How Many More Troops Was That?

“Wall Street Journal” Sees Defeat in Vietnam

Guatemalan Guerrillas Break with CP
How Many More Troops Was That?

"Wall Street Journal" Sees Defeat in Vietnam

Guatemalan Guerrillas Break with CP
The successful National Liberation Front offensive has had a stunning impact on the American people which has been transmitted to the summits of the capitalist ruling class. There is far less restraint than before in expressing doubts about the wisdom of Johnson's course in Southeast Asia and more explicit condemnations of it.

Relations between the administration and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are becoming further strained and embittered; some of the nation's most influential newspapers have assailed U.S. policy in Vietnam; and even the CIA is reported at odds with other advisers of the White House over a true assessment of the situation there after the latest events.

Following the altercation between Secretary of State Rusk and Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, over deployment of nuclear weapons to South Vietnam, the committee took the outgoing Secretary of Defense McNamara to task for deceiving the American people and manipulating Congress by presenting a distorted view of the Tonkin Gulf incidents in August 1964.

These incidents in 1964 were used as a springboard for escalating the war. They were utilized to secure a resolution from Congress that White House spokesmen later claimed to be "the functional equivalent" of a declaration of war and a warrant for air bombardments of North Vietnam.

It was previously disclosed that, some weeks prior to the alleged attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats on American destroyers, the administration already prepared a resolution for submission to Congress. McNamara assured the Foreign Relations Committee on August 6, 1964, that the two American destroyers were "carrying out a routine patrol." The record of his current interrogation by the committee reveals that their mission was neither routine nor unpugnacious.

The American warships were actually engaged in clandestine electronic surveillance, had violated the twelve-mile limit set by North Vietnam, and were trying to decoy that nation's ships away from an attack on its shores by South Vietnamese vessels. From available evidence it is even highly questionable whether any such attack upon the U.S. ships took place as described.

In any case, the unqualified assertion in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution that North Vietnamese patrol boats had "deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States vessels lawfully present...and have created a serious threat to international peace" can no longer be sustained. The administration's misleading version of the events, which was used to justify air assaults on North Vietnam, has fallen to pieces. And the already extensive "credibility gap" has become wider than the Grand Canyon.

"Even if the Administration's version of the Tonkin incidents is accepted," pertinently asked the New York Times editors on February 24, "does this justify the subsequent actions of the United States Government? Much more serious incidents in the Mediterranean last June and in the Sea of Japan last month produced far less traumatic results."

Senator Robert Kennedy uttered the first shrill cry of defeatism emanating from the heart of the American ruling class on February 8 (see: "Kennedy Admits U.S. Cannot Win in Vietnam" by Les Evans, World Outlook, February 16, p. 123.) Three important newspapers have since joined the chorus.

In an editorial February 23, entitled "The Logic of the Battlefield," that influential U.S. business daily, the Wall Street Journal, declared that "the whole Vietnam effort may be doomed." It warned that "everyone had better be prepared for the bitter taste of a defeat beyond America's power to prevent." [For text of this editorial see page 195.]

The senior associate editor of the Wall Street Journal, Joseph E. Evans, commented that "we gradually have become more critical of the premises and conduct of the war. This editorial does not advocate military withdrawal. It doesn't advocate any course of action. It is a warning to the American people that they better be prepared to accept the possibility that the whole thing may go to pot no matter what our Government does."

Bemoaning "the precarious predicament of the American forces now in Southeast Asia," the lead editorial in the New York Times for Sunday, February 25, comes to similar conclusions and recommends a specific line of action.

"The time has come for Americans and their leaders," it says, "to recognize that the policy [of escalation] itself is illogical; that it entraps the United States in a war without visible limits, despite all official optimism; that it will continue to make insatiable demands on American manpower, resources and energy far beyond the worth of any conceivable gains. The only sound policy is to move
from the battlefield to the negotiating table with fullest speed."

In an editorial published on the same day as that of the Wall Street Journal, the New York Post pointed out that the pessimistic findings of the Central Intelligence Agency controverted the administration's public insistence that all is for the best in Vietnam. "Not so long ago," it stated, "CIA director Helms is said to have informed Senators that the war could last 100 years, at least the way it is going now. More recently, relations between the agency and the White House have been reported so frigid that some CIA officials are doubtful about the future of their jobs."

Fewer and fewer personages in high places are taken in by the topsy-turvy official lies that the worse things are in the war zone, the better they actually are. Thus Senator Fulbright dismissed as "fantastic" the representation of Walt Rostow, the president's chief counselor on Vietnam, that the offensives "may have left the South Vietnamese army and government institutions stronger than before the attacks." On February 25, Fulbright called for a congressional investigation of the administration's war policy.

One glimpse into the gloomy mood prevailing in Washington was provided by the private reasons given for the abrupt refusal of Senator Morton of Kentucky, the moderate Republican leader, to run again for office. He has been a strong critic of Johnson's Vietnam policy. Close associates describe Morton "as profoundly depressed by the combination of Vietnam, urban insurrection and what he regards as insufficient national leadership and the failure of the Republican party to rise to the resulting challenges."

What about Johnson himself? He cannot be oblivious to the adverse turn of events and the rising revulsion against his policies. But he gives no sign of bending to criticism or changing his course. Instead he is listening approvingly to Westmoreland, the sinister general who is insatiable in his demands for the war machine and its needs in beating down a colonial people. Already the White House has begun to prepare public opinion for another big leap in the "escalation." This is what the speculation in Washington over numbers is about. If half a million more troops is mentioned, then Westmoreland sounds modest asking for 200,000; and how can loyal citizens oppose sending a mere additional 100,000 for right now?

"WALL STREET JOURNAL" SEES DEFEAT IN VIETNAM

[The following is the complete text of an editorial which appeared in the February 23 issue of the Wall Street Journal, the most authoritative national business and financial daily newspaper in the United States. The editorial appeared under the title, "The Logic of the Battlefield."]

** **

We think the American people should be getting ready to accept, if they haven't already, the prospect that the whole Vietnam effort may be doomed; it may be falling apart beneath our feet. The actual military situation may be making academic the philosophical arguments for the intervention in the first place.

Granted, there is an opposite theory, the "last gasp" notion that the weeks'-long wave of assaults on cities and hamlets is the enemy's final outburst before greatly decreasing the war's intensity and coming to the bargaining table. Perhaps it will turn out that way, but right now the evidence does not lend the theory much support.

Hanoi is believed to have relatively large numbers of troops still uncommitted in North Vietnam. The Communists appear to be getting ample supplies of weapons from the Soviet Union and Red China. As long as the arms keep coming and there are Vietnamese Communists to use them, you would suppose they could keep up the struggle more or less indefinitely. Thus far, at least, they are showing with a vengeance their ability to sow destruction and demoralization everywhere.

Meantime the present South Vietnamese government, never very impressive, looks worse and worse. Most important, the government can't protect the people even in the heart of the cities. The Saigon-U.S. effort to secure villages and woo villagers to the government side has been brought to a halt. This is a government and a nation in chaos; how long can it go on? The falling, it should be stressed, is not in U.S. will or valor, but basically in something lacking in Vietnam itself.

As for the U.S. military undertaking, the current tactic is sad to see: The wholesale destruction of towns and cities in order to "save" them, killing or making homeless refugees out of thousands more civilians. While it is certainly true that an American commander has to destroy a building or a town if he considers it necessary for his soldiers' safety, the scale on which it is going on is hardly endearing the U.S. or Saigon to the populace.
Hence the question: Are developments on the ground making hash of our original commendable objectives?

The U.S. went in to keep South Vietnam out of Communist hands. But no matter what our forces do, they can't seem to do that. If practically nothing is to be left of government or nation, what is there to be saved for what?

The U.S. also went in to demonstrate to Communist China that it couldn't get away with this kind of indirect aggression and that it hadn't better try direct aggression either. But the Communists are getting away with it; they are putting the mighty U.S. through a wringer, and they may be encouraged to try more of it.

Should such be the upshot, that the U.S. abandons the effort not because it "should" do so but because its purposes have become irrelevant in the light of events on the battlefield and of Vietnamese politics, let no one blink the fact that it will be a disaster. It will be a stunning blow to the U.S. and the West in the larger struggle with international communism. At home it will be a traumatic experience to have lost a war in which thousands of Americans died in vain.

The only thing is that continuing in circumstances so unprepossessing could be a worse disaster. If it had in fact been possible for the U.S. to intervene three years ago and accomplish, at reasonable cost, the objective of saving South Vietnam, it probably would have been well worth doing. But since it seems increasingly doubtful that the original purposes can any longer be achieved, the logic of the battlefield suggests that the U.S. could get forced out of an untenable position.

We don't know that the possibility is being squarely faced in Washington; it seems rather unlikely. The Administration insists that the Communist drives are failing of their aims, which Senator Fulbright describes as "wholly irrational, a fantastic analysis." President Johnson seems more firmly committed to Vietnam than ever.

Now stubbornness up to a point is a virtue, but stubbornness can also go beyond the realm of reasonableness. We believe the Administration is duty-bound to recognize that no battle and no war is worth any price, no matter how ruinous, and that in the case of Vietnam it may be failing for the simple reason that the whole place and cause is collapsing from within.

Conceivably all this is wrong; conceivably the Communists are on the brink of defeat and genuine peace talks are about to begin. It doesn't look that way, and as long as it doesn't everyone had better be prepared for the bitter taste of a defeat beyond America's power to prevent.

SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER SPEAKS UP FOR PENTAGON

The Pentagon received a rather unusual vote of confidence February 14 from Torsten Nilsson, Sweden's minister of foreign affairs. The Scandinavian statesman said he refused to believe that the American generals would go so far in Vietnam as to doom a million people by blowing up the Red River dikes.

"For the Americans to bomb the Red River dikes would be genuine genocide," he said in an interview. "The Red River dikes constitute a strictly civilian target. If they were destroyed this would probably mean the death of a million people while another million would be left shelterless and faced with famine. I refuse to believe that the American military command would consider such a frightful idea."

Questioned about the offensive mounted by the National Liberation Front, Nilsson said: "The NLF offensive appears to have had a very obvious aim -- to paralyze the Saigon administration and arouse doubt among the civilian population on the capacity of the generals to govern their own country. Under these conditions, I cannot understand how one can maintain that the guerrillas failed. Quite the contrary, according to all the reports reaching us, the chaos seems to be complete in Saigon."

ASSEMBLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN VIETNAM?

Noting the rumors that have persisted about the White House weighing the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam, the February 22 Chelsea Clinton News, a neighborhood paper in New York City, called attention to the following "home town" news item in its February 8 issue: "Army Pvt. First Class Francis E. Monahan, 20, son of Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Monahan, 457 West 49th Street, was assigned as a nuclear weapons assemblyman near Ci Chi, Vietnam, January 7."
The above cartoon appeared in the February 23 Los Angeles Times, the most prominent daily in the Southern California area. While it is a highly conservative newspaper, its cartoonist, Conrad, has a reputation of being independent, and the editors allow him considerable leeway. His ironic thrust at the "domino theory" of the Pentagon and the White House expresses an attitude that is becoming more and more widespread in the United States as the policy of "escalation" takes the country ever deeper into a dirty war of colonial conquest.
"It became necessary to destroy the country to save it."

"It became necessary to destroy the city to save it."

"It became necessary to destroy the continent to save it."

"It became necessary to destroy the earth to save it."

Domino Theory
West Berlin demonstration -- a milestone for Europe's antin war youth

By Werner Grave

West Berlin

Berlin hasn't seen anything like it since the demonstrations against Hitler in the early thirties. In fact, since the U.S. aggression against the Vietnamese began, Europe has not seen a mass demonstration as large and as radical as this one. The demonstration called for February 18 in West Berlin by the Brussels conference of vanguard youth organizations turned out to be a spectacular success.

The police admitted that "more than 10,000" participated. The AP correspondent, as well as most of the local papers, put the figure at "more than 15,000." The West Berlin Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund [German Socialist Students Federation], the sponsoring organization, counted 21,800 participants.

The demonstration was preceded by an international congress on the theme of victory to the Vietnamese revolution. The mood of the young revolutionists, who came to Berlin from more than twenty different countries, was clearly shown by the fact that this giant affair -- a non-stop session of more than twelve hours -- remained packed from beginning to end, with a huge overflow after all the standing room was gone. Thousands had to meet in the large portico of the Polytechnical Institute, and hundreds of others followed the proceedings in two other halls where simultaneous translations were provided in French and English. The attendance at all these various places ranged between 5,000 and 7,000 during the twelve-hour meeting.

The congress and the demonstration were the work of a broad united front consisting of almost eighty organizations. Among them were several official Communist youth organizations (Austria, Denmark, Norway and West Berlin) and a few that were unofficial, such as the Lambrakis Youth from Greece.

Negotiations had been undertaken with the large Communist youth organizations in France, Italy and East Germany. But they did not participate because of their objections to the central slogan and to the nonexclusive nature of the action. (They didn't like the phrase, "Vietnamese Revolution," and they condemned some of the participating groups as "anti-Soviet" and "Trotskyist." They sought in particular to exclude the French youth organization Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire.)

Later, when they saw the scenes on television, no doubt they recognized the tremendous success of the demonstration with mixed emotions. The East German press, radio and television gave extensive coverage to both the congress and the demonstration but sought to hide its militant character and its true composition.

The three main themes of the congress were: (1) The Vietnamese revolution; (2) the Vietnamese revolution and the revolution in the Third World; (3) the anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggle in the metropolitan countries.

On the first theme the main speakers were Kurt Steinhaus of the German SDS and Tariq Ali of the British Vietcong Solidarity Campaign. Official messages were read from the delegation of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front in Prague and from the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Youth.

The keynote of the second theme was the need to extend the solidarity shown to the Vietnamese revolution to other anti-imperialist revolutions throughout the world. The main speakers were Robin Blackburn of the New Left Review, Jeanette Habel of the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire, Gaston Salvatore of the German SDS, and the Iranian revolutionary socialist Ramin Niramand. Gilman of the British Radical Student Alliance read a message from the African National Congress of South Africa.

The main speakers on the third theme were the German writers, Peter Weiss and Erich Fried; Rostango, a representative of the youth of the left-socialist Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria [Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity]; a representative of the youth of the Venstre-Socialistisk Parti [the Left Socialist party of Denmark]; Alain Krivine of the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire, Rudi Dutschke of the German SDS; and Ernest Mandel of the Belgian revolutionary-socialist movement.

Messages were read from Bertrand Russell, Jean-Paul Sartre and the German philosopher Ernst Bloch.

Dale A. Smith, European representative of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and Jean-Marie Vincent of the French Comité Vietnam National, brought fraternal greetings. Dozens of organizations sent telegrams or messages that could not be read for lack of time. Two Americans living in West Berlin burned their draft cards.
Along with its spirit of spontaneity, the meeting was well organized. The main organizational committee remained in constant touch with the portico and other halls through walkie-talkies. A child-care center was set up inside the Institute where young mothers could leave their babies and small children, in order to participate in the congress. A first-aid center functioned smoothly. During the short intercessions it was possible for the thousands to get a coke and hot dog without undue waiting.

Only one attempt was made to disrupt the proceedings. A West Berlin right-wing lawyer rushed to the podium, declared the congress "dissolved," and tried to disable the microphone. He was hustled out of the hall without difficulty. In the afternoon, he came back, promised to state his point in an orderly way, and was given the floor for a few minutes.

The popular West Berlin student leader, Rudi Dutschke, called strong attention to the newly gained capacity of West European revolutionary socialists to unite in action. When he introduced Ernest Mandel, who was to deliver the final report to the congress, Dutschke said he was the one who had contributed most in the process of lifting the radical West German students to political maturity in the past two years and bringing them to realize the importance of acting in common. During the procession through the streets of West Berlin, Dutschke demonstratively marched side by side with Alain Krivine, the main leader of the delegation of three hundred French youth representing the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire.

The congress was a lively affair. Besides applause for points that met with approval, protests and whistling voiced opposition. The discussion was a free one, with give and take.

The speech by Rüders, the representative of the West Berlin Khrushchevist Freie Deutsche Jugend [Free German Youth, which in East Germany is the official youth movement], was well received when he spoke for unity of action, but met with strong opposition when he tried to defend the Soviet Union's passive attitude toward the Vietnam war.

Several speakers, among them Dr. Wolf, a German doctor who has been practicing in Hue (South Vietnam), cautioned the congress on being too optimistic about the present victory of the National Liberation Front. In the opinion of these speakers, the war may last for years before the imperialists decide to withdraw from Vietnam.

Other speakers, representing the Khrushchevist minority inside the German SDS, opposed the line adopted by the Havana conference of the Organization of Latin-American Solidarity [OLAS], as an oversimplification. They criticized the line of guerrilla struggle in particular. They were answered by both Mandel and Dutschke.

Weeks before the demonstration was announced, the West Berlin Senate (the municipal administration) opened a smear campaign against the SDS in particular and the radical students in general. The organizers of the demonstration, it was claimed, wanted to "provoke incidents against G.I.'s" in order to "endanger the status of West Berlin." The slander was even spread that the students were "conviving" with the Soviet military forces. The slandermongers said that the "West Berlin population" would refuse to be provoked by a "small radical minority." After a real lynch atmosphere had been whipped up against a demonstration which had been planned from the beginning as a peaceful one, West Berlin's mayor, Schütz, banned the demonstration on the pretext that it would inevitably provoke grave incidents and disturbances in the streets.

This arbitrary and antidemocratic act had the opposite effect from the one intended. Leading intellectual and religious figures in West Germany and Western Europe protested the ban on the demonstration. Telegrams of support poured into SDS headquarters. Meanwhile the radical student and working-class youth organizations reacted in the only way that could bring genuine pressure on the authorities. They decided that the demonstration would not only take place as scheduled but that an extra effort would be made to build it up even bigger than projected.

Dozens of buses left the principal West German cities on Friday, February 16, and early Saturday morning loaded with demonstrators. It is hard to estimate the total number of participants from cities other than West Berlin in West Germany, but it certainly exceeded 5,000.

While the municipal administration refused to let them sleep in schools or other official buildings, a broad solidarity movement developed. Food and lodgings were provided for all of them.

West Berlin religious leaders issued a proclamation stating that their churches would remain open day and night as sanctuaries for those fleeing from police brutality. While Schütz mobilized thousands of cops, the SDS bought hundreds of helmets for its defense squads. And the congress decided that the march would be staged, with or without the mayor's permission.

West Berlin student organizations that are in a united front with the SDS,
asked the West Berlin Supreme Court to issue an injunction on the grounds that the ban on the demonstration was unconstitutional. While the poet Erich Fried was speaking Saturday evening, SDS National Chairman Wolf interrupted him --- the court had granted the injunction!

The answering applause was the stormiest I have ever heard. When Fried finally continued, he said that in all his life he had never felt so pleased over being interrupted while he was speaking.

Rudi Dutschke summed up the lesson of the victory by saying, "The bourgeoisie grants you your rights only if you win them by mass pressure."

From then on it seemed certain that the demonstration would be a huge success. And this impression was confirmed by the sight of the many groups assembling late in the morning on the Kurfürstendamm, the street that has been built into a show window to display the supposed eternal superiority of capitalism over Eastern style "communism." What many observers have noted in recent months was again exemplified --- for West German youths, an abundance of consumer goods no longer constitutes a reason for supporting a system responsible for countless crimes against humanity everywhere in the world.

A year ago, even at student demonstrations, it was rare to see a red banner. (Red banners are associated by the predominantly anti-Communist population with the red flag which the Soviet occupation troops hoisted over the Brandenburger Tor in May 1945.) In the demonstration February 18, more than a thousand red flags, besides many NLF flags, and any number of portraits of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, Ho Chi Minh, and Che Guevara were carried by the 20,000 demonstrators.

The demonstration was even more lively and colorful than the congress. Many students sought on their own to involve the spectators at windows and balconies and on the sidewalks. The demonstrators chanted as they formed snake dances. One of the favorite slogans was, "Hey, Hey, LBJ, How Many Kids Have You Killed Today?"

Other favorites were "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh"; "FNL Vaincre"; "For the Victory of the Vietcong"; "Che Guevara"; "Che Is Alive." The main official slogan was: "For the Victory of the Vietnamese Revolution."

The democratic and nonexclusive nature of the demonstration was clearly to be seen in the variety of banners in the march, representing a gamut of political tendencies. Some took a straight Moscow line, others were pro-Mao; some expressed the violent opposition of the Social Democrats to the "wall" built by Ulbricht which divides Berlin into two separate parts.

One huge banner called for "Workers Councils Instead of the Bourgeois State" [Arbiterrat statt Untermacherei].

The final rally was held, appropriately, in front of the Berlin Opera House at the very spot where, eight months before, a few hundred students demonstrated against the Iranian shah. One of them, Benno Ohnesorg, was killed by the police in trying to put down the protest action. Now, 20,000 demonstrators listened to eight speakers. After paying tribute to the martyred Ohnesorg, they continued their action, distributing tens of thousands of leaflets.

The city authorities had appealed to the population to stay home so as to avoid "incidents." But they permitted, or encouraged, a few hundred right-wing provocateurs to range from one point to another seeking to start fights. The disciplined students and young workers, knowing that the reaction had suffered a great political defeat, ignored the provocateurs. A "counterdemonstration," staged in front of the city hall and addressed by one of the mayor's lieutenants, managed to round up about 100 participants.

The three political parties that constitute the "establishment" in West Berlin immediately went to work to organize an answering demonstration under the slogan, "Berlin is on the side of freedom." It is certain that they can mobilize tens of thousands of people with a vague slogan like that which plays on the elemental opposition of Berlin's population to Stalinism and the SED regime in East Germany.

But even these pro-American stalwarts of capitalism do not dare come out openly in defense of U.S. policy in Vietnam. This alone is sufficient commentary on how discredited this policy has become in West Germany. In its own way it also pays the highest tribute to all those who have tirelessly campaigned in defense of the Vietnamese revolution and against the U.S. imperialist aggression since 1965.

In Liège, on October 15, 1966, in the first international demonstration organized by revolutionary socialists in many years, some 4,000 demonstrators turned out. The 4,000 swelled to 20,000 in West Berlin sixteen months later. This is eloquent testimony to the progress that has been made by the new youth vanguard in Western Europe.
Twelve leading Soviet intellectuals took the very courageous action of airmailing a document February 25 to the conference of Communist parties that opened the following day in Budapest. The document appealed to the conference "to consider the peril caused by the trampling on man in our country."

The document was sent in defiance of heavy pressure from the KGB (secret political police), which has threatened the intellectuals with imprisonment if they persist in criticizing violations of Soviet law in trying and condemning citizens for holding views that do not meet with official approval.

The document protested the "series of political trials" in recent years and the imprisonment of individuals solely "for their beliefs."

Excerpts from the document, as published in the Western press, included the following:

"The trials have been conducted with gross violations of legality, the major one being an absence of public information. The people no longer wish to submit to such illegality and this has led to indignation and protests, which have been mounting from trial to trial.

"We have sent many individual and collective letters to various juridical, governmental and party organs, all the way to the Central Committee of the Communist party.

"These letters have remained unanswered. Instead the reply to those who have protested most actively has consisted of being discharged from their jobs, summons to the KGB for threats of arrest and, finally, the most shocking form of reprisals, forcible confinement in a mental hospital.

"We know that many Communists in foreign countries have expressed their disapproval of political repression in recent years. We appeal to the participants in the consultative conference to fully consider the perils caused by the trampling on man in our country."

The twelve signers were: Pavel M. Litvinov, Mrs. Larisa Daniel, Dr. Zamira Asanova, Akelsei Katerin, Pyotr Yakir, Viktor Krazin, Ilya Cabai, Boris Shragin, Anatoly Levitin, Yuli Kim, Yuri Glazov, and Pyotr Grigorenko.

This protest followed news from Moscow February 21 that some 200 prisoners in two labor camps and one prison had begun a hunger strike the previous week in support of their demands for better conditions.

Yuli M. Daniel, the writer given a five-year term in Camp No. 17, was said to be among those taking part in the protest action.

Besides Camp No. 17, Camp No. 11 near Potma and a prison in Vladimir were reported to be involved.

The demands of the prisoners included recognition of their special status as political prisoners, improved living conditions and food, abolition of forced labor, and an end to the restrictions on their right to send and receive letters.

The delegates at the conference of Communist parties, all graduates of the school of Stalinism, are the last ones to be inclined to heed the cries of intellectuals being smothered by their Kremlin colleagues. But it is not within their power to suppress news of the document that was placed before them.

The mood among the Soviet people behind appeals like this, coupled with demonstrations in the prisons and labor camps, can renew the process begun with the "de-Stalinization," and finally win the restoration of proletarian democracy in the Soviet Union.

ANTIWAR STICKERS APPEAR IN LONDON HOME OF U.S. AMBASSADOR

A demonstration in behalf of the Vietnamese people, scheduled for March 17, has been brought to the attention of the U.S. ambassador in London. Leaflets and stickers calling for people to assemble at Trafalgar Square at 2:30 p.m. and march on the U.S. embassy, are being distributed by the "March 17th Vietnam Ad Hoc Committee, 22 Sarre Road, N.W.2. The February 27 Daily Express told how Mrs. Kenneth Tynan, wife of the National Theatre's literary manager, who had been invited to dinner at the home of David Bruce, the American ambassador, attached stickers for the March 17 demonstration "to the elegant decor." Feeling "very desperate about the American involvement in Vietnam," Mrs. Tynan had "to make a gesture, however futile." It was "my only chance to do something like this in an official American place." She said she hopes to join the protest march.
REPORT BY MAJOR RAUL CASTRO ON ACTIVITIES OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE GROUP

[Continued from last week.]

- The exemplary conduct of the vast majority of Soviet technicians and those from other socialist countries

(I would like, however, to clarify, as a question of elementary justice, that, notwithstanding the conduct of a very small number of advisers, journalists and functionaries of foreign embassies who participated in activities of members of the microfaction, numerous technicians from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have worked in our country, demonstrating exemplary conduct and absolute respect for our Revolution. I personally can state that in these years thousands of Soviet officers, including advisers, specialists and technicians of all kinds, have worked with us in the Armed Forces, and there is, really, not a single complaint that can be made about them; quite the contrary, we hold pleasant memories of them and are deeply grateful to them.)

- They fear the State Security Organization and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution

In the middle of last year Aníbal Escalante told Octavio Fernández Boris that he knew the Department of State Security was going to move against the long-time Party militants and that, in line with this, the government would surely make one person in each CDR responsible for watching the long-time PSP militants. He said that it was necessary to watch out for the CDRs.

Following the closing address at the OLAS Conference, in which the Prime Minister spoke about the microfaction (this was the last of several warnings), a meeting was held in the house of Octavio Fernández (in custody), attended by Aníbal Escalante, Inaudi Kindelán and another person who has not been identified. At that meeting they discussed questions brought up by Mayor Fidel Castro in his address and, in their analysis, arrived at the conclusion that the Revolution could not take any measures against them, as their group was not formally organized.

There were some, more impatient than the others, who wanted to set up a clandestine organization, but Aníbal, as always a bit more astute than the rest of the group, opposed the formal creation of an organization, although the work was, in fact, perfectly organized. And all the measures they took were of such a nature that, if any difficulty arose, a cover-up could be found.

That is, in their analysis at that meeting following Fidel's last warning, they reached the conclusion that the Revolution could not take any steps against them because theirs was not a formal organization.

In that meeting they agreed to protect Aníbal Escalante by keeping him out of the foreground and to keep him informed, and agreed that he should orient them through a very small number of persons in order to make it appear that he was not connected with this whole situation.

Fidel not only gave out several public warnings but also, when he was with small groups of people, taking advantage of the presence of this or that person whom he knew to be in contact with Aníbal's group, he spoke of activities against the Party and against the Revolution being carried on by members of the microfaction so that they would realize we were not unaware of their activities.

As a result, on July 18, 1967, Aníbal Escalante sent Fidel a letter which is a model of hypocrisy and cunning.

- Hypocritical letter of Aníbal Escalante

Excerpts from the letter sent to Fidel by Aníbal Escalante on July 18, 1967:

"For that reason and because I believe (he refers to rumors heard at the University about his activities) that the passive acceptance of rumors started by enemies from any quarter -- be they simple intrigues of the numerous anti-Communist sectarians and opportunists, playing the tune they deem to be the tune of the day, or 'active measures' by the CIA or other imperialist intelligence services which also attempt to stick their fingers into the Cuban pie -- does not lead to any good, nor does it benefit the Party or the Revolution, I feel obliged, Comrade Fidel, to bother you once again, because to protest against such slander is not only to defend my revolutionary honor but, at the same time, to defend the necessary national solidarity and revolutionary unity, more necessary today than ever before, if that is possible. I have no proof of what I am fighting against, but, when a river roars, it may not only be a sign of an impending flood -- as you said in 1962 -- but also a sign that it carries with it a great deal of muck and trash."
"I am sure, almost instinctively, that a nauseating provocation against me is at large, using me as the instrument against the incorrectly-called old Communists, to which confused people of good faith may unwittingly contribute.

"Where does the provocation stem from? I do not know for certain, but by the smell -- by the stench, I should say -- it can only have sprung from within the dirty recesses of the CIA or its associates."

(Aníbal goes on:) "What's up now? Now it's a case of Aníbal forming groups! That's the rumor, isn't it? -- no more, no less; the enemy, of course, is shrewd. To form groups is to divide the Party, it is factionalism, it is contrary to revolutionary unity, it is anti-Party intrigue. And divisionist agitation, the spurring of frictions and the fomenting of rancor encourage the split or, at least, add fuel to the confusions that damage the Revolution. And there may even be some who, believing the slander, will contribute to increase the confusion by adopting intolerant attitudes or taking arbitrary measures in an environment in which intolerance and arbitrariness may seem the easy way to convince others.

"Of course, it is needless for me to say that, on principle, and as a Party militant, I am not forming any sort of a group. Being a genuine Communist, I favor democratic centralism and, in general, the Leninist theory and practice on Party organization. Furthermore, I have known for a long time what my duty is. And, parroting Bebel, I could say: 'If Washington wants disunity, I want unity; and if Washington attacks Fidel, I support Fidel.' You can be sure that I make no mistakes in that sense, ever.

"In a word, by writing this letter I do not attempt to clarify actions or conduct of any sort on my part; I only wish to set the record straight on a phenomenon I see, and, in addition, to repudiate all those who seek falsely to use my name, the CIA agents, the provocateurs of every type and the anti-Communists in general. I defend revolutionary unity, I support the Party and obey its leadership and I need no justification. That is my line of conduct."

I am not going to read more. I thought of making a comparison, showing the contradictions between these paragraphs addressed to Fidel and the "self-criticism" that he wrote four months later, once under arrest, to be sent to the leadership of the Party. I leave it to you to make this comparison when you read Aníbal's last letter.

Thus, in response to the warnings, rather than halting their infamous activ-

ities, they took measures to protect Aníbal and pretend that he was removed from all political questions.

At that time, Aníbal Escalante gave instructions to use the telephone as little as possible and to halt group meetings, limiting meetings to no more than three comrades, always in different places. He called a halt to the reproduction of material, the content of such material to be transmitted verbally. He warned against going to one another's places of work, so as to avoid establishing a direct relationship, leaving the care of those places to comrades in those sectors and fundamentally to those who worked directly in them. Finally, he advised them not to visit the homes of the members of the group, and especially not by car.

In order to call this meeting, Kindelán called Aníbal, referring to the latter by the name of "Roberto." A few days later Aníbal Escalante left a message at Octavio Fernández's house for him to visit him at his home at 7:00 p.m. When Octavio arrived, Aníbal told him he wanted to talk to him on the front porch and, in the course of the conversation, gave him to understand that the conversation might be taped. For that reason he made favorable comments on the Prime Minister's speech at OLAS, although he stated that he did not agree with some points. Octavio Fernández refuted the points, since he did not understand the defense that Aníbal was making of the speech.

(They were talking on the porch of the house, Aníbal defending Fidel's speech and Octavio not knowing what to do.)

At the end of the conversation, Aníbal Escalante took Octavio to his room and told him that a microphone might even have been put in the electric wires that ran past the house.

He added that the speech of the Prime Minister was not what Fidel had hoped for as the conclusion of the Congress, since the delegations of the Latin-American Communist Parties had not agreed to a condemnation of any Communist Party in Latin America. He also added that he considered that Fidel had made a mistake in bringing up the matter of the micro-

factions, because that revealed abroad that an ideological struggle existed in Cuba and that discrepancies existed, even in the line set down by the Party.

- The group continues taking precautions

After the group began taking precautions Aníbal Escalante told Octavio Fernández that, as it was nearing the
50th anniversary of the triumph of the Russian Revolution, it would be a good idea to send the Soviet Embassy in Cuba telegrams of congratulations on the anniversary and, furthermore, to send workers' commissions to the Embassy so that the Soviets would see that, despite existing differences, the Soviet Union was beloved, respected and admired by the masses. And they emphasized: "They should see our hand in all this." The members of the group were not to participate directly in this activity but to promote it through third persons and by taking advantage of meetings or assemblies in work centers; it was said that this did not go against the Party, because a commission had even been created for the celebrations and therefore there would be no risks involved.

Aníbal Escalante also gave that orientation, in a similar form, to Ramiro Puertas. Immediately, Octavio Fernández assumed the responsibility of talking with various members of the group, giving them this orientation and informing them that it came from Aníbal Escalante.

Among others, it is known that Octavio Fernández discussed this mission with Inaudi Kindelán, Félix Fleitas, Luciano Argüelles, Renay Hernández, Orlando Olivera, Edmigio López, Alberto Maceira, José A. Caballero, Rafael González Berano and Lázaro Salgueiro.

Meanwhile, Kindelán passed this orientation on to Manuel Lorenzo Torres, a functionary of the Villamil tobacco factory in Pinar del Río, and to Renay Hernández and Eufrides Núñez.

Ramiro Puertas (in custody) passed this orientation on to Radames Mancebo and Arturo García (also in custody). He conversed with the latter, who worked in the ICR (Radio Broadcasting Institute) department of documentaries, on the possibility of presenting some documentaries or programs about that anniversary on radio and television. He also told Félix Fleitas that, taking advantage of the fact that many Soviets worked at the Fishing Port, a party could be given there. (Fleitas always was one for drinks, parties, goat and pig feasts.)

- Places where groups and persons who hold a microfactual position were discovered

Small groups of microfactual elements were known to exist in the Ministry of Industry, where they were headed by Luciano Argüelles (in custody); in the newspaper GRANMA; in the Fishing Port; in the Corona cigar factory; in H. Ullmann and Gener plants; in FRUTICUBA; in the Worker-Farmer Faculty of the University; among the long-time PSP members in the Marte and Arsenal neighborhood; in the Ministry of the Interior; in the Academy of Sciences; in the ICR; among some former trade-union leaders; in some offices of the Central Committee; and in MINPAR (where there was a tiny group of five prisoners, long-time members of the Communist Youth or the PSP, each one with very special characteristics, as, for example, Lt. Hugo Vázquez, who was a prosecutor in the Legal Section of General Staff Headquarters and who took part in the underground movement against the Batista tyranny in the organization of I-don't-know-which strike. When Ventura found out about it, this man became frightened and, through the President of the Journalists' Association of Havana Province, requested an interview with Ventura, which was granted. Ventura reprimanded him and gave him a cigar; he smoked it there and left; he didn't conspire again. Naturally, when he was discussed for admittance on the Partisan list in the Armed Forces, he was not accepted; from then on, he has been "disgruntled.")

We also have information about persons who, though there is no evidence of their having participated in a definite group, hold a microfactual position. Similarly, we have information about some persons who maintained relations with microfactual elements without combating their positions.

In the enterprise FRUTICUBA, the microfactual elements were concentrated in positions of leadership. When that enterprise was created, several ex-members of the PSP, who were alike in many ways, began to work there. All of them had failed in the jobs they had been assigned before; they were resentful and always had some explanation to try to justify their failure. They all considered themselves victims of the Revolution and believed they had sufficient merit to be political leaders. Some were kept in their positions in spite of their ineptness and lack of prestige, and others, after having made mistakes due to their lack of ability, were sent to other posts in the enterprise but almost always continued to be leaders.

This entire group of resentful individuals had a position of constant, ill-intentioned criticism of everything the Revolution did and the orientations that were given to the enterprise. Those arrested from this enterprise were: Ricardo Bofill Pagés, who was head of the Publicity Department of FRUTICUBA; Francisco Brito Rodríguez, who was in charge of marketing; Reinaldo Puig Berdeja, in charge of installations and project planning; and Raúl Fajardo Escalona, administrator of a FRUTICUBA ice cream factory.

Some of the opinions that Bofill expressed to the group were of this nature: that the methods used to remove Aníbal Escalante from the National Lead-
ership had not been the most correct; that Che had left Cuba because of discrepancies with Fidel, and things of that nature.

Bofill had belonged to the ORI.

Francisco Brito publicly stated that Che had created problems for the economy of Cuba, trying to industrialize this country with importations of pencils, refrigerators, spark plugs, etc.; that he had installed a techocracy and brought in Latin-American Trotskyist technicians; that the best thing was for him to get the ---- out of the country. He said that after Major Fidel Castro had put Che down he had taken a quote from Dr. Quesada, that nobody could understand Fidel, that he was crazy.

These prisoners have given information that verifies and fills out the information we had about FRUTICUBA, which revealed the situation of resentment and mistrust that existed in that enterprise.

We are not going to speak of the moral attitude typical of most of the prisoners -- with a few exceptions, of course. It will suffice to read a short paragraph from document No. 2, written by Dr. Emilio de Quesada, which reads as follows: "As for some comrades" -- he was referring to those in the group -- "they were considered Communists because they shared those ideas, regardless of their human weaknesses. They were considered firm in their convictions, and the rest was tolerated." (For "firm" read loyal to the line that the group held; for "firm" read loyal to Aníbal.)

(How this paragraph reminds me of one of the factors that first began engendering sectarianism: Loyal to me, no matter what you do, what you have done, what you will do, the corrupt practices that you are committing, that you have committed, that you will commit; you are a good Communist because you are loyal to me.) I chose the name of Aníbal Escalante's first lieutenant, in order to bring up this aspect of the problem.

- Objectives of the microfractional group

Aníbal Escalante stated that his objective was to create a trend of opinion that would force his points of view to be discussed in the Party.

(That is, he said that his objective was to create a trend of opinion that would force his points of view to be discussed in the Party. I'd like you to permit me to tell a brief anecdote here that is called to mind by Aníbal's argument.)

(it was during the difficult years when bands of counterrevolutionaries rose up in various provinces of the country. February 1961. I remember I was in Oriente. The Chief of the State Security Department Capt. Méndez Comendes, called me, after having arrested an individual in Guantánamo with a load of rifles; several of his companions had risen up in Monte Rua. I believe, ironically enough, that fellow was also named Aníbal, Aníbal Rodríguez. Méndez called me at home one morning around dawn and told me, "Listen, I'd like you to come down here and question this man to see if he has the nerve to tell you what he is telling me." I put on my clothes and left for Security. I questioned the man; they had captured him with weapons, with a group of bandits who were going to rise up in Monte Rua, and he told me the same story, one similar to Aníbal Escalante's, that his objective was to create a trend of opinion that would force his points of view to be discussed with the Party. What did that Aníbal tell me? "No, pal, I wasn't going to rise up. We weren't going to fight against you." "And those weapons? Don't you admit that you were going to the hills of Monte Rua?" He said, "Yes, pal, I don't agree with these Communist things that are being put into practice here, and, since we couldn't talk to Fidel, we were going to Monte Rua. We were going to go there with men and rifles, and that way Fidel would be forced to discuss matters with us."

Meanwhile, the prisoners Octavio Fernández and Inaudi Kindelán Reyes declared that the failure of the economic plans of the Revolution would mean a political failure of the petty-bourgeois leadership, forcing a rectification of the line and a consideration of the points of view of the group, some of whom would be called on to occupy positions in the Party and the trade-union movement.

- Their total lack of a revolutionary attitude and their propensity for lying

(From this we can better understand how some of them provoked discontent and gave instructions for provoking discontent among people in shopping lines against the present Communists, although in honor of the truth and in the spirit of honesty and exactitude that have characterized these proceedings we must say that the person who states his now denies it. However, we have irrefutable proof that he said it and gave such orientation. Moreover, with all of the other things, their verbal and written accounts, our investigations were complete because, in the same way, they denied all of their infamous statements about leaders of the Revolution.)
(They denied this, and he denied it. I clarify this in order to be truthful and in fairness to the prisoner, but we do have proof. Such orientation was in no way contrary to the views they held, and evidence of this kind is present in the documents that we shall read next.)

(That is, that the economic "failure" of the Revolution and its plans would force a rectification of the official line and consideration of the viewpoints of the group, some of whose members would then be called to take up official posts because they are the representatives of the proletariat and we are the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie. They could not accuse us of strengthening ties with Yankee imperialism, and so they say that we are drawing nearer to French imperialism.)

(Moreover, attempts were made to win over Party members to their opinions in order to exert pressure on the Party leadership from the base.)

(But, more than our own words, we prefer to base ourselves on the documents written by them, in their own hand. I wish to point out to you, comrades of the Central Committee, that in what we have been reading thus far we have limited ourselves exclusively to what they have accepted, what they have confessed, and when we have expressed our opinions we have qualified them as such.)

(We have stated what they have stated, and, to destroy their arguments, we are going to use their own words, their own confessions, their own writings. Naturally we cannot read all of them, because there are reams and reams of paper. Therefore, the Political Bureau decided to organize an exhibition in a locale next to this room. Each member of the Central Committee present will be given a numbered booklet bearing his name, which should be returned before you leave here and which contains a complete index of all the evidence in our possession, so that all who so desire may examine it: captured documents, statements made by those in custody, photographs of the accused engaged in various conspiratorial activities, tape recordings of conversations and meetings, an exhibition of the documents and films of the questionings made by the investigation section, etc. All of this is at the disposal of the Central Committee.)

(After you have made use of these indexed booklets, please return them to the same place where they were given to you to assure control in view of their content, as they are guides for the convenience of the comrades of the Central Committee, who may examine the exhibition during any of the recess periods or at the end of today's sessions.)

(In other words, our investigation is based on innumerable and irrefutable facts and on what they themselves have written, accepted and confessed. And to destroy their arguments the Revolution does not need to defend itself from the infamous statements which these individuals spread, because the minimum of truth that might be present in their criticisms of the Revolution is invalidated by the fact of their absolute absence of any revolutionary attitude, their propensity for lying, the detestable mixtures which are mixed with their criticism, their monstrous distortions of history and the very characteristics of the revolutionary process, their disloyalty to the nation and the perverse, selfish and traitorous goals they pursued.)

(This is not the healthy criticism that we constantly apply to ourselves. In a word, they wished the Revolution to fail so that what they termed the petty-bourgeois leadership of the Revolution might be destroyed.)

(Let us turn to the documents that they themselves composed.)

(Manuscript No. 2 of Octavio Fernández.)

"Aníbal maintained that, as of 1970, difficulties would increase because, economically, we were not going to be able to hit the 10,000,000-ton mark in sugar production, since the measures necessary to guarantee this were not being taken. He said that the very pace of the present sugar harvest indicated this, since we would need almost a 4,000,000-ton increase in two years' time. He said that the shortage of food products as well as manufactured goods would not be solved at the level proposed. And, for all these reasons, the institutions that had been made to the people, such as free rent by 1970, could not be kept. Politically, the Latin-American Communist Parties would be stronger" (this is by 1970, according to the "prophet" Aníbal Escalante) "and in positions to exercise full leadership of the struggle in their respective countries. The Soviet Union would be much stronger because of its headlong development, technologically, economically, politically and militarily, and, on the contrary, imperialism would be much weaker.

"Because of this situation, it would surely become imperative to rectify the Party line in Cuba, to change the organizing methods and the work of the Party, giving the workers greater participation. More realistic methods would be applied to production, with greater attention given to workers' opinions, utilizing the trade-union movement in its true role of leader of the working class. And, as for the
Soviet Union, we would draw much closer to all its policies, thus eliminating a whole series of differences that we have today, because life itself would provide the example in this case. And also because the trend toward closer ties with France was doomed to failure, in spite of everything, in spite of all their attempts, since France was a capitalist country which in its dealings with us would not abandon its class position, and since it did not have such vast resources as the Soviet Union.

"As this was the situation, the group would work in the interest of defending the Soviet Union's stand on current events, such as, for example, the recent conflict in the Middle East, as well as clarifying that country's stand in its policy of peaceful coexistence. It would instill in the masses the necessary confidence in the Soviet Union's solidarity with our Revolution and with all revolutionary movements. It would assure the masses that the Soviet Union would never leave us to face the imperialists alone, since this was a question of principles in the defense of the Revolution. It would work to have the points of view of the working class on production taken into consideration as well as to have due recognition given to the role of the trade unions as the proper vehicle for putting socialist emulation into practice, raising the educational level of the workers and advising management in all administrative policy-making. It would work to convince all comrades of the correctness of this policy.

"In the work of winning over others, we established a method for feeling out comrades." (Octavio continues) "that is, one would take him aside and talk to him in order to find out his opinions. In most cases mention would be made of Aníbal, to see if the reaction was positive or negative. Then it could be judged whether or not it was likely that the comrade could be won over on this question. And, as for some leaders, Aníbal suggested that I go to see Blas and Kindelan to see Lázaro" (I mentioned this matter previously) "in order to find out their opinions.

"Aníbal maintained" (Octavio's writings state) "that when events had led to the situation he expected to see after 1970, as the result of an analysis made to overcome the existing weaknesses, changes would be made in the Party's work methods and in production and the trade-union movement, as well as in the policy toward the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of Latin America. Aníbal maintained that then there would have to be a new attitude recognizing his opinions, and, therefore, he would once more be asked to take up a leadership post in the Party or simply the same one he had held before, that of Organizing Secretary.

"Moreover, he maintained that the necessary moral support would surely come from the Soviet Union and that the Soviet comrades would even make suggestions to Fidel concerning a fraternal rapprochement with all those comrades who had been acting under Aníbal's orientation.

"The first precaution was to keep comrades from going to his house or to the farm. That is, to make it appear that he was aloof from the entire situation. But he was to continue giving orientation through a very small group of comrades, making such contacts individually and very infrequently.

- Continuation of Octavio Fernández' report

"Other measures taken included keeping use of the telephone down to a minimum, especially with him; limiting to three at most the number of comrades to be seen together in public; and making sure that such meetings occurred in different places. The comrades were advised not to frequent the same places all the time and to avoid, in particular, reproduction of material, it being better to communicate material verbally."

(Some of the group thought that Fleitas was a "provocateur" because he was always insisting on mimeographing material and on taking other measures.)

"Recently, Aníbal told me that in case he was arrested I would surely be arrested afterwards...and that it would be necessary in that case to send the answer he had made to the newspaper Le Monde in 1962 on sectarianism to L'Humanité and the Communist Party of France, another copy to the Soviet Union and a third to the Germans, because an explanation of his arrest would be found in that statement.

"Concerning the responsibilities which we would assume once this situation led to rectification of the Party line after 1970," (Octavio continues) "it was expected that, if Aníbal again held a top post, those of us who had taken part in these events would be promoted along with him, in keeping, of course, with our abilities, background and experience.

"But it is right to point out" (Octavio's report continues) "that the motivations of the great majority of comrades were not exactly to kick off a fight for official posts but to defend the Revolution, in keeping with Aníbal's orientation and viewpoints on this matter. In my own case, for instance, this was not the motivation, since I had, in the past, voluntarily proposed that I be transferred
to production.

"Now, in the specific case of Aníbal, having analyzed all these events and coming to understand his character and behavior, I see that, basically, what motivated him was the desire to figure once again among the leadership of the Party, because of personal pride and arrogance."

(Octavio continues.) "After having given a detailed account of this whole situation and having mulled it over, there is no room for doubt that the only conclusion I can reach is that all this was disgraceful and shameful. And the rest of the group must feel as I do, for the only thing we were truly interested in was the defense of this, our Revolution, nothing else.

"However, personal devotion and superficial evaluation of problems led us to fall into a position where we served as instruments for someone else to climb up the ladder only to selfishly satisfy his personal ambitions (referring to Aníbal)."

- Dr. Quesada's manuscript

Manuscript No. 1 of Dr. Quesada. Objectives: From the content of these procedures, it is clear that no attempt to seize power was ever intended; that would have been ridiculous. Aníbal could not get the cohesion nor attain the unity of the Revolution, and no one else in the group possessed the faintest possibilities of doing so.

"On one occasion, in the analysis of what should be done, we reached the conclusion that the situation in this respect was most difficult to define, that the presence of our most powerful enemy only 90 miles away was a factor that could not be forgotten. Once an attempt was made to hold a discussion on this matter, and it was concluded that for the moment it was only possible to create a climate of opinion by defending those points, which might work as an influence toward their being taken seriously -- beyond that it was not possible to make more specific formulations, it depended on what happened -- to form opinion, to defend points of view in all places and in every possible way, to gain wider acceptance of these ideas, etc."

(According to Quesada:) "The opinion was expressed that the objective factors were determinant, especially the external factors. By this we meant economic realities that tended to lead the Revolution along the road we considered the best. Bluntly speaking, we even wished for a certain degree of political pressure and that economic realities come into play that would help us in this sense. This may sound monstrous," (Quesada states) "but it is understandable from the point of view that the path of coincidences would, in the long run, save our Revolution; that a little pain was preferable to a course that would lead to serious dangers.

"I believed" (Quesada continues) "that such factors would come up as part of the basic objective evaluation that would be made outside our country without our participation. It was never expressly stated that we should take definite steps ourselves, but that is not important. And, anyway, examining the facts objectively, our activity as such was a way of bringing about such a situation. And, on one occasion, as I have already stated, I even explained to Octavio that it would be better if we did not have the help of the GDR in the setting up of the printing press.

"From what has been explained to me by the comrades in charge of these proceedings," (Quesada continues) "Comrade Aníbal was the one who took those steps. I knew nothing about the matter, but that does not matter, since, if I had been informed of the matter, I would not have opposed it, because by then the concept we held of things was essentially the same -- that is, I do not now claim innocence on this question."

(Now he refers to moral incentives.)

"We believed that moral incentives were only effective in stimulating production among persons with highly developed awareness, not among the backward strata."

(It appears that for Dr. Quesada and his group the Cuban people are made up of the backward strata.)

[To be continued.]

**GUEVARA'S GUERRILLA COMRADES LEAVE CHILE**

Denied political asylum by the Frei government, five of Che Guevara's guerrilla comrades, who left Bolivia and entered Chile, took a plane from Santiago February 24. They rejected any stop-offs in Western Hemisphere airports where they could be seized by CIA agents or forces working with them; and thus had to fly to Cuba the long route via Easter Island, Paris and Prague.
GUATEMALAN GUERRILLAS BREAK WITH COMMUNIST PARTY

[With its December issue, the well-known Mexico City magazine Política suspended publication. (See World Outlook, January 25, p. 58.) However, the subscribers have just received a supplement to that issue containing two items: the text of the speech made by the president of Cuba, Dr. Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, at the opening session of the Cultural Congress of Havana, and the text of a document sent to Política by the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Rebel Armed Forces) of Guatemala.

The editor of Política, Manuel Marcue Pardiñas, in a brief footnote to the FAR document, explained why he was putting out a supplement: "This document reached the editorial office of Política after the final issue had been mailed. Because of its extraordinary importance, Política is making an effort to bring it to the attention of national and international public opinion."

[Politics carried the following titles on the document: "Declaración by the FAR of Guatemala. The PGT has Captulated. The FAR Breaks with an Opportunist Political Current. A Genuine Vanguard Assumes Leadership of the Revolution."

The FAR is the wing of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement headed by César Montes. Until the public break came, as announced in this document, the FAR was considered to be closely linked with the PGT (Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo -- Guatemalan Labor Party; i.e., the Communist party). The PGT, in turn, because of its connection with the FAR, enjoyed the reputation of being committed to a revolutionary program and of favoring the road of armed struggle.

The break between the FAR and the PGT is a significant milestone in the development of the revolutionary struggle in Guatemala. It portends a much closer relationship between the FAR and the other wing of the guerrilla movement, the MR-13 headed by Yon Sosa. Internationally, its importance must be judged in the general context of the differences between the Cuban revolutionists and the Kremlin over the orientation of the struggle for freedom and socialism in Latin America.

The translation below is by World Outlook. The subheadings appear in Política. It is not clear whether these are contained in the original document.]

* * *

"And the peoples will follow the fighters and rally around the combatants, the revolutionaries, the men of action. The masses will be stirred by the men of revolutionary action, by the guerrillas. In Guatemala, in Colombia, in Venezuela, and in Bolivia this problem is being posed on the field of action." — Comandante Juan Almeida.

At the very moment when the struggle between the reactionary bandits and the poor people grows fiercer and more implacable, when the enemy is bringing massive destructive and annihilating power to bear, employing all of American technology's most horrible instruments of war and most inhumane methods; those who usurped the place of a popular vanguard have finally dropped their mask and their lying rhetoric. They show themselves now as what they have always been -- petty-bourgeois opportunists. To keep from burning their own fingers, they pushed us into testing whether a revolutionary war could be victorious. Then, as they did in 1954 and as they are doing now when they think they see a threat to the survival of their so-called Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (Guatemalan Labor Party), they abandoned us to our fate under the fire of the enemy, under the imperialist scourge of extermination and massacre.

For a year we have faced the counterrevolution's most furious and cunning assault, suffering the hardest blows the enemy has yet dealt us. We have paid the price for the failure of the false and adventurist orientations of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo which tried to lead the guerrilla struggle from its city hideouts, and with this the price of a military defeat -- the death of hundreds of compañeros and almost 3,000 men of the people. But far from renouncing the fundamental path of revolutionary war in this temporary and limited defeat, by standing up against the most brutal enemy operations and keeping up the fight even under the most adverse conditions, we learned to stop letting ourselves be deceived by dirty opportunistic politicians. We learned to gauge the enemy's strategy and tactics for ourselves and to conduct ourselves in accordance with our own experience. We are now testing our strength to resume the advance and preparing ourselves to continue the fight by carrying out ambushes, harassment, capturing weapons, incessantly attacking the enemy and by reaffirming our unshakeable determination to struggle and triumph.

Far from retreating, from becoming discouraged or faltering, we are overcoming all blows and reverses and today we are better prepared to face any eventual- ity and any circumstance. There has been no lack of hard blows suffered or of failures in the history of the victorious revolutionary struggle of the peoples. Blows
and failures are the beginning of our apprenticeship in victory.

- The war of extermination and the seductive demagogic gifts of the puppet government of Méndez Montenegro

Having the help of a civilian force in the government of Guatemala enabled imperialism to employ the methods of special warfare more effectively, through the development of more precisely directed combat operations against the revolutionary forces and through the implementation of Civil action tactics, such as the highly touted civic action of the pilot economic development and social plans. The electoral victory of Julio César Méndez Montenegro enabled the counterrevolutionary warfare specialists to plan more effective operations through simultaneous use of the Partido Revolucionario [Revolutionary party -- the party now in power] and the national army. During the military dictatorship of Peralta Azurdia, the imperialist agents were unable to establish a firm and effective policy to combat the armed struggle in our country. Only the victory of the PR made it possible for the enemy to win the support of the population while the army and the repressive forces sought to annihilate the revolutionary forces. Through the U.S. State Department, the American ambassador in Guatemala, Gordon Mein; its agent Mr. Hinton of the AID [Agency for International Development] mission; Colonel Hacker of the U.S. military mission in Guatemala; Major Frederick Boerner, the civic action expert of the U.S. military group; and, naturally, the CIA unit in our country, imperialism succeeded in putting at the service of counterrevolutionary war the legal political parties and their civic organizations as well as the majority of commercial, industrial, financial, and agricultural associations and enterprises. It gave specific responsibility for anti-guerrilla operations to the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and the offices and institutions of public service, social welfare, culture, and civil-military action.

The objectives of the government of Julio César Méndez Montenegro have been limited to crushing the armed movement, reestablishing order, and restoring public confidence and the stability of the regime for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, the landowners, and imperialism. The government's entire policy is oriented toward restoring tranquility for the ruling classes and maintaining the regime of imperialist domination by diverting into channels beneficial to it all the political militancy and activity of those masses susceptible to reformism, economism, and corruption. At the same time, it kidnaps, murders, and carries out repressions against those whom it cannot corrupt. To achieve these objectives, the puppet government has presented itself as the banner bearer of the revolution and the people's causes. It is developing a reformist policy for seductive purposes, while it brutalizes and murders those whom it cannot deceive. It allows the unions to organize and the traditional organizations to continue to function so long as they support its war of "pacification." Thus it divides and politically disarms the trade-union movement. It permits the student organizations to operate as long as the students stay shut up in their class rooms and are very careful not to raise any questions of national import. It kidnaps and murders those whom it cannot silence, who do not lend themselves to the maneuvers of the CIA agents, those whom it cannot use for its counterrevolutionary ends.

The reformist policy of the Méndez Montenegro regime is determined by the objectives of counterrevolutionary warfare. This regime does not seek to solve the problems of hunger, poverty, ignorance. It only pursues this policy to "win the hearts and minds of the people," to maintain the regime of imperialist exploitation and domination. The effectiveness of the government's reformist measures is not gauged by the extent to which they provide a real solution to the problems of the peasants and the workers but by how successful they are in drowning out the revolution's promises. Despite their success, through granting a few small crumbs, in "fostering sentiments, attitudes and behavior favorable to the government and the army in their pursuit of the national aims, including the destruction of the guerrillas." What the puppet government seeks is to win the war against the revolutionary movement and it cannot do this unless it can count on the support of the civilian population. The creators of the political-military science of counterrevolution are so stupid and so cynical that they seem not to have realized that a fight against the revolutionary movement is a fight against the people and that the people can never support these tortuous schemes. But the enemy is trying to make the people fight against the people; when its demagogic fails to persuade them it employs force and terrorism to obtain their support. And when it does not succeed in intimidating, it turns to merciless extermination.

The puppet government's demagogic policy succeeded for a few months in deceiving some sectors of the people and won a certain measure of support for the fight against the revolutionary movement. But the government's presents began to become too costly in the lives and blood of their kinsmen, brothers, and sons; and the regime's policy only fanned the people's hatred of their oppressors.
it is impossible to fight the revolutionary movement without fighting the people, the government had to take off its mask and show itself as it is -- a regime of violence, defending the interests of the ruling classes and imperialism and directed against the people. Since the people failed to see benefactors where there were none, the government tried to force them to and thereby it succeeded only in arousing a powerful desire in the people to fight against it armed in hand. Everything is turning out wrong for the puppet government because it is the guardian of the prevailing system of oppression which the people have risen up against. The government of Mendoza Montenegro needed to represent itself as revolutionary but its reactionary aims and its objective of defending the interests of its bourgeois masters, the big plantation owners and the imperialists, betrayed it; no other road was left to it but to continue on with its aggressive policy of extermination.

- The difficulties of the revolutionary war forced the petty-bourgeois opportunists to drop their masks, to falter and renounce the armed struggle.

The enemy policy of extermination is what frightened the opportunists and the weakest and least revolutionary elements. This does not surprise us because they never prepared themselves morally, politically, or militarily to confront these difficult situations; they do not even know what exhaustion is, how bare feet hurt on a march, what it is to have to face hunger while under enemy harassment and bombing. This group came into existence in conditions of legality, it was not formed in combat or even in street battles. Those who have played with the lives of the revolutionary fighters, with the lives of the people, are frightened because the enemy has moved in everywhere, deploying his forces broadly and murdering with impunity.

The aggressiveness of the enemy forces and the difficulties of the war have frightened the defeatist opportunist petty bourgeois of the PGT. In deceptive ways they have broken with the revolutionary forces and entrenched themselves in a conspiratorial rear guard. They speak shamelessly of a "strategic retreat" to organize and prepare the armed struggle and employ all forms of mass political struggle while they dismiss the present struggle of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes. We revolutionaries cannot retreat and make a truce to prepare and organize; combat is our school of preparation and organization. We are fighting in order to organize and we are organizing in order to fight. We are fighting and the people support us. We are organizing them. The people are organized and are fighting. Retreats and truces only give the enemy time to recondition his troops, to implement new repressive techniques, to recover lost ground, and to broaden his military and political control.

To speak of retreat at this stage in our war is more than defeatism, it is capitulation and complete abandonment of the struggle, leaving the worker and peasant masses defenseless so that the enemy can continue exterminating people with absolute impunity. Admissions of this type do not surprise us in the least because they have a historical explanation. The reason is that in our country the role of revolutionary vanguard has not been assumed by the workers or the peasants but by the oscillating middle layers of the petty bourgeoisie. These layers have swayed at times to the side of the revolution and at times to the side of reaction, giving rise to the proliferation of camarilla opportunism, diverting the popular movements into support at best of a reformist camarilla and at worst of a reactionary and pro-imperialist camarilla.

- The PGT arose and developed as an opportunist petty-bourgeois camarilla and usurped the leadership of the revolution.

The Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo arose in a period of legality as an extension of the bourgeois democratic revolution of the forties -- on the basis of bourgeois liberties and within the constitutional framework of the bourgeois government of Juan José Arévalo. The PGT did not develop out of the popular struggle that threw out the feudal dictatorship of Ubico but rather as an extension of the bourgeois conquests which this struggle made possible. It did not develop as the antithesis of the new bourgeois regime or the forces represented in this regime but as a component of these forces, as their radical component. It did not develop out of the struggles of the peasantry and the working class but took form as the vanguard of a bourgeois political party, as the vanguard of the Partido Acción Revolucionaria (PAR) [Revolutionary Action party]. Therefore, the PGT was never able to give the bourgeois-democratic revolution an impetus toward socialism, it limited itself to mere chatter about the evolutionary road to revolution, without turning working-class hegemony to account, without preparing the conditions for the advancement of the revolution, without creating the necessary mechanisms to consolidate the revolution and retain power for the exploited.

The ouster of the government of Jacobo Arbenz was the work of American imperialism but responsibility for the failure to defend it rests with the lead-
ers of the PGT. They were incapable of foreseeing the consequences of that regime's nationalist reforms and of facing up to the aggressive plans woven by the Central Intelligence Agency. Accustomed as they were to the horse-trading of machine politics, the PGT leaders never neglected to express their confidence in the national army's "democratic" and "revolutionary" spirit. And when the shadow of Foster Dulles, the U.S. secretary of state and a shareholder in and lawyer for the United Fruit Company -- the principal imperialist enterprise in Guatemala at that time -- fell over the country, instead of standing up to this aggression shoulder to shoulder with the people and defying it no matter what the consequences, these tinhorn politicians cravenly fled the country. Jacobo Arbenz' nationalist policy of seeking an independent capitalist development had clashed with the imperialist interests and thus touched off American aggression and military intervention.

- The defeat of the traditional forms of camarilla opportunism in 1954 was not final; they reappeared in the guise of underground activity and support for the armed struggle.

The 1954 failure buried forever the traditional forms of struggle. But when the PGT leaders -- who in the safety of exile did not experience the consequences of this defeat -- returned to Guatemala, they revived all the dirty political customs of the past in the guise of underground activity; they imposed the same conservative organizational forms on the popular masses. And when in 1962 the masses discovered on their own new forms of struggle and took the armed-struggle road to revolution, the PGT did not even attempt to take the lead of the new struggle. It wanted for its part to establish its own guerrilla movement in the mountainous regions of Raja Verapaz and precipitously pushed into this a handful of valiant compaereros who were massacred by the army before they had made their way deeply into the mountains.

Despite the PGT's indecision and scepticism about the potential of armed struggle, since there was no other popular organization, the train of events ended with its enlistment in the guerrilla struggle. Its leaders began setting orientations from the city up to promoting themselves into "strategists," organizers, and tacticians of revolutionary war without participating in it. In fact the guerrilla struggle was no more to them than a bargaining item, a power piece, "a tactical category" to be used while what they called a "shift in the forces in the counterrevolutionary camp" was taking place. The PGT's policy has always been to decide which is the main enemy, not in order to concentrate its struggle against this main enemy but with the aim of making deals with the "lesser enemies." This was the policy which they pompously termed "united-front work." The PGT entered into negotiations not only with the Unión Revolucionaria Democrática (URD) [Revolutionary Democratic Union] but also with the Democracia Cristiana [Christian Democracy] and the Partido Revolucionario. It carried on negotiations with the PR before the 1966 presidential elections, after those elections, and is now doing so when that party is submissively serving the imperialist objectives of special warfare.

- Peoples war is forging the legitimate leaders of the revolution and burying the petty-bourgeois opportunists usurpers.

But while the PGT survived on the basis of cheap political wheeling and dealing and usurped the leadership of the revolutionary war, the real and only leaderships of the revolutionary movement were being forged on the guerrilla front, in the guerrilla war where a worker-peasant alliance has taken form, in the mountains where the revolutionary intellectuals are being proletarianized. The PGT now not only repudiates its former ideological position of support for the armed struggle, concocting theories to suit its capitulationist attitudes and explanations for its compromises. In addition, it is trying to destroy the fundamental political content and the strategic perspective of the guerrilla war. It has unleashed an intense divisive campaign within the ranks of the Rebel Armed Forces, promoted rivalries among the fighters, tried to obstruct and undermine the authority of Comandante César Montes, and has mounted a campaign of slander against the patriotic, unifying, revolutionary work of the real and only leader of the Captain Alejandro de León Guerrilla Front and its Comandante Marco Antonio Yon Sosa.

The PGT has ceased to be a revolutionary instrument and is dying as a working-class party in the Marxist sense. It is becoming a mere bureaucratic apparatus living off international solidarity. Our defeats in the northeastern part of the country signify more than the culmination of the PGT's erratic and incorrect line; they signify the end of a political party called "Marxist Leninist" and definitively mark the end of a period in our history. This is so not because the enemy has defeated these conceptions in the field but because our defeats forced us to move forward, overcoming and outgrowing the traditional conceptions of revolutionary war, as well as overcoming and outgrowing the old conceptions of a party and revolutionary vanguard. Therefore the PGT's break with the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes went
beyond the mere break of a camarilla with the revolutionary fighters; it was a break of the revolutionary fighters with a political tendency; it was a break with the history of the so-called Guatemalan Communist party. This break marks the culmination of the process of establishing a real worker-peasant vanguard brought forth in battles of the guerrilla front from the ranks of the people. In these battles the worker-peasant vanguard is being forged; it is being tempered and consolidated in the heat of these battles, and from them a real party of the working class is being created.

- Camarilla opportunism has founded a school and the PGT's capitulationist attitude has led to the proliferation of petty-bourgeois positions of both the left and right.

The revolutionary fighters, however, realize that this erroneous tendency will not disappear overnight. It has already put down deep roots and if it is not eradicated politically the advance of revolutionary war will definitively erode. At this moment, we see how unprincipled opportunists have found their element in this perverse current. Using no political or ideological arguments, they are trying to distort and present a falsified view of the political and military activity of the guerrillas, alleging that there can be no revolution without a party. Opportunists who at one time engaged in a few battles have switched from bombast and heated talk to flight and refuge in the foxholes of a gang of dirty politicians. But let us also note how the "antiparty" opportunists are trying to exploit our break with the PGT to carry out their maneuvers and dirty political schemes. They proclaim the transfer of political leadership from the city to the mountains but totally deny the authority of the guerrilla leaders, to whom they deny all political capacity. These new opportunists see the PGT as political men and the guerrillas as military men. Oscillating between the city and the country, they call themselves "political-military men"; they claim to be complete revolutionaries but in reality they are neither political nor military men. For us, a revolutionary's worth depends not on his attitude toward the party but on his attitude toward the war, his attitude in the fighting. We are living in a time when it is not enough to be a party man to be a revolutionary nor antiparty to be a revolutionist. Both positions are equally opportunistic and adventurist. War leaves room for neither opportunism nor adventurism.

- The guerrilla leaders are assuming the leadership of the war under the banner of unity with all the revolutionary, democratic, and popular forces.

The people now must know that, as an urgent necessity and independent of any domatic, defeatist, bureaucratic, or opportunist tutelage, the guerrilla leaders of the FAR have taken the leadership of the revolution into their hands and that we share this historic responsibility with the compañeros of the Captain Alejandro de León Guerrilla Front. The Guatemalan revolutionary movement could not continue under the incompetent and adventurist leadership of a sect of opportunist provocation. The Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes represent the broadest popular and revolutionary interests; they are the organized and fighting vanguard of the peasant and worker masses and of the country's revolutionary youth. Our brother peoples need not worry about the vacillating and defeatist attitude of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo, because this party has always been on the fringes of the struggle of the people and its organized vanguard. Our nemesis realizes that our break with the perpetrators does not constitute a split in the revolutionary forces but rather a step forward in the indomitable struggle against them all. Despite the fact that the PGT is helping the exploiting classes solve their economic crisis by acting as the intermediary for the sale of coffee to certain socialist countries whose governments advocate the revolutionary coexistence road to revolution, the enemy has not ceased his preparations for war or his desperate attempts to crush the people's vanguard, the guerrillas of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes. Only revisionists can be alarmed by the development of people's war independent of petty-bourgeois, opportunist, and conciliationist so-called "Communist" parties.

We fighters of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes are for the unity of all the revolutionary, democratic, and popular forces in order to make the revolution in our country. We understand that the revolution must be the work of all patriotic Guatemalans. The revolution is not the objective of the FAR and the guerrillas alone; it is not only the endeavor of a class and an organization; it is the achievement of struggle and sacrifice of all the revolutionary and progressive classes; it is the accomplishment of the mobilization, organization and militant action of all the people. It is not a desperate or adventurist action on our part to plan the immediate overthrow of Méndez Montenegro or any other puppet or reactionary ruler. We are promoting the guerrilla movement in order to develop a guerrilla army which will overthrow the reactionary regime and create the conditions for the political and military defeat of the exploiting classes and the
imperialist aggressor. The revolutionary struggle has very deep roots in the needs of the peasants and workers and it has a guerrilla tradition. It is not an improvised, adventurist, or unprepared struggle. The FAR will continue to gather strength and force in the mountains of the country, in the working-class and student centers and in the agglomerations of agricultural workers as well as among all those who sympathize and collaborate with these sectors. Because the FAR's line of struggle for land, bread, and dignity is tied to the future of the entire people and the entire country.

The defeatists and the timorous, those who think that the defeat inflicted on the guerrillas has put an end to the political instability, who fear the hardships of revolutionary war, call us "adventurists," "half-baked leftists," "militarists," who are trying to skip stages. But we are responding to broader interests, to the national, immemorial aspirations of the peasants and workers, whose energies must be directed and organized militarily in order for us to be able to oppose the enemy's professional armies. The dogmatic sectarianism will call us "liquidators." But we will uphold the principle of armed struggle with forcefulness, firmness, and flexibility. We will promote violent political actions in coordination with the guerrilla struggle. We will develop an organizational network around us comprising and permeating all the best elements of all social sectors. And, in order to guarantee a correct leadership, we will realize an alliance of the workers and peasants. The defeatists, the divisionists, the discoled and the opportunists, with their so-called "strategic retreat," have made a move toward an accord, political negotiation, and conciliation. And, although the revolutionary situation in our country has receded, still the progress of the struggle for freedom is calculated, is measured, is assessed in blood — rights are not given; they are seized in the fight.

- The revolutionary fighters will fight to the victory or die arms in hand; the people will defeat the aggressors.

Revolutionary war is the people's strength as the land will be. Let Arrega Bosque, Arana Osorio and all their advisers of the American special forces keep hunting for us. Let them keep sending their troops. Let their armies range throughout the entire country; they will only fall into our snares and our traps. Let them come to the mountains; the mountains will come alive. Let them search for us; we will scatter and fade like the mist. Let them find us; we will give them a taste of the same lead that we have captured from them. Let the puppet Julio César Méndez Montenegro desperately rave on that the guerrillas have been decimated; we will answer with our gunfire where he least expects it. Let the idiot Héctor Manilla Pinto keep on announcing that all the kidnappings, tortures, and murders are self-inflicted; public opinion will throw his shameless and stupid lies back into his face. Let the CIA keep inciting clandestine enemy groups to commit their craven murders; they will only more quickly dig their own graves.

We have learned how to fight. We know the enemy. We do not underestimate him tactically or strategically. The special warfare which American imperialism is developing has had some success in our country. And let no one say that these soldiers do not know how to fight; that is the only thing they know how to do and they do it badly. But besides fighting they burn houses, destroy seed, rob, rape and sadistically murder the civilian population. We have learned how to fight and we are teaching the people how to fight, to implacably annihilate our enemies. Our struggle wins more and more support; it is like a flame that sweeps along, that catches everywhere, that daily swells in power. The puppet army and the whole repressive apparatus will find itself compelled to spread out their forces in the attempt to extinguish this struggle. The enemy may win a momentary respite but will fail in the end because our strength is rooted in the fact that the humble people of the countryside are beginning to struggle for the land of their glorious forebears. Our strength is rooted in the support of those who have nothing to lose but the chains that bind them. The students and revolutionary intellectuals who genuinely live in the stifling atmosphere of ignorance and inquisition support us. The new generation which is fighting for its land, for its traditions, and for its freedom, supports us. Imperialism and the landlords have police, new weapons, light and heavy planes, helicopters and bombs. But no matter what they have and do, they have not the people's will and morale. All the enemy's machines of war, all their napalm bombs, their poisonous- and noxious-gas bombs, all their fragmentation bombs and saturation bombings will only prolong their death agony in a war in which at last we will inevitably be victorious.

Following the fighting example of Comandante Luis Turchios Lima and the heroic Comandante Ernesto Guevara, we reaffirm our unshakeable determination to WIN OR DIE.

Sierra de las Minas, January 1, 1968.
Year of the Guerrillas.

Signed by the FAR Command:
Comandante Camilo Sánchez,
Captain Pablo Monsanto,
Captain Socorro Bical,
Lieutenant Androcles Hernández, and
[The following letter was written from prison by H. Rap Brown, chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. The black leader was jailed February 21 in New Orleans for allegedly violating a court order restricting him to the New York area. Brown was accused of making a trip to California where he met with his lawyer and spoke at several meetings.

[Brown had been free under $15,000 bond under frame-up charges of "inciting to riot" and transporting a rifle on a plane. His bail has now been raised to $100,000. Racist officials have added the charge that while under arrest Brown "threatened" an FBI agent. He is due to remain in a Louisiana prison until he eventually comes to trial, unless his supporters can raise the fantastic ransom demanded by the judge.

[One may disagree with some of the formulas used by H. Rap Brown. In our opinion, it is inaccurate, for instance, to call the Johnson administration, for all its reactionary nature, "fascist." Again, to use phrases that can be twisted by the racists into signifying an appeal for violence provides a handle for these vicious opponents of the black liberation movement to seek to justify their own constant resorting to violence. It would be better, in our view, to stress the elementary right of the victims of this violence to defend themselves with appropriate means.

[Nevertheless, the letter is an eloquent document of historical interest as a reflection of a widespread mood today among black militants in the U.S. and freedom fighters in other lands. And its fighting spirit and expression of determination to carry on the struggle no matter what the cost should serve to help inspire all those who have dedicated themselves to building a better world.]

* * *

Parish Prison
New Orleans, La.
2/21/68

Being a man is the continuing battle of one's life and one loses a bit of manhood with every stale compromise to the authority of any power in which one does not believe.

No slave should die a natural death. There is a point where caution ends and cowardice begins.

For everyday I am imprisoned I will refuse both food and water. My hunger is for the liberation of my people. My thirst is for the ending of oppression.

I am a political prisoner, jailed for my beliefs -- that Black People must be free. The Government has taken a position true to its fascist nature: Those who we cannot convert, we must silence. This government has become the enemy of Mankind.

Death can no longer alter our path to Freedom. For our people, Death has been the only known exit from slavery and oppression. We must open others.

Our will to live must no longer supersed our will to fight, for our fighting will determine if our race shall live. To desire Freedom is not enough.

We must move from resistance to aggression, from revolt to revolution.

For every Orangeburg there must be 10 Detroiters. For every Max Stanford and Huey Newton, there must be 10 dead racist cops. And for every Black Death there must be a Dien Bien Phu.

Brothers and Sisters, and all oppressed people, you must prepare yourself both mentally and physically, for the major confrontation is yet to come. You must fight. It is the people who in the final analysis make and determine history, not leaders or systems. The laws to govern you must be made by you.

May the deaths of '68 signal the beginning of the end of this country. I do what I must out of the love for my people. My will is to fight; resistance is not enough. Aggression is the order of the day.

NOTE TO AMERICA

America: if it takes my Death to organize my people to revolt against you, and to organize your jails to revolt against you, and to organize your troops to revolt against you, and to organize your children, your God, your poor, your country, and to organize Mankind to rejoice in your destruction and ruin, then here is my life! But my soul belongs to MY PEOPLE.

Lasime Tushinde Mbilashaka. (We shall conquer without a doubt.)

H. Rap Brown
THE STALKING-HORSE.Clears the Way for Mr. Moneybags

On February 24, Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller let it be known that "if drafted" by the Republican convention, he would be willing to run for president.

Four days later, on the eve of the New Hampshire primaries, where he was running against Richard M. Nixon for the Republican nomination, Gov. George Romney suddenly withdrew.

The two events were not unrelated. In fact the Nixon camp charged that Romney had been running as nothing but a stalking-horse for Rockefeller despite the latter's repeated disclaimers of any interest in the nomination.

The spotlight in the two-party system thus shifted to Rockefeller. He is considered to have better voter appeal than Johnson. One of his aides said: 'He's not flip or coky. He's a thoughtful guy who realizes the major events are transpiring.'

If the clique that really runs the U.S. feels that a concession must be made to the rising opposition against the war in Vietnam, they might do this through the Republican party. Rockefeller could promise to do what Eisenhower did in the Korean situation.

But up to now Rockefeller has remained silent on Vietnam.

In this issue

How Many More Troops Was That? .......................................................... 194
"Wall Street Journal" Sees Defeat in Vietnam ........................................ 195
Swedish Foreign Minister Speaks Up for Pentagon ................................ 196
Assembling Nuclear Weapons in Vietnam? ............................................ 196
The West Berlin Demonstration -- A Milestone for Europe's Antiwar Youth -- by Werner Grave ................................................................. 198
Soviet Intellectuals Appeal to World Communists Against Political Trials .. 201
Antiwar Stickers Appear in London Home of U.S. Ambassador ............... 201
Guevara's Guerrilla Comrades Leave Chile ............................................ 208
The Stalking-Horse Clears the Way for Mr. Moneybags ....................... 216
DRAWING: Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller .................................................. 216
Documents:
  Report by Major Raúl Castro on Activities of Ánibal Escalante Group .... 202
  Guatemalan Guerrillas Break with Communist Party .......................... 209
  H. Rap Brown's Letter from Prison .................................................... 215

Rebo Hansen, Business Manager, P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N.Y. 10010

EDITOR: Joseph Hansen. CONTRIBUTING EDITORS: Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, George Novack. WORLD OUTLOOK specializes in weekly political analysis and interpretation of events for publications of the labor, socialist, colonial independence and black liberation movements. Signed articles represent the view of the authors, which may not necessarily coincide with those of World Outlook. Insofar as it reflects editorial opinion, unsigned material expresses the standpoint of revolutionary Marxism. TO SUBSCRIBE: For 26 issues send $7.50 or 2 £1.5, or 37.50 francs to: World Outlook, P. O. Box 635, Madison Sq. Station, New York, N. Y. 10010. Write for rates on airmail or first-class subscriptions. PARIS OFFICE: Pierre Frank, 95 rue d, Faubourg Saint-Martin, Paris 10, France.
"NOT FLIP OR COKY"
"NOT FLIP OR COKY"