extent the road through the factory councils appears to be the more probable one.

The epigones have purely mechanically accepted the idea that workers' control of production, like Soviets, can only be carried out under revolutionary conditions. Were the Stalinists to attempt to bring their prejudices into a definite system, they would probably argue as follows: Workers' control as a sort of economic dual power is inconceivable without political dual power in the country which in turn, is inconceivable without the Soviets being counterposed to the bourgeois power; consequently -- the Stalinists would conclude -- the slogan of workers' control of production is admissible only simultaneously with the slogan of Soviets.

From all that has been said above, it follows clearly how false, schematic, and lifeless is such a construction. In practice, it results in the unique ultimatum which the party would put to the workers: I, the party, will allow you to fight for workers' control only in the event that you are prepared simultaneously to build up Soviets. But this is precisely what is involved -- that these two processes must in no case run absolutely parallel and simultaneously. Under the influence of crises, unemployment and predatory manipulations of the capitalists, the working class in its majority may be prepared to fight for the abolition of business secrecy and for control over banks, commerce and production even before they have reached an understanding of the revolutionary conquest of power.

Taking the path of control of production, the proletariat will inevitably have to advance further in the direction of the seizure of power and of the means of production. Questions of credits, of raw materials, of markets in turn extend the question of control beyond the walls of the isolated enterprise. In a country as highly developed industrially as Germany, the question of exports and imports also suffices to raise control immediately to the level of state tasks and to counterpose the central organs of the bourgeois state. The essentially irreconcilable contradictions of the regime of workers' control will have to be accentuated to the degree that its sphere of influence and its tasks are extended, thereupon to show themselves promptly as intolerable. A way out of these contradictions can be found either in the capture of power by the proletariat (Russia) or in the Fascist counterrevolution, which establishes the naked dictatorship of capital (Italy). It is precisely in Germany, with its strong Social Democracy, that the struggle for workers' control of production will in all probability be the first stage of the revolutionary united front of the workers, which precedes the open struggle for power.

Should the slogan of workers' control, however, be raised right now? Is the revolutionary situation "ripe" for it? This question is hard to answer. There is no measuring device which would permit one to determine, once and for all, what degree the revolutionary situation has reached. One is compelled to gauge it by deeds, in struggle, with the aid of the most varied measuring devices. One of these devices, under the given conditions perhaps one of the most important, is precisely the slogan of workers' control of production.

The significance of this slogan lies primarily in the fact that on the basis of it, the united front of the Communist workers with the Social Democratic, nonparty, Christian and other workers, can be prepared. The attitude of the Social Democratic workers is decisive. The revolutionary united front of the Communists and Social Democrats -- that is the fundamental political condition which is lacking in Germany for an immediately revolutionary situation. The presence of a strong Fascism is surely a serious obstacle on the road to victory. Yet, Fascism can retain its power of attraction only because the proletariat is split and weak, and because it lacks the possibility of leading the German people on the road to a victorious revolution. A revolutionary united front of the working
class already signifies, in itself, the political death blow for Fascism.

For this reason, be it said in passing, the policy of the German Communist party leadership in the question of the referendum bears an all the more criminal character. The most rabid foe could not have thought up a surer way of inciting the Social Democratic workers against the Communist party and of holding up the progress of the policy of the revolutionary united front.

Now this mistake must be made good again. The slogan of workers' control can be of extraordinary aid in this regard. However, it must be approached correctly. Advanced without the necessary preparation, as a bureaucratic command, the slogan of workers' control may not only prove to be a blank shot, but discredit the party even more strongly in the eyes of the working masses and undermine the confidence in it also of those workers who still vote for it today. Before this highly responsible fighting slogan is raised, the situation must be read well and the ground for it prepared.

We must begin from below, from the factory, from the workshop. The questions must be scrutinized and adapted to certain typical industrial, banking and commercial enterprises. Especially crass cases of speculation must be taken as a point of departure, camouflaged lockouts, fraudulent hiding of profits in order to justify cutting wages or fraudulent exaggeration of production costs for the same purpose, and so forth, in the factory which has fallen victim to such combinations, the Communist workers must be the ones through whom are felt the moods of the rest of the working masses, above all, of the Social Democratic workers: to what extent they would be ready to accept the demand to expose business secrets and to establish workers' control of production. Utilizing particularly crass individual cases, we must begin to conduct propaganda persistently in a completely positive way, and thus measure the power of resistance of Social Democratic conservatism. This would be one of the best ways of establishing to what degree the revolutionary situation has "ripened."

The preliminary probing of the ground assumes a simultaneously theoretical and propagandistic elaboration of the question of the party, a serious and objective educating of the advanced workers in the first place, of the factory council members, of the prominent trade-union workers, etc. Only the outcome of this preparatory work, that is, the degree of its success, can show at what moment the party can pass over from propaganda to further agitation and to direct practical action under the slogan of workers' control.

The policy of the Left Opposition in this question follows clearly enough from what has been presented, at least in its essential features. It is a question in the first period of propaganda for the correct principled way of putting the question and at the same time of study of the concrete conditions of the struggle for workers' control. The Opposition,* on a small scale and to the modest degree corresponding to its forces, must take up the preparatory work which was characterized above as the next task of the party. On the basis of this task, the Opposition must seek contact with the Communists who are working in the factory councils and in the trade unions, and explain to them our views of the situation as a whole, and learn from them how our correct views on the development of the revolution are to be adapted to the relationships in the factory and the workshop.

***

P.S. I wanted to close with this, only it occurs to me that the Stalinists might make the following objection: you are prepared to "dismiss" the slogan of Soviets for Germany; but you criticized us bitterly and branded us because at one time we refused to proclaim the slogan of Soviets in China.** In reality such an "objection" is only base sophistry, which is founded on the same organizational fetishism, that is, upon the identification of the class essence with the organizational form. Had the Stalinists declared at that time that there were reasons in China which hindered the application of the Soviet form, and had they recommended some other organizational form of the revolutionary united front of the masses, one more adaptable to Chinese conditions, we would naturally have met such a proposal with the greatest attention. But we were recommended to replace the Soviets with the Kuo Min Tang, that

* [In 1931, the Nazis initiated a referendum that aimed at ousting the Social Democratic government in Prussia. The German Communist party, under Stalin's theory that the Social Democrats were "Social Fascists" and constituted the "main danger," supported the referendum, calling it the "Red Plebiscite."

** [The International Left Opposition, the faction organized under Trotsky's leadership within the Communist International to defend the program of revolutionary Marxism against Stalinist revisionism.]

* [At one point in the 1925-27 revolution in China.]
is, by the enslavement of the workers to the capitalists. The dispute was over the class content of an organization and not over organizational "technique." But we must promptly add to this that precisely in China there were no subjective obstacles at all for the Soviets, if we take into consideration the consciousness of the masses, and not that of Stalin's allies of that time, Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Chin Wei. The Chinese workers have no Social Democratic, conservative traditions. The enthusiasm for the Soviet Union was truly universal. Even the present-day peasants' movement in China strives to adopt Soviet forms. All the more general was the striving of the masses for Soviets in the years 1925-1927.

August 20, 1931.

ISRAELI SOCIALISTS PROTEST ARREST OF KHALIL TOUAME

[The following statement, protesting the arbitrary arrest and sentencing of one of their members in Jerusalem, was issued by the Israeli Socialist Organization.]

***

Our comrade Khalil Touame was arrested by the police on January 8. The next day, January 9, the court of Jerusalem sentenced him to fifteen days detention.

This arrest is one in a series of acts of repression and terror committed by the government against the Arab citizens of the State of Israel and against many inhabitants of the conquered territories who oppose the occupation and express their opinion publicly.

Our comrade Khalil Touame, a law student at the University of Jerusalem, stands on the principles of revolutionary socialism as the basis for social progress and the way to solve the problem of Arab-Israeli relations.

Khalil Touame, like all our members, is irreconcilably opposed to all nationalism, Jewish or Arab, and upholds the right of self-determination for all peoples.

Any honest person can see this in reading his two interviews in Pi Haaton, the organ of the Federation of University Students and in the daily Davar (of the Mapai party). These journals published the interviews in question because he is a well-known figure among Arab students. In his capacity as secretary of the Arab students, he met the French philosopher J.P. Sartre when he came to Israel last year.

We contemptuously reject all attempts to bring false accusations against Khalil Touame in connection with scandalous "criminal" laws aimed at preventing political activity by those whom the government does not favor.

We appeal to enlightened opinion throughout the world and in Israel to protest arbitrary acts of this type.

Free Khalil Touame now!

DOES GENERAL WESSIN Y WESSIN HAVE A COUP IN MIND?

Brigadier General Elias Wessin y Wessin, who was banished from the Dominican Republic as part of the settlement of the civil war in 1965, is making moves to end his exile in the United States. In a January 19 press conference, he said he intends to run for president.

Although the elections are not to be held until 1970, Wessin claimed he already has 400,000 supporters in a newly formed "Quisqueyano Democratic party." He is running, he said, in response to "a gigantic and genuinely democratic movement."

The announcement by the general, who ordered the bombing of Santo Domingo in 1965, annoyed the New York Times. "A Wessin campaign," a January 23 editorial said, "would immediately reopen the wounds of the 1965 civil war if not the war itself."

The concern of the Times is rather curious. After all, the elections are two years off. Perhaps it is worried by something it does not see fit to print. Wessin's announcement is most likely a move toward a coup by the rightist military and police, the real power behind Balaguer, the current president. Wessin may be planning to sit in the "highest office" well before 1970.

The Times hinted that this may be the case. "The Dominican armed forces," it said, "are now led by the nonpolitical [sic] Gen. Enrique Perez y Perez, who has promised to crush any coup against Dr. Balaguer."
CEYLON TROTSKYIST STATEMENT ON DEVALUATION OF RUPEE

[The following statement was issued by the Political Bureau of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Revolutionary) on November 25, 1967.]

* * * 

The government's devaluation of the Ceylon rupee has already had the effect of:

1. Boosting rupee profits of tea and rubber exporters in Ceylon.

2. Raising the price of flour, sugar and petrol directly and of various other commodities of mass consumption indirectly, thus striking a severe blow at the already lowered consumption levels of the masses of the people.

It is clear that the government's decision was taken on the instructions of imperialist finance-capital, such as the U.S.-dominated World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The prime minister's statement reveals that the government considered that it had no other alternative but to devalue the rupee if it was to receive further loans and aid from these imperialist sources.

Furthermore, the government's own statement on the devaluation makes it clear that the fact that the export trade and the import trade are largely in the hands of British and Indian capital makes it doubtful even whether the increased rupee profits of these vested interests will be invested for development in Ceylon without being taken abroad in various ways.

In the circumstances, the government's decision to devalue the Ceylon rupee must be denounced as an act which is against the interests of the Ceylonese people and in the interests of imperialist finance-capital as well as foreign and local capitalist vested interests in the export trade in Ceylon.

What is involved in the current crisis is the question whether Ceylon's people should continue to submit to blow after blow upon them by a government serving the alliance of imperialist and Ceylonese capital or should unite to resist these blows and to fight for the overthrow of this alliance.

What the LSSP(R) considers necessary is not to make appeals to the government to resign but to mobilise the masses for action against the government and to demand and fight for the state take-over of the export trade as well as of the import trade and wholesale distribution of all major consumption items of the population.

The LSSP(R) calls upon all mass organisations in the country which wish to strike a blow in defence of the people and for the freedom of Ceylon from imperialist domination of its relations with the rest of the world to get together for common action against the government now on this issue.

The people will undoubtedly respond massively and enthusiastically for such action.

CEYLON UNION CALLS FOR STRUGGLE AGAINST DEVALUATION

[The powerful Ceylon Mercantile Union is waging a campaign against the devaluation of the rupee decreed by the Ceylonese government upon devaluation of the British pound. Under the signature of its general secretary, B.P. Tampoe, the CMU is circulating a resolution passed at a general membership meeting December 5, 1967. The text of the resolution is as follows.]

* * * 

This General Membership Meeting of the Ceylon Mercantile Union:

1. Condemns the devaluation of the Ceylon Rupee whereby Imperialist and Capitalist profits from the Ceylon economy have been increased whilst the economic hardships of the masses of the people have been made much greater by the sharp rise in living costs that has resulted from the devaluation and the all-round increase of the prices of food and other consumer commodities;

2. Draws attention to the fact that the Government's own Ministers have admitted that one of the main reasons for the adverse balance of Ceylon's trade was the flourishing Black Market in foreign exchange, by the under-valuation of exports and the over-valuation of imports, by import and export traders, and calls upon the Government immediately to take over the import-export trade and the wholesale distribution of all essential consumer commodities and to bring the prices of consumer commodities down to levels which are within the reach of the masses of the people;
(3) Protests against the Government's direct encouragement of all-round price increases of consumer commodities and services by its own increase of the prices of flour, sugar and fuel oils, and calls for the immediate cancellation of these increases;

(4) Declares that the limited wage increases promised to workers in the public sector and sections of workers in the private sector, and the increase in the guaranteed price of paddy by Rs.2/- per bushel will not enable the workers who receive the increases adequately to cope with their increased living costs and, in any case, will bring no relief to the vast masses of workers who work in small or poorly organised undertakings and to the vast mass of unemployed and under-employed poor in urban and rural areas;

(5) Authorises the General Council and the Executive Committee to take all appropriate steps to bring about an all-Island conference of trade unions for the purpose of formulating and presenting to the Government demands which will

(a) help to free Ceylon's economy from its present position of prostration and unchecked exploitation by foreign and local capital;

(b) free the people from the merciless exploitation of private traders, and to bring down living costs to reasonable levels;

(c) secure for the workers adequate increases of wages commensurate with the actual cost of living;

(6) Empowers the General Council and the Executive Committee to take all necessary steps to launch a direct struggle if the situation so warrants, by the unions, in association with any other unions or organisations that are willing to struggle for the realisation of the above-mentioned objectives, notwithstanding the threat of the use or the actual use of the "Emergency" powers by the Government to repress or suppress such a struggle.