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More and more details of the "liberation" of Hue are filtering into the press. With each new item, the picture becomes grimmer.

Two dispatches in the March 4 and March 5 issues of The Christian Science Monitor (Boston), sent by Beverly Deepe from the scene in Hue, provide stomach-turning items about the "looting, vandalism and souvenir hunting by Vietnamese Government troops and American marines" during the 26-day battle.

"What the fighting did not destroy in the city, the plundering did," one informed source told her.

"The looting was bad," according to a "reliable source" whom Miss Deepe does not identify. "Even the American houses were stripped bare. I wouldn't point my finger at who did it, but I'd certainly like to know. There was guilt on a lot of sides. The enemy was driven back from the American houses on the south side, and then all the clothes were taken -- and things like shaving material, razors. It was just incredible."

"I can understand if the troops were cold in the damp, drizzly weather, they'd take some booze from the cupboard, or a blanket, but TV sets, cameras, typewriters, no. Just amazing things disappeared."

It is to be noted that this reliable source did not accuse "the enemy" of plundering and looting in this fashion. He specified his own boozing troops and allies, representing the "free world." His amazement, however, is not quite understandable. After all, the troops were merely expressing the spirit of free enterprise which U.S. imperialism is defending and trying to advance on the Asian mainland.

On the south side of the Perfume River, which runs through Hue, the looting during the early days of the fighting proceeded quite systematically. An American marine told Miss Deepe: "The ARVN [Army, Republic of Vietnam] would follow the marines as they cleared an area and would ask if a house or building had been secured. If it had, they'd go in and take everything they could carry. If it wasn't -- they'd sit down and wait for us to clear out the NVA [North Vietnamese Army] and then they'd go in and loot it."

At first, reports Miss Deepe, the Saigon command was "reluctant to use artillery against its own properties" which had been taken by the fighters of the National Liberation Front. Later, perhaps under pressure from the American command, although Miss Deepe does not indicate this, "the Army officers called in the heavy fire power on their own homes and offices." The troops under their command, after the positions had been taken, "meandered around looting and plundering the homes of their own top command and senior governmental employees." This occurred sometimes in the presence of officers.

"Even in front of television cameras and their own officers ARVN troopers drove up two half-ton military trucks and began loading them with their war booty, including refrigerators, tables and chairs, sofas, television sets, and great bundles of clothes and kitchenware. Even before the former Imperial Palace had been swept clean of North Vietnamese troops, ARVN soldiers, ten blocks away, began breaking down the huge steel-grill doors of the shops along the main street of the north side. Goods from camera shops, the city's main movie house, small grocery stores, tailor shops, and stationery stores were heaped onto Vietnamese Army trucks, or the backs of bicycles, Cycles, and Hondas commandeered by the soldiers.

"Much of the activity of the marines, which seemed less blatant and widespread than that of Vietnamese Government troopers, involved making immediate use of bedding, mattresses, water, food, liquor, and kitchenware -- and then 'leaving the home looking like a pigeon,' as one source explained."

Being looted was not all that the people of Hue had to pay for being "liberated" by the forces of the Pentagon. Their city was smashed to rubble.

"Some compared the battle ruins of Hue to the photographs of Stalingrad, Warsaw, and Berlin in World War II," reports Miss Deepe.

"Some described sections of this once-imperial capital as "a Hollywood version of the Alamo."

"Some said the spotty damage to the turrets, ramparts, and most bridges of the once palatial citadel fortress evoked an image of medieval warfare not witnessed by the world since the Dark Ages. And some American marine veterans said Hue was the worst city destruction they had seen in three major wars spanning a quarter of a century.

"The damage to Seoul in the Korean war was less than and different from that of Hue," one veteran explained. "In Seoul, armies of both sides retreated or advanced through the city, but didn't fight within it like in Hue.
"Even the destruction to the cities of Okinawa during World War II was different -- because they were smaller and more scattered," he said. "But, if you put all the cities of Okinawa together, the damage in World War II would look something like Hue today."

As the fighting increased in fury in Hue, Miss Deepe continues, the people fled the city or holed up in makeshift refugee camps.

"With peopleless streets, the city took on an eerie day-time appearance of one vast cemetery. At night when illumination flares were popped for defensive lighting, the city took on an even more macabre, shadow semblance of a weird science-fiction world of charred homes, hit-and-run graves near cabbage patches, and bombed-out citadel turrets....

"Virtually every home, office, shop in the city, if not devastated by heavy Communist and allied weaponry, was subsequently ravaged by plundering, looting, and vandalism. At the peak of the battle, the whole population of 113,000 was at one time or another classified as refugees and sought dole-outs of meager food from the Vietnamese Army."

Even in the American military command, certain individuals expressed shock at what happened in Hue.

Miss Deepe quotes an American officer as explaining: "More and more, when you see the cost of this war for the Vietnamese, you wonder if it is really worth it."

And an American major, standing on the jet-length airstrip of Phu Bai outside of Hue, as combat aircraft landed and took off every 27 minutes with rice supplies for Hue and ammunition for Khe Sanh, shook his head and explained:

"You should see the civilian casualties coming in here -- old women and little kids. These are really touching sights. I stood here and watched the Vietnamese troops unload rice for the refugees in Hue, and they break two or three sacks each planeload so they can steal it for themselves. I don't know what can be done about Vietnam now."

Not all the U.S. troops acted in the traditional style of imperialist locusts. A marine, surveying the battle damage while Communist mortars exploded into villas 75 meters from him, said, according to Miss Deepe: "What a pity. It's such a pretty city. I didn't think such rich people lived in Vietnam."

As for the balance sheet in military and political terms, Miss Deepe is of the opinion that the National Liberation Front lost heavily but the Saigon forces "lost also, and may well become the chief victim of the campaign in the long run."

"More important," she continues, "the Vietnamese Army, despite individual acts of heroism, seemed to lose what it had sought to be for the last 15 years -- simply an army. Militarily, it had not secured the city. In a few places, North Vietnamese units marched four abreast in company formation into the city. Reliable sources report the government forces barely succeeded in securing its own division headquarters in the citadel.

"Politically, the Vietnamese armed forces in Hue manifested the most glaring, constant contradiction of the war -- it helped reconquer the city and then proceeded to damage it further by looting and plundering. Their armed forces had, in effect, nullified its prime political mission -- to reestablish law and order -- and instead simply added to the anarchy and destruction."

VIETNAMESE FREEDOM FIGHTERS SET UP REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES

The Vietnamese freedom fighters have taken some important political steps in coordination with their military victory at the beginning of February. These appear to be aimed at setting up a revolutionary government although this has not yet been proclaimed.

According to the February 19 issue of the Vietnam Information Bulletin, published in Rangoon, an extraordinary enlarged session of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation was held on February 11 and 12, with Nguyen Huu Tho acting as chairman.
vast expanses in the countryside and many district towns and townships, establishing people's revolutionary power, breaking the enemy's 'pacification' prong, occupying and controlling many towns, province capitals and townships, repelling enemy counterattacks, and winning many big victories.

"In this storm of revolution," the communiqué continued, "the people developing [developed] by big leaps their own forces, political and military, with millions of people freshly freed from enemy rule, indifferent of age, sex, religious belief and nationality, enthusiastically joining newly set up organizations, and tens of thousands of young boys and girls volunteering for armed service to wipe out the enemy and save the country."

The communiqué said that a United Front had been set up, a Democratic and Peace Alliance, which "is working actively in big cities and towns and, shoulder to shoulder with other patriotic organizations, is discharging the historic mission of the entire nation."

A special appeal was made by the session to the troops under the command of Saigon to come over to the side of the revolution.

The same issue of the Vietnam Information Bulletin carries the text of a communiqué issued by the People's Revolutionary Committee of Thua Thien Province and Hue City, which was set up in accordance with a decision of the "urgent national salvation congress" which was "recently convened" by the Front of National, Democratic and Peace Alliance.

The People's Revolutionary Committee had decided the following:

"(1) To wipe out all the administrative organs at all levels of the puppet Thieu-Ky clique in the province, city and down to every single hamlet.

"(2) To recognize the people's revolutionary committees at district, village and city quarter levels set up by the revolutionary armed forces and people, and regard these as the only legitimate people's power.

"(3) To maintain and broaden the right of the people to be masters of themselves, to step up the armed fight, the political struggle and the political agitation among enemy troops, to repulse all enemy counterattacks and punish reactionary elements, to apply timely measures to protect the people's lives and property, to respect the people's democratic freedoms, and to step up production and practice thrift, and care for the material and intellectual life of the people.

"(4) To demand resolutely that the U.S. troops respect the power of the Vietnamese, refrain from intervening in the Vietnamese people's own affairs, and stay in their camps. Any movement of U.S. troops must be sanctioned by the Vietnamese revolutionary power. Any transgression will be duly punished."

The last demand is of particular interest. It indicates that the political line of this body is to seek the internment of the U.S. forces that have been sent to Vietnam.

This would constitute a preliminary step to negotiations leading to the withdrawal of the imperialist forces.

In addition, the committee, according to the Vietnam Information Bulletin, "called on the people of all strata in urban and rural areas to obediently unite, strictly implement all the orders of the revolutionary power, and, with the impetus of new victories, to forge ahead to win ever greater victories in fighting, in production, as well as in cultural and health activities, in order to defend the revolutionary power and the people's rights.

"The committee called on all officers and soldiers and employees still working for the U.S. puppets to take their stand with the people to resist the U.S. aggression and save the country."

The February 20 issue of the Bulletin gave the text of an appeal issued by former troops of the Saigon regime who had gone over to the side of the freedom fighters.

"After coming into contact with the liberation armed forces," the appeal said, "we have been warmly welcomed and well treated. We now fully understand the policy of the National Front for Liberation, and are fully aware of our former errors. We now understand that it is an urgent task for the entire Vietnamese people to fight against the U.S. aggressors and the Thieu-Ky clique. We therefore have set up a unit of the allied forces so as to take part in the people's fight against the U.S. aggressors, for national salvation."

The appeal continued: "The present events in South Vietnam have testified to the invincible force of the Vietnamese people. They show that the U.S. aggressor forces are doomed to failure, that the republican army is nothing but a disintegrating and rotten organization."
MARCH 4 -- Since the Budapest conference, which opened February 26, has not yet ended, and the full texts of the speeches have not yet been published, judgment must be deferred on the work of the conference as a whole. Nonetheless, it can be said for certain that no matter what the final decisions may be, the walkout, February 29, of the Rumanians signifies a defeat at the conference for Moscow and the leaderships backing the Kremlin. The attendance of the Rumanians had been considered a successful first step on the road to rallying the Communist apparatuses against divisive tendencies encouraged in part by the Chinese.

Did the Rumanians participate with the intention of finding a pretext for making a scandal? Or were promises made to them and then broken as they claim? In the absence of anything but the press releases, it is difficult to say. However, I would incline rather to the second supposition. Indeed, I cannot see how it would serve the interests of the Rumanians to act in such a devious way as to further embitter relations with the Soviets, which are already not the best. On the other hand it would not be out of character for the Kremlin, after luring them to Budapest with reassuring promises, to try through indirect means to pressure them on a point where they are particularly vulnerable -- the question of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

The Syrian, Bagdash, is an old Stalinist (trained in the school of Maurice Thorez) and this would not be the first time he has lent himself to an operation of this sort.

A conference will probably be held around the end of this year. But after the walkout of the Rumanians, other delegations -- among them the Italians -- have spoken against any more criticizing of other parties and against any decisions binding on all the participants, etc. In other words, after the walkout of the Rumanians, greater reservations have been indicated, signifying that nothing will come out of this conference but vague, empty declarations, with the participants free to interpret them as they see fit.

The Budapest conference was an attempt at limiting the breakup of monolithism and giving an appearance of unity among the apparatuses of the majority of the Communist parties. The outcome was the opposite of what was sought. And this was not simply the result of an incorrect maneuver that can be made up.

We have gone into the reasons for the breakup of Stalinist monolithism many times. Fundamentally, Stalinist monolithism resulted from the consolidation of the bureaucracy around the Kremlin in a period of revolutionary retreat. Today, despite the inevitable ups and downs in the confrontation between revolution and counter-revolution, this period is over. Those directly pitted in conflict with imperialism, like the Vietnamese, the Cubans, and the Koreans, were not at the conference. The Cubans, who do not conceal their intention to aid the revolutionary forces in Latin America, organized an international conference, the OLA [Organization of Latin-American Solidarity]; and there they did not bother about diplomatic niceties. The Chinese, despite their monstrous bureaucratism, are ready to come to an understanding with other bureaucrats whom they are not sure, to say the least, of having on their side in the event of an imperialist attack.

In these circumstances, only the partisans of "peaceful coexistence" came to Budapest, and not all of these. Some, like the Yugoslavs, and now the Rumanians, are taking "socialism in one country," the concept that constitutes their common denominator, to its final conclusion.

Since they are all traveling the road of reformism, headed toward a sort of "social-democratization," their international conference could not fail to exhibit the features of the old Socialist International -- this "international" which has no purpose, whose members maintain relations of a diplomatic nature; that is, amiable hypocrisy until such time as a conflict breaks out among them.

The failure at Budapest found its most glaring expression in regard to the Vietnam war. The conference was preceded by a verbal turn on the part of the Communist party leaderships in favor of a Vietnamese victory. The conference sent the Vietnamese a lukewarm message of greetings.

But these parties encompassing millions of workers did not even decide to do what the students and organizations comprised mostly of youth have been doing for the whole past period in the United States, in Japan, and in Western Europe, to say nothing of the colonial countries.

The Budapest conference of bureaucrats did not even succeed in preserving their own unity of yesteryear. New revolutionary leaderships are being forged elsewhere.
TORONTO PICKETS DEMAND RELEASE OF KHALIL TOUAME

Toronto

The Israeli consulate was picketed here March 1 by demonstrators who demanded the immediate release of Khalil Touame, the Arab student leader recently jailed by the Israeli authorities in Jerusalem on charges of having given shelter to an ideological leader of the Arab resistance movement.

After picketing the consulate for a half hour in bitterly cold weather, the thirty demonstrators, who included Canadians of both Arab and Jewish extraction, assembled at the entrance of the building and adopted a statement explaining the significance of the case.

The statement pointed out that Khalil Touame was being held illegally, that he had not been given a chance to defend himself, that he had not been charged with a specific crime, yet had been denied bail.

"We call on the Israeli government to free Khalil Touame immediately," the statement said in part. "We call for an end to the harassment of Israeli citizens who are being prosecuted for their political activities.

"We also call on the Canadian people to join in the defence of the civil liberties of Mr. Touame and to protest vigorously his arrest and demand his release in accordance with international principles of human rights."

The demonstration was sponsored by an ad hoc committee of organizations, including the Arab Palestine Association, the Canada-Arab Friendship Society, and the Canada-Arab Federation.

Sponsoring individuals included Hussain Al-Shahistrani (president, Moslem Students Association of North America), Prof. Kenneth Golby (York University, and Amnesty International), Prof. George Haggar (Waterloo University and a prominent figure in the Canadian Arab community); Dick Fidler (League for Socialist Action); and Harry Kopyto (Young Socialists).

Prior to the demonstration, one of its organizers telephoned the Israeli consulate to invite a representative to come out and make any statement he wished to the pickets.

The Israeli official became very agitated, yelling: "This man [Touame] is a criminal and your action is a criminal action." He then hung up.

The February 9 issue of the leading Jewish newspaper in Canada, the Canadian Jewish Tribune reported Touame's arrest. The article, datelined Jerusalem, said that the police had interrogated Dr. Moshe Machover about his connections with Touame. Dr. Machover is a leader of the Matspen, a Jewish-Arab socialist group, and an associate of Khalil Touame.

BATTLES FOR "STUDENT POWER" IN ITALY

By Francesco Marchi

Rome

MARCH 4 -- The Italian universities have been in ferment for two months. The movement that began in Turin has gradually spread to all the universities, assuming a breadth never before seen. The students are struggling for "student power" against the authoritarianism reigning on the campus. This means breaking up the bureaucratic machinery which up until now has permitted a handful of men, in collusion with the government, to run the entire structure of higher learning as they see fit.

The movement appeared and developed spontaneously without any national organization leading it. After occupying dozens of university colleges, the students themselves have met in assemblies and commissions and discussed a platform of struggle and methods for advancing it.

All attempts by the parliamentary parties to take the lead of this movement have been to no avail. Not only have the students rejected any sort of dialogue with the government parties but they have taken their distance from the left parties as well. They accuse the government parties of seeking to initiate a reform, the so-called Gui Plan, which would leave the substance of bureaucratic power unaltered. However, they also accuse the left parties of wanting to exploit the student struggle for parliamentary and electoral purposes.

On the other hand, Cuban and Chinese influences have been very evident in the movement's critical attitude toward the traditional student organizations, and many supporters of vanguard
left groups have been participating in it. Recently, there have been frequent expulsions of leaders of the student movement from the Communist party. And the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano -- Italian Communist party] has had to take worried note of its absence from the movement. It is trying to make overtures while still continuing to accuse the students of "infantile extremism."

The student struggle was relatively delayed in Rome. But very quickly the movement in the capital attained exceptional depth and became the front line of the struggle. After occupying the colleges for many days, the students voluntarily left them. D'Avack, the university rector, responded with a lockout, ordering the university closed. At this point, the students carried out a mass demonstration and, after some minor clashes with the police, reoccupied the colleges.

The major political success of the action was attained when the faculty council of the College of Letters and Philosophy agreed to hold its examinations as usual in the occupied college and accepted the conditions posed by the students: (1) that the examinations be public, that all be permitted to attend; (2) that the students being examined be allowed to discuss the professors' final decisions with them and that others present be allowed to enter into the discussion; (3) that the students be able to reject the professors' judgment by leaving the examination; (4) that examinations be held continuously, that is that they take place every month.

In view of this success, the rector of the University of Rome and GUI, the minister of education, had the choice of accepting a victory by the student movement or invalidating the examinations and opposing the faculty itself. They chose a third way, to bring in the police in force and drive out the occupiers.

But their hope of intimidating the student movement in this way ran up against a firm determination to resist on the part of the students. For two consecutive days the students faced the violence of the police.

On Friday, March 1, in front of the College of Architecture, the students attempting to reoccupy the college [see photograph on cover] were attacked by the police with cords of jeeps, tear-gas bombs and clubs. However, instead of clearing out as the authorities hoped, they responded by arming themselves with sticks and stones and sent 150 policemen to the hospital.

Moreover, the police attack had the result of broadening the student front. Yesterday in Rome there was a mass assembly of more than 5,000 students determined to carry on the struggle, where the Action Committee of the Students of Rome proposed calling together representatives from all the occupied universities to decide on national coordination of the student movement.

The student movement, exhibiting great maturity, is moving toward a phase of more advanced and coordinated struggle. And it is possible that this may lead to the formation of a new student organization on the model of the German SDS [Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund -- German Socialist Students League] -- an organization which is forming and maturing in the heat of the struggle. The previously existing student organizations, which are more or less tied to the political parties, have in fact hopelessly collapsed; they no longer have the slightest student support.

DISINTEGRATION IN SAIGON

The arrest of bourgeois figures in Saigon by the Thieu-Ky regime has puzzled many commentators as irrational. Jean-Claude Pomonti, writing in the March 3-4 issue of the Paris daily Le Monde, also thinks it is little likely to increase the popularity of these puppets. But he indicates why they thought it was the thing to do.

In the past year, in addition to the opposition represented by the Buddhists, a critical current has been developing among the bourgeois liberals. Educated in the West, they maintain close connections with the U.S. command but have become more and more uneasy about the deteriorating situation. Since last June some of the most prominent of them have favored a ceasefire and serious negotiations.

They are gaining influence. "Even within the government," reports Pomonti, "some, likewise thinking of their future, have established rather close contacts with the opposition, and in private do not hide their concern, even their disgust over the brutality with which the government units, in Saigon and Hue in particular, repressed the Tet insurrection."

The Saigon regime wants to halt the disintegration; and is doing it in the way of all doomed regimes -- by smashing in all directions with a club.
Street demonstrations of students and workers in Egypt February 21-26 shook the Nasser government more severely than at any time since it came to power in 1954, according to accounts beginning to filter through the tightest censorship "ever seen in Egypt."

The demonstrations began in the industrial town of Helwan, just south of Cairo, the day after a military court meted out light sentences to air force commanders accused of negligence in the conflict with Israel last June.

In a dispatch from Cairo published in the March 2 issue of The Christian Science Monitor, John K. Cooley reports:

"The local ASU [Arab Socialist Union] and Socialist Youth League chapters decided to call out workers in Helwan's iron and steel, munitions, and aircraft factories."

The police used shotguns, injuring 23 according to the government. Eyewitnesses claim there were fatal casualties. The demonstrators returned to work but news of their action spread.

In Cairo, Alexandria, Assiut, Tantah, and many other towns, students and workers staged demonstrations, calling for a new trial and adding their own political demands. These included political freedom and an end to military and one-party rule. In formal demands presented to parliament and Nasser's palace, they asked for free elections, dissolution of the ruling Arab Socialist Union, and the resignation of Sayyed Qassem, the interior minister who ordered brutal repression of the demonstrations.

On February 25, the government announced that new trials had been ordered. At the same time the Interior Ministry warned the students that under Egypt's permanent martial law unauthorized demonstriations are banned.

"But the students poured into the streets by the thousands," Cooley continues. "Stunned police retreated across the Nile bridges under a hail of stones, sticks, and firecrackers."

"They regrouped and charged with sticks, fire hoses, and tear gas. Two girl students from Al Ashar managed to rustle two police horses and led a countercharge of students."

"The mood in Cairo Sunday was revolutionary," said one shocked middle-glass Egyptian. "No one knew then and no one knows now where it will lead."

"One of the student ringleaders said 'when the people in Debar district, near Ain Shams, saw the police action, many joined us.'"

One student told Cooley that he was not against Nasser personally. "But he must wake up. His entourage has led the country to the brink of ruin."

The student continued: "The Israelis are practically at the gates of our main cities, and yet one group of overfed military men tries another group when they should all be on trial. What a mockery."

Another student said: "The low standard of living, the hopeless feeling that there is nothing for a graduate except to emigrate -- these are our reasons. We are moving now and we won't stop. We are fed up with military government and all its graft and corruption."

By February 28, troops had taken over many police duties in Cairo. Although the demonstrations had receded, tension remained high and "more trouble" was expected.

NICE PIECE OF REAL ESTATE FOR SALE IN VIETNAM

A setback suffered by two members of the U.S. "pacification" crew in Vietnam has apparently escaped the American press was reported in the March 4 issue of the German magazine Der Spiegel.

It appears that in the days before the February victory of the Vietnamese freedom fighters, when the U.S. command had come to believe its own propaganda about things getting better and better for the U.S. military machine in Vietnam, two American majors bought up a chunk of land in the mountains near the coastal city of Qui Nhon. A heavily wooded area known for its fauna, it was an ideal location for an exclusive lodge for big game hunters after the war, the main attraction being tigers.

Der Spiegel reports that now the property has suddenly been put up for sale. No price is mentioned, but the two majors are probably willing to negotiate on the question.

Anyone interested in real estate in Vietnam, especially a good site for a tiger hunting lodge, might try to get in touch with them through Der Spiegel.
An article by James Baldwin, the well-known Afro-American writer, appeared in the February 14 issue of the British Guardian under the title "Black Power -- in defence of Stokely Carmichael." In this piece Baldwin traces the development of the black struggle in the U.S. from the stage of nonviolent protest to its present black power stand.

"I first met Stokely Carmichael," Baldwin writes, "in the Deep South when he was just another nonviolent kid, marching and talking and getting his head whipped. This time now seems as far behind us as the Flood, and if those suffering, gallant, betrayed boys and girls who were then using their bodies in an attempt to save a heedless nation have since concluded that the nation is not worth saving, no American alive has the right to be surprised...."

Baldwin comments bitingly on the origins of the term "black power": Carmichael "didn't coin it. He simply dug it up again from where it's been lying since the first slaves hit the gangplank.

"I have never known a Negro in all my life who was not obsessed with Black Power. Those representatives of White Power who are not too hopelessly brainwashed or eviscerated will understand that the only way for a black man in America not to be obsessed with the problem of how to control his destiny and protect his house, his women and his children, is for that black man to become in his own mind the something less than a man which this republic, alas, has always considered him to be.

"And when a black man, whose destiny and identity have always been controlled by others, declares and states that he will control his own destiny and rejects the identity given to him by others, he is talking revolution."

The black author derided the government's attempts to persecute Stokely Carmichael for traveling without a passport, and "inciting to riot":

"He is being punished by a righteous Government, in the name of a justly wrathful people, and there appears to be a very strong feeling that this punishment is insufficient. If only, I gather, we had had the foresight to declare ourselves at war, we would now be able to shoot Mr. Carmichael for treason...."

"The Government would like to be able to indict Stokely, and many others like him, of incitement to riot; but I accuse the Government of this crime. It is, briefly, an insult to my intelligence, and to the intelligence of any black person, to ask me to believe that the most powerful nation in the world is unable to do anything to make the lives of its black citizens less appalling.

"It is not unable to do it, it is only unwilling to do it. Americans are deluded if they suppose Stokely to be the first black man to say 'The United States is going to fall. I only hope I live to see the day.' Every black man in the howling North American wilderness has said it, and is saying it, in many, many ways, over and over again."

James Baldwin challenges the government's right to regulate the travel of U.S. citizens:

"And I contest the Government's right to lift the passports of those people who hold views of which the Government -- and especially this Government -- disapproves. The Government has the duty to warn me of the dangers I may encounter if I travel to hostile territory -- though they never said anything about the probable results of my leaving Harlem to go downtown and never said anything about my travels to Alabama -- but it does not have the right to use my passport as a political weapon against me, as a means of bringing me to heel. These are terror tactics."

In concluding, the black writer defends the right of revolution in the United States:

"Let us attempt to face the fact that we are a racist society, racist to the very marrow, and we are fighting a racist war. No black man in chains in his own country, and watching the many deaths occurring around him every day, believes for a moment that America cares anything at all about the freedom of Asia. My own condition, as a black man in America, tells me what Americans really feel and really want, and tells me who they really are. And therefore, every bombed village is my home town.

"That, in a way, is what Stokely is saying, and that's why this youth can so terrify a nation. He's saying the bill is in, the party's over, are we going to live here like men or not? Bombs won't pay this bill, and bombs won't wipe it out. And Stokely did not begin his career with dreams of terror, but with dreams of love. Now he's saying, and he's not alone, and he's not the first, if I can't live here, well then, neither will you. You couldn't have built it without me; this land is also mine; we'll share it, or we'll perish, and I don't care."
NEW CONCESSIONS TO DEMANDS FOR LIBERALIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By George Novack

On February 23, less than two months after the political upheaval whereby the unregenerate Stalinist, Antonin Novotny, was replaced by Alexander Dubcek as first secretary, the Czechoslovak Communist party commemorated the twentieth anniversary of its assumption of power. Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev was the most prominent guest at the celebration. The Communist leaders of Rumania, Poland, Hungary, East Germany and Bulgaria were also on deck and doubtless discussed with Brezhnev and Dubcek the problems connected with the meeting of sixty-seven Communist parties which opened February 26 at Budapest.

This was Brezhnev's second appearance in Prague in three months. He made a flying trip last December to save Novotny, or, failing that, to work out a settlement of the dispute between the Old Guard diehards and their opponents in the Presidium and the Central Committee. The best he could get was a compromise by which Novotny retained the presidency but yielded the real power to Dubcek as head of the party.

Liberal and radical elements were incensed by this ostentatious interference in Czechoslovak affairs. Their resentment flared up at the December meeting of the Central Committee when Frantisek Vodslon was said to have demanded to know by what authority the body had invited Brezhnev to Prague when "I, as a member of the Central Committee, knew nothing of it."

These forces were concerned lest the Soviet leader take advantage of his current visit to Prague to put pressure on Dubcek to slow down the pace of economic and political reforms which the defeated Novotny and his supporters in the party and trade unions are trying to hammer. The Kremlin is apprehensive that hasty and sweeping measures might set oppositional forces into motion which could pass beyond the control of the new regime.

The clash over domestic policy is sharpened by economic difficulties between the two countries. Prague's basic grievance is that it must export to the Soviet Union too much, and at unfavorable prices, to pay for raw material and food imports, and that this keeps Prague from trading more with the West.

Dubcek, who is inclined to greater independence from Moscow, obliquely referred to these irritants in an anniversary article under his name in the Soviet party paper Pravda: "Despite various difficulties and complicated problems, which logically arise and should not be exaggerated, we are convinced all-embracing collaboration between the Socialist countries will be worked out."

Meanwhile a tense struggle is being waged between conservative and liberal elements in the party over the implementation of the economic reforms. In a radio interview on February 21, Professor Ota Sik, the Central Committee member who has been chief proponent of such reforms, stated that workers have been told not to accept them because they would lose their "privileges."

He thus pointed an accusing finger at Novotny whom he had vigorously opposed in the stormy Central Committee sessions leading to his deposition as party chief. It is reported that when Novotny visited the CKD machinery factory in Prague the week before, he warned that the real fight was no longer the class struggle between capitalism and communism but between workers and intellectuals supporting reform.

Without mentioning Novotny by name, Sik declared that democratic discussions within the party had been banned for several years by "fossilized elements." And Pravo, the trade-union newspaper, demanded on February 22 "a ruthless analysis to establish conditions so that people can express without fear their views on everything."

Significantly, at the anniversary ceremony on February 23, Dubcek carefully mentioned the contributions of the intellectuals, whose insistence on economic reforms and greater democracy helped push him in power, while Novotny demagogically praised the working classes.

The anti-Novotny camp is convinced that the reforms, which have given little results to date, cannot succeed unless they are promptly put into effect with a minimum of interference from the apparatchiks. But such elements are too deeply entrenched in the party and trade unions for their resistance to be easily overcome.

The ruling circles are split on almost every major question, from economic orientation and relations with the Soviet Union to the Czech-Slovak problem and intellectual liberty. The most advanced intellectuals in both the USSR and Czechoslovakia are pressing for greater freedom of cultural and even political expression. The attitude toward them in Prague is very different from that in Moscow.
While the Kremlin continues to crack down on literary rebels and their defenders, Dubcek has retracted the punitive measures taken against the critics after the Writers' Congress in June 1947. [See: "New Regime Makes Concessions to Dissident Czech Writers," World Outlook, February 9, p. 105.] He has also installed his friend, Jaroslav Kozel, in place of Frantisek Havlcek, a zealous partisan of Novotny, as head of the ideological department of the Central Committee which regulates party relations with the intellectuals.

The atmosphere has been further eased by the removal of the former head of the state security forces. There is much wider latitude for the ventilation of grievances in the country than at any time since 1948.

Under these conditions any extension of the interbureaucratic conflicts cannot help but arouse new layers of the party and the people into critical activity. Czechoslovakia is today the most unsettled of all the regimes in East Europe. The twentieth anniversary of Stalinist rule there clearly coincides with the opening of a new and momentous stage in its political evolution.

This estimate was further confirmed March 5 when Jiri Hendrych was ousted from his influential post as secretary for ideological affairs. As cultural commissar for the Novotny regime, Hendrych was directly responsible for last year's attacks upon the rebellious writers and students.

Hendrych was replaced by Josef Spacek, one of the four new Presidium members elected when Alexander Dubcek replaced Novotny as first secretary of the Communist party last January. When he was first secretary of the regional party organization in Brno, Spacek displayed a more tolerant attitude toward the intellectuals by permitting criticism against the cultural policies of Novotny and Hendrych.

In addition to this shift, the Presidium abolished a 1966 law restricting the press, radio and television. It will transfer the Central Publication Administration, the government censorship agency, from the Interior Ministry to an unspecified jurisdiction. It also voted to expand the importation and sale of foreign literature and press publications.

Hendrych had to go despite the fact that he deserted his patron Novotny and switched to the opposition during the prolonged interbureaucratic contest for supremacy last December and January. It is reported that the new fifteen-member party Presidium plans to publish a "full account" of the Central Committee sessions which culminated in Novotny's deposition.

The enforced sacrifice of Hendrych testifies to the strength of the demands for liberalization sweeping Czechoslovakia. It may be the prelude to a more drastic cleanup of the old-line Stalinist officials that could strip Novotny of his remaining post as president of Czechoslovakia.

HUMPHREY PINCH-HITS FOR JOHNSON ON "RIOT PANEL" REPORT

The current scandal in Washington is the reception given by Johnson to the report of his "National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders" which was made public February 29. The commission, appointed by Johnson himself last July 27, was an agglomeration of very respectable figures. The White House obviously counted on it for favorable comment on what the administration is doing to ease the ghetto crisis in the United States.

The commission brought in a report of some 700 pages. Actually it presented no facts that were not already quite well known and proposed no new remedies that had not already been urged on the government. But the report created a sensation because of its admission that the guilt for the disorders that have repeatedly broken out in the black ghettos lies squarely with "white racism."

In a summary of its report, the commission said: "Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally unknown to most white Americans. What white Americans have never fully understood -- but what the Negro can never forget -- is that the white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it."

The commission said quite frankly, "This is our basic conclusion: Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white -- separate and unequal."

The police were accused of precipitating "riots." "'Prior' incidents, which increased tensions and ultimately led to violence, were police actions in almost half the cases; police actions were 'final' incidents before the outbreak of violence in 12 of the 24 surveyed disorders."

The commission also warned about
the current policies of the authorities in this respect: "The commission believes there is a grave danger that some communities may resort to the indiscriminate and excessive use of force. The harmful effects of overreaction are incalculable. The commission condemns moves to equip police with mass destruction weapons, such as automatic rifles, machine guns and tanks. Weapons which are designed to destroy, not to control, have no place in densely populated urban communities."

Assessing the choices, the commission could see only disaster in the present course. "To continue present policies is to make permanent the division of our country into two societies; one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities; the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs and in outlying areas."

The commission's recommendations included a big program of welfare, housing, education, and jobs, the cost of which would run into billions of dollars.

Johnson appears to have been enraged at the report. The thing was absolutely useless as a source of material for his reelection campaign. In fact it was positively damaging. And where is money to be found for the commission's recommendations when the bottom of the barrel is being scraped for the $30 to $40 billion a year going into the war in Vietnam?

The entire White House staff was visibly embarrassed. As Max Frankel of The New York Times reported from Washington March 5: "No day passes at the White House without someone asking for President Johnson's reaction to the grave warnings and far-reaching recommendations of his National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. But Mr. Johnson sits silent and his official spokesmen keep weaving, ducking and dodging."

An example of the fast footwork was provided by Vice-President Hubert Humphrey March 4. In a 2,400-word speech, the voluble darling of the top AFL-CIO officialdom wove, ducked and dodged, averring that the commission's conclusion about the U.S. moving toward a racially separated and unequal society "may be true" but "is open to some challenge."

On the findings of the commission, Humphrey said: "We have known about those needs for some time. Why haven't we done something? The answer is that we have been doing something."

Besides the good deeds of the Johnson administration in this field, Humphrey found other favorable things that had not been noticed by the commission. Hundreds of businessmen, he said, are responding to the call of the government to provide jobs and recreation for youth next summer.

There is a "new willingness," too, among businessmen to provide jobs, housing and financial backing to slum residents. And the building trade unions have promised to open up their apprenticeship training programs to disadvantaged young adults.

And that's not all. "On college campuses across the country," said Johnson's good left arm, "once you tune out the angry shouts of a noisy few, you see an unprecedented sense of social responsibility."

There were no reports on how well Humphrey's oratorical performance had satisfied his commander in chief.
"WEAVING, DUCKING AND DODGING"
REPORT BY MAJOR RAUL CASTRO ON ACTIVITIES OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE GROUP

[Continued from last week.]

- Another Quesada manuscript
  Manuscript No. 2 of Dr. Quesada.
  (I'll pass over several pages and concentrate on the more important aspects.)

(He began here:) "Anibal was seen as a figure symbolic of our stand, so that his rehabilitation would represent the longed-for rectification, although that was not the only possible way. I believe there were three trends: one, recognition by history; two, expectation of rectification coming from Fidel himself through his facing reality; three, one which wished to do something to help things along. This last was the trend represented by Anibal, and it explains the origin of the whole issue; others certainly saw the situation in another light. Throughout, there was though of the risk that the Revolution was running if the rectification were not effected soon.

"In the course of this situation, political prejudices and obsessions were accentuated which prevented things from being seen in perspective and did not permit our arriving at the most objective conclusions. Actually, I don't remember any profound analysis of things.

"This prejudice led us to exaggerate the negative elements in the Revolution's work, and to lack a positive attitude toward things. Minds working in the midst of such contradiction could not generate enthusiasm in carrying out the tasks of the Revolution, nor, absurdly enough, perhaps, could our very conception of things.

"How to work with Fidel, a thing historically necessary for the progress of the Revolution, without ridding oneself of these prejudices?

"As to the persons in the leadership of the Revolution, the group had confidence in Fidel and Raúl, and I also had faith in Dorticós, whom I respected. Regarding other comrades, in general, we underestimated them and denied the possibility of their developing.

"But in the area of concepts the question of personalities did not matter; what mattered was the general conception of things. I was unable to have a true personal opinion owing to lack of knowledge, but let myself be led by the general consensus, my baseline being the political position. That explains conversations where, in the heat of political passion, rather unelegant things were said.

"As for some comrades, they were considered Communists because they shared those ideas, regardless of their human weaknesses. They were considered firm in their convictions, and the rest was tolerated.

"In this process revolutionary fervor was lost and we fell into the morass of these contradictions, forgetting that the process was leaving us behind.

"Regarding the figure of Anibal, we thought that the European socialist countries, especially the USSR, viewed him as a guarantee that Cuba would continue to follow a policy that coincided with theirs; that they had more confidence in him than in Fidel, and this would force the 'rectification.'

"In general, we saw an upward swing in the initial stage of the Revolution because Fidel was incorporated into the Party. Later, this trend, having been broken in the process against sectarianism, could only be restored by a return to the same path.

"Many long-time militants who did not accept these things were viewed as opportunists who had adopted such positions to retain their posts and their comfort, who were insincere in their convictions and denied their own past." (Those whom they accused of being traitors and sell-outs.)

(And Quesada continued:) "The anticommunist is defined by its position in the face of the enemy. All who struggle against imperialism, whatever their ideology be, serve the cause of communism; that is essential, and we lost track of that truth and created prejudices. The general (correct), strategy of communism is peace, but it entails tactical sacrifices, engenders new forms. (We were unable to understand this.)

"1. The enemy and the real possibility of aid from friends are what determine tactics. To understand what is happening in the socialist camp (and the internal forces, also).

"2. To employ the flanking tactic against imperialism.

"3. We have gotten lost as to the form and not as to the essence of the issue in international and domestic affairs.

"4. A concept that prevented mutual confidence and brought about negative results.

"5. Understanding of why the Revolution had to act as it did with Anibal.
"a. Recognition of the historic process.

"b. To see, he said, the future of the Revolution.

c. To have the sectarians destroy sectarianism.

"The Revolution needs its own theory. Our group never made a profound analysis of all elements; it was enmeshed in an old formula that was unrelated to historical reality and had no possibility of success. Serious analysis was replaced by passion; we remained in the past, unable to see the future in perspective. I have understood that it was an anti-historical conception and a chimera to force that situation. I was unable to arrive at an understanding in time, since I was blinded by passion, and only when confronted with the reality of the process was I able to see that it was a blind alley. Passion prevented me from seeing things otherwise.

"The true communist attitude would have been to contribute to Marxism, to stimulate the task of building communism and to struggle against imperialism, to liquidate the residue of this chimera and to contribute to the strengthening of domestic unity, to be able to arrive at the point at which prejudices didn't hinder sincere collaboration by those who could contribute to the construction of communism, and endeavor to have the image of Fidel emerge pure, as that is what history requires.

"1. To understand that the maintenance of this kind of illusion has been a chimera.

"2. That these illusions have damaged the Revolution.

"3. To facilitate their total liquidation.

"4. The only communist attitude is to understand that one must give unconditional help to the Revolution. Not to hide behind resentment or distrust, because that hinders work and leads to errors.

"5. Not to lose sight of the fundamental thing.

"Centering about Aníbal, we thought in terms of a systematic escalation of political promotions, a thing which did not permit more profound analysis. One must understand that there was a contradiction between this conception and the strategy of the leadership of the Revolution that had to be resolved in favor of the strategy of the Revolution's leadership.

"The lack of understanding of the Revolution's strategy, which, since we could not explain it to ourselves, generated passionate political distrust." (Here he creates a formula:) "System of reactivation plus contradiction with the strategy of the Revolution = the need to paralyze the phenomenon.

"Revolution - strategy = counter-imperialism.

"Revolution - strategy = confuses certain revolutionaries."

(We quote textually.)

Manuscript No. 3 of Dr. Quesada.

"Analysis of the conception of the problem of sectarianism; role of the USSR; Aníbal, activities, my contact abroad, my concrete contacts, forms of contact, orientation that came from higher up, articles and documents that I knew of, study circles, how problems were discussed, how I was involved, how I see the problem now.

"Sectarianism. I understood that Fidel had become a Marxist in the course of the struggle, that the taking of power had been possible thanks to the strategy pursued by Fidel; in the struggle, in the Sierra, the PSP had not been able to do it directly. That only Fidel could manage the struggle, but that the PSP had offered it help, which in the beginning was not much, since it did not understand the possibility of armed struggle; but that finally this thesis had triumphed and it had therefore given increased help, above all in 1958.

"The Cuban Revolution had taken the socialist path owing to the errors of imperialism, the help of the socialist camp, and, naturally, the decision made by Fidel and all the forces that composed the Revolution.

"I perceived that the Revolution was advancing along a sure path. When the criticism of sectarianism came about and Aníbal was blamed, that is how I understood it.

"I have already explained that my lack of understanding of certain phenomena in which I found myself participating and the circumstances which brought me close to Aníbal Escalante made me begin to understand that these phenomena existed because Fidel, although he was a conscientious revolutionary, wanted to do things his way and had placed himself over the Party.

"This conception stood out for its lack of understanding of what form the Revolution's actions had taken in the building of socialism and in international policy.
"In international policy we believed that everything which brought us closer to the Soviet Union and coincided with its basic policies was good, and that what led us away from it was dangerous for our Revolution, because of our inability to defend ourselves alone. We looked to the USSR as the strongest pole in the socialist camp and as the country that was strategically able to detain and finally overcome imperialism.

"We expected a 'rectification' by Fidel on the basis of his revolutionary honesty when our economy failed and because of our need to depend on the Soviet Union, as I saw this as the only path open to us.

"We even got to the point of hoping for certain pressure from the USSR, and saw in the person of Aníbal a symbol of this rectification and believed that this rectification would bolster confidence among the European socialist countries in the path followed by our Revolution. However, this idea related to the policy followed by the Revolution rather than to individuals.

"All these ideas were expressed in conversations with the circle formed around Aníbal, discussions not only of a general nature but also applied to concrete circumstances. They were generally accompanied by great political passion in the throes of which certain personalities of the Revolution were caricatured and described in disrespectful terms.

"This circle of aroused political passion led to:

"1. Losing faith in Fidel and the leadership of the Revolution while faith in Aníbal became stronger.

"2. Making the whole course of our Revolution and our history depend on this issue, this type of historically impossible 'restoration.'

"3. Producing in all of us a blindness to reality so complete that it led us to do foolish things. I can understand now how the passionate defense of an erroneous cause can blind a man to such a degree as to make him incapable of the most elementary realistic reasoning.

"4. Magnifying the negative aspects and the problems of the Revolution and losing sight of the overall picture of our heroic people and the great things that have been achieved, or at least not seeing them in all their fullness, and minimizing the good things. This situation wore away at revolutionary conscientiousness and caused a loss of enthusiasm in the fulfillment of the tasks of the Revolution.

"5. Not being able to reason and to understand the strategy of the Revolution.

"6. Since we were looking to the past, without understanding the present -- and without being able to predict the future -- the Revolution, much greater than ourselves, passed us by and left us behind.

"And all of this spread out from this one group.

"The weakest points in this concept were, I believe, the following:

"1. Not once (as far as I know), and as I have stated, did our group make any serious analysis of the true state of our economy. Instead, the economy was analyzed, in general, without any firm basis.

"2. The whole idea collapses for lack of a basic argument if one takes into account the concept of dignity as defined by Fidel in such a grave situation as the October Crisis. And now I understand that this concept was not based on personal vanity, but rather on our Revolution's need for undisputed leadership so as to deal with the difficulties of the times we live in.

"3. The complexities of the problems involved in the socialist camp could not be understood by a simple schema without a knowledge of other facts, which was not available and could not have been obtained.

"4. The policy of principles which the Soviet Union should follow was not taken into consideration.

"In regard to the phenomenon of sectarianism, it was never understood as a historical reality necessary for the triumph of the Revolution.

"It was not understood that, because of the historical realities of the Revolution, to have followed the road Aníbal proposed would have destroyed vital unity.

"Marxism was not grasped in its truly creative sense, but was understood rather as limited to certain forms which may very well not correspond to the historic moment which demands a united people with a strong, undisputed and respected leadership with high anti-imperialist awareness, firm at all times, and willing to fight against an enemy which threatens to attack and destroy us.

"For example, the concept of internal democracy cannot be examined in the abstract but must rather be applied
to concrete circumstances." (Quesada continues.) "I believe all men have their weak points and that no one is perfect. But it is true that within the group there were comrades with moral defects which are not acceptable to socialist morality. And this was tolerated (liberalism). It is impossible to deny any cause that way. Moreover, in many cases passions fed upon resentments or frustrations, or were simply expressions of personal affection, pity or prejudice and other such feelings, of merely an inability to look ahead rather than revert to the past."

(Quesada continues.) "When one comes up against reality he can begin to reason, to slowly recover his ability to think clearly, to understand the basic notions of the Revolution's strategy and regain confidence in those whom, for historical reasons, one should never have lost faith in; to understand the error that has been committed and the need the Revolution had for putting an end to it without shilly-shallying."

(I pass on to page 14 of manuscript No. 3.)

"Toward the end I worked as a liaison between Aníbal and relatives of some of those now in custody." (When arrests had already begun, he was the contact between Aníbal and members of the families of those in custody.) "Ramiro Puertas (through his brother Julio), Octavio's family (at times I went to their home, and sometimes through his Uncle Oscar).

"I have now begun to realize certain things:

"1. The damage that these activities did to the Revolution.

"2. The just treatment given this matter by the Party.

"3. That the correct attitude of a Communist was not to lose sight of the fact that the fundamental thing for our Revolution in the present historical circumstances is the preparation for confronting imperialism, and that, because of this, unity of all anti-imperialist forces is necessary. That the worst thing a Communist can do is to rivet his attention on the past and lose confidence in the future. That Marxism cannot be interpreted as a rigid formal pattern; that some forms may be correct under certain circumstances, at definite places and times, but are not necessarily valid in others.

"It is impossible to justify a revolutionary's halting in his march while the process of Revolution is going on, nor his activities' causing difficulties for that process in practice. I have thought out the reasons for all this in order to explain it to myself. And I believe they are:

"1. A rigid ideological concept.

"2. A chain of circumstances.

"3. A large number of personal defects which explain how one can fall into this error:

"a. A nonrevolutionary idea of friendship and affection.

"b. A tolerant and weak attitude toward one's own defects and those of others.

"c. The arrogance of believing that one's own ideas are the correct ones, without attempting to test them against reality.

"d. An attitude which tends toward pessimism.

"e. Noticing others' prejudices and not one's own.

"f. An undisciplined attitude.

"g. Naiveté.

"h. Allowing emotion to blind one to reality instead of using it as a way of serving the Revolution.

"And, in addition, other defects, all of which I am becoming aware of and which explain, but do not justify, my mistake."

(Thus ends manuscript No. 3 of Quesada.)

Letter written by Aníbal Escalante to the Party leadership after his arrest

Comrades:

Please accept this autocrirical statement that I am making on my own initiative to explain to you, as the highest authority of the Party and revolutionary power, the understandings I have been able to attain and their corollaries regarding the serious actions that have led to my detention. I will try to be brief.

I should begin this autocrirical statement with a straight confession:

1. I take responsibility for the actions which have been imputed to me.

2. I accept as valid the assertion that my attitude led me into factional activity -- that is, the forming of a "microfaction" such as Comrade Fidel him-
self described.

3. I spontaneously recognize the need for the measures taken by the leadership of the Party in taking drastic action and eliminating the source of infection that was created.

But, in addition to making this express confession, I should explain something to the leadership of the Party: how I came to end up in this state of affairs, or, even better, how this negative phenomenon could have been created, what it is and where it may lead, as I understand it.

One of the questions which has been bothering me most in these days is the following: How did I, starting from a communist position (which cleaves firmly to the Revolution and which reverses the Party and its leadership), come to end up in this business of factionalism and all that goes with it? And I ask myself this question and try to justify myself (there is no justification for what I have done), but doing it because I need to explain realistically, to myself, what happened and not only get at the reason but also find the courage needed to help me aid the Party clean out all factionalism and liquidate this phenomenon which, anyway, weighs on me like a stone.

As I understand it, there are two types of causes that have contributed to the formation, first, of a factional tendency and, then, of factional activity with totally inadmissible implications which I will go into later.

The first type of cause corresponds to what might perhaps be best termed the objective situation or objective factors. It is the situation or factors which serve as a starting point for this attitude or which have nurtured it. I would like to refer to the fact that, over a long period of time, here, among ourselves, in our homeland, an aggregate of ideas, a framework through which to view the world and everything in it, an index that became dogmatic with the years and even created very precise conditioned reflexes was forged and thrived, arising from all the circumstances of its birth and its life in a world hostile to it. Everything that didn't fit in this framework, everything that didn't follow this hidebound index, and even everything that pained these conditioned reflexes had to be considered anathema. Starting in 1962, a great effort was made to clean up this state of affairs, and no few could have benefited by this effort; but I tell you it isn't easy, and it won't be easy, to overcome all these things that are admittedly worn out, dogmatic and schematic and which act as conditioned reflexes.

As far as I am concerned, my head is filled with the turmoil of clashing ideas and the crashing down of a multitude of things that up to now appeared to be irrefutable truths, or created situations which were acceptable or necessary, although, to tell the truth, I often admitted their dangerous character, or, simply, their incorrectness.

The key to most of the "discontent" lay in the "international situation." Or, I should say more plainly, each country's role in the socialist world -- concretely, the USSR's role and Cuba's role. In considering these roles, deep down, many of us have always -- as we did in the past -- worked from the outside in: from the USSR, center of the world revolution, to Cuba, a part of the world revolution, instead of working from the inside out, from Cuba, a part of the world revolution, to the USSR, a part of the world revolution -- a great part, very powerful, very respected, but no longer an isolated socialist center but rather a part of the socialist world. I am saying this without judgment on nationalism, but simply and plainly as fact. Separate, converging facts, of similar structure, but separate. A truth so simple that to some -- to many -- it seems obvious, but it is a serious problem that we must be well aware of if we want to be up-to-date in 1967, when, in addition to the USSR, there is a socialist Cuba and, of course, other socialist countries.

This may sound like a platitude, but it isn't. If we do not understand the essence of the phenomenon, we will always be looking beyond our own frontiers to see what's going on. We shall think, at every turn, that the source of truth lies outside, and we shall always be searching for it abroad, although finding the truth will never be easy in these matters of social and political sciences, which are not so exact and are always subject to so many factors.

It is understandable that, based on these ideas -- I mean fossilized ideas -- "discontent" over anything that did not fit in our scheme of things, or which resulted from hearing strong criticism of Soviet positions, would always seem natural. In the same way it always looked natural not to distinguish where Soviet citizenship -- or that of any other sister socialist nation -- ended and where our own citizenship -- with all its responsibilities -- began when considering common problems or our problems, or simply expressing our opinions.

I imagine that perhaps those who have never gone through these stratified states of mind may hesitate to admit these arguments and so may attribute what I say to the situation in which I find myself. This is understandable, but, with all due respect, it is not necessarily correct.
It is not my present situation in itself but rather a whole series of facts -- which, due to my irresponsibility, I had never stopped to consider -- and the seriousness with which others regard these facts that impel me to understand. Yes, that is what hammers at me relentlessly and adds to the crashing turmoil in my head to which I previously referred.

There are comrades of long militancy who, for countless reasons, are freer from past schematic thinking and reflexes, who are marching shoulder to shoulder with the army of the people along the right paths. There are others of us who have lagged behind. Well, it is among those who have lagged behind -- and taking into account other kinds of frustrations, even of a personal nature, and perhaps even the lack of direct encouragement or help -- that the breeding ground for this current of resistance to seeing things a new way came into being; this, at least, is the objective basis of the trend which later crystallized into factional activity.

If we take all those persons directly involved in factional activity, one by one, we would find that all of them -- with the exception of some unusual case -- would have one common denominator above all: "the international problem." That, and the "schema."

I am not attempting to justify anyone's conduct. I am only trying -- as I said before -- to understand how and why such conduct has come about.

Let us now go on to other reasons, the subjective reasons, which each person had. I will analyze mine. It seems to me that things like the following weighed heavily in my actions:

1. The rankling, obsessive idea that, even though I had accepted the events of 1962, there had been things that were not discussed with me. I considered myself a sort of "sacrificial lamb" made accountable not only for my own actions but for those of others. This idea hammered at me constantly; perhaps I did not understand the fundamental lesson of 1962, which I can now grasp more clearly: a radical change in methods, "schemata" and style. This obsession drove me to two things: to live in expectation of a discussion which could not take place and to openly express personal opinions which could only interfere with the new, more advanced unity proclaimed in 1962.

2. An evident overestimation of my ideas and even my role in the revolutionary development of the country. I don't know, consciously, I have never desired this overestimation, but it is evident that the constant expounding of such ideas alone, without taking into account the existing reality, and the eagerness to submit proposals and plans on every type of problem existing in the country, could only stem from a magnified idea of my role in our society. The origin of this, its "historic roots," can probably be found in the positive and certainly important role I played in leading the old Party to the triumphant line of armed struggle; in the prestige this may have given me among members and allies; and perhaps in my being accustomed to working at the center of things prior to and after victory, etc. And all this has led me to feel, in contrast, greatly underestimated, neglected, and even persecuted. Embittered.

3. In connection with the above, we must also note immodesty and excessive use of the word "I," "I believe," "I have ideas," "I do have opinions," etc. This -- and everything connected with that exaggerated concept of my role in society -- must have been, and in fact has been, continually fed by the "chorus" -- that is, by the constant "visits," the "consultations" on any little thing, the attending of funerals and similar events, etc., where -- in my opinion -- there was far too much praise of my supposed -- or relative -- capabilities or experience, etc.

4. Stubbornness and arrogance in holding criteria or opinions, failing to recognize that at times an idea avails only to the extent that it is brought up and discussed in an appropriate and correct manner, at the proper time, in the proper place, and among the proper persons, those who are the right ones with whom to raise and discuss it. The arrogant "freedom" to express ideas or opinions regardless of place, conditions or timeliness can only lead to confusion and anarchy, with detriment to the Party.

5. A strong dose of irresponsibility, of doing things without consulting anybody, on my own, going only by my own sense of justice, at times so limited, and forgetful that what is correct today may be incorrect tomorrow. Moreover, I was not in a position to know the whys and wherefores of many decisions, nor did I have authority of any sort to set myself up as sole judge of my actions, as there was a Party, greater than one individual, and a state to make decisions. This irresponsibility led me to make erroneous criticism, to transgress regulations, to act, and lines, to be irritated at the lack of measures of observance that resulted from my blunders, and to act, in a way, without consulting others -- above all, the Party. The same defect has made me commit acts which now weigh upon me heavily.

Mixed with all this, there must also have been a certain sense of frus-
tration, a great deal of bitterness -- as Fidel said -- and resentment, although I find it hard to accept this anomaly. To realize that I am no longer what I used to be, to feel displaced and useless "except to a few hens," to feel myself out of the mainstream of "life in this country -- all these are factors that must have filled me with bitterness; they have contributed to my errors; I was irritated and went on making mistakes. Comrades: I did not feel this way when I had the opportunity, from time to time, to speak to and consult with comrades in the leadership. Solitude -- in this sense -- has isolated me and made me bitter.

It isn't that I aspire to "vindicate" myself with great things, and much less to become a member of the leadership again. It would not be honest for me to say such a stupid thing. NO. I, myself -- in answer to César's question -- suggested the post in Italy, far from the national ado and the pressures of the old concept. For me -- and for my closest relatives -- it was a source of joy to hear that I would be sent to Turiguanó to work in the agricultural and cattle-raising programs. I would have liked to participate directly in troubleshooting work in the sugar industry by working in some sugar mill, with or without the ideas I expressed when I came back from abroad. I was fully aware that a "stage" had ended and that, at my age -- at the rate everything, events and people, was developing -- I could never "aspire" to a "return" of any sort, even one of an unusual sort. To cooperate, yes. To help out with my efforts and opinions, yes. To be put to use somewhere, as an experienced veteran, capable of being utilized in whatever task the Party decided upon, yes; to be respected and taken into consideration, yes. I have indeed wished for all this most vehemently.

I want to make it clear that this self-criticism of my defects is not to be taken for breast-beating. I do this because of a spiritual need and to help explain to the Party -- and to myself -- everything that so overwhelms me now. And if I have mentioned my isolation and aspirations as I was not to "attenuate" my self-criticism but simply to mention facts that explain my bitterness.

I want to make something else clear: I haven't had the time to gather all my thoughts together, and I cannot be exhaustive overnight.

As is known, one's mind is not freed or flooded with ideas at once. There is a process of development, and, for me, the important thing is that I am in that process. For that very reason, my statement must surely be very limited, incomplete and even disjointed. If the leadership would permit it, perhaps I could, in the near future, write a more comprehensive statement. Anyway, this statement contains the essential things I want to say.

Let us now look at my conduct, at the facts themselves.

I realize that the Party leadership did not put me in the hands of State Security because of my opinions, but rather because of my actions. I am convinced of this.

And these actions -- carried out directly by me or closely linked to me -- were as follows:

1. The formation of a certain current of opinions, on the basis of the aforementioned causes, which became gradually defined and finally led to a factional trend on the fringe of the Party -- that is, factional activity. I would dare to say that I did not seek factionalism, but facts are facts. The mechanics of bitter struggle invariably lead to factionalism. The only remedy against this is either not to become bitterly persistent in statements and discussions and accept, without subterfuge, the decisions of the center -- or, as the case may be, of the majority -- or else disband the faction and put an end to factional activities. The Party cannot tolerate any other way out.

2. Attempts and actions aimed at acting over the Party's head, such as the attempt to carry out activities around the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution on our own.

Nobody gave us such authority. It was an action outside the Party, and, regardless of whether or not it was carried out, it was a disturbing action that encouraged indiscipline. The "initiative" would have been shown up at once as ridiculous by the Party decision, around the same time, to celebrate that anniversary on a large scale.

3. The continued dissemination of ideas and positions outside the Party, often in opposition to ideas and positions of the Party itself.

These actions tended to bring about an atmosphere of factionalism.

4. Reporting to foreign comrades on ideas and positions, which included private opinions on the national process, inadmissible discussions on national and international affairs, details on the life of the nation, etc.

I wish to state that I consider it a serious matter to have discussed a matter concerning Cuba with a Soviet comrade and to have gone so far --
driven by an extreme degree of overestimation and self-sufficiency — as to admit or contemplate the thought of discussing, in the USSR, the best way for relations between the two countries to be handled.

Such actions can only be interpreted on the basis of the schema I mentioned before, complete failure to recognize that there are real national differences and, even more, an impermissible intrusion in a field where only an official voice may speak, lest friction, foreign interference, etc., be produced.

5. Tacit acceptance of the reproduction of polemical material from other parties (in contradiction to our Party).

Let me make it clear that I did not approve of the procedure, but at no time — except perhaps on two occasions — did I disapprove of it as I should have. The logical attitude should have been one of rejection and condemnation, without leniency of any sort.

6. Interference with functions of the leadership, trying to find out the opinions of leaders, giving consultations on reports, accepting reports I had no right to receive, giving advice on matters which did not concern me, etc:

This is the conduct — as I see it — for which I should be held responsible. I do not know if I have managed to express it clearly in this brief summary.

I wish to make two additional remarks:

One: that during the course of the interrogation I learned several things I had never before imagined. I honestly think that, had I heard such things outside, I would have condemned them firmly.

Two: that, for me, the entire factional activity operated as a trend, or state of opinion, and those who shared my views and opinions were only a small number of persons linked to me by close friendship. In other words, to me, the faction consists of a small group, and I can do no less than share responsibility for their actions. I say this as a point of clarification, not to look for excuses for my responsibility.

Let us look at my aims, my purposes, in all this activity so justly condemned as factional.

As a matter of fact, comrades, I did not have any program or schema of preconceived objectives.

In general, I had estimated that the whole situation would lead to some sort of discussion with me. In that case, I had planned to bring up with the leadership such matters as aspects of international policy, the situation of the ideological struggle and the Party's role, the economic plan, the problem of incentives and voluntary work, reinforcement of the sugar industry plan, the plan for grain growing, etc. I expected that the discussion announced by the Party would take place this year, to be followed up by the Congress sometime later.

In readiness for this eventuality I kept my position "alive" and made every effort to have everyone know that I "held opinions," although at times I did not express them in detail. These were the grounds for my effort to make my thinking known to others. And I felt confident that somehow I would be heard and that the strength of my arguments — and the facts of real life, which I expected to prove me right — would result in their being given some recognition.

I never told anyone of any other aim but "to wait for events to prove who was right." It was my habit to advise everyone to work at whatever task he had, to advance the Revolution there, for "life would tell the tale." Honestly, I had nothing else to say. Meanwhile I waited for my discussion. My plans for the future were vague.

Several times I thought of moving to the farm and going into isolation. I also thought of asking the Party to send me to some obscure post abroad. I saw nothing else ahead.

One might then think that I expected life to prove me right in this or that viewpoint, that I expected the leadership of the Party, forced by circumstances, to have to adopt this or that change of position. Well, but in any event I never said which circumstances would change, and, moreover, if new circumstances came about, new conditions, and the Party modified its orientation or line in some way, wouldn't that be evidence of its leadership ability?

In reality, if I have spoken of the future, it has simply been a question of waiting, of seeing whether or not time told the tale, as the saying goes, and proved me right. But when all is said and done, all of this is relative. Take the example of the sugar plan about the implementation of which I gave some ideas. The plan — according to what I saw in 1964 — is, in my opinion, quite good. But if we do not hit the 10-million-ton mark by 1970, if circumstances do not make it possible, it will not be a catastrophe but, at the very worst, a setback. Moreover, it appears to me that if by that time we produce not 10 but 8 million tons it will be a great success for the
Revolution. Furthermore, it will be evident that we will hit the 10-million-ton mark in very short order. For me to speak of these things is, of course, mere speculation, because I have no data, but it seems to me that a serious effort is being made to build up the sugar industry, and that eventually we will overcome all difficulties and achieve the 10-million-ton goal. And that is what is important. Therefore, when I spoke of time, I referred to nothing specific but to positions in general; moreover, I have said many times that I am in agreement with the general Party line, with its strategy, with its plans, etc., and that my discrepancies have been on matters of international tactics, on matters of incentives, etc. On the other hand, I am obliged to give serious consideration today, under the stimulus of life itself, to the general overhauling of my thought; it is my duty to do so.

Furthermore, I am sure that socialism is being constructed in Cuba. I am sure that we are making progress, and I know the source of our difficulties (the blockade, inexperience, etc.). I have always said that we must support the leadership of the Party and the state, something I have said to anyone who wanted to hear me. Moreover, I am convinced to the very core that this is communism, and that the Party leadership is indispensable and necessary for thousands of reasons about which I will not go into detail here. Fortunately, I have no doubt or hesitation about that. I am firmly convinced.

About my personal ambitions, aspirations? There were none. I have committed serious errors, but I have not been ambitious. I never was. And if I wasn't in the past, I certainly am not now. If I have ever spoken of personal "vindication" or anything similar, I referred to it solely in the noblest sense of the word, in the sense that Comrade Fidel spoke to me of this in 1962. To be vindicated, or put back on my feet, through work. In the struggle. In Turiguanó, for example, where I would have felt "back on my feet." Carrying out my work there -- and I would have tried to do the best work possible -- I believe that I would have succeeded in being recognized by Fidel himself. I never thought of anything but serving the Revolution. And, of course, at my age, and with certain physical problems, I do not think I would be up to the work at Turiguanó.

I have behaved badly, very badly, comrades, but I never harbored intentions that were petty or unworthy of a Communist.

Comrades, this exposition has been much too long, and so I must now conclude it.

The reason for this petition to the leadership of the Party is, above all, to aid in rooting out all traces of this matter, both ideologically and in practice.

The purpose of this petition is to aid the Party to integrate or eliminate the last scattered remnants of any type of sectarian or dogmatic resistance. If I could, I would tell all of them there is only one way, that of the Party. This is the Revolution, as it is, as it must be. Everyone to the heart of the Revolution, no one outside. All other ideas, no matter how correct they may seem abstracly (and it remains to be seen if they are) will only serve to add grist to the mill of the enemy.

In the final analysis, I make this petition to the Party leaders because I am a Communist and because what is of greatest importance, of far more importance than myself, is the Party, the Revolution, communism; these must come first.

Now I wish to present my conclusions.

With this statement of self-criticism I present myself to the leadership of the Party stating that I am aware of my mistake. I have committed serious errors, errors which are unpardonable in a Communist.

Such serious errors -- I am very well aware -- call for drastic measures, and I am going to state this to the Party, to its leaders. I am prepared to receive what I deserve and to respect in every way the Party's decisions and the Party leadership's judgment in order to end this irresponsible turmoil of factionalism and breach of discipline, for which, to a great extent, I am responsible.

Here I would sign and submit this petition.

But if the Party leaders should ask me, "What do you think of these measures? You with the grey hair, with your past record, with the name you bear, what do you think?"

In this case, and greatly concerned over not falling into new errors of over-estimation with only the title communist and to show the seriousness with which I evaluate all this, I would answer the Party leadership as follows:

In spite of everything, prepared to fulfill whatever orders I am given, I would venture to ask the Party leadership for severity, with consideration. That is, I would request them to attenuate the logical penalty to the maximum. The arguments for this could only be the sure strength of the Party and the Revolution; the great authority of its leadership; the relative weak-
ness of the factional activity; the fact that other condemnable activities did not spread, thanks to the Party's vigilance; and the fact that also, according to everyone or almost everyone, we are prepared to eliminate the remnants of this focus, even in our consciences, and so help the Party to wipe out all that remains of dogmatism and sectarianism. And I am convinced that all, or almost all, of these men can be saved to do something useful for the Party and the Revolution as ordinary citizens, after the necessary measures have been taken for political rehabilitation of those in the Party and even the others.

This is, simply, what I would request for the others.

- Aníbal Escalante suggests his own "sanction"

As far as I am concerned, no, I would not dare to ask for such kindness. Morally, I feel very responsible for all this trampling on the discipline and norms of the Party and the Revolution. I can feel it burning inside of me, like a volcano. For the first time in my life, I find myself involved in problems of a factional nature. Comrades, I myself did not realize how serious these things were; now I see them all as a whole, and it is a very painful blow to me. Moreover, they give me the feeling that I have acted in a most irresponsible manner. It is also precisely due to this blindness, this irresponsibility, that I did not, at any time, imagine that security measures would be taken against me.

Yes, and it is because of all that, because I feel indebted to the Party and I wish to pay my debt, that I do not expect to come out of this without paying as much as possible. In this connection, should the leadership of the Party say to me: "We are asking you, what is your opinion? What do you consider benign treatment for yourself?" I would answer: Assuming that you understand how I am thinking now, as well as the load weighing on my spirit, I would consider -- unless you have a better idea -- the following a benign sanction: that I be sent into seclusion, for whatever period of time the leadership may consider correct, to the El Yarey Farm (there is an isolated house to which I had expected to retire) with the express provision that no one visit me except my close relatives. There I would be obliged to work in charge of technical management of the farm and to study poultry genetics.

My wife and the rest of my family nucleus would live with me. And I would only beg you -- if this is possible -- to allow me to visit my old mother for two or three hours every month.

That I be entrusted with respecting the provisions of the sanction -- in other words, I would be in seclusion on my word of honor to the Party.

That either once and for all or else every year, on this date, I write out an analysis of self-criticism on what a Communist should not do in regard to this factional affair and on its implication and harmful effects, and turn it over to the Party leadership.

The sanction would be, of course, both severe and instructive. In addition, the years to come must be marvelous years, and being kept in seclusion, separated from the mainstream -- being, as one is, a revolutionary, and not having any other point of view but this, our own, that of the Revolution and communism -- would be really hard to bear.

For me, the sanction would be -- in certain respects -- a benign one, for the following reasons:

1. Because I would be able to serve it, shall we say, in the company of and aided by my family.

2. Because it would still permit me to work on something useful to the state, doing something I like and working in a subject requiring serious study. Moreover, even if I was not in direct contact with the outside, I would feel more like a part of the Revolution, of the people on the march.

3. Because, at the same time, it would make it possible for me not to see anybody, at least anybody who was not a member of my family or a worker or a technician of the farm and the enterprise.

This is not a sudden attack of misanthropy but simply a desire, deep inside of me, to be alone -- I should rather say isolated -- in order to meditate, carry out self-analysis, and have the opportunity to concentrate my thoughts on this whole affair and other things connected with the theory and practice of our cause.

Therefore, what I would suggest as a benign sanction -- should the leadership of the Party authorize me to do so -- would not be orthodox; neither can it be conceived within orthodox canons, but I would ask, How many things has the Revolution done -- and very successfully, by the way -- by not going by the books? And wouldn't this be a good way to give a lesson on how Communists settle these problems? And wouldn't the fact that I was my own guardian, responsible to the Party and the state, set a precedent for a new moral standard, a new type of social responsibility, of the new material and moral order we are now building? Wouldn't it be something akin to a look into the future, a way to show what the future will be like
in these matters of infringement and indiscipline?

Comrades, I still don't know whether or not this is an absurd idea. I don't know if it may be taken for demagogy or for a desire to seem different from others. I do not know, but speak to you with absolute sincerity. This is because I recognize all my errors, I am deeply repentant for having committed them and my only desire is to settle my debt to the Party in the most exemplary and dignified way possible. I leave nothing behind me. I consider myself an honest man. I am a convinced Communist. I believe in this new concept of morals. Future experiences will demonstrate to you whether or not, in this painful hour, I have been acting honestly toward the Party, toward communism and toward the Revolution, and even toward my own children, whom I wish to help to be better.

At any rate, should you consider this part of my conclusions as another error, I beg you to excuse me. An excuse could be found in my enormous confusion and my desire -- created by my communist conviction -- to undo my errors in any possible manner.

I write this letter to you, Comrade Fidel, and to you, comrades members of the Party leadership, and -- since you are all men of action -- I ask not for pity but rather for a little understanding, if such a thing is possible. I have nothing else to say. I am at your command!

Aníbal Escalante

(This letter needs no comment, except the clarification that only a few days afterward Aníbal sent a letter to the Political Bureau suggesting the way he believed sectarianism, dogmatism, etc., could be eradicated. Therefore, if anybody is interested, if some Secretary of the Party in the provinces wants to learn "wise man" Aníbal's method, we place it at his service.)

This Commission wishes only to get on the record that it does not believe in the sincerity of the man in custody. He did not tell the whole truth, and many of his affirmations are self-justifications and falsehoods.

The total number of implicated persons arrested was 43, among them four women who were later sent home to remain under house arrest. The same treatment was given to three men for reasons of health.

This is what we wanted to tell the Central Committee, so that whatever decisions considered correct may be taken.

I have finished the report submitted by the Armed Forces and State Security Commission of the Central Committee of the Party.

[The End.]

FRANZ J.T. LEE FACED WITH DEPORTATION TO SOUTH AFRICA

The German youth organization SDS [Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentebund -- German Socialist Students League] has taken up the defense of the anti-apartheid fighter Franz J.T. Lee, who is threatened with deportation from West Germany to his native South Africa.

SDS has become internationally known for its role in mobilizing ever larger numbers of German youth in militant protests against authoritarianism and oppression. On February 18, it was host in West Berlin to an international youth demonstration of 20,000 against the war in Vietnam, the largest demonstration of its kind in that city since the demonstrations against Hitler.

The SDS national leadership issued a statement February 24 "sharply protesting the action of the South African Ministry of the Interior in refusing to renew the passport of the 'colored' South African student and doctoral candidate Franz J.T. Lee."

The SDS called attention to the dangers facing Lee if he is returned: "The South African government, which represses all opposition to its apartheid policy, is now seeking to silence all opponents of racism outside the sphere of its control. The case of Dr. Neville Alexander, who received his degree at the University of Tübingen, is an example of what return to South Africa means for oppositionist students. He was sentenced to ten years in prison in 1964 for his opposition to the Suppression of Communist Act and the Sabotage Act."

Lee was a political associate of Dr. Alexander in South Africa. A year before the arrest of Dr. Alexander and his companions, Lee left South Africa to study in West Germany. Since their imprisonment he has been active in defense work in their behalf.
ZENGAKUREN STUDENTS SPEARHEAD PROTEST AGAINST SUPersonic AIRPORT

The Sampa Rengo faction of the Zengakuren were the center of attention in Japan February 26 when they spearheaded a militant demonstration against the construction of a new airport near Tokyo large enough to accommodate supersonic military planes.

The opposition to building the airport began with protests from farmers to be dispossessed from their ancestral lands. They organized the Sumisuka-Shibayama Joint New International Airport Opposition League and appealed for help from the Socialist and Communist parties. But when these organizations proved ineffective because of their lack of militancy, the farmers turned to the Zengakuren. They responded to the appeal, since the projected construction of the big airport obviously dovetailed with the consistent efforts of the Japanese government to militarize the country as an ally of American imperialism.

The demonstration of some 1,500 participants started about 3:30 p.m. after a rally at the Narita Municipal Baseball Stadium. As the crowd proceeded down its route, some 900 Zengakuren students suddenly turned in a different direction and sought to storm the Narita branch offices of the New Tokyo International Airport Corporation, the builder of the supersonic airport.

Police stationed there, met the charge of the students and then retreated under a shower of stones which were supplied by coeds to the male students. The students even wrested shields from the police. Rocks smashed the windows of the corporation's offices.

Finally the police countercharged and drove the students down the slope. After reforming, the students returned the charge.

The police reported 418 officers and 43 students injured.

During the night, the students stayed as guests at the homes of farmers. They intended to continue the demonstration the following day.

However, some 16,000 police were drawn up in tight cordons around the offices of the building company.

In face of this array of force, the farmers persuaded the students not to go ahead. They said they could not stand to see any more students injured.

Katsuyuki Akiyama, leader of the student demonstrators affiliated with the militant Sampa Rengo faction of the Zengakuren, bowed to the wishes of the farmers. But he said, "We will come back for a big protest rally scheduled March 9."

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